

CHAPTER 13

OTHER BILATERAL INITIATIVES

Other non-African countries besides the “P-3” have formulated general policies and specific programmes to promote peacekeeping in Africa. As of mid-1999, 63 countries outside of Africa had contributed Blue Helmets to United Nations peacekeeping operations on the continent.¹ (See Annex H.) While several of these countries have become more reluctant to send peacekeepers for financial and political reasons, many others have reduced their presence because there are simply fewer opportunities. In addition to or in lieu of their contributions of Blue Helmets, a number of non-African countries have undertaken initiatives to enhance African peacekeeping. The bilateral programmes of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden merit special mention.

BELGIUM

Belgium pursued a different policy after decolonization than both France and the United Kingdom. The chaos and bloodshed following its hasty withdrawal in 1960 from its colony, Congo, eroded domestic and international support for potential high-profile and interventionist policies on the continent. In addition, Brussels had a comparatively small defence budget, more limited air and naval assets, and fewer troops than either

¹ Fourteen of the 63 countries have participated in at least half of the 16 missions: Argentina (in 8 operations), Bangladesh (12), Brazil (9), Canada (10), Hungary (8), India (12), Jordan (9), Malaysia (11), the Netherlands (10), New Zealand (8), Norway (9), Pakistan (11), Slovak Republic (8—including as part of Czechoslovakia), and Sweden (9). Fifteen, have taken part in only one operation: Barbados, Bolivia, Burma (now Myanmar), Colombia, El Salvador, Iran, Jamaica, Japan, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Panama, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Venezuela.

France or the UK. As a result, it pursued few strategic ambitions in Africa.² Nevertheless, Belgium did give special attention to its former colony and trust territories, Burundi and Rwanda, in the areas of military assistance and development cooperation.³ Prior to 1994, Brussels contributed contingents to United Nations peacekeeping operations on the continent more frequently than either London or Paris.

Belgium's experience in the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) effectively ended its direct participation in peacekeeping operations on the African continent. On 7 April 1994, 10 Belgian members of UNAMIR were murdered by Hutu extremists,⁴ and Belgium unilaterally decided to withdraw its troops from the mission.⁵ The episode had a profound effect on Belgian society and Government policy. In 1997, the Belgian Senate established a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry to investigate Belgium's role in the events leading up to the Rwandan

² Alain Rouvez, "French, British, and Belgian Military Involvement," in David R. Smock (ed.), *Making War and Waging Peace: Foreign Intervention in Africa*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1995, pp. 42-43. Brussels did retain significant business interests, especially in the mines in Congo, which explains its surreptitious support for the Katangese secessionist movement in the early 1960s. See *ibid.*, p. 43.

³ For example, Belgium conducted military assistance programmes with Congo/Zaire and Rwanda, maintaining roughly 100 military advisers on the ground. *Ibid.*

⁴ The event that sparked the Rwandan genocide, the downing of the plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal Habyarimana, had taken place the previous day.

⁵ The UN Security Council subsequently voted on 21 April to reduce UNAMIR's authorized strength to a mere 270. UN Document S/RES/912 (1994), 21 April 1994.

genocide.⁶ Brussels is not yet ready to again commit its own troops to serve in Africa.

Since its experience in Rwanda, however, Belgium has participated in and observed several training exercises on the African continent as a way of becoming re-engaged in African peacekeeping issues. In February 1998, it provided a C-130 aircraft for Exercise *Guidimakha*. In April 1998, 12 Belgian trainers and a medical team took part in the first phase of the US African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) training in Ghana.⁷ Prior to that, Brussels had sent an officer to observe ACRI training in both Malawi (for four weeks) and Uganda (for two weeks).⁸

Belgium has continued to voluntarily support peacekeeping efforts on the continent. For UNAMIR, Brussels contributed equipment and logistical assistance including vehicles, ambulances, a field kitchen, radios, spare parts, various equipment for the use of an infantry company, transportation, and training.⁹ Much of this support aided a Malawian company participating in the mission.¹⁰ In 1995, it provided equipment and other logistical support for

⁶ The Commission was preceded by an ad hoc working group, which released a report in January 1997 accusing Belgium and the international community of ignoring the events taking place in Rwanda. A Special Commission on Rwanda was then established to assign responsibilities and to identify possible lessons learned from the experience. In April 1997, the Special Commission was transformed into a Commission of Inquiry—with an investigative role. Jean-Claude Willame, *Les Belges au Rwanda: le parcours de la honte*, Brussels: GRIP, 1997, pp. 7-9.

⁷ "Initiatives and Support from Belgium," *UN Database on Peacekeeping Training and Initiatives in Africa*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/ext5.htm>>>.

⁸ Interview with Maj. Richard Naughton, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement Policy, US Department of Defense, 11 March 1998, Arlington.

⁹ *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 731.

¹⁰ See UN Document A/49/PV.18, *Address of Bakili Muluzi, President of the Republic of Malawi, Forty-Ninth Session, General Assembly, 18th Meeting*, 5 October 1994; see also "Initiatives and Support from Belgium."

Organization of African Unity (OAU) military observers in Burundi. ¹¹ The Belgian Government also contributed US\$ 1.5 million in 1997 to equip a Burkinabé battalion participating in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) mission in Liberia.¹²

CANADA

Canada, which has long identified participation in peacekeeping as a cornerstone of its foreign and defence policies,¹³ remains committed to promoting peace and security in Africa by deploying its own troops in UN-authorized operations on the continent. This commitment has withstood adversity and embarrassment. Like Belgium, Canada's experience in a United Nations mission in Africa stands out as a defining moment in its peacekeeping history. On 4 March 1993, Canadian troops serving in the United Task Force (UNITAF) in Somalia shot at Somali intruders who had entered their compound, wounding one and killing another, and then tortured and killed a Somali teenager in their custody. ¹⁴ Unlike Belgium, however, Canada has not subsequently shied away from peacekeeping commitments in Africa (or elsewhere) as a result.¹⁵ The 1994 Canadian White

¹¹ "Initiatives and Support from Belgium." As of 31 December 1998, Belgium had contributed US\$ 282,380 to the OAU General Peace Fund and US\$ 1.5 million to the Special Contributions component. Written correspondence with S. Basseby Ibok, Head, Conflict Management Division, OAU Secretariat, 26 January 1999.

