



United Nations Institute for  
Disarmament Research

# Small Arms and Light Weapons as Part of an Integrated European Union Conflict Prevention Strategy

**International Alert**

Background Paper Prepared for the Project  
*European Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Explosive Remnants of War*

with funding by  
the European Union  
and the United Kingdom





## NOTE

This work is one of a number of Background Papers commissioned by the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) to help inform the project *European Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Explosive Remnants of War*.

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## ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In 2003, at the request of the European Parliament, the Commission tasked UNIDIR to undertake the project *European Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons and Explosive Remnants of War* with the purpose of offering suggestions as to how the European Union might deploy the full range of its capabilities in ways that enhance overall effectiveness in actions relating to small arms and explosive remnants of war. The project was principally funded by the European Commission at the request of the European Parliament, with additional funding from the Government of the United Kingdom.

## SUMMARY

The European Union's potential in peace-building and conflict prevention stems largely from its wide range of economic and political instruments as well as its presence in over 120 countries (a third of which are affected by conflict). However, these strengths of the European Union (EU) also constitute its biggest weakness. EU policy and action remains fragmented in a field that demands coherence and coordination within and among institutions.

This fragmentation is evident across the full spectrum of peace-building and small arms and light weapons (SALW) issues. SALW cannot be seen solely as a single issue to be controlled and regulated (although this too is important); rather it needs to be viewed as a driver, trigger and symptom of wider social, economic and political challenges. Addressing the problem of SALW therefore needs to begin with a recognition of these complex dynamics as a basis for developing a comprehensive package of measures that have to be located within a wider peace-building process. This paper aims to situate SALW, and the EU's approaches to it, within this process and provide recommendations on how the multiple challenges and dilemmas posed by SALW can be integrated into a comprehensive EU conflict-prevention and peace-building strategy.



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## SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS AS PART OF AN INTEGRATED EUROPEAN UNION CONFLICT PREVENTION STRATEGY

### International Alert

## INTRODUCTION

Violent conflict poses important challenges to the European Union (EU). Growth in terrorism and organized crime such as the illicit trafficking in people, drugs and weapons, rampant migration diminish Europe's stability and prosperity. Armed conflict further undermines the EU's ability to meet its external assistance objectives in development, poverty reduction, promotion of democracy and human rights, energy security as well as in trade and investment. Peace-building and the prevention of violent conflict are therefore critical goals for the EU, and it has the resources, capacity and emerging expertise to address them.

The EU's potential in this area stems largely from its wide range of economic and political instruments as well as its presence in over 120 countries (a third of which are affected by conflict). However, these strengths of the EU also constitute its biggest weakness. EU policy and action remains fragmented in a field that demands coherence and coordination within and among institutions.

This fragmentation is evident across the full spectrum of peace-building and small arms and light weapons (SALW) issues. SALW cannot be seen solely as a single issue to be controlled and regulated (although this too is important); rather it needs to be viewed as a driver, trigger and symptom of wider social, economic and political challenges. Addressing the problem of SALW therefore needs to begin with a recognition of these complex dynamics as a basis for developing a comprehensive package of measures that have to be located within a wider peace-building process. This paper aims to situate SALW, and the EU's approaches to it, within this process and provide recommendations on how the multiple challenges and dilemmas posed by SALW can be integrated into a comprehensive EU conflict-prevention and peace-building strategy.

## EU POLICIES AND INSTRUMENTS ON SMALL ARMS

Understanding the EU's existing commitments in respect to SALW must be the starting point for exploring its broader role in curbing the threats posed by SALW. These commitments encompass both specific policies and the instruments established within the EU as implementation mechanisms. Clearly, the extent to which current policy translates into practice, and practice itself is consistent with policy (and consistently applied), is a critical aspect of maximizing the EU's potential in this area.

## POLICIES

The EU is subject to a number of major agreements that are relevant to the regulation of SALW. The multi-layered nature of SALW means that some agreements are important with

regards to arms exports, others in respect of the protection of EU populations, and yet more relate broadly to conflict prevention and development.

