

**Efforts to Develop  
African Capacities**



## CHAPTER 10

### UNITED STATES

#### **AFRICA: NOT A US “VITAL NATIONAL INTEREST”**

Historically, the interest of the United States in Africa has been negligible compared to attention and resources it has paid to other regions.<sup>1</sup> The US was not involved in the “scramble” for Africa and was not a colonizing power there, although it did forge a special relationship with Liberia in the early nineteenth century.<sup>2</sup> America’s interest in Africa was elevated during the cold war, during which time Washington supported or opposed several African countries, supplying or withholding military equipment and financial aid in line with geopolitical considerations. Much of its involvement has been substantially reduced since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The US has no

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<sup>1</sup> This lack of interest is exemplified to a certain extent in the travel itineraries of US Presidents. According to National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, President Bill Clinton’s 12-day visit in March and April 1998 to six African countries during which he met with 10 African heads of State was historically significant in that it represented a marked departure from his predecessors’ actions. Berger noted that George Bush had visited US troops serving in Somalia during the final days of his presidency, that Jimmy Carter had spent a few days in Liberia and Nigeria during his term, and that in 1943 Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s plane had touched down in Africa to refuel. See “Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, Administrator of AID Brian Atwood, and Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater,” *Office of the Press Secretary, The White House*, 20 March 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.whitehouse.gov/Africa/19980320-5382.html>>>.

<sup>2</sup> Beginning in the 1820s, freed slaves from the US returned to Africa and settled in what is now Liberia with US assistance. The connection is symbolized in part by the fact that the country’s capital, Monrovia, is named after James Monroe, the US President at the time resettlement activity began, and by the fact that the US dollar is legal currency in Liberia.

sustained military presence in Africa, and its global military structure has contributed to the continent's marginalization as concerns American policy.<sup>3</sup>

On a global scale, however, US assistance to Africa is significant. Many Western countries provide aid that is more generous on a per capita basis or as a measure of their gross national products. Nevertheless, few provide the overall amounts of developmental, military, and humanitarian aid that the US contributes. For example, in 1997, the US budgeted US\$ 700 million for development projects and provided an additional US\$ 600 million in humanitarian relief and disaster assistance to sub-Saharan Africa alone.<sup>4</sup>

To a large extent, humanitarian concerns rather than strategic or political considerations shape US African policy. As a result, US policy is considerably reactive. The US, for example, lavished hundreds of millions of dollars of aid in response to the mass exodus of refugees from Rwanda to Tanzania and Zaire after the genocide in 1994. Yet it was parsimonious and unenthusiastic towards the possible augmentation of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Rwanda or towards a new operation in the Great Lakes region.<sup>5</sup> The Africa

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<sup>3</sup> The US military is organized into five regional commands. The majority of African States are the operational responsibility of the US European Command (USEUCOM). Eight countries, largely around the Horn and including Egypt, fall under the aegis of the US Central Command (USCENTCOM). In both instances African security matters have traditionally assumed a much lower priority than other concerns of these two military commands: namely the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Persian Gulf, respectively. See Dan Henk, "Peace and Security in Africa: Contributions by the United States," *ISS Monograph No. 35*, Halfway House: Institute for Security Studies: March 1999, pp. 19-20. Similarly, the core focus of the US Pacific Command (USPACOM) does not include the island nations of the Comoros, Madagascar, and Mauritius, which are part of its area of responsibility.

<sup>4</sup> These figures were provided by the Administrator of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). See "Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, Administrator of AID Brian Atwood, and Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater."

<sup>5</sup> Former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen recounts a powerful and damning anecdote about how US policy in Africa is sometimes made. When Cohen spoke to a congressional staffer about the advisability of taking a proactive stance in the Great Lakes region to possibly avert a  
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lobby on Capital Hill suffers from a lack of resources and has virtually no domestic constituency.

The 1993 deaths of 18 US servicemen in Somalia continue to undermine a more robust US African policy. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25, issued in May 1994, has made it more difficult for the US to intervene in Africa, either directly or indirectly.<sup>6</sup> PDD-25 was formulated at a time when domestic support for American involvement in United Nations peacekeeping operations was waning. President Bill Clinton sought to seize the initiative from a hostile Congress and deflect criticism on this aspect of US foreign policy. While the Clinton Administration was justified in calling for US vital interests to be at stake in any decision for the US to intervene militarily, it applied the same criterion to US support for United Nations peacekeeping operations, regardless of the US level (quite possibly none) of military participation in the undertaking. This has permitted members of Congress with isolationist agendas or simply opposed to multilateral diplomacy to more forcefully and effectively question and withhold support for United Nations peacekeeping operations—especially in Africa where US vital interests are less clear. As former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen has succinctly put it, “with this rigid criterion in PDD-25, the Administration is being hung by its own petard with the Congress.”<sup>7</sup> A senior official in the Clinton Administration has described PDD-25 as too confining

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<sup>5</sup> (...continued)  
humanitarian tragedy, saving both lives and money, his interlocutor conceded matter-of-factly that supporting such a policy might well have had the desired effect. The staffer added that saving lives and money was not the issue, however. He opined that budgetary considerations were of far greater concern. Humanitarian assistance is a different budget line item and does not affect the cost- and image-conscious voting of congresspersons serving on the House International Relations Committee or the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Written correspondence with Amb. Herman J. Cohen, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, US Department of State, 27 February 1999.

<sup>6</sup> “The Clinton Administration’s Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,” *Executive Summary of Presidential Decision Directive 25*, May 1994, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/NSCDOC1>>>.

