

CHAPTER 14

MULTILATERAL INITIATIVES

Multilateral initiatives to enhance African peacekeeping capabilities—both through existing organizations and informal cooperation networks—are becoming increasingly important. The European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU)—both individually and collaboratively—have expanded their efforts to respond to crises in Africa and to develop African peacekeeping capabilities. The Commonwealth has proven more willing to review and criticize political developments in its member States. The Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (known by its Portuguese acronym, CPLP, for *Comunidade dos Países de Língua Portuguesa*) mediated the conflict in Guinea-Bissau and contemplated deploying a military observer force. The International Organization of the Francophonie (known by its French acronym, OIF, for *Organisation internationale de la Francophonie*) has transformed itself from a cultural association into a political organization and has become more involved in trying to resolve crises in Africa. On the informal level, cooperation between France and the United Kingdom has intensified, and the two countries have announced that they are harmonizing their policies towards Africa. The Franco-African Summit, long an important forum for addressing threats to African peace, has made security the central theme of two of its last three meetings. The Nordic countries have begun to work together to develop peacekeeping training in Africa.

ORGANIZATIONS WITHOUT AFRICAN MEMBERS

European Union

Since 1995, the 15-member European Union¹ has consistently noted its support for developing African preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping capabilities. In December 1995, the Council of the European Union stated that the EU was “ready to support African efforts in the field of preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping, where necessary via the WEU.” It stressed, however, that “[i]t is essential for there to be an African lead in preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution in Africa.”² In June 1997, the Council reiterated its willingness to assist. Its Common Position and Council Conclusions on “Conflict prevention and resolution in Africa” provided that the EU will “actively support efforts in favour of the prevention and resolution of conflicts in Africa.”³ It also averred that “[t]he Union is ready to assist in building the capacities for conflict prevention and resolution in Africa on the basis of concrete project proposals, in particular through the [Organization of African Unity] OAU and African subregional organizations.”⁴

In line with these policy goals, the EU has funded both regional and subregional African capacity-building initiatives. As of 31 December 1998, it had contributed more than US\$ 1 million to the OAU Peace Fund.⁵ The

¹ EU members include: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.

² See “Preventive Diplomacy, conflict resolution and peacekeeping in Africa,” 4 December 1995, available on the Internet at <<<http://europa.eu.int/comm/development/prevention/conclusion-1995.htm>>>.

³ EU Document 97/356/CFSP, *Common Position defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, concerning conflict prevention and resolution in Africa*, 2 June 1997, Article 1.1, available on the Internet at <<http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/lif/dat/1997/en_497X0356.html>>.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Article 7.1.

⁵ Written correspondence with S. Bassey Ibok, Head, Conflict Management Division, OAU Secretariat, 26 January 1999.

organization has focused on improving the OAU's telecommunications, with an emphasis on the OAU's field offices and missions. It has procured equipment such as satellite telephone sets (with encryption features), laptop computers, and portable printers.⁶ In addition, on 15 June 1999, the EU agreed to provide financial support for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security.⁷

The EU has also helped underwrite various peace processes on the continent. It has, for example, contributed financially to regional efforts to find a peaceful settlement to the conflict in Burundi. Following a meeting of the European Development Fund on 16 June 1999, the EU decided to allocate more than US\$ 2.5 million via the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in support of the Lusaka Peace Process to end the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).⁸

In addition, the EU has established a Special Envoy for the African Great Lakes Region to support conflict resolution efforts there and report on developments. Amb. Aldo Ajello of Italy, who had previously been the United Nations Secretary-General's Special Representative for Mozambique and had headed the United Nations peacekeeping operation there, has served in the post since its creation in March 1996. The Special Envoy assists national, regional, and international initiatives to find a lasting solution to the economic, humanitarian, and political problems facing the region. Among other tasks, Ajello is charged with supporting "the preparation for the holding of a Conference on Peace, Security, and Stability in the Great Lakes Region."⁹ The Brussels-based team, which has grown as the Special Envoy's mandate has been expanded, has traveled extensively throughout Africa and

⁶ Written correspondence with Peter Craig-McQuaide, Principal Administrator, European Correspondent's Unit, Directorate General for External Relations, European Commission, 30 November 1999.

