

CHAPTER 12

UNITED KINGDOM

FROM DECOLONIZATION TO DEVELOPING AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES

The British post-colonial strategy has differed significantly from the French. Marked by its experience with Indian independence, the UK initially sought to withdraw gracefully but quickly from its African colonies. Its disengagement was both political and military. On the political side, London has increasingly worked through international forums such as the United Nations and the Commonwealth. The British Government has generally shunned direct military interventions in Africa and limited its support to the provision of military assistance, which encompasses training as well as arms sales. Indeed, the UK has only deployed a large force in post-colonial Africa one time; in 1980, it dispatched 1,000 troops as part of the Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) to oversee Zimbabwean independence.¹

The UK's formal efforts to develop African peacekeeping capabilities began in late 1994, with a proposal presented to the United Nations General Assembly by then Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd. The United Nations was just emerging from the Rwanda debacle, and the proposal was a reaction to the crisis there and the likelihood that problems would continue in the region. The idea was not to establish actual forces but to develop the capacity of Africans to undertake peacekeeping. Suggestions concerned providing peacekeeping training to interested countries, establishing centers

¹ See generally, Alain Rouvez, "French, British, and Belgian Military Involvement," in David R. Smock, (ed.), *Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1993, pp. 37-42.

of excellence on the continent, and enhancing logistical capabilities.² Between November 1994 and January 1995, the UK organized a series of seminars in Accra, Cairo, and Harare, which were attended by various African and donor countries, the United Nations, and the Organization of African Unity (OAU). Together with Nigeria, the UK also co-chaired a working group that produced a paper entitled *Conflict Prevention and Peace-keeping in Africa*. That report was submitted to the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the OAU in April 1995.³ The UK began the more practical phase of its regionally-focused initiatives in early 1996.⁴

Three branches of the Government—the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), the Ministry of Defence, and, most recently, the Department for International Development (DFID)⁵—contribute to British capacity-building efforts. Within the Government, the FCO has traditionally funded training activities for foreign armies. The Ministry of Defence has furnished them with equipment and logistical support. In March 1999, DFID announced that it was expanding its focus to provide non-military training and assistance to foreign security forces and relevant civilian bodies, with the goal of increasing effective civilian Government control over the security sector. Although DFID's Security Sector Reform Programme is not Africa-specific, it could have a significant impact on the African continent. The FCO, Ministry of Defence, and DFID are increasingly endeavouring to coordinate their activities and espouse a consistent security policy.

² Interview with Simon J. Manley, First Secretary, UK Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 5 May 1997, New York; see also, UN Document, A/49/PV.8, *Intervention by Douglas Hurd before the General Assembly* 28 September 1994.

³ "Conflict Prevention and Peace-keeping in Africa," 11 April 1995, courtesy of UK Permanent Mission to the UN in New York. In the domain of peacekeeping, the report covered the issues of doctrine, training, preparation of units, equipment and logistics, and planning. Ibid.

⁴ Interview with Manley, 5 May 1997, New York.

⁵ Until 1997, the British Government had no separate development agency, and foreign aid fell under FCO control. Shortly after its election in May 1997, the Labour Government established DFID.

AFRICAN PEACEKEEPING TRAINING SUPPORT PROGRAMME

Unlike US and French capacity-building initiatives, the UK African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme focuses primarily on training officers. In light of the relatively small size of its initiative, the UK has determined that its comparative advantage lies in “training the trainer.” The rationale underlying this “top down” approach is that the officers receiving training will then impart the lessons they learned to their soldiers. The annual budget for the programme, which is funded by the FCO, has been roughly US\$ 4 million since it was introduced in 1996.⁶

British Military Advisory and Training Teams

A central goal of the British programme is helping to develop national military staff colleges into “centres of excellence” for regional peacekeeping training. Two African-based British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATTs)—BMATT Southern Africa (in Zimbabwe) and BMATT West Africa (in Ghana)—provide training and instruction to officers from the host countries as well as from other African States.⁷ Both BMATT Southern Africa and BMATT West Africa, which are based at the Zimbabwe Staff College (ZSC) and the Ghanaian Armed Forces Command and Staff College (GAFSC), respectively, are fully integrated into the command structures of their host institutions.⁸ The UK’s plans to establish a BMATT in Uganda to cover the East Africa subregion were scuttled in light of political unrest in

⁶ Interview with Gill Coglein, Deputy Head, Peacekeeping Section, United Nations Department, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 27 August 1999, by telephone.

