

**Understanding  
African Peacekeeping Abilities  
and Limitations**



## CHAPTER 8

### FROM KOREA TO KOSOVO: 50 YEARS OF EXPERIENCE

The problems African organizations and coalitions have encountered in fielding their own multinational forces should come as no surprise. Statistics on African countries' participation in United Nations peacekeeping operations are routinely offered as proof of their readiness to take on new responsibilities. While such figures do help inform, they can also obfuscate the true significance of African contributions.

#### UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

As of mid-1999, 33 of the 53 African United Nations Member States had contributed military personnel or civilian police to United Nations peacekeeping operations.<sup>1</sup> (See Annex E.) They had participated in 40 of the 50 United Nations missions. These numbers are especially impressive considering that most African countries did not gain independence until the early 1960s and, therefore, did not have an opportunity to contribute troops to the initial peacekeeping operations. Moreover, 10 African countries have only achieved independence and joined the United Nations since 1974.

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<sup>1</sup> Soldiers from Congo (now the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)) and the Central African Republic (CAR) have served alongside UN peacekeeping forces in the UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) and the UN Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA) but cannot be considered UN Blue Helmets. From February 1963 until June 1964, a battalion of the Congolese National Army served within ONUC. (*The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peacekeeping (Third Edition)*, New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 710.) A contingent of 150 "carefully selected" soldiers from the restructured *Forces armées centrafricaines* (FACA) served under the operational control of MINURCA to assist in providing security during the elections. UN Document S/1998/1203, *Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic*, 18 December 1998, para. 10.

Most of this experience has been gained during the past decade, reflecting the growing political will in Africa to participate in peacekeeping activities. Before 1989, only 14 African countries had contributed Blue Helmets to United Nations peacekeeping operations. Eight of these countries' participation had been limited to the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), which concluded in 1964. While the number of opportunities to contribute to United Nations peacekeeping operations has grown since 1989, this fact alone does not explain the trend. Even after United Nations peacekeeping had been scaled back, African participation continued to increase. Twenty-two African countries contributed troops, observers, or police to United Nations operations between January 1997 and June 1999.

African participation has been concentrated among a small group of countries. Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia have been the most active and the largest contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations. As of 30 June 1999, Nigeria had provided Blue Helmets to 24 United Nations peacekeeping operations—the most of any African country. Ghana had contributed military personnel or civilian police to 23 operations, Egypt to 21,<sup>2</sup> Senegal to 20,<sup>3</sup> Kenya to 19, and Tunisia to 16. No other African country had participated in more than 10 missions. Nearly one-third

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<sup>2</sup> Egypt provided troops to ONUC as part of the United Arab Republic (UAR), a political union with Syria proclaimed in February 1958. (It ended in September 1961 when Syria declared itself independent from Egypt. Egypt, however, retained the name UAR for another 10 years.) The UN records Egypt as having provided troops, observers and police to a twenty-second operation, UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), (see, for example, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, p. 754) but according to Cairo, Egypt did not participate in that operation. Written correspondence with Hossam Zaki, First Secretary, Egyptian Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 3 May 1999.

<sup>3</sup> Senegal, together with Mali, comprised the Mali Federation, which contributed troops to ONUC. Shortly after the decision to contribute troops, the Mali Federation disbanded in August 1960. The contingent remained under the command of a Senegalese officer. Interview with Alioune Diagne, Minister Counsellor, Senegalese Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 14 April 1999, by telephone.

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of the remaining 27 African countries that had participated in United Nations peacekeeping operations had done so only once.<sup>4</sup>

The 27 African countries contributing formed units of military personnel to United Nations peacekeeping operations have all provided ground troops, which have ranged from brigade to platoon strength. (See Table 8.1.) In this context, a brigade consists of a minimum of three battalions, a battalion comprises at least three companies, and a company includes no fewer than three platoons.<sup>5</sup> The level of self-sufficiency expected for each category has a greater bearing on the potential significance of the contribution than the actual strength per se.<sup>6</sup> For example, whereas an infantry company may have the odd artillery platoon, a battalion will likely consist of several support units including medical, artillery, engineer, and logistics. Of all African countries, Ethiopia, Morocco, and Tunisia have made the most sizeable single contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations: all furnishing infantry brigades of at least 3,000 men in ONUC.<sup>7</sup> Ghana and Nigeria similarly sent contingents much larger than single infantry battalions to that operation.<sup>8</sup> Egypt provided a smaller brigade of 1,661 troops to the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II).<sup>9</sup> These six countries and eight others have all contributed infantry battalions

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<sup>4</sup> Seven countries have contributed to a single UN peacekeeping operation: Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, the Gambia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Cameroon and Malawi would join this list if not for contributions of two civilian police to MINURCA, and one military observer to the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), respectively, in 1999.