⁷ Written correspondence with Craig-McQuaide, 2 December 1999.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ EU Document 96/250/CFSP, *Joint Action of 25 March 1996 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article J.3 of the Treaty on European Union, in relation to the nomination of a Special Envoy for the African Great Lakes Region*, 25 March 1996.

the West to encourage the pacific settlement of disputes in the Great Lakes region and to generate and coordinate diplomatic and financial support.¹⁰ On 28 June 1999, the EU extended the Special Envoy's mandate until 31 July 2000.¹¹

While the EU has concentrated its resources on developing African capabilities in the areas of early warning and preventive diplomacy, it has also supported African peacekeeping forces—albeit to a much smaller extent. From 1994 to 1997, the European Commission provided vehicles to the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia and coordinated its development assistance (such as infrastructure repairs) to aid ECOMOG operations when possible.¹² Although the EU pledged to provide funds to African countries that might contribute troops to the proposed Canadian-led multinational force for Eastern Zaire, this support should not be taken at face value. By the time EU development ministers agreed on an aid package for the Great Lakes region as well as funds for African contingents,¹³ it should have been clear that the mission was not likely to go forward. Indeed, the multinational force never was deployed (see Chapter 8).

¹⁰ Written correspondence with Craig-McQuaide, 8 December 1999.

¹¹ EU Document 1999/423/CFSP, *Council Decision extending Joint Action 96/250/CFSP in relation to the nomination of a Special Envoy for the African Great Lakes Region*, 28 June 1999.

¹² Interview with Craig-McQuaide, 7 December 1999, by telephone.

¹³ Gorm Rye Olsen "Western Europe's Relations with Africa Since the End of the Cold War," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 35, No. 2, 1997, pp. 316-17.

Western European Union

Like the EU, the 10-nation WEU¹⁴ has stated its desire to enhance and support African peacekeeping capacities. In November 1995, the WEU Council indicated that it was studying the possibility of supporting African peacekeeping initiatives. In May 1996, the Council instructed the Permanent Council to pursue this objective, in accordance with a request by the EU. The Permanent Council subsequently decided to send a fact-finding mission to Africa, and the Ministers endorsed this decision in May 1996. In August 1996, the WEU fact-finding mission visited the OAU and several African countries.¹⁵ The mission recommended: [1] creating a link between the WEU and the OAU; [2] establishing contacts with subregional organizations; [3] developing ideas for supporting African organizations and States with communications, logistics, and training; and [4] enlisting the WEU's Military Staff to coordinate support provided by individual WEU member States.¹⁶ The WEU Planning Cell has since established a database that records the peacekeeping training that European countries offer to African States.¹⁷ In addition, the organization has sent representatives to training exercises as well as attended and hosted various seminars with peacekeeping themes and an African focus.¹⁸

The WEU has devoted substantial resources to monitoring and analysing threats to peace and security on the African continent. The WEU Satellite Centre, for example, has been focusing on African peace and security issues since shortly after its creation in 1993. In 1994, the Centre analysed

¹⁴ WEU members include: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The five EU countries that are not members of WEU (Austria, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, and Sweden) enjoy "observer" status within WEU.

¹⁵ "WEU's contribution to reinforcing peace in central Africa," *Report of Mr. Masseret on behalf of the Defence Committee, Assembly of Western European Union*, Document 1566, 13 May 1997, pp. 30-31.

¹⁶ "Statement by José Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU," *Colloquy: Peacekeeping and security in Africa*, Lisbon, 15 September 1998, Paris: Assembly of Western European Union, 1998, p. 56.

¹⁷ "WEU's contribution to reinforcing peace in central Africa," p. 31.

