

CHAPTER 5

SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

States from the southern African subregion have also increasingly begun to take the lead in the promotion of peace and security. Prior to the end of apartheid in 1994, many of the subregion's countries were preoccupied with their own security situations and with countering the machinations of South Africa to destabilize its neighbours as well as to subjugate the majority of its own population. The Southern African Development Community (SADC), which was established in 1992 and now counts South Africa as a member, has exhibited a growing interest in conflict prevention and resolution. Since its creation, the organization has endeavoured to develop a formal framework for addressing peace and security issues. Disagreements over the proposed mechanism's structure and leadership as well as personal feuds among the subregion's heads of State have thwarted progress towards this end. Nevertheless, even without a functioning peace and security mechanism, SADC countries have undertaken important peacekeeping training and other capacity-building initiatives. Yet although SADC members have fielded two multinational operations since the organization's creation, the peacekeeping capabilities of SADC—as an organization—have never truly been tested.

ORGANIZATIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

Front-line States

The Front-line States (FLS) was established in the mid-1970s to coordinate support for those still fighting for independence in Southern Africa. The Presidents of Botswana, Tanzania, and Zambia, along with the

President-elect of Mozambique met in 1974¹ to discuss concrete ways to implement the 1969 Lusaka Manifesto.² The leaders initially tried to unify the various Rhodesian liberation movements. Over time, both the focus and membership of the group, which became known as the Front-line States in early 1976, expanded. In addition to assisting in Zimbabwe's struggle for independence, the FLS concerned itself with Namibia's liberation, the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique, and the campaign for economic sanctions against South Africa.³ Angola joined in September 1976. Zimbabwe and Namibia became members of the organization upon achieving independence in 1980 and 1990, respectively. Majority-ruled South Africa became an FLS member in 1994.⁴

¹ Thomas Ohlson, "Strategic Confrontation versus Economic Survival," in Francis M. Deng and I. William Zartman (eds), *Conflict Resolution in Africa*, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1991, p. 237.

² The Lusaka Manifesto had been written by Presidents Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and issued by the April 1969 Fifth Summit Conference of East and Central African States. Colin Legum, "Southern Africa: The Year of the Whirlwind," in Colin Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record 1976-77*, Vol. 9, p. A12; Ronald Dreyer, *Namibia and Southern Africa: Regional Dynamics of Decolonization 1945-90*, London: Kegan Paul International, 1994, p. 111. It provided in part:

Our objectives in Southern Africa stem from our commitment to [the] principle of human equality. We are not hostile to the Administrations of these States because they are manned and controlled by White people. We are hostile to them because they are systems of minority control which exist as a result of, and in the pursuance of, doctrines of human inequality. What we are working for is the right of self-determination for the people of those territories. We are working for a rule in those countries which is based on the will of all the people and an acceptance of the equality of every citizen."

Lusaka Manifesto of 1969, cited in Colin Legum, "The Southern African Crisis," in Colin Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1977-78, Vol. 10, p. A3.

³ Ohlson, "Strategic Confrontation versus Economic Survival," pp. 237-38.

⁴ Jakkie Cilliers, "Building Security in Southern Africa—An Update of the Evolving Architecture," *ISS Monograph*, forthcoming, courtesy of author.

The group convened informally on an ad hoc basis to exchange views and coordinate activities. At times, the FLS Heads of State met frequently, almost on a monthly basis. Bilateral and trilateral meetings were often held on the side, as were other meetings at the functional level.⁵ Other States were sometimes invited to attend FLS meetings,⁶ and liberation movements such as South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) and Namibia's South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) routinely participated.⁷ The FLS's loose structure was one of the keys to its success. According to Thomas Ohlson, "[t]his way, each national leader can pursue the foreign policy of his country, while the summitry format allows for flexibility, pragmatism, and rapid, collective responses to questions of vital importance to the common goals."⁸ Although FLS members disagreed on certain key issues, their disputes did not threaten to break up the alliance. Tanzanian President Julius Nyerere served as the organization's first Chair until 1985. President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, who succeeded Nyerere, headed the group until 1991. Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe chaired the FLS until it disbanded in July 1994.⁹

⁵ "The Southern African Crisis 1986-87," in Colin Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1986-87, Vol. 19, p. A42.

⁶ For example, Nigeria participated in the April 1979 Summit meeting dealing with the Rhodesian election ("The Continuing Crisis in Southern Africa," in Colin Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1978-79, Vol. 11, p. A22), while Zaire attended the October 1986 Summit on Mozambique ("The Southern African Crisis 1986-87," p. A42).

⁷ See, for example, "Mozambique," in Colin Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1984-85, Vol. 17, p. B686.

⁸ Ohlson, "Strategic Confrontation versus Economic Survival," p. 237.

⁹ The longest-serving head of State generally served as the FLS Chair. According to this practice, Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos should have assumed the position after Kaunda. Dos Santos declined, however, due to instability in Angola. See Horace Campbell, "SADC Heads at loggerheads?," *SAPEM*, 15 September-15 October 1997, p. 6.

Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference

In 1980, the then nine majority-ruled States in Southern Africa formed the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC).¹⁰ The FLS, led by Botswanan President Seretse Khama,¹¹ convened a preparatory conference in Arusha, Tanzania, in July 1979. Wishing to coordinate their assistance to the FLS's struggle against Pretoria, the United Kingdom and its European Economic Community (EEC) partners were also instrumental in the organization's creation.¹² SADCC was formally established in April 1980 at a regional economic conference in Lusaka. The organization's strategy was outlined in the Lusaka Declaration, entitled "Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation." In it, the signatories identified "the reduction of economic dependence particularly, but not only, on South Africa" as one of their principal objectives and determined priorities and strategies for achieving that goal.¹³ A programme of action allocating

¹⁰ The nine founding members of SADCC were Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. SADCC's membership eventually grew to 10 with the inclusion of Namibia in 1990. After the reform process began in South Africa in the early 1990s, the organization also invited two South African liberation movements—the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) to participate in its activities. The SADCC Executive Secretary at the time, Simba Makoni—referred to them as "full members of the SADCC." "Simba Makoni—Interview with the Executive Secretary of SADCC," *SAPEM*, Vol. 5, No. 2, November 1991, p. 6, cited in Peter Meyns, "Time to Decide: Rethinking the Institutional Framework of Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa," in Hans-Joachim Spanger and Peter Vale (eds), *Bridges to the Future: Prospects for Peace and Security in Southern Africa*, Boulder: Westview Press, 1995, p. 40.

¹¹ Khama, the SADCC's chief proponent and first Chair observed, "economic dependence has in many ways made our political independence somewhat meaningless." Reginald H. Green and Carol B. Thompson, "Political Economies in Conflict: SADCC, Southern Africa and Sanctions," in Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds), *Frontline Southern Africa: Destructive Engagement*, New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1988, p. 371.

¹² Meyns, "Time to Decide: Rethinking the Institutional Framework of Regional Co-operation in Southern Africa," p. 40.

¹³ "Southern Africa: Toward Economic Liberation," *Declaration by the Governments of independent states of Southern Africa*, Lusaka, April 1980, reprinted in Colin Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, Vol. 13, 1980-81, pp. C31-C35. The
(continued...)

specific studies and tasks to member Governments was also approved in Lusaka.¹⁴

SADCC was essentially a loose cooperative framework rather than a formal supranational entity. There was no treaty establishing the organization or governing the activities of its members.¹⁵ No SADCC institution was authorized to make binding decisions on behalf of individual members or the subregion. Rather, each member State was responsible for a particular aspect of SADCC's programme.¹⁶ Meetings were held at both the ministerial and heads of State levels on an ad hoc basis. The rationale underlying this informal arrangement was that it did not encroach upon member States' sovereignty and thus endeavoured to facilitate cooperation among countries with different ideologies and development priorities.¹⁷ Given the diverse political ideologies of SADCC members, political cooperation was limited. Moreover, the organization was not very visible on a day-to-day basis.¹⁸ There was no Secretariat to administer its programmes or coordinate its activities.¹⁹

¹³ (...continued)

Lusaka Declaration identified three other development objectives: forging links to create a genuine and equitable regional integration; mobilizing resources; and acting in concert to secure international cooperation within the framework of SADCC's economic liberation strategy. Ibid.

¹⁴ "Southern African Development Community—SADC," *Africa South of the Sahara 1999 (28th Edition)*, London: Europa Publications, 1998, p. 133.

¹⁵ In July 1981, SADCC members did sign a Memorandum of Understanding on the Institutions of the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference. Cilliers, "Building Security in Southern Africa—An Update on the Evolving Architecture."

¹⁶ Ohlson, "Strategic Confrontation versus Economic Survival," p. 241.

¹⁷ Meyns, "Time to Decide: Rethinking the Institutional Framework of Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa," p. 41. See also, Reginald Herbold Green, "SADCC versus South Africa: Turning of the Tide?," in Colin Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, 1987-88, Vol. 20, p. A31.

¹⁸ Agostinho Zacarias, "SADC: From a system to community of security?," *African Security Review*, Vol. 7, No. 6, 1998, pp. 46-47.

¹⁹ Written correspondence with Jakkie Cilliers, Executive Director, Institute for Security Studies, 18 November 1999.