<sup>7</sup> Written correspondence with Cohen, 27 February 1999.

and restrictive, preventing the US from being appropriately creative and engaged in promoting peace and security in Africa.<sup>8</sup>

This lack of interest to become involved militarily in Africa—be it direct or through the United Nations—explains the causes and contours of many US policies towards Africa. The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) represents the centerpiece of the US peacekeeping policy in Africa. There are several other US undertakings, however, which seek to promote African countries' abilities to manage and resolve conflicts on their continent. Indeed, several long-standing Department of Defense programs that impart peacekeeping-related skills to African military personnel or provide military equipment for peace support operations, taken together, represent a greater financial commitment than ACRI.

## **TRAINING AND LONG-TERM CAPACITY-BUILDING PROGRAMMES**

### **African Crisis Response Initiative**

#### *Plans for an African Crisis Response Force*

The African Crisis Response Initiative has its origins in the Clinton Administration's ill-conceived and short-lived proposal in 1996 to create an African Crisis Response Force (ACRF). The failure of the US and the international community to respond appropriately to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was still fresh in policy makers' minds in early 1996 as concern grew in Washington over escalating political tensions in Burundi.<sup>9</sup> The sense of urgency can be seen from the spate of visits by senior US

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<sup>8</sup> Interview with US Government official, March 1998, Washington, DC. A subsequent directive, PDD-56, issued in May 1997 provides further guidelines for US participation in peace operations with an emphasis on improving inter-agency planning and coordination to implement policy. "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations," *Presidential Decision Directive 56*, May 1997, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.whitehouse.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/html/documents/NSCDoc2>>>.

<sup>9</sup> Burundi, like Rwanda, had experienced several instances of mass killings over the previous 30 years.

officials to Burundi during 1996<sup>10</sup> to gauge the situation and attempt to avert a bloodbath. Congress's decision to appropriate US\$ 20 million to support preventive action in Burundi<sup>11</sup> is perhaps the clearest indication of the fear in Washington of a possible Rwanda-type genocide in Burundi to which the US might be compelled to send American troops. To make such a scenario less likely, the US hastily proposed to create a standing African peacekeeping force capable of responding to the crisis in Burundi or elsewhere in Africa down the line.<sup>12</sup>

Fortunately, the crisis in Burundi subsided,<sup>13</sup> obviating the immediate need for an ACRF (or for an American intervention) and giving the US much-needed time to re-think its policy. The way ACRF had been presented engendered resentment throughout Africa. Kenya's President Daniel arap Moi, for example, was asked to make a commitment to join the ACRF project during the same brief meeting at which the US first informed Kenya of its proposal. US officials familiar with the incident were embarrassed at the way it was handled and sympathetic to Moi, who, not surprisingly, did not

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<sup>10</sup> US National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, Special Assistant to the President Susan Rice, and Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose all travelled to Bujumbura. Interview with Amb. George Moose, former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, US Department of State, current Permanent Representative, US Permanent Mission to the UN in Geneva, 4 March 1998, Geneva.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

<sup>12</sup> The US hoped to establish this force within six months. It would have considered providing aircraft and minimal logistical support including communication equipment to assist such a force if necessary. Interview with Ken Hillas, Deputy Chief, Political Section, US Embassy to South Africa, 20 January 1998, Pretoria. This was an unrealistic timetable, and the amorphous commitment underscores the lack of seriousness with which ACRF was formulated.

<sup>13</sup> Maj. Pierre Buyoya's coup on 25 July 1996 had a calming effect. Buyoya, a Tutsi, had previously stepped down as President in June 1993, when Melchior Ndadaye, a Hutu, was democratically elected. Many, therefore, viewed Buyoya as a moderate and conciliator. He continues to rule Burundi, which experiences sporadic outbursts of ethnic killings but is no longer considered on the precipice of mass slaughter.

respond favourably.<sup>14</sup> The heavy-handed and non-transparent manner in which the US introduced ACRF also rankled some of America's European allies.<sup>15</sup>

*From Standing Force to Capacity Enhancement*

Whereas ACRF proposed to create a *force*, ACRI seeks to develop a *capacity*. Under ACRI, national contingents at the battalion-level receive classical peacekeeping training. Instruction for brigade staff headquarters with support staff is also a part of the programme. ACRI training is based on procedures from both national and intergovernmental peacekeeping doctrines.<sup>16</sup> Basic soldiering skills as well as specific peacekeeping functions are taught, such as establishing checkpoints, providing perimeter security, and processing displaced persons. The importance of respecting human rights and developing and maintaining good relations with civil society is also emphasized.

As originally envisaged, ACRI training was to be conducted in recipient countries at six-month intervals over a three-year period and was to be divided into two "phases." Phase 1 was to last 60 days and culminate in a field training exercise (FTX) that involved humanitarian agencies, the media, and the local population.<sup>17</sup> Phase 2 was to include six Sustainment Training (ST) modules. The first five STs were to last 30 days each. The timing and

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<sup>14</sup> Interviews with US Government officials in the United States and Africa, 1998.

<sup>15</sup> See Dan Henk and Steven Metz, "The United States and the Transformation of African Security: The African Crisis Response Initiative and Beyond," *Strategic Studies Institute*, Carlisle: US Army War College, 5 December 1997, p. 24.

<sup>16</sup> ACRI training borrows from US, UK, Nordic, UN, and NATO peacekeeping doctrines.

