

Globalisation and Insecurity in the 21st Century

A draft discussion paper circulated for comment

Susan Willett
UNIDIR
Geneva

October 2000

We look forward to receiving your comments (swillett@unog.ch)

Introduction

For much of the 1990s globalisation was proclaimed a panacea for all economic ills and a force for global political stability as societies around the world became integrated into the global capitalist system. The argument was premised upon two suppositions; firstly, that free trade and unfettered markets encourages economic growth which in turn enhances the living standards of the poor, and in so doing reduces the tensions and conflict about the distribution of resources; secondly, economic interdependence renders war unprofitable, because if a country's main markets risk being destroyed, war is unlikely to be initiated for reasons of vested economic interests. In this manner economic interdependence was thought to reduced the previous lack of altruism of the dominant nation states and encourage greater co-operative behaviour on a global scale through a process of collective self-interest.

This optimistic view of globalisation has, however, been subject to increasing contestation. A growing body of research has draw attention to the ways in which globalisation has marginalised the poor and concentrated wealth into the hands of an already privileged global elite. Others have highlighted the social and economic hardships imposed upon the poor as a result of the debt crisis and structural adjustment programmes. In a world of finite resources the polarisation of wealth and power has its corollary in the growing levels of poverty, human insecurity, weapons proliferation, crime and violent conflict in the periphery of the global economy. For others the fragmentation and social dislocation caused by globalisation in the periphery of the global economy is for certain analysts the principle cause of post-Cold War of global disorder.

The financial crisis in East Asia in 1997-98, lent considerable weight to those arguments that have emphasised globalisations destabilising effects. In the space of a few months the East Asian crisis reversed many of the development gains that had been achieved within the region over the previous two decades. The socio-economic hardship and in some cases (Indonesia) violent conflict which has accompanied the market adjustments, revealed the destabilising nature of unregulated global financial markets.

Nevertheless, mounting protests around the world about the deleterious effects of globalisation have so far had little effect on transforming the policies of the dominant multilateral organisations (WTO, IMF and World Bank) who actively promote the neo-liberal agenda that underpins the present phase of globalisation. Rather than reform the structural forces which are generating instability, the dominant world powers, in particular the United States, have responded to the deteriorating global order, via a process of remilitarisation and rearmament, which reinforces rather than addresses the problems of global instability and insecurity.

In tackling these issues this chapter is divided into four discrete sections. The first part looks at the effects of globalisation on human security, the second at the trend between globalisation and patterns of weapons proliferation while the third part analyses the strategic responses of the dominant military powers to the new security challenges . The final section suggests at an alternative approach to global development, which is aimed at enhancing rather than exacerbating security and stability. Breaking out of this vicious cycle of insecurity requires a new approach to global development and security which address the underlying asymmetries and inequities in the global economic structure.

I. Globalisation and Human Security

The current neo-liberal preoccupation with the benefits of globalisation, which have been hailed as the great panacea for all the worlds economic problems, has done little for the 1.3 billion people whose economic circumstances have stagnated or deteriorated in poverty over the last ten years. The neo-liberal idea that somehow the benefits of global economic growth will 'trickle down' to the worlds poor, has been

challenged by the stark reality of the experience in the worlds poorest societies. Kenneth Galbraith once described trickle-down theory using a less than elegant metaphor, when he said that 'if you feed a horse with enough oats some will pass through to the road for the sparrows'. The empirical evidence gathered by the UNDP in its annual Human Development Report's strongly indicates that globalisation has resulted in a severe fissure between the 'winners and the losers' in unfettered global markets.

Some stark UNDP figures summarise the balance of poverty , which will be argued here to be the root cause of most physical insecurity towards the end of the 20th century:

- More than a quarter of the developing world's people still live in poverty as measured by the UNDPs human poverty index (HPI). About a third of total global population, 1.3 billion, live on incomes of less than \$1 a day.

- Sub-Saharan Africa has the highest proportion of people in poverty, some 220 million people. It is estimated that by 2000 half the people in Sub-Saharan Africa will live in poverty.

- Eastern Europe and the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) have seen the greatest deterioration in their living standards in the past decade. Poverty has spread from a small proportion of the population to about a third. There, 120 million people live on less than \$4 a day.