Although SADCC did achieve some measure of success, it failed to reduce the subregion's economic dependence on South Africa. The organization served to build solidarity among its members, and it also mobilized significant international donor support for its projects.²⁰ Despite such positive developments, Pretoria continued to exert a powerful economic grip on the subregion. A 1985 SADCC report noted, for example, that countries from the subregion had actually become more reliant upon South Africa as a trading partner since the organization's creation. The 1986 SADCC Summit recommended the imposition of economic sanctions against Pretoria, but it did not establish a timetable for doing so.²¹

Dismantling of Apartheid and Other Notable Developments

SADCC's lack of progress coupled with significant regional and wider international developments prompted the decision to revamp the organization. The end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union had a pronounced impact on subregional dynamics. The dismantling of apartheid in South Africa and the unbanning of majority-led South African organizations such as the ANC and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC)²² led SADCC to rethink its anti-South Africa stance. Members began to consider the possibility of an economically-strong, democratic South Africa joining the organization. In Angola, there was a rapprochement between the *União Nacional para Independência Total de Angola* (UNITA) and the *Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola* (MPLA). In Mozambique, peace talks were being brokered between the *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO) and *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (FRELIMO). Other states in the subregion were moving towards more democratic forms of government.

²⁰ Meyns, "Time to Decide: Rethinking the Institutional Framework of Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa," p. 41. However, SADCC's ties to the EEC prompted charges of "neocolonialism." Sanford J. Ungar, *Africa: The People and Politics of an Emerging Continent (Revised and Updated Edition)*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986, p. 337.

²¹ "Southern African Development Community—SADC," p. 133.

²² South Africa's President F.W. de Klerk unbanned opposition parties on 2 February 1990 and released Nelson Mandela from prison the following week.

These developments contributed to a positive view of economic integration.²³

Creation of a “Community”

SADC was established in 1992, putting in place a more formalized structure with an altered focus. A January 1992 SADCC Council of Ministers meeting approved proposals to transform the organization into a fully integrated economic community. On 17 August 1992, the 10 SADCC members signed a treaty establishing SADC.²⁴ South Africa subsequently joined the organization in August 1994, followed by Mauritius in August 1995, as well as the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Seychelles in September 1997. (See Map 5.1.)

The SADC treaty provides for the creation of a number of formal institutions. The Summit of Heads of State or Government, the organization’s chief policy-making body, meets at least once per year.²⁵ The Summit elects a Chair and Vice-Chair from among its members to serve “for an agreed period.”²⁶ The Council, comprising one minister from each member State, oversees the development and functioning of SADC.²⁷ It currently meets at least twice per year. The SADC treaty states that

²³ Rosalind H. Thomas, “Introductory Note: Southern African Development Community,” *International Legal Materials*, Vol. 32, 1993, p. 117.


²⁴ Meyns, “Time to Decide: Rethinking the Institutional Framework of Regional Cooperation in Southern Africa,” pp. 40-41. All 10 States had ratified the treaty by September 1993. “Southern African Development Community—SADC,” p. 132.

²⁵ Article 10, *Treaty of the Southern African Development Community*, 17 August 1992, reprinted in *International Legal Materials*, Vol. 32, No. 1, January 1993, p. 126.

²⁶ *Ibid.*

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Article 11, p. 126.

Map 5.1



Commissions will be constituted in designated sectoral areas.²⁸ Since the organization's creation, 18 Sector Coordinating Units have been established in member States.²⁹ The Standing Committee of Officials acts as a technical advisory body to the Council and meets at least once per year.³⁰ The Gaborone-based Secretariat, currently headed by Kaire Mbuende of Namibia, is responsible for strategic planning and management of SADC programmes.³¹ The SADC Treaty designates the Tribunal as the organization's dispute-settlement body,³² but it had not been established as of mid-1999.³³ The Treaty also provides for the establishment of other institutions "as necessary."³⁴

EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A SECURITY FRAMEWORK

Although economic independence was the primary aim behind the creation of SADC, peace and security concerns were nevertheless evident. The Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of Southern African States that accompanied the SADC Treaty—"Towards the Southern African

²⁸ *Ibid.*, Article 12, p. 127.

²⁹ The 18 sectors are: [1] Agricultural Research (Botswana); [2] Crop Protection (Zimbabwe); [3] Culture and Information (Mozambique); [4] Employment and Labour (Zambia); [5] Energy (Angola); [6] Environment and Land Management (Lesotho); [7] Finance and Investment (South Africa); [8] Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources (Zimbabwe); [9] Health (South Africa); [10] Human Resources Development (Swaziland); [11] Industry and Trade (Tanzania); [12] Inland Fisheries, Forestry and Wildlife (Malawi); [13] Livestock Production, Animal Disease Control (Botswana); [14] Marine Fisheries and Resources (Namibia); [15] Mining (Zambia); [16] Tourism (Mauritius); [17] Transport and Communications (Mozambique); and [18] Water (Lesotho). "SADC Sectoral Responsibilities Chart," *Southern African Development Community*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.sadc.int/sector.htm>>>.

³⁰ Article 13, *Treaty of the Southern African Development Community*, p. 127.

³¹ *Ibid.*, Articles 14 and 15, pp. 127-28.

³² *Ibid.*, Article 16, p. 129.

³³ See Cilliers, "Building Security in Southern Africa—An Update on the Evolving Architecture."

³⁴ Article 9.2, *Treaty of the Southern African Development Community*, p. 126.

Development Community”—addresses the issue of a more formal security structure. It provides:

Good and strengthened political relations among the countries of the region, and peace and mutual security, are critical components of the total environment for regional cooperation and integration. The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity, and provide for mutual peace and security.³⁵

The SADC Treaty anticipates the creation of a security framework. Article 4 identifies “solidarity, peace and security” as one of the principles that should guide the actions of SADC members.³⁶ Article 5 provides that one of the objectives of SADC is to “promote and defend peace and security.”³⁷ Article 21 obligates member States to cooperate in the area of “politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security.”³⁸ Yet beyond these broad provisions, the treaty does not flesh out the details of a peace and security mechanism. Indeed, Article 22 instructs that members will conclude the necessary protocols in such areas of cooperation.³⁹

Inter-State Defence and Security Committee

Prior to the creation of SADC, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), a substructure of the FLS, dealt with various individual and collective defence and security issues in the subregion. The organization was established in 1975 as a forum for sharing and coordinating defence and security strategies.⁴⁰ The ISDSC initially comprised three members:

³⁵ “Towards the Southern African Development Community,” *A Declaration by the Heads of State and Government of Southern African States*, 17 August 1992, courtesy of SADC Secretariat, Gaborone.

³⁶ Article 4, *Treaty of the Southern African Development Community*, p. 124.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, Article 5, p. 124.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, Article 21, p. 130.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, Article 22.

⁴⁰ The ISDSC’s early work included coordinating training assistance and venues for freedom fighters within Africa and abroad. Written correspondence with Maj-Gen. (Rtd) Daan Hamman, former de facto Secretary, Inter-State Defence and Security Committee, 6 November 1999.

Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia.⁴¹ Angola, Botswana, Namibia, and Zimbabwe joined the organization during the FLS era. The remaining SADC members joined after the FLS had disbanded: Lesotho, Malawi, South Africa, and Swaziland in 1994; Mauritius in 1995; and DRC and the Seychelles in 1997.

The ISDSC was created as an informal body. It had no charter or other governing text. Moreover, it had neither a Secretariat nor an institutional headquarters.⁴² Meetings were held on an ad hoc basis, but at least once per year, at both the ministerial and official levels.⁴³ Three sub-committees—Defence, Public Security, and State Security⁴⁴—were set up to facilitate the organization's work, but they were not formal structures.

Proposal for an Association of Southern African States

In 1994, SADC member States took the first concrete steps to move beyond the ISDSC and create a new security framework.⁴⁵ In July 1994, SADC convened a ministerial-level Workshop on Democracy, Peace and Security in Windhoek. The conference recommended the establishment of a sector devoted to conflict resolution and political cooperation, with

⁴¹ Cilliers, "Building Security in Southern Africa—An Update on the Evolving Architecture."

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Written correspondence with Hamman, 6 November 1999.

⁴⁴ Interview with Hamman, 21 January 1998, Halfway House. Defence assisted with training and transportation, Public Security performed police functions, and State Security screened new recruits from South Africa, gathered intelligence regarding raids, and arranged border crossings. Written correspondence with Hamman, 6 November 1999.

⁴⁵ SADC's 1993 Programme of Action had recommended a strategy for advancing subregional security that included adopting a wider definition of security, establishing a forum for mediation and arbitration, and reducing military expenditures. Zacarias, "SADC: From a system to a community of security?," p. 48 (citing SADC, "Southern Africa: A framework and strategy for building the community, SADC Secretariat, pp. 24-25).

responsibility allocated to a SADC member State.⁴⁶ This proposal was referred to the next SADC Council of Ministers meeting in Gaborone, where it was decided to establish a conflict mediation and prevention “wing,” rather than a “sector.”⁴⁷ On 30 July 1994, the FLS decided to dissolve and proposed to become SADC’s political and security arm.

The first formal proposal called for the creation of the Association of Southern African States (ASAS). In March 1995, SADC Foreign Ministers, meeting in Harare, recommended replacing the FLS cooperative framework with a more formal peace and security mechanism. They suggested that this new structure, called the ASAS, would function independently of the SADC Secretariat and would report directly to SADC Heads of State and Government. They also envisaged that the ASAS would incorporate two specialized SADC sectors—one dealing with military security and one dealing with political affairs.⁴⁸

SADC Heads of State and Government ultimately rejected the ASAS proposal. The recommendations were first considered at the August 1995 SADC Summit in Johannesburg. However, some of the countries were still uncomfortable with the idea that such sensitive sectors as military security and political affairs would be allocated to individual member States. Moreover, the proposal for the creation of the ASAS had not been reviewed by the various ministers of defence and police or the intelligence community.⁴⁹ SADC members also disagreed over how the Association’s chair should be designated. Namibia’s idea for a two-year revolving chairmanship was ultimately accepted, but Mugabe, who had headed the FLS when it was disbanded, continued to insist that the longest-serving SADC

⁴⁶ Mark Malan, “SADC and Sub-Regional Security: *Unde Venis et Quo Vadis?*,” *ISS Monograph 19*, February 1998, p. 12. Other recommendations of the workshop included the creation of: [1] a human rights commission comprising judges and other eminent persons; [2] a conflict resolution forum composed of foreign ministers; [3] a security and defence forum comprised of ministers responsible for defence, police, and intelligence; and [4] an institute for strategic studies. Denis Venter, “Regional security in sub-Saharan Africa,” *Africa Insight*, Vol. 26, No. 2, 1996, p. 172.

