

CHAPTER 7

AFRICAN AD HOC INITIATIVES

African countries have also undertaken a number of military interventions on the continent outside of regional and subregional organizations. Those resulting from purely bilateral arrangements are not considered in this chapter, except for the 1979 deployment of Nigerian troops in Chad. Military invasions, no matter how well intentioned,¹ are not included. While few of the interventions reviewed were instrumental in bringing about a negotiated settlement, all are noteworthy for the political will exhibited in deploying troops abroad and in accepting foreign troops on one's own territory.

ZAIRE (1977-1979)

The first African-led multinational force was not established through a regional organization. In April 1977, a force principally comprised of Moroccan troops was deployed to Zaire to put down an incursion from Angola into the mineral-rich mining province of Shaba. The *Forces armées zaïroises* (FAZ) had proved to be ineffective in countering the rebels, who had commenced their attack the previous month. The intervention received significant international support and included military personnel from other countries. Egypt, which provided some pilots and aviation technicians,² and France, which contributed military advisers,³ assisted the 1,300-strong⁴

¹ Tanzania's invasion of Uganda in 1978 is noteworthy in that it received broad—albeit tacit—approval among African States even though they officially condemned the action.

² See Colin Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, Vol. 9, 1976-77, p. B527.

³ France initially denied that it had sent military personnel, but incriminating photographs soon surfaced and a French officer in Shaba acknowledged that
(continued...)

Moroccan force. Belgium also supplied personnel.⁵ The provision of military units from other countries is less clearly documented.⁶

Morocco received considerable assistance from Western countries in mounting the operation. France contributed 11 aircraft to transport Moroccan troops.⁷ Approximately 80 flights were required to deploy the requisite food, fuel, ammunition, and equipment.⁸ The US helped plan and execute the Moroccan contingent's deployment.⁹ Washington also provided "non-lethal" equipment and supplies worth US\$ 15 million, which included rations and parachutes.¹⁰ Belgium sped up the delivery of military equipment already on order.¹¹ The Moroccans departed by June, after order had been restored—at least temporarily.

³ (...continued)
they had been sent to defend the mining town of Kolwezi and to assist the Moroccans. (Claude Wauthier, "France's Year in Africa," in Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, Vol. 10, 1977-78, p. A88.) The size of the French contingent is disputed; it has been reported as 20 (I. William Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Updated Edition)*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 150) and 65 (Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, Vol. 10, 1977-78, p. B594), for example.

⁴ Written correspondence with Raja Ghannam, Counsellor, Moroccan Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 3 April 1999. The figure most often cited in academic literature is 1,500.

⁵ I. William Zartman records the Belgian contingent's strength as 80. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Updated Edition)*, p. 150.

⁶ For example, *Africa Contemporary Record* mentions only that the Sudan provided military support and that Uganda volunteered to send a "suicide squad." Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, Vol. 10, 1977-78, p. B594.

⁷ Wauthier, "France's Year in Africa," Vol. 10, 1977-78, p. A88.

⁸ Henry Wiseman, "The OAU: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution," in Yassin El-Ayouty and I. William Zartman (eds), *The OAU After Twenty Years*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984, p. 141.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, Vol. 10, 1977-78, p. B594.

¹¹ Ibid.

A year later, Moroccan troops returned to Zaire—this time to lead an inter-African force. In May 1978, a much larger group of Zairean rebels invaded Shaba. Again, the FAZ proved incapable of containing the insurgency. On this occasion, Belgium and France dispatched significant numbers of their own forces to the region. The African force was assembled following discussions between French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing and various African leaders at the 22-23 May 1978 Franco-African Summit that, as it happened, was being held during the time of the rebellion and just a few days after Belgian and French troops arrived in Shaba.¹² Support for a Moroccan-led mission was quickly secured, although the proposal had its dissenters. By the month's end, Morocco replaced the French troops—the Belgians having departed a week earlier.¹³ Contingents from the other countries participating in the operation began to arrive in June.¹⁴ According to I. William Zartman, Morocco provided 1,500 troops, Senegal 600, Central African Empire (CAE)¹⁵ 390, Côte d'Ivoire 110, and Gabon and Togo “token”

¹² George E. Moose, “French Military Policy in Africa,” in William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen (eds), *Arms and the African: Military Influences on Africa's International Relations*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, pp. 71-72. Gabonese President El Hadj Omar Bongo championed the idea of sending an Organization of African Unity (OAU) force to Shaba, but it was not seriously considered as support for the proposal was half-hearted even among its advocates. Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Updated Edition)*, p. 162.

