

Mine action and development: merging strategies

Judy GRAYSON

In February 2001 I watched as a team of deminers in northern Chad worked under the desert sun to open a road between Faya Largeau, a northern oasis, and the capital city of N'Djamena. It looked like an unimportant wasteland with no inhabitants close by, but the Team Leader explained that it was a priority. The task might have appeared minor—only a small portion of narrow track on the outskirts of Faya Largeau was suspected to be mined and then the rest of the road was clear. And the impact of this blockage might also appear to have been insignificant. In the twenty years since this section of road had been closed, local inhabitants had carved a detour through the dunes that added thirty kilometres to the Faya Largeau–N'Djamena trip.

What is the cost of a thirty-kilometre detour? In many countries it is no more than minutes on the highway; it would have been an annoyance. Yet in Chad, the implications of an extra thirty kilometres are huge. For a truck in the rainy season the detour translates into at least an additional eight hours' slog through the dunes. In a country with little refrigeration, eight hours of additional transport time means that certain produce is not viable for sale from one village to another. It means that transported livestock needs to be fed another day or arrive at market thinner and therefore less valuable and less nutritious. For Faya Largeau it meant that in the years since the road fell into disuse because of suspicion and fear of mines, certain crops were no longer worth growing because they could not make it to a wider market and it meant that other perishables that the inhabitants of Faya Largeau enjoyed receiving from farther south no longer made it to the oasis.

Raising funds for clearance activities such as this can be difficult. Although these activities have a serious impact on people's lives and are, therefore, 'humanitarian', they do not fall easily within the definition of humanitarian aid for many donors. In recent years the boundary of what constitutes humanitarian aid with respect to mine action has been liberally and, in my view, accurately stretched to encompass land interdiction and many other activities where, technically, lives are not immediately jeopardized. This is a significant evolution in the international community's outlook, which initially considered landmines simply a military issue.

Yet it is a relatively recent phenomenon. Only in the late 1980s, in Afghanistan, did the international community begin to recognize the humanitarian implications of landmines. Gradually this has progressed to the point where the socio-economic impact of mines (primarily interdiction to land and other resources) has gained general acceptance as the second most important factor—after the number of casualties—in determining how scarce resources should be prioritized and allocated to mine action.

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In its outline of key principles, the UN Strategy for Mine Action 2001–2005¹ contained the following statement under the heading ‘Humanitarian Imperative’: ‘Landmines are first and foremost a humanitarian concern and must be addressed from this perspective.’ After some debate, a sentence referring to their impact on development was added. The revised strategy endorsed by the Inter-agency Coordination Group on Mine Action in July 2003 contains a new paragraph outlining an additional key principle, ‘Development perspective’:

The presence of landmines and UXO [unexploded ordnance] is frequently an obstacle to progress towards the Millennium Development Goals² through preventing participation by affected communities in economic development. In countries where this is the case, the UN will encourage governments to include a mine-action impact assessment in all development planning, and to incorporate a strategic plan for mine action in the national development plan and poverty reduction strategies.

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by mines and UXOs. This should not replace humanitarian funding—it should supplement it. Nor does this mean that countries should diminish the prominence given to the most immediate impact of mines on human lives in favour of purely economic assessments. Rather this should be an enhancement of existing activities and an attempt to distribute the burden of response, financial and non-financial, more even-handedly. If it is roads that are mined, then the ministry of transportation and the funding streams that support it—domestic and foreign—should be activated. If it is private industry that is thwarted by mine contamination then countries could attempt to design a burden-sharing scheme where a portion of future revenues are channelled back into mine action once the obstacles are cleared, the industry is established, and profits are realized. In Mauritania, for example, the mined areas are vast tracts of desert where few people live and hardly any casualties are sustained. However, mineral exploration companies do sometimes request assistance when suspected minefields hinder their ability to prospect for new exploitation sites. With mineral export a major source of foreign exchange for the government and a source of revenue for the entire country, who should foot this mine action bill? Should it be funded from humanitarian, development or even private sources? Ultimately it is the Government of Mauritania that will need to make this decision, either by levying a fee on private enterprise or requesting foreign assistance for clearance. And at that point it will be for donor countries or lending institutions to decide from which account the funding might flow. (One further question: do most mine action staff really have the mindset and experience to advise them on creative, yet practical, solutions to such a problem?)