⁴⁷ Malan, “SADC and Sub-Regional Security: *Unde Venis et Quo Vadis?*,” p. 12.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 13.

Head of State—Mugabe himself in this instance—should serve as the ASAS chair.⁵⁰ The Summit deferred the decision to establish a formal political and security framework. The Communiqué provided:

The Summit considered and granted the request of the Foreign Ministers of SADC, that the allocation of the sector to any Member State be deferred and that they be given more time for consultations among themselves and with Ministers responsible for Defence and Security and SADC Matters, on the structures, terms of reference, and operational procedures, for the sector.⁵¹

Organ for Politics, Defence and Security

The Organ for Politics, Defence and Security was proposed and accepted in place of ASAS. SADC Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Defence and Security recommended its creation on 18 January 1996.⁵² In May 1996, President Ketumile Masire of Botswana, as Chair of SADC, wrote to the SADC Heads of State declaring the Organ officially established and indicating that Mugabe would serve as its interim until the next SADC Summit.⁵³ The 28 June 1996 SADC Summit in Gaborone accepted the Organ concept. The Summit's Communiqué defined 16 objectives to be pursued through the new body. It also provided that the Organ would function at the Summit level, operating independently of other SADC structures, as well as at the ministerial and technical levels. Its Chair would rotate among a troika on an annual basis. The ISDSC would become an institution of the Organ, and the

⁵⁰ See Cilliers, "Building Security in Southern Africa—An Update on the Evolving Architecture."

⁵¹ SADC Summit Communiqué, Johannesburg, 28 August 1995, courtesy of SADC Secretariat, Gaborone.

⁵² Malan, "SADC and Sub-Regional Security: *Unde Venis et Quo Vadis?*," p. 13.

⁵³ Documentation provided by the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Pretoria.

Organ could establish other structures as well.⁵⁴ The summit meeting elected Mugabe as the Organ's first Chair.⁵⁵

A fissure within SADC regarding the relative autonomy of the Organ soon became apparent. South Africa, on the one hand, maintained that the body should be a SADC sub-structure and should report directly to the SADC Summit.⁵⁶ Zimbabwe, on the other hand, asserted that the Organ should function under a separate Chair, as essentially a parallel structure to SADC.⁵⁷ Tensions came to a head at the August 1997 SADC Summit in Blantyre, Malawi, and the Summit failed to adopt the draft protocol as planned.⁵⁸ The Summit Communiqué simply "noted the ongoing efforts to finalize a protocol

⁵⁴ SADC Summit Communiqué, Gaborone, 28 June 1996, courtesy of SADC Secretariat, Gaborone.

⁵⁵ Zambian President Frederick Chiluba did not attend the Summit, reportedly because his Government feared that the Organ would be empowered to interfere in a country's internal affairs. "Southern African Development Community—SADC," p. 133.

⁵⁶ South Africa based its argument on Article 10 of the SADC Treaty, which provides that the SADC Summit is the "supreme policy-making Institution of SADC" and is "responsible for the overall policy direction and control of the functions of SADC." Articles 10.1 and 10.2, *Treaty of the Southern African Development Community*, p. 126. See also Horst Brammer, "In search of an effective regional security mechanism for southern Africa," *Global Dialogue*, Vol. 4.2, August 1999, available on the Internet at

<<http://www.igd.org.za/publications/global_dialogue/official_view/security.html>>.

⁵⁷ Zimbabwe was of the view that the Gaborone Summit created a separate summit for the Organ, based on FLS principles. (Brammer, "In search of an effective regional security mechanism for southern Africa.") In reaching this conclusion, Harare drew upon the Gaborone Summit's Communiqué, which provides that "The SADC organ on Politics, Defence and Security shall operate at the Summit Level, and shall function independently of other SADC structures." SADC Summit Communiqué, Gaborone, 28 June 1996; see also Cilliers, "Building Security in Southern Africa—An Update on the Evolving Architecture."

⁵⁸ Fernando Gonçalves, "Deadlock in Blantyre," *SAPEM*, 15 September-15 October 1997, p. 11.

that will establish the institutional structures and operational procedures for the organ.”⁵⁹

Hopes that the matter could be resolved quickly proved unrealistic. The issue of the Organ’s structure was deferred until a meeting of Heads of State and Government that was scheduled to be held in Luanda in September 1997. The Angolan Government cancelled the Summit, however, fearful that a controversy-filled meeting might upset the Angolan peace process.⁶⁰ The matter was raised during an extraordinary meeting of SADC Heads of State in Maputo in March 1998, but no decision was made. At the meeting, Mozambican President Joaquim Chissano, the Deputy Chair of SADC, announced that he, together with the Presidents of Malawi, and Namibia, would form a working group to study and help resolve the issue. The three Presidents, in turn, delegated the task to their Ministers of Foreign Affairs. In May 1998, Mozambique convened a SADC Organ ministerial meeting to enable the three ministers to make their recommendations on the proposed form and structure of the Organ.⁶¹

The compromise solution presented at the May 1998 meeting was not enthusiastically embraced. According to Mark Malan, the recommendations “amount to a ham-fisted effort at steering a middle road between the positions of South Africa and Zimbabwe.”⁶² The ministers suggested that the SADC Organ should be created as a Committee comprising five SADC member States. They further stated that this Committee would be given a mandate to intervene in all conflicts arising within the subregion. The idea behind this structure was that its small size would render it flexible and better ensure the confidentiality of information. Moreover, Ministers of Defence, Home Affairs and Security should continue to operate as the ISDSC, and the Committee may ask the Foreign Affairs Ministers to assist in its activities. According to the proposal, the SADC Summit could modify decisions of the

⁵⁹ SADC Summit Communiqué, Blantyre, 8 August 1997, courtesy of SADC Secretariat, Gaborone.

⁶⁰ Malan, “SADC and Sub-Regional Security: *Unde Venis et Quo Vadis?*,” p. 16.

⁶¹ Mark Malan, “Regional Power Politics Under Cover of SADC—Running Amok with a Mythical Organ,” *ISS Paper No. 35*, October 1998, p. 4.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 5.

Committee. The envisaged Organ would have no permanent Secretariat, and would meet on an ad hoc basis.⁶³

As of mid-1999, the controversy continued unabated. It is unclear whether the Malawian, Mozambican, and Namibian presidents had approved the recommendations of their foreign ministers and were prepared to propose them at the next summit. In any event, this question became moot. The matter of the Organ's form and structure was removed from the agenda of the September 1998 SADC Summit in Mauritius. SADC members had not formally met to address the issue as of June 1999.⁶⁴

SADC CAPACITY-BUILDING EFFORTS

ISDSC Initiatives

Notwithstanding the non-functioning of the Organ, SADC members have undertaken some important capacity-building initiatives, primarily through the ISDSC. After the dissolution of the FLS, the ISDSC continued to exist in anticipation of its (yet undefined) role as an institution of the SADC Organ.⁶⁵ In the interim, its three Sub-Committees have taken on new responsibilities—some in the domain of capacity-building.

Recognizing the importance of a secure and reliable communication network, the ISDSC has established a satellite communication system linking the various SADC Governments. This "high-level hotline" was installed and became operational in early 1999. Each member State has been given two terminals, which they will place as they see fit with one likely dedicated to

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Interview with Horst Brammer, Deputy Director, SADC Political Affairs, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 27 August 1999, by telephone.

⁶⁵ Until the controversy over the SADC Organ is resolved, the ISDSC will remain a "floating structure" completely detached from other subregional structures. Ibid.

the office of each nation's Defence Minister. The idea is that the terminals should be supervised 24 hours per day.⁶⁶

Under the ISDSC's supervision, the SADC subregion has committed itself to creating a standby brigade. Each country will earmark formed units as well as headquarters staff. This arrangement was supposed to be operational by the end of 1998, but due to the impasse concerning the Organ, little progress has been made. According to Maj-Gen Daan Hamman, former de facto Secretary of the ISDSC, the SADC Organ must initiate a number of the actions to be taken, such as determining the procedure to be followed in the case of a conflict alert in order to deploy peacekeepers in the region. The civilian structures to manage the peacekeeping operation must also be decided upon and established.⁶⁷

The ISDSC has been involved in important training and other preparatory initiatives as well. For example, the Defence Sub-Committee has solved a number of technical problems associated with disaster relief support operations. It has also approved a training syllabus for peace support training, based on the United Nations training syllabus, which SADC defence forces will use. It is working to develop operational procedures and ensure that standing operational orders are in place as well. Moreover, the ISDSC requested that the Zimbabwe Staff College (ZSC), through its Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC), coordinate and harmonize peacekeeping education training in the SADC subregion.⁶⁸

Peacekeeping-Related Instruction

The Zimbabwe Staff College has endeavoured to market itself as the subregion's peacekeeping training center. With advisory and financial assistance from both Denmark and the United Kingdom, the ZSC has improved its training facilities and expanded its peacekeeping course