- Certain groups of people are particularly vulnerable to poverty - these include children, women and the aged. An estimated 160 million children are moderately or severely malnourished, and some 110 million receive no education. Women are disproportionately poor and often dis-empowered. Their lack of access to land, credit and better employment opportunities inhibits their ability to be able to improve their economic circumstances. The aged are often live their final years in acute poverty and neglect.

Widespread economic collapse in the periphery has undermined the social cohesion of many societies exposing the fragility of developing states and their inability to extend basic security to their citizens. The plight of the poor, the marginalised and the displaced are only taken seriously when they become a threat to the perceived global order. The resources required to eradicate poverty are a mere fraction of the resources available in the global economy. Nevertheless the political elites of the North appear increasingly reluctant to respond constructively. The Special Advisor to the UNDP has warned 'The cost of accelerated action must be measured against the cost of allowing poverty to grow - that is against continuing political conflict and instability, poverty and disease and affronts to human sensibilities.

The Economics of Conflict

The deep polarisation of wealth that has become a structural feature of the global economy has been identified as one of the major threats to future peace and security in the coming millennium. Conflict theorists have for some time been at pains to point out that the unequal distribution of wealth and the failure to meet basic human needs constitute a source of structural violence that lies at the heart of the many conflicts. Distributional inequalities are of course not the not the only trigger of violent conflict.

The French writer Alain Minc in his book *Le Nouveau Moyen Age* has noted that the the collapse of bi-polarity, the weakening of the developmental state and the shift of power from the weaker to stronger states has resulted in a loss of security in a growing number of regions around the world, referred to as zones grises. The latter are characterised as regions where state legitimacy and the rule of law has broken down. Collapsing states are defined by Zartman as 'a situation where the structure, authority (legitimate power), law, and political order have fallen apart'. Minc's zones grise are on the increase with the greatest concentration in Sub-Saharan and the former Soviet Union. In such regions authority and power are increasingly divided between what is left of the formal institutions of the state, (which are invariably corrupt), local warlords and gang or mafia leaders.

Minc's zones grise are largely composed of states where economic collapse poses a serious threat to basic human security. Human security is here defined as freedom from fear and freedom from want. Poverty, the basic factor undermining human security, not only leaves basic needs unmet, but creates the conditions for conflict and violence, as groups compete for access to scarce and often diminishing resources. The relationship between poverty and conflict is evident when one examines the list of impoverished countries at war or emerging from conflict situations. At the time of writing in March 2000 of the 34 poorest counties in the world, nine were engaged in conflict (Angola, Afghanistan; Eritrea, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo ,Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Somalia), while a further twelve (Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Djibouti, Haiti, Liberia, Mali; Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda, and Yemen) are currently under-going the fragile process of transition from conflict to peace.

The majority of countries engaged in conflict are based in Sub-Saharan Africa where development has failed to take hold. According to the World Bank, the minimum requirement for a basic standard of living is an annual income of \$370. In 1998 the average per capita income in Sub-Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa) was \$316 per annum, life expectancy at birth was 50 years, infant mortality was 92 per

1000 live births and illiteracy was 40% of the population over the age of 15. The average annual growth of real gross domestic product has fallen from 2.5% between 1985-1989 to 1.9% between 1990-1997.

Table 1 :Average Annual Percentage Rate of Growth In Selected Sub-Saharan African Countries
1975-84 1985-89 1990-97

Angola	- 4.7	-1.6
Burundi	3.8	5.1 -2.8
Cameroon	8.5	-0.1 -0.9
Congo, Democratic Republic	-0.3	1.7 -6.7
Ethiopia	4.1	3.5
Gambia	4.3	3.3 2.4
Kenya	4.7	5.9 2.1
Liberia	0.1	-1.2 -
Mozambique	- 6.0	4.2
Rwanda	6.8	2.9 -5.5
Sierra Leone	2.0	0.8 -3.3
Sudan	2.6	0.9 -
Zambia	0.2	2.3 -0.4

Source :World Bank Data 1998

Facing extremes of economic deprivation and threats to basic human security (life, food, shelter, income), the widespread resort to arms within Sub-Saharan Africa can be understood as a Darwinian bid for survival. In the absence of a state that is able to provide basic safety nets or basic security, individuals or communities will resort to their own solutions. Darwinian survival takes a variety of forms: from sporadic and localised banditry as in Mozambique, where ex-combatants have failed to secure employment in civilian life and returned to the use of the gun as a means of survival, to the violent and organised crime as in South Africa, where mugging, car hijacking and burglary are popularly referred to as 'distribution by other means'. Alternatively it has taken on a more structured form, as in the case of warlordism in Somalia, representing as it does an alternative structure of economic and political power, in the absence of a state.

