

## CHAPTER 9

### MEANS, MOTIVES, AND MILITARIES

#### ENABLING CHARACTERISTICS OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS AND WESTERN-LED MISSIONS

Any evaluation of African countries' participation in United Nations peacekeeping and Western-led multinational forces must acknowledge several characteristics of these missions that often affect a country's ability to take part. The structure and benefits associated with these operations make it easier and more attractive for many African States to participate. Without such frameworks, several African countries' limitations would be exposed and their willingness to participate would be greatly reduced.

Countries participating in these undertakings are routinely assisted in deploying to the mission area. This was true, for example, in the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), the first United Nations peacekeeping operation in which African countries participated, and continues. During ONUC, the US airlifted Ghanaian, Guinean, Moroccan, and Tunisian troops.<sup>1</sup> The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) airlifted the Ghanaian and Senegalese battalions serving in the Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II).<sup>2</sup> The US did the same for Senegal in the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).<sup>3</sup> Most recently, in the United

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<sup>1</sup> The UK also assisted with the airlift of the Ghanaian contingent . *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 710.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 695.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 700.

Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), France transported the African troops to the field.<sup>4</sup>

Upon arrival, African countries participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations and Western-led multinational forces can usually count on other countries' contingents or donor countries to provide what they lack. Contingents are expected to deploy with agreed-upon provisions and to be self-sufficient in rations and water for between 30 and 60 days. They also may be required to supply their own fuel, spare parts, and ammunition for a specific period.<sup>5</sup> African countries, however, often cannot meet these expectations. This was the case with the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), an operation composed primarily of African countries. Donor States had to provide substantial equipment to enable the force to become and remain operational. Contributions included: ambulances, field kitchens, generators, mine detectors, radios, vehicles, and a vehicle repair workshop. The value of this equipment, together with training in how to use it, amounted to more than US\$ 5 million.<sup>6</sup>

Deploying without appropriate resources is not limited to major military items, and even the inability to provide basic provisions can have adverse effects. Such was the case with the Ghanaian civilian police contingent serving in the International Police Task Force (IPTF) of the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). Former IPTF Commissioner Peter Fitzgerald observed:

I have seen colleagues from Ghana, most honourable people, spend most of their energy trying to keep warm in sub-zero temperatures of Bosnia. They had not been supplied with winter clothing and indeed many of

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<sup>4</sup> Interview with Col. Pierre de Saqui de Sannes, Counsellor for Africa and the Middle East, Office of the Chief of the General Staff, French Ministry of Defence, 28 May 1998, Paris.

<sup>5</sup> Written correspondence with Hocine Medili, Director, Field Administration and Logistics Division, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 10 March 1999.

<sup>6</sup> Money provided to the UN Trust Fund for Rwanda (which may have been used to procure equipment or help defray other costs to troop-contributing African countries) is not included. *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, p. 731.

them finished working in Irish 'Garda' uniforms that we had spare. It is very difficult to expect personnel to perform effectively under such conditions.<sup>7</sup>

For many countries, there are financial incentives for participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations. The United Nations reimburses countries directly for most of their military personnel that serve in United Nations peacekeeping operations.<sup>8</sup> The basic United Nations rate for a soldier serving within a formed military unit is fixed at US\$ 1,058 per month.<sup>9</sup> Provision is also made to pay each troop-contributing country an additional allowance of US\$ 291 per month for 10 per cent of an infantry unit or 25 per cent of any speciality contingent.<sup>10</sup> Thus, a country providing a 500-strong infantry battalion would be reimbursed US\$ 543,550 per month, while a Government contributing a 500-strong engineering battalion would receive US\$ 21,825 more.<sup>11</sup> (All personnel also receive a direct payment from the United Nations, albeit a nominal one: the United Nations pays them US\$ 1.28 per day plus a "recreational leave allowance" of US\$ 10.50 per day for no more than one week every six months.<sup>12</sup>) For many countries in Africa, outlays are significantly lower than the amount the United

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<sup>7</sup> Written correspondence with Peter Fitzgerald, former Commissioner, International Police Task Force, 17 February 1999.

<sup>8</sup> For administrative reasons, the UN pays a mission subsistence allowance (MSA) directly to Blue Helmets not serving in formed units—i.e. military observers, civilian police, and in exceptional cases some troops. The rate of MSA is determined anew for each mission, and is designed to cover accommodation, meals, and incidentals.

