

CHAPTER 2

EVOLVING ROLE OF “PEACEKEEPING”

The concept of contemporary “peacekeeping” is replete with doctrinal ambiguities and defies a straightforward definition. The term has become synonymous with any number of international activities designed to resolve or attenuate a conflict.¹ Since the end of the cold war, the tenets of traditional peacekeeping have been eroded and the scope of its activities has expanded significantly. In practice, the temporal boundaries between peacekeeping and the related notions of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, and peace-building are not always apparent. The once-clear distinction between peacekeeping operations and enforcement actions has also become blurred. Moreover, the United Nations is no longer the only actor performing peacekeeping duties; regional organizations and ad hoc coalitions have in fact become the primary peacekeepers.

Efforts to clarify the terminology have not kept up with the rapid pace of developments on the ground. In an early attempt to make sense of the changing security environment, the then United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali provided definitions for the “integrally related” concepts of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building.² He also spoke about the possible creation of peace enforcement

¹John Chipman, “What Do We Understand by Peacekeeping Today?,” in Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills (eds), *Peacekeeping in Africa (Volume 2)*, Halfway House: Institute for Defence Policy, 1996, p. 11.

²UN Document A/47/277 - S/24111, *An Agenda For Peace: Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992*, 17 June 1992. The Report defines preventive diplomacy as “action to prevent disputes from arising between parties, to prevent existing disputes from escalating into conflicts and to limit the spread of the latter when they occur.” Peacemaking entails
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“units.”³ While Boutros-Ghali’s definitions initially gained wide currency, their value has declined over time. With the expansion of peacekeeping following the end of the cold war, commentators began to speak of successive “generations” of United Nations operations.⁴ In some circles, the terms “peace operations” and “peace support operations” are now used interchangeably with the term “peacekeeping operations” to encompass a broad spectrum of conflict management and resolution techniques. A new vocabulary of related concepts has emerged. The South African Department of Defence, for example, recently identified and defined nine overlapping terms: [1] peace missions; [2] peace support operations; [3] preventive diplomacy; [4] peacemaking; [5] peacekeeping operations; [6] peace enforcement; [7] peace-building; [8] humanitarian assistance; and

²(...continued)

“action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations.” According to the Report, peacekeeping is “the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.” Peace-building is “action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.” *Ibid.*, paras. 20-21.

³According to Boutros-Ghali, such peace enforcement units “would be available on call and would consist of troops that have volunteered for such service. They would have to be more heavily armed than peace-keeping forces and would need to undergo extensive preparatory training within their national forces.” *Ibid.*, para. 44.

⁴Classical missions have commonly been termed “first generation” operations. The expansive UN missions of the immediate post-cold war period have been widely labelled “second generation” operations. Some commentators have also spoken of the more robust operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia as “third generation” missions. Others have even attempted to delineate a possible “fourth generation” of operations. See, for example, Mark Malan, “Peacekeeping in the New Millennium: towards ‘Fourth Generation’ Peace Operations?,” *African Security Review*, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1998, pp. 13-20.

[9] humanitarian intervention.⁵ To further complicate matters, different countries and organizations ascribe different meanings to the same terms.

Without minimizing these doctrinal inconsistencies, this book does not elaborate them. The study focuses on conflict management and resolution activities, rather than on conflict prevention per se. The term “peacekeeping” is used broadly to denote a military or a police force deployed at the request of a Government or a representative group of political and military actors that enjoys wide international recognition.⁶ This presence will usually be multinational in composition⁷ and receive its authority from the United Nations or a regional organization.⁸ Peacekeeping encompasses a variety of interventions on the continuum of peace to war that may include aspects of peace enforcement—i.e., when the use of force other than in self-defence is authorized to achieve limited goals.⁹ Peacekeeping operations place much greater constraints on the use of force than do pure enforcement actions.¹⁰

⁵*White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions*, approved by the Cabinet on 21 October 1998, pp. 6-7, courtesy of South African Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva. The *White Paper* uses “peace mission” as a generic term encompassing “preventive diplomacy,” “peacemaking,” “peacekeeping,” “peace enforcement,” and “peacebuilding.” Like Boutros-Ghali’s 1992 *An Agenda for Peace*, the South African Department of Defence restricts the definition of “peacekeeping operations” to UN missions. See *ibid.*, p. 6.