⁶⁶ Interview with Hamman, 21 January 1998, Halfway House; and written correspondence with Hamman, 18 February 1998 and 7 July 1999.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Written correspondence with Hamman, 7 July 1999.

offerings.⁶⁹ The RPTC was inaugurated in November 1995. Since then, it has conducted an annual, two-week peacekeeping course for commanders, which is geared towards officers designated to participate in peacekeeping operations as sector commanders, battalion commanders, or chiefs of staff.⁷⁰ The course draws both instructors and participants from throughout the subregion. The RPTC has conducted other training programmes in addition to the annual course. In June 1998, for example, it held a three-week regional military observer course. Vacancies in regional courses are allocated to each country in the subregion according to the size of its population, the size of its military, and its past and present involvement in United Nations operations.⁷¹ With Danish support, the RPTC is currently developing a “clearing house” that will, among other things, monitor peacekeeping training activities, identify new regional training requirements, and keep a record of trained peacekeeping practitioners and instructors in the subregion and beyond.⁷² The clearing house will also establish direct links between the various SADC countries at the defence force level.⁷³

Rather than relying exclusively on the RPTC, other SADC members have begun to offer peacekeeping-related training to other countries in the subregion. With British support, Malawi hosted a four-week regional command and staff course in October 1998⁷⁴ and an eight-month regional

⁶⁹ The ZSC’s involvement in peacekeeping training dates to early 1995, when it hosted a “lessons learned” seminar on participation in peace operations with British assistance. Interview with Gen. Happyton Bonyongwe, Commandant, Zimbabwe Staff College, 26 January 1998, Harare.

⁷⁰ “Commandant’s Brief on the Development of the Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre at the Zimbabwe Staff College,” courtesy of Zimbabwe Staff College.

⁷¹ Interview with Bonyongwe, 26 January 1998, Harare.

⁷² Kurt Mosgaard, “Training Co-ordination: the NACC Clearing House Concept,” in Mark Malan (ed.), “Resolute Partners: Building Peacekeeping Capacity in Southern Africa,” *ISS Monograph No. 21*, February 1998, p. 88.

⁷³ Interview with Bonyongwe, 26 January 1998, Harare.

⁷⁴ Written correspondence with Gill Coglein, Deputy Head, Peacekeeping Section, UN Department, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 21 October 1998.

training course for junior officers in January 1999.⁷⁵ Namibia was expected to host a regional senior officers course in late 1999, similarly with British assistance.⁷⁶ South Africa has suggested that individual SADC countries should provide peacekeeping training in a particular "specialty," under the rationale that no single country can possibly have a center of excellence that covers all of the components of peacekeeping.⁷⁷

Regional Peacekeeping Training Exercises

Blue Hungwe

The subregion has also initiated regional peacekeeping training exercises, the first of which was held in April 1997. Some 1,500 troops from 10 SADC countries participated in exercise Blue Hungwe, which Zimbabwe hosted and organized with British assistance.⁷⁸ Blue Hungwe aimed "[t]o enhance regional African liaison, cooperation, military skills and interoperability by means of a multinational joint field training exercise in the tactics and techniques of international peacekeeping."⁷⁹ The exercise included three phases of substantive training. At the outset, participants received five days of low-level instruction, including weapons handling, medical assistance, road blocks, and convoys. Commanders and officers were then brought to the ZSC for tactical training. Troops subsequently were deployed to the exercise area and played out a number of scenarios.⁸⁰

⁷⁵ "SADC Armies Ready for Peacekeeping Duties," *Panafrican News Agency*, 14 January 1999, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.africanews.org>>>.

⁷⁶ Chrispin Inambao, "SADC Peace Force Efforts Get a Boost," *Africa News Service*, 5 October 1999.

⁷⁷ Interview with R.M. "Rocky" Williams, Director, Defence Policy Department, South African Department of Defence Secretariat, 23 January 1998, Halfway House.

⁷⁸ The UK Government spent over US\$ 500,000 for Blue Hungwe and its British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) Southern Africa served as the exercise's "umpire." Interview with Brig. Adrian Naughten, Commander, BMATT Southern Africa, 26 January 1998, Harare.

⁷⁹ *Exercise Blue Hungwe Report, Book Two*, courtesy of BMATT Southern Africa.

⁸⁰ Interview with Naughten, 26 January 1998, Harare.

Blue Hungwe proved to be a useful initiative and was instrumental in highlighting areas where progress still needed to be made. Brig. Adrian Naughten, Commander of the British Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) Southern Africa, acknowledged that certain contingents lacked an adequate appreciation of who does what in a multinational integrated headquarters. However, he stressed that given the lack of expertise and the varied military standards among the participating States, Exercise Blue Hungwe was a resounding success and “a major achievement in both military and political terms.”⁸¹ Other observers praised the exercise’s straightforward format as well as its comprehensiveness.⁸² Zimbabwe Defence Force Chief of Staff (Administration and Quartermaster Staff) MajGen. Michael Nyambuya noted that Zimbabwe had found it difficult to work with certain contingents with different training standards and doctrine, and emphasized the need for the subregion to conduct standardized pre-deployment training and to develop standard operating procedures (SOPs). There was also a clear need to enhance the compatibility of communication equipment and procedures for effective command and control.⁸³

Blue Crane

South Africa subsequently hosted the brigade-level Blue Crane under the auspices of the ISDSC. The exercise was originally scheduled for November 1998 but was postponed until April 1999.⁸⁴ Blue Crane, which cost some US\$ 3.3 million to stage, brought together 4,965 troops from 13 SADC countries. It was designed to simulate a UN-led multinational operation deployed in a classic inter-positional role between two warring factions on

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Interviews with military observers that attended Blue Hungwe, 26 February 1998, Bakel.

⁸³ Michael Nyambuya, “Zimbabwe’s Role as Lead Nation for Peacekeeping Training in the SADC Region,” in Malan (ed.), “Resolute Partners: Building Peacekeeping Capacity in Southern Africa,” p. 93.

⁸⁴ Both subregional instability and budgetary pressures on the South African Department of Defence have been cited as reasons for the delay. The training for commanders at the ZSC and the training of civilians and civilian police took place as originally planned in late 1998.

a fictional island in the Indian Ocean.⁸⁵ The exercise had both land and naval components. The field dimension covered military tasks such as disarming and separating combatants, patrolling, and manning checkpoints, as well as humanitarian and media relations skills. It included a significant role for civilians. The naval dimension reviewed tasks such as enforcing a naval embargo and handling refugees at sea.⁸⁶

Blue Crane can be termed a success for a number of reasons. Although South Africa received significant financial and logistical contributions from donor countries, it essentially organized the exercise on its own. Blue Crane was also the first brigade-level undertaking held in Southern Africa. The exercise proved timely in view of the tensions in the subregion, giving participants a much-needed opportunity to train together. Beyond that, it developed SOPs that SADC can use in future peacekeeping missions.⁸⁷ Also, as Cedric de Coning, a Controller of the civilian component of the exercise noted, "for the first time civilian organizations took part, not in an isolated one-on-one basis with the military in a peace exercise, but as a central part of the organization and planning of the scenarios."⁸⁸

Yet there were also some criticisms of Blue Crane, and a number of lessons learned have been identified. Some viewed the exercise's emphasis on the civilian component of peacekeeping as too ambitious or unrealistic. Military participants and observers in particular complained about the heightened participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Exercise planners were not wholly successful in integrating the civilian and humanitarian dimensions into the exercise, according to one observer.⁸⁹ The organizers of the civilian activities have concluded that there should be more

⁸⁵ Cedric de Coning, "Exercise Blue Crane: A unifying moment for SADC," *Conflict Trends*, April 1999, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.accord.org.za/publications/99apr/bluec.htm>>>.

⁸⁶ Leon Engelbrecht, "Preparing for Peace Missions in Southern Africa," *Vanguard*, Issue 2, 1999, p. 26.

⁸⁷ See de Coning, "Exercise Blue Crane: A unifying moment for SADC."

⁸⁸ Engelbrecht, "Preparing for Peace Missions in Southern Africa," p. 25.

⁸⁹ Interview with South African Government official, August 1999, by telephone.

opportunities for joint civil-military training.⁹⁰ The structure of some of the battalions was also criticized as impractical. For example, one of the battalions comprised a headquarters staffed jointly by South Africa and Tanzania, motorized infantry companies from Lesotho, Mozambique, South Africa, and Tanzania, as well as South African support elements. Some observers claimed that deploying such small national contingents would be unworkable in an actual operation.⁹¹

Tulipe

Most recently, eight SADC members participated in a subregional peacekeeping training exercise in Madagascar in May 1999. Madagascar, which has expressed an interest in becoming a SADC member,⁹² organized Exercise Tulipe with French assistance. Some 1,700 troops from France and 10 African countries—Botswana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, the Seychelles, South Africa, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe—participated.⁹³ This exercise provided another important opportunity for the subregion's armed forces to train together.

(PROPOSED) MILITARY INTERVENTIONS OF SADC MEMBER STATES

SADC member States have considered undertaking concerted military actions on three separate occasions. In 1998, inter-African forces comprising SADC countries were deployed in DRC as well as Lesotho. These interventions were essentially ad hoc initiatives by willing coalitions of African States that just happened to be SADC members, although both ultimately received some form of SADC "approval." In 1994, three Southern African

⁹⁰ "Lessons Learned from the Civilian Participation in Exercise Blue Crane," *The African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)*, courtesy of ACCORD.

