



*PRACTICAL DISARMAMENT FOR ENHANCING
HUMAN SECURITY
PARTICIPATORY ASSESSMENT OF WEAPONS
COLLECTION: A SUMMARY OF THE LESSONS
LEARNED FROM UNIDIR'S WEAPONS FOR
DEVELOPMENT PROJECT*

MALI CASE STUDY

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I. INTRODUCTION

This paper is part of the research findings of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) Weapons for Development Project. The experiences of UNIDIR are briefly discussed in this paper under four main themes.

- An overview of micro-disarmament schemes (weapons collection programmes)
- Weapons for Development (WfD) Approach.
- UNIDIR'S PM&E methodology in evaluating Weapons Collection Programmes.
- The key lessons learned from local and community level involvement in weapons collection, which is detailed discussed under the followings sub-headings:
 - (i) What are the salient issues to consider when researching in conflict, SALW or violence related issues?
 - (ii) What are the required field research conduct, behaviour and ethics?
 - (iii) How do we build a sense of ownership in the whole research process, when researching on SALW and violence related subjects?
 - (iv) How do we design and implement weapons collection programmes and incentive schemes.
 - (v) What are the criteria for determining success or failure or Impact and performance indicators?
 - (vi) What are characteristics of weapons collection and the incentive schemes for communities to participate in weapons collection and crime prevention
 - (vii) What are the best practices in weapons collection and weapons for development projects?
 - (viii) What are the constraints and the capacity-building needs for the local communities to get involved
 - (ix) How can local and community level disarmament schemes contribute to peace building and prevention of the re-occurrence of conflict.

II. OVERVIEW OF WEAPONS COLLECTION PROGRAMMES.

One of the recommended follow-up actions of the 2001 UN Programme of Action, was to develop and support action-oriented research aimed at facilitating greater awareness and better understanding of the nature and scope of the problems associated with' the illicit small arms trade (Section III, para. 18 of the

UNPoA). It is pursuant to implement this action and others related to it, that UNIDIR launched the Weapons for Development Project.

The implementation of UNPoA instigated a range of measures aimed at controlling the illicit proliferation of SALW, but in general these fall under the following headings:

- Reduction Measures;
- Preventive Measures and
- Coordination Measures.

The need for local and community level participation weapons collection or what can be termed “micro-disarmament”, which is the focus of this paper, falls mainly under Reduction Measures. Under the Reduction Measures, different types of incentive schemes have been tried in several different regions of the world before and after the coming into place of the UNPoA;

In Haiti and Eastern Slovenia, weapons-buy-back programmes, whereby a sum of money roughly equivalent to the market value of the items handed in, were put in place.

- In Nicaragua, token rewards—certificates signed by President Doña Violeta Chamorro—were given to ex-combatants when they returned their weapons.
- In South Africa, in addition to token rewards—a certificate signed by former President Mandela—each participant received gift vouchers to a local store and was entered in a raffle to win prizes up to \$25,000.
- In Mozambique, people handing in weapons were given farming tools.
- In Albania, Cambodia, and Mali weapons-for-development programmes—whereby the weapons collected from everyone resulted in development projects that would benefit the whole community (i.e. schools, roads, wells, etc.)—Were put in place.

This paper discusses the latter in details.

III. THE WEAPONS FOR DEVELOPMENT (WFD) APPROACH.

The Weapons for Development (WfD) is a strategy for micro-disarmament, in which illegally held weapons are collected and handed over to the legitimate authorities in exchange for developmental goods and services that benefit the whole community. This approach encourages the affected communities to collect weapons, with incentives being the area-based developmental projects that benefit the whole community. They differ from buy-backs and other programmes,

in that cash or any other incentive is not offered to an individual that possess a weapon, but instead to the whole community from which a weapon is collected. The approach tries to link development aid to weaponry surrender.

Background: Although, the WfD approach had been applied in weapons collection programmes, in many countries before; such as Mali, Nicaragua and others, the term “Weapons for Development” was first formally used in the disarmament literature in early 1998: In the wake of the Albanian conflict, a large amount of weaponry was looted and in the aftermath, the government of Albania requested assistance from the UN Secretary General in the development of a national strategy and programme to recover the looted weaponry. A UN assessment mission visited Albania in June 1998 to make a preliminary estimate of the options to assist Albania.

This mission concluded that a “Buy Back” scheme would not be suitable for Albania due to the following reasons;

- It would be very expensive because of the number of illegal weapons in circulation,
- Would have a major inflationary impact on an already fragile economy.
- Donors would not support a programme that rewarded the illegal actions of the population.

The mission recommended the development of a programme linking development aid to weapons surrender. This highly imaginative approach came to be formerly known as weapons for development.

The approach created a better local security environment, whilst promoting social and economic development and also proved more promising in this particular case than the more traditional approaches of “Guns for Goods”, “Buy Back” or a Directed programme.

UNIDIR project is evaluating such programmes, using a Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation (PM&E) techniques, with a view to understand better, how the affected communities can be involved in disarmament process, as well how these programmes can be implemented.

IV. UNIDIR'S PM&E APPROACH IN WEAPONS COLLECTION PROGRAMMES.

UNIDIR is applying the PM&E methodology to evaluate weapons collections programmes in countries where the WfD approach has been applied: The main goal of the project is: *to detail and document the lessons learned as well as the best practices drawn from the weapons collection and weapons for development programmes.*

What is PM&E? The PM&E methodology is a well-established research method and project evaluation. PM&E is defined as ‘collaborative problem solving through the generation and use of knowledge: a process that leads to corrective action by involving all levels of stakeholders in a shared decision making process. In particular, PM&E involves bringing people at the grass roots to actively participate in all stages of projects’ management including weapons collections.

PM&E has been successfully applied in various World Bank development projects since the 1980s. UNIDIR has only recently pioneered this methodology in the disarmament field, starting with Mali and later will apply it in Cambodia and Albania. This is after recognising that past approaches to evaluate weapon disarmament programmes have been conducted in a classical “consultants and clipboard” manner, with poor involvement of major stakeholders such as women, children, youth, older men and ex-combatants—rural, urban, or border communities. The technique can be applied to evaluate the whole processes involved in weapons collection—overall goal setting, identification and design, appraisal and implementation, monitoring and evaluation, effectiveness, relevancy and sustainability of the programmes. Different visual participatory tools are applied to encourage the participation of even the most silent member of the community.