¹⁸ "Statement by, José Cutileiro, Secretary-General of WEU," p. 57.

infrastructure and military installations in Burundi and Zaire and created overview maps of large areas of those countries. In 1995, it studied Angolan airfields and produced a number of reports on Rwanda. During 1996-1997, the Satellite Centre performed a number of tasks associated with the crisis in the Great Lakes region, which included detecting and analysing refugee camps and associated lines of communication as well as identifying airfields and access routes. As of September 1998, it had produced over 100 reports analysing 280 different locations in Africa with some 175 satellite images.¹⁹ This information has been made available to WEU members and "associate members"²⁰ but not to African States or organizations.²¹

WEU support for peacekeeping in Africa—either direct or indirect—has yet to materialize. Members were split on whether to intervene directly in support of the Canadian-led multinational force in Eastern Zaire.²² This lack of unity was reflected in the reactive manner in which the organization approached the conflict. On 15 November 1996—the day the United Nations Security Council authorized the multinational force in Eastern Zaire—the WEU Permanent Council asked the Planning Cell to examine the possibilities for WEU involvement. The next day, the Planning Cell presented its advice on four possible options, determining that: [1] the WEU could not make a meaningful contribution in coordinating transportation for the multinational force; [2] the WEU could coordinate transport for the humanitarian aid operation being prepared by the EU; [3] although it was too late to coordinate training for the first units of African participants in the multinational force, the WEU could provide training for units being prepared for rotation; [4] further WEU support and logistics for the multinational force would not be useful, but it could be important for the humanitarian

¹⁹ "Statement by Frank Asbeck, Deputy Director of the WEU Satellite Centre," *Colloquy: Peacekeeping and security in Africa*, Lisbon, p. 21.

²⁰ WEU associate members include the six European members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) that are neither WEU members nor observers—Iceland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Norway, Poland, and Turkey.

²¹ Interview with Frank Asbeck, Deputy Director, Satellite Centre, WEU Secretariat, 9 December 1999, by telephone.

²² Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain supported an intervention, whereas the Netherlands, Portugal, and the UK did not. Olsen, "Western Europe's Relations with Africa Since the End of the Cold War," p. 316.

operation.²³ Ultimately, the Permanent Council could only agree to make a vague commitment to provide training and logistical support for African troops participating. On 2 December, the Planning Cell indicated to the Permanent Council that the WEU could provide transport aircraft for the civil humanitarian operations, assist in the delivery of humanitarian aid with military transport, and conduct training.²⁴ In the end, none of this support was given as the force did not materialize. Since then, the organization has neither offered to provide similar assistance, nor considered fielding a peacekeeping force in Africa.

ORGANIZATIONS WITH AFRICAN MEMBERS

The Commonwealth

Besides establishing common ideals, the Commonwealth has increasingly criticized members that fail to uphold them. The Commonwealth, created in 1949,²⁵ is a voluntary association of States linked by their past relationship as a colony, protectorate, or trust territory of another Commonwealth country.²⁶ The organization now has 54 members—19 of which are African States²⁷—and is headed by Chief Emeka

²³ "WEU's contributing to reinforcing peace in central Africa," pp. 40-41.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 41.

²⁵ From its creation until the late 1950s, the Commonwealth was a small, British-run "club" with fewer than 10 members. Membership expanded rapidly with decolonization in Africa and Asia, however, and had grown to 21 by the time the Secretariat was established in 1965. Ron Gerver, "Guide to the Commonwealth," *BBC News*, 11 November 1999, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.bbc.co.uk>>>.

²⁶ Mozambique, which became a Commonwealth member in 1995, is the sole exception. Maputo was admitted in recognition of its unique historical relationship with the organization in the struggle against the apartheid regime in South Africa. *The Commonwealth*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.thecommonwealth.org>>>.

²⁷ African membership in the organization includes: Botswana, Cameroon, the Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, the Seychelles, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, (continued...)