⁶Thus, Angola’s decisive and unilateral military support for Denis Sassou-Nguesso in 1997 during the Congolese civil war cannot be seen as a peacekeeping operation.

⁷The peacekeeping interventions of Nigeria and Congo (Brazzaville) in Chad in 1979 and 1980, respectively, are notable exceptions.

⁸Sometimes this authorization is not explicit, but must be inferred from a tacit or implicit acceptance; other times this authorization comes retroactively.

⁹Examples might include helping ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid or defending clearly-defined safe havens.

¹⁰The US-led Operation Desert Storm in 1991 is an example of a pure enforcement action and is not a peacekeeping or a peace enforcement mission.

ORIGINS OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING

Not specifically envisaged in the United Nations Charter, peacekeeping developed as an impromptu reaction to the political constraints of the bipolar world. The Charter's designs to establish a standing United Nations army that would be "on call" and at the Security Council's disposal became unrealistic with the onset of the cold war.¹¹ The five permanent members of the Council were unable to agree upon a collective security regime. The concept of peacekeeping thus emerged as a workable alternative. As of 30 June 1999, the United Nations had established 50 peacekeeping operations¹²(see Table 2.1).

The classical peacekeeping model that took shape was thus moulded by the political realities of the cold war period. The scope of United Nations peacekeeping operations was rather limited. They generally fulfilled a conflict management role and were established sparingly. In 1987, for example, there were only five,¹³ in which about 10,000 troops from 23 troop-contributing States were deployed. The supplemental peacekeeping budget was less than US\$ 250 million.¹⁴

The specific contours of the classical peacekeeping model derive from the first United Nations peacekeeping force—the United Nations Emergency

¹¹Article 43, UN Charter. Anticipating that the World Organization would be summoned to confront forces on the same size and scale as World War II, the drafters of the Charter provided for the creation of a standing UN army composed of contingents from the armed forces of Member States.

¹²In deference to Indonesia, the UN does not consider the UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), established in June 1999 (UN Document S/RES/1246 (1999), 11 June 1999), as a peacekeeping mission.

¹³These operations, all of which continue to the present day, were: [1] UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO); [2] UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP); [3] UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP); [4] UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF); and [5] UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

¹⁴This sum only covered the costs of UNFICYP, UNDOF, and UNIFIL, as UNTSO and UNMOGIP have been financed from the UN's regular budget since their inception.

Table 2.1

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (1 of 2) (as of 30 June 1999)			
	Acronym	Name	Dates
01	UNTSO	UN Truce Supervision Organization	06/48 to date
02	UNMOGIP	UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan	01/49 to date
03	UNEF I	UN Emergency Force I	11/56 - 06/67
04	UNOGIL	UN Observation Group in Lebanon	06/58 - 12/58
05	ONUC	UN Operation in the Congo	07/60 - 06/64
06	UNSF	UN Security Force in West New Guinea (West Irian)	10/62 - 04/63
07	UNYOM	UN Yemen Observation Mission	07/63 - 09/64
08	UNFICYP	UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	03/64 to date
09	DOMREP	Mission of the Representative of the Secretary-General in the Dominican Republic	05/65 - 10/66
10	UNIPOM	UN India-Pakistan Observation Mission	09/65 - 03/66
11	UNEF II	UN Emergency Force II	10/73 - 07/79
12	UNDOF	UN Disengagement Observer Force	06/74 to date
13	UNIFIL	UN Interim Force in Lebanon	03/78 to date
14	UNGOMAP	UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan	04/88 - 03/90
15	UNIIMOG	UN Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group	08/88 - 02/91
16	UNAVEM I	UN Angola Verification Mission I	01/89 - 05/91
17	UNTAG	UN Transitional Assistance Group	04/89 - 03/90
18	ONUSCA	UN Observer Group in Central America	11/89 - 01/92
19	UNIKOM	UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission	04/91 to date
20	MINURSO	UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara	04/91 to date
21	UNAVEM II	UN Angola Verification Mission II	05/91 - 02/95
22	ONUSAL	UN Observer Mission in El Salvador	07/91 - 04/95
23	UNAMIC	UN Advance Mission in Cambodia	10/91 - 03/92
24	UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force	02/92 - 12/95
25	UNTAC	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia	02/92 - 09/93