<sup>5</sup> The exact size and composition of each of these four categories will differ according to the individual army and the nature of the force being assembled. Generally, a battalion serving in a UN peacekeeping operation will include a minimum of 500 troops, a company 100, and a platoon 30.

<sup>6</sup> Thus, Egypt is credited with providing a "battalion" to UNPROFOR even though it consisted of only 410 men. Written correspondence with Zaki, 3 May 1999.

<sup>7</sup> Indarjit Rikhye, *Military Adviser to the Secretary-General: U.N. Peacekeeping and the Congo Crisis*, London: Hurst & Company, 1993, p. 331.

<sup>8</sup> The Ghanaian and Nigerian contingents, which numbered roughly 2,000 and 2,600, respectively, included large numbers of civilian police. *Ibid.*

<sup>9</sup> Written correspondence with Zaki, 3 May 1999.

Table 8.1

African Countries Providing Formed Units of Infantry Troops to UN Peacekeeping Operations (as of 30 June 1999)				
Country	Strength (number of operations)			
	BRIGADE 3 Battalions ~1,500-3,000+ men	BATTALION 3 Companies ~500-1,000+ men	COMPANY 3 Platoons ~100-300+ men	PLATOON 3 Squads ~30-50+ men
01	Botswana		X (1)	X (1)
02	Burkina Faso			X (1)
03	Chad			X (2)
04	Congo (Brazzaville)			X (1)
05	Côte d'Ivoire			X (1)
06	Djibouti			X (1)
07	Egypt	X (1)	X (2)	X (1)
08	Ethiopia	X (1)	X (1)	
09	Gabon			X (1)
10	Ghana		X (5)	
11	Guinea		X (1)	
12	Guinea-Bissau			X (1)
13	Kenya		X (3)	
14	Liberia			X (1)
15	Malawi			X (1)
16	Mali		X (1)	X (2)
17	Morocco	X (1)	X (1)	
18	Namibia			X (2)
19	Niger			X (1)
20	Nigeria		X (4)	X (1)
21	Senegal		X (3)	X (2)
22	Sierra Leone			X (1)
23	Sudan		X (1)	
24	Togo			X (1)
25	Tunisia	X (1)	X (2)	X (1)
26	Zambia		X (3)	
27	Zimbabwe		X (2)	
TOTALS		4 (4)	14 (30)	16 (20)
				4 (4)

on other occasions<sup>10</sup>—six among these 14 have also provided sizeable numbers at company-strength and above.<sup>11</sup> (Togo had agreed to make an infantry battalion available to serve in the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia within seven days' notice, but was never called upon to deploy.<sup>12</sup>) Thirteen additional African countries have furnished infantry units below battalion strength: 10 at company strength or larger;<sup>13</sup> and three with smaller detachments.<sup>14</sup>

On rare occasions, African States contributing infantry troops have undertaken missions that require a high degree of mobility and armoured

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<sup>10</sup> Infantry battalions have been supplied by: **Botswana**, to UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ); **Egypt**, to ONUC (as part of UAR), UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), and UNOSOM II; **Ethiopia**, to ONUC and UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR); **Ghana**, to ONUC, Second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II), UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), and UNAMIR; **Guinea**, to ONUC; **Kenya**, to UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), UNPROFOR, and UNCRO; **Mali** (as part of the Mali Federation) to ONUC; **Morocco**, to ONUC and UNOSOM II; **Nigeria**, to ONUC, UNIFIL, UNOSOM II, and UNPROFOR; **Senegal**, to ONUC, UNEF II, and UNIFIL; the **Sudan**, to ONUC; **Tunisia**, to ONUC, UNTAC, and UNAMIR; **Zambia**, to ONUMOZ, UNAMIR, and the third UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III); and **Zimbabwe**, to UNOSOM II and UNAVEM III.

<sup>11</sup> The six countries are Botswana, Egypt, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia. They have each contributed at least 100 infantry to the following missions: UNOSOM II (Botswana and Tunisia); UNAMIR (Mali, Nigeria, and Senegal); and MINURCA (Egypt, Mali, and Senegal).