<sup>9</sup> This figure is broken down as follows: US\$ 988 for each contingent member, plus a clothing allowance of US\$ 65 and US\$ 5 to cover ammunition for training purposes. UN Document A/51/967, Annex A, *Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, 27 August 1997, para. 2 (a-c).

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, para. 2 (d).

<sup>11</sup> The calculations for the infantry and engineer battalions are: US\$ 543,550 (500 x 1,058 = 529,000 plus 50 x 291 = 14,550) and US\$ 565,375 (500 x 1,058 = 529,000 plus 125 x 291 = 36,375), respectively.

<sup>12</sup> UN Document A/51/967, Annex A, para. 3.

Nations reimburses them and they stand to make a handsome profit.<sup>13</sup> Furthermore, the United Nations pays each country for the depreciation in the value of its equipment, which can be a significant amount.

The delayed deployment of the Zimbabwean battalion in Somalia is a concrete example of how monetary considerations may influence a country's peacekeeping policy. In 1992, Harare agreed to provide an infantry battalion to serve in the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I). Subsequent to that decision, but prior to the contingent's departure, the Security Council established the United Task Force (UNITAF).<sup>14</sup> Countries that had already committed troops to serve in UNOSOM, but had not yet deployed them by December 1992 were invited to serve in UNITAF. As it was not a United Nations operation, participants were expected to pay their own costs. Zimbabwean troops did arrive on 15 January 1993,<sup>15</sup> but only at company strength. The remaining complement of the 939-strong Zimbabwean battalion did not arrive until 26-28 June 1993,<sup>16</sup> after UNITAF's mandate had expired and it had been replaced by the second United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II).<sup>17</sup> Logistical constraints contributed to the initial delayed and partial deployment. Zimbabwe's appreciation for the different financial incentives between a multinational force and a United Nations peacekeeping operation, however, also influenced the date its contingent reached full strength.<sup>18</sup> Harare received no

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<sup>13</sup> If a country's costs exceed the UN rate of reimbursement, that country bears the shortfall. This is the case with many Western States.

<sup>14</sup> UN Document S/RES/794 (1992), 3 December 1992.

<sup>15</sup> Martin Rupiah, "Peacekeeping Operations: The Zimbabwean Experience," in Mark Shaw and Jakkie Cilliers (eds), *South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa (Volume 1)*, Halfway House: Institute for Defence Policy, 1995, p. 115.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 118-19.

<sup>17</sup> UN Document S/RES/814 (1993), 26 March 1993. UNITAF completed its mission on 4 May 1993.

<sup>18</sup> The United States, which led UNITAF and provided significant financial and logistical support to many of the 23 other countries in the force, did not push Zimbabwe to deploy the remainder of its battalion. (Interview with Amb. Robert Oakley, former US Special Envoy to Somalia, 12 February 1999, by telephone.) Oakley also pointed out that Zimbabwe (along with Botswana) performed especially well among *all* the countries that took part in UNITAF. *Ibid.*

assistance to help offset its expenses during UNITAF.<sup>19</sup> Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe has emphasized the financial considerations and constraints that his country and others face in deciding whether or not to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations.<sup>20</sup>

Any monetary incentives a United Nations peacekeeping operation may provide are no longer as alluring as they once were. This is not because the terms have changed. Rather, it is because in the current financial crisis troop-contributing countries have been forced to wait years to be reimbursed. The United Nations in effect has borrowed from its supplemental peacekeeping account to cover shortfalls in its regular budget. Many countries, therefore, are still waiting to be paid, and are likely to continue to wait for some time.

African increased participation in non-UN undertakings highlights that financial incentives, while potentially important, are not the main factors in African countries' decision-making processes. Contributing to a multinational force is generally not remuneratively rewarding. Indeed, most are loss-making ventures. The expected political benefit to be gained from taking part or the moral imperative is often sufficient to convince countries to volunteer military or police forces, regardless of the level of reimbursement.

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<sup>19</sup> Interview with Maj-Gen. Edzai Absolom Chanyuka Chimonyo, Chief of Staff (Operations and Plans), Zimbabwean Ministry of Defence, 27 January 1998, Harare.