Table 2.1

United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (2 of 2) (as of 30 June 1999)			
	Acronym	Name	Dates
26	UNOSOM I	UN Operation in Somalia I	04/92 - 03/93
27	ONUMOZ	UN Operation in Mozambique	12/92 - 12/94
28	UNOSOM II	UN Operation in Somalia II	03/93 - 03/95
29	UNOMUR	UN Observer Mission Uganda-Rwanda	06/93 - 09/94
30	UNOMIG	UN Observer Mission in Georgia	08/93 to date
31	UNOMIL	UN Observer Mission in Liberia	09/93 - 09/97
32	UNMIH	UN Mission in Haiti	09/93 - 06/96
33	UNAMIR	UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda	10/93 - 03/96
34	UNASOG	UN Aouzou Strip Observer Group	05/94 - 06/94
35	UNMOT	UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan	12/94 to date
36	UNAVEM III	UN Angola Verification Mission III	02/95 - 06/97
37	UNCRO	UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia	03/95 - 01/96
38	UNPREDEP	UN Preventive Deployment Force	03/95 - 02/99
39	UNMIBH	UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	12/95 to date
40	UNTAES	UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium	01/96 - 01/98
41	UNMOP	UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka	01/96 to date
42	UNSMIH	UN Support Mission in Haiti	07/96 - 06/97
43	MINUGUA	UN Verification Mission in Guatemala	01/97 - 05/97
44	MONUA	UN Observer Mission in Angola	07/97 - 02/99
45	UNTMIH	UN Transition Mission in Haiti	08/97 - 11/97
46	MIPONUH	UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti	12/97 to date
47	UNPSG	UN Civilian Police Support Group	01/98 - 10/98
48	MINURCA	UN Mission in the Central African Republic	04/98 to date
49	UNOMSIL	UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone	07/98 to date
50	UNMIK	UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	06/99 to date

Force (UNEF I).¹⁵ In that operation, the now well-established tenets of traditional peacekeeping—the consent of the parties to the conflict, the impartiality of the peacekeeping force, and the prohibition of the use of force except in self-defence—crystallized. In accordance with these principles, most United Nations peacekeeping missions established before the end of the cold war involved positioning lightly-armed Blue Helmets between adversaries in order to monitor adherence to truces and preserve the status quo. Such “first generation” peacekeeping operations were essentially emergency measures designed to contain explosive situations.¹⁶

Traditional peacekeeping operations are thus neither pure Chapter VII enforcement actions nor pure Chapter VI means of pacific dispute settlement. On the one hand, such classical missions employ more moderate measures than the enforcement provisions contained in Chapter VII.¹⁷ Moreover, Security Council resolutions establishing these operations¹⁸

¹⁵Although the UN had previously deployed two observer missions—UNTSO and UNMOGIP—UNEF I was the first UN peacekeeping operation to have troop contingents.

¹⁶Georges Abi-Saab, “La deuxième génération des opérations de maintien de la paix: Quelques réflexions préliminaires,” *Le Trimestre du Monde*, Vol. 4, No. 20, 1992, p. 89.

¹⁷Chapter VII describes the enforcement tools at the Security Council’s disposal. Article 40 authorizes the Council to call upon the parties to a dispute to comply with “such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable.” Article 41 identifies “measures not involving the use of armed force” available to the Council, including “complete or partial interruption of economic sanctions and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic provisions.” Article 42 provides that if Article 41 sanctions are or would be inadequate, the Council “may take such action by air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.” Articles 40, 41, and 42, UN Charter.

¹⁸The Council has not established all UN peacekeeping operations. UNEF I was created by the General Assembly. After France and the UK had vetoed US- and Soviet-sponsored Security Council resolutions, the matter was
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generally do not mention the buzzwords triggering Chapter VII's application: "threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression."¹⁹ On the other hand, traditional peacekeeping operations are more intrusive than the peaceful means of dispute settlement outlined in Chapter VI.²⁰ To highlight the in-between character of such operations, former United Nations Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld referred to them as belonging to "Chapter Six and a Half."

