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Mainstreaming SALW, Landmine, and ERW Issues in Development and Humanitarian Processes and Institutions

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NOTE

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SUMMARY

This paper is concerned with how the European Union can support humanitarian and development agencies to address more effectively issues related to small arms and light weapons, landmines and explosive remnants of war. It will place these in relation to global trends in the development field, particularly those related to security and development; lessons that can be learned from pitfalls and practice of mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity; and lessons learned on the development of institutional capacity and strategic alliances.

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MAINSTREAMING SALW, LANDMINE, AND ERW ISSUES IN DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN PROCESSES AND INSTITUTIONS

Andrew Sherriff

INTRODUCTION

This paper is concerned with how the European Union (EU) can support humanitarian and development agencies to address more effectively issues related to small arms and light weapons (SALW), landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW) (to be known hereafter collectively as SALW/L/ERW). It will place these in relation to global trends in the development field, particularly those related to security and development; lessons that can be learned from pitfalls and practice of mainstreaming of conflict sensitivity; and lessons learned on the development of institutional capacity and strategic alliances.

Box 1. Definitions of humanitarian and development agencies and macro-processes

The terms humanitarian and development agencies are imprecise and cover a broad gamut of organizations with varying capabilities, experience, mandates and resources. In this paper, humanitarian and development agencies cover organizations that are international in nature and have either a humanitarian or social/economic development mandate. The humanitarian and development agencies referred to in this piece will cover agencies linked to EU institutions—for example EuropeAid, European Commission Delegations, Directorate General for Development (DG Dev), and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO)—and also bilateral development and humanitarian institutions/arms of EU member states—for example the UK Department for International Development (DfID), Development Cooperation Ireland, Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), Belgium Directorate-General for Development Cooperation, and so on. It will also be used to cover UN agencies and institutions (the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the World Food Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, other members of the United Nations Development Group and so forth), and non-governmental organizations (for example Oxfam, Caritas, Save the Children, *Médecins sans Frontières* and so on). National and local agencies in the development and humanitarian fields are for the most important actors promoting sustainable development. However, the remit of this paper is to focus on those that are international in nature, hence the use of the acronym IDHA for international development and humanitarian agencies.

Macro-processes of development and humanitarianism are multi-stakeholder strategic initiatives undertaken at the country level. They are designed to promote and enable greater coherence and impact in addressing developmental and humanitarian challenges. Examples in the development sphere include Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and National Development Processes (NDPs), and in the humanitarian sphere the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP).

The EU and analysts in the field have recognized the cross-cutting nature of SALW/L/ERW for some time. The causes and dynamics of violent conflict are a complex mix of socio-cultural, economic, political, and security factors that are usually prevalent in inter-linked local, national and regional levels. Specifically focused and narrowly defined SALW/L/ERW efforts cannot hope to address conflict and development alone. Therefore such efforts that are linked or integrated into wider peace-building and development processes have a better chance of a sustainable impact. The management and implementation of this more comprehensive approach is much harder in practice.

The transformation of violent conflict into sustainable peace and the establishment of the rule of law must be predominately the role of national political institutions and the societies in conflict themselves. However, international development and humanitarian agencies (IDHA) have a powerful set of resources and experience that can be used to support this end. A creative mix of approaches addressing not only the consequences of SALW/L/ERW, but also the causes of violent conflict is required for maximizing the full leverage of the EU and European institutions on any situation directly, or indirectly through the international community. The importance of this type of multi-dimensional approach has been noted time and time again in EU policy statements from the *European Security Strategy*,¹ to the *EU Programme of Action on the Prevention of Violent Conflict*² and the *Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention*.³ It has also been noted in more specific EU policies and actions in regard to SALW/L/ERW.⁴

GLOBAL TRENDS AFFECTING DEVELOPMENT AND HUMANITARIAN FIELDS

It may be tempting to conclude that policy trends on the global scale have very little to do with the day-to-day operational considerations of IDHA. These trends do, however, dictate higher political focus, the allocation of financial resources as well as the policy parameters that IDHA and specifically the European Commission (EC) must work within. In recent years, specific global trends have had an important impact within the development and humanitarian fields, and therefore have had an effect on SALW/L/ERW related issues. This paper groups and outlines four.

The drivers and entry points for IDHA engagement on SALW/L/ERW are impacted by these macro political agendas, which at times conflict, but are not always mutually exclusive. Indeed, sometimes they coexist uneasily within EU member state government bureaucracies (and EU institutions). These agendas are referred to in this paper as the renewed security agenda (RSA), the conflict prevention to peace-building agenda (CPPA), the human security agenda (HSA), and the poverty-focused development agenda (PFDA). Development institutions and donor governments more widely tend to be affected to a greater or lesser degree by each agenda, with the RSA having more weight with Foreign and Defence Ministries and the PFDA having more weight with development agencies.⁵ In the case of European institutions, this means that the RSA is more prevalent within the Council Secretariat and the Directorate General for External Relations (DG Relex) while the PFDA has more weight with DG Dev and ECHO. Although in recent years it is also important to note that the EU and European institutions have made considerable progress in developing and advancing the CPPA.⁶

Renewed security agenda

The renewed security agenda implicitly or explicitly promotes the primacy of “national security”, that is the security of the state as the central concern (rather than security of the individual). The RSA views development and humanitarian action as assisting in the promotion of national security goals.⁷ Undoubtedly the catalyst for the re-emergence of this agenda were the 11

September 2001 attacks, and the resulting response in terms of the “Global War on Terror”. However, the heritage of this approach (if not the specific issues engaged within it) dates from the Cold War, hence the terminology of the renewed security agenda. While the RSA may be dominant within the overarching approach to current international relations, it is highly influential but not dominant within the humanitarian and development spheres.

