

BORDERS, STATES AND VIOLENCE IN WEST AFRICA
Towards Cross-Boundary Preventive Diplomacy
and Community-Based Peacebuilding

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Geneva

February 2003

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Acronyms and Abbreviations

AU	African Union
ECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
JSC	Joint Security Committee
LURD	Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MJP	Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix
MPCI	Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire
MPIGO	Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest
MRB	Mano River Basin
MRU	Mano River Union
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPFL	National Patriotic Front
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
RFDG	Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
ULIMO-K	United Liberation Movement of Liberia for Democracy - (Alhaji)Kromah Branch
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Sierra Leoneans will taste the bitterness of war.
(Liberian rebel leader) Charles Taylor, in 1991

If we do not get peace in Sierra Leone, Liberia will continue to suffer.
(Liberian President) Charles Taylor, in 2000

I. Fifteen Sovereign States, One Security Fate

The current crisis in Côte d'Ivoire and the great tension it generates between this country on the one hand and, on the other hand, neighbouring Burkina Faso and Liberia highlights the fact that, despite substantial efforts from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)¹ to promote and consolidate regional integration and security, for many states in the sub-region, shared borders continue to be perceived much more as areas of discord and confrontation than zones of peace and collaboration. Indeed, current accusations and counter-accusations between Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso look very much like a frightening remake of what happened a decade ago between Liberia and Sierra Leone.

In terms of the relationship between state boundaries and armed conflict, we face a great paradox in West Africa:

- On the one hand, there seems to be a strong understanding of a shared security fate among neighbouring countries; this impression is evidenced by regional efforts within ECOWAS as well as bilateral diplomatic endeavours between many West African countries;
- On the other hand however, one notices an equally strongly shared suspicion and distrust among some decision-makers in the sub-region (Liberia/Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire/Burkina Faso, Liberia/Sierra Leone, etc.).

The basin of the River Mano, which is shared by Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, is one of the regions where this paradox is the most obvious.

II. The Mano River Basin: an Incarnation of the Great Security Paradox

A Mano River Union (MRU) was founded in October 1973 between Liberia and Sierra Leone. Guinea joined the organization in 1980. The Union was established with a view to strengthening sub-regional economic integration, notably through the establishment of a customs union amongst its members. Needless to say that the last 14 years of armed crisis in the area has radically undermined these cooperative ambitions. Consequently, today, efforts to revamp the organization have been essentially security oriented, with particular emphasis on collective peacebuilding and conflict prevention.²

Meeting on 23 August 2001 in Freetown, the Joint Security Committee (JSC) of the Mano River Union “reaffirmed its political will to do everything possible to rebuild the confidence of the three member states of the MRU so that peace and stability can be restored in the sub-region.” Among other things, the JSC decided (1) “to put an end to the endemic problems of dissidents, armed groups and other para-military forces involved in the destabilisation of states of the sub-region” and (2) “to implement the deployment of Joint Border Security and Confidence Building Units along their common borders.” This is something new in a region that has been famous for the malicious intentions of some of its leaders to destabilize their neighbours. One must remember for instance that in 1991, Liberian rebel leader Charles Taylor was boasting that “Sierra Leone will taste the bitterness of war”, what the country did indeed. Ten years after, in conformity with the MRU’s new vision of peace and security, the same Charles Taylor, now President of Liberia, insists: “*if we do not get peace in Sierra Leone, Liberia will continue to suffer.*”³

Similarly, meeting in December 1999 with Guineans in Conakry, the author of this analysis got this message: “it would be a very dangerous illusion for Charles Taylor [President of Liberia] to think that Liberia would sleep in peace when Guinea is on fire.”⁴

These declarations underscore the complex nature of the trans-boundary security relationship that relates not only the three countries sharing the basin of the River

Mano, but also the ensemble of West African states in general. A rational option in such circumstances would be that decision-makers in the sub-region work hand in hand in order to tackle the scourge of endemic cross-border violence. This has not always been the case unfortunately. In fact, the visionary rhetoric on a collectively shared security destiny is strongly counterbalanced by a contradictory perception of one's neighbour as "the face of evil" with whom dialogue and collaboration are uncompromisingly impossible. This has been true for quite a long time between Guinea and Liberia. It is true today between Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso. If the methods and strategies to contain the endlessly spreading violence in West Africa do not appropriately change, others countries will inevitably follow suit.