To date, action and discussion on mine action and development have fallen into two general categories: factoring the effects of mine contamination into all applicable sectors (agriculture, health, transportation, etc.) and factoring the costs of mine action into specific development project that are affected by the presence of mines (roads, bridges, etc.). Recent years have seen some key advances in both categories and predominantly in the second. The large-scale reconstruction projects in Afghanistan are a case in point. After considerable negotiation, all the major funders of road works in Afghanistan (the World Bank, European Commission, Asian Development Bank, USAID and Japan) did incorporate the true costs of mine-related activities into their budgets—even central services provided by the Mine Action Centre for Afghanistan (MACA). Moreover, for the most part they are contracting local NGOs to do the work and thereby adding to the development of Afghanistan’s own management and staff

capacities. There are important lessons in this for Angola, Lao and Sri Lanka, among other countries, where the budgets of roads and reconstruction projects generally have not incorporated the projected costs of mine survey and clearance to international standards.

Integrating mine action costs into development budgets requires early consultation with local mine action actors. Otherwise the budget will be set in a donor capital or lending institution and the 'add on' of mine action will come as a surprise. Most often, the United Nations and NGOs then scramble together for humanitarian funds to support the project, drawing assets away from other tasks. The average figure quoted for the costs of mine action associated with development projects is 10%. This is a good enough starting point, but it is abstract and bears little resemblance to reality. Ten percent of a US\$ 200 million infrastructure project should be excessive. The reckoning becomes even more difficult in smaller projects where the cost of mine action associated with its achievement may be far greater than the project's budget itself. If it costs US\$1,000 to dig a bore hole and irrigate some fields, and the fields are mined, then the corresponding clearance could cost ten times the amount. Should these funds come from the project's source as for the reconstructed roads, or from a separate humanitarian budget?

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The role of the multilateral institutions

Within the broad boundaries of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, the two actors most directly concerned are the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Bank. The UN Policy on Mine Action³ assigns UNDP the primary responsibility within the UN system of assisting countries to address the socio-economic consequences of mine and UXO contamination. Over twenty-one countries—as varied as Chad, Yemen, Croatia, Lao and Angola—are currently receiving some level of support. The frontline in this effort are the advisors who work with national and local authorities, mine-affected communities, NGOs, donors, and other UN and multilateral agencies at the country level. At UNDP headquarters, a small team of specialists provides policy guidance, advice and technical support for these programmes. The team also advocates both within UNDP for inclusion of mine action as a development issue in affected countries, and among external actors for financial support and a place at the table.

Although even the UNDP mine action community has been guilty of sometimes forgetting this, UNDP itself has a much broader development role. A typical country portfolio will address such issues as governance, poverty alleviation or micro-finance, all of which can have direct or indirect links to mine action. The UN Resident Coordinator—frequently the UNDP Resident Representative—will coordinate the formulation of various overarching documents by the entire Country Team and the host government: the Common Country Assessment (CCA), the Common Country Framework (CCF) and the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). These documents, developed in consultation with the government, outline a sectoral strategy for the entire country and apportion lead roles for various actors in assisting the country to meet its development objectives. UNDP also manages a resource mobilization mechanism known as 'Roundtables' and assists governments to prepare the supporting budgets, documents and presentations for the international donor community.

The World Bank has a comparable set-up. Its Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit based in Washington, DC is the nominal focal point for mine action although, given a decentralized system of Regional Vice-Presidencies that rival UNDP's Regional Bureaux for their independence, it does not aspire to control mine action for the World Bank globally. The unit was involved, however, in the drafting of guidelines concerning the financing of mine clearance, the development of a handbook and, for some time, it also employed a mine action consultant.