<sup>12</sup> Bangladesh, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia, all entered into similar arrangements with the UN, without effect. *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, p. 214.

<sup>13</sup> The 10 are: **Burkina Faso** (in MINURCA); **Chad** (UNAMIR and MINURCA); **Côte d'Ivoire** (MINURCA); **Djibouti**, (UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)); **Gabon** (MINURCA); **Liberia** (ONUC); **Malawi** (UNAMIR); **Namibia** (UNAVEM III and UN Mission in Angola (MONUA)); **Sierra Leone** (ONUC); and **Togo** (MINURCA).

<sup>14</sup> Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea-Bissau, and Niger provided roughly 40 troops each to UNAMIR. Namibia also provided a convoy escort element containing a slightly higher number of infantry to UNTAC towards the end of the mission, just before elections.

protection in a hostile environment. Namibia provided mine-resistant vehicles to assist in convoy escort duties in the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and operations in Angola.<sup>15</sup> The Nigerian battalion serving in UNOSOM II deployed with sufficient armoured vehicles to fulfil a reconnaissance role.<sup>16</sup> A small unit from Ghana took part in an “integrated headquarters camp command” that constituted a rapid response capability in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).<sup>17</sup>

Similarly, African States have provided specialized units to United Nations peacekeeping operations infrequently. During ONUC, Liberia deployed a movement control contingent, Ghana contributed two medical units, and Ethiopia sent an air unit and ground support personnel.<sup>18</sup> A Zimbabwean communication company served in UNOSOM II.<sup>19</sup> Morocco ran a forward field hospital in UNOSOM II.<sup>20</sup> Ghana provided an engineering company to UNIFIL.<sup>21</sup> Most recently, Egypt sent logistics and medical units to replace French contingents serving in the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA).<sup>22</sup>

African countries have been much more likely to provide military observers or civilian police than to contribute troops. As of mid-1999, they had supplied observers and police 126 and 122 times, respectively, whereas

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<sup>15</sup> Written correspondence with Amb. Martin Andjaba, Permanent Representative, Namibian Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 17 February 1999.

<sup>16</sup> UN Document S/26738, *Further Report of the Secretary-General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraph 19 of Resolution 814 (1993) and Paragraph 5 of Resolution 865 (1993)*, 12 November 1993, para. 47.

<sup>17</sup> See *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, p. 699.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 709-10.

<sup>19</sup> UN Document, S/26738, para. 47.

<sup>20</sup> Written correspondence with Raja Ghannam, Counsellor, Moroccan Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 3 April 1999.

<sup>21</sup> Interview with Col. Oduro Apenteng, Director, International Peacekeeping Operations, Ghanaian Ministry of Defence, 18 March 1999, Accra. (The UN lists Ghana's contribution to be at “platoon” strength. See *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, p. 699.)

<sup>22</sup> Written correspondence with Zaki, 3 May 1999.

they had furnished troops in 66 instances.<sup>23</sup> Twenty-two African countries had contributed military observers, and 23 had provided civilian police—of which 16 had given both. (See Table 8.2.) In keeping with the greater role civilian police are being asked to assume in United Nations peacekeeping, African countries have increasingly made civilian police available.

On average, African States are likely to provide relatively fewer observers and more police to a particular peacekeeping operation. Broadly speaking, the numbers of military observers and civilian police that African countries contribute to a United Nations peacekeeping operation tend to range from 1-10 and 10-40, respectively. There have been some notable exceptions. Several African countries sent many more military observers to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) than is customary: Kenya, for example, gave 47.<sup>24</sup> Ghana, which furnished more than 55 observers to the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), stands out among African States as having provided the largest contingent of military observers at one time to a single United Nations peacekeeping operation.

Concerning the provision of civilian police, African countries have contributed sizeable contingents on numerous occasions. Ghana and Nigeria have distinguished themselves as having made available particularly large forces in several instances. Nigeria's 400-man unit in ONUC<sup>25</sup> represents the single largest contribution of police by any country in any United Nations peacekeeping operation. Nigeria also provided units of 163

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<sup>23</sup> Besides the 59 occasions when African countries have contributed formed units (which may also include staff officers), there have been seven instances when African countries have only provided small numbers of staff officers or military experts (such as de-miners): **Egypt** (UNAVEM III and MONUA); **Ghana** (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)), **Kenya** (UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and MONUA); **Zambia** (MONUA); and **Zimbabwe** (MONUA).