¹² "Initiatives and Support from Belgium."

¹³ Interview with Col. J. Michael Snell, Military Adviser, Canadian Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 17 March 1998, New York.

¹⁴ Ottawa established a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the matter. Subsequently, the Government sought to curtail the inquiry, but its attempt was ruled unlawful. The Government refused to grant the Commission's request for a six-month extension. The Commission issued its report, maintaining that it had been unable to complete its work. See "Executive Summary, Report of the Somalia Commission of Inquiry," *Canadian Department of National Defence*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol.v0sle.htm>>>.

¹⁵ Ottawa provided additional troops to serve in the UN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in 1996. Canadian assistance was needed because China, in retaliation for (continued...)

Paper on Defence reaffirmed the country's commitment to participating in multilateral peace operations.¹⁶ Ottawa provided a contingent comprising communication, logistics, and medical units as well as the Force Commander to UNAMIR.¹⁷ In 1996, it offered to lead the proposed multinational force for the humanitarian operation in Eastern Zaire.¹⁸ With France's withdrawal from the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic (MINURCA), Canada is the only non-African country to have formed units of Blue Helmets serving in that mission.

Beyond contributing contingents to United Nations operations in Africa, Ottawa also offers peacekeeping training to African countries in Canada, albeit on a small scale. Most of this training is funded through the Military Training Assistance Programme (MTAP). MTAP has enabled several African countries to send officers to the Canadian military's United Nations Logistics Course as well as its Observer Training Course. About 10 African officers have attended the two-week logistics course in each of the past two years. African participation in the military observer course varies, as it only convenes prior to the deployment of Canadian forces in peacekeeping

¹⁵ (...continued)

Haiti's support for Taiwan, had threatened to veto a resolution extending the mission unless it was scaled down. The Security Council acceded to China's request. An additional Canadian battalion was deployed to support the work of the UN peacekeeping operation—at considerable cost to Canada. Eric G. Berman, "The Security Council's Increasing Reliance on Burden-Sharing: Collaboration or Abrogation?," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 4, No. 1, Spring 1998, pp. 6-7.

¹⁶ "1994 White Paper on Defence," *Canadian Department of National Defence*, available on the Internet at <<http://www.dnd.ca/eng/min/reports/94wpaper/white_paper_94.html>>.

¹⁷ UN Document S/1995/107, *Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda*, 6 February 1995, para. 23.

¹⁸ Although the force never became operational due to circumstances outside of Canada's control, some 550 Canadian military personnel had been deployed in the field in preparation for the mission. "Canadian and Multilateral Operations in Support of Peace and Stability," *Canadian Department of National Defence*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.dnd.ca/eng/archive>>>.

operations.¹⁹ The Canadian Government also funds courses offered at the Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, which are open to African officers.²⁰ The MTAP initiative has grown considerably since it was transferred from the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT) to the Department of National Defence (DND) in 1991.²¹

Canadian peacekeeping training on the African continent is a less developed aspect of its capacity-building programme, but there is interest in enhancing it. In the past, Canada has seconded an officer to the Zambian Staff College and has given presentations on peacekeeping at the Egyptian Institute of Foreign Affairs.²² In addition, several Canadian logistics officers have trained Kenyan forces for peacekeeping as part of the United Nations Training Assistance Team (UNTAT) programme. Ottawa is interested in developing a version of its United Nations Logistics Course in both English and French, which it would offer to African countries and teach on the continent.²³

¹⁹ Interview with Maj. Robert J. Moquin, Deputy Military Adviser, Canadian Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 18 November 1999, New York.

²⁰ "Initiatives and Support from Canada," *UN Database on Peacekeeping Training and Initiatives in Africa*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/ext6.htm>>>.

²¹ Interview with Canadian Government official, 1999. The annual budget for MTAP has increased from around US\$ 700,000 per year to more than US\$ 10 million—although the greatest share of those funds goes to supporting countries participating in the Partnership for Peace programme of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). *Ibid.*

²² Ernie Reumiller, "Canadian Perspectives on African Capacity-Building," in Mark Malan (ed.), "Resolute Partners: Building Peacekeeping Capacity in Southern Africa," *ISS Monograph No. 21*, February 1998, p. 69. Canada's "start-up assistance" to the Zambian Staff College ended in 1998. *Letter from Amb. Michel Duval, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Canadian Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, to Bernard Miyet, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping*, 2 March 1998, courtesy of Canadian Permanent Mission to the UN in New York.

²³ Interview with Moquin, 18 November 1999, New York.

Canada has also supported regional organizations as well as subregional training initiatives on the continent. As of 31 December 1998, Ottawa had contributed US\$ 194,180 to the OAU Peace Fund.²⁴ For Blue Crane, Canada gave some US\$ 35,000.²⁵ It plans to provide money and instructors to a United Nations peacekeeping workshop for civilian police to be held in Ghana in late 1999.²⁶

Canadian direct support for African peacekeeping efforts on the continent is a relatively insignificant element of its overall policy. For the 1960 United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC), it did airlift food supplies at the beginning of the mission.²⁷ Most recently, Canada provided some US\$ 700,000 in non-lethal *matériel*, including rations and medical supplies, to Ghanaian and Nigerian troops serving with ECOMOG in Sierra Leone.²⁸

DENMARK

Denmark's programme to develop African peacekeeping capabilities has its origins with the end of the cold war and focuses on the Southern African Development Community (SADC) subregion in general and Zimbabwe in particular. After assuming office in January 1993, Danish Defence Minister Hans Haekkerup sought to use the capacity of the armed forces to promote global security—and thus forestall likely cuts in the defence budget.²⁹ In 1995, Denmark undertook an assessment of the existing capacity of the Southern Africa region and identified the need for a regional centre and a clearing house for peacekeeping training. As an interim step, the Danish Government funded and provided several instructors for a regional peacekeeping course held at the Zimbabwe Staff College (ZSC) in October

²⁴ Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999.