III. The Plight of Cross-Border Insurrections

Mutual suspicion and shared distrust among some West African political authorities is easily understandable when one looks into the sub-regional pattern of insurrectional and rebellion movements since 1989. Since at least the beginning of the Liberian civil war in December 1989, West Africa has been suffering from an endemic plight of cross-border insurrections. To mention but some of the most notorious cases:

- In the night of 25 December 1989, a group of armed men attacked Liberia from the border with Côte d'Ivoire, using the Ivoirian territory as a safe haven and presumably with the support, or at least the sympathy, of the Government of Côte d'Ivoire. The rebels called themselves the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and their leader was a certain Charles Taylor;
- On 23 March 1991, a group of armed men attacked Sierra Leone from the border with Liberia, using the Liberian territory as a safe haven and with the ostensible support of the Liberian rebel leader Charles Taylor. The rebel group called itself the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), and its leader was a retired Sierra Leonean army corporal called Foday Sankoh;

- After the July 1997 presidential elections in Liberia, from which former rebel leader Charles Taylor was consecrated head of state, the Liberian rebel movement ULIMO-K withdrew in the jungle and established a safe haven at the border between Liberia and Guinea. For the last five years, ULIMO-K rebels have been harassing the Liberian government, using Guinean territory as a safe haven for their hit-and-run operations;
- By September 2000, a Guinean rebel movement, the *Rassemblement des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée* (RFDG), attacked Guinea from the border between Guinea and Liberia, using the Liberian territory as a safe haven. RFDG rebels allegedly benefit from the support, or at least the sympathy, of the Liberian leader, Charles Taylor. In the same period (September-December 2000), for reasons still to be clarified, ULIMO-K rebels attacked several Guinean towns and villages (Forecariah, Gueckedou, Nzerekore, Kissidougou, Kindia, etc.), looting, burning, raping, maiming and killing Guinean citizens, (Liberian and Sierra Leonean) refugees and international humanitarian workers.⁵
- A coalition of Liberian rebel movements, the Liberian United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), is currently fighting a harsh war against the Government of Liberia, using the Guinean territory as a safe haven. Observers working in the area notice that “Sierra Leonean mercenaries” are “hired by the LURD rebels to fight alongside the dissidents.”⁶
- Since September 2002, Northern and Western Côte d’Ivoire are under attack by at least three rebel groups (MPCI for the North and MPIGO and MJP for the West).⁷ The Government of Côte d’Ivoire insists that Northern rebels benefit from the support—or, at least, “the sympathy”, of neighbouring Burkina Faso, while Western insurrectional movements benefit from “the complicity” of neighbouring Liberia.

It is obvious that there can only be little room for mutual trust and confidence in such a context.

IV. The Great Illusion of Being in Control I: Where Facts Tell Another Story

This bleak panorama shows that the surest avenue to regional peace and security in West Africa cuts across sovereign state borders. One of the main weaknesses of ongoing diplomatic efforts to find a viable solution to armed conflicts in West Africa is a lack of both cross-boundary and community-based peacebuilding vision. The danger is that ongoing anarchic and cross-border violence is increasingly degenerating into a boundless and stateless phenomenon. As demonstrated in Sierra Leone yesterday, and Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire today, the challenge of cross-border violence threatens not only the security and stability of the state, but also, it endangers its very existence and sovereignty.

The question of the relationship between state sovereignty and percolating violence across state borders has to be addressed seriously by peace initiatives in the region. If these initiatives are to be effective, they have to be *not only nationally circumscribed and top-down oriented, but also cross-boundary and bottom-up framed*. To paraphrase our Guinean interlocutors, Sierra Leone for instance will never “sleep in peace” as long as there are troubles in Liberia; Burkina Faso, with more than 2 millions of its citizens living as immigrants in Côte d'Ivoire, will never live in peace in case there is a civil war in Côte d'Ivoire; Liberia will never return to a state of constructive peace if there is mayhem in neighbouring Sierra Leone, Guinea and Côte d'Ivoire, etc.