<sup>24</sup> Written correspondence with Lt-Col. Haggai O. Dulo, Defence Adviser, Kenyan Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 11 March 1999.

<sup>25</sup> John W. T. Gibor, "The Nigerian Police in International Police Missions," in Chris A. Garuba (ed.), *International Peace and Security: The Nigerian Contribution*, Lagos: Gabumo Publishing, 1997, p. 85.

Table 8.2

<b>African Countries Providing Military Observers and/or Civilian Police to UN Peacekeeping Operations</b> (as of 30 June 1999)		
<b>Country</b>	<b>Military Observers</b>	<b>Civilian Police</b>
01	Algeria	X
02	Benin	X
03	Botswana	X
04	Cameroon	X
05	Cape Verde	X
06	Chad	X
07	Congo (Brazzaville)	X
08	Côte d'Ivoire	X
09	Djibouti	X
10	Egypt	X
11	Ethiopia	X
12	Gambia	X
13	Ghana	X
14	Guinea	X
15	Guinea-Bissau	X
16	Kenya	X
17	Malawi	X
18	Mali	X
19	Morocco	X
20	Namibia	X
21	Niger	X
22	Nigeria	X
23	Senegal	X
24	Sudan	X
25	Tanzania	X
26	Togo	X
27	Tunisia	X
28	Zambia	X
29	Zimbabwe	X
TOTALS	22	23

police to UNTAG,<sup>26</sup> 150 to UNTAC,<sup>27</sup> 55 to the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), 74 to UNPROFOR, and 68 to the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO).<sup>28</sup> Ghana supplied units of at least 100 police to four operations: ONUC, <sup>29</sup> UNTAG (129), UNTAC (283), and the International Police Task Force (IPTF) (100)<sup>30</sup> as part of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). Egypt and Kenya both contributed units of more than 50 police to three separate peacekeeping operations.<sup>31</sup> Algeria, Cameroon, and Morocco also provided contingents of 75 or more to UNTAC<sup>32</sup> and Guinea-Bissau and Zambia provided contingents of at least 50 police to ONUMOZ. <sup>33</sup> Mali

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<sup>26</sup> Ibid., p. 90.

<sup>27</sup> *The United Nations and Cambodia: 1991-1995*, New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1995, p. 23.

<sup>28</sup> Based on a compilation of "UN Monthly Summaries of Troop Contributing Countries to Peacekeeping Operations" by Erwin Schmidl. Written correspondence with Erwin A. Schmidl, Head of Research, Bureau of Military Scientific Studies, Austrian Ministry of Defence, 18 May 1999. Nigeria's contributions to UNPROFOR and UNCRO were not concurrent.

<sup>29</sup> Erwin Schmidl, who has published widely on the history of civilian police in UN peacekeeping operations, surmises that based on his archival research of UN documents, Ghana provided between 150-300 police to ONUC. Written correspondence with Schmidl, 18 May 1999.

<sup>30</sup> Written correspondence with Mohammed Alhassan, Assistant Commissioner, Civilian Police Unit, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 21 September 1999.

<sup>31</sup> Egypt provided contingents of 70 civilian police to ONUMOZ, 85 to UNPROFOR, and 100 to UNTAC. Kenya provided 50 to UNPROFOR, 100 to UNTAC, and 50 to UNTAES.

<sup>32</sup> The individual countries' contributions were: Algeria, 157; Cameroon, 75; and Morocco, 100. See, for example, *The United Nations and Cambodia: 1991-1995*, p. 23. The table provides the numbers of police for each contributing country when the mission's police force was at peak strength—which was not necessarily the case for each individual contingent. Cameroon and Morocco, for example, had provided 75 and 100 police, respectively and not 73 and 98 as listed.

<sup>33</sup> *United Nations Peace-keeping Information Notes: Update December 1994*. New York: UN Department of Public Information, February 1995, Annex.

provided a 48-man unit to the United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti (UNTMIH), and Senegal sent a 53-man unit to IPTF.<sup>34</sup>