<sup>20</sup> In his address before the 48<sup>th</sup> UN General Assembly, President Mugabe stated, "We stand ready to... participat[e] in [UN] peacekeeping operations. ... However, unless all Member States commit themselves to timely payments of their assessed contributions for these efforts, some countries will find continued participation difficult." UN Document A/48/PV.7, 8 October 1993, p. 4, cited in Angela Kane, "Other New and Emerging Peacekeepers," in Trevor Findlay (ed.), "Challenges for the New Peacekeepers," *SIPRI Research Report No. 12*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 117.

## CAPABILITIES AND CONSTRAINTS

Many African countries have acquitted themselves well in carrying out their responsibilities. Eric Falt, the former Spokesperson for the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) and the United Nations Support Mission in Haiti (UNSMIH), singled out the gendarmes from Benin as “outstanding” and among the most effective Blue Helmets serving in that operation. According to Falt, “they did wonders everywhere they were deployed and brought an understanding of sometimes inextricable situations in a way no other national contingent seemed able to match.”<sup>21</sup> Maj-Gen. Klaas Roos, who held senior positions in two United Nations peacekeeping operations, observed that African police developed excellent rapports with the local populace and could have “given lessons” to other peacekeepers. Roos singled out the Ghanaian and Kenyan police contingents as among the most professional of the 32 countries contributing police to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), for which he served as Police Commissioner.<sup>22</sup> The Botswanan contingent serving in UNITAF has received high marks as one of the very best units within the 24-nation force according to US officials familiar with the operation.<sup>23</sup> They were well disciplined, well trained, well versed in the rules of engagement, and professional in carrying out their tasks. While there are cases of ill-discipline and corruption among African contingents serving in United Nations missions,<sup>24</sup> they are isolated instances. Moreover, this problem is certainly not limited to African peacekeepers.

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<sup>21</sup> Written correspondence with Eric Falt, former Spokesperson, UN Mission in Haiti and the UN Support Mission in Haiti, 4 February 1999.

<sup>22</sup> Interview with Maj-Gen. Klaas Roos, former Chief Operations Officer, UN Transition Assistance Group, former Police Commissioner, UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, current Military Adviser, Dutch Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 31 August 1999, New York.

<sup>23</sup> Interview with Oakley, 12 February 1999, by telephone, and interview with Scott Fisher, Political-Military Adviser, ACRI Interagency Working Group, US Department of State, 24 August 1999, by telephone.

<sup>24</sup> See, for example, “Somalia: Closing-down sale,” *The Economist*, 24 September 1994, p. 51.

African military and civilian officers as well as diplomats have gained important peacekeeping experience. Battalion commanders often are tasked with overseeing the activities of other contingents and units based in their sectors. Many military observers and headquarters staff have assumed—or may still assume—greater responsibilities in subsequent peacekeeping operations. For example, the Deputy Force Commander of the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), Daniel Ishmael Opande of Kenya, subsequently served as the Chief Military Observer of the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL). (Table 9.1 provides a list of Africans who have commanded United Nations peacekeeping forces or headed civilian police components.) Similarly, many Africans have served as civilian heads of United Nations peacekeeping operations (see Table 9.2) and in senior positions of civilian components. They provide the continent with an important pool of highly knowledgeable and capable diplomats and administrators who can be called upon to help plan and implement multifaceted peacekeeping missions—whether within a United Nations structure or through some other framework.

Generally, exposure to and participation in United Nations and Western-led missions can provide a valuable opportunity to learn and hone peacekeeping skills. Peacekeeping manuals provide important information for the aspiring peacekeeper (and help to develop national training courses). Peacekeeping exercises provide excellent opportunities to practise basic techniques such as staffing checkpoints or observation posts. However, some important peacekeeping skills can best be taught and mastered during actual operations. Learning how to work in a multinational environment, developing good civil-military relations, and practising a restraint in the use of force all take time. Besides possessing general military and certain peacekeeping skills, peacekeepers also must possess a certain attitude.<sup>25</sup> The Nordic peacekeeping manual, which is widely used and consulted, stresses that “peace-keeping is an empirical art” and no manual can hope to cover every situation.<sup>26</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> NORDSAMFN (Joint Nordic Committee for Military UN Matters), *Nordic UN Tactical Manual: Volume I (2nd Edition)*, Jyväskylä: Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, 1996, p. 17.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid*, p. 18.