POST-COLD WAR PEACE OPERATIONS

Initial Expansion

The end of the cold war altered the international peace and security landscape significantly. With the easing of East-West tensions, cooperation in the Security Council has been enhanced, presenting new opportunities to resolve certain conflicts. Yet the post-cold war era has also been characterized by the proliferation of other conflicts. Complex and violent intra-State wars—often with regional dimensions—have erupted worldwide.

In response to these new political realities, the international community turned to peacekeeping, which expanded in size and scope. From 1991 through 1994, at the height of United Nations peacekeeping, the Council established 17 operations. As of December 1994, 77,783 United Nations Blue Helmets from 76 troop-contributing countries were deployed, and

¹⁸(...continued)

transferred to the General Assembly in accordance with the procedure outlined in the Assembly's 1950 "Uniting for Peace" resolution at Yugoslavia's request. See *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 36.

¹⁹Article 39, UN Charter.

²⁰Chapter VI identifies "negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice" as appropriate pacific dispute settlement options. Article 33, UN Charter.

annual expenditures had risen to US\$ 3.6 billion.²¹ As the international community became increasingly willing to dispatch United Nations peacekeepers to deal with more complex scenarios, a “second generation” of peacekeeping operations—with economic, humanitarian, political, and social components—emerged.²² Rather than simply preserving the status quo, such missions were intended to build a firm and sustainable peace.²³ Because these operations developed in the post-cold war era, they were able to transcend the conflict management role that the cold war ultimately relegated to first generation operations and encompass peacemaking as well as peace-building.²⁴

A by-product of the expansion of peacekeeping was the obscuring of its definition. New operations challenged and eroded the established pillars of

²¹*The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping (Third Edition)* p. 4.

²²Missions such as UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, UN Observer Mission in El Salvador (ONUSAL), UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), and the third UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III) fall into this category of peacekeeping operations.

²³In his 1995 *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace*, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali identified a number of functions of second generation operations: [1] supervising cease-fires, demobilizing forces, and reintegrating them into civilian life; [2] designing and implementing demining programmes; [3] returning refugees and internally displaced persons; [4] providing humanitarian assistance; [5] supervising existing administrative structures; [6] establishing new police forces; [7] verifying the respect for human rights; [8] designing and supervising constitutional, electoral, and judicial reforms; [9] conducting, observing, organizing, and supervising elections; and [10] coordinating support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction. UN Document A/50/60 - S/1995/1, *Supplement to an Agenda for Peace: Position Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations*, 3 January 1995, para. 21.

²⁴Georges Abi-Saab, “United Nations Peacekeeping Old and New: An Overview of the Issues,” in Daniel Warner (ed.), *New Dimensions of Peacekeeping*, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995, pp. 6-7.

traditional peacekeeping. The principles of consent, impartiality, and defensive force were no longer the hallmarks of United Nations operations; missions were established where consent was forfeited, impartiality was foregone, and force was used other than in self-defence. As a result, the distinction between peacekeeping and enforcement action became blurred.

Experience of Somalia

Too much was expected of the United Nations in the aftermath of the cold war, and it proved unable to meet those expectations. As the current United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan noted recently, “the United Nations’ peacekeeping mechanism for a time became the international community’s emergency services, fire brigade, gendarmerie, and military deterrent, even in instances where there was no peace to be kept.”²⁵ The United Nations became overstretched and many of its Member States disillusioned.

The turning point was Somalia. Conceptualized by the then US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, Madeleine Albright, as “an unprecedented enterprise aimed at nothing less than the restoration of an entire country as a proud, functioning and viable member of the community of nations,”²⁶ the international community’s efforts in Somalia fell far short of that mark. A United Nations-authorized multinational force managed briefly to distribute crucial humanitarian aid, but the two United Nations peacekeeping operations proved ill-equipped and unable to help restore the Government and bring peace to Somalia. After considerable loss of life and little progress, the United Nations peacekeepers withdrew in March 1995. The United Nations’ “failure” in Somalia precipitated a rapid and decisive retreat from United Nations peacekeeping worldwide. In the wake of the debacle, the five permanent members of the Council—led by the United States—became increasingly reluctant to commit their troops or their money to United Nations peacekeeping efforts. As a result, the international community’s peacekeeping goals became decidedly more modest.