<sup>17</sup> The FTX was to last eight to ten days. James Jamerson, "A United States Contribution to Capacity-building: The African Crisis Response Initiative," in Mark Malan (ed.), "Resolute Partners: Building Peacekeeping Capacity in Southern Africa," *ISS Monograph No. 21*, Halfway House: Institute for Security Studies, February 1998, p. 46.

duration of the last ST, a regional training exercise, was undetermined given the greater number of variables involved.<sup>18</sup>

Before Phase 1 training begins, each participating African State in ACRI is furnished with approximately US\$ 1.2 million worth of related equipment, for the battalion as well as the individual soldier. This equipment is intended for use both in training and in the event of actual deployment. Emphasizing interoperability, the US supplies recipients with equipment that meets United Nations specifications whenever possible, which explains the procurement of significant foreign-manufactured systems. ACRI participants receive standard communication equipment (US radios and repeaters<sup>19</sup>), night vision binoculars (Russian), water-purification equipment (US), generators (US), and mine detectors (Austrian). Provision is made to replace worn parts for most of the major systems over the course of the three-year programme.<sup>20</sup> Given the variety of cars and trucks in use, the limited shelf-life of many spare parts, and the rapidity with which vehicles fall into disrepair, the US decided not to provide vehicles or try to standardize transportation equipment.<sup>21</sup> Except for small arms ammunition for marksmanship training, the ACRI package does not include any lethal equipment. Each trainee is outfitted with a complete uniform, boots, personal gear, and even eyeglasses if necessary.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Interview with Maj. Richard Naughton, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Policy, US Department of Defense, 11 March 1998, Arlington.

<sup>19</sup> British repeaters were originally used, but they were replaced with American models because experience showed a more rugged communication set to be preferable. The new systems ensure that interoperability is maintained. Interview with Troy Shirley, Deputy for Budget and Logistics, ACRI Interagency Working Group, US Department of State, 27 July 1999, by telephone.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> Interview with Col. Keith Betsch, Defense Attaché, US Embassy to South Africa, 20 January 1998, Pretoria.

<sup>22</sup> Col. David McCracken, "Ambassador Marshall F. McCallie & Colonel David E. McCracken Briefing on African Crisis Response Initiative," *News Briefing, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)*, 29 July 1997, courtesy of ACRI Interagency Working Group, US Department of State.

*Changes to Phase 1 and Phase 2*

ACRI has undergone a metamorphosis since it was unveiled in early 1997 to replace the ACRF concept. Whereas ACRF suffered from a failure to adequately inform or consult with African leaders, let alone consult them, the first Special Coordinator of the ACRI Interagency Working Group (IWG), Marshall McCallie, emphasized from the very beginning the importance of working with America's "African partners"<sup>23</sup> to design and develop ACRI. McCallie's openness to innovation combined with the inchoate programme he inherited led to a series of changes that make the 1999 ACRI significantly different from the programme that existed in 1997.

The changes to phase 1 are relatively insignificant. The period of training has been extended to 70 days, as 60 days was deemed too short. A member of the US Special Forces who trained Senegalese troops participating in ACRI in 1997 compared their ability to retain and benefit from the training to "trying to take a sip of water from a fire hose." There was simply too much material to cover in too short a time period.<sup>24</sup> In another effort to address this concern, the number of Special Forces participating in the training was augmented,<sup>25</sup> although the overall figure will vary slightly with the number of trainees.<sup>26</sup> The level and type of equipment provided for the initial training

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<sup>23</sup> In an effort at damage control, the US first began to use the term "partner" when speaking of Africa and the programme's recipients in late 1996 before the creation of the IWG. See, for example, "U.S. Department of State On-the-Record Briefing by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs George Moose on Secretary Christopher's Trip to Africa," *Office of the Spokesman, US Department of State*, 3 October 1996, available on the Internet at <<[http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/press\\_statements/9610/](http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/press_statements/9610/)>>.

<sup>24</sup> Interview with ACRI trainer, Special Forces, US Department of Defense, 28 February 1998, Bakel.

<sup>25</sup> The number of Special Forces taking part in Phase 1 training for Malawi, Senegal, and Uganda was 60. This number was later increased to 70. Interview with Naughton, 9 March 1998, Arlington.

<sup>26</sup> For example, fewer Special Forces were required to train the Beninois battalion, which was smaller than the other African battalions trained in ACRI. Interview with Amb. Marshall F. McCallie, former Special Coordinator, ACRI Interagency Working Group, US Department of State, current Deputy Commandant for  
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and the conditions for its use have not changed much,<sup>27</sup> nor have the terms under which it may be used outside of ACRI training.

Phase 2, by contrast, has undergone substantial restructuring. According to US Government officials, while the strict six-month interval had made sense because of the need to schedule the Special Forces instructors well in advance and to secure appropriate funding, it did not necessarily correspond with the needs and absorptive capacities of ACRI recipients. Thus, the time-frame was relaxed and the number of ST modules reduced. Phase 2 was amended to encompass up to six shorter ST modules for elements of the selected battalion. Elements of each ACRI-trained battalion would receive four to six STs in one or more of the following areas: [1] logistics and maintenance; [2] battalion headquarters staff operations; [3] operational interaction with international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs); [4] brigade headquarters staff operations; and [5] human rights and “train the trainer” development.<sup>28</sup>

Sustainment Training has since given way to Follow-on Training (FT) modules. FTs are designed to be more flexible than the revised STs in meeting the different needs of each recipient. Accordingly, while Special Forces still take part in FTs (albeit in smaller numbers), ACRI now makes increasing use of private companies and NGOs, which also possess the requisite expertise but have less rigid schedules, to provide the sought-after training. For example, Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) and Logicon provide specialized training to officers, including computer-simulation exercises.<sup>29</sup> Instructors from the NGO the US Institute of Peace

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<sup>26</sup> (...continued)  
International Affairs, US Army War College, 30 June 1999, by telephone.