Conflict prevention to peace-building agenda

The conflict prevention to peace-building agenda is not nearly as powerful globally as the RSA, but is of particular interest because it is relevant to a wide range of SALW/L/ERW issues. The recent move from conflict prevention to more “strategic” and comprehensive “peace-building”, particularly by multilateral and bilateral development agencies and the United Nations and European Union, is why the agenda is named as such. The key original drivers for the conflict prevention to peace-building agenda were the original UN Agenda for Peace, the post-Cold War “new world order”, the Rwandan genocide, intervention experience (in the Balkans, Cambodia and Mozambique), and the fact that many focus countries for development and humanitarian assistance were experiencing violent conflict. An additional factor is the supposed “cost efficiency” of conflict prevention. There has been more reflection on the experience of implementation over the last ten years, with a desire to learn and consolidate lessons. The key messages emerging from this reflection seem to be that there is a need to move from specific conflict prevention/reduction activities, to a wider and deeper “peace-building” approach, based on sound analysis, local ownership and tackling systematically the drivers of conflict and instability utilizing the full range of tools available.

Human security agenda

The human security agenda affirms the importance of addressing the security of the individual, either expressed in terms of “freedom from fear” or “freedom from want” or both. It contains many elements of the CPPA and re-affirms the PFDA (see below) as a way of promoting “freedom from want”. Since the mid-1990s, the HSA has been closely associated with SALW and landmine issues. It has enjoyed something of a renaissance due to the work of the Commission on Human Security, the UN High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and the UN Secretary General as well as the work of development international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and some official bilateral development institutions see the HSA as a way of articulating an alternative global security agenda to the one dominated by the RSA.⁸ Its heritage derives from work on human development, the UN Agenda for Peace, and the 1994 Human Development Report. It was originally championed by Lloyd Axworthy, the Canadian Foreign Minister, and the Japanese government. The terminology (if not a shared understanding and follow-through to implementation) is now firmly embedded in many bilateral, multilateral, and INGO policy documents, and can also be found within the EC.

Poverty-focused development agenda

This agenda affirms the primacy of poverty alleviation and a commitment to the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It is usually a powerful agenda within many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee (OECD–DAC) and EU member state official development agencies, but not across all EU member state government agencies. The PFDA is also very strongly championed by most development and humanitarian INGOs. Aspects of the good governance agenda advanced within the MDGs are very relevant to SALW/L/ERW. The PFDA heritage comes from the post-Cold War “poverty

alleviation” consensus, and more recently the MDGs and the Monterey Declaration. There have been a number of attempts in recent years to draw the line of causality between poverty and SALW and landmines therefore aligning these issues more directly with PFDA. Some of these attempts are more convincing than others, but it is unlikely and unadvisable that SALW/L/ERW will ever be fully embraced as a critical and central poverty issue (such as health or education). There are undoubtedly links between poverty and SALW/L/ERW, but the linkages only make sense within a much wider frame of reference.⁹

IDHA CONCERNS

There is concern among IDHA that resources and political will be, at best, diverted from poverty alleviation by the RSA. At worst, actions pursued in the course of the RSA directly undermine poverty alleviation and global stability.¹⁰ While these points can of course be debated, the reaction against the RSA is very pronounced from many humanitarian and development agencies. The *European Security Strategy* advocates a strategic response that would apply “to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities”¹¹ has caused concern amongst some IDHA. CONCORD, the umbrella organization of EU INGOs with an interest in development, promoted a “manifesto for development” during the European Parliament elections of 2004 that called for the, “Protect[ion of] the integrity of development cooperation or humanitarian aid against subordination to EU external relations policy and the Common Foreign and Security Policy in the context of negotiation and implementation of the draft EU Constitution and the EU Security Doctrine, as well as in the budgetary reform under the multi-annual financial framework.”¹² The EC itself has an internal institutional difference of opinion (if not openly expressed) regarding what agenda should dominate in relation to development and humanitarian priorities.

A structural barrier to IDHA engagement on SALW issues was recently removed in the OECD–DAC. This was when the forum (for which all EU bilateral development agencies and the Commission are members) explicitly agreed that spending toward the “controlling, preventing and reducing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons” could be designed as Official Development Assistance (ODA).¹³ There was concern among INGOs (and some bilateral agencies) that the definition of ODA included many more and “harder” security-related issues. In the end, while some security sector reform (SSR), civilian oversight of security expenditure and civil society engagement on security issues was agreed as ODA, the definition of ODA was not extended into areas such as funding capacity-building in counterterrorism activities. Any expansion into the area of counterterrorism has been strongly resisted by European non-governmental organizations (NGOs) however the likelihood of this occurring was never strong given the resistance of some OECD–DAC members themselves.¹⁴

Clearly, if the EU or EC engagement with SALW/L/ERW is merely seen as part or a subset of the RSA, it will dissuade many of the most capable and able IDHA from becoming involved or associated with it. It will also be a missed opportunity to genuinely address SALW/L/ERW within a broader development and peace-building framework. While certain development and humanitarian agencies remain wary of some aspects of the CPPA or HSA they are considerably more comfortable working with it than the RSA. Some IDHA are concerned that the CPPA and HSA agendas dilute rather than reinforce PFDA and humanitarian principles.¹⁵ However, these concerns are relatively minor when compared to the angst over the RSA.

CONFLICT-SENSITIVITY AND SALW/L/ERW

Since the 1990s those concerned with the CPPA have turned their attention to the role that development and humanitarian action can play in addressing the structural and proximate causes of violent conflict.¹⁶ There has been an increasing realization that development and humanitarian activities can have a negative impact as well as a positive impact on conflict dynamics. A significant amount of work has been undertaken to develop and promote methodologies and ways of working that seek to avoid negative and enhance positive impacts on conflict. This work is often referred to “conflict-sensitive approaches” or “peace and conflict impact assessment” (PCIA).¹⁷

New European action on SALW/L/ERW could benefit from learning from PCIA and conflict-sensitive approaches. Yet the actual use and operationalization of these approaches on the ground to inform EU member state and EC programming has been scant.¹⁸ Some actors still presume that any SALW/L/ERW initiative, programme or project, by its very nature, will have a positive impact on conflict dynamics. This, however, is not the case. Premature weapons collection that does not take into account wider conflict dynamics can encourage an escalation in violence. Not understanding fully the developmental context can result in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes in which the reintegration is unrealistic or fuels resentment and tension as ex-combatants get a “better deal” than non-combatants. Capacity-building programmes of national governments to address small arms issues can result in heavy-handed security measures that infringe on human rights. National civil society organizations can be encouraged by internationals to take on small arms advocacy programmes aimed at national governments, resulting in putting themselves at considerable personal risk and also complicating future SALW action. Incorrectly timed weapons collection programmes can also put staff of IDHA at direct risk. Using ex-combatants to clear landmines in some settings may contribute to a reduction in tension, while a rise in others. These are but a few examples in which with the best intention SALW/L/ERW programmes are planned and implemented “conflict insensitively”.