Table 9.1

African Heads of Military or Civilian Police Components of UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) (as of 30 June 1999)				
PKO	Name	Country	Title	Dates
UNTSO	Lt-Gen. Emmanuel A. Erskine	Ghana	CoS	01/76-04/78 02/81-05/86
	Maj-Gen. Rufus Modupe Kupolati	Nigeria	CoS	10/95-03/98
ONUC	Lt-Gen. Kebede Guebre	Ethiopia	Commander	04/62-07/63
	Maj-Gen. Aguiyu Ironsi	Nigeria	Commander	01/64-06/64
UNIFIL	Lt-Gen. Emmanuel A. Erskine	Ghana	Commander*	03/78-02/81
UNIKOM	Maj-Gen. Timothy K. Dibuama	Ghana	CMO	07/92-08/93
UNAVEM II	Maj-Gen. Edward Ushie Unimna	Nigeria	CMO	10/91-12/92
	Brig-Gen. Michael Nyambuya	Zimbabwe	CMO	12/92-07/93
	Maj-Gen. Chris Abutu Garuba	Nigeria	CMO	07/93-02/95
ONUMOZ	Brig-Gen. Ali Mahmoud	Egypt	PC	03/94-12/94
UNOMUR	Col. Ben Matiwaza	Zimbabwe	Acting CMO	10/93-03/94
UNOMIL	Maj-Gen. Daniel Ishmael Opande	Kenya	CMO	10/93-05/95
	Maj-Gen. Mahmoud Talha	Egypt	CMO	11/95-06/96
	Col. David Magomere	Kenya	Acting CMO	06/96-12/96
UNAMIR	Brig-Gen. Henry K. Anyidho	Ghana	CMO	04/94-09/95
	Col. C.O. Diarra	Mali	PC	10/94-01/96
UNAVEM III	Maj-Gen. Chris Abutu Garuba	Nigeria	FC	02/95-09/95
	Maj-Gen. Philip Valerio Sibanda	Zimbabwe	FC	10/95-06/97
UNPREDEP	Col. David Kattah	Ghana	CMO	04/96-04/97
UNMOP	Col. Harold Mwakio Tangai	Kenya	CMO	11/96-07/98
MONUA	Maj-Gen. Philip Valerio Sibanda	Zimbabwe	FC	06/97-04/98
	Maj-Gen. Seth Kofi Obeng	Ghana	FC	05/98-02/99
MINURCA	Brig-Gen. Barthélemy Ratanga	Gabon	FC	04/98 to date

CMO = Chief Military Observer  
CoS = Chief of Staff

FC = Force Commander  
PC = Police Commissioner

\* Lt-Gen. Erskine began his command of UNIFIL as Interim Commander in March 1978 and was given full command in April.

Table 9.2

<b>African Civilian Heads of UN Peacekeeping Operations</b> (as of 30 June 1999)				
<b>PKO</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>Country</b>	<b>Title</b>	<b>Dates</b>
ONUC	Mr. Mekki Abbas	Sudan	Acting SRSG	03/61-05/61
	Mr. Robert K.A. Gardiner	Ghana	OiC	02/62-05/63
UNAVEM II	Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye	Mali	SRSG/CoM	06/93-02/95
UNOSOM I	Mr. Mohamed Sahnoun	Algeria	SRSG	04/92-11/92
UNOSOM II	Mr. Lansana Kouyaté	Guinea	Acting SRSG	02/94-06/94
	Mr. James Victor Gbeho	Ghana	SRSG	07/94-04/95
UNOMIL	Mr. Anthony B. Nyaki	Tanzania	SRSG/HoM	03/94-04/97
	Mr. Tuliameni Kalomoh	Namibia	SRSG/HoM	04/97-09/97
UNMIH	Mr. Lakdhar Brahimi	Algeria	SRSG/HoM	09/93-03/96
UNAMIR	Mr. Jacques-Roger Booh Booh	Cameroon	SRSG/HoM	11/93-06/94
UNAVEM III	Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye	Mali	SRSG	02/95-07/97
MONUA	Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye	Mali	SRSG/CoM	07/97-06/98*
	Brig-Gen. Seth Kofi Obeng	Ghana	OiC	06/98-08/98*
	Mr. Issa B.Y. Diallo	Guinea	SRSG/CoM	08/98-02/99
MINURCA	Mr. Oluyemi Adeniji	Nigeria	SRSG/CoM	04/98 to date
UNOMSIL	Mr. Francis G. Okelo	Uganda	SRSG/CoM	07/98 to date