Anyaoku of Nigeria. The Commonwealth has no written charter, but its members have subscribed to a number of written statements and a body of "Commonwealth principles" has emerged. The association has increasingly focused on promoting good governance and democracy, sustainable economic and social development, and respect for the rule of law, human rights, and gender equality.²⁸ In November 1995, Commonwealth Heads of Government created the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group (CMAG) to recommend actions to be taken against members that persistently violate the organization's principles.²⁹ During its first four years, CMAG has focused on political developments within the Gambia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone—all three of which were under military rule when selected for scrutiny.³⁰

Although the Commonwealth has deployed an observer group on the African continent, this initiative is not likely to be repeated despite its success. The Commonwealth, which was actively involved in efforts to liberate the subregion from minority rule, played a central role in shepherding Zimbabwe's transition to independence during 1979-1980. Several of its members took part in the 1,300-strong Commonwealth Monitoring Force (CMF) (see Chapter 8), and the Secretariat observed the February 1980 elections. In the United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG), which oversaw the elections that led to Namibian independence, 17 Commonwealth members contributed either Blue Helmets or electoral supervisors.³¹ In 1992, the multidisciplinary civilian Commonwealth Observer Mission to South Africa (COMSA) was created to assist South Africa in

²⁷ (...continued)
Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

²⁸ *The Commonwealth*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.chogm99.org/what/comsec.htm>>>.

²⁹ The Heads of Government also decided at the 1995 Summit to suspend Nigeria from the Commonwealth because it had executed nine minority-rights activists. The suspension was lifted in May 1999. "Nigeria-Commonwealth: Ban Lifted," *Africa Research Bulletin*, Vol. 36, No. 5, 1-31 May, 1999, p. 13560.

³⁰ *Report of the Commonwealth Ministerial Action Group on the Harare Declaration (CMAG) to Commonwealth Heads of Government: Executive Summary*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.chogm99.org/>>>.

³¹ See *The Blue Helmets: A Review of UN Peace-keeping (Third Edition)*, New York: UN Department of Public Information, 1996, pp. 711-12.

stemming the escalating political violence that threatened to derail the process towards ending apartheid rule. COMSA continued through the April 1994 elections and concluded its operations in May 1994. In addition, a 33-strong Commonwealth Peacekeeping Assistance Group, comprised of military and police officers from nine member countries, helped train the South African National Peacekeeping Force constituted to provide security during the elections.³² While the association will continue to examine the political situations and human rights abuses in member countries and to field election observation missions,³³ it is not likely to undertake another peacekeeping operation—either in Africa or elsewhere.

The Commonwealth Secretariat has, however, facilitated and coordinated peacekeeping assistance from its members to an African State or regional organization. In 1998, the Secretariat recruited and administered a six-person Commonwealth Police Development Task Force to serve with and help train Sierra Leonean police.³⁴ In 1999, Canada arranged through the Secretariat to procure and transport non-lethal aid³⁵ to the Ghanaian and Nigerian contingents serving with ECOMOG in Sierra Leone. Ottawa initiated this novel approach because it judged that it could procure more supplies and ensure that they reached their intended recipients in a shorter time if it bought and sent the items from Europe. Canada was pleased with the results of this initiative but has no plans to repeat it.³⁶

³² *The Commonwealth in Action: South Africa*, p. 5, courtesy of Commonwealth Secretariat.

³³ As of 30 June, 28 Commonwealth Observer Groups had been dispatched to monitor elections among—and at the request of—Commonwealth members. “Commonwealth News Release: Commonwealth to observe Parliamentary and Presidential elections in Mozambique,” *The Commonwealth*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.thecommonwealth.org>>>.

³⁴ The UK provided the bulk of the operation’s funding as well as three police officers, and Canada, Sri Lanka, and Zimbabwe contributed one officer each. Interview with Sandra Pepera, Chief Programme Officer, Political Affairs Division, Commonwealth Secretariat, 6 December 1999, by telephone.

³⁵ Medical supplies, food, and generators were among the items purchased. Written correspondence with Pepera, 6 December 1999.

³⁶ Interview with Canadian Government official, 1999.

Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries

CPLP has evolved significantly since it was established in 1996 and has begun to concentrate on peace and security issues. When Angola, Brazil, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, Portugal, and Sao Tome and Principe initially discussed creating an organization, the proposed mandate was rather narrow, focusing on the promotion of Portuguese culture and language. After several years of false starts, the proposed mandate was expanded. At the time of CPLP's creation in July 1996, plans for a common Parliamentary Assembly and a common University were underway. These ideas proved overly ambitious and have not been implemented. Initially, the CPLP Secretariat comprised only Executive Secretary Marcolino Moro of Angola, his deputy, and a secretary—all of whom shared a one-room office. Moreover, the organization had no budget.³⁷ Despite these constraints, in September 1997, experts from CPLP member States met to prepare a conference of defence ministers and discussed the topic of CPLP participation in peacekeeping forces.³⁸ In July 1998, Defence Ministers from CPLP member States approved an initiative to train and prepare military units for humanitarian and peace missions. They also announced that a Center for Strategic Analysis would be established in Maputo.³⁹

CPLP's active involvement in conflict resolution on the African continent crystallized with the crisis in Guinea-Bissau. In July 1998, at the second Conference of Heads of State and Government in Praia, Cape Verde, the seven CPLP Heads of State condemned the rebellion in Guinea-Bissau and called for the re-establishment of democratic order. They also agreed to establish a Contact Group at the foreign minister level to explore appropriate diplomatic means to end the conflict.⁴⁰ The CPLP Contact Group, under the leadership of Cape Verde's Foreign Minister, is credited with negotiating the

³⁷ Interview with Rafael Branco, Deputy Executive Secretary, CPLP Secretariat, 1 March 1999, Lisbon.

³⁸ "CPLP Defence Experts Meet in Maputo," *Panafrican News Agency*, 16 September 1997, available on the Internet at <<<http://africanews.org>>>

³⁹ *Africa Research Bulletin*, Vol. 35, No. 7, 1-31 July 1998, pp. 13170-71.

⁴⁰ UN Document S/1998/686, Annex, 17 July 1998 *Praia Declaration of the Second Conference of the Heads of State and Government of CPLP*, 24 July 1998, para. 13.

truce of 26 July 1998.⁴¹ In the memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the Government of Guinea-Bissau and the military junta, the parties agreed upon the “[d]eployment of a military observer or an interpositional force, preferably from Portuguese-speaking countries.”⁴² On 26 August, a meeting was held under the joint chairmanship of CPLP and ECOWAS, at which the parties transformed the truce into a cease-fire.⁴³ In mid-September, CPLP and ECOWAS convened another joint meeting and addressed the size and composition of the eventual peacekeeping force. The Ministers referred to the deployment of an ECOWAS/CPLP observer mission.⁴⁴ CPLP advocated the deployment of a military observer force of around 150 officers, while ECOWAS proposed a regional intervention force of some 5,000 troops.⁴⁵ ECOWAS orchestrated the November 1998 Abuja Accord and thereafter took the lead in overseeing the peace process. That agreement provided for the deployment of an ECOMOG intervention force, but indicated that ECOWAS and CPLP would both send observers to the scheduled elections⁴⁶—which the May 1999 coup d’état made moot.

CPLP member States still envisage a future peacekeeping role for the organization but have yet to address its financial and organizational

⁴¹ Interview with Branco, 1 March 1999, Lisbon.

⁴² UN Document S/1998/698, Annex, *Memorandum of Understanding of 26 July 1998 Between the Government of the Republic of Guinea-Bissau and the Self-Proclaimed Military Junta*, 28 July 1998, Article 1(d).

⁴³ See UN Document S/1998/825, Annex I, *26 August 1998 Cease-fire Agreement in Guinea-Bissau*, 1 September 1998. This meeting was billed as a joint mediation effort, but there was initially some disagreement over which organization would have the principal role. “Guinea Bissau: Cease-fire Agreement,” *Africa Research Bulletin*, Vol. 35, No. 8, 1-31 August 1998, p. 13225.

⁴⁴ UN Document S/1998/884, Annex, *Final communiqué of the Second Joint Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the ECOWAS Committee of Seven on Guinea-Bissau and the CPLP*, held at Abidjan on 15 and 16 September, 22 September 1998, Article 12.

⁴⁵ Interview with José Duarte, Politico-Diplomatic Adviser, CPLP Secretariat, 1 March 1999, Lisbon.