In some cases these new centres of authority have adopted organisational forms that represent alternative forms of government. Although they engage in activities declared illegal by the formal state, many of their functions imitate the characteristics of formal state activities. Authority is exercised through established power structures and obedience is rewarded and disobedience punished often with the use of violence. The pervading culture of violence undermines attempts at conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Under such circumstances the risk to life and property have substantially grown: a situation which is compounded by the ready availability and abundant flows of small arms.

Warlords in many parts of Sub-Saharan Africa are inter alia engaged in a struggle for control over strategic assets such as mines or oil (Sierra Leone, DRC, Liberia, Angola). In this pursuit, warlords often secure support from multinational companies that have a vested interest in maintaining access to profitable natural resources. Multinational companies operating in regions of conflict are also known to hire the services of mercenary groups such as Executive Outcomes and Sandline who often secure payment in lucrative mining concessions. In this manner international capital rewards and reinforces the indigenous structures of violence enhancing militarised solutions to resource disputes and often inadvertently undermining legitimate state or international resolution to conflict. Mercenary groups who profit well out of such disputes have few incentives to see a peaceful resolution to conflict.

The resort to violence, while benefiting certain militarised actors, interrupts normal economic activity, inhibits inward investors and increases the sense of personal insecurity and tension within these societies and regions. But far from being the irrational responses as some liberal scholars would have us believe, these 'post-modern' forms of violence, are in fact highly rational in a situation of economic scarcity where there are few choices for survival.

As these organisation become established and flourish they have developed their own trade and communications networks that operate outside the formal global economy but have become an enduring feature of globalisation. The economic activities of warlords and organisations such as the Russian Mafia and the Colombian drug cartels have rapidly developed into powerful and clandestine transnational networks with operations in the international drugs trade, prostitution and illicit arms business. The international linkages between powerful criminal groups are as much a feature of the current structures of globalisation as are the formal linkages through which legal economic transactions take place.

11: The Means of Destruction in the Periphery

One of the factors contributing to the intensity of violence and to the growing levels of physical insecurity in the growing number of zones of crises around the world is the increased availability of arms, particularly small arms.

As a result of the downsizing of military forces since the end of the Cold War there has been a cascading of surplus or second hand weapons onto the global market much of which has found its way into intra-state conflicts, especially in those situations where the state has ceased to exert control. The widespread proliferation of small arms, is particularly alarming as they are responsible for most of the deaths in contemporary intra-state conflicts. Huge numbers of small arms were supplied by the super-powers into conflict zones around the world during the Cold war.

Small arms typically weigh less, cost less, are more portable and less visible than major conventional weapons. Weapons in this class do not require extensive logistical and maintenance capability, and are capable of being carried by a combatant or by a light vehicle. This category includes assault rifles, hand grenades, rocket launchers, landmines and explosives. The mobility and ruggedness of these arms ensures their constant circulation and supply into new conflict situations, which in turn contributes to the duration and intensity of hostilities. Often small arms transfers affect the balance of power between warring factions and are therefore identified as one of the 'triggers' to internal conflict by spreading fear and insecurity - conditions which in turn are largely responsible for the existence of millions of refugees and internally displaced people.

Much of the supply of small arms is legal, but there has been a dramatic rise in illicit trade in weapons. As United Nations embargoes have increased and an growing number of conflicts involve non-state actors, black market suppliers have become important sources of supply. Other sources of illicit supply have been through theft from government arsenals, ambushes designed to seize arms and sub-national groups conducting arms deals with each other. Apart from being used in armed conflict these weapons are increasingly used in armed robberies, hijacking, terrorism, the stealing of livestock, drug trading and smuggling.

Where light weapons are widely distributed in a society, development organisations and humanitarian agencies have found it increasingly difficult to conduct their work which has led to a decrease in donor aid in regions of violence. More generally it has encouraged a general process of disengagement by the major military powers from regions of violent conflict or to new military strategies that emphasis over the horizon engagement which reduce the threat of engagement on the ground.