Projects are designed at the country level, with varying degrees of input from the Conflict Prevention and Reconstruction Unit. For many countries the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) is the most prominent document, drafted jointly by the government and the international community to guide development strategies and international support, particularly that of the World Bank itself. And, outside of a handful of countries in Africa and Asia, Roundtables have given way to the World Bank's Consultative Group (CG) as the preferred resource mobilization mechanism. The CG, PRSP and its precursor, the Interim PRSP (I-PSRP), therefore should be prime targets for any mine action programme seeking to integrate itself into a country's overall development strategy.

The World Bank guidelines, issued on 7 February 1997, are entitled 'Guidelines for Financing Land Mine Clearance', although they embrace many facets of what we now commonly refer to as mine action. The guidelines are quite broad and state that 'to be eligible for Bank financing, land-mine clearance must be an integral part of a development project or a prelude to a future development project or program to be adopted by the borrower.' The guidelines go on to describe three examples of activities that could be eligible for financing:

- a) *Capacity building*: support for the development of national or local demining centers to create or expand capacity to implement the demining components of projects in priority sectors;
- b) *Area demining programs*: financing of a demining programme in particular areas of a country as a component or first phase of a development project or programme that aims to reintegrate displaced populations and reactivate the local economy and carry out additional development activities;
- c) *Sector demining programs*: support for demining programs targeted at specific sectors; for example, demining of agricultural land as part of a larger agricultural rehabilitation program or demining of roads and bridges as part of a transport project.

For the most part, the World Bank has been most active and most successful in the third category, sector demining (with a few notable exceptions such as a substantial grant to kick-start UNDP's support to Sri Lanka's mine action programme and some research funds to UNDP for a study it conducted with the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) on socio-economic approaches to mine action).⁴ This does not take full advantage of its potential in part because when we think of technical assistance in mine action we think in too narrow terms. In the example given earlier of financing mine survey and clearance to permit exploration of Mauritania's mineral resources, the World Bank and similar agencies would be the ideal institutions to provide support. If the goal is to develop a financing mechanism whereby the costs of mine action can be recouped if a company discovers and exploits mineral resources, it must be done with care so that it does not inadvertently provide a disincentive to investment and mineral exploration in the first place. Irrespective of any knowledge of landmines, development and financial staff are far more likely to have the relevant expertise than your average mine actioneer if only someone would ask them, and provided they have a broad enough outlook to accept.

Where we are now

In spite of the liberal expansion of the definition of humanitarian mine action to encompass areas well within the development sector, and in spite of increased discussion of the topic at mine action meetings, action is lagging behind the rhetoric.

This is not surprising for several reasons. First, although the concept of mine action as a humanitarian *and* a development activity now has gained acceptance within the mine action community, this does not automatically imply that the development community has embraced the notion simultaneously with reciprocal and sudden fervour. It took years of debate and persuasion for this concept to take hold within the mine action community, and reciprocity also will require similar effort. It is interesting to reflect back on the strong opposition to any involvement by UNDP in mine action as recently as 1997. The opposition came from other UN agencies that felt that only the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the humanitarian agencies such as the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) need bother. Resistance also emerged from members of UNDP's Executive Board—particularly those from the more developed countries—who felt that this would dilute UNDP's attention to economic and development issues. And opposition came from within UNDP itself as many managers wondered why a development agency should involve itself with something apparently so far removed from its core agenda and that could entail involvement with militaries.

Second, the mine action community has traditionally kept itself quite separate from the development community for a variety of reasons. One enduring factor is the distinct cultural differences between the broad groups that tend to work in the two fields (this also holds true for humanitarian aid workers.) With the exception of mine risk education and advocacy staff, mine action personnel come primarily from military backgrounds, and are new to some of the basic concepts (and frustrations) of development work. This is equally true amongst mine action NGOs, commercial companies and UN staff. The latter also are often unfamiliar with their role as advisors and facilitators of government and local management. Even the language used by the two groups, and the donors who support them, is different. If only the participants of Retired Colonel X's 'Joined Up Mine Action Exercise Group' could be persuaded to join NGO Y's 'Participatory Workshop for Holistic Planning in the Transition Environment' (or vice versa) we would all be spared one more seminar. ('Translators' from both camps have informed me that these are indeed the same thing.)