²⁵ Leon Engelbrecht, "Preparing for Peace Missions in Southern Africa," *Vanguard*, Issue 2, 1999, p. 26.

²⁶ Interview with Moquin, 29 November 1999, by telephone.

²⁷ *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, p. 710.

²⁸ Interview with Canadian Government official, 1999.

²⁹ Interview with Amb. Jørgen Bøjer, Permanent Representative, Danish Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 21 December 1998, New York.

1996. This involvement led to discussions about how Copenhagen could help in a more comprehensive way.³⁰ In January 1997, Denmark and Zimbabwe signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) to formalize their cooperation in the field of subregional peacekeeping training. The budget for the initial three-year programme was some US\$ 2.7 million.³¹

The Danish programme is centred around the development of a Regional Peacekeeping Training Centre (RPTC) at the Zimbabwe Staff College. In accordance with the January 1997 MOU, Denmark has begun to construct and equip peacekeeping training facilities at the ZSC. The same agreement calls for Denmark to organize and largely finance 10 peacekeeping courses at the ZSC over a three-year period and to provide both short- and long-term technical advisers.³² Accordingly, the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has seconded a Danish officer to the ZSC.³³ Denmark is also supporting the creation of a clearing house at the ZSC that will monitor peacekeeping training activities, identify new regional training requirements, keep a record of trained peacekeeping practitioners and

³⁰ Interview with Danish Government official, 1998. Prior to the end of apartheid, Denmark had financed courses in South Africa that promoted civil-military relations. When apartheid was dismantled in 1994, Denmark undertook a new "development paradigm," in which peacekeeping was a component. Interview with Peter Lysholt Hansen, Head, Department for Southern Africa, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 February 1998, Copenhagen.

³¹ "Memorandum of Understanding Between Zimbabwe and Denmark," 31 January 1997, courtesy of Danish Embassy to Zimbabwe. This figure does not include costs associated with the provision of short- and long-term technical experts, which Denmark also covers. *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ The appointment of a military officer to serve as the point person for Denmark's efforts at the ZSC is significant, as it is the first time the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has paid for a Ministry of Defence official to conduct what is billed as a "development project." Interview with Maj. Michael Lollesgaard, Department of International Affairs, Danish Ministry of Defence, 18 February 1998, Copenhagen.

instructors in the subregion and beyond, establish a library, and publish a quarterly magazine.³⁴

Another component of the Danish programme involves providing the means for participants from the SADC subregion to attend Nordic peacekeeping courses. In 1997, Denmark financed the participation of two officers from the SADC subregion in the Nordic United Nations Peacekeeping Senior Management Seminar (UNMAS). For each year of its three-year programme, Denmark also committed to funding two participants in both the Nordic United Nations Military Police Officers Course in Denmark and the Finnish-hosted Nordic United Nations Military Observers Course.³⁵

As a part of its programme, Denmark has also given SADC officials an opportunity to learn first-hand about the Baltic Peacekeeping Battalion (BALTBAT)³⁶ with the intention of helping SADC member States develop

³⁴ Kurt Mosgaard, "Training Co-ordination: the NACC Clearing House Concept," in Malan (ed.), "Resolute Partners: Building Peacekeeping Capacity in Southern Africa," p. 88. In 1993, the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) appointed Denmark to be the lead nation for peacekeeping training and education. One of its responsibilities was to establish a clearing house for the exchange of information and to identify new training requirements and available resources. The NACC Clearing House for Peacekeeping Training has developed a pamphlet entitled "Standardization of Peacekeeping Training and Education and a Peacekeeping Course Handbook," which is updated and distributed annually. Denmark's current initiative in Southern Africa is modelled after the NACC Clearing House. *Ibid.*, p. 84.

³⁵ "Memorandum of Understanding between Zimbabwe and Denmark," 31 January 1997.

³⁶ The three Baltic countries—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—have agreed to contribute troops for a joint battalion earmarked for international peacekeeping duties. Denmark, together with Norway and Sweden, has taken the lead in providing peacekeeping training to these countries. According to a Danish Government official, a "SADCBAT" might have several advantages over its Baltic counterpart: [1] SADC countries do not have to erase Soviet-style thinking; [2] most SADC countries share a common language; [3] within SADC, there is a potential lead country that possesses substantial military hardware and abilities; [4] many SADC member States have retained a useful residue of colonial
(continued...)

similar capabilities. The Danish Government organized a visit for SADC Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence to Denmark and to Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 1998 and underwrote the costs of the trip.³⁷

Denmark also organized a second trip in May 1998 for senior SADC military officers to observe the joint Danish-Polish brigade participating in the multinational force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which included a Lithuanian company serving with the Danish battalion.³⁸

Other Danish initiatives designed to enhance the peacekeeping capabilities of African States also focus on the SADC subregion. Copenhagen, for example, has funded a defence management course at a South African university for mid-level officers and civilians from SADC countries and has supported an effort to develop indigenous conflict resolution strategies.³⁹ Although these initiatives are somewhat tangential to peacekeeping, they provide the basis for important confidence-building measures that contribute to peacekeeping. Denmark has also contributed some US\$ 35,000 to Blue Crane.⁴⁰

Danish support for capacity-building in the SADC subregion has not come at the exclusion of assistance to peacekeeping efforts there and elsewhere on the continent. Denmark has made voluntary financial contributions to a number of United Nations peacekeeping operations in Africa, including the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ),

³⁶ (...continued)
training; and [5] there is a clear dominant power in the subregion. Interview with Julian Elgaard Brett, Head of Section, Office Eight, Danish Ministry of Defence, 18 February 1998, Copenhagen.