<sup>27</sup> Changes to the ACRI equipment package include an upgrade to the base communication system and the provision of some additional and upgraded personal gear for the troops. Interview with Shirley, 27 July 1999, by telephone.

<sup>28</sup> Written correspondence with Philip Egger, Political Officer, ACRI Interagency Working Group, US Department of State, 27 August 1998.

<sup>29</sup> Interview with McCallie, 30 June 1999, by telephone.

(USIP) will train Special Forces on negotiating techniques to better prepare them for the relevant ACRI training segment.<sup>30</sup>

### *The Eight Recipients*

As of 30 June 1999, eight African countries had concluded agreements with the US, and six of those had begun to receive training. (See Table 10.1.) Ghana, Ethiopia, Malawi, Mali, Senegal, and Uganda were identified early on as ACRI recipients.<sup>31</sup> Tunisia was also mentioned as a possible candidate, but an agreement was never concluded as Tunisia desired more than the US was willing or able to provide.<sup>32</sup> Benin and Côte d'Ivoire have subsequently joined ACRI, concluding agreements in July 1998 and November 1998, respectively. Ethiopia was scheduled to receive Phase 1 training in August 1998, but this was put on hold due to the outbreak of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea in May 1998. ACRI training for Ethiopia is still being re-evaluated. Additional follow-on training for Uganda was suspended because of Kampala's activities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Marshall McCallie, *Lessons from the African Crisis Response Initiative*, Address before the "Conference on Conflict Resolution and Peace Education in Africa, California State University", 30 April 1999, Sacramento, courtesy of ACRI Interagency Working Group, US Department of State.

<sup>31</sup> Malawi, Mali, Senegal, and Uganda concluded agreements with the US between July and September 1997. Ethiopia and Ghana followed suit in February 1998. Written correspondence with Egger, 3 February 1999; written correspondence with Scott Fisher, Political-Military Adviser, ACRI Interagency Working Group, US Department of State, 6 July 1999; and interview with Fisher, 23 July 1999, by telephone.

<sup>32</sup> Tunisia sought armoured vehicles to be included in the training package, which was not in the offing. Interview with Charles Ikins, Management Associate, Cohen and Woods International, 11 March 1998, Arlington.

<sup>33</sup> Interview with Fisher, 2 July 1999, by telephone.

Table 10.1

Recipients of ACRI Training <sup>a</sup>								
(as of 30 June 1999)								
dates indicate the month training commenced or was scheduled to begin								
Country	Phase 1	Phase 2 <sup>b</sup>						
		FT 1	FT 2	FT 3	FT 4	FT 5	FT 6	
1	Benin	10.98	8.99	11.99	5.00	4.01		
2	Côte d'Ivoire	10.99	3.00	9.00	4.01	9.01		
3	Ethiopia	<del>8.98</del>						
4	Ghana	4.98	3.99	9.99	8.00	2.01		
5	Malawi	9.97	4.98	10.98	9.99	6.00		
6	Mali	2.98	11.98	5.99	7.00	11.00		
7	Senegal	7.97	3.98	4.99	10.99	2.00		
8	Uganda	7.97	3.98	<del>4.00</del>	10.00	7.01		

<i>s h a d e d</i>	= planned
<i>s t r i p e d</i>	= postponed

<sup>a</sup> Based on interviews and written correspondence with the ACRI Interagency Working Group.

<sup>b</sup> Phase 2 includes four to six Follow-on Training (FT) modules of roughly 30-day sessions. FTs were initially called "STs" for "Sustainment Training." Countries that received Phase 2 training prior to December 1998 did so under "ST 1."

*Possible Further Changes*

While ACRI still provides bilateral training at battalion-level strength, it is now willing to train smaller infantry as well as specialized units and focuses greater attention on officer training. In March 1998, McCallie spoke of the desirability of training 10-14 battalions and 10-12,000 troops.<sup>34</sup> Initial recipients were each to provide a single battalion with the exception of Ethiopia, which was to provide two battalions and a brigade headquarters. When McCallie left the IWG 13 months later, ACRI had trained some 4,200 African troops,<sup>35</sup> but the total number had assumed less importance. Comparatively greater emphasis is now placed on training officers in general, and on "training the trainer" in particular.

There is continued interest in training a Brigade Staff battalion, but no final decision has been taken on how to proceed. The IWG envisages that instruction will be given to some 60 senior officers and a forward support company with specialized cells that together will likely comprise more than 300 soldiers of various ranks. Pending an eventual decision to move ahead with ACRI training for Ethiopia, the US is evaluating other options. Both Ghana and Senegal have concluded the necessary agreements to make them eligible recipients.<sup>36</sup> Besides determining which country or countries are to receive Brigade Staff training, the US must still identify appropriate instructors and then coordinate their availability with each selected recipient. Special Forces are able to train many of the units within the Brigade Staff battalion's forward support company, but do not have the organizational competence to provide instruction to the senior staff.<sup>37</sup> This issue has long been appreciated in policy planning circles but has yet to be resolved.

ACRI is now actively considering whether to provide assistance on a subregional basis. The US has shown a particular interest in developing a programme with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The IWG is evaluating the advisability of having a Presidential Decision Directive issued that would allow ECOWAS to receive direct

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<sup>34</sup> Interview with McCallie, 11 March 1998, Washington, DC.

<sup>35</sup> McCallie, *Lessons from the African Crisis Response Initiative*.

<sup>36</sup> Interview with Fisher, 2 July 1999, by telephone.