CoM = Chief of Mission  
 HoM = Head of Mission  
 OiC = Officer-in-Charge  
 SRSG = Special Representative of the Secretary-General

\* On 26 June 1998, Alioune Blondin Beye was killed in a plane crash along with five MONUA staff members and two pilots. Secretary-General Kofi Annan designated the MONUA Force Commander, Maj-Gen. Seth Kofi Obeng, as Officer-in-Charge of the Mission. On 7 August, Annan informed the Security Council of his intention to appoint Issa B.Y. Diallo as his SRSG for Angola.

Yet sometimes prior experience is of questionable value in either evaluating countries' capabilities or preparing them to participate in future missions. Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Sudan, for example, all provided ground troops to ONUC. However, they are in no position to contribute to international or regional peacekeeping efforts now or for the foreseeable future. Moreover, previous peacekeeping experience can have potential drawbacks. Former UNTAC Force Commander John Sanderson stresses that, "Prior experience is useful for some officers and observers. Often it is counter-productive. People try to do totally irrelevant things they picked up on very different missions. ... Experience will never replace good quality specific to mission training."<sup>27</sup>

Statistics enumerating a country's peacekeeping experience often obscure or exaggerate its inclinations or contributions. Agreeing to contribute to an entirely new peacekeeping initiative is more significant than renewing a commitment to have already-deployed troops simply remain in a follow-on mission. On 31 March 1995, those countries with soldiers or police in the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia that just happened to be stationed in Croatia or the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) got to record another notch in their peacekeeping belts.<sup>28</sup> Similarly, four of the five missions to which Benin has contributed Blue Helmets (always gendarmes serving in a civilian police role) have been cascading United Nations peacekeeping operations (in Haiti).

To a large degree, African countries' participation in United Nations and Western-led peacekeeping operations is indicative of what they

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<sup>27</sup> Written correspondence with Gen. (Rtd) John Sanderson, former Force Commander, UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, 18 February 1999.

<sup>28</sup> It was on that day that the Security Council adopted resolutions 981, 982, and 983, which split UNPROFOR into three separate operations. Resolution 981 established the UN Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO), resolution 982 extended UNPROFOR's mandate only as it referred to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and resolution 983 established the UN Preventive Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) in FYROM. (See UN Documents S/RES/981 (1995), S/RES/982 (1995), and S/RES/983 (1995), all dated 31 March 1995.) The "hapless" countries whose troops, military observers or civilian police were only stationed in Bosnia and Herzegovina remained with the same number of "contributions" as on 30 March 1995.

can—and cannot—provide. Many countries possess ground troops in excess of what they require for national security purposes. Conversely, the Government might consider it to be in its self-interest to keep some troops and, perhaps more importantly, some officers, away from the country.<sup>29</sup> According to Dan Henk and Steven Metz:

Many African militaries are rich in peacekeeping experience and leadership talent. Their senior leaders have studied in western staff or war colleges. Yet African militaries reflect the relative poverty of their States. Budgets rarely are sufficient for adequate living standards for military personnel, to acquire and maintain equipment, or undergo realistic, large-unit training. Militaries in sub-Saharan Africa are particularly weak at maintenance of complex equipment, strategic mobility, advanced command, control, and intelligence, airpower, or naval power.<sup>30</sup>

Few African countries have specialized units in addition to their basic needs, or with sufficient skills and equipment that make them attractive potential contributors to multinational operations. For example, when Mauritania volunteered to provide troops to the operation in Somalia, its offer was declined as Nouakchott neither possessed the necessary equipment nor the desirable experience.<sup>31</sup> DFI International, in a 1997 study conducted

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<sup>29</sup> To assuage their well-founded fears of succumbing to a coup d'état, African leaders often send capable, popular, or ambitious military leaders far from home, and develop robust paramilitary groups such as presidential guards or gendarmes as a counterbalance to the armed forces. See Walter L. Barrows, "Changing Military Capabilities in Black Africa," in William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen (eds), *Arms and the African: Military Influences on Africa's International Relations*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, pp. 103-07.