By engaging people in problem-solving activities relevant to their immediate security, participation creates ownership, builds people’s confidence in themselves, and taps into local knowledge, information and expertise. If community members are to become more conscious and develop a genuine commitment to get rid of SALW and maintaining peace in their communities, then clearly they cannot be treated as passive when it comes to talk about the proliferation of SALW.

The preliminary research findings from Mali, so far reveal that by applying PM&E, a lot of salient issues, can be un-raveled, which would not be possible, when traditional methods (Clipboard) are used. PM&E is therefore a promising tool that will add value to understand better, the causes of violence as well as how communities can involve is stamping out the root causes and tools for violence (weapons, drugs, alcohol etc).

Recent trends in post-conflict countries such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone and Iraq, show the need for such an approach, but this cannot be done without first understanding the nitty-gritty of how its done. The development for a framework is therefore very vital at this time.

V. THE KEY LESSONS LEARNED FROM LOCAL AND COMMUNITY LEVEL DISARMAMENT SCHEMES.

Through the process, UNIDIR has learned several lessons. These are summarized under the following questions:

- (i) What are the salient issues to consider when researching in conflict, SALW or violence related issues?
- (ii) What are the required field research conduct, behaviour and ethics?
- (iii) How do we build a sense of ownership in the whole research process, when researching on SALW and violence related subjects?
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- (ix) How can local and community level disarmament schemes contribute to peace building and prevention of the re-occurrence of conflict.

A. Salient issues to consider when researching in conflict or SALW

From UNIDIR's experience of researching in conflict and other violence-prone areas, three issues are evident:

- More people choose not resort to violence than choose to do.
- Many communities don't resort to violence than do.
- When violence or war breaks out, many people don't involve in it, than do.

What is the implication? The implication of the above statements to a researcher, is that however violent, a situation may be, those directly involved and supporting the violent means are always fewer than those opposed to it. Some researchers have termed those that are opposed "***connectors or peace constituents***" which the researcher should lookout for to establish contact with. The peace constituents could be individuals or institutions and when identified can be used to deter people from getting far deeply involved in the violence.

UNIDIR's experience from Mali revealed that tribal chiefs, elders, religious leaders and village committees were very important connectors, who played significant role in the in the success of weapons collection programmes, and the general

removal of the so-called “culture of violence” from their communities. It is important to note that in spite of the war, famine and all their associated consequences such as displacements, killings, and these institutions survived and the traditional powers they held could not be completely eroded.

This finding dismisses the wrongly held notion of “culture of violence—(state of affairs beyond redemption) as apposed to systemic violence—which can be dampened and society resorts to its original peaceful norms once the causes of the violence are stamp dealt.

B. Required field research conduct, behaviour and ethics.

Local and community level involvement in weapons collection schemes or crime or violence prevention requires prior research. Researching in conflict zones is a challenge in itself, requiring a researcher to exhibit high quality conduct, behaviour and ethics. The lack of such tenets diminishes the chances for: Areas where sensitivity is vital include the following:

- The need to appropriate all levels of authority—community level upwards until an overall overview is reached; findings from the field should be correlated at different levels.
- Gaining access to places and information can require contacting the people in power—which is a highly politized act.
- While NGOs are an important component—as they can help access certain areas and assist in follow-up to research, researchers should be aware of the NGOs backgrounds.
- Over-relying on one source may obscure some issues—for some organizations, including NGOs, sometimes ignore issues that contradict their views.
- Getting a complete picture; to get as a complete picture as possible, one might need to look outside the “bad situation” as there may be other strategic areas where people might have relevant information, e.g. issues like the before situation when things were better or worse—depending on the prevailing situation.
- Also to be aware, that it is easier for a foreign researcher to be critical than a local researcher or NGO.

The issue of dishonest or questionable research

- Is the research for academic purposes, action or mere “research tourism”

- Discovery of some information, which agencies do not understand, may raise some concerns.
- Use of quick and dirty methods of extracting information e.g. accessing confidential files by bribing office messengers
- Behaving in a manner that may raise suspicion like hanging in corridors
- Raising expectations; the research needs to be clear about what will fall after the research
- The need for the community's voice to be heard— recognize that community voices are always missing in conflict and thus a need for sitting with people and talk.

“Respect”: is crucial element for successful research on any subject

- Understanding environmental issues that led to the conflict or made people to resort to violence
- Do not re-traumatize the population especially when asking questions
- Consciousness of people's norms, cultures, values and traditions.
- Power relations in a community, who controls what, what is the role of women?

Preparations before going to the field:

- The need for proper knowledge of the subject--being specific about the research aim, narrows down the sources.
- Be aware that no plan, however ingenious survives the reality: once in the field a researcher has to clarify the objectives and adjust the plans by choosing the most accessible field with the most representative community.
- Personal safety is very important, never send someone to do things, which you wouldn't do yourself.
- While the use of modern technology like email to contact NGOs and others based in the field for the news on the prevailing situation is vital, these may not exist in the field and such one has sometimes to rely on the experiences of people that have been in such areas, which is sometimes outdated.

- Gender issues; have a bearing on the outcome of the research, e.g. in order to access information from women, one needs to include a woman in the research team; people from a particular community or tribe may not be suitable in another tribe; this requires retraining, logistics and other valuable resources for the research.
- Clarity of terms of references for the hired local researchers and other contact persons; this needs to be agreed upon at the outset of the research so that at the end of the research, the researcher is not presented with bills beyond his budget.

Others crossing-cutting issues

- Avoiding professional bias;
- The lack of mutual partnership.
- Language problems.
- Lack of good rapport between the researchers, donors and local authorities.
- Lack of local control and awareness about the role of the researcher on a subject.

C. The need for “local ownership in the whole research process”

UNIDIR has also learned that ownership of the research process is as important as the outcome of the research itself. For action-oriented researches such as weapons collection, crime prevention etc, involving all the stakeholders right from the outset is very crucial. And when overall aim the research is to come up with a set of policy recommendations to be implemented by different practitioners, the process of arriving at these recommendations is even more important than the recommendations themselves.

What measures has UNIDIR pursued to build a sense of ownership among the stakeholders in its local and community level disarmament programmes?

Taking an example of the weapons for development project: The implementation of the project began in September 2002. Immediately the following measures were taken to inculcate a sense of ownership of the research process among the stakeholders.