- The Programme of Action (PoA), adopted at the UN Conference on Preventing, Combating, and Eradicating the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects in July 2001, is the main framework for the further elaboration and development of international cooperation in SALW control. The UN PoA defines some of the norms and principles that guide the work of the international community on SALW issues. It establishes that the consequences of SALW proliferation and misuse are multiple and that long-term and sustainable approaches are necessary to tackle this issue. It underlines the importance of conflict prevention, development, crime control and public health in the fight against SALW proliferation. However, in the process of negotiating consensus, many of the important dimensions of SALW proliferation had to be sacrificed, including the issue of export controls in relation to non-state actors and the vital issue of civilian possession of SALW.<sup>1</sup>
- The European Convention on the Control of the Acquisition and Possession of Firearms by Individuals was adopted in June 1978 and entered into force in July 1982. The Convention establishes a system for controlling the movements of firearms (including SALW) from one country to another in two ways: notification and double authorization. This initiative has subsequently been augmented by the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Sales. All EU member states subscribe to the Code of Conduct, which was adopted in June 1998. A further 13 non-EU countries chose to associate themselves with the principles of this Code of Conduct two months after it was agreed. It is a politically, but not legally binding document and therefore does not require implementation or ratification. The Code includes eight criteria, through which the members pledge not to export weapons that would exacerbate regional tensions or conflict, be used in internal repression or human rights violations. The Code also prohibits the export of land mines but fails to address other critical issues such as international arms brokering, licensed production agreements, end-user certification and monitoring.<sup>2</sup>
- As part of the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA), EU states are required to ensure through their national policies that transfers of arms and dual-use goods and technologies do not contribute to the development or enhancement of military capabilities that undermine international and regional security and stability, and are not diverted to support such capabilities. The WA information exchange requires semi-annual notifications of arms transfers, covering seven categories derived from the UN Register of Conventional Arms. In December 2002, the WA member states adopted the *Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons*. The Guidelines point at the need to adopt legislation and ensure its implementation in such areas as evaluation of SALW exports; exports licensing; re-export/re-transfer; unlicensed manufacture; requirements for the potential SALW recipients; and SALW marking, record-keeping and cooperation.<sup>3</sup>
- The European Union Joint Action on SALW was signed in December 1998; in July 2002 it was replaced with the new Joint Action that incorporated a regulation regarding ammunition. This document is legally binding for EU member states and is implemented through national laws and procedures. The Joint Action aims, first, to combat and contribute to ending the destabilizing accumulation and spread of small arms; second, to contribute to the reduction of existing accumulations of these weapons and their ammunition to levels consistent with countries' legitimate security needs; and third, to help solve the problems caused by such accumulations.<sup>4</sup>
- Finally, EU member states are also governed by a number of Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) agreements, which, while only politically binding, are still important in terms of ensuring coherence across the EU. These include the OSCE

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Document on SALW which, among other things, commits signatories to combat illicit trafficking and control the spread and accumulation of SALW; the OSCE Principles on Conventional Arms Transfers which requires states to consider a number of factors, including ones relating to human rights, in their decisions on arms transfers; and the OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition which provides practical procedures and mechanisms for the destruction of surplus stockpiles of ammunition.

## POLICY INSTRUMENTS

The EU has a broad range of policy instruments available to address the gamut of supply and demand issues that exacerbate the destructive global impact of SALW. Currently however, EU instruments are at best incoherent, and at worst aggressively competitive with one another. The current court case taken by the European Commission (EC) against the Council with regard to SALW competencies represents the extreme case in incoherence. As a result, the EU cannot respond as effectively as it could to the cross-cutting nature and with the long-term vision required to effectively implement a coherent SALW policy. The fundamental challenge therefore is to address the EU's strategic deficit in conflict prevention and peace-building, in which small arms should be an integral part.