### NON-AFRICAN-LED MULTINATIONAL FORCES

Kenya's participation in the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) of 1979-1980 represented the first instance when an African country participated in a non-African-led multinational force in Africa. (See Annex F for a list of African participation in all such operations both on the continent and elsewhere.) The Lancaster House Conference in England established CMF to oversee Rhodesia's transition from minority rule to form the new State of Zimbabwe and thus end that country's civil war. The fact that Kenya, which provided 51 military observers,<sup>35</sup> was the only African country to take part in the mission had little to do with African countries' peacekeeping capacities or political will. Rather, the sensitivities and sensibilities of the United Kingdom were of paramount importance. The UK, which provided the financial, political, and military backing for the 1,300-strong force,<sup>36</sup> wanted to keep CMF small and to limit the number of participating countries.<sup>37</sup> It was not interested, therefore, in taking advantage of the services of several African States that were part of the Commonwealth and possessed extensive peacekeeping experience.<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Based on a compilation of "UN Monthly Summaries of Troop Contributing Countries to Peacekeeping Operations" by Erwin Schmidl. Written correspondence with Schmidl, 18 May 1999.

<sup>35</sup> Jeremy Ginifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Zimbabwe*, Geneva: UN Institute for Disarmament Research, 1995, p. 5.

<sup>36</sup> The United States assisted in transporting the force. Alan James, *Peacekeeping in International Politics*, London: Macmillan, 1990, p. 107.

<sup>37</sup> The UK provided the bulk of the five-nation force. The four other Commonwealth countries accounted for fewer than one in four members of the 1,319-man force: Australia (159), Fiji (24), Kenya (51), and New Zealand (75). Ginifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Zimbabwe*, p. 5.

<sup>38</sup> For example, London rejected possible Ghanaian and Nigerian participation. The two rebel groups that had coalesced into a united Patriotic Front had demanded a more diverse CMF and had mentioned those two (and several other) countries by name as possible candidates for inclusion in the force. Ibid.

African participation was significantly greater in the United Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia in 1992-1993. The Security Council, recognizing that the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) could not cope with the enormity of the growing humanitarian catastrophe, authorized the United States on 3 December 1992 to lead an international force that would help ensure that the relief effort reached its intended beneficiaries.<sup>39</sup> Botswana, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe all contributed at least a company of infantry (with the Moroccan contingent considerably larger)<sup>40</sup> to the 24-nation, 37,000-strong force. All six African participants remained in the mission area, joining UNOSOM II, upon the completion of UNITAF's mandate in May 1993.<sup>41</sup>

Seven African countries took part in Operation Turquoise, a much smaller and shorter French-led force that deployed in Rwanda in response to the genocide. As with UNITAF, the Council authorized the operation for humanitarian purposes and in light of an existing United Nations peacekeeping operation's limitations.<sup>42</sup> The roughly 3,100-strong eight-nation multinational force lasted two months, from 22 June until 21 August 1994.<sup>43</sup> France provided the requisite operational support for its own troops as well as those of the other participating nations. Chad and Senegal both provided contingents of at least company-strength. Congo (Brazzaville), Guinea-Bissau,

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<sup>39</sup> UN Document S/RES/794 (1992), 3 December 1992. The initial forces first deployed in Somalia on 9 December. See UN Document S/24976, Annex, *Report by the United States pursuant to Security Council resolution 794 (1992)*, 17 December 1992.

<sup>40</sup> Exact numbers are difficult to obtain. As of 7 January 1993, the US reported that Botswana had 303 troops serving in UNITAF, Egypt 270, Morocco 1,356, and Nigeria, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe had "advance parties" in the country. See UN Document S/25126, Annex, *Report dated 16 January 1993 by the United States of America pursuant to Security Council resolution 794 (1992)*, 19 January 1993.

<sup>41</sup> The transfer of military command from UNITAF to UNOSOM II occurred on 4 May 1993. (See UN Document S/26317, *Further Report of the Secretary-General submitted in pursuance of paragraph 18 of resolution 814 (1993)*, 17 August 1993, para. 4.)

<sup>42</sup> UN Document S/RES/929 (1994), 22 June 1994.

<sup>43</sup> UN Document S/1994/1100, Annex, *Final report on Operation Turquoise authorized by Security Council resolution 929 (1994)*, 27 September 1994. The force was "over 3,060" troops. *Ibid.*

and Niger provided platoon-strength detachments. The combined strength of the Egyptian and Mauritanian units was 17 men.<sup>44</sup>