⁷ There is another BMATT in Pretoria, which was established in 1994 and provides advice solely to South Africa on restructuring its armed forces and does not give peacekeeping training. This BMATT, which is staffed by 10 officers, has been funded through 2001. Written correspondence with Coglein, 21 October 1998; and interviews with Coglein, 25 August 1999 and 27 August 1999, by telephone.

⁸ According to Gill Coglein of the British FCO, this is a “unique aspect” of the British programme. In the cases of both BMATT Southern Africa and BMATT West Africa, a BMATT officer serves as the college’s Director of Studies and reports directly to the institution’s Commandant. Interview with Coglein, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

Uganda and Kampala's recent military involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). London now intends to establish a BMATT elsewhere in East Africa.⁹ Although the BMATTs are staffed primarily by British military officers, they are administered and funded by the FCO.¹⁰

BMATT Southern Africa has undergone a significant transformation since its creation, evolving from a nationally-focused to a regionally-focused assistance programme. BMATT's involvement in Zimbabwe dates back to Zimbabwean independence in 1980. At that time, the new Zimbabwean Government requested the UK to oversee the integration of the Zimbabwean armed forces and to help them become an organized military.¹¹ The Commandant of BMATT also served as the Commandant of the ZSC until the mid-1980s. At one point there were as many as 80 BMATT personnel at the ZSC. By 1994, however, the team had dwindled to four people. In 1996, the British Government expanded its training initiative to include other countries in the subregion and began offering regional training.¹² As of mid-1999, BMATT Southern Africa comprised 11 British officers.¹³

BMATT West Africa was established much later than BMATT Southern Africa, and consequently, has not undergone a similar transformation. The British Government assisted Ghana with the construction of the staff college in the 1970s, but not under the guise of BMATT. Over time, the British military's primary tasks there shifted from providing material support to providing instruction and training.¹⁴ BMATT West Africa was established in

⁹ Interview with Coglein, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

¹⁰ Interview with Lt-Col. Simon Diggins, Trainer, BMATT West Africa, 17 March 1999, Accra.

¹¹ Zimbabwe was created in April 1980, after democratic elections brought an end to the civil war and white-ruled Rhodesia. The new national army would comprise elements of the Rhodesian armed forces and the two guerrilla forces of Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo.

¹² Interview with Brig. Adrian Naughten, Commander, BMATT Southern Africa, 26 January 1998, Harare.

¹³ Interview with Coglein, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

¹⁴ Interview with Diggins, 17 March 1999, Accra.

1996, and it had a subregional focus from the outset. As of mid-1999, the office was staffed by four British officers.¹⁵

Both BMATT Southern Africa and BMATT West Africa try to tailor themselves to the specific needs of the host country and the subregion. BMATT Southern Africa conducts bilateral and regional peacekeeping training in Zimbabwe as well as other countries in the subregion. In Harare, the BMATT team works closely with the directing staff of the ZSC to run the annual four-week peacekeeping module in the senior staff course, which is open to participants from the subregion and beyond. Until recently, BMATT taught regional tactical and staff training courses, but the BMATT programme was refocused to concentrate exclusively on peacekeeping training.¹⁶ Outside Zimbabwe, BMATT Southern Africa has run a company commanders course in Swaziland, a disaster management course in Mauritius, and a method of instruction course in Mozambique. Each of these programmes was open to military personnel from the host country only.¹⁷ In October 1998, BMATT Southern Africa held a four-week command and staff course in Malawi for officers from Southern African Development Community (SADC) countries.¹⁸ It began a subregional course for junior officers in Malawi in January 1999,¹⁹ and was scheduled to sponsor a senior officers development course in Namibia in late 1999.²⁰

Unlike BMATT Southern Africa, BMATT West Africa conducts training only within the host country. BMATT West Africa works closely with the

¹⁵ Interview with Coglein, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

¹⁶ London had already begun to reorient its BMATT Southern Africa towards the provision of peacekeeping training, but Harare's military involvement in DRC gave a new urgency to this effort. The UK has revamped its BMATT programme and now concentrates exclusively on providing peacekeeping training. Interview with Coglein, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

¹⁷ Written correspondence with Coglein, 21 October 1998.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ "SADC Armies Ready for Peace Keeping Duties," *Panafrican News Agency*, 14 January 1999, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.search.nando.net>>>.