²⁵UN Document A/51/950, “Renewing the United Nations: A Programme for Reform,” *Report of the Secretary-General*, 14 July 1997, para. 14.

²⁶UN Document S/PV.3188, 26 March 1993.

The first United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I)—ostensibly a traditional peacekeeping mission—demonstrated the limitations of classical peacekeeping in a hostile environment. Securing the consent of the parties proved time-consuming and tedious. Although the Council established the operation in April 1992,²⁷ agreement on the deployment of a 500-strong infantry force was not reached until mid-August.²⁸ Without consulting the parties to the conflict, the Council authorized the expansion of UNOSOM to 3,500 in late August²⁹ and then to 4,219 troops in early September.³⁰ These actions antagonized the parties and jeopardized the initial agreement reached.³¹ At its height, UNOSOM comprised only 54 military observers and 893 troops³² and the force never managed to deploy beyond the airport of Somalia's capital, Mogadishu.³³ There was little the mission could do given that the country's Government had collapsed and that the warring factions routinely attacked United Nations peacekeepers. As the humanitarian crisis

²⁷UN Document S/RES/751 (1992), 24 April 1992.

²⁸UN Document S/24451, *Letter dated 12 August 1992 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council*, 14 August 1992.

²⁹UN Document S/RES/775 (1992), 28 August 1992; UN Document S/24480, *The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary-General*, 24 August 1992, para. 37.

³⁰See UN Document S/24480/Add.1, *Addendum to The Situation in Somalia: Report of the Secretary-General*, 28 August 1992, (proposing the additional deployment of three specialized units comprising up to 719 personnel); UN Document S/24531, *Letter dated 1 September 1992 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council*, 8 September 1992 (reiterating the proposal for the deployment of three logistic units); and UN Document S/24532, *Letter dated 8 September 1992 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General*, 8 September 1992 (informing the Secretary-General of the Council's agreement with the proposed deployment of three logistic units).

³¹See Jarat Chopra, Åge Eknes, and Toralv Nordbø, "Fighting for Hope in Somalia," *Peacekeeping and Multinational Operations*, No. 6, Oslo: Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt, 1995, p. 36.

³²*UN Peacekeeping: 50 Years*, New York, UN Department of Public Information, October 1998, p. 28.

³³Chopra, Eknes, and Nordbø, p. 36.

worsened, the peacekeeping force was unable to fulfil its mandate of monitoring the cease-fire, protecting United Nations personnel, and safeguarding its relief assistance activities.³⁴

Although the United Task Force (UNITAF), the US-led multinational coalition authorized to work alongside UNOSOM, may have accomplished its humanitarian mission, it was ultimately not sustainable. In the face of the deteriorating humanitarian situation, in December 1992, the Security Council authorized Member States to “use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia under Chapter VII of the Charter.”³⁵ The 36,000-strong multinational force, codenamed Operation Restore Hope, improved humanitarian conditions. Little progress was made, however, on restoring law and order or disarming the Somali factions. A controversy between the US and the United Nations over the scope of disarmament arose; the US was not prepared to undertake the complete disarmament that the United Nations envisaged.³⁶ Concerns about “mission creep” led the US to push for the United Nations to essentially take over the operation, almost from the outset. By late February 1993, the US had already reduced its presence from some 26,000 to 16,000.³⁷

The final phase of operations—the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II)—was a failure both conceptually and operationally. UNOSOM II was established to take over from UNITAF in March 1993.³⁸

³⁴See UN Document S/RES/751; UN Document S/RES/767 (1992), 27 July 1992; and UN Document S/23829, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Somalia*, 21 April 1992, paras. 22-27 (outlining the initial concept of operations).

³⁵UN Document S/RES/794 (1992), 3 December 1992.

³⁶Chopra, Eknes, and Nordbø, p. 42.