Table 1. Conflict sensitivity explained¹⁹

Definition of conflict sensitivity	
Conflict sensitivity is the capacity of an organization to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • understand the (conflict) context in which it operates; • understand the interaction between its operations and the (conflict) context; and • act upon that understanding of this interaction in order to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts of the intervention on the (conflict) context. 	
The “what” and “how” of conflict sensitivity	
What to do	How to do it
Understand the context in which you operate.	Carry out a conflict analysis, and update it regularly.
Understand the interaction between your intervention and the context.	Link the conflict analysis with the programme cycle of your intervention.
Use this understanding to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts.	Plan, implement, monitor and evaluate your interventions in a conflict-sensitive fashion (including redesign when necessary).

There is no way that success can automatically be guaranteed for SALW/L/ERW initiatives. However, there is a way in which to make better informed and more holistic choices by undertaking them “conflict sensitively”. This does not mean changing the overarching purpose of any SALW/L/ERW initiative, but rather that they should be adapted to be conflict sensitive. This means ensuring that all SALW/L/ERW geographic or thematic strategies, programmes and projects are planned, implemented and evaluated with their (direct and indirect) impact on wider issues of violent conflict (and peace-building) as a key consideration.

MAINSTREAMING SALW/L/ERW—ALWAYS APPROPRIATE FOR HUMANITARIAN AND DEVELOPMENT AGENCIES AND PROCESSES?

A recent vogue in the development field is to note that thematic issues are cross-cutting and inter-linked and should be dealt with as such. This means in relation to SALW/L/ERW that:

- Rather than having a discrete SALW/L/ERW project, there should be an overarching development country strategy that includes SALW/L/ERW as cross-cutting issues in other sectors.
- Rather than (or in addition to) having a specialist unit for SALW/L/ERW issues, have a SALW/L/ERW expert advising on all programming and projects.
- Rather than (or in addition to) having a small arms expert, have all staff SALW/L/ERW trained and utilizing operational guidance to engage on the issue.

While there is a seductive logic to this approach, the reality is much more complicated. This process of ensuring an issue is placed within wider strategic and institutional processes is known as “mainstreaming”.

Mainstreaming is a comprehensive process, which ensures that an issue and approach is systematically addressed across all strategies, programmes and initiatives undertaken by any agency (for example EuropeAid) or process (for example a Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper/Country Strategy Paper). Mainstreaming is based on an understanding that a partial, isolated or piecemeal approach to the issue would be at best ineffective and at worst counterproductive. Mainstreaming has many different elements, including a significant amount of internal institutional awareness-raising and capacity-building within organizations. Mainstreaming has progressed furthest within the cross-cutting issues of gender and environment, though progress is still needed. The European Community Development policy statement of 2000 identifies a number of cross-cutting themes including human rights, environmental issues and equality between men and women. There is also now special attention to crisis management and conflict prevention issues.²⁰

Despite the current vogue for mainstreaming, it is questionable how relevant and useful blanket “mainstreaming” of SALW/L/ERW actually would be for the development and humanitarian field and the EU more particularly. Institutional mainstreaming is a costly and time-consuming process. It would seem for many agencies that there are other more pertinent issues to mainstream (gender, “rights-based approaches to development”, conflict sensitivity and so forth). However, what would be the cost-benefit of doing this and how might it be approached? Without a clear answer to these questions, IDHA should not be compelled or required on a blanket basis to engage in SALW/L/ERW mainstreaming (as a condition of EU/EC funding, or as a policy requirement). Indeed this would be wholly counterproductive. There is also a clamour to mainstream many issues within macro-development and humanitarian processes. A clearer case can be made for mainstreaming “conflict sensitivity” across all institutions, agencies and processes

in the development and humanitarian sphere operating in areas impacted by violent conflict or where it is a threat. There is certainly a case for greater awareness of SALW/L/ERW related issues within the processes of mainstreaming conflict sensitivity.²¹ Such as ensuring that EU conflict assessment frameworks designed to promote conflict sensitivity adequately addressed SALW/L/ERW issues, or that country strategies for peace-building pay due attention to SALW/L/ERW. At present this is not the case within the EC although some progress has been made.

MAINSTREAMING WITHIN MACRO-PROCESSES

In recent years there have been moves within the development and humanitarian community to be more strategic and coherent at the country level through the development of macro multi-stakeholder processes. Two of these deserve special attention because of their comprehensive acceptance, endorsement and promotion by the EC and EU member states. One, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper is focused on the overall development of individual countries and often closely aligned with national development processes. The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are at considerable pains to emphasize that it is not their process, but rather that of the national government. The EC's National Indicative Programme (NIP) and Country Strategy Paper (CSP) approach is required to be specifically linked and anchored within the PRSP. The second macro approach is focused on humanitarian action, and is the UN-led Consolidated Appeals Process. Significantly, these processes involve multiple stakeholders and multiple issues.

Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers and National Development Processes

There are many opportunities in which SALW/L/ERW issues not only relate to PRSP goals but could also interconnect with other wider issues in the good governance, health, economic development and education sectors. There is currently research underway within the World Bank on how conflict sensitivity could be mainstreamed with PRSP, which could also provide insight in terms of SALW/L/ERW issues.²²

Box 2. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers²³

Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) describe a country's macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programmes to promote growth and reduce poverty, as well as associated external financing needs. PRSPs are prepared by governments through a participatory process involving civil society and development partners, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

In some countries, national development processes and strategies are closely aligned with PRSP, while in other countries the national development plans are more distinct. The adoption in each country of a national strategy for development is a cause currently being championed by the UN Secretary-General.²⁴ National strategies could also have SALW/L/ERW mainstreamed within them. This will very much be up to the national government concerned in most cases. If there are major SALW/L/ERW issues in any given country and if civil society is engaged then it may be appropriate for an external agency to use its political support to encourage the acceptance of SALW/L/ERW. However, action related to SALW/L/ERW will have to be owned and pushed by national authorities for it to be successful.