³⁷ Eleven of 14 SADC members sent representatives, although not all at the ministerial level. Interview with Hansen, 17 February 1998, Copenhagen.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Jakkie Cilliers, "The United States, Southern Africa, the ACRI, and the ACSS," *Background Paper Prepared for a Meeting with Amb. Marshall McCallie*, April 1998, courtesy of author.

⁴⁰ Engelbrecht, "Preparing for Peace Missions in Southern Africa," p. 26.

UNAMIR, the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL),⁴¹ and MINURCA. For example, a Danish contribution permitted MINURCA to air radio broadcasts 24 hours per day.⁴² Denmark also contributed financially to UNITAF in Somalia.⁴³ In 1996 and 1997, Denmark provided some US\$ 2 million to Benin, Burkina Faso, and Ghana, in recognition of their efforts and the costs they incurred in taking part in ECOMOG in Liberia. (Benin, Burkina Faso, and Ghana were the only three ECOWAS countries eligible for assistance due to their “privileged partner” status.⁴⁴) While it was clearly understood that Danish largesse was to cover peacekeeping costs, the transfer “officially” was not made for “operational costs” but rather was for “balance of payments support.”⁴⁵ The Director of the Africa and Middle East Department at the Beninois Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation described the aid as “budgetary support,” in which the money was given to Benin with the understanding that it would allow the Government to deploy troops, as it had indicated it wished to do.⁴⁶ According to the Chief of Staff of Benin’s Armed Forces, the Danish “contribution” was used for logistical support including per diems, hazard pay, food, medical supplies, and

⁴¹ *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, pp. 727, 731, and 733.

⁴² “Daily Press Briefing of Office of Spokesman for Secretary General,” 26 August 1998, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/1998>>>.

⁴³ *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, p. 724.

⁴⁴ Interview with Danish Government official, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 February 1998, Copenhagen. Copenhagen has 21 “privileged partners” that benefit from its bilateral development cooperation programme. Thirteen are African: Benin, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Eritrea, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. “Country Strategies,” *Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.um.dk/english/undenrigspolitik>>>.

⁴⁵ Interview with Danish Government official, Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 February 1998, Copenhagen.

⁴⁶ Interview with Francis Loko, Director, Africa and the Middle East Department, Beninois Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 15 March 1999, Cotonou; interview with Amb. Edmond Cakpo-Tozo, Secretary-General, Beninois Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, 15 March 1999, Cotonou.

transportation.⁴⁷ Denmark had also contributed US\$ 299,980 to the OAU Peace Fund as of 31 December 1998.⁴⁸

GERMANY

Germany has become an increasingly important provider and supporter of peacekeeping education and training to African countries. Berlin's Support Aid Programme includes the provision of military advisory groups to 10 African countries from all of the continent's subregions.⁴⁹ This four-year, US\$ 23 million initiative includes training and materials for civilian police. Germany also makes available peacekeeping training to African officers at the battalion and company commander levels in Germany. Officers from Burkina Faso, Egypt, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe have availed themselves of this opportunity. In Zimbabwe, Germany has equipped the Zimbabwe Staff College with computers. In addition, Berlin was by far the largest contributor to Blue Crane,⁵⁰ providing more than US\$ 493,000, a C-160 aircraft, and 28 satellite phones.⁵¹

Germany is also seeking to influence the international agenda as concerns peacekeeping-related policy. In 1996, it introduced a draft resolution to the General Assembly First Committee on "consolidation of peace through practical disarmament measures," which the Assembly adopted without a vote. Follow-up resolutions were adopted in 1997 and 1998, at subsequent General Assembly sessions. In March 1998, a Group of Interested States was established under German chairmanship. Among other

⁴⁷ Interview with Col. Felicien Antoine Dos Santos, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, Beninois Ministry of National Defence, 15 March 1999, Cotonou.

⁴⁸ Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999.

⁴⁹ The 10 countries are: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Morocco, Namibia, Senegal, Tanzania, Tunisia, and Zambia. "Initiatives and Support from Germany," *Database on Peacekeeping Training and Initiatives in Africa*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training>>>.

⁵⁰ Interview with Betsie Smith, Deputy Director, OAU Politics and Security, and Peacekeeping, South African Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 27 August 1999, by telephone.

⁵¹ Engelbrecht, "Preparing for Peace Missions in Southern Africa," p. 26.

projects, the Group jointly financed a “Train the Trainer” workshop for military experts from Central African States in July 1998.⁵² Berlin has also sponsored United Nations “lessons learned” studies and seminars on various United Nations peacekeeping missions in Africa, spending nearly US\$ 140,000 between 1996 and 1999.⁵³

Germany has provided operational assistance to United Nations peacekeeping missions in Africa as well. In January 1974, the then Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) airlifted Ghanaian and Senegalese troops serving in the Second United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II).⁵⁴ For the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) in Namibia, the FRG contributed light vehicles, minibuses, mobile workshops, ambulances, and spare parts.⁵⁵ It voluntarily furnished vehicles, field kitchens, and a repair workshop for UNAMIR.⁵⁶ For the third United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM III), Germany also gave equipment.⁵⁷ In late 1998, Germany funded the transportation of 150 *Forces armées centrafricaines* (FACA) troops who served under the operational control of MINURCA during the period of the legislative elections, spending US\$ 100,000.⁵⁸

In addition, Germany has supported African regional and subregional peacekeeping initiatives. In the context of the OAU, Berlin contributed money, flak jackets, helmets, and binoculars for OAU missions, valued at

⁵² Amb. Dieter Kastrup, “Practical Disarmament: A Year-Old ‘Group of Interested States’ Takes Stock of Successes and Plans New Projects,” *UN Chronicle*, No. 1, 1999, p. 76.