⁴⁶ See UN Document S/1998/1028, Annex, *Agreement between the Government of Guinea-Bissau and the self-proclaimed military junta*, 3 November 1998, paras. 2 and 5.

constraints, suggesting that such plans will not soon materialize. On 25 May 1999, CPLP Defence Ministers agreed in Praia to create a CPLP peacekeeping force to participate in humanitarian operations.⁴⁷ Concerning the CPLP force discussed for Guinea-Bissau, it was never clear which countries would provide observers or how the mission would be financed. CPLP did not expect that its members alone would comprise or underwrite the relatively small observer mission it had proposed.⁴⁸ The organization's annual budget is just US\$ 600,000-800,000 (US\$ 210,000 of which is assessed), and almost half of its small staff is seconded from member Governments. Moreover, according to Rafael Branco, CPLP's Deputy Executive Secretary, member States' priorities are very different and it has thus been difficult to formulate a common strategy.⁴⁹

International Organization of the Francophonie

OIF, also known as the Francophonie, has undergone a significant transformation since its creation as a cultural and linguistic association designed to promote cooperation throughout the French-speaking world.⁵⁰ At the November 1997 Summit of Heads of State and Government in Hanoi, the Francophonie took on a political dimension and assumed the status of an international organization. The Summit adopted a charter outlining the organization's revised objectives and structure.⁵¹ In addition, the Secretariat

⁴⁷ See "Defense: Lusophone Countries," *Africa Research Bulletin*, Vol. 36, No. 5, 1-31 May 1999, p. 13560. The five-point document that the Defence Ministers approved also addressed technical-military cooperation and sought to develop the seven CPLP members' defence industries. *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Interview with Duarte, 1 March 1999, Lisbon.

⁴⁹ Interview with Branco, 1 March 1999, Lisbon.

⁵⁰ The first intergovernmental organ, the Cultural and Technical Cooperation Agency, was established in March 1970; the first Francophonie Summit followed 16 years later, in 1986. "L'histoire de la Francophonie: Les grandes dates de la Francophonie," *La Francophonie*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.francophonie.org/oif/francophonie>>>.

⁵¹ The new structure comprises three organs: the Summit of Heads of State and Government, which meets biannually, the Ministerial Conference, which convenes at least once each year, and the Permanent Council, which meets at least two times per year. Articles 3, 4, and 5, and Annexes 3, 4, and 5, "La
(continued...)

was established and Boutros Boutros-Ghali was elected as OIF's first Secretary-General. Building upon the work he began as United Nations Secretary-General, Boutros-Ghali convened a meeting of 16 regional organizations in March 1998.⁵² Of the 49 members of the organization, 29 are African States—not all of them French-speaking.⁵³ Indeed, French is not widely spoken in many OIF member countries.

With its expanded focus, the Francophonie has become increasingly involved diplomatically in conflict prevention, management, and resolution on the African continent. Since 1998, the organization has dispatched four "conciliation missions" to Africa: to Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR), DRC, and Togo. OIF has undertaken other political activities in Africa. As part of its preventive diplomacy efforts, it has fielded numerous election monitoring teams.⁵⁴ Conflict management and resolution initiatives have included mediation attempts in the Comoros and Guinea-Bissau.⁵⁵ OIF has not, however, considered deploying a peacekeeping force or supporting African peacekeeping endeavours financially or materially.

⁵¹ (...continued)

Charte de la Francophonie," 15 November 1997, *La Francophonie*.

⁵² Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "L'an I de la francophonie politique," *Le Monde*, 23 February 1999.

⁵³ The 29 African members are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic (CAR), Chad, the Comoros, Congo (Brazzaville), Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, the Seychelles, Togo, and Tunisia. "Données sur les Etats participant au Sommet francophone," *La Francophonie*.

⁵⁴ OIF has sent teams to observe 49 elections in member countries. *La Francophonie*.

⁵⁵ "Rapport du Secrétaire général de la Francophonie: de Hanoi à Moncton," *La Francophonie*.