³⁷*Ibid.*, p. 47.

³⁸UN Document S/RES/814 (1993), 26 March 1993 (adopting the concept of operations set out in the Secretary-General’s report of 3 March 1993). See UN Document S/25354, *Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1992)*, 3 March (continued...)

Although officially termed a peacekeeping operation, UNOSOM II actually constituted the United Nations' first so-called "peace enforcement" mission.³⁹ The 30,000-strong operation prioritized military tasks at the expense of political reconstruction,⁴⁰ but ultimately it failed in both domains. After 25 Pakistani soldiers were killed and more than 50 wounded in a series of ambushes and attacks by fighters loyal to Somali warlord Gen. Mohamed Farah Aideed,⁴¹ UNOSOM II undertook a number of actions to restore law and order and disarm the factions.⁴² The botched 3 October raid by US Rangers intended to capture a number of Aideed's key aides—which resulted in the deaths of 18 US soldiers—effectively ended American involvement in Somalia. Four days later, on 7 October, President Bill Clinton announced that

³⁸(...continued)

1993, paras. 56-88. UNOSOM II's military tasks included: [1] monitoring compliance with cease-fire agreement; [2] preventing a resumption of violence; [3] maintaining control of the heavy weapons seized; [4] seizing, registering, and securing unauthorized small arms; [5] securing ports, airports, and lines of communication for the delivery of humanitarian assistance; [6] providing protection for personnel, installations, and equipment of the UN, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and non-governmental organizations; [7] demining; [8] and assisting in the return of refugees and internally-displaced persons (IDPs). *Ibid.*, para. 57.

³⁹Boutros-Ghali initially indicated that the operation would differ from the peacekeeping model and would constitute "the first peace-enforcement operation to be carried out under United Nations command." (See UN Document S/24992, *Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 (1992)*, 19 December 1992, para. 43.) However, he ultimately recommended enlarging UNOSOM and redefining its mandate to include operations under Chapter VII. UN Document S/25354, paras. 56-88. See also Serge Lalande, "Somalia: Major Issues for Future UN Peacekeeping," in Warner (ed.), *New Dimensions of Peacekeeping*, pp. 77-78.

⁴⁰Chopra, Eknes, and Nordbø, p. 57.

⁴¹See UN Document S/26022, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 837 (1993)*, 1 July 1993, paras. 8-9.

⁴²See *ibid.*, paras. 17-32.

the US would withdraw its combat forces and the bulk of its logistics units by 31 March 1994.⁴³ In February 1994, the Security Council revised UNOSOM's mandate to exclude the use of coercive methods.⁴⁴ The mission was withdrawn in March 1995.⁴⁵

Subsequent Reduction

The US experience in Somalia prompted it to re-evaluate and redefine its peacekeeping policy, which in turn has influenced other countries' approaches. In May 1994, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, the unclassified version of which is entitled *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*.⁴⁶ Early drafts of PDD-25 had actually envisioned a growing US commitment to multilateral peace operations and advocated the expansion of United Nations peacekeeping. However, the document ultimately issued in May 1994 bore witness to a profound transformation in the Clinton Administration's policy.⁴⁷ PDD-25 established strict conditions for US participation in United Nations and other peace operations and indicated that the United States would reduce its United Nations peacekeeping assessment from some 31 per cent to 25 per cent. PDD-25 also indicated that the US would wield its power on the Security Council to prevent the

⁴³*The United Nations and Somalia: 1992-1996*, New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 61.

⁴⁴UN Document S/RES/897 (1994), 4 February 1994; see also UN Document S/1994/12, *Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Resolution 886 (1993)*, 6 January 1994, paras. 55-59 (reviewing the options for the future mandate of UNOSOM II).

⁴⁵*The United Nations and Somalia: 1992-1996*, p. 68.

⁴⁶"The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," *Executive Summary of Presidential Decision Directive 25*, May 1994, available on the Internet at

<<<http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/NSCDoc1>>>.

⁴⁷Ivo H. Daalder, "The United States and Military Intervention in Internal Conflict," in Michael E. Brown (ed.), *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1996, pp. 481-82.

establishment of what it considered to be ill-defined and imprudent missions.⁴⁸ The other four permanent members of the Security Council have largely taken their cues from the United States.