⁵³ Documentation provided by the German Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, August 1999.

⁵⁴ *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, p. 695.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 712.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 731.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 717.

⁵⁸ Interview with German Government official, German Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 18 August 1999, by telephone. See also UN Document S/1998/1203, *Third Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic*, 18 December 1998, para. 10.

more than US\$ 260,000 during 1996-1997.⁵⁹ In 1996, it donated more than US\$ 35,000 worth of medical supplies for the OAU Observer Mission in Burundi (OMIB).⁶⁰ In 1998, Germany provided two contributions of some US\$ 30,000 each to support the OAU Mission in the Comoros (OMIC) and OAU mediation efforts to end the conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia.⁶¹ Regarding subregional operations, Germany donated 35 trucks for ECOMOG contingents serving in Liberia in late 1996.⁶² The next year, it provided 27 jeeps and some medical equipment to participating countries. In 1998, Berlin supplied 5,000 uniforms for ECOMOG in Sierra Leone, valued at US\$ 163,000, and it donated US\$ 337,000 worth of communication equipment to the Ghanaian contingent in 1999.⁶³ For the ECOMOG mission in Guinea-Bissau, it provided US\$ 40,000 worth of medicines and medical supplies. It was in the process of fulfilling a request for some US\$ 100,000 worth of office and basic communication equipment at the time of the May 1999 coup in Guinea-Bissau. At that point, the German Embassy in Dakar had procured roughly half of the items, which included computers, a fax machine, furniture, and safes. This equipment was then transferred to ECOMOG in Sierra Leone. Germany had also planned to finance the participation of a Malian contingent in Guinea-Bissau and had earmarked US\$ 139,000 for that purpose, but the mission was withdrawn before the troops had been deployed.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Documentation provided by the German Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, August 1999.

⁶⁰ Written correspondence with German Government official, German Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 31 August 1999.

⁶¹ Documentation provided by the German Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, August 1999.

⁶² UN Document S/1996/858/*Nineteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia*, 17 October 1996, para. 19.

⁶³ Documentation provided by the German Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, August 1999.

⁶⁴ Interview with German Government official, 18 August 1999, by telephone.

ITALY

In recent years, Italy has increasingly sought to develop African peacekeeping capabilities through bilateral assistance programmes. It has agreed to undertake a peacekeeping training initiative with Ethiopia, which will include establishing an Ethiopian brigade for peacekeeping activities. Although some minor elements of this initiative have been implemented, it has essentially been suspended pending the cessation of hostilities between Eritrea and Ethiopia.⁶⁵ Rome had also planned to establish a “technical assistance” mission in Eritrea, but that too has been put on hold. According to the Italian Government, these two initiatives will cost some US\$ 20 million.⁶⁶ Italy has established a technical and military assistance mission in Morocco, which provides training to the Moroccan armed forces at a cost of US\$ 250,000 per year. It also finances the participation of African officers in peacekeeping seminars and courses at the United Nations Staff College in Turin and at national police officer training courses.⁶⁷ On average, 30-35 African officers receive training at Italian military institutes each year. The Italian Government forecasts that it will spend US\$ 700,000 on preventing and managing conflicts in Africa during the course of 1999.⁶⁸

Italy has also provided voluntary in-kind support and financial assistance for both United Nations and subregional peacekeeping operations in Africa. For ONUMOZ, it supplied an air component comprising eight helicopters, three fixed wing aircraft, and some 110 personnel.⁶⁹ It also made available police training as a part of the second United Nations Operation in Somalia

⁶⁵ “Initiatives and Support from Italy;” and interview with Gianfranco Incarnato, Counsellor, Italian Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 18 August 1999, by telephone.

⁶⁶ Written correspondence with Incarnato, 19 August 1999.

⁶⁷ See “Initiatives and Support from Italy;” and Interview with Incarnato, 18 August 1999, by telephone.

⁶⁸ Written correspondence with Incarnato, 19 August 1999.

⁶⁹ *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, p. 727.

(UNOSOM II)⁷⁰ and demining training as a part of UNAVEM III.⁷¹ More recently, Italy offered a C-130 aircraft to transport participating contingents for ECOMOG missions in Sierra Leone and Guinea-Bissau. ECOMOG accepted, but the offer had not been acted upon by mid-1999. The ECOMOG mission in Guinea-Bissau was withdrawn before the Italian offer could be implemented.⁷²

JAPAN

Japan has recently organized a number of conferences and symposia that address the issue of developing African peacekeeping capabilities. In October 1993, it hosted the first Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development (TICAD I). Drawing upon the Conference's conclusion that "stability and security are prerequisites to sustainable development," the Japanese Government held a High-Level Symposium on Peace and Development: Problems of Conflict in Africa in October 1995. The meeting brought together 21 prominent persons from African States, donor countries, and international organizations.⁷³ This was followed by a High-Level Symposium on Conflicts in Africa: Road to Nation-Building in the Post-Conflict Period in September 1996.⁷⁴ In January 1998, Tokyo sponsored an International Conference on Preventive Strategy, which placed particular emphasis on the African continent.⁷⁵ It hosted TICAD II in October 1998, which addressed the themes of conflict prevention and post-conflict

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 724.

⁷¹ "Initiatives and Support from Italy."

⁷² Interview with Incarnato, 18 August 1999, by telephone; and written correspondence with Incarnato, 19 August 1999.