A fourth relevant operation in Africa in which regional countries participated was a small observer group in 1995-1996 in Eastern Zaire. A proposed United Nations peacekeeping operation in response to security concerns at refugee camps along the Zaire/Rwanda border was not supported by United Nations Member States<sup>45</sup>. In a four-day period following the fall of the Rwandan Government in July 1994, more than one million Rwandans, almost all Hutu—tens of thousands of whom had actively taken part in the genocide—streamed across the border and into Zaire.<sup>46</sup> The decision by the head of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to take advantage of Kinshasa's offer to provide security for the camps was one of desperation. The Zairean Camp Security Operation (ZCSO) was created in January 1995. It comprised a Zairean Camp Security Contingent (ZCSC) of 1,500 members of the Presidential Guard, and a Civilian Security Liaison Group (CSLG) of some 35 non-Zairean security advisers, with police or military backgrounds. CSLG was initially under the command of a Canadian General and subsequently headed by a Norwegian. Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and Guinea (along with the Netherlands and Switzerland) provided "Liaison Officers." All members of CSLG received their salaries from their respective Governments, but the African officers also

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<sup>44</sup> UN Document S/1994/933, Annex, *Operation Turquoise: developments from 10 to 25 July 1994*, 4 August 1994. The numbers were Chad (130), Congo (Brazzaville) (45), Egypt (7), Guinea-Bissau (35), Mauritania (10), Niger (43), and Senegal (243). (Ibid.) Note that despite the report's title, a significant number of these troops arrived *after* 25 July. Note also that these numbers do not tally exactly with the number of African troops (508) mentioned in the *Final Report*.

<sup>45</sup> Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali had proposed the creation of a UN peacekeeping operation composed of troops, civilian police, or military observers. See UN Document S/1995/65, *Second Report of the Secretary-General on Security in the Rwandese Refugee Camps*, 25 January 1995, paras. 21-34.

<sup>46</sup> The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated 850,000 Rwandans fled to the areas surrounding Goma in the north, and another 370,000 crossed into the Bukavu area in the south. UN Document S/1994/1308, *Report of the Secretary-General on Security in the Rwandese Refugee Camps*, 18 November 1994, para. 6.

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received a daily subsistence allowance (DSA) from UNHCR at the same rate as United Nations staff.<sup>47</sup> CSLG, which became operational along with ZCSC in February 1995, continued through mid-1996. By that time, ethnic violence and the nascent rebellion headed by Laurent Kabila made it impossible to continue.<sup>48</sup>

Numerous African countries were prepared to commit troops to the proposed Canadian-led multinational force for Eastern Zaire. The ZCSC, which had proven surprisingly professional, showed little interest in defending the camps against the rebels.<sup>49</sup> The situation in the region was becoming increasingly tense as refugees were displaced in the fighting and interested parties sought to settle old scores. A multinational force was proposed that would provide security for a humanitarian corridor to be established in Eastern Zaire in an attempt to restore some semblance of order. There was no shortage of African countries willing to participate.<sup>50</sup> According to the US, which was to provide significant financial and logistical support to the operation,<sup>51</sup> at least 13 African countries were likely to contribute troops<sup>52</sup>—although the actual number of countries to take part

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<sup>47</sup> Interview with Kimberley Roberson, former Desk Officer for Zaire, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 4 June 1999, Geneva.

<sup>48</sup> The rebellion began in response to the increased persecution of the Banyamulenge by Kinshasa and Rwandan *Interahamwe* militia. The Banyamulenge were Zaireans who had lived in Eastern Zaire since the eighteenth century but were nevertheless targeted because of their perceived ethnic ties to Tutsis. See Simon Massey, "Operation Assurance: The Greatest Intervention that Never Happened," *Journal of Humanitarian Assistance*, 15 February 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www-jha.sps.cam.ac.uk>>>.

<sup>49</sup> Interview with Roberson, 4 June 1999, Geneva.

<sup>50</sup> Interview with Col. J. Michael Snell, Military Adviser, Canadian Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 22 December 1998, New York.

<sup>51</sup> Many have questioned US resolve for undertaking the mission. Washington appeared hesitant to become involved from the beginning.

<sup>52</sup> The 13 countries mentioned by name were Botswana, Cameroon, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe. See Jacqueline S. Porth, "Final Decision on US Troops for Zaire Not Yet Made," *US Information Agency*, 14 November 1996, and Judy (continued...)

would likely have been significantly fewer.<sup>53</sup> The Security Council authorized the mission<sup>54</sup> but the force never deployed. It was determined that the subsequent massive repatriation of Rwandan refugees made such an intervention unnecessary.<sup>55</sup>

African countries' willingness to join Western-led multinational forces is not limited to operations in Africa. Ethiopia and South Africa contributed troops to the US-led force in Korea from 1950-1953. Egypt, Morocco, Niger, Senegal,<sup>56</sup> and Sierra Leone<sup>57</sup> took part in the US-led force to liberate Kuwait, known as Operation Desert Storm in 1990-1991. In the US-led operation in

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<sup>52</sup> (...continued)

Aita, "Security Council Ready to Authorize Zaire Relief" *US Information Agency*, 15 November 1996, available on the Internet at <<<http://pdq2.usia.gov>>>.