A database of stakeholders: Possible stakeholders, both at the international and national levels were identified and database established. These include: governments, donors, UN and IGOs, research institutions and NGOs.

Consultations with the individual stakeholders: Individual consultations were undertaken in which the ideas UNIDIR had were explained. The stakeholders presented their points of views on the project. Several organizations based in Geneva and UK were visited. Others were contacted by email, telephone, fax and direct mail.

Direction Support Group (DSG): A DSG was formed comprising of members drawn from, UNHCR, UNDP, UNDDA, Africa Union, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, UN Quaker office, Geneva, Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex and the Government of Japan. The DSG gives the policy direction to the group.

Stakeholders Workshop: The individual consultation process was concluded with the Stakeholders Workshop, which was held in Geneva on 9 December 2002. 53 delegates including delegations from Sri-Lanka, Mali, Cambodia, Albania, Sierra Leone, and DR Congo attended it. The methodology to be applied in the research was introduced and participants gave their views on the various aspects of the project—deciding on the three final case study countries (originally ten countries; Angola, Albania, Cambodia, Brazil, DR Congo, Sri-Lanka, Mali, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone, Mozambique had been suggested). The draft conference report was sent to participants for their comments before it was finally published.

Developing the methodology: As the technical team developed the methodology, information was shared with practitioners in case study countries—whom the team had earlier identified as contact points. Where appropriate, these contact persons provided an input to the methodological development process. The DSG was also kept posted.

Country core team: At the national level in Bamako, Mali, the following agencies were identified as most suitable entry points:

- The ministry of Foreign Affairs—section responsible for Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW).
- The National Commission for Demobilisation and Reintegration.
- The UNDP Office.
- A local NGO practicing participatory methods.

- Several international organizations implementing programmes in the field of SALW were contacted and information was exchanged.

Coordination at national level: The National Commission for Demobilisation and Reintegration voluntarily accepted to coordinate all the above elements, prior to

the WfD team arrival in Mali¹. In consultation with other national stakeholders, suitable regions where the field research was to be conducted² were selected and a draft research programme was prepared prior to the arrival of the team in Bamako. All these steps were important for the WfD team; none among its members had ever been to Mali.

National Coordination meeting: This meeting was held in the NCDR office in Bamako and was attended by the relevant stakeholders. It revised the original plan to tailor it with the field reality. It finally decided that the research be conducted in only three areas: Lere, Gao City and Menaka (originally they were five). The reasons were that the results from these areas would be comparable and would provide a comprehensive evaluation, as they were rural, urban and border areas, respectively.

Final planning for the field: The team spent five days in Bamako, prior to going to the field, re-orienting the original plan; assembling a core field research team and logistics; contacting –by telephone, the local authorities and organizations in the field; inducting the locally recruited field researchers on the methodology and preparing their terms of reference and meeting and briefing stakeholders individually.

Field operational strategy: A field research strategy was mapped out which required the team to first meet and introduces itself to the local administration authorities, prior to carrying any field activities. This avoided suspicion and other issues of security concern to the authorities—since the research itself was a sensitive subject.

Involving Local Organizations: The local authorities identified local people who were trained in the PM&E methodology and who were also offered short-term contracts³. The local authorities and organizations offered venues for the meetings and also arranged general community meetings. The meetings were briefed on the purpose of the research and it was from these meetings that focus groups that conducted the whole research were formed (based on gender, age and/or according to other differences existing in their societies).

Field Code of Conduct: A code of conduct to guide the field research was developed with the trained local facilitators. One of its core elements was respect and carefully listening to the views of the participants.

A feedback on the preliminary research findings: After conducting the exercises, records of the proceedings would be read out to the participants to enable them crosscheck whether it was a true record of what they discussed:

¹ Col Sangare, the head of the Commission attended the 9 December Geneva Conference.

² On arrival to Bamako, the team reviewed some of the places that had been earmarked.

³ Although the team had requested that at-least fifty percent of the trainees be women, this was not done. The local authorities claimed that they were unable identify any woman for training.

- Local administrators in each area were debriefed on the findings
- At the regional level, the regional heads of government departments, other agencies and the press were debriefed on the preliminary research findings and they had the opportunity to clarify certain aspects.
- At the national level a meeting of national stakeholders—chaired by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was arranged and a debriefing on the research findings made. All the stakeholders made some clarifications where it was necessary.
- The team individually debriefed the UN Resident Coordinator and other organizations, which did not attend.

Conclusion

Almost all the stakeholders had an input in both the process and the final report that will come out. This process can be applicable to any project and at all levels—international, regional, national or community.

D. Designing and implementing weapons collections and incentive schemes.

UNIDIR has learnt that a certain criteria (might be situational specific) has to be followed when designing and implementing micro-disarmament projects. For instance, its preliminary research findings from Mali case study, have revealed that the following issues have to be put into consideration⁴:

Key findings on design and implementation

- Beneficiary Identification: Who are the weapons collection project or crime prevention intervention meant to benefit? Sometimes the beneficiaries are not put at the center when planning.
- What do the intended beneficiaries want: The need to listen to what the affected community is saying is very crucial.
- Problem identification: Has the problems been identified. If so what is the threat and how big is this threat.

Note: To arrive at these conclusions a combination of PM&E techniques, prominent among the following were applied:

- i) For determining the projects' **goal and purpose objectives settings**, the main technique applied was Force Field Analysis, plus a combination of others.
- ii) For the projects' **identification and design**, the main technique applied was Decision Making Pictures, plus a combination of others.
- iii) For the projects' **appraisal and implementation**, the main technique applied was Focus Group Interviews, plus a combination of others.
- iv) For the **projects' monitoring**, the main technique applied was Monitoring Form, plus a combination of others.
- v) For the projects' **evaluation**, the main technique applied was a Star Game, plus a combination of others.