⁹¹ Engelbrecht, "Preparing for Peace Missions in Southern Africa," p. 26.

⁹² See "Madagascar: SADC's Trojan Horse," *The Indian Ocean Newsletter*, 3 April 1999.

⁹³ Documentation on *Tulipe*, courtesy of Office of the Ambassador for RECAMP, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "'Tulipe,' premières manoeuvres militaires communes des pays de l'océan indien," *Agence France Presse*, 5 May 1999.

countries contemplated intervening in Lesotho, but a force was never actually fielded. This example is nevertheless important because it was the first and last time the FLS met to discuss an internal crisis in a majority-ruled state and because it was majority-ruled South Africa's first attempt to resolve a conflict within the subregion.

Lesotho (1994): the Intervention that Never Was

In 1994, countries from the Southern Africa subregion undertook diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis in Lesotho. Tensions between the democratically-elected Prime Minister, Ntsu Mokhehle and the Kingdom's monarch, King Letsie III, had been steadily rising since 1993. In January 1994, Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe formed a task force to find a peaceful solution to the dispute.⁹⁴ This attempt at mediation began as an FLS initiative⁹⁵ but included South Africa, which was not yet a FLS member (or a member of SADC). Despite their efforts, the situation did not improve. On 17 August, following Mokhehle's announcement that he would establish a commission of inquiry into the future of monarchy, Letsie suspended the constitution and dissolved Mokhehle's administration. The task force held an emergency meeting in Gaborone on 23 August and condemned the "royal coup." On 25 August, the warring factions were assembled in Pretoria and given one week to resolve their differences.⁹⁶ On 2 September, one day after their deadline had expired, Letsie and Mokhehle agreed in principle to restore constitutional order and determined that Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe would act as guarantors to their agreement.⁹⁷ In the following days, however, it became clear that King Letsie had placed certain

⁹⁴ Brendan Seery, "Africa's Reluctant New Policeman Twirls His Truncheon: The Lesotho Experience and South Africa's Role in Peacekeeping," in Mark Shaw and Jakkie Cilliers (eds), *South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa (Volume I)*, Halfway House: Institute for Defence Policy, 1995, p. 93.

⁹⁵ L.H. Evans, "Preventive Diplomacy in Lesotho and Mozambique," in Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills (eds), *Peacekeeping in Africa (Volume II)*, Halfway House: Institute for Defence Policy, 1996, p. 188.

⁹⁶ Seery, "Africa's Reluctant New Policeman Twirls His Truncheon: The Lesotho Experience and South Africa's Role in Peacekeeping," pp. 94-95.

⁹⁷ See Evans, "Preventive Diplomacy in Lesotho and Mozambique," p. 189.

unacceptable conditions on his handing power back to Prime Minister Mokhehle.⁹⁸

Ultimately, a “show of force” by South Africa proved sufficient to seal the agreement. On 9 September 1994, three South African Impala jets performed manoeuvres and paratroopers staged a mass drop near the Lesotho border. The South African National Defence Force (SANDF) described the military activity as “exercises” designed to “stabilize certain aspects of its contingency planning” and confirmed that the unrest in Lesotho’s capital, Maseru, was the issue at hand. According to Brendan Seery, “it was clear that the SANDF deployment was the stick to the carrots being proffered in diplomatic shuttling behind the scenes by South Africa and some of its neighbours.”⁹⁹ South Africa terminated the exercises on 11 September,¹⁰⁰ and within 48 hours, Letsie had agreed to restore Mokhehle’s Government and to abdicate in favour of his father, Moshoeshe II.¹⁰¹

Had Letsie not backed down, it is unlikely that an inter-African force—either under SADC auspices or as an ad hoc undertaking—would have been deployed. Meeting in July 1994, SADC Foreign Ministers had determined that any military intervention in a SADC member State would only be sanctioned as a last resort.¹⁰² Presidents Masire and Mugabe may have wanted to send a tough message—to their own restive armies as much

⁹⁸ See Seery, “Africa’s Reluctant New Policeman Twirls His Truncheon: The Lesotho Experience and South Africa’s Role in Peacekeeping,” p. 96.

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 87.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*

¹⁰¹ Moshoeshe II had been Lesotho’s king from the country’s independence in 1965 until he was deposed by the military Government in 1990. Lesotho’s principal chiefs then elected Moshoeshe’s eldest son as his successor, and his son assumed the throne as Letsie III. When he returned to the throne, Moshoeshe pledged not to involve the monarchy in any aspect of political life. Richard Brown, “Lesotho: Recent History,” in *Africa South of the Sahara 1999 (28th Edition)*, pp. 596-99.

¹⁰² Seery, “Africa’s Reluctant New Policeman Twirls His Truncheon: The Lesotho Experience and South Africa’s Role in Peacekeeping,” p. 91.

as Lesotho's—that military coups in the subregion would not be tolerated.¹⁰³ Yet neither of their countries could undertake an operation in Lesotho on its own—although Zimbabwe was willing to command an intervention force.¹⁰⁴ South African military support for such a mission was therefore required, but it was questionable if it would be forthcoming.¹⁰⁵ Although the SANDF had begun making contingency plans for a possible intervention, political approval for an intervention was never given, and the South African Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) was not significantly involved in the matter.¹⁰⁶ Pretoria was in the process of integrating members of former liberation armies and homeland defence units into a new national defence force. With drastic budget cuts, the Department of Defence was preoccupied with downsizing and creating a new unified military structure. Thus, the SANDF showed little enthusiasm for undertaking a costly and potentially lengthy peacekeeping operation.¹⁰⁷

Democratic Republic of the Congo (1998 to date)

On 2 August 1998, a new rebellion broke out in northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and soon posed a serious threat to the Government of President Laurent Désiré Kabila. The *Rassemblement congolais pour la démocratie* (RCD) enjoyed the active support of Rwanda and Uganda¹⁰⁸—which hitherto had been Kabila's principal benefactors.

¹⁰³ Ibid., p. 92. According to Mafa Sejanamane, while Mugabe's preferred option appeared to be the use of force, Masire's position was less clear. Mafa M. Sejanamane, "Peace and Security in Southern Africa: The Lesotho Crisis and Regional Intervention," in Ibbo Mandaza (ed.), *Peace and Security in Southern Africa*, Harare: SAPES Trust, 1996, p. 73.

¹⁰⁴ Indeed, a Zimbabwean Force Commander had been identified and appointed. Written correspondence with Cilliers, 13 November 1999.

¹⁰⁵ Jakkie Cilliers believes that South Africa would not have stopped Zimbabwe from taking military action and would have joined the operation. Ibid.

¹⁰⁶ Interview with Williams, 23 January 1998, Halfway House.

¹⁰⁷ See Seery, "Africa's Reluctant New Policeman Twirls His Truncheon: The Lesotho Experience and South Africa's Role in Peacekeeping," pp. 92-93.

¹⁰⁸ Initially, both Rwanda and Uganda publicly distanced themselves from the RCD, denying any support. Their involvement in the conflict on the side of the rebels was an open secret, however, and both countries subsequently acknowledged that they
(continued...)

Kabila's *Forces armées congolaises* (FAC) proved ineffective, and the RCD quickly made inroads. Within days, the rebellion had spread from the populous but strategically insignificant town of Goma on the western shore of Lake Kivu to an important military base at Kitona, located clear across the vast country, near the Atlantic ocean.¹⁰⁹ Within two weeks, the RCD had seized the Inga hydro-electric dam that supplied electricity to the capital and had advanced to the outskirts of Kinshasa. Kabila, who had made a similar trek westward two years earlier in his successful bid to unseat President Mobutu Sese Seko—but at a much slower pace—knew that his FAC could offer no serious defence and that he and his Government were extremely vulnerable.

Kabila Secures "SADC" Support

Kabila secured the diplomatic and military support he desperately needed from SADC countries spearheaded by Zimbabwe. Within 72 hours after the outbreak of the rebellion, Mugabe mentioned his intention to host a summit of regional leaders in an effort to resolve the conflict.¹¹⁰ On 8 August, in Victoria Falls, Zimbabwe, the first meeting of regional Heads of State and Government was held to address the war. Those in attendance included the leaders of Angola, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.¹¹¹ Mugabe announced at the meeting that a four-nation committee of representatives from Namibia, Tanzania, Zambia, and

¹⁰⁸ (...continued)

had troops in DRC fighting alongside the RCD.

¹⁰⁹ James Kabarere, the FAC Chief of Staff until 13 July when Kabila summarily dismissed him, commandeered three aircraft and flew from Goma with 400 rebels to Kitona to tap into popular discontentment among the FAC, thousands of whom were stationed at the airbase there. See "Congo in Crisis," *New African*, October 1998, available on the Internet at

<<<http://www.africalynx.com>>>.

¹¹⁰ "Zimbabwe to host regional summit," *BBC News*, 5 August 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.bbc.co.uk>>>.

¹¹¹ UN Document S/1998/891 Annex, *Letter from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Zimbabwe to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council regarding the crisis in the Democratic Republic of the Congo*, 25 September 1998.

Zimbabwe would be created and charged with helping secure a cease-fire.¹¹² Upon receiving the recommendations of this task force, Mugabe forwarded the proposals to an ISDSC meeting in Harare on 18 August.¹¹³ Speaking on state television, Mugabe declared that SADC had unanimously agreed to Kabila's request for assistance.¹¹⁴ The following day, the Defence Ministers of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe declared that their three countries would come to the assistance of fellow SADC member DRC's.