¹³ Moose, “French Military Policy in Africa,” p. 71.

¹⁴ Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, Vol. 11, 1978-79, p. B577.

¹⁵ The President of the Central African Republic (CAR), Jean-Bédél Bokassa, declared his country an “Empire” in 1976 and renamed CAR accordingly. Bokassa held his coronation the following year at which point he became Emperor. In 1979, Bokassa was overthrown, and his successor, David Dacko, returned the country to a Republic.

numbers.¹⁶ Egypt, which reportedly offered to provide military personnel,¹⁷ ultimately did not send a contingent.

All six African countries that participated in the operation received assistance from Belgium, France, or the United States. The US airlifted the various African contingents to the mission area,¹⁸ and Belgium and France joined the US in providing logistical support to maintain the force.¹⁹ The mission successfully fulfilled its tasks before withdrawing some 15 months later.

CHAD (1979)

The Nigerian undertaking in Chad differs from other bilateral initiatives in that it enjoyed international support and resulted from a multi-party agreement concluded in an effort to end the civil war there. As discussed in Chapter 3, the factious Chadian polity was not yet ready to conclude a workable peace agreement. From subsequent events, however, it is clear that Lagos could not have fielded a force of sufficient size and staying power to implement an accord on its own. The Nigerian force, known as Harmony II,²⁰

¹⁶ Zartman, *Ripe for Resolution: Conflict and Intervention in Africa (Updated Edition)*, p. 154. *Africa Contemporary Record*, which suggests the force was smaller than the one Zartman outlines, adds that Gabon's contingent was 44-strong and that the Ivorian contingent included a medical team. Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, Vol. 11, 1978-79, p. B577.

¹⁷ Claude Wauthier, "France's Year in Africa," in Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, Vol. 11, 1978-79, p. A92.

¹⁸ Zdenek Cervenka and Colin Legum, "The Organization of African Unity in 1978: The Challenge of Foreign Intervention," in Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, Vol. 11, 1978-79, p. A33.

¹⁹ See Legum (ed.), *Africa Contemporary Record*, Vol. 10, 1977-78, p. B591.

²⁰ Despite the name of the operation, the intervention had little in common with Harmony I, Nigeria's 1964 mission to assist the Government of Tanzania in restoring order on the island of Zanzibar where mutinous troops opposed the island's political union with mainland Tanganyika.

was deployed in March 1979 with only 150 men and was later reinforced to 800.²¹

Nigeria was ill-prepared to undertake the mission and withdrew its peacekeepers in June 1979, after only three months. Neither the Nigerians nor the Chadians were properly briefed on what was expected of them. The concept of “neutrality” was not universally appreciated and the legal status of the peacekeepers was unclear. Anglophone Nigerians and francophone Chadians found it difficult to communicate with one another, which aggravated the situation.²²

MOZAMBIQUE (1986-1992)

The military intervention by regional countries in support of Maputo in Mozambique’s civil war represents the largest African-led ad hoc undertaking. Concerned about recent advances the rebel movement *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO) had made, in 1986 the Mozambican Government asked the Front-line States (FLS) for military assistance. Tanzania and Zimbabwe agreed to deploy troops inside Mozambique to help counter the threat RENAMO posed. Zambia pledged to establish joint patrols with Mozambique along their shared border but would keep its army on its own territory.²³ Malawi, which was not a FLS member, also sent troops to Mozambique under a separate agreement. The Zimbabwean contingent of 10,000 troops²⁴ was by far the largest foreign

²¹ Nathan Pelcovits, “Peacekeeping: The African Experience,” in Henry Wiseman (ed.), *Peacekeeping: Appraisals & Proposals*, New York, Pergamon Press, 1983, pp. 267-68.

²² Wiseman, “The OAU: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution,” p. 131. As a result of its difficulties, Nigeria resolved never again to undertake peacekeeping operations wholly on its own. Ibid.

²³ Interview with João Honwana, former Chief, Mozambican Air Force, current Senior Researcher, Centre for Conflict Resolution, University of Cape Town, 21 September 1999, Montreal.

²⁴ Phyllis Johnson and David Martin, “Mozambique: Victims of Apartheid,” in Phyllis Johnson and David Martin (eds), *Frontline Southern Africa: Destructive* (continued...)

presence, but Malawi and Tanzania together also contributed several thousand personnel.