The EU's instruments and institutions are divided into three "pillars", each with a specific mandate (see Table 1). This compartmentalized structure means that incoherence is likely in any EU initiative not wholly contained in a single pillar. Unfortunately, SALW cuts across all three pillars. Budget and implementation responsibilities for SALW-related issues vary across pillars. Justice and Home Affairs (pillar 3) dictate issues relevant to SALW control such as border control and legislation on money laundering within the Union. It is, however, under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) (pillar 2) that responsibility for SALW funding lies and through which security sector reform (SSR) initiatives are supported via European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) civil and military police missions. By their political nature, CFSP funding and mission support are relatively short-term. These initiatives are structurally and strategically divorced from longer-term initiatives related to SALW under European Community funding (pillar 1). These include disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), democracy and human rights initiatives and wider development and rehabilitation activities funded through direct budget support and support to NGOs.

The Commission is the implementer for CFSP-funded (excluding ESDP) and Community-funded small arms initiatives. With the current process of deconcentration of Commission decision making to its in-country delegations, these coherence issues could be amplified, particularly where delegations lack capacity and expertise.<sup>5</sup> Any new initiative to promote the expansion or integration of small arm initiatives into broader Community programming must therefore consider strengthening the capacity of delegations through better recruitment processes and training (in relation to small arms analysis, consultation with civil society, monitoring etc.).

Table 1 provides an overview and examples of the use of instruments for addressing small arms issues across the EU pillar structure.

Table 1. EU SALW-related instruments and their use

<b>European Community Policy Pillar 1</b>	<b>CFSP Pillar 2</b>	<b>Justice and Home Affairs Pillar 3</b>
<p>No EC budget line exists for SALW specifically, nevertheless, European Community initiatives support a range of activities that are directly and indirectly related to small arms, these include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Providing financial support to third countries for the development of small arms National Action Plans (e.g. with the Tanzanian Government)</li> <li>• SALW/DDR initiatives as non-focal lines in some Country Strategy Papers (e.g. DDR funding through the 9<sup>th</sup> European Development Funds to Eritrea)</li> <li>• Funding to regional DDR programmes in West Africa (via UN and ECOWAS) and the Great Lakes region (via the World Bank Multi-country Demobilization and Reintegration Programme, MDRP)</li> <li>• Support to DDR projects in Uganda and Sierra Leone (via ECHO) and Congo-Brazzaville (via the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, RRM)</li> <li>• Support on police, public order, organized crime, integrated border management, migration and judicial reform (e.g. to the Western Balkans countries under the Stabilization and Association Process)</li> <li>• A range of humanitarian, development and rehabilitation projects in countries affected by SALW issues</li> </ul>	<p>SALW-related projects are financed through the CFSP budget under a specific article “non-proliferation and disarmament”, toward which €720,000 was committed for 2005. Since 2000, this has included:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Providing expertise for the Clearinghouse Project relating in South East Europe (via UNDP)</li> <li>• Destruction of ammunition in Albania (via NATO)</li> <li>• Equipment for the Special Coordination Centre in South Ossetia, Georgia (via the OSCE)</li> <li>• Police and customs officials training; equipment; destruction of weapons and stockpile management, standardization of legislation in South America and the Caribbean (via UN–LiREC)</li> <li>• European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) missions are currently supporting SSR processes including the EU Police Missions in Bosnia (EUPM) and Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo (EUPOL).</li> </ul>	<p>The EU’s JHA policy aims to create an area of freedom, security and justice across the 25 member states. The concept covers issues like fundamental rights, asylum and immigration, managing the EU’s external frontiers and close cooperation between national police, judicial and customs authorities. This includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Cooperation between national police forces, especially within the framework of Europol</li> <li>• Common legislation on terrorism, money laundering, corruption, trafficking in human beings, drug production and trafficking</li> <li>• Working with partner countries, notably the US, Russia and countries in the Mediterranean region, as well as international organizations, on devising policies and implementing measures to consolidate its area of freedom, security and justice</li> </ul>

With the exception of Cambodia, the CFSP-funded initiatives have tended to be relatively small and short term with mixed success. The only long-term, integrated SALW initiative supported by the EU is EU ASAC (European Union Assistance on Curbing Small Arm and Light Weapons) with the Cambodian Government. This, also the only SALW project managed by the EU itself, is an integrated programme involving legal assistance in drafting arms law, weapons collection and destruction, building of safe storage facilities and weapons-for-development schemes.