INFORMAL ARRANGEMENTS

France and the United Kingdom

Particularly since December 1998, France and the United Kingdom have increased their cooperation with regard to Africa.⁵⁶ At a bilateral summit in St. Malo, France, they announced that they would harmonize their policies towards Africa and pursue Anglo-French cooperation on the continent itself. In a joint declaration, the two countries pledged to intensify their exchange of information on developments in Africa, to explore the possibility of sharing embassy premises, to organize Anglo/French-Africa Heads of Mission conferences at the subregional level, and to prepare meetings between their respective ministers and joint visits by their Foreign Ministers to Africa.⁵⁷ According to Ian Mackley, the British High Commissioner to Ghana, the new Franco-British approach to African security is ultimately designed to be "joint" in the domain of conflict prevention, rather than conflict resolution.⁵⁸ In March 1999, French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine and British Foreign Secretary Robin Cook together visited Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana to formally inaugurate the new cooperation programme. In Abidjan, they chaired a conference of British and French ambassadors and high commissioners serving in a number of African countries to devise ways to implement these policy goals. The group discussed sharing embassies and functions and determined that information-sharing, even on matters as sensitive as security, will be prioritized.⁵⁹ In this spirit, France and the UK jointly signed MOUs

⁵⁶ Besides working together in several multilateral organizations, they have undertaken joint operations to evacuate their nationals from various conflict zones. Interview with Lt-Col. Simon Diggins, Trainer, BMATT West Africa, 17 March 1999, Accra.

⁵⁷ "Joint Declaration Issued at the British-French Summit, St. Malo, France," 4 December 1999, *British Foreign and Commonwealth Office*, available on the Internet at <<<http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?1797>>>.

⁵⁸ Interview with Ian Mackley, High Commissioner, UK High Commission to Ghana, 18 March 1999, Accra.

⁵⁹ Interview with Lt-Col. Joe Gordon, Trainer, BMATT West Africa, 17 March 1999, Accra.

with the United Nations regarding their standby capabilities in June 1999, becoming the first permanent members of the Security Council to do so.⁶⁰

Franco-African Summits

Franco-African Summits have long been an important forum for addressing African peace and security issues. The first such meeting, which convened in 1974, was attended by 10 francophone countries—six at the Head of State level.⁶¹ These Summits were held annually until 1988, when a biannual time-frame was instituted. In 1996, the meeting expanded to include non-francophone African countries. At the most recent Summit, held in Paris in November 1998, 49 African States were represented. Meetings are now thematic,⁶² although not to the exclusion of other business. Over the years, a number of concrete proposals for resolving African conflicts and developing peacekeeping capabilities have originated or been cemented at Franco-African Summits. At the May 1978 Summit, for example, France secured the agreement of five African countries to provide contingents for an inter-African force to deploy in Zaire's Shaba province.⁶³ The last three Franco-African Summits have addressed the issue of the appropriate structure

⁶⁰ According to Foreign Secretary Cook, the act "underlines excellent UK/French cooperation and builds on the understanding reached in St. Malo last year." "UK Troops Available for UN Peacekeeping," *British Foreign and Commonwealth Office News*, 25 June 1999, available on the Internet at <<http://www.fco.gov.uk/news/newstext.asp?2591>> >.

⁶¹ See Hugo Sada, "Afrique: Le XXe Sommet Franco-Africain," *Défense nationale*, February 1998, p. 176.

⁶² For example, the November 1994 Summit in Biarritz, France was devoted to Security and Military Intervention; the December 1996 Summit in Ouagadougou to Good Government and Development, and the November 1998 Summit to Security. The Security theme of the November 1998 Summit encompassed issues such as attempting to find solutions to the crisis in DRC and the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia, arms trafficking, maintaining peace after a conflict, and the Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS). "Franco-African Summit: Security Theme," *Africa Research Bulletin*, Vol. 35, No. 12, 1-31 December 1998, p. 13382.

⁶³ George E. Moose, "French Military Policy in Africa," in William J. Foltz and Henry S. Bienen (eds), *Arms and the African: Military Influences on Africa's International Relations*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985, pp. 71-72.

for an African peacekeeping force.⁶⁴ Moreover, African efforts to resolve the recent crisis in the Central African Republic (CAR) date from the December 1996 Franco-African Summit.⁶⁵ Indeed, the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (known by its French acronym, MISAB, for *Mission interafricaine de surveillance des accords de Bangui*) was an outgrowth of the November 1996 Summit.