The direct ramifications of the international community's retreat from peacekeeping were most pronounced in Rwanda. Unable to summon the necessary political will or the financial and human resources, the international community failed to intervene to prevent the genocide there. In fact, the Security Council initially responded to the spiralling violence by reducing the authorized strength of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) by almost 90 per cent—from 2,548 to a mere 270.⁴⁹ Although the Council subsequently authorized the augmentation of UNAMIR to 5,500 troops in May 1994,⁵⁰ less than 10 per cent of the force had been fielded by the end of July.⁵¹ Operation Turquoise, the French-led multinational force that served alongside UNAMIR from 22 June to 21 August 1994, is credited with saving thousands of lives, but it created certain problems as well.⁵²

⁴⁸"The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations."

⁴⁹See UN Document S/RES/872 (1993), 5 October 1993, and UN Document S/RES/912 (1994), 21 April 1994.

⁵⁰UN Document S/RES/918 (1994), 17 May 1994.

⁵¹See UN Document S/1994/923, *Letter dated 1 August 1994 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council*, 3 August 1994 (reporting his urgent request to Governments to provide the reinforcements and equipment necessary to bring UNAMIR to the strength authorized by the Council in Resolution 918 (1994)).

⁵²Allegations persist that France rearmed remnants of the former Rwandan Government's armed forces during *Operation Turquoise*. (See, for example, "Rwanda/Zaire: Rearming with Impunity," *Human Rights Watch Arms Project* Vol. 7, No. 4, May 1995, pp. 6-9.) According to former US Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen, however, such accusations are "nonsense" and "totally unjustified." Cohen states that "Operation Turquoise saved tens of thousands of Tutsis, and the French were the only ones to do anything about the genocide (except for the Ghanaian (continued...))

Although Rwanda may be the most glaring casualty of the international community's revised approach to peacekeeping, it is far from the only one. In general, the Security Council has scaled down United Nations peacekeeping in both size and scope. Although the Council established 15 operations from 1995 to mid-1999, only four of those represented interventions in new conflicts.⁵³ As of 30 June 1999, fewer than 12,000 Blue Helmets from 73 troop-contributing States were deployed worldwide, in 15 operations. The largest mission as of that date, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), comprised only 4,500 troops—which itself represented a reduction of more than 10 per cent since 1993.⁵⁴ The annual supplemental budget assessment for United Nations peacekeeping operations has again fallen below the US\$ 1 billion mark. The mandates of United Nations missions have also been reduced. The Security Council has become reluctant or unwilling to authorize large-scale, multi-functional peacekeeping operations.

Instead, the Security Council has established military observer and civilian police missions with increasing frequency. As of 30 June 1999, only five of the 15 ongoing missions were composed of formed units of national

⁵²(...continued)

general who saved a few thousand in a Kigali stadium). The Rwandan propaganda machine has been determined to make the French their scapegoat for the genocide and they have succeeded." Written correspondence with Amb. Herman J. Cohen, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, US Department of State, 27 February 1999.

⁵³Eleven of them were authorized to succeed or supplement ongoing operations in Angola, Haiti, and former Yugoslavia. The 1997 peacekeeping operation in Guatemala represented a new Security Council initiative, but it constituted a small and short-lived addition to a civilian operation authorized by the General Assembly in 1994. New missions were also established in the Central African Republic (in 1998), Sierra Leone (1998), and Kosovo (1999).

⁵⁴As of 31 May 1993, 5,280 troops served in UNIFIL. The force's authorized strength was 7,000. *United Nations Peace-keeping*, New York: UN Department of Public Information, August 1993, p. 19.

contingents and just one of those five was created after October 1993.⁵⁵ Seven were primarily military observer missions,⁵⁶ most comprising relatively small numbers of unarmed military officers charged with tasks including monitoring cease-fires, verifying troop withdrawals, patrolling borders or demilitarized zones, and monitoring the performance of larger regional forces. Three were primarily staffed by civilian police,⁵⁷ which have assumed an increasingly important role in United Nations operations. Five other operations also had civilian police components as of that date.⁵⁸ Tasks of such missions range from performing law enforcement duties to reorganizing, rebuilding, training, and monitoring national police forces.