Humanitarian Consolidated Appeals Process

The Consolidated Appeals Process and associated agencies put a high value on the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence. In this regard, while “mine action” is already covered by the CAP process, SALW is not.

The EC and EU member states are significant contributors to the CAP process. In 2004 the EC was the second largest donor in real dollar terms, and EU member states made up seven of the top 10 donors measured as a percentage of their gross domestic product.²⁵ ECHO strategy for 2005 also carries a clear commitment to improving CAP.

Box 3. The Consolidated Appeals Process explained²⁶

The CAP is much more than an appeal for money. It is an inclusive and coordinated programme cycle of:

- strategic planning leading to a Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP);
- resource mobilization (leading to a Consolidated Appeal or a Flash Appeal);
- coordinated programme implementation;
- joint monitoring and evaluation;
- revision, if necessary; and
- reporting on results.

The CHAP is a strategic plan for humanitarian response in a given country or region and includes the following elements:

- common analysis of the context in which humanitarian action takes place;
- assessment of needs;
- best, worst, and most likely scenarios;
- stakeholder analysis, that is, who does what and where;
- clear statement of longer-term objectives and goals;
- prioritized response plans; and
- framework for monitoring the strategy and revising it if necessary.

Despite its comprehensive nature, SALW is not mentioned in the CAP in 2004. There are probably good reasons for this. Firstly dealing with SALW is perceived to be a good deal more “political” than mine action. Therefore it is less likely to be seen as meeting the humanitarian criteria of neutrality and impartiality. Many humanitarians feel that the CAP already covers too many issues that are not “strictly humanitarian” by their interpretation. Secondly, contributions to CAP have been declining. By October 2004, only 52% of overall needs were met. Mine action needs were only 40% covered.²⁷ In this climate those involved with CAP have no desire to see it enlarged to encompass another issue, and an expensive one at that.

Therefore while there is significant merit in continuing to support mine action through the CAP (even increasing support where appropriate) there is less merit in supporting SALW or seeking its inclusion. While it may be possible to envisage some SALW activities as meeting humanitarian criteria, when SALW is linked to DDR or SSR (as often they should be) or wider governance reforms, it becomes even less likely that they would meet “neutrality” and “impartiality” test. If the EU or EC’s overall engagement on SALW is closely aligned with the RSA

or is perceived as such, there would be even greater resistance within the humanitarian community (including ECHO) to any inclusion of it within the CAP. An aggressive push by the Commission or EU member states to include SALW in the CAP would be counterproductive and would likely alienate other agencies, but many within humanitarian departments and units associated with the Commission (for example ECHO, DG Dev) and certain member states.

In summary, it would seem logical that given the cross-cutting nature of SALW/L/ERW, they should be sensitively included within macro development processes (such as PRSP and National Development Processes). Indeed, supporting advocacy efforts that utilize evidence-based policy research on SALW/L/ERW issues to ensure that these issues are properly addressed by the EC and host governments within PRSP and NDP could have much more of an impact than individual SALW/L/ERW projects. This should occur beyond the inception and consultation phase to the crucial implementation and evaluation phases.

It is not appropriate to push for the inclusion of SALW within CAP. This does not mean that nothing can be learned from the process and implementation of CAP in terms of how to be more strategic with SALW. A reflection on the issues, challenges and successes of including mine action within CAP would be useful. SALW activities that are “complementary” to the CAP process but not included within it could be supported and encouraged by the EU and EC.

There are a great many development issues vying for inclusion within PRSP. Thus, inclusion of SALW/L/ERW may amount to little more than a few paragraphs in many cases. While this does represent an important political statement and also a hook on which to hang programming to mobilize and allocate resources, it does not represent the comprehensive strategic engagement on SALW/L/ERW. It is also the case that in many settings where concerted action on SALW/L/ERW is required, such development macro-processes are not fully functioning. Additionally and significantly, as SALW/L/ERW issues are often cross-border and regional in nature, they require a more regional solution. The EC, with its Regional Indicative Programmes (RIP) in Africa, already has a useful tool it could deploy to engage holistically on SALW/L/ERW matters within larger efforts aimed at conflict prevention.²⁸

New comprehensive macro multi-stakeholder processes

While in no way detracting from the importance of ensuring that SALW/L/ERW are covered within macro development processes such as PRSP and NDP, something both more comprehensive (in terms of bringing in wider related security and governance issues) yet focused (on peace-building) is required. This is particularly true in countries emerging from conflict where there may be no PRSP or NDP. CSP, PRSP and NDP often do not cover wider issues related to conflict prevention, peace agreements, security, policing, border controls, SSR, DDR, rule of law and justice, and even peacekeeping, yet these are the issues that are highly relevant to a more holistic approach to SALW/L/ERW.

In 2004 the UN High-level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change called for the establishment of a Peace-building Commission and a Peace-building Support Office.²⁹ This proposal for a UN Peace-building Commission has been supported by the EC.³⁰ Another report in 2004 noted the “strategic deficit” in the international community’s support to peace-building, including the creative mixing of security, political, socio-economic, and justice and reconciliation measures to promote sustainable peace. The overview report authored by Dan Smith, *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peace-building: Getting Their Act Together* (also known as the Utstein

study), was based on an extensive study of three EU member states' (Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom) and Norway's bilateral efforts in peace-building.³¹

The UN High-level Panel report and the Utstein study indicate that a new strategic country- and/or regional-based framework for peace-building (incorporating all security, governance and development issues) would be desirable. It would be imperative that SALW/L/ERW issues are properly incorporated into any framework that is developed and utilized in the future. It is also important that the EU and the EC take an active role in the development and implementation of any multi-stakeholder strategic framework for peace-building, including adapting where necessary existing CSP/NIP processes.

Box 4. Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program in the greater Great Lakes region³²

The Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program (MDRP) is an interesting initiative because it includes SALW within a wider process that has multiple donors and operational agencies. The size of the financial resources being devoted to it (over US\$ 350 million pledged) is administered by the World Bank but with significant resources from EU members. Clearly agencies interested in the region came to the conclusion that the security and development challenge was too encompassing, expensive (and possibly too risky) to embark upon alone. The initiative is not without its critics and detractors in terms of its efficacy, focus and operational relevance. Its success is also largely held hostage by the ups and downs of the wider political peace process in the region. This could lead to the conclusion that the success and failure of even the most well thought out integrative security-development initiatives in some circumstances is largely dependent upon higher political and diplomatic factors. These factors exist outside the ability of IDHA to impact directly. It would seem that even as large a process as MDRP would benefit from being placed within a wider strategic framework for peace-building.