⁷³ "High-level symposium on Peace and Development: Problems of Conflict in Africa," *Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/sympo9510>>>.

⁷⁴ "Chairmen's Summary," *High-Level Symposium on Conflicts in Africa: Road to Nation-Building in the Post-Conflict Period* 10 September 1996, Tokyo, courtesy of Japanese Permanent Mission to the UN in New York.

⁷⁵ "Initiatives and Support from Japan," *UN Database on Peacekeeping Training and Initiatives in Africa*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training>>>.

development. Among other commitments made at TICAD II, the Asian "Development Partners" agreed: to support capacity-building for police and internal security forces; to continue strengthening the conflict prevention, management, and resolution capacities of the OAU and subregional organizations; to continue assisting African centres for training in conflict prevention and peacekeeping; and to support OAU efforts to improve its early warning capabilities.⁷⁶

Japan has also made significant financial contributions to other Africa-oriented programmes and projects, both through the United Nations and African regional organizations. Tokyo has contributed US\$ 600,000 to the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa Trust Fund.⁷⁷ Part of this sum was used to finance a training seminar on peacekeeping operations in Cameroon for high-level civilian and military officers from the subregion in September 1996.⁷⁸ Of the US\$ 950,000 that Japan had given to the OAU Peace Fund as of 31 December 1998,⁷⁹ some US\$ 203,000 went to establishing the Early Warning System (EWS).⁸⁰

In addition, Japan has occasionally made voluntary financial contributions for peace operations in Africa and has supported mediation efforts on the continent. For example, it contributed to UNTAG and to UNITAF.⁸¹ Tokyo has also established a trust fund with the United Nations

⁷⁶ "African Development Towards the 21st Century: The Tokyo Agenda for Action," 21 October 1998, *Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad2>>>.

⁷⁷ "Initiatives and Support from Japan;" see also *United Nations Concern for Peace and Security in Central Africa: Reference Document*, New York: United Nations, 1997, p. 56.

⁷⁸ *United Nations Concern for Peace and Security in Central Africa: Reference Document*, p. 12.

⁷⁹ Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999.

⁸⁰ Written correspondence with Yuki Kitagawa, First Secretary, Japanese Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 27 October 1999.

⁸¹ *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, pp. 712, and 724. Tokyo's US\$ 100 million contribution to UNITAF is particularly (continued...)

called “the Sub-account for the Trust Fund in support of Special Mission and other activities related to Preventive Diplomacy and Peacemaking.” As of mid-1999, it had contributed US\$ 200,000 to the fund—US\$ 150,000 of that to resolve African conflicts.⁸²

NETHERLANDS

Dutch efforts to enhance African peacekeeping capabilities are a component of its bilateral development assistance programmes as well as its military cooperation initiatives. For 1999, the Netherlands is concentrating its bilateral structural aid on 19 developing countries, 10 of which are in Africa.⁸³ Funds from the Ministry for Development Cooperation can now be used for activities that were once the exclusive responsibility of the Ministry of Defence. In general, the Ministry of Defence still furnishes all peacekeeping-related equipment and funds some training initiatives, while the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation finance other aspects of Dutch capacity-building initiatives.⁸⁴

The Netherlands has supported efforts to provide peacekeeping-related training to Africans. The Ministry of Defence routinely invites and covers the expenses of African officers to attend courses at Dutch military institutes,

⁸¹ (...continued)
noteworthy.

⁸² Written correspondence with Kitagawa, 27 October 1999.

⁸³ The 10 countries are: Burkina Faso, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Mali, Mozambique, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Although Egypt and South Africa did not strictly fulfil the aid criteria, the Dutch Government has also entered into more limited development relationships with them. In addition, the Netherlands will carry out human rights, peace-building, and good governance programmes in Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Namibia, and Rwanda as well as private sector development programmes in Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nigeria. “Aid to be Concentrated on Nineteen Countries,” *Netherlands Ministry for Development Concentration Press Release*, 2 March 1999, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.bz.minbuza.nl/English/MEWS>>>.

⁸⁴ Interview with Maj-Gen. Klaas Roos, Military Adviser, Dutch Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 31 August 1999, New York.

some of which have a peacekeeping component and are taught in English.⁸⁵ In April 1999, the Netherlands contributed more than US\$ 249,000 to exercise Blue Crane.⁸⁶ The Hague has also indicated its willingness to support Gabon 2000, tentatively agreeing to install and service a water purification system for the exercise.⁸⁷

The Netherlands has also supported—both financially and logistically—UN and subregional peacekeeping efforts on the African continent. The Dutch Government was the largest voluntary contributor to UNAMIR, supplying nearly US\$ 5.5 million and another US\$ 3 million worth of equipment including vehicles, generators, kitchen trailers, ambulances, and mine detectors.⁸⁸ The Dutch donation substantially enabled a Zambian battalion to participate in the operation.⁸⁹ The Netherlands has also given voluntary contributions to UNOSOM II, ONUMOZ, and UNOMIL.⁹⁰ The Dutch Government made available 84 trucks for ECOMOG contingents serving in Liberia in the period leading up to the July 1997 presidential elections.⁹¹ In addition, the Hague provided “balance of payments support” to ECOMOG contributors with the understanding that recipient countries would then use their own funds to deploy and sustain their contingents in Liberia.⁹² More recently, the Netherlands helped underwrite Mali’s

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Engelbrecht, “Preparing for Peace Missions in Southern Africa,” p. 26.

⁸⁷ Interview with Roos, 31 August 1999, New York.

⁸⁸ *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, p. 731.

⁸⁹ Interview with Roos, 31 August 1999, New York.

⁹⁰ *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, pp. 724, 727, and 733.

⁹¹ UN Document S/1996/858, *Nineteenth Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia*, 17 October 1996, para. 19. Dutch support totaled US\$ 1 million. Interview with UN official, UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, June 1999, New York.