<sup>37</sup> Interview with Fisher, 24 August 1999, by telephone.

assistance at substantial levels.<sup>38</sup> The selection of ACRI recipients demonstrates this interest: five of the eight “partners” are from the West African subregion and are members of ECOWAS. According to ACRI officials, the US would also like to work with the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and possibly the East African Co-operation (EAC).

### **Other Programmes that Develop Peacekeeping Capacities**

#### *Joint/Combined Exchange Training*

In addition to ACRI, the US conducts other military assistance programmes that enhance recipients’ peacekeeping capabilities through field training and group exercises. Unlike ACRI, however, they are not regional in application and peacekeeping is not their primary objective. Indeed, the focus of the largest such programme, Joint/Combined Exchange Training (JCET), is to improve US military capabilities. JCET familiarizes American troops with different environments and seeks to build long-term military contacts rather than to enhance the skills of the countries hosting the exercises per se. Nevertheless, the adage that a good peacekeeper must first be a good soldier underscores the value of such training to develop the latter’s peacekeeping abilities. JCETs are relatively small month-long exercises. US troops taking part in the exercise will commonly be below platoon strength. Those participating from the host country will be more numerous, typically ranging from platoon to company strength.<sup>39</sup> Many African States have hosted JCET exercises since the programme was instituted in 1991.<sup>40</sup> Between 1996 and 1998, for example, more than 20 took part.<sup>41</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Interview with McCallie, 30 June 1999, by telephone.

<sup>39</sup> Interview with Fisher, 24 August 1999, by telephone.

<sup>40</sup> Prior to 1991, a similar exchange programme existed under a different name. Interview with George Grimes, Acting Director, Public Affairs, US Special Operations Command, US Department of Defense, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

<sup>41</sup> Countries hosting JCET training during that time period included Benin, Botswana, Cameroon, Congo (Brazzaville), Côte d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, (continued...)

*Regional Command Exercises*

US regional commands also conduct bilateral exercises abroad in which African countries participate. Like JCETs, their primary purpose is to enhance the effectiveness of US troops. However, these exercises tend to be larger, although not necessarily longer. In 1996, US European Command (USEUCOM) undertook its first bilateral exercise in Africa.<sup>42</sup> Lessons learned from that exercise in Mali were applied to the initial design of the FTX in ACRI.<sup>43</sup> US Pacific Command (USPACOM) held a similar training exercise in Madagascar early in 1999, and USEUCOM will undertake another in Botswana from July-August 1999.<sup>44</sup> Natural Fire, a US Central Command (USCENTCOM) exercise held in Kenya in June 1998, included troops from Tanzania and Uganda—countries outside of USCENTCOM's area of responsibility.<sup>45</sup> The US contributed 400 troops to the 2,100-strong exercise.<sup>46</sup> Plans are under way for a follow-up exercise to be held in 2000.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>41</sup> (...continued)

Namibia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Lynne Duke, "Africans Use Training in Unexpected Ways," *The Washington Post*, 14 July 1998, p. A1.

<sup>42</sup> Interview with Grimes, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

<sup>43</sup> Interview with Lt-Col. Mike Burke, Central Africa Desk Officer and ACRI Point of Contact, Africa Branch, European Division, Joint Staff, US Department of Defense, 12 March 1998, Arlington.

<sup>44</sup> Interview with David Hamon, Regional Director for Plans and Policy, Office of African Affairs, US Department of Defense, 19 August 1999, by telephone.

<sup>45</sup> This created budgetary concerns as USCENTCOM only had funds for Kenya, and USEUCOM, which did not initiate the exercise, did not have monies earmarked to cover the costs of Ugandan and Tanzanian participation in the 27-day exercise. Nairobi agreed to reimburse Dar es Salaam and Kampala for the expenses they incurred once in Kenya (other than on spent ammunition). Interview with Col. Ron Roughead, Chief, Kenya-United States Liaison Office, US Embassy to Kenya, 14 July 1999, Nairobi.

<sup>46</sup> Kenya provided approximately 1,250 troops, Tanzania 235, and Uganda 210. Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Interview with Hamon, 29 July 1999, by telephone.

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*International Military Education and Training*

Besides providing tactical training, the US offers academic courses, many with peacekeeping dimensions, which are open to African military officers. The International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme is the largest undertaking of this kind. It received US\$ 49.8 million for fiscal year (FY) 1999.<sup>48</sup> IMET was created in the 1950s and was designed to introduce foreign military officials to the United States as well as American values and expertise.<sup>49</sup> Among the courses covered by IMET, those of particular relevance to developing peacekeeping capacities include segments on human rights and civil-military relations.<sup>50</sup> African participation has grown considerably. In FY 1978, for example, US\$ 2.65 million was allocated to fund six sub-Saharan African countries selected to benefit from IMET.<sup>51</sup> Between FYs 1994 and 1998, the annual IMET budget for sub-Saharan Africa increased from US\$ 4 million to US\$ 8 million.<sup>52</sup> Forty of the 48 sub-Saharan countries participated during this time, with 36 receiving funding in FYs 1997 and 1998.<sup>53</sup>

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<sup>48</sup> Interview with Glenn Lazarus, Deputy Director for the Americas and sub-Saharan Africa, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, US Department of Defense, 16 August 1999, by telephone.

<sup>49</sup> More than 120 countries have benefited from the programme. See "DSCA Information Paper on IMET," August 1999, courtesy of Defense Security Cooperation Agency, US Department of Defense.

<sup>50</sup> For example, the Navy Justice School, which is open to African participants, conducts courses on military law, respect for human rights and the role of the military in democracies. See "US Security Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa," *Defense Issues*, 10(78), August 1995, available on the Internet at <<[www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1995/di1078.html](http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1995/di1078.html)>>.