Unfortunately, a Manichean personalization of conflict in the region renders impossible any hope for a sincere and collaborative dynamic among some West African decision-makers. The perception of the neighbour as a deadly *personal foe* renders futile nearly any official peace initiative aimed at building a mutually shared perception of insecurity and a common vision of peace opportunities. The erroneous perception of security as essentially “national” and of sovereignty as “territorial integrity” and “boundary inviolability” can no longer hold up. In the light of the endlessly spreading transnational violence in the region, such

perception stands as a pure mystification of both the meaning of security and the reality of sovereignty.

A good news is nonetheless that in West Africa, a strong sense of collectively shared threats (as illustrated by current ECOWAS' efforts to find a quick and lasting solution to the Ivorian crisis⁸) continues to coexist with this great reluctance to consider one's neighbours as a partner in peace. But the region still needs to fill the gap between ECOWAS's rhetoric of regional security and political leaders' behaviour of distrust and suspicion. Security can no longer realistically be considered as "national" in West Africa today. And sovereignty needs to be extended beyond purely national boundaries. To reach this point, West African states will certainly need to introduce "coercive diplomacy" in their already impressive preventive diplomacy arsenal.⁹

Perhaps today, the stubborn perception of one's neighbour as a deadly enemy is the most powerful obstacle to genuine peace in West Africa. Undeniably, so much would be realized if, for instance, the leaders from Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone could sit in good faith and sincerely commit themselves to a global cross-boundary agenda for peace in the Mano River basin. Some of the great tragedies happening today in Côte d'Ivoire would certainly have been avoided if there had been good collaboration and a shared vision of security between the leaders of Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire.

The current situation of "my neighbour is the devil at my border" can only fuel violence escalation and engender greater tragedies for West African people.

Although it is politically hard for West African leaders to admit that most of them are not effectively in control of their borders, they will have to be realistic and humble enough and recognize their incapacity to master the control of their borders. They will have to take this incapacity for what it is actually, which is a given fact, a reality they have to courageously face. True, such admission of weakness (and failure) may chip their political prestige, but it will be salutary for regional peace.

For obvious domestic political reasons, no Head of state for instance would publicly acknowledge that his country is sliding towards anarchy because of the fragility of state institutions and the lack of state authority. Each government is striving hard, against all evidence, to persuade its domestic audience that deliberately hostile intentions from “evil” neighbours, and not the fragility of the state’s institutions, are the main cause of ongoing troubles and violence.

The reason of this *politique d’autruche* is clear: by admitting that the government, in which is vested the legitimate power to guarantee national security and protect territorial integrity, is not in full control of its sovereignty would be suicidal for those in power. Obviously, that would be another way to confess that the Government, which can no longer fulfil its fundamental security mission is not only powerless, but also, it has become purposeless and useless. This fear of being perceived as powerless and useless certainly explains for instance the emphatic rhetoric from President Lansana Conté of Guinea, who keeps on repeating in substance: “whoever has the ambition to destabilize Guinea will find my army and myself in his way.” On the other side of the border, President Charles Taylor of Liberia entertains a similar discourse. Meanwhile, innocent Guineans, Liberians and Sierra Leonenans continue to be killed in clashes at the border between the two countries and criminal groups continue to wreak havoc in the area.

So, instead of recognizing their collective weakness for what it is, governments prefer a much more comfortable way of explaining their security difficulties, which is to dramatize the external dimension of national insecurity (which is real, although not always key).

The reality is by far less complicated than the subtleties of this instrumental discourse on national insecurity and neighbourhood subversion. The rhetoric of the neighbour as “the face of evil at our national borders”¹⁰ makes reality appear much more complicated than it actually is. Evidences from the ground show that, individually taken, with or without war, there is very little West African governments can do to control what is going on at their borders, given their very weak institutional capacity (in terms of logistics, human and financial resources). A

vicious, and increasingly powerful and autonomous nest of criminality made up of rebel groups, mercenaries, arms smugglers, diamond dealers and timber traffickers has established a lawless and order-free zone in the area. Within this new “state of nature” proliferates a special kind of juicy chaos and remunerative mayhem for those engaged in and entertaining the business of producing and reproducing violence. In fact, havens of organized crime are taking control, at the expense of sovereign states, of entire portions of territory in the region. The challenges generated by this situation are far beyond the individual capacity of West African states to act as sovereign entities.