INCREASING RELIANCE ON BURDEN-SHARING

Although the Security Council has proven increasingly reluctant to authorize United Nations peacekeeping operations, it appears increasingly willing to allow regional, subregional, and ad hoc initiatives in their stead.

⁵⁵The five included: [1] UNFICYP (created in 1964); [2] UNDOF (1974); [3] UNIFIL (1978); [4] UN Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM) (1991); and [5] UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) (1998).

⁵⁶Those seven operations were: [1] UNTSO; [2] UNMOGIP; [3] UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO); [4] UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG); [5] UN Mission of Observers in Tajikistan (UNMOT); [6] UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP); and [7] UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). The majority of the UNTSO military observers have been effectively seconded to UNDOF and UNIFIL. UNIKOM also has a military observer component.

⁵⁷The three missions were: [1] UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH); [2] UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti (MIPONUH); and [3] UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). UNMIK will consist of 1,800 civilian police, 1,150 officers assigned to special units, and 205 border police. UN Document S/1999/779, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo*, 12 July 1999, para. 60.

⁵⁸Those missions were: [1] UNFICYP; [2] MINURSO; [3] UNMOT; [4] MINURCA; and [5] UNOMSIL.

There are a number of recent examples of this “burden-sharing” trend. Such regional, subregional and ad hoc undertakings have varied significantly in terms of their size and effectiveness.

There is nothing inherently wrong with utilizing the peacekeeping services of others. Indeed, Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter recognizes a subsidiary but integral role for regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. Article 52 empowers regional organizations to deal with those matters that are appropriate for regional action and encourages them to undertake the pacific settlement of local disputes before referring them to the Security Council. Article 53 permits regional organizations to undertake enforcement actions, provided the Council gives its approval. Article 54 requires any regional organization to inform the Council of activities it is contemplating for the maintenance of international peace and security.⁵⁹

However, the five permanent members of the Security Council have embraced Chapter VIII disingenuously, to lend both respectability and legitimacy to some of their selfish desires. Among the Permanent Five, the concerns of the United States—saving its money and the lives of its citizens—clearly predominate. The objectives of the four other permanent members of the Council are not adverse to the US-led changes. China, for example, while never enthusiastic about inter-State peacekeeping in the first place, is decidedly less enthusiastic about intra-State peacekeeping. China has also sought to scale down peacekeeping operations as a means to settle political scores. Although Russia complains that it would prefer the United Nations to play a greater role in peacekeeping operations where the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) is active, Moscow has benefited from the respectability that Chapter VIII bestows upon its peacekeeping activities in the region.⁶⁰

⁵⁹See Articles 52-54, UN Charter. Beyond the broad requirements of Chapter VIII, however, the Charter does not prescribe a precise division of labour between the UN and regional organizations in security-related matters. This ambiguity has permitted an ad hoc and crisis-driven division of competencies.

⁶⁰For a fuller description of the various motives behind burden-sharing see
(continued...)

Outside of Africa, the Council's reliance on regional organizations has had some success. In Kosovo, the ability of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to deploy a peacekeeping force in the tens of thousands is not in doubt. In Bosnia, NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) have managed to assume responsibilities previously carried out by the United Nations, although initially with some difficulty. China's February 1999 veto of an extension of the United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)—in retaliation for that country's decision to establish diplomatic relations with Taiwan—has had no adverse effect. Western countries simply took over the United Nations' responsibilities.

In contrast, African political and security organizations, which have relatively few resources, have encountered greater obstacles in filling the void created by Security Council inaction. Partly in response to perceived Western indifference, African States have begun to exhibit a growing willingness to intervene in African conflicts. Several political and economic alliances on the continent have been expanded to include military dimensions. While it is important that Africans have recognized the need to take primary responsibility for responding to crises and armed conflict, their political will far surpasses their peacekeeping capabilities.

⁶⁰(...continued)

Eric G. Berman, "The Security Council's Increasing Reliance on Burden-Sharing: Collaboration or Abrogation?," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 3-4.