²⁰ Chris Inambao, "SADC Peace Force Efforts Get a Boost," *Africa News Service*, 5 October 1999.

directing staff of the GAFSC to run the annual four-week peacekeeping module in the senior command and staff course.²¹ The year-long programme typically has 37 participants: 22 from Ghana and 15 from other countries. In the past, Côte d'Ivoire, Malawi, Nigeria, Senegal, Tanzania, and Uganda have sent officers.²² BMATT's "main effort" during 1999-2000 will be to help reorient and rewrite the curriculum for the senior command and staff course.²³ In September 1998, BMATT helped organize a three-week, "stand-alone" international peace support operation (PSO) course.²⁴ The UK paid the transportation costs, subsistence allowances, and course fees for participants. The next international PSO course is scheduled for November 1999.²⁵ BMATT West Africa is also sending an instructor to Zambakro²⁶ to provide two-week training segments on an ad hoc basis.²⁷

The UK has improved and helped equip the staff college facilities in both Ghana and Zimbabwe. The British Government has provided funding for the construction of extra classrooms, dining facilities, and dormitories. Most recently, in 1998, it constructed an additional accommodation block at the GAFSC, which can house some 30 students.²⁸ The UK has also agreed to fund a new peacekeeping training library at the GAFSC, which

²¹ Letter from Sir John Weston, Permanent Representative, British Mission to the United Nations, New York, to Bernard Miyet, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, 20 February 1998, courtesy of United Nations Department, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

²² Documentation provided by Diggins, March 1999.

²³ *Ibid.* Accordingly, the course will not be offered during the 1999-2000 calendar year.

²⁴ Thirteen countries sent a total of 43 participants to the course: Cameroon (1), Côte d'Ivoire (2), Egypt (1), Ethiopia (1), Ghana (12), Kenya (1), Malawi (5), Mali (5), Senegal (5), South Africa (2), Tanzania (1), Uganda (5), and Zimbabwe (2). *Ibid.*

²⁵ Documentation provided by Diggins, March 1999.

²⁶ Interview with Lt-Col. Joe Gordon, Trainer, BMATT West Africa, 17 March 1999, Accra.

²⁷ The UK has also offered to sponsor the participation of Ghanaian instructors. Interview with Coglin, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

²⁸ Letter from Weston to Miyet, 20 February 1998.

will be opened in November 1999.²⁹ It also offsets the costs of computers and other classroom equipment³⁰ and routinely supplies books, training materials, and printing assistance.³¹

Other Elements of the Programme

Although the BMATTs are the most formalized component of the British programme, the UK also has smaller-scale training initiatives. Short-Term Training Teams (STTTs) provide specialized training to recipient countries bilaterally, for periods of roughly six weeks. The UK has also conducted map exercises for a wide range of African countries, at the former British Staff College in Camberley and in Addis Ababa.³² A British Military Liaison Officer (BMLO) is stationed in Addis Ababa and works closely with the Ethiopian military and the OAU.³³

Building upon the work of the BMLO in Addis Ababa, the British Government has undertaken a wider effort to enhance the capacity of the OAU Conflict Management Center (CMC). In January 1999, the FCO sent a Needs Assessment Team to the CMC, which worked together with the OAU to identify priority areas for donor funding and devise a plan of assistance.³⁴ The team noted that the CMC's Situation Center was staffed by a single clerk and determined that three political desk officers were needed. Accordingly, London has agreed to fund three personnel for a three-year period. After these individuals have begun work, the UK will support a command post

²⁹ Interview with Coglein, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

³⁰ Documentation provided by Diggins, March 1999.

³¹ Interview with Coglein, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

³² An April 1997 exercise, for example, was attended by diplomats and military officers from 17 African countries. Letter from Weston to Miyet, 20 February 1998.

³³ Interview with Coglein, 27 August 1999, by telephone.