Mugabe's claim of "unanimous" support within SADC for his decision to intervene on behalf of Kabila was disingenuous. Opposition to Zimbabwe's desire to rally behind Kinshasa militarily was strongest in—but not limited to—South Africa. Mandela, the SADC Chairman, challenged Mugabe's authority to send troops on behalf of SADC and continued to champion a diplomatic solution as the only viable route towards resolving the crisis. On 23 August he convened an extraordinary SADC Summit in Pretoria, to which he also invited the Presidents of Kenya, Rwanda, and Uganda, as well as the Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Mugabe, who declined to meet with Mandela in a pre-Summit consultation on 22 August, did not attend the Summit,¹¹⁵ sending his High Commissioner to South Africa to represent him. Angolan President José Eduardo Dos Santos was in telephone contact.¹¹⁶

The justifications that the three troop-contributing countries offered for their actions are unfounded. They initially explained that their intervention had been based on an Organ decision. The Organ, however, was not

¹¹² "Congo talks fail to secure truce," *BBC News*, 8 August 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.bbc.co.uk>>>.

¹¹³ See UN Document S/1998/891, Annex, and Sam Mujuda, Dickson Jere, and Goodson Machona, "Nine Nations to Send Troops to Congo Kinshasa," *The Post of Zambia*, 20 August 1999, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.africanews.org>>>.

¹¹⁴ "Congo troops launch counter-offensive," *BBC News*, 18 August 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.bbc.co.uk>>>.

¹¹⁵ Mary Braid, "Congo war threatens to draw in rival states," *The Independent*, 23 August 1998. Kabila also refused to meet with Mandela, sending his Foreign Minister in his stead. *Ibid.*

¹¹⁶ Interview with Brammer, 27 August 1999, by telephone.

operational and was not involved in the peace negotiations. Still, Mugabe as the Chair of the Organ believed he could take the decision on the Organ's behalf. The intervening countries alternatively claimed that an ISDSC decision authorized their intervention. Yet the ISDSC does not have a mandate to take decisions. Moreover, there were only four ministers present at the August 1998 ISDSC meeting from which they claimed the authority derived.¹¹⁷ Mandela's spokesman Parks Mankahlana put it bluntly, "There is no way that the people who met at Victoria Falls and Harare can have met under the auspices of the SADC."¹¹⁸

Tensions between Mandela and Mugabe on SADC's position grew, and the prospects for SADC to play an effective role in resolving the conflict diminished. Both men exchanged thinly-veiled insults. For example, Mugabe lectured Mandela, "No SADC country is compelled to help [a brother country]. But those who don't want to help should keep quiet about those who want to do so."¹¹⁹ Mugabe concluded that, "We must now enlist the OAU which has an organ for conflict resolution. It is not possible for us to resolve it as SADC because we are divided."¹²⁰

At an unscheduled meeting of SADC Heads of State on 2 September, Mandela unexpectedly¹²¹ toned down his strong rhetoric against Mugabe and announced that SADC unanimously supported the three SADC countries' military intervention in DRC. The meeting was held in Durban during the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) Summit. Eleven of the 14 SADC countries were present—nine at the Head of State level.¹²² Kabila, Mugabe, and

¹¹⁷ Ibid.

¹¹⁸ "The last days of Laurent Kabila?," *Electronic Mail & Guardian*, 21 August 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.mg.co.za>>>.

¹¹⁹ Iden Wetherell, "Africa's Napoleon facing his Waterloo," *Mail & Guardian*, 28 August 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.mg.co.za>>>.

¹²⁰ "Mugabe Says 'Hypocrites' Feed Congo Conflict," *Reuters*, 29 August 1998.

¹²¹ Mandela's about-face *vis-à-vis* the appropriateness of Mugabe's response to the rebellion in DRC took officials in DFA by surprise. Written correspondence with Cilliers, 18 November 1999.

¹²² The Seychelles and Zambia were represented at the foreign ministerial and vice-presidential levels, respectively. "SADC Summit Supports Intervention in Congo," (continued...)

Namibian President Sam Nujoma did not attend and were not represented. Mandela said, "It is quite reasonable when a legitimate leader says 'I have been invaded' and asks for support and it is quite reasonable for countries to respond to that."¹²³

Mandela's acquiescence to Mugabe's actions did not signify his approval. Mandela simply no longer took to jousting with Mugabe verbally in public. Indeed, the South African president continued to champion a negotiated settlement. According to Horst Brammer, the Deputy Director of SADC Political Affairs in the South African Department of Foreign Affairs, Mandela's announcement was purely an attempt to reflect some form of unity in SADC. South Africa did not diverge from its position that a standstill, cease-fire, and elections were necessary for a true resolution to the conflict.¹²⁴

Mandela's efforts to resolve the conflict through diplomacy were not just undermined by the split within SADC, but by the active involvement of several actors outside of SADC supporting Kabila and the rebels. For example, a coalition of largely francophone Central African States backed Kabila. On 24 September, Gabon hosted a meeting of regional countries united in their support for Kinshasa.¹²⁵ Kabila had already secured support for his cause earlier that month. Gabonese President El Hadj Omar Bongo had proposed to hold a regional summit during a meeting with Kabila on 12 September, and agreement with Chad had been reached prior to the summit.¹²⁶

¹²² (...continued)

Panafrican News Agency, 3 September 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.africanews.org>>>.

¹²³ *Ibid.*

¹²⁴ Interview with Brammer, 27 August 1999, by telephone.

¹²⁵ Besides Gabon, the Heads of State of CAR, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), and Equatorial Guinea also attended the meeting, as did the Prime Minister of Cameroon, among other countries' representatives. See IRIN-CEA, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Chadian involvement detailed," 24 September 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.notes.reliefweb.int>>>.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*

SADC member States' attempts to establish an uneasy compromise between Mugabe and Mandela were apparent in the carefully-worded communiqué issued at the SADC Summit in Mauritius. The text welcomed the initiatives of SADC and its member States to restore peace and security to DRC and diplomatically mentioned both the Victoria Falls and Pretoria meetings. SADC Heads of State and Government reaffirmed their call for an immediate cessation of hostilities and commended the Governments of Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe for providing troops in a timely manner.¹²⁷ Zambia's President, Frederick Chiluba, was given the unenviable task of developing a programme of action to promote a peace process.

SADC Coalition's Operational Successes and Limitations

Troops from Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe arrived in DRC within days of the 18 August meeting that Mugabe hosted. According to eye-witness accounts, some 2,500 Angolan troops together with their equipment crossed from the Cabinda enclave over the Iema bridge into DRC over a three-day period from 22 to 24 August.¹²⁸ Zimbabwe deployed a similar number of troops in the first week of operations, frequently recorded to be 2,800.¹²⁹ Namibia's relatively modest contribution was widely reported to number 200-300.¹³⁰

The coalition was placed under the operational command of Zimbabwe. Air Marshal Perence Shiri served as the first head of the joint force, followed by Maj-Gen. Michael Nyambuya, (a former Deputy Force Commander in the United Nations peacekeeping operation in Angola), and later Maj-Gen.

¹²⁷ See UN Document S/1998/915, Annex I, *Final Communiqué of the 1998 Summit of the Heads of State or Government of the Southern African Development Community*, 5 October 1998, para. 21.

¹²⁸ Nicholas Phythian, "Angola Sends Thousands of Troops To Back Kabila," *The Washington Post*, 25 August 1998, p. A10.

¹²⁹ "More deployed as casualties rise," *The Zimbabwe Independent*, 28 August 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.africanews.org>>>.

¹³⁰ "Kabila Pays Quick Visit to Ally Namibia," *Reuters*, 31 August 1998.

Amoth Chingombe.¹³¹ The Deputy Force Commander has always been a Namibian, and Zimbabwe has always provided the Chief of Staff.¹³² The forces of Chad and the Sudan operated independently of those from Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe.¹³³ (In February 1999, however, an Angolan detachment was assigned to the Chadian-Sudanese sector to serve as reinforcements.¹³⁴)

Luanda provided the bulk of the logistical support required to deploy the three-nation inter-African force. Besides airlifting its own troops, the Angolan air force transported Namibian and Zimbabwean soldiers to DRC as well as Zimbabwean tanks and armoured vehicles.¹³⁵ It also ferried FAC contingents within the country.¹³⁶ Harare provided Alouette helicopters and Casa light transport aircraft.¹³⁷

Initially, the coalition forces enjoyed military success. The RCD's gains in western DRC began to be reversed within days of the arrival of foreign troops from the three Southern African States. They soon successfully repulsed the rebel offensive on the capital. By the end of August, Angolan troops had retaken the port city of Matadi and the Inga dam.

Contrary to the heady pronouncements by Kabila and Mugabe that the rebels would soon be defeated, the war dragged on. While the coalition forces were reclaiming rebel-held positions in the west of the country, the RCD was advancing virtually unchecked through much of the rest of the country. Kisangani, the country's second largest city, and the port towns of

¹³¹ Interview with Francis N.F. Mutisi, Military Adviser, Zimbabwean Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 28 October 1999, by telephone.

¹³² Interview with African Government official, 1999.

¹³³ Interview with Jakkie Potgieter, Senior Researcher, Institute for Security Studies, 14 October 1999, by telephone.

¹³⁴ Written correspondence with Adonia Ayebare, Analyst, International Crisis Group, 3 November 1999. A battalion of former *Forces armées rwandaises* (ex-FAR) was also assigned to the sector. Ibid.

¹³⁵ "More deployed as casualties rise."

¹³⁶ Howard W. French, "Congo's Fate Lies in the Hands of Neighbors Grown Used to Intervening," *International Herald Tribune*, 19 August 1999.

¹³⁷ "More deployed as casualties rise."