<sup>51</sup> Walter L. Barrows, "Changing Military Capabilities in Black Africa," in William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen (eds), *Arms and the African: Military Influences on Africa's International Relations*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, p. 110.

<sup>52</sup> Interview with Lazarus, 16 August 1999, by telephone. Sub-Saharan African countries received US\$ 8 million again in FY 1999. Ibid.

<sup>53</sup> Henk, "Peace and Security in Africa: Contributions by the United States," p. 37. The eight sub-Saharan African countries that did not receive any IMET funding during this period were Burkina Faso, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Liberia, Nigeria, Somalia, and the Sudan. Ibid.

*Expanded International Military Education and Training*

Through the Expanded IMET (E-IMET) programme, foreign civilians are also able to receive defence-related training and attend academic courses. E-IMET is a sub-programme within IMET and was created in 1990<sup>54</sup> to engage foreign Government officials outside of the military as well as members of civil society, including the media and NGOs. E-IMET focuses on enhancing a recipient country's commitment to democracy through strengthening its defence resource management, developing its military justice systems and codes of conduct, promoting civilian control of the military, and protecting human rights.<sup>55</sup> E-IMET, like IMET, enables beneficiaries to attend courses in the US, but it provides a greater percentage of its training overseas through Mobile Education Teams (METs). METs allow the US to better tailor its courses to a country's specific needs and enable a greater number of people to benefit from the programme. The US Defense Institute of International Legal Studies (DIILS) in Rhode Island, for example, has provided training on disciplined military operations to more than 20 countries throughout Africa since 1996.<sup>56</sup>

*Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities*

The Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) initiative focuses on developing foreign countries' peacekeeping doctrines. The motivation behind the programme's creation in 1996 was to make certain countries more capable of undertaking peacekeeping and in so doing make it less likely that the US would have to intervene.<sup>57</sup> As of 30 June 1999, South

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<sup>54</sup> See "DSCA Information Paper on IMET."

<sup>55</sup> Interview with Terri Smith, Country Programme Director for Southern Africa, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, US Department of Defense, 13 August 1999, by telephone.

<sup>56</sup> Written correspondence with Walter Munroe, Academic Director, Defense Institute of International Legal Studies, US Department of Defense, 20 August 1999.

<sup>57</sup> Written correspondence with a US Government official familiar with the programme and its genesis.

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Africa was the only African country to have received EIPC funding.<sup>58</sup> The money enabled a team of South African peacekeeping trainers to visit the US for an orientation tour of available peacekeeping-related programmes and equipment. Together with US experts, South Africa is assessing its needs and developing an appropriate peacekeeping programme and curriculum.<sup>59</sup> A relatively small initiative to begin with, EIPC is likely to become more modest; the programme was allocated US\$ 7 million in FYs 1998 and 1999, but only US\$ 5 million is being sought for FY 2000.<sup>60</sup> Congressional support for EIPC is lukewarm, and additional funding for any of the countries that received EIPC support in the programme's first two years of funding is not assured. As of mid-1999, no commitments had been made to fund any additional countries—in Africa or elsewhere.

#### *African Center for Strategic Studies*

The African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS)<sup>61</sup> represents the most recent US initiative to engage Africa on issues of peace and security. ACSS was officially established in May 1999 and follows the creation of other regional centres.<sup>62</sup> It will provide academic seminars and a dynamic forum in Africa to promote civil-military relations, national security strategy, and

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<sup>58</sup> South Africa received US\$ 350,000 in FY 1998, and US\$ 300,000 in FY 1999. Interview with Smith, 13 August 1999, by telephone.

<sup>59</sup> Interview with Smith, 17 August 1999, by telephone.

<sup>60</sup> Interview with Smith, 13 August 1999, by telephone.

<sup>61</sup> When first unveiled by President Clinton during his 1998 trip to Africa, ACSS stood for the African Center for *Security* Studies.

<sup>62</sup> The George C. Marshall Center, located in Germany, was created in 1993 and caters to countries from Europe and Eurasia. The Asia-Pacific Center in Hawaii was established in 1995, and the Washington, DC-based Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, which focuses on Latin America and the Caribbean, opened in 1997. "DoD Launches African Center for Strategic Studies," *News Release, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)*, No. 343-99, 22 July 1999, courtesy of Office of African Affairs, US Department of Defense.

defence economics.<sup>63</sup> Like E-IMET, ACSS will be open to military officers as well as civilians, but on a grander scale. Instruction will be in English and French with simultaneous translation.<sup>64</sup> The initial two-week course is scheduled to begin on 31 October 1999 in Senegal. The location for future seminars as well as the permanent facility has yet to be chosen.<sup>65</sup>

*Support for Other Countries' Peacekeeping Training Initiatives*

In addition to these US programmes, Washington has also supported other countries' peacekeeping training initiatives on an ad hoc basis. In February 1998, an American platoon joined Exercise *Guidimakha* in Senegal. Washington provided US\$ 1 million in airlift to bring troops from regional countries to South Africa to participate in Blue Crane.<sup>66</sup> The US plans to participate in Gabon 2000, the follow-up to *Guidimakha*.<sup>67</sup> It has also agreed to pay for 10-12 African participants attending the British-assisted international peace support operation (PSO) course to be held at the Ghanaian Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFCSC) in November 1999.<sup>68</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Through an arrangement with Portugal, lusophone participants will also be assisted. Interview with Hamon, 19 August 1999, by telephone.

<sup>65</sup> "DoD Launches African Center for Strategic Studies."