⁹² “Regional Peacekeeping and the Liberian Peace Process,” *Report prepared jointly by the US Department of State and the US Department of Defense*, 1998, p. 8, courtesy of Pacific Architects and Engineers.

participation in the ECOMOG operation in Sierra Leone.⁹³ The money was used to transport a Malian battalion to the mission area, and the Hague has indicated that it will finance the contingent's transportation home at the end of the operation. As of mid-1999, the Netherlands had contributed some US\$ 8 million to ECOMOG in Sierra Leone and was considering providing an additional US\$ 3-5 million.⁹⁴

NORWAY

Like Denmark, Norway's efforts to develop African peacekeeping capabilities focus on the SADC subregion. The Norwegian Government is financing an ambitious US\$ 2.5 million five-year Training for Peace in Southern Africa Project (TfP) that aims to build capacity for conflict management and peacekeeping. Two South African non-governmental organizations have helped develop the curricula, which covers the civilian and political aspects of peacekeeping and civil-military relations, and provide the training. More than 250 Government officials, representatives of defence and police forces, and members of civil society including the media and NGOs have attended TfP workshops throughout 11 of the 14 SADC countries. Since 1998, specialized training for civilian police has become a feature of the project. TfP will be extended for at least one year.⁹⁵ Beyond this programme, each year Oslo covers all expenses for six officers from the SADC region to participate in its courses in logistics, commanding officer appointments, and civilian police duties. It similarly sponsors two individuals

⁹³ UN Document S/199/20, *Special Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone*, 7 January 1999, para. 9.

⁹⁴ Interview with Roos, 31 August 1999, New York.

⁹⁵ Written correspondence with Amb. Knut Tøraasen, Special Adviser for Peacekeeping Operations, Security Policy Department, Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, 2 December 1999.

from SADC countries to attend courses at its Police Academy.⁹⁶ In addition, Norway contributed nearly US\$ 80,000 to exercise Blue Crane.⁹⁷

Oslo also supports various initiatives to promote peace and security elsewhere on the continent. Norway is playing a leading role in a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) project to review the OAU Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution. In addition, as of 31 December 1998, it had donated US\$ 517,192 to the OAU Peace Fund.⁹⁸ In 1999, Oslo pledged more than US\$ 1 million in support of the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED),⁹⁹ which is to oversee the implementation of the ECOWAS moratorium on the production, import, and export of small arms and light weapons. It has financed both bilateral and multilateral mediation efforts to end the conflicts in Burundi, Rwanda, Somalia, and the Sudan.¹⁰⁰ Norwegian military officers have provided peacekeeping instruction at various African institutions on an ad hoc basis.¹⁰¹ Oslo has also provided more than US\$ 2 million in voluntary funds to support UNOSOM II, ONUMOZ, UNAMIR, and UNOMIL.¹⁰²

The Norwegian Government has also developed several emergency relief systems active on the African continent that could have a potential role to play in aiding African initiatives. Although the Norwegian Emergency

⁹⁶ "Initiatives and Support from Norway," *UN Database on Peacekeeping Training and Initiatives in Africa*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/ext.14.htm>>>.

⁹⁷ Engelbrecht, "Preparing for Peace Missions in Southern Africa," p. 26.

⁹⁸ Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999.

⁹⁹ Documentation provided by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, December 1999.

¹⁰⁰ Helga Hernes, "Nordic Perspectives on African Capacity-Building," in Malan (ed.), "Resolute Partners: Building Peacekeeping Capacity in Southern Africa," p. 61.

¹⁰¹ "Initiatives and Support from Norway," *UN Database on Peacekeeping Training and Initiatives in Africa*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/ext.14.htm>>>.

¹⁰² *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, pp. 724, 727, 731, and 733.

Preparedness System (NOREPS), for example, is designed to support disaster relief rather than peacekeeping per se, its pre-positioning of humanitarian-related equipment could be used effectively in a peacekeeping operation. Under NOREPS, Oslo has stocked non-lethal items such as communication equipment, medical supplies, tentage, and rations in four locations in Africa: Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.¹⁰³

SWEDEN

Swedish capacity-building efforts include support for African organizations. Stockholm contributed US\$ 136,877 to the OAU Peace Fund¹⁰⁴ in 1998 and has budgeted the same amount for 1999.¹⁰⁵ In addition, it has invited the OAU to send three participants to attend courses on the United Nations at the Swedish Armed Forces International Centre (SWEDINT).¹⁰⁶ It has also given US\$ 100,000 to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). In 1999, Stockholm gave US\$ 300,000 in support PCASED—the first installment of its US\$ 1 million pledge.¹⁰⁷

Stockholm has also supported peacekeeping education and training through both bilateral and multilateral initiatives. Each year SWEDINT invites two participants from SADC member States to attend its courses for junior officers, police officers, and staff officers, and covers course fees and accommodation. It has provided instructors and funding for courses at the RPTC in Zimbabwe.¹⁰⁸ Swedish support for field exercises includes a

¹⁰³ "NOREPS," available on the Internet at <<<http://www.noreps.com/>>>.

¹⁰⁴ Written correspondence with Ibok, 26 January 1999.

¹⁰⁵ Interview with Col. Kent Edberg, Military Adviser, Swedish Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 3 December 1999, by telephone.

¹⁰⁶ "Initiatives and Support from Sweden," *UN Database on Peacekeeping Training and Initiatives in Africa*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/ext17.htm>>>.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Edberg, 3 December 1999, by telephone.