Kalemie and Moba on Lake Tanganyika fell to the RCD. The infusion of troops from Chad and the Sudan in September 1998¹³⁸ bolstered Kabila's position and allowed Angola, Namibia, and Zimbabwe to better concentrate their limited resources. Nevertheless, the country was simply too vast, the roads too dilapidated or poorly developed, and the rebels too numerous, organized, and well armed for Kabila and his SADC backers to defend or retake many remote positions.

Military Stalemate and Political Fallout

Despite sporadic heavy fighting and the infusion of additional troops on both sides of the war, a stalemate has been effectively in place since late 1998. After having concluded arrangements with Angola, Chad, Namibia, the Sudan, and Zimbabwe for formed units of troops, Kabila turned to various non-state actors to augment the FAC. Numerous rebel groups fighting other countries in the region joined Kabila's cause, including the elements of the former *Forces armées rwandaises* (ex-FAR) and the *Interahamwe* militia fighting Kigali, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) and other rebel groups fighting Kampala, and the *Front pour la défense de la démocratie* (FDD) fighting Bujumbura.¹³⁹ As for the States supporting DRC, Zimbabwe supplemented its initial presence with the deployment of additional brigades over the course of the war. In June 1999, it was reported that the 8,000 Zimbabwean troops serving in DRC would be further reinforced, with some analysts predicting the force would soon total 11,000 men.¹⁴⁰ Angola is believed to have deployed as many as 7,100 troops during the early stages of the war, but its subsequent commitment has been closer to 1,600.¹⁴¹ The

¹³⁸ See, for example, IRIN-CEA, "Democratic Republic of Congo: Chadian involvement detailed." Khartoum persistently denied sending its own troops to DRC, but diplomats and seasoned observers of the region do not find its denials credible.

¹³⁹ See for example, "Africa's Seven-Nation War," *International Crisis Group*, 21 May 1999, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.intl-crisis-group.org>>>.

¹⁴⁰ "Zimbabwe Sends More Troops to DR Congo," *BBC News*, 24 June 1999, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.bbc.co.za>>>.

¹⁴¹ "The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and the Prospects for Peace," *International Crisis Group*, 20 August 1999, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.intl-crisis-group.org>>>.

RCD received additional support from Burundi.¹⁴² Remnants of the former *Forces armées zairoises* (ex-FAZ) are reported to have joined both sides of the conflict. The infusion of additional troops (and weapons) has not resulted in a significant change in the territory the two sides control. The country effectively remains split in two.

The split within the RCD—which more significantly indicates a further breakdown in relations between Rwanda and Uganda—does not bode well for any attempt to resolve the conflict. In May 1999, Ernest Wamba dia Wamba was effectively ousted from the RCD's leadership and replaced by Emile Illunga. Wamba dia Wamba subsequently set up a new headquarters in Kisangani. Thus, there are now in effect two RCDs—one headquartered in Kisangani and led by Wamba dia Wamba, which enjoys Ugandan support, and another headquartered in Goma and led by Illunga, which enjoys Rwandan support. This further complicates any eventual negotiation with the rebels, which had already been made more difficult by the creation of the *Mouvement pour la libération du Congo* (MLC) led by Jean-Pierre Bemba and headquartered in Gbadolite. An attempt by Tanzania to create some semblance of a unified front among the two RCDs and the MLC in June 1999 was unsuccessful as the RCD-Goma faction failed to attend the meeting.¹⁴³

¹⁴² Bujumbura has forcefully denied its involvement in the conflict, claiming to be neutral. However, remaining “uninvolved” and “neutral” does not preclude having deployed its forces on DRC territory. It is understood that several hundred Burundian troops were deployed across Lake Tanganyika in South Kivu in an effort to contain Burundian rebel activity. Given that the RCD controls the territory in which Burundian troops have been stationed, it is fair to say that Burundi provides de facto support to the forces fighting Kabila.

¹⁴³ See “The Agreement on a Cease-Fire in the Democratic Republic of Congo: An Analysis of the Agreement and the Prospects for Peace.”

Lesotho (1998-1999)

Escalating unrest and violence in Lesotho following May 1998 parliamentary elections prompted the September 1998 military intervention of Botswana and South Africa. In response to the posted results, which awarded 79 of the 80 seats to the ruling Liberal Congress for Democracy (LCD) party of Prime Minister Pakalitha Mosisili, opposition parties claimed that the elections were rigged.¹⁴⁴ In August 1998, SADC established a committee of experts to investigate the allegations of fraud in an effort to stem the growing political crisis. The Langa Commission¹⁴⁵ ultimately found that there had been irregularities in the voting and counting processes but determined that they did not nullify the elections.¹⁴⁶ Fearing a further breakdown of law and order, Mosisili requested SADC member States¹⁴⁷ to intervene militarily in support of his Government. The situation further deteriorated on 11 September when junior officers of the Royal Lesotho Defence Force (RLDF) placed the Prime Minister under house arrest and effectively removed senior military officers thought to be loyal to the LCD. By the time the Langa Report was made public on 17 September,¹⁴⁸ Botswana and South Africa had already established a joint force in

¹⁴⁴ The LCD achieved this landslide despite claiming to have received (only) 60 per cent of the vote. "Lesotho: sad aftermath," *The Economist*, 10 October 1998, p. 47.

¹⁴⁵ The SADC committee of experts was chaired by South African judge Pius Langa.

¹⁴⁶ William Boot claims the Langa Commission's final report was redrafted for political reasons and "... sections which questioned the legitimacy of the LCD Government and called for re-elections under an interim Government of national unity [were] excised." See William Boot, "SA's crippling arrogance," *Weekly Mail & Guardian*, 9 October 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.m&g.co.za>>>.

¹⁴⁷ In addition to Botswana and South Africa, the Prime Minister also reportedly invited Mozambique and Zimbabwe to intervene. Malan, "Regional Power Politics Under Cover of SADC—Running Amok with a Mythical Organ," p. 7.

¹⁴⁸ Three South African officials—the Minister of Safety and Security, the Director-General in the Office of the Deputy President, and the Director-General of DFA—flew to Maseru on 17 September to deliver the final report to Government and opposition leaders. See Sechaba ka'Nkosi and Howard Barrell, "SA troop alert as Maseru mutinies," *Weekly Mail & Guardian*, 18 September 1998, available on the Internet at <http://www.m&g.co.za>.

preparation for a possible military operation.¹⁴⁹ South African troops crossed into Lesotho in the early morning hours of 22 September, followed later that day by those from Botswana.

A Rash Decision to Intervene Made Outside of SADC

The decision to respond militarily was made without explicit SADC authorization. From the outset, the SANDF claimed that the intervention took place under “SADC auspices” in accordance with “SADC agreements.”¹⁵⁰ At a 21 September 1998 meeting, the South African Minister of Safety and Security and representatives from Botswana, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe reportedly confirmed that SADC had authorized a possible military intervention in the event of a coup in Lesotho.¹⁵¹ In fact, the organization had taken no such action. At the SADC Summit in Grand Baie the week before, SADC Heads of State had merely “expressed concern at the civil disturbances and loss of life following the recent elections” and “welcomed the mediation initiative led by the South African Government.”¹⁵² According to Malan, “[i]t is hard to imagine how this was translated into a SADC mandate for a peace operation that resembled a military invasion and occupation of the Kingdom of Lesotho.”¹⁵³ Moreover, doubt has been cast on the legality of Lesotho’s request for assistance in the first place. Although Mosisili, as Head of Government, appealed for States to intervene, King Letsie III, Lesotho’s

¹⁴⁹ The Botswanan/South African Combined Task Force (CTF) was formed on 16 September 1998. “Bulletin No. 96/98,” *South African Department of Defence*, 4 December 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.mil.za/SANDF/>>>.

¹⁵⁰ “SA, Botswana troops move into Lesotho,” *Chief of Joint Operations: SANDF*, 22 September 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.woza.co.za.news/>>>.

¹⁵¹ Malan, “Regional Power Politics Under Cover of SADC—Running Amok with a Mythical Organ,” p. 7.

¹⁵² UN Document S/1998/915, Annex I, para. 17.

¹⁵³ Malan, “Regional Power Politics Under Cover of SADC—Running Amok with a Mythical Organ,” p. 8.

nominal Head of State,¹⁵⁴ had not been consulted as required by the Constitution¹⁵⁵ and had opposed such an action.

Combined Task Force (CTF) Boleas, as the intervention was known, was essentially a South African undertaking that enjoyed the political support of a few countries from the subregion. Botswana's initial contribution to Operation Boleas was limited to a motorized infantry company (130 personnel) and a battalion command element (15). South Africa, by contrast, initially sent roughly 500 troops to Lesotho and also provided air and medical support.¹⁵⁶ The CTF was placed under the command of Col. Robbie Hartslielief of the SANDF.¹⁵⁷ Mozambique and Zimbabwe, which together with Botswana and South Africa were "guarantors" to the previously-mentioned 1994 agreement,¹⁵⁸ supported the intervention.

Ironically, the South African-led intervention received little domestic support. Within the South African Foreign and Defence Departments, there was a complete breakdown in communication and planning. South African foreign affairs officials criticized the intervention and claimed they did not participate in the policy-making process and only learned about the decision after the fact and through the media. According to Brammer, only the DFA

¹⁵⁴ Upon the death of King Moshoeshoe II in January 1996, Letsie returned to the throne in accordance with a 1994 law passed in conjunction with his abdication. Like his father, Letsie vowed not to intervene in the country's political affairs. Brown, "Lesotho: Recent History," p. 599.