<sup>66</sup> The US provided three C-130 Hercules transport aircraft. Leon Engelbrecht, "Preparing for Peace Missions in Southern Africa," *Vanguard*, Issue 2, 1999, p. 26.

<sup>67</sup> Interview with Hamon, 29 July 1999, by telephone.

<sup>68</sup> Interview with Gill Coglin, Deputy Head, Peacekeeping Section, United Nations Department, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

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## OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN THE FIELD

The US has also routinely assisted in the airlift of African troops to multinational operations—both on the continent and abroad. For the United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), it transported contingents from Ghana, Guinea, Morocco, and Tunisia (as well as some non-African countries) to the mission area.<sup>69</sup> The US supported the French airlift of Moroccan troops to Zaire in 1977.<sup>70</sup> In 1978, the US airlifted Senegalese troops to join the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).<sup>71</sup> Washington provided airlift services for several countries participating in the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia during 1989 and 1990,<sup>72</sup> including Kenya.<sup>73</sup> Between 1991 and 1997, the US airlifted Malian, Ghanaian, Senegalese, Tanzanian, and Ugandan troops at various stages of the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group's (ECOMOG's) operations in Liberia.<sup>74</sup>

The US has supplied African forces with equipment for use in peacekeeping operations. It is not uncommon for the US to provide non-lethal *matériel* such as uniforms, tents, rations, spare parts for vehicles, and repair kits for radios. For example, the Tanzanian and Ugandan troops serving in ECOMOG received many of these items. For the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), besides airlifting the Ghanaian

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<sup>69</sup> *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 710.

<sup>70</sup> Henry Wiseman, "The OAU: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution," in Yassin El-Ayouty and I. William Zartman (eds), *The OAU After Twenty Years*, New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984, p. 141.

<sup>71</sup> *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, p. 700.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 712.

<sup>73</sup> Interview with Fisher, 24 August 1999.

<sup>74</sup> "Regional Peacekeeping: ECOMOG and the Liberian Peace Process," *Report prepared jointly by the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense*, 1998, pp. 7-8, courtesy of Pacific Architects and Engineers.

contingent, the US also furnished it with illuminating mortar rounds and armoured personnel carriers with 50-calibre guns for self-protection.<sup>75</sup>

Washington has also provided services to help sustain African troops already deployed in the field through civilian subcontractors. In Liberia, for example, the American company International Charter Incorporated (ICI) received US funding to provide commercial helicopter lift.<sup>76</sup> Similarly, Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE) helped procure, maintain, and repair vehicles in Liberia with US money (as well as financing from other countries). The US has also employed civilian subcontractors to provide various non-lethal equipment. Again in Liberia, the US provided funds for generators and communication equipment.<sup>77</sup> Washington has funded similar programmes to support United Nations peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Rwanda. Other civilian contractors have included Raytheon, Dyncorp, Brown and Root, Lockheed Martin, Bechtel, and MPRI.<sup>78</sup>

## ASSESSMENT

Not surprisingly, the US takes offense at the suggestion that it is “disengaging” from Africa. The provision of the airlift, equipment, and subcontracted services for ECOMOG operations in Liberia alone amounted to US\$ 80 million.<sup>79</sup> A year of ACRI training is budgeted at about US\$ 20 million. The various Defense Department programmes in which Africans partake receive significantly more. The cost of this military training and education is often much less than US humanitarian assistance. A common refrain among many US Government officials interviewed for this book was that if the US was truly leaving Africa to its own devices, Washington could do so less expensively.

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<sup>75</sup> Interview with Fisher, 24 August 1999. It is rare for the US to provide such “lethal” aid in the context of peacekeeping.

<sup>76</sup> “Regional Peacekeeping: ECOMOG and the Liberian Peace Process,” p. 9.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Ibid., p. 11.

<sup>79</sup> See *ibid.*, p. 7.

More telling than the amount of money being spent, is the reactive manner with which it is dispensed. The majority of the funds allotted to support ECOMOG's efforts in Liberia did not materialize until six years into the conflict. The US allocated roughly US\$ 15 million towards the Senegalese contribution to ECOMOG in 1991 and 1992, and another US\$ 15 million for Tanzanian and Ugandan participation in 1993 and 1994. Washington came up with US\$ 50 million in 1997 and 1998, which together with other factors helped bring an end to the Liberian civil war. Given numerous variables such as the political will of the combatants and other interested political actors in the region, it is not necessarily the case that an influx of funds from Washington earlier in the conflict would have brought an end to the war any sooner. Still, one thing is certain about the "wait and see" attitude that characterized American policy: the situation deteriorated significantly before it improved. The same is true of most US efforts to assist regional—and to a lesser extent international—peacekeeping initiatives.

Those policies designed to be proactive are quite limited. Most Defense Department programmes that develop African military capacities as well as their respect for civilian authority and human rights tend to be small and uncoordinated. While ACRI differs from most other initiatives in its Africa-centric focus, it too represents a relatively minor undertaking compared to what the US is capable of doing. One US Government official lamented that ACRI was "supposed to be a major African policy initiative, but it's living from hand to mouth."<sup>80</sup>

Despite talk of working with its "African partners," US programmes are first and foremost a response to American needs and constraints. The largest Defense Department programmes that provide training and education for African recipients are designed primarily for the benefit of US armed forces. IMET and JCET do not make claims to the contrary. ACRI, however, purports to serve African interests. Yet above all ACRI is a response to domestic priorities and considerations. It reflects the desire of the US not to be drawn into armed conflicts and humanitarian tragedies in Africa.

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<sup>80</sup> James Rupert, "U.S. Troops Teach Peacekeeping to Africans; Despite Little Funding, Program to Form Continental Force Draws Interest Abroad," *The Washington Post*, 26 September 1997, p. A16.