Any new macro strategic "peace-building" framework must ensure appropriate national ownership as well as draw on local evidence-based policy research. The processes and practice of stakeholder consultation and expert input into existing macro-frameworks (and for that matter CSP) is inadequate, and any new processes should not replicate these flaws.³³

HOW TO DEVELOP INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY

While macro-strategic processes are important, they are not where the day-to-day implementation of SALW/L/ERW-related programmes and projects happen. Programmes and projects are ultimately implemented by institutions, or coalitions of institutions. As noted, it is not appropriate for most development or humanitarian agencies to develop a comprehensive process for the mainstreaming of SALW/L/ERW issues. Yet if IDHA do wish to take on the issue of SALW/L/ERW in more depth, they will either have to either draw on existing capacity, develop new capacity, or seek to bring capacity in from elsewhere. Engaging with SALW/L/ERW without appropriate expertise would be likely to fail. Some IDHA have already developed their capacity, or are partly through processes of this development, such as by hiring SALW advisers or developing training programmes.


Experience shows that efforts to develop appropriate institutional capacity is more than the development of specific tools, training, and recruitment of specialist staff, or advocating for the

handling of SALW/L/ERW issues in partnerships with external agencies. These can be aspects of capacity development, but they need to be added and be equal to the scale of the commitment to engage on SALW/L/ERW issues.

To fully develop institutional capacity in SALW/L/ERW an organization must have institutional commitment, including a willingness to make changes in organizational culture and institutional structures and procedures; support for internal capacity development; conducive relations with external parties; and have accountability mechanisms. Importantly, engaging directly or indirectly in SALW/L/ERW issues must be related to any institution's mandate and identity. If not, SALW/L/ERW will be "bolt-on issues", seen as following either a high political agenda that is not embraced by the agency or as a move to gain financial resources. Neither of these form the bedrock of good programming.

Effective development of institutional capacity within an agency requires a strategy, a plan, resources, skills and incentives. A partial approach with key elements missing (even if others are in place) will be unsuccessful (as illustrated in Figure 1).

Figure 1. Successful and unsuccessful approaches to the development of institutional capacity in SALW/L/ERW³⁴



The following aspects would be:

Strategy. Institutional strategy and guiding overarching policy statement related to SALW, landmines and ERW and clarity on key definitions and approach.

Plan. Individual country strategies, and departmental/unit annual plans for the issues.

Resources. Human resources, resources to develop training, financial resources to invest in capacity internally, and use as leverage externally, resources to development effective knowledge management and sharing of learning on SALW/L/ERW issues.

Skills. Skills of and awareness of staff in relation to SALW/L/ERW issues (not just specialists), analytical and decision-making tools and operational guidance (such as the Conflict Assessments including SALW/L/ERW).

Incentives. Incentives and disincentives for departments, units and individuals to develop SALW/L/ERW capabilities and to implement programmes to a high standard.

Additionally, these components of institutional capacity must complement each other. For example, training in SALW/L/ERW issues would be useful for the staff of IDHA (such as EC Delegations). However, training in SALW/L/ERW directly related to a needs-assessment process, linked in itself to the design of the overall development of the CSP that would also gain recognition from senior management, would be much more effective. Integrative approaches that place SALW/L/ERW within existing policies, procedures, training, and appraisal mechanisms will be more successful and less administratively costly in the long run than stand-alone initiatives.

Too often in the development and humanitarian field, institutional capacity-building efforts are not strategically linked. Resources are found (for example, special staff are appointed) but there is no plan. Or, a strategy and plan are developed but there are no resources (financial or human) to make it happen. Or, operational guidance to assist making tangible day-to-day programming decisions is absent. Or, very commonly, incentives and disincentives for follow-through are confused or non-existent, therefore it is “business as usual”.

Developing institutional capacity for SALW/L/ERW requires clear focal points of specialist expertise and mechanisms for cross-organizational learning. For larger IDHA operating in multiple settings, it would include learning between regional and policy departments in headquarters and the field. Effective institutional development requires both leadership from the top, and respect for knowledge, experience and insight coming from the lower levels of the organization, particularly those closest to the ground.³⁵

Developing institutional capacity requires clear benchmarks and targets that are qualitative as well as quantitative. For example, in a related area the EC requires all CSP to be checked against a “root causes” of conflict indicators. While this process is a laudable attempt to develop capacity in conflict sensitivity, there are questions concerning the level of analysis, the quality of the analysis tool, the time spent on this process, the higher-level political commitment to drive through changes, and whether the Commission has the number of specialist staff available to make this process effective. The Commission itself has a problem with staffing, particularly “in country”. By the end of 2004 the Commission will had 4.8 staff to manage every €10 million distributed, which still places it near the bottom of a table relative to other EU member states that are members of the OECD–DAC.³⁶ In some countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, one Delegation staff member may manage an EC portfolio ranging from health and human rights to landmines.

DEVELOPING OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE

There is no substitute for comprehensive issue-based and regional-specific research, needs assessments and stakeholder consultations, although general operational guidance should not be seen as a quick fix to avoid these steps. As noted above, the employment of those with particular expertise and training have a role in building capacity, however there is also a utility in developing written operational guidance. Appropriate operational guidance will assist non-specialists (such as

the vast majority of those working for the Commission and EU member state agencies at headquarters and field levels) in making better-informed choices regarding SALW/L/ERW.

Those working in IDHA have no desire to be unprofessional or unethical in their implementation, yet they may not necessarily have the skills and insight needed for effective SALW/L/ERW programming, or to link SALW/L/ERW with other sectors. The complexity of the political, social and economic contexts in which conflict and SALW/L/ERW issues arise can overwhelm implementers in the humanitarian and development fields. Being overwhelmed can happen even before the complex issues of SALW/L/ERW are added to the mix. In recent years, IDHA has called for clear and realistic operational guidance and professional standards by those working at the sharp end of implementation.³⁷ Operational guidance is different from other forms of written outputs in the fact that it is directly related to providing assistance and insights on matters of day-to-day strategy development and programme implementation, rather than overarching policy, or broader background research studies.