The cultural divide can be equally large between staff of the affected countries themselves. Whether or not the national mine action staff come from military backgrounds—and many do—most are not experienced in the activities of other ministries. Where the army has the lead role in mine action the gulf often is widest, yet these often are the countries farthest past the humanitarian emergency phase of mine action and well along the development spectrum, such as Thailand. The ministry of finance, key to the funds of the international financial institutions, usually is far at the periphery. While some form of inter-ministerial consultative body exists in most mine-affected countries and, theoretically, would be the forum to rectify this situation, the fact that the problem is so pervasive would indicate that many are not operating at their full potential. The legitimate emphasis on operations during the first, emergency years of a programme can translate into neglect for the development of these bodies in favour of the proper functioning of a mine action centre (the generic 'MAC'). However understandable this might be, it is clear that some country programmes suffer in the long term as a result.

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Further cultural misunderstandings exist amongst staff from donor countries who deal with the major international lending institutions (the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, Inter-American Development Bank, etc.). In their home capitals, relations with these institutions are handled by finance ministries, as opposed to the mostly foreign ministry staff who attend international mine action meetings or administer development assistance funds. In mine-affected countries themselves, many embassies

will have economic officers to interact with one group while a political or development officer will interact with the mine action actors. And they, in turn, deal with local counterparts at different ministries, often with insufficient communication between them.

A third reason is a simple lack of knowledge. Whether it is staff from UNDP, the World Bank or a donor country, development officers typically spend their time in countries such as Ghana and Chile where, even if a landmine problem does exist (as it does in Chile) they probably would not encounter it because the military is the predominant actor. A transfer to Lao or Angola will put them suddenly in charge of a portfolio with which they are not familiar and which—unless they are persuaded otherwise—might not strike them as an important development issue.

A fourth reason, simply put, is turf. Although each institution claims that it would have never engaged in turf battles if only the others hadn't started it first, in this war there are no innocent parties.

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Fifth, and last, is that this is a lot more complicated than it sounds. These obstacles are very real, as is the reticence by entrenched communities to change.

A way forward

Mine action's admission into the development world should not require a revolution; gradual infiltration will be sufficient. Often, the best way to gain acceptance in new territory is to learn the local language and customs. Mine action has begun this already by incorporating methodologies common to the development world to analyse the social and economic impact of mines on local populations. The relative impact of mines on communities now is calculated primarily through Landmine Impact Surveys⁵ and similar methods. The mine action community has made other inroads toward adopting the vocabulary and approach of sociologists and economists, primarily through the GICHD/UNDP study *Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action* and follow-on operational handbook. This was an important step and a good product; the logjam has been in transmitting the concepts to staff in the field and inducing modifications to their traditional approaches. NGOs, particularly Norwegian People's Aid, have taken the subject on board as well and incorporated socio-economic analysis into their tasking and planning. It is indeed a long way from the days when 'output' was measured by the number of mines cleared.

Cost-benefit analysis is the most recent vogue among donors and mine action academics. It is not unfamiliar territory for mine action—all programmes use it, although its application is varied and certainly not scientific. Two studies were conducted in Afghanistan in the 1990s to compare the value of land post-clearance with the cost of mine action (by all standards, the benefits far outweighed the costs) and most countries conduct some degree of so-called Level Four survey to assess the value of their work. But cost-benefit analysis has not yet been applied systematically in mine action and many operators are unfamiliar with its use in a formal sense. Benefits are calculated in terms of impact, average costs generally are known, and one is weighed against the other to determine priorities. (Then the following factors come into play: weather, terrain, available assets, proximity to other high priority tasks, politics, security, and donor earmarking, to name a few.) Cost-benefit analysis will definitely have some relevant applications however, particularly in taking snapshot post-clearance surveys to double-

check that the land is being used productively (and taking steps to ensure that it is). Work currently underway, for instance, by James Madison University's Mine Action Information Center, may provide some answers as to where cost-benefit analysis can be relevant and practical.