¹⁰⁸ "Initiatives and Support from Sweden."

donation of roughly US\$ 125,000 to Exercise Blue Crane¹⁰⁹ and a commitment to send a military instructor to Gabon 2000.¹¹⁰

Apart from its assistance to African organizations and individual States, Sweden has also funded African civil society projects and United Nations undertakings. For example, it financed a three-year, US\$ 348,000 project to enable a South African NGO to develop a system to monitor and obtain information on impending crises in Africa with a goal of helping to prevent conflicts from arising or escalating further.¹¹¹ Besides providing Blue Helmets, Sweden has also made voluntary financial contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations on the continent. Stockholm gave more than US\$ 2 million to UNOSOM II and ONUMOZ.¹¹²

OTHER NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES

Other non-African countries have programmes or initiatives to develop indigenous capabilities. Finland contributed some US\$ 200,000 to the OAU Peace Fund in 1997.¹¹³ It also provides a yearly donation of US\$ 100,000 to the OAU/International Peace Academy Joint Task Force on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in Africa. Helsinki invites two officers from SADC member States to participate in its military observer course as well.¹¹⁴ For Blue Crane, it provided one military observer and one civilian police

¹⁰⁹ Engelbrecht, "Preparing for Peace Missions in Southern Africa," p. 26.

¹¹⁰ Interview with Edberg, 3 December 1999, by telephone.

¹¹¹ "Initiatives and Support from Sweden."

¹¹² *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, pp. 724, and 727.

¹¹³ This money was allocated for "Conflict Prevention through the Fund," and the Finnish Government specified that "the funds should not be used for supporting the OAU Conflict Management Center." Written correspondence with Lt-Col. Markku Nikkila, Military Adviser, Finnish Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 13 September 1999.

¹¹⁴ "Initiatives and Support from Finland," *UN Database on Peacekeeping Training and Initiatives in Africa*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/ext9.htm>>>.

trainer.¹¹⁵ Ireland has assisted the Zambia Staff College in developing its peacekeeping training curriculum.¹¹⁶ It has also trained African officers from Egypt, Ethiopia, Morocco, Tanzania, and Zambia at its United Nations Training School.¹¹⁷ Portugal, for its part, will assist with translations for lusophone participants at seminars sponsored by the US African Center for Strategic Studies (ACSS), as well as with some conference documentation.¹¹⁸ Switzerland has also initiated programmes to strengthen African capabilities, including the secondment of a Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs official to a South African non-governmental organization.¹¹⁹ For exercise Blue Crane, Austria gave US\$ 50,000, India provided an aircraft, and China contributed some 20,000 uniforms.¹²⁰

Other non-African States have also made important voluntary contributions to United Nations peacekeeping operations on the African continent. The Soviet Union airlifted food at the beginning of ONUC.¹²¹ For UNTAG, Greece supplied logistics equipment.¹²² Australia provided communication equipment to the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).¹²³ Switzerland made available air ambulance services for the second United Nations Angola Verification

¹¹⁵ Written correspondence with Nikkila, 10 September 1999.

¹¹⁶ Ireland has a long-standing relationship with the Zambian army dating back almost to the time of Zambia's independence. This is the one bilateral relationship with an African country that Ireland has cultivated. Interview with John Deady, First Secretary, Irish Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 31 August 1999, by telephone.

¹¹⁷ "Initiatives and Support from Ireland," *UN Database on Peacekeeping Training and Initiatives in Africa*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/training/ext11.htm>>>.

¹¹⁸ Interview with David Hamon, Regional Director for Plans and Policy, Office of African Affairs, US Department of Defense, 19 August 1999, by telephone.

¹¹⁹ Written correspondence with Swiss Government official, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, 29 August 1999.

¹²⁰ Engelbrecht, "Preparing for Peace Missions in Southern Africa," p. 26.

¹²¹ *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peacekeeping (Third Edition)*, p. 710.

¹²² *Ibid.*, p. 712.

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p. 720.

Mission (UNAVEM II).¹²⁴ For UNAMIR, the Republic of Korea provided vehicles and containers valued at roughly US\$ 530,000.¹²⁵

ASSESSMENT

Despite their relatively small size, the capacity-building programmes of these other countries share much in common with those of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. They too vary considerably in terms of their level of financial and political commitment as well as their primary emphasis. Domestic considerations similarly motivate and constrain many of these smaller initiatives. For example, the desire of Denmark's Minister for Defence to carve out a high-profile role for himself helps to explain the surprisingly large scope of the Danish programme. More broadly, Denmark was eager to differentiate itself from its Nordic partners and has taken obvious pride in being mentioned as one of the "big players." Japan's increased involvement in African peace and security issues has been linked to its goal of gaining a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Some posit that Japan's new approach is a short-term attempt to curry favor with African States, which comprise the largest bloc of nations in the United Nations General Assembly.¹²⁶ (This charge could of course be made against any donor country assisting Africa with an interest in claiming a permanent seat on an expanded Council.) Ottawa's interest in supporting peacekeeping and related initiatives in francophone Africa can be in part explained by its sensitivity to the Québec issue.

Although some of these programmes are extremely small or are tangential to capacity-building, several have had a significant impact on African peacekeeping capabilities and potentially merit emulation. Africans have warmly welcomed these low-profile approaches to developing their peacekeeping capabilities. Germany, in particular, has been praised for providing significant assistance with little fanfare. Although their programmes are relatively small compared to those of the P-3, countries such as Belgium,

¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 715.

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 731.

¹²⁶ Peter J. Schraeder, "Japan's Quest for Influence in Africa," *Current History*, May 1999, p. 234.

Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands have provided timely and meaningful support to African troops participating in actual peacekeeping operations. Denmark's creative use of balance-of-payments support and development aid is noteworthy. Copenhagen's initiative to introduce SADC countries to the possible benefits of instituting the BALTBAT concept in the subregion also deserves additional attention. The pre-positioning of non-lethal equipment in Africa under NOREPS could complement France's decision to pre-position *matériel*, and its potential should be explored.