The inter-African force in Mozambique later distinguished itself by the limited degree to which it relied on Western countries. In addition to Tanzanian and Zimbabwean contributions of troops, the three other FLS States assisted Maputo materially. Angola donated oil and uniforms, Botswana supplied rations, and Zambia contributed communication equipment.²⁵ Mozambique also secured much-needed logistical and medical assistance from Algeria, Ethiopia, India, Nigeria, and Yugoslavia. France agreed to sell Mozambique helicopters and offered other assistance.²⁶ The foreign troops operated independently from one another and withdrew at separate and uncoordinated times over the next several years.²⁷ Zimbabwean troops remained in Mozambique until 1992, when Maputo and RENAMO concluded a peace agreement.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (1997-1998)

The African multinational force that deployed in the Central African Republic (CAR) in 1997 is widely hailed as model of cooperation between Africa and the West. During 1996, the political situation in the country had rapidly deteriorated.²⁸ By December, CAR's capital, Bangui, was divided: one part held by the mutinous army and elements of the gendarmerie, and the other by the presidential guard, which remained loyal to President Ange-Félix

²⁴ (...continued)

Engagement, New York: Four Walls Eight Windows, 1988, p. 43.

²⁵ Interview with Honwana, 21 September 1999, Montreal.

²⁶ Johnson and Martin, "Mozambique: Victims of Apartheid," p. 43.

²⁷ Tanzania, for example, withdrew in 1988. Eric Berman, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*, Geneva: United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, 1996, p. 20.

²⁸ Army officers had mutinied three times in a period of eight months. Much of the population shared the officers' discontent with the Government's economic and social policies and performance.

Patassé. French troops based in CAR served as a buffer.²⁹ The potential for the State to collapse was great, and there was considerable fear that such an event would exacerbate regional conflicts. With French support, African countries undertook the Inter-African Force to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (known by its French acronym, MISAB, for *Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui*).

Political and Legal Framework

African efforts to resolve the conflict date from the December 1996 Franco-African Summit in Ouagadougou. At the meeting, President Patassé, through his Minister of Foreign Affairs, requested the assistance of those in attendance to negotiate a peace accord. In response, the Heads of State present designated Gabonese President El Hadj Omar Bongo to chair a four-nation International Mediation Committee, which included the presidents of Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali. These four leaders, in turn, established the International Monitoring Committee, to which each country designated a representative. Former Malian President Amadou Toumani Touré chaired this body, which was charged with assessing the situation and recommending how the conflict might best be resolved. Touré proposed to Bongo that “military structures” be put in place. Bongo agreed and spoke to France about providing logistical support for the force.³⁰ With the agreement of the Conference on Consensus-Building and Dialogue, held from 11 to 16 January 1997, the International Mediation Committee decided to dispatch an inter-African force.³¹

The force deployed with neither a clear mandate nor a status of forces agreement (SOFA). Touré explained that MISAB “drew up [its] own

²⁹ Amadou Toumani Touré, “La problématique du maintien de la paix en Afrique,” courtesy of author.

³⁰ Interview with Gen. Amadou Toumani Touré, Former Head of State of Mali, Former Chairman, International Monitoring Committee to Supervise the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements and the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements, 25 March 1999, Bamako.

³¹ UN Document S/1997/652, Enclosure, *First Report to the Security Council Pursuant to resolution 1125 (1997) concerning the situation in the Central African Republic*, 21 August 1997, para. 15.

mandate," which he described as "very clear and simple."³² It was signed by President Bongo on 6 March 1997 for an initial period of three months. The mandate provided that "the objective of MISAB is to help restore peace and security by monitoring the implementation of the agreements signed on 25 January 1997 in Bangui." Beyond that, the text simply stated that "MISAB shall conduct operations to disarm the ex-rebels, the militia and all other unlawfully armed individuals."³³ The SOFA, which outlined the relationship between MISAB troop-contributing countries and Bangui,³⁴ was signed later.³⁵

Composition and Command

MISAB comprised contingents from the four countries on the International Monitoring Committee as well as two others—Senegal and Togo. Although Senegal and Togo were not represented on the Committee, they were present on the ground from the beginning of the operation.³⁶ Each troop-contributing country provided an infantry company of roughly the same size: Burkina Faso (114 troops), Chad (147), Gabon (149), Mali (113), Senegal (153), and Togo (120).³⁷ According to the International Monitoring Committee, the strengths of the contingents remained substantially constant throughout the mission.³⁸

Touré continued to chair the International Monitoring Committee and was given political authority over MISAB. All six troop-contributing countries

³² Interview with Touré, 25 March 1999, Bamako.