A good deal of relevant operational guidance has already been produced:

- Generic assistance in conflict assessment frameworks and conflict sensitive approaches such as *“Conflict-sensitive Approaches to Development, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace-building—A Resource Pack”*.³⁸
- More sectoral operational guidance in the areas linking thematic issues to conflict prevention such as the *“Youth and Conflict”*, *“Land and Conflict”*, and *“Minerals and Conflict”* toolkits designed for USAID.³⁹
- Specialist assistance for the humanitarian practitioner on SALW issues such as *Putting Guns in Their Place: A Resource Pack for Two Years of Action by Humanitarian Agencies* developed by the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue.⁴⁰
- A survey of tools related to landmines issues in *A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action* produced by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining for the United Nations Development Programme.⁴¹
- For a variety of agencies there is *Protecting Civilians from Explosive Remnants of War, A Guide to Providing Risk Education under CCW Protocol*, produced by Landmine Action.⁴²
- Generic advice on the importance of SALW issues and a brief checklist for developing programming is offered by the OECD–DAC *Mainstreaming Conflict Prevention in Development Cooperation* tipsheet.⁴³
- For those INGOs and civil society organizations who wish to familiarize themselves with SALW issues and conduct advocacy around them, there is a handbook produced by International Alert, Saferworld and Oxfam, *Action Against Small Arms: A Resource and Training Handbook*.

These are merely an indication and sample of the breadth of operational guidance already available. There is particular value in operational guidance that draws on expert knowledge and best practices that is also accessible and useable by non-specialists and connected to other fields of work.

Table 2. Characteristics of effective operational guidance

Characteristic	Explanation
Developed in collaboration with end-users and other stakeholders	Systems developed by experts tend to be methodologically sound but not user-friendly, nor do they take into account the day-to-day challenges of practitioners. Involving end-users (those that are going to utilize the operational guidance) and also other stakeholders (such as those impacted by implementation) ensures that the advice is more relevant.
Utilizes the latest evidence-based knowledge and research evidence on SALW/L/ERW issues	Guidance must draw on the body of basic and applied research surrounding SALW/L/ERW, as well as established lessons learned from implementation.
Utilizes the latest evidence-based knowledge and researched evidence of related issues covered	Most operational guidance will be in relation to other thematic, regional, or institutional topics (for example, gender and small arms, refugee returns and landmines, PRSPs and SALW, rural health and ERW, Burundi and SALW). Guidance must draw on the body of basic and applied research surrounding and lessons learned from implementation in these fields as well.
Utilizes clear examples drawn from practice	In the most innovative and new SALW/L/ERW areas this is of course not possible. However with most such issues related to wider development and humanitarian programming there is a body of implementation experience that should be drawn on. Mini case studies are very useful in illustrating points. Bad practice/experiences should be highlighted as well as good.
Developed (or adaptable) to specific institutional systems, processes and resources	If designed for guiding an individual agency, it must clearly fit within institutional systems, process and resources. There is no point having detailed advice on integrating SALW/L/ERW issues if it does not fit into an agency's own planning processes.
Realistic in its recommendations/options	It may be desirable, for example, that every SALW/L/ERW related project has a 12-month research phase, but few agencies have the resources to undertake such activities. Recommendations that are unrealistic will frustrate and turn away potential advocates.
Have a menu of options	Narrow prescriptive approaches are not very helpful and fly in the face of the need to be adaptive. An options menu for programme choices and ways of undertaking programming are more likely to be incorporated than a simple "take it or leave it" approach.
Intelligent but not using academic jargon or requiring specialist knowledge	"Experts" tend to have a way of writing and expressing themselves that makes a great deal of sense to them, but very little to anyone else. The guidance notes must be accessible to end-users.
Not overly long (although individual topics can be placed within a larger framework)	Nothing more guarantees that operational guidance will be ignored than a large and heavy text. Those involved in development and humanitarian activities are often overworked and simply do not have the time to read many pages. Despite the protestations by experts as to why an issue cannot possibly be covered in less than 20 pages, it should be.
Does not reinvent the wheel	As noted above there is a good deal of operational guidance that already exists and is relevant for non-specialists of SALW/L/ERW. There is no need to waste time and resources reinventing the wheel in this regard.

Producing operational guidance that exhibits the above characteristics is much easier said than done. The processes require good consultations, multi-disciplinary teams and a willingness to learn, adapt and compromise in the interests of brevity, accessibility and relevance.

Box 5. Possible topics for EC/EU-specific operational guidance

- Country-specific EU action involving SALW/L/ERW
- SALW/L/ERW issues—interacting with national governments under the Cotonou Framework
- Coordinating joint country-level EU action on SALW/L/ERW
- National Indicative Programmes, CSP and SALW/L/ERW
- Role of the EC in Mainstreaming SALW/L/ERW in PRSP
- Regional Indicative Programmes and SALW/L/ERW
- An introduction to SALW/L/ERW issues and what to do about them that targets Heads of Delegations
- Engaging non-state actors on SALW/L/ERW guidelines for EC Delegations
- EC funding mechanisms for SALW/L/ERW issues

STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

If IDHA wish to engage in SALW/L/ERW issues (or place such issues within their wider programming) then there is a duty and responsibility to either develop their own institutional capacities to some degree (as noted above), or seek strategic alliances with those with the requisite skills and experience to complement their own capacities. The temptation in the development and humanitarian business is to “get the consultants in” when capacity and expertise is not found in-house, or when there is neither the institutional commitment nor resources to recruit or commit to wider processes of institutional capacity development. Strategic alliances based on partnerships have the potential to be much more effective than using consultants or the utilization of operational guidance. The use of local agencies with real partnerships (rather than mere subcontracting) also improves ownership and sustainability, two key development principles.