V. The Great Illusion of Being in Control II: An Illustration

In order to better understand how the perception of power and state boundaries in West Africa can sometimes be disconnected from the reality and negatively impact on crisis management, we take, as an illustration, the following “dialogue” between President Lansana Conté of Guinea and Siradou Diallo, leader of a (Guinean) political party called *Union pour le Progrès et le Renouveau*.

In January and February 2001, it was widely known that the Liberian rebel group ULIMO-K, which has been until now harassing the Liberian government from a safe haven established in the Guinean territory, was wrecking havoc at the border between Guinea and Liberia. Hysterically out of control rebels were looting, burning and killing Guinean local communities and Sierra Leonean and Liberian refugees, as well as international organizations and NGOs workers. In an interview on this situation, Siradou Diallo (whose political party has local representatives based in the region-- *Guinée forestière*--where these sad events were happening), confirmed that according to credible information obtained from his local representatives, and “in contrast to the affirmations of the government, ULIMO well and truly exists in the [Guinean] forest”. He concluded: “this is no longer a secret, ULIMO is now in control of certain [Guinean] areas in the region”¹¹

Reacting to the same situation, President Lansana Conté officially declared that this was simply not true. Rejecting the most abrasive evidence, as collected by the

United Nations, journalists, NGOs and local people, the Guinean leader declared that there was not such a thing like ULIMO in the torn apart area of Guinea. The only thing one could find there, he said, was “refugees in refugee camps.”

Notably, President Conté declared: “people speak about ULIMO. As for me, only refugees are found in Guinea.” At a certain point in his declaration, and certainly as a way of playing the situation down, the President, referring to Liberia’s accusations that Guinea was supporting the Liberian rebels from ULIOMO-K, ironically joked: “if there are people among refugees who do not like Mr. Taylor [President of Liberia], is it my fault?” Finally, he strongly warned that, if ever someone had the intention of attacking Guinea, “I will be there with my soldiers”.¹²

On the other side of the border, in Liberia the same illusion of being in control was obvious, this time on much more diplomatic grounds. In January 2001, using the same robust rhetoric aimed at confirming that not only there was a commander in chief in Liberia, but also, the commander in chief was fully in control, President Charles Taylor, after he (counter) accused Guinea of giving support to Liberian rebels, took two important decisions: (1) the Liberian Ambassador in Conakry was called back home (one of the gravest diplomatic decisions a Head of State would take in time of crisis) and, more importantly, (2) *the Government of Liberia decided to close its border with Guinea, as a way of protection from “possible attacks.”*¹³

When one knows that (1) Liberia shares nearly 600 kilometres of border with Guinea, (2) the area is nothing but a thick and tough jungle, (3) in terms of police and customs officers, the Government of Liberia can claim to “control” only a tiny portion of this hostile jungle, the whole story about “closing up the border” just sounds surrealist.

Thus, in the Mano River basin, while decision-makers continue to assert their faith in territorial integrity and boundary inviolability and to act as if their power to protect (close and open at will) national borders is effective, tangible facts point toward another direction and show the reality of extremely porous and

indefensible boundaries with cross-border flows of refugees, insurrectional movement and organized crime. For instance, at the height of violence in neighbouring Liberia and Sierra Leone, Guinea, a country not at war at that time, found itself hosting a huge number of refugees, between 500,000 and 700,000 (roughly 10% of the Guinean population). Guinea then became, according to UNHCR standards, the number one country on the list of the “top four refugee-hosting countries in Africa”.¹⁴ This situation has not substantially changed, as shown by the following table.