(See appendix for the details)

- Root causes rather than manifestations: The interventions for a micro-disarmament intervention, should not be a reaction to the manifestations, but should rather address the underlying causes of the demand for weapons. Where is the threat rising from
- Reduction in the circulation of weapon: A weapons collection project should have an operational objective mainly aimed at reducing the number of weapon circulating in a given community or reducing the level of violence.
- Community Initiative: As much as possible the initiative to collect weapons should be community—driven rather than external. This automatically comes up as long as the community is confronted with violence and crime.
- Partnership: The whole community should be able to know the goal of the weapons collection projects, so as to build partnership with those responsible for implementing the projects.
- Situation analysis: Analysis of the situation to compare the now and before situations (where it is applicable), giving the communities a clearer view of what went wrong in their community and therefore how to come out of such as situation.
- Analysis of the historical problems: There could be historical issues that led the people to resort to arms or violence; for example the need to understand how different events have affected the social, economic, political and other safety networks especially among the various age groups, to resort to violence as a means of survival.
- Regional developmental gaps: Structural issues like disparities in regional development should be analyzed in order to determine to what extent they feed into the demand guns and violence.
- Security first: The recognition of security as a pre-condition for development (where applicable). The affected communities should be able to understand the impact, the misuse of SALW and violence in general has had on their communities: economically, socially and human loss. Security and insecurity should be defined in the context of how communities understand them.
- Clarity of desired state of affairs: The desired state of conditions, that a weapons collection programmes envisages, should be made known to the whole community from the out set. This requires a high level of participation from all community members.

- Collective Good: In most cases as long as the physical security is restored, every member of the community will acknowledge that they benefited.
- Full Participation: The affected community itself should be able to analyze the causes of its problems and how to locally solve it.
- Participation levels: Participation should not be limited to information sharing, but all levels, by allowing the entire social, economic, political and gender to define their input in the process.
- Inclusiveness: All social, economic, political and cultural forces in the community should be given an opportunity to air the views. Sometimes issues perceived to be sensitive have been handled excluding groups like opposition parties.
- Mainstreaming: The issue of SALW and crime prevention should be put top on the community's and national development agenda.
- Basic needs/rights-based Approach: Incentive programmes should provide basic needs of the affected communities. The right to food, clean water, health, and shelter are important in determining the cause of crime if they are lacking.
- Sub-regional scoped projects: For communities neighbouring international borders, similar programmes may need to be started across, because they may be experiencing similar problems.
- Community Synergies: Once communities are faced with a similar problem, it is easier to pool their synergies and work for a common goal.
- Build on what already exists rather than importing new sets. External agencies must understand this point.
- Institution analysis: It is important to understand the dynamics of community institutions and how they relate to the whole society.
- Use traditional institutions to implement programmes: These include council of elders, religious leaders and traditional chiefs.
- Long-term benefits: Patience is needed from all parties involved—including those that have handed over weapons. This should be premised on the fact that building confidence requires a long time:
- Role of Women: Women's participation might not be visible, but they may have influence behind the scenes. There is need to study their roles, so as to bring them at the forefront early enough in the weapons collection

process. Previous interventions have only looked at women as only victims, while ignoring their roles peacemakers.

- Partnership in action: The implementation of the projects should be a partnership between the local communities, authorities and external agencies.
- Lead role by the community: The local communities should as much as possible play a leading implementation role, with the external organization playing more of a facilitation role.
- Outreach Strategy: An outreach strategy to bring on board everybody's views should be put in place.

E. Criteria for determining success or failure: Impact and performance indicators

Indicators for determining success or failure of the programmes can be both qualitative and quantitative.

Qualitative

As much as possible community—developed indicators should be applied to determine the success or failure of weapons collection programmes.

- Security improvement: Statements by the communities such as “there are no more killings, murders and robberies” are important indications of weapons reductions since they indicate the level of reduced violence.
- Settling in rural areas: For rural-based societies such as in Africa, when people begin to leave urban centers and start to resettle in rural (usually villages become depopulated as result of proliferation of SALW and violence) it is indicative that the rural areas have been pacified.
- Free Movement: Traveling without the need for military escorts from one part of the affected region to another.
- Opening new settlements in parts regions: This is an important indicator for both improved physical security conditions as well as the social infrastructure--accruing from the implementation of weapons for development projects.
- New projects: Such as construction of wells, pumps for irrigation, trading activities, micro-credit, signify the restoration of normality.

- Civil administration: The return of the civilian local administrators as opposed to military to the areas. In most cases, the civilian administrators are the first victims of guns.
- Civil organizations: The presence of humanitarian and development NGOs in the area (especially the return of those NGOs that left due to insecurity).
- The destruction of weapons: “Flames of Peace” The public destruction of weapons that have been collected, confiscated or retrieved. These ceremonies are very important for those people that had been victims of violence resulting from the proliferation of SALW.
- The reduction of insecurity incidents: The reduction in violent incidents in which SALW are involved (robberies, killings, injuries etc).
- Few people seen carrying guns: These include law enforcement agents as well as private security guards.
- Improved means of livelihoods: Incentives for the affected communities, should involve undertaking activities that provide means of livelihoods. Promoting programmes that address the existing structural vulnerabilities and skills that meet the demand of the rapid changing society (market economy).
- Reconciliation: Different ethnic groups in a community, working together to solve common problems, e.g. participating in community projects--compared to the before situations.
- The international “fame” . Every community would wish to be known if it has contributed something positive e.g. “Peace of Timbuktu” in the case of Mali.
- Removal of the military from villages and cities: Pursuance of correct policing policies or security sector reforms, as opposed to the deployment of a large number of military personnel in anticipation that it will curb end violence. There is evidence that by deploying the military, more weapons and ammunitions are likely to get their way to illegal hands.
- Freedom: The free movement of people and goods and people freely going about with their daily activities.
- The removal of road checks and other military patrols:
- The resumption of “normal development process”: Long term and sustainable development activities being undertaken as opposed to war economies.

- *The improvement of security along the borders:* This applies to both international and inter-community borders.
- *Demobilisation:* The number of demobilised ex-combatants and other groups, which handed in guns. This should be compared to the estimated number of those suspected to be possessing guns and involved in crime.
- *The reintegration:* The number of ex-combatants or rehabilitated former criminal integrated into regular forces, the civil services and other non-combat related sectors.
- *Restocking programmes:* In communities where armed livestock raiding is practiced, the success of restocking programmes indicates that weapons have reduced and herdsmen have felt confidence and began to stock their herds.
- *Financing from government of medium-to-long term development projects:* Building water points, canals for irrigation etc. To the affected communities, these indicate that structural development gaps are beginning to be addressed.
- *The return of refugees and IDPs to their villages:* Those who fled start coming back to settle in their former places.
- *The resumption of cultural activities:* In some instances people resort to the use of arms because they had denied freedom to practice their culture, language or religion.
- *The negotiated agreements between governments and rebel movements.* When there is a negotiated agreement or any attempt to negotiate between the authorities and those holding guns, it signifies the era of solving the conflict through peaceful means.
- *Restoration of trust* among the communities that had been torn apart.
- The resumption *of health and education* services.
- *Free interaction among communities* as opposed to the situation before.
- *No kidnaps and disappearance* of people as opposed to the situation before.
- *The opening of administrative centres* and bringing administration services nearer to the people.