<sup>53</sup> Simon Massey mentions only six African countries (Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Mali, and Senegal) as having offered to provide troops and questions the extent to which they could have contributed given financial concerns. See Massey, "Operation Assurance: The Greatest Intervention that Never Happened."

<sup>54</sup> UN Document S/RES/1080 (1996), 15 November 1996.

<sup>55</sup> Concurrent with the Council's decision to authorize the multinational force, hundreds of thousands of Rwandan refugees began crossing the border back to Rwanda as a result of the rebels' advance. (See, for example, Gérard Prunier, "The Geopolitical Situation in the Great Lakes Area in Light of the Kivu Crisis," *Writtenet Country Papers*, February 1997, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.unhcr.ch/refworld/country/writenet/wridrc.htm>>>.) According to Prunier, the mass exodus, which began the day before the Council voted, was "completely unforeseen." The uncertain fate of several hundred thousand of the estimated 1.3 million refugees in Eastern Zaire as of September 1996, that fled westward into Zaire was deemed troublesome, but not significantly so to warrant the force's deployment. (Ibid.) It is believed that significant numbers of this group—which included *Interahamwe* and members of the armed forces of the former Government of Rwanda—were killed.

<sup>56</sup> Written correspondence with Gerri Taylor, Directorate for Public Information, US Department of Defense, 19 May 1999.

<sup>57</sup> Sierra Leone provided a small medical contingent. (Dan Henk, "Peace Operations: Views From Southern and Eastern Africa," *U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute Occasional Paper*, Carlisle: Center for Strategic Leadership, June 1996, p. 38.) The other four African countries provided combat troops.

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Haiti in 1994-1995,<sup>58</sup> Benin provided 34 gendarmes.<sup>59</sup> Egypt and Morocco<sup>60</sup> participated in both the Implementation Force (IFOR)<sup>61</sup> undertaken by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1995-1996 as well as the NATO-led follow-on mission known as the Stabilization Force (SFOR).<sup>62</sup> Most recently, in June 1999, five African countries—Egypt, Ghana, Mozambique, Senegal, and Zimbabwe—were among the 28 Member States<sup>63</sup> that Secretary-General Kofi Annan proposed to comprise the 280-authorized police contingent<sup>64</sup> of the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET),<sup>65</sup> which despite its name is not a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

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<sup>58</sup> The Security Council established the force in July 1994 to create the necessary conditions for the military regime in Haiti to return the country to democratic rule. (UN Document S/RES/940 (1994), 31 July 1994.) The force deployed in September and continued until the end of March 1995, when its authority was transferred to UNMIH.

<sup>59</sup> Interview with Col. Jean N'Dah, Director-General, Beninois National Gendarmerie, 15 March 1999, Porto Novo.

<sup>60</sup> See "The NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina," *NATO Basic Fact Sheet No. 11*, April 1997, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/sfor.htm>>>.

<sup>61</sup> IFOR (known as Operation Joint Endeavour in NATO) was launched in December 1995 after receiving a one-year mandate from the UN Security Council to help implement the Bosnia Peace Agreement, concluded on 14 December 1995. See UN Document S/RES/1031 (1995), 15 December 1995.

<sup>62</sup> SFOR (known as Operation Joint Guard in NATO) succeeded IFOR. SFOR's initial mandate was for 18 months (UN Document S/RES/1088 (1996), 12 December 1996) and was later renewed for consecutive 12-month periods (UN Document S/RES/1174 (1998), 15 June 1998, and UN Document S/RES/1247 (1999), 18 June 1999).

<sup>63</sup> UN Document S/1999/735, *Letter dated 25 June 1999 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council*, 30 June 1999.

<sup>64</sup> UN Document S/RES/1246 (1999), 11 June 1999.

<sup>65</sup> As of 21 June, 41 police had deployed. UN Document S/1999/705, *Question of East Timor: Report of the Secretary-General*, 22 June 1999, para. 4.