The “human security approach” that recognizes the linkages between development, security and governance/corruption in the design of the project reflects a more holistic and sustainable approach. EU ASAC could provide a useful model for future EU small arms initiatives. Box 1 outlines the project approach and highlights some key lessons.

### **Box 1. Case Study: EU ASAC in Cambodia**

An EU-led disarmament programme started in Cambodia in November 1999, in response to a specific request by the Cambodian government. The programme was constructed around four key elements:

1. Helping the government to ratify a new arms control law, including establishing the necessary legal framework for the rest of the programme. In addition, EU ASAC developed several educational and training programmes to prepare the populace for implementation;
2. Assisting the Ministry of National Defence in developing a comprehensive weapons registration and storage system. Initially, this was confined to one region—Kampong Cham—but was later expanded;
3. Introducing the “Weapons for Development” programme. This included working with local police forces to improve both their effectiveness and their engagement with civil society as a means of addressing wider security concerns. The developmental aspect of the programme was sub-contracted to local NGOs to increase efficiency and allow EU ASAC to focus on its core competency of arms control; and
4. Awareness-raising programmes and government–civil society confidence-building measures.

#### **Lessons learned**

Although commendably ambitious and comprehensive in its scope, the programme suffered from a number of shortcomings which need to be addressed in future projects of this nature:

- When weapons collection ended, so did the community awareness work. Public education is a critical long-term process, which needs to be sustained.
- Lack of oversight of development projects. In some cases, this led to flawed implementation and reduced effectiveness.
- The year-by-year funding created sustainability questions and prevented proper long-term planning.
- Lack of a clear prior agreement with the government. This led to significant time being wasted in negotiations and contributed to the somewhat piecemeal nature of the programme’s implementation.
- The Weapons for Development project was inconsistent and implementation differed across provinces. Although projects need to reflect the priorities and needs of the specific context, there is a danger in creating uneven development and “disarmament tourism” as individuals seek out the best projects.

- Insufficient attention was paid to wider economic issues. Weapons for Development should aim to strengthen local economies in an effort to reduce the need and demand for guns. Ideally, this should be coordinated with the wider development work carried out. In this case, however, it is unclear to what extent there was coordination in planning and implementation.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

If the EU wishes to strengthen its conflict-prevention and peace-building impact, its programming design must be more integrated. This should be supported by the establishment of a budget line in the EC budget for SSR in post-conflict situations on the ground. While the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) already provides support in this regard, its very design is short term and crisis-focused. A budget line that can commit to the same timelines as those in the Country and Regional Strategy Papers is needed.<sup>6</sup>

Too often, it is the longer-term rehabilitation and peace-building aspects of small arms work that are over-looked. This budget line should therefore support job creation; trust and confidence-building initiatives between the security sector and local populations; conflict-sensitive micro-finance projects associated with weapons collection, and reintegration processes associated with DDR, including support to host communities. This could fall either under the Stability Instrument or the Development Instrument in the new Financial Perspectives.

The more technical expertise for disarmament and security sector reform will, of course, still reside within ESDP civil and military capabilities. The Civil–Military Cell must therefore move forward the EU’s commitment in the Action Plan on Civilian Aspects of ESDP to strengthen its SSR and DDR expertise, and to develop SSR and DDR concepts (see section 4 below). This must be undertaken, however, in close collaboration with Commission and member state representatives and include security sector, democratic governance and development competencies.


In summary, the EU should:

- Strengthen the capacity of delegations through better recruitment processes and training in conflict analysis and planning—including small arms analysis, consultation and monitoring processes.
- Establish a budget line for security sector reform within the Community budget that reflects the extended timelines of SSR processes and fits in with the timetables of country/regional strategies. This would specifically address the long-term, structural causes of arms use and proliferation.
- Develop new, overarching SSR and DDR concepts through a cross-institutional process, based on the idea of a strategic peace-building framework.