Whether within country strategies, programmes or individual projects, there is great utility in creating strategic alliances between those with experience and expertise in SALW/L/ERW issues and those with more “traditional” development and humanitarian experience and expertise. These partnerships create situations where the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. As evidenced by the membership of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), there are now a great many organizations with a focus, expertise and experience in SALW issues. There is a growing network of local agencies specializing in landmine/ERW issues. Add to this the large number of organizations doing policy- and field-related research on the issues and there is the potential for some very useful alliances. With the exception of clearance programmes, most of the SALW and mine action organizations tend to be very small in size (in number of employees, financial resources and project portfolio) when compared to more conventional IDHA. Also, many SALW/L/ERW organizations are much less familiar with standard humanitarian and development programming. There are plenty opportunities for synergies, although strategic alliances need significant management of time and clear understandings expressed in agreed memorandums if they are to function effectively.

While there is some value in strategic alliances at the level of the overall institution or at the headquarters level, it is at the project, programme, country and regional level that they are likely

to be most useful. Indeed the EC, through its cofinancing budget lines (particularly budget line 21-02-03), has some degree of experience in promoting partnerships between European development NGOs and national NGOs and civil society.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION

- Any development-related EC action on SALW/L/ERW must not be associated or aligned with the RSA and the “Global War on Terror”, nor should requirements be made that they be linked to issues such as counterterrorism. SALW/L/ERW activity should have a distinct and explicit human security, developmental or peace-building goal. Engagement should not undermine basic humanitarian principles (such as requiring ECHO to support controversial SALW programming).
- It is important that when engaging on SALW/L/ERW, the EC ensures that their interventions are “conflict sensitive”. In other words, that they “enhance positive impacts” and “avoid negative impacts” on wider conflict dynamics. Conflict sensitivity should be a requirement for SALW/L/ERW strategy and programming and EC resources should be provided to facilitate this.
- Blanket institutional mainstreaming of SALW/L/ERW is not appropriate in all IDHA. Mainstreaming SALW/L/ERW should not be made a blanket priority or requirement of all EC developmental or humanitarian funding mechanisms. Greater SALW/L/ERW awareness within processes to mainstream conflict sensitivity or promote conflict prevention/peace-building within the EC should be promoted.
- Some macro-processes of development (particularly PRSP and NDP) are appropriate for the mainstreaming of SALW/L/ERW issues. Yet these efforts should be approached on a country case-by-case basis. EC resources to ensure that expert opinion on SALW/L/ERW (preferably nationally sourced) and national civil society have an appropriate role throughout the research, consultation, planning and implementation phases.
- The EC should monitor and ensure any new macro multi-stakeholder processes that emerge around peace-building include sufficient attention to SALW/L/ERW issues (for example out of the new proposed UN Peace-building Commission which the EU and EC is supporting).
- IDHA should develop a deeper process of institutional capacity-building to link SALW/L/ERW to wider development programming. The EC should provide resources for the development of this institutional capacity as it will improve impact and sustainability. Therefore an appropriate balance between resources allocated to the development of institutional capacity and direct implementation should be found.
- The EC, with support from appropriate experts and end-users, should develop operational guidance tailored for non-specialist IDHA on a range of related SALW/L/ERW issues.
- Strategic alliances between organizations with general or sectoral humanitarian and development experience and skills, and with those dealing with SALW/L/ERW issues should be encouraged, facilitated and enabled. The EC should draw on its experience gained with its cofinancing budget lines to support these types of strategic alliances.

Notes

- ¹ European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy”, 2003, <<http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf>>, p. 13.
- ² Council of the European Union, *Draft Report to the European Council on EU Activities in the Framework of Prevention, including Implementation of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts*, EU document 9714/05, 7 June 2005.
- ³ European Commission, *Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention*, EU document COM (2001) 211 final, 11 April 2001.
- ⁴ Commission of the European Communities, *Annual Report 2005 on the European Community’s Development Policy and the Implementation of External Assistance in 2004*, EU document COM (2005) 292 final, 15 July 2005, p. 14.
- ⁵ For a list of relevant policy and institutional developments see Saferworld and International Alert in association with the European Peace-building Liaison Office, *Developing an EU Strategy to Address Fragile States: Priorities for the UK Presidency of the EU in 2005*, 2005, pp. 57–59.
- ⁶ For a good overview of progress on conflict-prevention issues, see the various papers by International Alert and Saferworld, in collaboration with the European Peace-building Liaison Office, available at <http://www.international-alert.org/our_work/themes/european_union.php>.
- ⁷ For more explicit examples indicating this, see Australian Agency for International Development, “Counter-Terrorism and Australian Aid”, 2003. Also the Danish development cooperation policy makes extensive references to the fight against terrorism: Government of Denmark, *The Government’s Vision for New Priorities in Danish Development Assistance 2004–2008*, 2003; and United States Department of State/United States Agency for International Development, *Strategic Plan, Fiscal Years 2004–2009, Aligning Diplomacy and Development Assistance*, 2003.
- ⁸ For an overview of some of this, particularly INGO perspectives see, United Nations Integrated Regional Information Networks, “Human Security and the ‘Tug-o-War of Agendas’”, *IRIN news*, 17 August 2004, <http://www.irinnews.org/S_report.asp?ReportID=42702>.
- ⁹ See, UK Department for International Development, *Tackling Poverty by Reducing Armed Violence: Recommendations from a Wilton Park Workshop*, London, 14–16 April 2003; and Small Arms Survey, “Obstructing Development: The Effects of Small Arms on Human Development”, in *Small Arms Survey Yearbook 2003: Development Denied*, 2003.
- ¹⁰ See Nick Cater, “‘War on Terror’ Threatens Aid Priorities”, *Alertnet*, 10 May 2004, <<http://www.alertnet.org/thefacts/reliefresources/108418153847.htm>>; Christian Aid, *The Politics of Poverty: Aid in the New Cold War*, 2004.
- ¹¹ European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy”, 2003, <<http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf>>, p. 13.
- ¹² CONCORD, *A Strong Development Agenda for the New Europe—Containing the Principle Demands from NGOs to the New Parliament*, 2004.
- ¹³ Development Assistance Committee, *Conflict Prevention and Peace Building: What Counts as ODA?*, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2005.
- ¹⁴ See CONCORD, “Four Urgent Demands for European Development Cooperation”, presented at the Summit of Den Hague (Netherlands), 2 December 2004.
- ¹⁵ For a discussion indicating why the CPPA is not a threat to humanitarian principals and effectiveness of humanitarian agencies, see Maria Lange and Mick Quinn, *Conflict, Humanitarian Assistance and Peace-building: Meeting the Challenges*, International Alert, 2003.
- ¹⁶ See, for example, Kenneth Bush, “A Measure of Peace: Peace And Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA) of Development Projects In Conflict Zones”, International Development Research Centre, *Working Paper No. 1*, 1998; Anton Barré, David Shearer and Peter Uvin, *The Limits and Scope for the Use of Development Assistance Incentives and Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations—Case Study: Rwanda*, Development Assistance Committee, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1999; Manuela Leonhardt, *Conflict Impact Assessment of EU Development Cooperation with ACP Countries*, Saferworld and International Alert, 2000; Jonathan Goodhand with Philippa Atkinson, *Conflict and Aid: Enhancing the Peace-building Impact of International Engagement: A Synthesis of Findings from Afghanistan, Liberia and Sri Lanka*, International Alert, 2001; Paul Collier (ed.), *Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy*, World Bank, 2003.