³⁴ Interview with Coglein, 25 August 1999, by telephone. This plan of assistance will be presented to potential donor countries in October 1999. *Ibid.*

exercise (as a follow-up to the US-run exercise of April 1998), scheduled for Spring 2000.³⁵

The UK has aided subregional training initiatives as well. Through BMATT Southern Africa, it supported and helped organize Blue Hungwe, a three-week peacekeeping exercise hosted by Zimbabwe in April 1997. The UK spent over US\$ 500,000 for the event,³⁶ in which more than 1,500 troops and observers from 10 SADC member States participated. The Commandant of BMATT Southern Africa, described BMATT's role as the "umpire" of the exercise.³⁷ In February 1998, the UK contributed a C-130 aircraft and a 61-strong contingent to *Guidimakha*.³⁸ The UK offered to help South Africa plan Blue Crane, but South Africa sought to limit external assistance aside from financial support. Ultimately, the UK sent several members of BMATT Southern Africa to advise the exercise planning coordinators on lessons learned from Blue Hungwe. For the exercise itself, the UK contributed roughly US\$ 250,000 in cash and sent six "umpires," observers, and advisers.³⁹

In the past, African officers received training at various military academies and institutions in the United Kingdom, but the British

³⁵ The exercise was originally scheduled for March 1999 (written correspondence with Coglin, 21 October 1998), but was postponed due to staffing concerns following the recommendation of the needs assessment team. Interview with Coglin, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

³⁶ Interview with Alice Walpole, Head, Peacekeeping Section, United Nations Department, UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 28 February 1998, Dakar. Much of that sum went to establishing the necessary infrastructure to conduct the exercise. Ibid.

³⁷ Interview with Naughten, 26 January 1998, Harare.

³⁸ Interview with Lt-Col. Robert Bruce, Commander of British *Guidimakha* Contingent, UK Ministry of Defence, 28 February 1998, Bakel; and interview with Geoff Collier, Third Secretary (Political Affairs), UK Embassy to Senegal, 23 February 1998, Dakar.

³⁹ Written correspondence with Coglin, 21 October 1998; and interview with Coglin, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

Government has curtailed this aspect of its programme.⁴⁰ Places at Sandhurst and the Royal College of Defense Studies, for example, used to be open to African participants.⁴¹ The provision of training in Africa is more cost-effective.⁴²

The UK has supported and initiated several other projects designed to strengthen African peacekeeping. For example, British contributions to the United Nations Trust Fund for Improving Preparedness for Conflict Prevention and Peacekeeping in Africa have financed courses in Ghana, Kenya, and Zambia.⁴³ In an effort to promote anglophone/francophone military cooperation in the field, the UK funded an English/French glossary of peacekeeping terms produced jointly by the Ghanaian and Senegalese armed forces.⁴⁴

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM PROGRAMME

DFID's Security Sector Reform Programme also aims to develop indigenous capabilities, with the ultimate goal of enhancing security and reducing poverty. The initiative will support activities such as providing training in human rights, humanitarian law, and democratic accountability to security services, strengthening the capacity of civilian bodies to manage and monitor the security sector, and enhancing the effectiveness of peacekeeping forces.⁴⁵ Explaining the rationale behind the new policy, Secretary of State for International Development Clare Short stated, "In the past we said someone should make peace and then we will come in and help. ...That's

⁴⁰ Interview with Coglein, 25 August 1999, by telephone. The directing staff of the GAFSCS and the ZSC still attend the peace support operations course at the Joint Services Command and Staff College in Bracknell annually. Interview with Coglein, 27 August 1999, by telephone.

⁴¹ Written correspondence with Coglein, 21 October 1998.

⁴² Interview with Coglein, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

⁴³ Written correspondence with Coglein, 21 October 1998.

⁴⁴ Letter from Weston to Miyet, 28 February 1998.

⁴⁵ Dylan Hendrickson, "A Review of Security-Sector Reform," *The Conflict, Security & Development Group Working Paper No. 1*, London: Centre for Defence Studies, 1999, p. 10.

not good enough.”⁴⁶ Reforming the security sector is a relatively new domain for development agencies, which have often restricted their support to civilians.