- The beginning of decentralisation programmes: full devolution of powers from the centre to the affected regions. Decentralisation of powers is an indicator that reforms in governance are being undertaken.
- Reduction in custom duties: This is especially so for the border communities whose traditional livelihoods are affected by the “official” boundaries. Sometimes these communities are compelled to use guns to enable them to smuggle.
- General infrastructure development: The rehabilitation and construction of new infrastructures such as roads, schools, bridges, communication etc.

Quantitative Indicators

Recovery Statistics: The number of weapons recovered (by type) is compared against the estimated number of weapons present in the local community:

$$\text{Weapons Recovered (\%)} = \frac{\text{Quantity of Weapons Recovered}}{\text{Estimated Weapons in Community}} \times 100$$

Crime Statistics: Crime statistics in the area prior to, during and after completion of the weapons collection phase. Statistics should be kept for; 1) murders using weapons; 2) wounding as a result of weapons; 3) armed robbery; 4) illegal weapon finds and; 5) illegal weapon sales. These can again be reported in percentage terms:

$$\text{Percentage Change (\%)} = \left(1 - \frac{\text{Current Crime Figures}}{\text{Previous Crime Figures}}\right) \times 100$$

Economic Statistics: This involves the analysis of the street price of weapons in the target community and the adjoining regions.

$$\text{Percentage Change (\%)}^5 = \left(1 - \frac{\text{Current Street Price}}{\text{Previous Street Price}}\right) \times 100$$

An increase in the street price would indicate an increasing scarcity of available weapons. This increasing scarcity is either being caused by the impact of the collection phase or by an outflow of weapons from the community into adjoining regions, (where a better price can be obtained for the dealer). Either way, it is an indicator that weapons are being removed from the target community, although it is difficult to know whether or not the problem is just been shifted elsewhere. This too justifies the need to start cross-border programmes.

A decrease in the street price would obviously require a serious examination of the progress of the project and its impact on the community. The laws of supply

⁵ If this percentage change is negative, it indicates an INCREASE in the Street Price.

and demand would suggest that a reduction in street price equates to an increase in available weapons. This may be because individuals are trying to cash in on the value of their illicitly held weapons before they became significantly less valuable as demand falls. Alternatively it could suggest that the programme is having such an impact on the community that they wish to prolong the programme in order to obtain maximum benefit.

Financial Comparison: The comparison of the “cost” of recovering a weapon to the programme against the street price. The total costs of the programme (operating costs and infrastructure development), divided by the number of weapons recovered gives an initial crude indicator of what it has cost to recover each individual weapon. If this is less than the street price, then perhaps this indicates a degree of success. It could also be argued that, even if the price paid per weapon was above the street price, if a serious threat has been eliminated, or there are additional programme benefits in terms of community perceptions, then the programme could still be considered a success. As such qualitative indicators remain the most relevant measurement tool.

$$\text{Cost per Recovered Weapon (\$)} = \frac{\text{Total Cost of Programme (\$)}}{\text{Total Weapons Recovered}}$$

Risk Rating: This PI allocates a risk rating to each individual weapon type based on previous and current weapon usage in the area. It is an indicator of the risk of being killed or injured if a specific weapon is used in an attack against personnel:

$$\text{Risk Rating (Fatality)} = \frac{\text{Total Number of Fatalities}}{\text{Total Weapons used in Attacks}}$$

For example, if 40 fatalities had resulted from 100 AK47 attacks, and then the Risk Rating for the AK47 would be 0.4.

$$\text{Risk Rating (Injury)} = \frac{\text{Total Number of Injuries}}{\text{Total Weapons used in Attacks}}$$

These Risk Ratings can be established for both the target community and the country as a whole. If the Risk Rating for each weapon recovered is multiplied by the number of weapons recovered, then it gives an indication, based on previous experience of the use of that specific weapon against the community, of the potential number of lives saved by the micro-disarmament programme:

$$\text{Potential Lives Saved Recovered} = \text{Weapon Risk Rating} \times \text{Total Weapons Recovered}$$

$$\text{Cost per Life Saved} = \frac{\text{Total Cost of Programme}}{\text{Total Potential Lives Saved}}$$

Applying performance indicators;

The use of performance indicators is undoubtedly a valuable management and reporting tool, but it is emphasized that inappropriate use of these indicators could lead to false conclusions being drawn. There is a danger that the use of only quantitative indicators misleads policy makers and the community on the other less visible and tangible benefits of weapons collections programme such as improved community perceptions of safety and increasing political stability. Therefore they must be used in parallel with the qualitative evidence as presented above.

F. Characteristics of local and community level weapons collection programmes.

- *Avoid individuals:* Incentives should benefit the whole community, rather than an individual. This to ensure that the whole community benefits.
- *Sustainability:* Projects must be sustainable and able to link with the medium to long-term needs of the community and thus be more relevant to solving existing problems that may make communities to resort to violence.
- *Community contribution:* As much as possible communities should commit some of their own resources in all forms.
- *Preventing the recycling:* Proper mechanisms for destroying the decommissioned and retrieved weapons so as to ensure that even the remaining metallic components are melted.
- *Community based indicators:* Indicators to determine success or failure should be developed by the beneficiaries so as to avoid over-relying on statistic, which do necessarily indicate how, perceive security.
- *Medium-to-long term needs:* Projects should address the factors that drive the demand for the use of weapons.
- *Continuity:* interventions should impact on the community so that there is continuity to get rid of weapons and use of violence from the community, even along after the projects have ended.
- *Unifying and non-discriminative projects:* Projects whose benefits, the members of the community can access simultaneously without discrimination and which promote communal cooperation should be promoted.