## CONTEXTUALIZING SALW AS PART OF A PEACE-BUILDING STRATEGY

Developing the structural conditions, attitudes and modes of political behaviour that enable peaceful, stable and prosperous social and economic development demands a wide range of policy instruments and practical interventions. To understand this, it is useful to break peace-building down into its component parts. One way of doing so is by presenting peace-building as a palette.<sup>7</sup>

Figure 1. The Peace-building Palette



This framework not only provides a basis for highlighting the more specific components of peace-building but also for illustrating the linkages between them. Unless the constituent parts are connected conceptually in analysis, planning and implementation, the overall impact will be limited. For example, DDR processes can only be successful if stockpiles of arms can be properly policed; if there are employment options for ex-combatants other than the gun; if communities can reintegrate ex-combatants and reconcile their grievances; or if the political elite can and will release control over its security forces and bring an end to impunity.

Few issues are as cross-cutting and complex in their nature and impact as SALW. It is a key tool and driver of conflict, terrorism and organized criminality on the one hand, but also critical to a state's capacity to provide for the security of its people. Therefore while SALW is important as an early warning indicator as well as a key ingredient in most conflicts, and as such should be controlled, they are also legitimate products which sovereign governments need access to and so cannot be banned in a similar way to land mines. The dilemma this poses is how to prevent or avoid the illegal and destructive uses of SALW while not infringing on state sovereignty through

undermining the ability to provide security. The first step in this is to understand the relationship between SALW and broader socio-cultural, economic and political issues.

## SALW AND TRAFFICKING

The relationship between SALW and trafficking is complex. SALW plays a key role in all aspects of trafficking, not just as a trafficked commodity but as a means of facilitating trafficking of other commodities. Therefore, the issue is not just about the trafficking of SALW per se but is also about how the availability of SALW facilitates other forms of trafficking, be it drugs, diamonds or humans.

The issue of SALW in relation to trafficking is therefore explicitly about the trafficking of weapons and the impact this has on the communities and areas where the weapons end up, but is also implicitly about the role SALW plays in facilitating other forms of trafficking. In addition to the evidence showing close linkages between SALW, drug and precious mineral trafficking specifically and more tentatively to transnational organized crime and terrorism, there is increasing anecdotal evidence that the same criminal networks are also used for trafficking in women and girls.<sup>8</sup> In Bangladesh it was also reported that trafficking of women has increased with the increase in arms smuggling.

The OSCE has taken the lead in looking in more depth at the linkages between the different recognized forms of trafficking. They organized a conference in 2003, which brought together those involved in tracking and controlling these different forms of trafficking.<sup>9</sup> The conference recognized the rise of transnational organized crime, the trafficking of illicit goods, the provision of illegal services and the expansion of illegal markets as the shadow side of globalization and interdependence. Different scenarios were identified which showed that while some trafficking organizations engage in multiple commodity trafficking, others will specialize in particular activities, such as developing skills, mechanisms, routes and corrupt linkages peculiar to one product. It was also evident that some groups will move from one form of trafficking to another, often in response to changing market opportunities. For example, in the Balkans, with the cessation of the conflict, some groups which had been involved in arms trafficking began to focus on trafficking in women. Women freed from trafficking rackets in Liberia have been able to verify that those involved in the human trafficking were also dealing in SALW.<sup>10</sup>

There are lessons that can be shared across the various approaches to different forms of trafficking, in order to develop an integrated strategy for improved control and monitoring.<sup>11</sup> Building on the PoA's emphasis on the importance of international efforts and cooperation aimed at combating illicit trade from both a supply and demand perspective,<sup>12</sup> there is a need for cooperation discussions to also focus on addressing the gender-based human security needs of those pushed into these networks by necessity. This requires broader collaboration and engagement of the social and economic development sectors.<sup>13</sup>

The various forms of trafficking can have significant and widespread impacts on the economics, social cohesion and security of a country as well as its development potential. Furthermore, the trafficking of SALW specifically has the potential to fuel conflict, violence and human rights abuses.

## SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

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SSR is intended to build adherence to transparency, human rights and civilian control and as such is a vital part of good governance. This is an important development issue that is strongly interlinked with that of SALW.

Several member states, especially Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, along with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee (OECD–DAC), see SSR as a key element in development strategy especially in countries transitioning from authoritarian governments and following a conflict. This is because, from a human security perspective, the security sector is a vital concern because of its role in ensuring public safety, and because of the potential negative impact a corrupt or inefficient security sector can have on good governance.