111. Globalisation and defence production

Although it is predominately small arms which are used in the intra-state conflicts which are proliferating in sub-Saharan Africa, the Balkans and Central Asia, there is also a worrying trend in the proliferation of more conventional weapon systems.

In the past the major military powers considered the unilateral command of high technology weapon systems as a crucial strategic asset. However, with the end of the Cold War budgetary constraints have intensified and military technology has rapidly been turned into export commodities. Krause's history of the diffusion of military technology demonstrates that the leading edge in military technology has never been maintained for long periods and that the arms trade has been instrumental in the proliferation of military technology. Periods of qualitative innovation have always been followed by export driven proliferation. The current situation bears all the hall marks of a new age of export driven proliferation, for despite calls for multilateral controls on the arms trade and 'dual-use' technologies, the major military powers are engaged in intensive arms export drives in order to maintain defence industrial capacities.

As competition has become more cut throat and as buyers' power has been enhanced there has been a qualitative escalation in the transfer of arms and related technologies. Buyers have become increasingly adept at extracting concessions from suppliers eager to secure sales. The more industrially advanced buyers have insisted on the transfer of technological know-how in order to build-up their indigenous defence industrial capacity. A number of mechanisms have been developed to facilitate the transfer of technology such as direct industrial offsets, buy back programmes, joint production and joint development. Through such mechanisms the defence companies in the developing world have become integrated into the growing web of transnational production, supply and service of advanced military technology. At the same time some of the large defence companies from the major military powers have begun relocating the production of sub-components to the more industrialised developing countries in order to take advantage of cheaper factor inputs and to gain a better access to local and regional markets. These are early stages in the globalisation of defence production and have raised concern about the security implications of the diffusion of military technology.

At the centre of the current phase of the globalisation of the defence sector is the importance of

technology as a factor of defence industrial competitiveness and the emergence of civil innovation as the driver of technological change. During the 1970s and 1980s technological advances in IT, driven by commercial market demand began to outstrip military sector innovations. Civilian technology has diffused into defence products rather than vice versa.

As a result of the adoption of value for money procurement systems, military products increasingly rely on a pool of technology deriving from civil industries, thereby blurring the traditional demarcation between civil and military production. Commercial rather than military forces are increasingly determining the geo-spatial structure of the arms industry. Global restructuring on these lines makes attempts to stem global weapons proliferation ever more complex and challenging.

The paradox of participation in a more liberal and permissive arms market is that the main military powers have resorted to developing ever more sophisticated military technology in order to maintain a leading edge against the military equipment that they are exporting around the world. This technologically driven arms race has ensured the survival of the armaments culture which was previously nurtured during the Cold War.

IV. The Means of Destruction at the Leading Edge

The problems stemming from intra-state conflicts and the proliferation of weapon systems has helped to undermine the general mood of optimism that inculcated US foreign and security policy at the beginning of the 1990s. The ignoble defeat of US peace enforcement operations in Somalia in 1994, the genocide in Rwanda and the unremitting nature of ethnic cleansing in the Balkans has produced a more pessimistic view of the 'new global order' at the turn of the millennium. Such events have resulted in waning support for humanitarian intervention to halt massive human rights abuses or even genocide. In its place there is growing advocacy for 'conflict management' which appears to correspond to an increasingly selective and conditional approach to the funding of interventionist, 'humanitarian' activity by Western powers.

Academically the mood of pessimism about the deteriorating post-Cold War order has been reflected in the work of scholars such as Robert Kaplan, Matthew Connolly Paul Kennedy and Samuel Huntington who have collectively painted grim pictures of a future world embroiled in chaos, full of malevolent hordes intent on destabilising global law and order and undermining and destroying 'civilised' society. In essence the "new pessimists" have reverted to a Hobbesian view of global politics in which the international system is viewed as a state of anarchy where the strong dominate the weak and in which self-protection alone can guarantee security. Much follows politically, diplomatically and militarily if one accepts such precepts.

Since the routing of US troops from Somalia in 1994 the US public has displayed a deep seated reluctance to tolerate casualties in overseas operations. In avoiding direct military intervention, much effort and resources have been put into military technologies that enable 'over the horizon intervention' which allows military reprisals without committing soldiers to the battlefield. The use of such strategies was exemplified by the cruise missile attacks on Sudan in 1998 and the NATO use of Tomahawk missiles against the Serbs in 1999.