³³ UN Document S/1997/561, Appendix I, *Mandate of the Inter-African Force to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements*, 22 July 1997, Articles 2 and 3.

³⁴ *Ibid.* Appendix II, *Status of the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements*, 22 July 1997.

³⁵ Interview with Touré, 25 March 1999, Bamako.

³⁶ *Ibid.*

³⁷ UN Document S/1997/652, Enclosure, para. 17.

³⁸ See, for example, UN Document S/1997/759, Annex, *Fourth report to the Security Council pursuant to resolution 1125 (1997) concerning the situation in the Central African Republic*, 30 September 1997, para. 46.

were represented at the senior-staff level at headquarters.³⁹ Brig-Gen. Dejo Edouard Nkili of Gabon served as MISAB's first Force Commander. He was replaced in August 1997 by his compatriot, Gen. Augustin Mombo Moukangi.⁴⁰ Moukangi died of a heart attack in October 1997, and MISAB's Chief of Staff, Col. Talla Nyang of Senegal, was appointed Acting Force Commander.⁴¹

Performance in the Field

MISAB succeeded on numerous accounts. According to Touré, the troop-contributing countries generally provided competent men who possessed the necessary expertise.⁴² The force essentially brought the rebellion to a stop and recovered 96 per cent of the heavy weapons and 60 per cent of the light weapons.⁴³ A United Nations official following developments in CAR enthused that MISAB did a "good job" and commended Touré and the International Monitoring Committee for getting Patassé to go to the negotiating table.⁴⁴ Nyang cited the unity of language and military culture of MISAB troop-contributors as one of the reasons for its

³⁹ Touré emphasizes the importance of this structure because it gave each participating country a say in the decision-making process. Interview with Touré, 25 March 1999, Bamako.

⁴⁰ UN Document S/1997/652, Enclosure, para. 8.

⁴¹ UN Document S/1997/828, Enclosure, *Sixth Report to the Security Council pursuant to resolution 1125 (1997) concerning the situation in the Central African Republic*, 29 October 1997, paras. 38-39.

⁴² Touré, "La problématique du maintien de la paix en Afrique." However, there were reported incidents of ill-discipline. Chadian members of MISAB allegedly committed serious human rights abuses. ("Central African Republic Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997," *US Department of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor*, 30 January 1998, available on the Internet at <<http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_.../1997_hrp_report/97hrp_report_toc.html>>.)

⁴³ Interview with Touré, 25 March 1999, Bamako.

⁴⁴ Interview with Peter Due, Political Affairs Officer, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 17 March 1998, New York.

impressive performance.⁴⁵ Touré identifies four “keys” to MISAB’s success: (1) A group of Heads of State was intent on devising a workable solution to the situation in CAR and provided the necessary international political support for the peace process; (2) Touré was a “free agent” who largely took his own initiatives and made his own decisions in an impartial manner; (3) Western embassies in Bangui lent crucial support to the mission; and (4) United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) provided important financial support and played a coordinating role.⁴⁶

Dependence on External Support

MISAB’s achievements must not obscure a fundamental weakness: the force was wholly reliant on French largesse. Paris transported all six contingents to the field within days of the signing of the Bangui Agreements. The force also required French logistical and tactical support on the ground. Although each participating State provided its troops with their regular pay and supplied them with weapons, France paid their total food and daily subsistence allowances at rates then applicable to Central African military personnel.⁴⁷ Enlisted men received US\$ 167 per month, non-commissioned officers US\$ 334, and officers US\$ 668. France also provided personal equipment for the troops, including clothing.⁴⁸ In addition, it supplied, provided fuel for, and maintained tactical and support vehicles, paid rents for buildings used by MISAB command and military personnel, and donated office equipment. The International Monitoring Committee estimated France’s support at US\$ 600,000 per month.⁴⁹ From among its 1,300 troops stationed in CAR in accordance with a bilateral defence accord, France made available to MISAB a logistical support command unit of 88 personnel and a 39-strong liaison and assistance detachment.⁵⁰ French tactical support was

⁴⁵ “Intervention du Col. Nyang: Séminaire Gabon 2000,” courtesy of French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Paris.