- Improved and alternative means of livelihood: Incentives that provide improved means of livelihoods, rather than simply restoring the previous status quo should be promoted.
- Non-expensive and complicated: The projects should be simple and cost-effective so as not to discourage donors, and at the same being beyond the managerial capabilities available in the community.
- Sensitization and awareness: Activities like sensitization and awareness rising are a precursor to any success of a weapons collection and weapons for development project and therefore should be implemented as programmes of their own.
- Confidence building measures: These might include keeping confidential the names of those who hand over weapons or those who have renounced violence, which is important to assure those still holding weapons.
- Timely external support: Donors should provide the assistance in time so that projects to the communities that have handed in weapons are not delayed. This discourages others from handing in their weapons.
- Acceptability: The whole community should accept and promote disarmament and non-violent initiatives.
- Timing: Weapons collection and the implementation of certain activities/projects should be timed to match with seasonal climatic conditions. Times when the need for a weapon in a community is lowest are the best for weapons collection.
- Forward planning is necessary: This is to ensure that weapons collection is implemented in parallel with the incentive programmes.
- Ownership: The actual collection of weapons must be seen, as the product of a long process that involved everybody.
- Reach out strategy: A mechanism for seeking different views should be put in place, so as to allow input from divergent views.
- Consensus: A transparent decision—making mechanism of reaching consensus through general community meetings (Palaver Tree Parliament) should be put in place (where it does not exist).
- Individual incentives: For war population groups such as ex-combatants, projects that provide individual and immediate income may be more important than any other activity that may be laborious.

- Full Village Cycle: Projects should be able to link skills with opportunities and market.
- Empowerment: Real empowerment that involves imparting skills that enable competing in a market economy rather than dominating through the use of violence should be provided. For example children that have access to guns may feel empowered—but alas! in a wrong way.

G. The best practices in weapons collection and incentive schemes.

- Full trust: There should be full trust by the community for those involved in the implementation of weapons collection.
- Confidence: Those implementing the project must earn the confidence and trust of those holding weapons.
- Transparency: The collected weapons should be publicly destroyed.
- Collective responsibility: This requires the spirit “each for everybody and everybody for each”. By doing so, those that hand over weapons will be doing it in the interest of the community.
- Local Committees: It is important to form local committees to handle the handed in weapons.
- Traditional Institutions: Institutions such as elders, religious leaders traditional chiefs should be entry points if local and community level disarmament efforts are to succeed.
- Access to storage: For the monitoring purposes, those mandated to handle the weapons handed in must have access to where the weapons are stored (if stored with the military).
- Verification: Any weapon received should be verified before it is stored, so as to know how it came into circulation.
- Suspected elements: Any members of the community or institutions that people don't trust, such as the army, security agencies should initially not participate.
- Integration: Incentives projects to be implemented should be able to integrate the various social, economic and cultural groups, rather sharpening the divisions among them.

- Handling Weapons: There should be an elaborate process—from when a weapon is collected until it is publicly destroyed.
- Storage places: The places where collected weapons should be stored must be acceptable to the community.
- Acknowledgement of contribution: A successful weapons collection programme may also require that each stakeholder's contribution be equally recognized. For instance the salient role played by women.
- Confidence building: Promises for those who hand over weapons must be honoured so as to create confidence and to encourage those that have not yet handed over their weapons.
- Parity of treatment in packages: Reinsertion packages given to ex-combatants/ex-weapon holders or those that have renounced violence should be as much as possible similar. This is to discourage dissent by those who think that they were cheated.
- Discourage individual's benefits: Projects whose profits tend to benefit only their members or managers are not conducive to attract handing in of weapons and should be discouraged.
- Complete Demobilisation: In some instances, the question of demobilisation of ex-combatants should be resolved first (depending on the situation), before a community weapons collection programme begins. But should be situational context—as demobilization is a highly politicized activity.
- Individual needs vs. community: In some special circumstances, the needs of individuals who have handed in weapons or renounced violence, should be considered first.
- Recognition of differences: The need to recognize the differences existing in a community—rural, urban, ex-combatants, men, women, youth, traders and how these may be affected differently by the proliferation of SALW and violence
- Micro-disarmament as a process: Community disarmament is a long process that requires confidence measures to be established—if all the community armories are to be accessed. Communities may hesitate to disclose where the weapons are hidden until there are sure that the means to ensure their safety has been put in place.
- External organizations: Must listen before they deliver their aid; first understand the root causes of SALW proliferation in the community.

- Timing of WfD: There is a relationship between climatic seasonal events and the desire to have a weapon. Therefore the timing of when weapons collection should implemented is important such that the incentives are provided at the time when the need for a weapon is lowest.
- Protection: The need for governments to fulfill their traditional role of protecting their citizens by controlling weapons and fighting against crime. This may entails putting in place and enforcing deterrent measures and laws.
- Flames of Peace: Ceremonies for “Flames of Peace and Monuments” are important to the community—for they are a message to the outsiders and also a social accountability of creating gun-free societies.
- Weapons destruction: As much as possible collected weapons, drugs or any contraband should be publicly destroyed as nearer as possible to the communities who participated in the collection. This measure is also a public accountability
- “Don’t encourage more guns”: The weapons for development approach should never encourage the importation of guns by some communities who want to benefit from projects.
- Early involvement: There should be an early campaign by parents to sensitize their children against the culture of guns. This should be supplemented by the development of curricula on peace education to be taught in elementary schools.

Constraints and capacity building required for local and community level involvement.

- Handling collected weapons: Technical support needs to be provided to the local Committees who receive weapons.
- Material Assistance: Provision of protective wares and materials such as guidebooks on how to handle guns and ammunitions.
- Insurance cover: For those that may get injured when handling the weapons.
- Training: Mostly to frontier guards, customs and immigration officials in matters related to checking and controlling arms.

- *Destruction:* Both technical and financial support to enable the disposition the weapons collected—ensuring that all the metallic elements are destroyed beyond redemption.
- *Monitoring and law enforcement:* Provision of support to local authorities to enforce the existing laws on firearms and to monitor local artisans who fabricate guns.
- *Security Sector Reforms:* Support affected countries to reform their security sectors so as to counteract the real threats to both human security and national security.
- *Stimulate Action:* Assist in disseminating the already lessons learned so that actions at the community level can be able to stimulate a chain of actions at other higher levels e.g. the West Africa Moratorium is said to have been emanated from the Mali experience.
- *Support for women initiatives:* Promote greater involvement of women initiatives in disarmament programmes by building their capacity on issues related to SALW.
- *Capacity building for local organizations:* Support the development of local organizations; women, youth, ex-fighters, local commissions.
- *Legal instruments:* The legal instrument to protect those willing to voluntarily surrender weapons is very important to supplement the community initiated disarmament efforts. This needs to be supported.
- *Support demobilisation:* Those who have given up violence need support to enable reintegrate into normal life. Like communities may continue hold their weapons, because the promised but not implemented development projects.
- *Recognition of the daunting task:* To earn the trust of community to the extent that they begin handing over their weapons is not easy, even if it is in exchange for development—as such various means which require money had to be applied.
- *Fund sub-region scoped projects:* Sometimes it is difficult to convince one community to disarm while its neighbour across the border is heavily armed. This requires trans-border approach.
- *Funding and fundraising:* Fundraising vehicles such as organizing roundtable conferences for country-based donors should be pursued.