<sup>30</sup> Dan Henk and Steven Metz, "The United States and the Transformation of African Security: The African Crisis Response Initiative and Beyond," *Strategic Studies Institute*, Carlisle: US Army War College, 5 December 1997, p. 9.

<sup>31</sup> See Brahim Benbrahim, "Les dimensions stratégiques et humanitaires dans les relations maroco-africaines: l'action du Maroc et Somalie," in Abdallah Saaf (ed.), *Le Maroc et l'Afrique après l'indépendance*, Rabat: Institut des Etudes Africaines, 1996, p. 129, cited in Carlos Echeverria, "Cooperation in Peacekeeping Among the Euro-Mediterranean Armed Forces" *Chaillot Papers* No. 35, Paris: The Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, (continued...)

for the US Government, reviewed the military capabilities of African countries and concluded that only 11 were capable of deploying a battalion without significant augmentation for a multinational peace or humanitarian operation.<sup>32</sup> Besides infantry, DFI analysed other units' capabilities and concluded that "little to no capability exists" among any African country as concerns airlift, logistics, ground transport, naval assets, and medical skills.<sup>33</sup> (Annex G provides DFI's 19 country-specific case-studies.)

With few exceptions, African countries do not possess the ability to project force great distances. Henk and Metz mention South Africa, and to a lesser degree, Ghana and Nigeria as possessing military and commercial assets that permit them to deploy troops and equipment substantial distances either by air or by sea.<sup>34</sup> South Africa has used its air assets to assist United Nations peacekeeping operations in Angola and Mozambique, although unofficially,<sup>35</sup> and it was considering providing airlift support for the proposed multinational force in Eastern Zaire.<sup>36</sup> Egypt also possesses substantial heavy airlift capacity as evidenced by its contribution of two full divisions to Operation Desert Storm totalling some 40,000 men—which it transported to

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<sup>31</sup> (...continued)  
February 1999, p. 21.

<sup>32</sup> *African Capabilities for Peace Operations: An Assessment in Support of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)*, 17 October 1997, courtesy of DFI International. The 11 are: Botswana, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe. Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> Henk and Metz, "The United States and the Transformation of African Security: The African Crisis Response Initiative and Beyond." pp. 9-10.

<sup>35</sup> For a detailed account of the South African air force's contributions to the UN Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM I) and the UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), see H.A.P. Potgieter, "South African Assistance in ONUMOZ and UNAVEM," in Jakkie Cilliers and Greg Mills (eds), *Peacekeeping in Africa (Volume 2)*, Halfway House: Institute for Defense Policy, 1996, pp. 231-39.

<sup>36</sup> Interview with R.M. "Rocky" Williams, Director, Defence Policy Department, Defence Secretariat, South African Department of Defence, 23 January 1998, Halfway House.

the field on its own.<sup>37</sup> Ethiopia, with the aid of civilian aircraft,<sup>38</sup> was largely able to deploy an infantry battalion to UNAMIR. <sup>39</sup> Angola rates mention given its relatively significant fleet of transport aircraft.<sup>40</sup> Although Luanda will remain preoccupied with its civil war, it has shown itself willing to use some of its assets further afield in Congo (Brazzaville) and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).

The ability to sustain a sizeable force presents a more significant obstacle. Whereas it is possible to utilize civilian assets to assist in the initial transport of troops and some *matériel*, it is much more difficult to paper over shortcomings in command and control, maintenance, and re-supply. Even deploying with the desired level of self-sufficiency has proven an illusive goal. The problems that this creates concerning these units' effectiveness have often been offset by the largesse of other countries. This limitation is greater than what can be ascertained from African countries' participation in multinational operations, however. The country leading the multinational force, after securing the desired international political support, will often limit the number of countries requiring high levels of assistance because of the drain on resources and the strain on military credibility. Thus, the fact that even pre-selected countries should encounter serious problems in this regard underscores this limitation.

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<sup>37</sup> *African Capabilities for Peace Operations: An Assessment in Support of the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI)*.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>39</sup> The US provided some assistance and equipment, but it was essentially an Ethiopian undertaking. Interview with Fisher, 24 August 1999, by telephone.

<sup>40</sup> The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) records Angola as possessing five Am-2s, four An-26s, six BN-2s, eight C-212s, four PC-6Bs, two L-100-20s, six C-130s, as well as a large helicopter fleet. *The Military Balance 1998/99*, London: Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 241.