Table 1: Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in the Mano River Basin¹⁵

Refugees and IDPs in the MRB				
	Guinea	Liberia	Sierra Leone	TOTAL
IDPs	200,000- 250,000	78,000	31,000	762,000
Refugees	170,000	55,000	25,000	250,000

VI. Towards a New Vision for National Security

It emerges from this specific environment that both the nature, as well as the meaning of “national security” are radically altered by circumstances.

Consequently, they need to be theoretically reconceptualized and practically rethought.

The porous nature of West African borders and the consequent endemic cross-border violence are just symptoms of a deeper crisis, which is the crisis of territoriality and sovereignty. If preventive diplomacy is to be efficient in West Africa, this fact must absolutely be taken into consideration.

Territorial and boundary conflicts within or between sovereign states generally take the form of claims over territory, either in terms of self-determination and

partition or of decentralization and autonomy. In West Africa, problems are paradoxically both less and more complicated than this classical pattern. The legality of borders is not generally questioned. Problems arise most often from the porosity of boundaries and the lack of state capacity to effectively have control over what is going on in these areas.¹⁶

Two great consequences of this situation are that:

- It renders futile the African Union's sacrosanct principles of territorial integrity and intangibility of colonial boundaries,¹⁷ and,
- It deeply challenge preventive diplomacy endeavours, since these endeavours are essentially based on the assumption that (1) states are sovereign and (2) these sovereign states are fully in control of their legal territory.

In a context of essentially porous borders with boundless violence percolating across state territorial limits, officially consecrated frontiers become not only meaningless, but also useless.¹⁸ If we really need to tackle the scourge of armed conflict in the region, there is a need to reconsider the official meaning of state boundaries and territorial integrity in West Africa. This process of border reconsideration must be accompanied by a contextual redefinition of what, in the light of current circumstances, has to be called "national security". For the sake of collective peace and regional security, a psychological adjustment of the perception of "national boundaries" and "state sovereignty" is necessary.

As long as it would remain impossible for *the ensemble* of the political authorities of West Africa to build a genuine vision of shared security threats (and hopes)¹⁹, as related to the specific nature of their borders, sustainable peace will remain unattainable and diplomatic endeavours will produce only little marginal benefit, as has been the case for the last decade with the extremely difficult Sierra Leonean peace process for instance.

Some challenging questions come in mind that highlight the great difficulty in striving to make peace in one country without taking into consideration its close neighbourhood:

- How, for instance, to achieve conflict resolution and genuine reconciliation in Côte d'Ivoire today when tension remains high between this country and neighbouring Burkina Faso?
- How to expect durable peace and sustainable post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone as long as the relationships with neighbouring Liberia remain under great tension?
- What would be the chances for lasting peace and stability in Guinea if the current tension and suspicion between Guinea and Liberia remain the order of the day in the relationship between the two countries?

Given these circumstances, we certainly need more than official (or "Track-One") diplomacy to get out of the crisis of armed violence in West Africa. While peace efforts from governments and intergovernmental organizations are going on, it is necessary to give more solid chances to grassroots and community-oriented (or "Track-Two") diplomacy. In other words, as a way of boosting and strengthening, on a complimentary basis, ongoing official peace efforts from politicians and diplomats, it is crucial to dig into the high peace potential of local communities in general and among cross-border ethnic groups and villages in particular.

Experience shows that communities living across state borders most often host great potential for both hostility and conviviality, "discord and collaboration."²⁰

Today sophisticated conflict resolution and crisis management techniques in community peacebuilding and violence prevention are available that can help in selectively promoting and consolidating conviviality over hostility and collaboration over discord.

Notes and references

¹ ECOWAS' member states are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.

² See for instance the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), "Development for Peace Programme in the Mano River Basin Countries for Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone", Consultative meeting of United Nations and other partners, Addis Ababa, 29 October 1999; ECA, "Working Group on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development in the Mano River Union Countries", Conakry, 23-24 March 2000.

³ Robin White, "Liberia: Face to Face", *BBC Focus on Africa*, October-December 2000, pp. 14-16. Roughly at the same period, a high authority of the Ministry of Territorial Administration in Guinea many times repeated to the author "there would never be such a thing like peace or security in Guinea, if there is no peace and security, *at the same time* [he emphasized], in Sierra Leone and Liberia".