Nordic Countries

Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden have begun to orient their long-standing cooperation in the domain of peacekeeping training towards African countries. They first agreed to work together on United Nations peacekeeping training in 1964, and joint training courses are now held in each of the countries according to a division of labour scheme.⁶⁶ In addition, they initiated a training course for senior United Nations personnel, known as the Nordic United Nations Peacekeeping Senior Management Seminar (UNMAS).⁶⁷ The Nordic countries routinely sponsor African participants to

⁶⁴ France's 1994 proposal for a standing African peacekeeping force was not supported by African States. Instead, the Summit tasked Togolese President Gnassingbé Eyadéma to study the issue and devise an appropriate structure. Togo distributed a document entitled "Standby Force Modules" at the December 1996 Summit. Discussions over the issue continued at the November 1998 Summit. See "Communication du Président de la République Togolaise, Son Excellence Gnassingbé Eyadema au 20ème Sommet France-Afrique," courtesy of Togolese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lomé.

⁶⁵ Interview with Gen. Amadou Toumani Touré, Former Head of State of Mali, Former Chairman, International Monitoring Committee to Supervise the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements and the Inter-African Mission to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements, 25 March 1999, Bamako.

⁶⁶ Denmark trains military police, Finland military observers, Norway logisticians, and Sweden staff officers. Hans Haekkerup, "Peacekeeping—A Danish Perspective," in *Peacekeeping in Africa (Volume 2)*, Halfway House: Institute for Defence Policy, 1996, pp. 202-03.

⁶⁷ Peter Viggo Jakobsen, "The Danish Approach to UN Peace Operations after the Cold War: A New Model in the Making?," *International Peacekeeping*, Vol. 5, No. 3, Autumn 1998, p. 116. This annual two-week course is designed for potential force commanders, special representatives of the Secretary-General, (continued...)

attend these courses. They have also adopted a joint approach to peacekeeping in Africa. In November 1997, they met to discuss their assistance to the continent⁶⁸ and sent a fact-finding mission.⁶⁹ The idea behind these initiatives was to extend their cooperation to Africa. Nordic countries have focused particularly on Southern Africa in terms of devising and articulating a common capacity-building strategy for the region. Indeed, they have proposed the "Nordic Model" of peacekeeping training for the Southern African region.⁷⁰

ASSESSMENT

These multilateral initiatives focus primarily on conflict prevention, and their capacity-building aspects tend to support structures and processes rather than operations. The EU and the WEU both stress their commitment to developing African peacekeeping capabilities, yet the emphasis and scope of their initiatives belie their resolve. The EU has only provided operational support to an African peacekeeping undertaking on one occasion. None of the WEU's initiatives constitute capacity-building. Moreover, despite pronouncements to the contrary, the EU and WEU too often work independently of one another. The Commonwealth has distinguished itself by deploying a sizeable multinational force in Africa, but such an initiative is not likely to be repeated. Although the political forces and personalities behind the Francophonie's recent expansion suggest that it will assume a more important role in resolving crises in Africa, its engagement will likely remain political rather than operational. CPLP has expressed its willingness to deploy a peacekeeping force and to develop African peacekeeping

⁶⁷ (...continued)

police commissioners, and humanitarian coordinators. Helga Hernes, "Nordic Perspectives on Capacity-Building," in Mark Malan (ed.), "Resolute Partners: Building Peacekeeping Capacity in Southern Africa," *ISS Monograph No. 21*, February 1998, p. 64.

⁶⁸ Interview with Danish Government official, 1998.

⁶⁹ Hernes, "Nordic Perspectives on Capacity-Building," p. 62.

⁷⁰ Interview with Lt-Col. Erik Berg, Deputy Military Adviser, Swedish Permanent Mission to the UN in New York, 26 February 1998, Bakel.

capacities, but it has neither the resources nor the experience to contribute in a significant way.