The most important way in which SSR impacts on SALW control is that of being a driver for SALW demand. Namely, in a situation where state security forces are at best incapable of providing security to the civilian population, and at worst are a direct threat to the security of the general population, civilians will seek to protect themselves and if possible will seek access to SALW. More generally, if the security forces are incompetent or corrupt there will be much greater leakage from government SALW stockpiles, as well as more porous borders because of inadequate customs checks. Therefore, in many situations the security sector can also be a key source of illicit SALW. This most famously occurred in the 1990s in Albania when the general population emptied the state SALW stockpiles. National Commissions, as promoted by the PoA, are an excellent example of the integrated approach to security that SSR advocates given that they are inter-governmental and also often have civil society input.

## SOCIAL, COMMUNITY AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE

Small arms and light weapons play an important role in exacerbating the impact of social and community violence. The presence of SALW in a community can result in an increase in the use of SALW in domestic and other forms of violence.

Domestic violence entails any violence targeted at family members or friends within a household. The correlation between the incidence of domestic violence and levels of SALW possession is strong; a particularly worrying fact is that the possession of firearms in the household means that an occurrence of domestic violence is more likely to end in fatality. Domestic violence is a significant issue in states with high levels of civilian possession of firearms, such as Sweden. A recent Canadian study found that 40% of women killed by their husbands are shot to death, 80% of these with legally owned guns. Indeed, a legally held gun in the home is more likely to be used to intimidate or injure family members than to be used against an outside intruder.

The issue of domestic violence is a core area where the blurring between use of licit small arms and illicit small arms is clearly illustrated. Despite the emphasis in law enforcement on illegal handguns and crime, legal firearms are the primary weapons used in domestic homicides. The likelihood that domestic violence will result in fatality dramatically increases when there is a firearm in the house. For example, security forces and private security guards are usually issued a licit firearm, which they may hold in their possession when off-duty. Research has shown that these firearms are often used in domestic violence incidents against the wife or partner of the security guard.<sup>14</sup>

While gun-related domestic violence does occur in peaceful settings, it increases during and after conflict. After a conflict ends, guns still circulate in the community. Post-conflict stress,

















- <sup>6</sup> Country and Regional Strategy Papers are designed for a five-year period in collaboration with the partner country.
- <sup>7</sup> Dan Smith, *Towards a Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding: Getting Their Act Together*, International Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 2004.
- <sup>8</sup> Refugees International, "Liberia: UNMIL's Crackdown on Trafficking Puts Women at Risk", 10 May 2004; and examples from Bangladesh at IA South Asia Consultation on Women, Peace and Security Toolkit, September 2004.
- <sup>9</sup> Phil Williams, "Combating Trafficking: The Role of Governments in the OSCE Region", 11th OSCE Economic Forum, Discussion Paper for Working Group B, 14 May 2003.
- <sup>10</sup> Refugees International, "Liberia: UNMIL's Crackdown on Trafficking Puts Women at Risk", 10 May 2004.
- <sup>11</sup> This is another area, which requires further research, recognising that information is limited, due to the clandestine nature of trafficking networks.
- <sup>12</sup> See United Nations, *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*, UN document A/CONF.192/15, 9–20 July 2001, preamble para. 7, para. 27.
- <sup>13</sup> This would further support the implementation of the General Assembly Resolution 55/25 of 8 January 2001—the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime— as well as the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, referred to in Annex 2 of the Programme of Action.
- <sup>14</sup> "The Gun on the Kitchen Table", South Africa, 2004.
- <sup>15</sup> International Alert, "Putting Gender on the Small Arms and Light Weapons Agenda", 2005.
- <sup>16</sup> From the *EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts*, 2001, <<http://www.eu2001.se/static/eng/pdf/violent.PDF>>:
- "the capacities of the Union will, as needs are identified, be strengthened by developing instruments in areas such as expertise on human rights and democracy, fact-finding missions, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), and demining;
  - the Council will examine how instruments for disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation, including confidence- and security building measures, can be used more systematically for preventive purposes, including as means for early warning and post-conflict stabilization and as element in the political dialogue, whilst avoiding duplication of the activities of regional and international organization;
  - The EU will support the ratification and implementation of agreements to tackle the problem posed by unregulated spread of small arms and light weapons in all its aspects, including the proposed UN Programme of Action".
- <sup>17</sup> See European Commission, *Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention*, EU document COM (2001) 211 final, 11 April 2001.
- <sup>18</sup> Council of the European Union, *Common Position of 2 June 1997 Defined by the Council on the Basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, Concerning Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa*, EU document 97/356/CFSP, 2 June 1997, art. 7.
- <sup>19</sup> *The Cotonou Agreement*, 2000, art. 11. The text of the treaty is available at <[http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/cotonou/pdf/agr01\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/development/body/cotonou/pdf/agr01_en.pdf)>.
- <sup>20</sup> European Union Institute for Strategic Studies, "A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security Strategy", 2003, <<http://www.iss-eu.org/solana/solanae.pdf>>, p. 13.
- <sup>21</sup> The major working groups under the Council of Ministers in which member states discuss these matters are the Working Groups on Small Arms (CODUN), on conventional arms (COARM) and on armaments policy (POLARM).
- <sup>22</sup> Gender roles and relations are also specific to a given culture and affected by other forms of differentiation such as age, ethnicity, class, caste, religion and socio-economic status.
- <sup>23</sup> Nicola Johnston, William Godnick, Charlotte Watson and Michael von Tangen Page, "Putting a Human Face to the Problem of Small Arms Proliferation: Gender Implications for the Effective Implementation of the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects", International Alert, 2005.