Peace building and prevention of re-occurrence of conflict

- *Reconciliation:* When communities participate in implementing projects whose benefits serve their common interests of the community, the likelihood for quicker reconciliation among all ethnic groups through working together is higher.
- *Integration:* Projects that make communities to come together should be promoted in weapon for development projects. This is very crucial for post conflict societies.
- *Rights based approach:* Projects and activities whose benefits link with solving the people's every day basic needs, will enhance people's consciousness about their rights.

- *Durable Peace:* The general understanding by those holding weapons such that the desire to have peace be the driving force towards overcoming the constraints
- *Preventive-in-built peace-building mechanisms:* Design projects that will enable the communities that had been torn apart to work together for a common objective
- *Disaster Management:* Communities learn how to manage crisis, when they participate in implementing weapons collection projects.

CONCLUSION

This study is still inclusive, but it is hoped this handout will give important hints to those interested in researching on the subject of weapons collection, violence prevention and the incentive schemes that go with them. A detailed study can get by contacting the author.

About the author

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Appendix: PM&E techniques applied and questions asked.

Training in PM&E Techniques

Most of the trainee facilitators had never done any work related to participation of communities. Therefore to induct them to participatory methods of work, the PM&E team introduced a pictorial exercise on how to establish basic interpersonal communication skills. The exercise included pictures of a village woman and a woman community worker depicted in different positions—one in which there is communication between the two, another showing communication breakdown between the two and another showing how later communication was restored between the two women. This exercise stimulated discussion among the trainees, who appreciated the power of using pictures in communication. Those who did not immediately understand were encouraged to ask more questions. For instance there was a question as to why only women were involved in the picture. But in general when the trainees were asked the implication of the exercise their responses as noted below showed that they had understood:

- *"The exercise made me improve my capacity in the field of interpersonal communication skills".*
- *"Why didn't the agent change her communication style on the second picture, when the village woman appeared not to understand"*
- *"Are there any other methods other than using pictures in which basic interpersonal communication skills could be done"?*
- *"We shall be able to practice during the data gathering".*

Force-Field Analysis as a technique


Trainees were introduced to this technique as a participatory tool to apply in evaluating how the overall goal and purpose for weapons collection and weapons for development projects were set and later achieved. The method, in the context of the evaluation compared the now situation—improved (after interventions have been implemented) and the before situation (prior to implementation of various intervention) Conditions including guns littered in the village had been added on the before box.

Elements on the before situation box, depicted a community in a dangerous situation—guns littered around every-where, killings and deaths, water and sanitary problems and unplanned activities. Trainees were asked to look at the boxes and compare with their own community—prior to the implementation of Weapons collections and Weapons for development projects. Trainees added elements in the before situation box, which were even worse than those developed by the Team Leader. The now situation box showed an improved community, with people freely going about their business, a well-planned village with water and sanitary conditions, no guns. The trainees agreed that it

corresponds with the current situation in Lere. Also additional elements, where further improvement had been registered were added.

Trainees were told that their task will be to engage the community in analyzing pictures—making comparisons with the situation in their community and discussing what steps were taken to move the situation from the before to the now improved situation. What kind of resources, constraints and other issues of importance they encountered.

Diagram: 1 Forced-Field Diagram



For the detailed guidance trainees were instructed to encourage participation by posing open-ended questions that encourage conversational discussion rather than direct question and answer approach. Questions aimed at understanding how overall goal and purpose for weapons collection and weapons for development projects were set and later implemented. In particular the following questions were given to guide trainee facilitators:

- (i) What was the existing situation?
- (ii) What was the wide problem that the weapons collection project aimed to help to resolve?
- (iii) What future state of affairs was envisaged?
- (iv) How did the community manage to achieve the now state of affairs?
- (v) Is it the current situation the situation that was envisaged at the beginning and if not why?
- (vi) What resources were required and from where?
- (vii) What were the major constraints encountered?
- (viii) How were these constraints overcome?
- (ix) What were the measurable indicators (qualitative) for successes/failure?
- (x) From where can the indicators be verified?
- (xi) What external factors were necessary to attain this goal?
- (xii) Who were the target group?
- (xiii) What was the immediate impact of the project on the project area or the target group?
- (xiv) What changes or benefits did it bring?
- (xv) How long did it take to achieve the results? From where can one verify these successes or failures?
- (xvi) What specific results were expected in order to achieve the purpose?

- (xvii) What were these specific operational objectives for the project e.g. reduction in the number of weapons available to criminals, community awareness.

At the end of the exercise trainees were asked to clear any doubts on the Forced Field technique. Their responses indicated that they had fully understood and would be able to apply it in the field, which they ably did very well when it came to conducting the field exercises.

This technique, the process it follows and the questions, were applied to all the field exercises, which involved the evaluation of projects' setting of the overall goal and purpose of weapons collection and weapons for development projects.

Training in other Techniques: Trainees were trained in the other PM&E techniques. Training sessions in the techniques took place in the mornings while in the afternoons, trainee facilitators applied the techniques in the field. The techniques included the following:

Determining decision-making process techniques

The technique enables participants to understand and evaluate the decision-making process in the community, how the community participated in this process to decide the various weapons collection activities and weapons for development projects.

The Process involves pictorial diagrams showing institutions/individuals responsible for decision making in a community. These may depending on community being studied include⁶: an external agent, a village official, a village chief, a village committee, a local ordinary woman, a local ordinary man, an artist in the village and a local ordinary youth Participants are asked to compare with their own situation. Participants are usually each given small cards to vote on which among the pictures decided the various activities listed above. During the exercise *project identification and design* questions are posed to the participants. Such questions range from;

- (i) How did the weapons collection projects begin?
- (ii) Who initiated them?
- (iii) Were the affected communities involved?
- (iv) What was the situation?
- (v) Were women and other marginalized groups involved and to what extent?
- (vi) Who identified the community projects to exchange with the weapons collected?
- (vii) Did the activities implemented have any linkage in addressing the demand factors?