Many of these constraints are self-imposed. US Government officials readily concede that ACRI is flawed but stress that it represents the best policy option that can realistically be expected to garner Congressional support.<sup>81</sup> Isolationist and anti-UN sentiment in Congress is formidable, but President Clinton emboldened those holding such views and enfeebled his Administration's ability to mount a rigorous challenge. During the 1996 national election campaign,<sup>82</sup> he made the United Nations and then Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali scapegoats in an effort to shield himself against potential partisan attacks from accountability for US policy "failures" in Somalia and Yugoslavia. The manner in which PDD-25 was worded and the decision not to make United Nations and peacekeeping priority concerns have resulted in the Clinton Administration's inability to regain control of this aspect of US foreign policy from a hostile Congress even after Clinton won re-election.

Congressional support for ACRI has been maintained, albeit at a modest level.<sup>83</sup> McCallie stresses that no African country has been denied battalion-level training because of budgetary concerns. A few countries that had expressed interest in receiving ACRI training were not viewed favourably because of their human rights records and questionable embrace of democracy, and a few others could not be accommodated because they could not provide units of sufficient size.<sup>84</sup> (In March 1998, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger mentioned that 15 African countries had expressed an interest in receiving ACRI training, but provided no details.<sup>85</sup>) Civilian control

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<sup>81</sup> Interviews with US Government officials, Winter and Spring 1998, Geneva, Pretoria, and Washington, DC.

<sup>82</sup> For a succinct overview of the mood and tenor of the times, see John M. Goshko, "U.N. Becomes Lightning Rod for Rightist Fears: Criticism of World Body Resonates in GOP Themes," *The Washington Post*, 23 September 1996, p. A01.

<sup>83</sup> Initially, ACRI received US\$ 15 million for FY 1997. Henk and Metz, "The United States and the Transformation of African Security: The African Crisis Response Initiative and Beyond," p. vii. It has received close to US\$ 20 million in subsequent fiscal years.

<sup>84</sup> Interview with McCallie, 30 June 1999, by telephone.

<sup>85</sup> "Press Briefing by National Security Advisor Sandy Berger, Administrator of AID Brian Atwood, and Secretary of Transportation Rodney Slater."

over the military and respect for the rule of law and human rights are important considerations for the US. Yet more than eight African countries would be eligible to receive ACRI training under such guidelines if money were not a factor. Additional financing could permit units smaller than battalion-level to benefit from ACRI.

The programme's long-term prospects remain in doubt. Although ACRI funding is only guaranteed for FY 1999, there initially was a general appreciation that Congress would fund the programme at current levels for the first five years. Discussions have since ensued to extend this informal understanding for an additional two years. Given current commitments and plans to train a brigade staff battalion, it will be difficult for the US to engage additional countries for ACRI training unless Congress appropriates funds well in excess of what has been agreed to date.

The motivation of the African recipients also raises questions as to ACRI's efficacy. The US, in an effort to appear less paternalistic, has always underscored that African countries receiving ACRI training will decide for themselves whether to take advantage of the skills taught and equipment provided in ACRI to undertake peacekeeping. This uncertainty represented a potentially troubling aspect of the programme: a recipient might choose not to become involved in regional peacekeeping. Washington has stressed that several ACRI recipients have subsequently sent ACRI-trained troops to serve in regional peacekeeping operations, and has taken evident satisfaction in being "vindicated." Examples include Benin in Guinea-Bissau, Ghana in Sierra Leone, and Mali in CAR. Understandably, the US has not sought to focus attention on the activities of Senegal in Guinea-Bissau and Uganda in DRC, which highlight another aspect of the programme that is potentially troubling: a recipient may select not to honour its commitment to use the equipment as intended. (There is no proof, however, that ACRI equipment has been used in such ventures.)

Moreover, the initial selection process of ACRI recipients did not engender much confidence in the long-term vision of the US and its "African partners." One US Government official familiar with the origins of ACRF and its transformation into ACRI described the first group of ACRI recipients as

essentially comprising the first countries to raise their hands.<sup>86</sup> The way in which Malawi was selected to receive ACRI training is a case in point. The US had sought to interest several SADC countries—particularly Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe—in ACRI training but settled instead on Malawi. Lilongwe simply asked to participate during a US briefing on ACRI before the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), which Malawi happened to be chairing at the time.<sup>87</sup> The subsequent selection of Benin and Côte d’Ivoire, however, represents a clear policy decision to help create a healthier political and military balance within ECOMOG undertakings.

McCallie’s successor, Aubrey Hooks,<sup>88</sup> will likely oversee an ACRI that will continue to evolve. For example, the interest shown in working directly with ECOWAS represents a step in the right direction. It could permit countries to receive training that otherwise might not have the opportunity. ACRI has not been able to engage some States because they do not have a sufficient capacity to merit selection for battalion-level training.<sup>89</sup> A regional approach might enable smaller national units to train alongside those from another country. It also increases the likelihood that the training provided will be used for the purposes intended. By enhancing the capability of a regional organization with a mandate to undertake peacekeeping, this uncertainty is reduced. Along these same lines, the provision of relevant training and equipment for specialized units, especially signals and logistics, is also made more attractive given that additional oversight will help ensure that equipment will be used as intended.

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<sup>86</sup> Interview with US Government official, 1998.

<sup>87</sup> Interview with Fisher, 24 August 1999, by telephone.

<sup>88</sup> Hooks became the ACRI Special Coordinator in April 1999.

<sup>89</sup> Interview with McCallie, 30 June 1999, by telephone.