¹⁵⁵ Howard Barrell, "We have some serious explaining to do," *Weekly Mail & Guardian*, 25 September 1998, available on the Internet at: <<<http://www.m&g.co.za>>>. The Prime Minister does not have to secure the King's acquiescence, however. *Ibid.*

¹⁵⁶ "Bulletin No. 57/98," *South African Department of Defence*, 22 September 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.mil.za/SANDF/>>>.

¹⁵⁷ Col. Hartslielief served until 3 December 1998, when he was succeeded by Col. Hannes van der Merwe—also of the SANDF. "Bulletin No. 96/98," *South African Department of Defence*, 4 December 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.mil.za/SANDF/>>>

¹⁵⁸ Maputo became involved when it assumed the Vice Chairmanship of SADC. Interview with Brammer, 27 August 1999, by telephone.

Director-General was involved.¹⁵⁹ Policy was formulated and implemented at the Department of Defence in a similar fashion. Although the Chief of the SANDF, Siphwe Nyanda, had been consulted, Defence Secretary Pierre Steyn was kept in the dark. The SANDF later complained that it had 48 hours to plan and execute the operation.¹⁶⁰ The intervention also contravened several of the criteria identified in the *White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions*, which had been finalized but had not yet been tabled in Parliament when the operation was launched.¹⁶¹

The Force Encounters Unexpected Difficulties

The operation was expected to be both quick and easy. South Africa fully anticipated that the troops it sent would be sufficient to resolve the situation peacefully. The “plan” was for the show of force to convince the mutinous soldiers that had rallied behind the King in opposition to the Prime Minister to return to their barracks. As with its 1994 involvement in Lesotho, the SANDF did not expect to engage in offensive military operations. This time, however, the SANDF crossed the border and entered Lesotho. According to Amb. Jackie Selebi, Director-General of South Africa’s Department of Foreign Affairs, the idea was that “maximum visibility but minimum force” would suffice. Indeed, the South African armoured vehicles sent to Lesotho were not heavily armed. For example, blank cartridges were fired to make its presence felt while limiting the potential for bloodshed and property damage.¹⁶²

Events did not transpire as South Africa had anticipated, however. The SANDF encountered stiff resistance from the outset. Selebi believes that the

¹⁵⁹ Interview with Brammer, 27 August 1999, by telephone.

¹⁶⁰ Written correspondence with Cilliers, 13 November 1999.

¹⁶¹ For example, the White Paper provides that Parliament must give prior approval before South African military forces can be sent as part of a peace mission. The mission must also have an appropriate international mandate or UN approval. See *White Paper on South African Participation in International Peace Missions*, approved by Cabinet on 21 October 1998, courtesy of South African Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva.

¹⁶² Interview with Amb. Jackie Selebi, Director-General, South African Department of Foreign Affairs, 26 March 1999, Geneva.

rebellious soldiers must have quickly become wise to the fact that the South African troops were not prepared to fight, which emboldened them.¹⁶³ In the ensuing mayhem, eight South African soldiers¹⁶⁴—and many more Lesothans¹⁶⁵—lost their lives. Rioters took to the streets and destroyed property and looted businesses. Much of the capital, Maseru, was torched and laid to ruins. Thousands of people were uprooted from their homes.

The SANDF was ill-prepared to respond to the unexpected developments. The initial mission was much smaller than what was needed to put down the unrest. (The force would eventually grow to more than 3,000 troops.) The new SANDF did not possess the discipline and abilities of its predecessor, the South African Defence Force (SADF).¹⁶⁶ The SANDF claimed that the Government did not have a clear national security policy and admitted that the units involved were not combat-ready. Brig-Gen. Borries Bornmann, Chief of South Africa's Special Forces, said, "[t]he wrong people were sent in and there was a lack of intelligence. Our troops could not adapt to the terrain."¹⁶⁷ SANDF Lt-Gen. Deon Ferreira stated that there were limited reserves of ration packs and spare parts due to cuts in

¹⁶³ Ibid.

¹⁶⁴ "Bulletin No. 61/98," *South African Department of Defence*, 25 September 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.mil.za/SANDF/>>>. The Department of Defence also announced that 17 SANDF troops had been wounded. "Bulletin No. 60/98," *South African Department of Defence*, 23 September 1998, available on the Internet at

<<<http://www.mil.za/SANDF/>>>. Media reports at the time suggested the number of CTF casualties was significantly higher.

¹⁶⁵ President Mandela regretted that 58 Lesothan soldiers had lost their lives as a result of the intervention. "Verbatim," *Weekly Mail & Guardian*, 25 September 1999, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.m&g.co.za/>>>.

¹⁶⁶ "Lesotho: Pretoria Under Fire for Messy Intervention," p. 13239.

¹⁶⁷ Howard Barrell, "Defence force reputation in tatters," *Weekly Mail & Guardian*, 2 October 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.m&g.co.za/>>>. South Africa's intelligence operatives failed to identify 53 truck loads of heavy weapons that were moved to a military base. (Lawrence Whelan, "Questions raised by Lesotho intervention," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, January 1999, p. 44.)

defence spending. He also acknowledged that no scenario planning was done because there were no aerial photographs.¹⁶⁸

Salvaging a Bungled Operation?

Operation Boleas eventually restored a semblance of calm, and a negotiated settlement was reached between Prime Minister Mosisili and the aggrieved opposition parties. In October 1998, they agreed to establish a Transitional Committee responsible for organizing new elections within 18 months.¹⁶⁹ Troops from the CTF began to withdraw in significant numbers in December 1998.¹⁷⁰ Operation Boleas was concluded on 15 May 1999.¹⁷¹

The botched intervention raised doubts internationally about South Africa's diplomatic and military competence. The military response was arguably not justified by the circumstances. Leaving aside whether further diplomatic initiatives might have succeeded in resolving the crisis, coercive measures short of military force, such as the imposition of economic sanctions, were never fully explored. According to Richard Cornwell, "Lesotho was a prime candidate for negotiated settlement. Besides, in these situations, you do not just march in. You mass troops at the border, make threatening noises or drop a few paratroopers and flyers."¹⁷² The intervention was also inconsistent with South Africa's own policy of non-military intervention in DRC. Beyond that, it challenged expectations that South Africa will serve a constructive role in the subregion. Moreover, it raised the concern that if South Africa cannot handle a relatively small problem, like Lesotho, it cannot well serve as the subregion's policeman.

¹⁶⁸ "South African Army Admits Mistakes in Lesotho," *Panafrican News Agency*, 3 November 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.africanews.org>>>.

¹⁶⁹ "Lesotho deal reached," *BBC News*, 15 October 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.bbc.co.uk>>>.

¹⁷⁰ "Bulletin No. 96/98."

¹⁷¹ "Bulletin No. 40/99," *South African Department of Defence*, 24 May 1999, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.mil.za/SANDEF/>>>. A training element of 300 soldiers from Botswana and South Africa remained in Lesotho. *Ibid.*

¹⁷² "Lesotho: Pretoria Under Fire for Messy Intervention," p. 13240.

SADC PEACEKEEPING PROSPECTS: THE ORGAN AND BEYOND

It is inaccurate to term the military responses of SADC members in DRC and Lesotho “SADC” interventions. The Organ for Politics, Defence, and Security, which should be the SADC body that sanctions such military actions on behalf of the organization, is not yet operational. In both cases, no other SADC structure followed the proper procedure for approving the interventions. The SADC Treaty provides that for all meetings of SADC institutions, two-thirds of the organization’s membership constitutes a quorum and all decisions are taken by consensus.¹⁷³ Moreover, the SADC Secretariat has been substantially divorced from the decision-making process in both instances and has not played a very visible or transparent role. The Secretariat has not exercised any operational oversight into either intervention.

The interventions in DRC and Lesotho have exacerbated pre-existing tensions among SADC countries and have created new ones. The announcement in April 1998 that Angola, DRC, Namibia, and Zimbabwe had concluded a mutual defence pact does much more than simply reinforce the four countries’ relationship *vis-à-vis* the conflict in DRC. It is a harbinger that the split within SADC may yet become more pronounced. Luanda’s war with UNITA shows no signs of abating, let alone concluding, and there are clear indications that SADC countries are split in their approach to the conflict—with some favouring military force against the rebels while others support negotiations and a political solution to that conflict. Even before the defence pact had been concluded, Mugabe had let it be known publicly that he favoured supporting Angola militarily.¹⁷⁴ The agreement will likely embolden Luanda to increase its sabre rattling against Zambia, which it has accused of aiding UNITA. The prospect for some form of Angolan intervention in Zambia—ostensibly in “hot pursuit” of UNITA rebels—has

¹⁷³ Articles 18 and 19, *Treaty of the Southern African Development Community*, p. 129.

¹⁷⁴ Joseph Winter, “Mugabe backs troops for Angola,” *BBC News*, 19 February 1999, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.bbc.co.uk>>>.

increased, and the existence of the Defence Protocol threatens to draw other countries into the fray.¹⁷⁵

The fact that SADC member States continue to discuss ways to make the Organ effective suggests, however, that political will does exist to address previous shortcomings. Exercise Blue Crane underscores this point. During a time of heightened political tensions among many countries from the subregion, adversaries managed to put aside their differences to work towards developing a military capability to jointly undertake peacekeeping operations. SADC countries' present and foreseeable inability to field and sustain a brigade-sized force as envisioned in Blue Crane must be borne in mind, but perhaps is of less significance.

¹⁷⁵ Windhoek, which accuses Lusaka of encouraging successionist activity within the Caprivi Strip, would likely support an Angolan intervention in Zambia.