Sierra Leone is the first country to receive assistance under this programme. There DFID is working closely with the UK Ministry of Defence to help Freetown devise a new security sector policy that will distinguish between internal and external security functions and define roles for the army, police, customs and immigration units, and local defence forces.⁴⁷ The UK is helping to restructure and train the Sierra Leone army, which will eventually consist of 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers, as well as to reorganize Freetown’s Ministry of Defence to ensure that it is controlled by qualified civilians. At the same time, efforts are being made to address the difficult question of how to find sufficient public funds to embed the structural reforms in the security sector.⁴⁸ Although this is a very complex and lengthy process, only a short-term commitment—one year with a possible two-year extension—has so far been made. If the initiative shows promise in Sierra Leone, it will influence DFID’s efforts to develop security sector reform programmes in other countries over the next several years.⁴⁹

OPERATIONAL ASSISTANCE IN THE FIELD

The UK also donates peacekeeping-related *matériel* or funding to purchase equipment on an ad hoc basis. In view of the expense involved in providing equipment, the UK has traditionally felt that offering training and instruction is a better use of its limited resources. Increasingly, however, it has allocated money to buy equipment for use in peacekeeping operations. In 1995, for example, London contributed accommodation equipment for use

⁴⁶ “Overseas aid: Alms for armies,” *The Economist*, 13 March 1999, p. 47.

⁴⁷ Written correspondence with Dylan Hendrickson, Research Fellow, Centre for Defence Studies, King’s College, University of London, 2 November 1999.

⁴⁸ Written correspondence with Hendrickson, 15 November 1999.

⁴⁹ Written correspondence with Hendrickson, 2 November 1999.

in the third United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III).⁵⁰ In 1996, it contributed more than US\$ 160,000 to purchase and dispatch vehicle spare parts for contingents serving in Liberia with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG).⁵¹ It also donated generators and provided funding for communication equipment for ECOMOG in Liberia.⁵² Following the December 1998 rebel advance on Freetown, the UK provided an additional US\$ 1.6 million worth of logistical support for ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, in the form of communication equipment, trucks, and field ambulances. It has also provided personal equipment for the Ghanaian contingent.⁵³ Some of the US\$ 16 million matching grant that the British Treasury designated for Sierra Leone in early 1999 has been used to purchase equipment for ECOMOG.⁵⁴

Beyond equipment, the British Government has provided other logistical support to African contingents. For the ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone, for example, the UK has shared intelligence with ECOMOG commanders on the ground and provided the force with detailed maps of the area. In addition, a British naval vessel has helped repair Nigerian naval ships.⁵⁵

The British Government has also ensured the transportation of African contingents to and from the mission area. In the 1960 United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), for example, the UK funded the airlift of

⁵⁰ *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 717.

⁵¹ Interview with Coglein, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

⁵² "Regional Peacekeeping: ECOMOG and the Liberian Peace Process," *Report prepared jointly by the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense*, 1998, p. 9, courtesy of Pacific Architects and Engineers.

⁵³ Documentation provided by Coglein, February 1999.

⁵⁴ Interview with Coglein, 25 August 1999, by telephone. Part of the grant was designated for the Government of Sierra Leone, and part was designated for assistance to ECOMOG. Other donor countries provided US\$ 16 million in matching contributions. *Ibid.*

⁵⁵ Documentation provided by Coglein, February 1999.

Ghanaian troops at the beginning of the mission.⁵⁶ Much of the more than US\$ 3 million that the UK contributed to the United Nations Trust Fund for Sierra Leone was removed from the Fund and then used to finance the transportation of ECOMOG contingents by the US company, Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE).⁵⁷ In early 1999, the UK funded the airlift for a Ghanaian battalion deploying to the ECOMOG mission in Sierra Leone out of part of its US\$ 16 million contribution.⁵⁸

The UK has also provided specialized training to African contingents preparing to deploy to peacekeeping operations on two occasions. STTTs provided mine awareness training to the Zimbabweans before they participated in the third United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III). They also provided more general pre-deployment training to a Ghanaian contingent in January 1996 before it was deployed to Liberia as a part of ECOMOG.⁵⁹

ASSESSMENT

Whereas France and the United States have recently been accused of disengaging from Africa, the UK has more routinely been singled out for stepping up its aid and military assistance to the continent.⁶⁰ The FCO's budget for Africa has risen from nine per cent of the total in 1995-1996 to 11

⁵⁶ *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)* p. 710.

⁵⁷ After contributing more than US\$ 3 million to the UN Trust Fund in Sierra Leone in early 1998, the UK discovered that this was not the most effective means of providing support for ECOMOG. The money was thus withdrawn from the fund in mid-1998 and used to renew a transportation contract that the US had originally had with PAE. Interview with Coglin, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

⁵⁸ Documentation provided by Coglin, February 1999.

⁵⁹ Interview with Coglin, 25 August 1999, by telephone.