⁴ Conakry was then (and is still) convinced that Charles Taylor was bringing his support to the insurrectional groups striving, from the border with Liberia, to overthrow President Lansana Conté from power.

⁵ See for instance "UNHCR is appealing to authorities throughout West Africa and to the international community to help locate and secure the release of Ms. Sapeu Laurence Djeya, a national of Côte d'Ivoire. Witnesses said Ms. Djeya was last seen Sunday morning being taken away by armed men who shot and killed the UNHCR head of office in Macenta, Mr. Mensah Kpognon." (UNHCR communiqué, 17.09.2000).

⁶ James B. Bleetan, "LURD Splits: Damate Konneh Threatens to Kill Joe Wylie," 24 April 2002, in <http://www.allaboutliberia.com/april2002/220424n5.htm>. An independent and credible source, namely Human Rights Watch, confirms that among LURD fighters are "combatants from the former warring factions in Sierra Leone. Human Rights Watch has interviewed numerous Sierra Leonean ex-combatants from the Kamajors, the West Side Boys, and RUF who have been recruited by the LURD as mercenaries since January 2001." In HRW, "The LURD Forces", <http://www.hrw.org/reports/2002/liberia/liberia0402-02.htm>.

⁷ MPCl: Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire ; MPIGO: Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest ; Mouvement pour la Justice et la Paix.

⁸ Says President Eyadema of Togo: "If calm does not prevail [in Côte d'Ivoire] and the population does anything to create a social explosion, the spill-over effect will cause a disaster in the entire sub-region", Ebow Godwin, "Why Gbagbo Gov't Wants Eyadema's Intervention", *Ghanaian Chronicle*, 4 February 2003.

⁹ Anatole Ayissi, *Cooperating for Peace in West: An Agenda for the 21st Century*, United Nations, Geneva, 2001.

¹⁰ A declaration to the author by a journalist in Conakry (Guinea), December 2000.

¹¹ Siradou Diallo, interview in *L'œil*, 7-13 février 2001, pp. 4-5.

¹² « Le général-Président Lansana Conté au Bureau Politique du PUP », in *La Chronique*, 24 janvier 2001, pp. 5-6.

¹³ « Taylor : 'Le Libéria peut vivre sous l'embargo' », *La Guinée Actuelle*, 2-9 février 2001, p. 10.

¹⁴ The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, November 1999. *Africa Fact Sheet* (Geneva: UNHCR). The list of four, as on November 1999: Guinea: 489,000; Sudan: 391,000; Tanzania: 343,900 and Ethiopia: 262,000 refugees.

¹⁵ US Agency for International Development (USAID), "Mano River Countries Complex Emergency Situation Report", 12 Jun 2002. See also OCHA and UNHCR websites.

¹⁶ On territory as an object of claim and the different preventive diplomacy strategies used to preclude violence escalation in territorial claims, see for instance: Anatole Ayissi, "Preventing Escalation in Territorial Claims", in I. William Zartman (ed.), *Preventive Negotiation: Avoiding Conflict Escalation*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001.

¹⁷ "The [African] Union shall function in accordance with the following principles: (a) Sovereign equality and interdependence among Member States of the Union; (b) Respect of borders existing on achievement of independence...", Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4.

¹⁸ "Anarchy" is used here in its etymological sense as a wild environment with no paramount ordering power where different independent poles of authority (and violence) operate in an autonomous way.

¹⁹ Such a vision of shared peace interests and threats is already a reality at the level of civil society. See for instance: "Resolutions and Commitments of the Civil Society Organizations of the Mano River Union Countries for Promoting Peace", a document signed on 2 February 2001 by 11 West African NGOs in Accra; "Joint Statement of the Meeting Held Between Inter-Faith Council of Liberia and the Religious Groups of Guinea", a document signed in Conakry by 8 West African NGOs on the 23 September 1999; "Report on a Peace Mission to Three West African Countries: Guinea, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast, by a Delegation of the Inter-Faith Council of Liberia", Monrovia, October 1999.

²⁰ Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics*, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 9th edition, 1991.