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- <sup>24</sup> See Sanam Anderlini and Dyan Mazurana, "Forgotten in the Peace: Boys and Girls Who also Carried Guns", *International Herald Tribune*, 12 March 2004.
- <sup>25</sup> The EAS is a proposal in the yet to be ratified Constitution for a joint secretariat that could include external relations units from the Council Secretariat, the Commission and Member States under a "double-hatted" EU Foreign Minister.
- <sup>26</sup> Sources for the Watchlists include member state intelligence, the Policy Unit (for political intelligence), the EU Military Staff (military intelligence), the Civilian Committee on Crisis Management (civilian intelligence) and the Commission's Conflict Prevention Unit (economic and humanitarian intelligence from DG Dev, ECHO and Relex Desk Officers).
- <sup>27</sup> "The Council will pursue coherent and comprehensive preventive strategies, using appropriate existing instruments and taking into account ongoing actions, in order to identify challenges, set clear objectives, allocate adequate resources and ensure co-operation with external partners. The implementation of the preventive strategies will be monitored by the Council, drawing on contributions from the Secretary General/High Representative and the Commission", *EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts*, endorsed by the Göteborg European Council, June 2001.
- <sup>28</sup> Internal EU document.
- <sup>29</sup> The desk officer will instead send the document to the Conflict Prevention Unit, which uploads the information to a database and prepares their own separate analysis.
- <sup>30</sup> This is according to the Inter-Quality Service Group (IQSG), a unit in DG Dev that monitors, coordinates and facilitates policy coherence from a development perspective across the Commission.
- <sup>31</sup> Guinea-Bissau and Guinea Conakry remain as on-going pilot strategies. The pilot strategies in Bolivia, Haiti, Indonesia, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and Turkmenistan have been halted.
- <sup>32</sup> Draft Mission report, May 2004.

## ACRONYMS

ACP	African, Caribbean and Pacific
CCA	Country Conflict Assessments
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
DDR	disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
DG Dev	Directorate General for Development
DG Relex	Directorate General for External Relations
DPS	EU Development Policy Statement
EC	European Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ESDP	European Security and Defence Policy
ESS	European Security Strategy
EU	European Union
EU ASAC	European Union Assistance on Curbing Small Arms and light weapons in Cambodia
EUMS	EU Military Staff
OECD–DAC	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Development Assistance Committee
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PoA	Programme of Action
RRM	Rapid Reaction Mechanism
RSP	Regional Strategy Paper
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SSR	security sector reform
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDIR	United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
WA	Wassenaar Arrangement
WHO	World Health Organization