⁶ These were simply pictures. For example a **guitar** represented a local artist, but in general the pictures were male.

This technique, the process it follows and the questions were applied to all the field exercises, which involved the evaluation of projects' identification and design.

Evaluating the projects' implementation through Focus Group interviews as a technique.

The exercise involved inducting trainee facilitators on how to facilitate a conversational discussion within a group. The purpose was to enable the evaluation of how the projects were implemented. The discussed issues covered project appraisal and implementation questions such;

- (i) Were there any mechanisms for collecting weapons prior to the WfD project(s)?
- (ii) If yes, did the project planners build on these mechanisms or they introduced new ones?
- (iii) Before, were there any incentives given to those handing over weapons?
- (iv) How different were those incentives from the ones introduced in the WfD?
- (v) Which of the two is most preferable and why?
- (vi) How sustainable do they consider WfD?
- (vii) How do they value their own contribution to weapons collection programmes—(number of weapons handed, time spent, resources etc.) compared to goods and services received from the weapons for development programmes?
- (viii) What implementation arrangements were pursued and how effective were they?
- (ix) What convinced those holding weapons to hand them over?
- (x) What confidence building measures were put in place?
- (xi) What guarantees were put in place to encourage the participation of different stakeholders (e.g. safety in handling, legal protection)?
- (xii) In which places were the handed over weapons taken and which ones did they consider the best for safe custody?
- (xiii) Who ensured that the weapons collected were safe?
- (xiv) Which weapons were handed over first and what could have the reasons why?
- (xv) From their experiences what was the best timing for implementing weapons collection and incentive programmes?
- (xvi) Who should participate and who should not in weapons collection programmes and why?
- (xvii) How were the incentives implemented?
- (xviii) How did they manage to make the handing over of weapon a collective responsibility—given the fact that weapons sometimes belong to individuals?
- (xix) What were the constraints in the implementing the incentives and how can these be overcome?

- (xx) Did women and other marginalized groups had any tasks in implementing weapons collection or WfD and what were these tasks?
- (xxi) What information sharing mechanisms were put in place to ensure that all the stakeholders were brought on board?
- (xxii) What general lessons can be learned from implementing the weapons collection and weapons for development programmes?

This technique, the process it follows and the questions, were applied to all the field exercises, which involved the evaluation of the project appraisal and implementation.

Community monitoring techniques

The techniques aims at understanding the community's experiences on how the monitoring of weapons collection and weapons for development projects was conducted. The process involves participants listing all the activities/ projects that were undertaken and using monitoring forms with a Calendar, indicate what time of the year were weapons collected. Trainees were also given the questions that had been specifically developed for this particular exercise. These included:

- (i) What were aspects of the project that needed critical monitoring and why?
- (ii) Were there any benchmarks upon which monitoring was based and what were these benchmarks?
- (iii) Who got involved and who did not and why?
- (iv) What performance indicators were put in place to show that activities were going on course?
- (v) How did they assess that weapons in the community were reducing/increasing?
- (vi) What weapons were handed in first and why?
- (vii) What kind of weapons were handed in large numbers and why?
- (viii) Where were the collected weapons kept and why?
- (ix) Who handled the weapons handed in?
- (x) At what time in the year did the rate of handing over weapons increased and why?
- (xi) What process is involved from when a weapon is handed in until it is destroyed?
- (xii) What type of incentive did attract the highest number of weapons handed in and why?
- (xiii) How was the distribution of benefits accruing from the incentives for weapons collection monitored?
- (xiv) How did they monitor who was cooperating or not?
- (xv) How was the information recorded?
- (xvi) What lessons can be learned from their experience of monitoring weapons collection and weapon for development projects?

This technique, the process it follows and the questions, were applied to all the field exercises, which involved the evaluation of how the projects were monitored.

Evaluating performance, using STAR Game as a technique

The techniques included three stars—the biggest representing excellent performance, Middle-sized representing fairly excellent performance and the smallest representing good performance. “Good, fair and bad” comparisons were not used because people generally feel uncomfortable using them, seeing them as over critical and offensive to people involved. Participants are asked to list all the activities/projects that were undertaken and also list all individuals and institutions that were involved in these activities/projects. Based on their own experiences, participants have the discretion to place a Star on an activity/project or individual/institutions. The exercise enables the understanding of what kind of activities/projects are preferred by the community—based on their relevancy, effectiveness and sustainability. Also what institutions/individuals should in future be involved in the activity/projects implementation? Trainees were also taken through the questions that had been developed for this particular technique, which included the following:

- (i) How did communities rate their participation in weapons collection programmes?
- (ii) How do they rate the contribution of different institutions or individuals and why?
- (iii) Which interventions/activities had the most desirable results and why?
- (iv) What did they consider to be the indicators for success/failure of weapons collection programmes?
- (v) How do they evaluate the distribution of benefits from the incentive projects?
- (vi) Is weapons for development approach, to weapons sustainable
- (vii) To what extent did it empower the populations to have motivations, resources, and knowledge to maintain and pursue various measures to get rid of illicit weapons as well as violence from their community?
- (viii) Were the activities undertaken relevant—considering the degree to which the population or the authorities gave priority/no priority to disarmament?
- (ix) What impact did the weapons collection and weapon for development projects have e.g. on reducing incidents resulting from the use of SALW, reduce violence or increase working capacity—due to conducive security?
- (x) Do they consider weapons for development approach as more effective than other approaches e.g. buy-backs?
- (xi) How many weapons do they consider to be enough for the community/country?

- (xii) What lessons can be learned from their experience in evaluating of weapons collection and weapons for development projects?

This technique, the process it follows and the questions, were applied to all the field exercises, which involved the evaluation of the performance of individuals, institutions and activities or specific components of the projects.

Conclusion on the techniques

Communities were excited by these techniques and were provoked to say anything they knew about the weapons collections. Even those that some affluent members of the community had always thought that they don't have ideas contributed, which was a surprise to many. Every exercise would generate a hot argument among the participants, but in the end a general consensus would be reached. However, in some cases, the local facilitators, did not conduct the exercises very well, but this is attributed to the short training they had.