⁴⁶ Interview with Touré, 25 March 1999, Bamako.

⁴⁷ UN Document S/1997/652, Enclosure, para. 19.

⁴⁸ Interview with Touré, 25 March 1999, Bamako.

⁴⁹ UN Document S/1997/652, Enclosure, para. 19.

⁵⁰ UN Document S/1997/684, Enclosure, *Second Report to the Security Council pursuant to resolution 1125 (1997) concerning the situation in the Central* (continued...)

needed in March and June 1997, when France was called upon to provide military back-up to MISAB troops.⁵¹

The International Monitoring Committee received logistical and technical support from UNDP. The assistance was initially scheduled to be terminated at the end of September 1997, due to lack of funds.⁵² This would have prevented the International Monitoring Committee from carrying out its activities. UNDP was ultimately able to allocate additional resources in the amount of US\$ 130,000 from its Emergency Response Division, however, enabling the Committee to continue functioning for the duration of the MISAB mission.⁵³

Transition to a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation

French threats to withdraw placed the mission in jeopardy. France had grown tired of supporting Patassé and had decided to close its military bases in CAR. When no other Western countries stepped in to help alleviate its financial burden, Paris became increasingly vocal about its dissatisfaction with the MISAB arrangement. The Security Council, which had waited until August 1997 to give its political support for MISAB,⁵⁴ proved even more reluctant to give its financial support. The Council eventually decided to authorize the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) to replace MISAB in March 1998.⁵⁵

⁵⁰ (...continued)

African Republic, 4 September 1997, para. 27.

⁵¹ Interview with Col. Bruno Dary, Chief, Operations Centre, Africa Division, General Staff, French Ministry of Defence, 29 June 1999, Paris.

⁵² See UN Document S/1997/759, Annex, paras. 40-42.

⁵³ UN Document S/1997/795, Enclosure, *Fifth Report to the Security Council pursuant to resolution 1125 (1997) concerning the situation in the Central African Republic*, 14 October 1997, para. 31.

⁵⁴ Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Council "authorized the Member States participating in MISAB and those States providing logistical support to ensure the security and freedom of movement of their personnel." UN Document S/RES/1125 (1997), 6 August 1997.

⁵⁵ UN Document S/RES/1159 (1998), 27 March 1998.

The creation of the United Nations mission responded to French concerns, but it created new problems. The Council's decision to place the operation on a shoestring budget contributed to numerous and largely preventable delays. The lack of adequate air craft and logistics personnel severely restricted the United Nations force's ability to provide necessary security and support.⁵⁶ Due in part to the insufficient number of troops, the legislative elections initially scheduled for September 1998 were postponed until November 1998.⁵⁷ Ultimately, *Forces armées centrafricaines* (FACA) troops were recruited to serve alongside MINURCA during the elections and provide the necessary manpower that the United Nations force lacked.

PROPOSED OPERATION IN CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE) (1997)

The contemplated peacekeeping operation in Congo (Brazzaville) similarly illustrates the growing willingness of African States to intervene militarily. Fighting erupted in Congo in June 1997 between forces of the democratically-elected President, Pascal Lissouba, and the militia of former military ruler, Gen. Denis Sassou-Nguesso. In light of the deteriorating security situation, several of the subregion's leaders established a mediation committee chaired by President Bongo to bring about a peaceful resolution of the crisis. After securing a temporary cease-fire in mid-June, the committee requested the Security Council to authorize the rapid deployment of an inter-African force to Brazzaville. United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan suggested two possible force options: either a UN-authorized multinational force or a United Nations peacekeeping operation composed mainly of

⁵⁶ See, for example, UN Document S/1998/540, *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic*, 19 June 1998, and UN Document S/1998/783, *Second Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic*, 21 August 1998.

⁵⁷ The failure to agree on a mandate for MINURCA regarding running the elections also caused numerous delays in concluding necessary contracts to help plan the elections (such as in contracting helicopters and planes to monitor the country for potential sites). Moreover, the UN's piecemeal approach created a negative image of the UN and reduced the mission's credibility with the local people, the Government, and the opposition. Interview with Carlos Valenzuela, former Chief Electoral Officer, UN Mission in the Central African Republic, 9 March 1999, Lagos.