This strategic shift to reliance on 'over the horizon' high-tech weaponry is reflected most graphically in the so-called revolution in military affairs (RMA). RMA involves the use of a number of advanced technologies like overhead surveillance, global mapping, instant video-feeds, satellite link-ups, interactive fibre optic networks, computer simulations, etc. that creates the technical ability to fight war with minimum casualties and at arms length. The power of RMA, (at least in theory), lies in its ability to collapse distance by bringing the 'there' here in near real-time and with near-verisimilitude, what the US Army refers to as the 'fifth dimension' in global warfare.

In theory at least, RMA is designed to create a strategic as well as comparative advantage in the production and utilisation of the means of destruction. But it also creates huge military technological asymmetries which may encourage more developing states to resort to weapons of mass destruction as the only guarantor of deterrence against the overwhelming technological superiority of an increasingly isolationist and belligerent United States.

This incongruity has not been lost on certain US politicians. In November 1997 William Cohen, Secretary of Defence, warned 'Indeed, a paradox of the new strategic environment is that American military superiority actually increases the threat of nuclear, biological and chemical attacks against us by creating incentives for adversaries to challenge us asymmetrically. These weapons may be used as a tool of terrorism against the American people'. In this sense the RMA may create its own 'security dilemma' reducing rather than enhancing national and global security. The perception of threat from the weapons of mass destruction has encouraged US military planners to redefine US nuclear deterrence. The conclusion of a review of the US nuclear posture conducted in 1994 and the reiteration of a Presidential Directive

(PDD) in 1997 commits the US to maintain a robust triad of strategic forces based on leading edge technologies and in sufficient numbers to double the size of the START 11 force as a hedge against political reversals in the Russian Federation or elsewhere. Such trends indicate a deeply entrenched reluctance to contemplate significantly reduced reliance on nuclear weapons.

With conventional weapons (and despite open recognition of the destabilising effects of the technological asymmetries between the US military and the rest of the world) US military planners persist in their preoccupation with long range precision bombing capabilities, intercontinental ballistic missiles and missile defences, amphibious operations and the use of carrier based air power, satellites, automated battlefields and cyberwarfare . Such technologies come at a price. As a consequence the US Administration is seeking a substantial increase in military expenditures of \$12.6 billion for the FY '00 which will take US military expenditure up to \$280.8 billion. Some \$1.3 billion is for the National Missile Defence (NMD) programme

If these recent developments in strategic planning are any indication , the coming years may indicate a deepening isolationism and a tendency to concur less importance to arms control and diplomacy in favour of the use of military instruments and sovereign defence. The US fixation with technological solutions to meet the uncertainties of the global security environment seems to provide evidence that more collective and liberal sentiments expressed in the early 1990s are giving way to more traditionalist approaches to international relations.

Resorting to a strategy of rearmament in response to an increasingly insecure and unstable world is unlikely enhance either global security or indeed the security of the United States itself. While the structural violence of the global systems persists such responses can only exacerbate tensions and instability around the world. What is needed is a radically different approach to both economics and security.

V. An Alternative Vision

In the Human Development Report of 1994, the UNDP warned that 'it is not possible for the community of nations to achieve any of its major goals - not peace, not environmental protection, not human rights or democratisation, not fertility reduction nor social integration - except in the context of sustainable development that leads to human security.' The emphasis placed on sustainable development rather than more orthodox economic growth strategies derives from a realisation that neo-liberal policies of development based on material enrichment as measured by GNP per capita, have not necessarily improved the conditions of the vast majority of the populations of the developing countries of the world. In fact, despite growth in GNP, poverty and deprivation has been on the increase and with it a growing incidence of insecurity and violence.

The paradigm of sustainable human development values human life for itself. It does not value life simply because people can produce or consume material goods. Nor does it value one person's life over another. In this paradigm, no human being ought to be condemned to a short life just because they are born in a certain region or country, are a certain race or sex. Development should allow individuals the choice to explore their human potential to the full and to put their capabilities to best use. The universal right to life is the link between the needs of human development in the present and those of the future - especially the needs for environmental preservation and regeneration. The strongest argument for protecting the environment is the right of future generations to opportunities similar to the ones earlier generations have enjoyed.