- ¹⁷ For a variety of opinions on the evolution of work related to PCIA and conflict-sensitive approaches see the *Berghof Handbook for Constructive Conflict Management's* Dialogue series on PCIA at <<http://www.berghof-handbook.net/dialogue.htm>>.
- ¹⁸ The EC Delegation in Nepal has developed some conflict-sensitive guidelines for programming, yet a comprehensive or even partial roll-out of capacity-building in conflict sensitive approaches across EC Delegations has yet to materialize. This is despite significant EC policy development with regards to conflict prevention at the global level. Yet the EC is not alone in its lack of tangible progress in this area, which is comparable to most member states.
- ¹⁹ For further information, see <<http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/>>.
- ²⁰ Commission of the European Communities, *Annual Report 2005 on the European Community's Development Policy and the Implementation of External Assistance in 2004*, EU document COM (2005) 292 final, 15 July 2005, p. 87.
- ²¹ For a review of how INGOs are approaching and "mainstreaming" the issue of conflict sensitivity see, Maria Lange, *Building Institutional Capacity for Conflict-sensitive Practice: The Case of International NGOs*, International Alert, 2004.
- ²² For more information see the World Bank's "Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers in Conflict-affected Countries", at <<http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/67ByDocName/ConflictAnalysisPovertyReductionStrategyPapersPRSPinconflict-affectedcountries>>.
- ²³ Ruth Driscoll with Karin Christiansen, *The PRSP Approach - A Basic Guide for CARE International*, Overseas Development Institute, 2004.
- ²⁴ General Assembly, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. Report of the Secretary-General*, UN document A/59/2005, 21 March 2005.
- ²⁵ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, *Humanitarian Appeal 2005 – Consolidated Appeals Process*, 2004, p. 6.
- ²⁶ Ibid.
- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ For more on RIPs and conflict prevention, see Lindsay Alexander, Adam Higazi, James Mackie, Javier Niño-Perez and Andrew Sherriff, "Regional Approaches to Conflict Prevention in Africa: European Support to African Processes", European Centre for Development Policy Management, *InPolicy Brief*, 2003, pp. 1–12. .
- ²⁹ General Assembly, *A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility. Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, UN document A/59/565, 2 December 2004.
- ³⁰ European Union, *Commission Adopts Strategy for Successful 2005 UN Summit*, EU document IP/05/738, 15 June 2005.
- ³¹ Dan Smith, *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together*, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 2004.
- ³² A similar mechanism is in operation in Sierra Leone.
- ³³ See Jane Giffen, *Implementers or Actors? Reviewing Civil Society's Role in European Community Development Assistance in Senegal, Kenya, Bolivia and India*, British Overseas NGOs for Development, 2003.
- ³⁴ Adapted from change management chart—original source unknown.
- ³⁵ The point is reinforced by research produced in the publication, Maria Lange, *Building Institutional Capacity for Conflict-Sensitive Practice: The Case of International NGOs*, International Alert, 2004.
- ³⁶ See Jonas Fredericksen and Heather Baser, "Better Aid Delivery, or Deconcentration of Bureaucracy? A Snapshot of the EC's Devolution Process", European Centre for Development Policy Management, *InPolicy Brief*, 2004, p. 4.
- ³⁷ One of the most comprehensive approaches to the development of operational guidance and professional standards was the Standards in Humanitarian Relief Project (SPHERE). Which produced the SPHERE guidelines and SPHERE handbook. See <<http://www.sphereproject.org/>>.
- ³⁸ Available at <<http://www.conflictsensitivity.org/>>.
- ³⁹ Available from <http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/crosscutting_programs/conflict/recent_events/spotlight.html>.
- ⁴⁰ Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, *Putting Guns in Their Place: A Resource Pack for Two Years of Action by Humanitarian Agencies*, 2004.

- ⁴¹ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining and the United Nations Development Programme, *A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action*, 2001.
- ⁴² Landmine Action, *Protecting Civilians from Explosive Remnants of War, A Guide to Providing Risk Education under CCW Protocol V*, 2004. Landmine Action also produced *Protecting Civilians from Explosive Remnants of War, A Guide to Providing Warnings under CCW Protocol V*, 2004.
- ⁴³ Development Assistance Committee, "Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW)", Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, *Issues Brief*, <<http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/27/35034375.pdf>>.

ACRONYMS

CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CHAP	Common Humanitarian Action Plan
CPPA	conflict prevention to peace-building agenda
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DfID	UK Department for International Development
DG Dev	Directorate General for Development
DG Relex	Directorate General for External Relations
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Community Humanitarian Office
ERW	explosive remnants of war
EU	European Union
HSA	human security agenda
IANSAN	International Action Network on Small Arms
IDHA	international development and humanitarian agencies
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	international non-governmental organization
MDRP	Multi-Country Demobilization and Reintegration Program
NDP	National Development Processes
NGO	non-governmental organization
NIP	National Indicative Programme
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD–DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee
PCIA	peace and conflict impact assessment
PFDA	poverty-focused development agenda
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RIP	Regional Indicative Programme
RSA	renewed security agenda
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SALW/L/ERW	small arms, light weapons, landmines and explosive remnants of war
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
SSR	security sector reform