⁶⁰ According to *Africa Confidential*, for example, with France reducing its involvement in Africa and the US increasingly preoccupied with the 2000 presidential election, the UK is the most likely of the three to put its diplomatic weight behind Africa. "Britain/Africa: Diplomacy with attitude," *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 40, No. 9, 30 April 1999, p. 1.

per cent in 1998-1999. That sum for 1998-1999 is US\$ 96 million. DFID's bilateral aid to Africa for 2001-2002 is estimated at US\$ 780 million, up from US\$ 480 million when the Labour Government took over in 1996-1997.⁶¹ While the budget for the African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme has not grown—and is not likely to grow—appreciably, the Security Sector Reform Programme will significantly augment the resources the Government has available for capacity-building. In addition to these programmes, the UK has provided substantial additional funding on an ad hoc basis—particularly since the “Sandline Affair,” which came to light in May 1998.⁶² The 1999 matching grant of US\$ 16 million that London made available to support the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG operations there is four times the annual funding for BMATT, for example.

Although the FCO, DFID, and the Ministry of Defence are working to better coordinate their activities, current British capacity-building initiatives do not yet consistently reflect Labour's new notion of “joined up Government.” Each of the departments is in the process of devising a three-year plan for its activities that will facilitate a rationalization of policies. According to Dylan Hendrickson, all three departments still have an incomplete understanding of the broader environment in which they work. Moreover, communication is often poor, both within and between departments. Finally, the departments still have—and will likely always have—conflicting approaches and interests.⁶³

Notwithstanding its relatively small size, the African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme has a number of positive aspects. The “train the trainer” approach is a cost-effective way for the UK to disseminate its instruction to a wide audience. By being permanently present in the country, BMATT officers are necessarily in close contact with their African

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 1-2.

⁶² Shortly after ECOMOG retook Freetown from Sierra Leonean rebels in February 1998 and reinstalled President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, London was implicated in a scandal concerning a violation of the UN arms embargo against Sierra Leone. The UK company Sandline International acknowledged that Kabbah had contracted it to provide equipment, training, and personnel in support of ECOMOG. Sandline maintained that the FCO was fully aware of its activities, a claim that Foreign Secretary Robin Cook denied.

⁶³ Written correspondence with Hendrickson, 2 November 1999.

counterparts. This should facilitate the development of personal relationships and enable BMATT officers to better assess the needs of recipient countries (although there are some complaints that this has not always been achieved).⁶⁴ Recognizing the importance of providing instruction on a subregional basis, both BMATTs have opened their programmes to participants outside their host countries. BMATT Southern Africa's policy of actually conducting training programmes in various countries throughout the subregion is valuable and should be replicated. Providing specialized training to contingents preparing to deploy to peacekeeping operations, as STTTs have done on two occasions, is a worthwhile initiative and should be further developed.

DFID's Security Sector Reform programme is more financially significant—although its impact is yet unknown. DFID enjoys much greater funding than the FCO. However, early indications are that it has rushed into this new area of activity without a sufficient understanding of the problems it is trying to address, appropriate policy instruments, or the international capacity to support reforms successfully.⁶⁵ Critics of the programme have predicted that it is just a matter of time before an army recently trained by DFID in the niceties of human rights and international law contravenes the standards taught.⁶⁶ Yet the failure to provide training also raises moral issues. DFID's initiatives in Sierra Leone are justifiable given Freetown's inability to establish law and order and the proven ruthlessness of the rebels.

Recent UK assistance to Sierra Leone represents a marked departure from past practices, but its significance may be limited to that country. London's generous support and matching grant were instrumental in quickly generating a significant infusion of funds. While African countries may share a similar historical relationship with London, there is no denying that the

⁶⁴ Some African recipients have criticized BMATT officials for dictating programmes with a "take it or leave it" attitude, and have accused them of being unresponsive to stated needs. It is clear from speaking to several African military officers familiar with BMATT programmes and officers that a residue of colonial baggage remains. Interviews with African Government and military officials, 1998 and 1999.

⁶⁵ Written correspondence with Hendrickson, 2 November 1999 and 15 November 1999.

⁶⁶ "Overseas aid: Alms for armies," p. 47.

embarrassment over the Sandline Affair contributed to the United Kingdom's generosity, and the alacrity with which it dispensed funds. It is too early to tell whether this response and DFID's substantial engagement will be limited to Sierra Leone or represent the beginnings of an enhanced commitment to Africa and peacekeeping on the continent.