African contingents. Annan recommended that the force should initially comprise 1,600 to 1,800 troops, support units numbering 400 to 800, and United Nations military observers.⁵⁸ A number of African States reportedly indicated their willingness to participate. Senegal offered to lead and contribute a battalion to the eventual force. In early July, it designated Brig-Gen. Charles Nelson as commander of the proposed force and pledged to provide some 520 troops.⁵⁹ Chad, Mali, and Niger⁶⁰ also reportedly expressed their tentative interest in participating in the force, as did Botswana, Namibia,⁶¹ and Togo.⁶²

The mission did not deploy as planned, however, in part due to circumstances beyond the control of those African countries that had volunteered to participate in the force. The Security Council set three preconditions for the establishment of a peacekeeping operation that were never met. They were: [1] complete adherence to an agreed and viable cease-fire; [2] agreement to the international control of Brazzaville airport; [3] a clear commitment to a negotiated settlement covering all political and military aspects of the crisis.⁶³ In October 1997, rebel forces—with Angolan assistance—gained full control of Brazzaville. In the wake of Sassou-Nguesso's military victory, Western countries were accused of turning a blind eye to and even complicity in the situation. France reportedly had supported Sassou-Nguesso both militarily and politically. While France was expressing

⁵⁸ UN Document S/1997/484, *Letter dated 20 June 1997 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council*, 20 June 1997.

⁵⁹ "Senegal Names Commander of Multinational Force in Congo," *Panafrican News Agency*, 10 July 1997, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.africanews.org>>>.

⁶⁰ Interview with Lt-Col. Mamadou Dione, Commanding Officer, Senegalese Army Military Academy (Thiès), 25 February 1998, Dakar.

⁶¹ Former French Prime Minister Michel Rocard indicated that Botswana and Namibia had pledged to send troops. Baffour Ankomah, "Chuck your bloody constitution in the dustbin," *New African*, May 1998, p. 13.

⁶² "IRIN Emergency Update No. 199 on the Great Lakes," 24 June 1997, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.notes.reliefweb.int>>>.

⁶³ UN Document S/PRST/43, 13 August 1997. The Secretary-General had first identified these conditions for the deployment of an international force in June. UN Document S/1997/484.

its tentative support before the Security Council for a UN-authorized intervention, President Jacques Chirac allegedly concluded a deal with Sassou-Nguesso on behalf of French business interests.⁶⁴

The logistical and financial constraints of those African countries that had volunteered to participate in the operation were an equally critical factor in its failure to materialize. The proposed Senegalese-led force simply could not deploy without outside assistance. As Secretary-General Annan observed in his 21 October 1997 *Report to the Security Council*: “No country emerged that was able and willing to assure the command, control and communications capacity, the rapid deployment capability or the ability to generate the necessary financing that would be required to assume the leadership of a multinational force.”⁶⁵ The financial impediments to constituting the proposed force are also telling. According to Annan, “[m]ost potential troop contributors specified that the force should be a United Nations peacekeeping operation rather than a multinational force.”⁶⁶ This is instructive because it highlights a reality that is often unstated: financial—not political—concerns are frequently paramount when African countries speak of seeking United Nations authorization.

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The examples of the two Moroccan-led forces in Zaire, the Nigerian operation in Chad, the military involvement of Southern African countries in Mozambique, MISAB in CAR, and the proposed mission in Congo (Brazzaville) underscore the political willingness of African countries to intervene militarily on the continent. The ad hoc approach characteristic of these initiatives shows that much can be achieved outside of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) or one of the several African subregional organizations. Even as these bodies have begun to develop peacekeeping mechanisms, the practice of constituting ad hoc forces has persisted. As MISAB attests, a coalition of States with common interests but

⁶⁴ See Ankomah, “Chuck your bloody constitution in the dustbin,” pp. 12-13.

⁶⁵ UN Document S/1997/814, *Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in the Republic of Congo*, 21 October 1997, para. 27.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*

no common membership in a subregional organization can make a positive contribution to regional peace and security by deploying peacekeepers.

These five examples also highlight the limitations of African countries. With the exception of the initiative in Mozambique, each case shows that participation in an ad hoc military intervention is contingent upon substantial Western assistance. If substantial Western financial and logistical support is not given, as in the case of Congo (Brazzaville), or is withdrawn, as in the case of MISAB, then African countries are extremely hard-pressed to go it alone.