The universal right to life is also the common thread which binds the notion of sustainable human development to that of human security. The fear or the reality of want and of physical threat are the major factors that contribute to the insecurity for the poor and marginalised in the developing world. For far too long the concept of security has been tied to the idea of territorial security, the protection of national interests in foreign policy (or the idea of global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust). These concepts overlooked the fact that for many millions of people the greatest threats to their security come from disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards. Human security is therefore concerned with economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security. They are interdependent. Furthermore when human security of people is endangered anywhere in the world, other nations are often drawn in. The problems of famine, disease, drug trafficking, terrorism, ethnic disputes and social disintegration know no borders. Their consequences traverse the globe. Thus the provision of guarantees for human security to those most threatened in their daily lives ensures greater global security. Replacing a global economic system which marginalises and impoverishes people with one that provides sustainable livelihoods is a starting point for guaranteeing human security for all. In tackling the deprivation of the Third World, the UNDP argues that in future the world must move away from concern with economic

growth as an end in itself to one which promotes pro-poor growth through education, employment, access to land and to credit for small businesses for those presently marginalised.

In the sense in which sustainable human development provides an ethical and normative framework that conforms with certain fundamental universal moral values about the right to life and freedom of choice, it can also be viewed as a tool for conflict prevention and local and regional security. The UNDP concludes that states spending relatively little on defence and more on human development have been more successful at defending their national sovereignty than those spending heavily on arms. By way of illustration the relatively peace-ful histories of low defence spenders such as Botswana, Costa Rica and Mauritius can be compared with the conflicts afflicting ex ante high military spenders such as Iraq, Myanmar and Somalia.

Long-term sustainable development is required not just to alleviate grinding poverty but as a key strategy for conflict prevention and political stabilisation. Current and future development potential is hindered by trade disadvantages, the debt crisis, environmental exploitation and political instability. If these issues are to be addressed head on, the international community needs to build an integrated approach towards the issues of economics, security and development and one that is grounded in a new culture of peace and security.

Attempts to articulate an alternative value system for the global political economy are also to be found in the Alternative Declaration produced by the NGO Forum at the Copenhagen Summit. It lays stress on equity, participation, self-reliance and sustainable human development. In so doing it rejects the economic liberalism accepted by the governments of the North and South, seeing it as a path to aggravation rather than the alleviation of the global social crisis.'

The recognition of the need to manage economic reforms in such a way as to enhance rather than undermine political stability has been forced rather reluctantly on the agendas of the Washington institutions by the experience of the East Asian crisis. It has opened the way to an acknowledgement that governments must be fully involved in defining the reform process and that programmes must not be imposed formulaically but instead tailored to each country's particular political and economic circumstances. But if economic inequality is to be effectively challenged as a source of structural violence, the international institutions need to do far more than simply tinker with reforms. There needs to be a fundamental transformation of the ideological foundations upon which these institutions legitimise themselves. Global security will not be enhanced until such time as the existing economic orthodoxy is challenged and replaced.

VI. Conclusion

The turn of the millennium witnesses an increase in tensions between - on the one hand - the centres of wealth and power that have so far gained from globalisation and - on the other - broad swathes of global society which are condemned to remain marginalised and impoverished at the periphery of the global system. These trends are unequivocally contributing to an intensification of North-South tensions.

The US quest for military, technological solutions to global insecurity reflects an inappropriate and potentially destabilising response to many security problems which have their roots in the deep seated inequities of the global economic and political system. If we adhere to Clausewitz's maxim that war is an extension of politics then contemporary conflicts which are rooted the deep inequalities produced by the global economic system are unlikely to be resolved by military technological solutions. On the contrary the introduction and use of RMA and a growing reliance on Ballistic Missile Defences and nuclear weapons are likely to make the global security environment more insecure and less stable.

We have entered a difficult phase of transition in which globalisation has already had a profound impact on the reordering of the global strategic environment, but this has not dispersed political power to the point where orthodox strategic assessments have lost their salience. For classical balance of power assessments are being imposed on a world in which the boundaries between communities are blurred and traditional centres of power diluted. Moreover the methods used to ensure security in one arena are precisely those that undermine it in another.

If the international community is to address the current causes of violence a wholly different approach is required, one that addresses global inequities and recognises the need for transformational forces that are based on a different value system than those that are at present being promoted through almost all of the international institutions.