To continue the infiltration, a methodical approach by many players will be required, as will patience. The key to success lies at the country level, not in international meetings, and this is where the focus should shift. A few suggestions:

FOR THE NATIONAL DIRECTORS OF MINE ACTION PROGRAMMES

- Make sure that you know well in advance of a Consultative Group or Roundtable, and work to get mine action recognized. It need not be a specific agenda item—in fact its integration may be more persuasive if it is not. If mines affect roads, then this should be mentioned in the transportation section. If they affect arable land, then the minister of agriculture should present statistics on the amount of land that is denied to farmers because of landmine contamination, the estimated cost of clearance, and the estimated benefit of increased agricultural productivity.
- Get to know your counterparts in other ministries. Cultivate colleagues in the ministry of finance to bring them on board. Work early in the PRSP or I-PRSP process to identify mine action as a cross-cutting issue and participate in drafting the document.
- Do the same for the CCA, CCF and UNDAF
- If you have technical advisors from the United Nations make sure they know that you expect them to be responsible for advising you on mine action. Include these activities in your own annual workplan and those of relevant staff in your office.
- Think through the information available in the Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) or comparable database from the point of view of other development sectors without waiting for them to come to the MAC. Extract what would be useful to your colleagues in other ministries and government offices and take it to them, or have the minister to whom you report deliver it to his/her counterparts. Maps and data that clearly show the relationship between mine contamination and various sectors can be very persuasive once in the hands of the right people.
- Hold special briefings on mine action for the economic counsellors attached to the embassies of donor countries if they are different from the officers with whom you interact on a regular basis.
- Work to improve the functioning of the inter-ministerial body that provides oversight and coordination to mine action in your country, if one exists. Internally review its terms of reference, frequency of meetings, level of representation and agenda annually to see if these still correspond to the needs of your programme or if you should propose changes.
- Conduct post-clearance surveys to assess the benefits of mine action. The results will help you check whether or not your prioritization system is functioning well and whether or not the links to sequential development projects are being made where necessary. Post-clearance surveys are a good resource mobilization tool provided they substantiate the positive effects of your programme.
- Approach the representatives of the international financial institutions with a description of how mine contamination affects development and/or investment. Most likely, this will be a slow education process. If possible, ask a representative of the ministry of finance or other staff who deal with them on a regular basis to facilitate the meeting.

FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

- At the country level the mine action technical advisors should assist their counterparts in all of the above.
- Technical advisors should take time out to study development literature and learn more about the culture and economic and social factors of the country in which they work.
- The advisors should meet frequently with representatives of other development institutions, attend their meetings and remain informed of all projects planned in mine-affected areas.
- The Resident Coordinator should recognize mine action as a cross-cutting issue and include the technical advisor and/or government counterpart in all relevant meetings, particularly the drafting of strategy documents.
- Programme Officers in country offices, who tend to work on many other portfolios beyond mine action, should advise the technical staff of other relevant factors and considerations outside the narrow sphere of mine action, and assist in the integration process.
- UN-supported programmes should seek funding for and encourage post-clearance surveys and a snapshot use of cost-benefit analysis to double-check priorities and demonstrate impact.
- Headquarters-level mine action staff should organize an outreach programme with GICHD to apply the findings of the *Study on Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action* and other relevant work.
- Headquarters-level mine action staff should remember to meet with representatives of the international financial institutions (particularly the World Bank and relevant regional development banks) when they visit mine-affected countries on mission.
- UN Headquarters, particularly UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery, should redouble its efforts to engage the World Bank on this topic and seek guidance on how to further the agenda in the field.
- UNDP should develop and disseminate a list of suggested actions and interventions—including these—to its staff in the field and compile a guide to UNDP's many relevant, non-mine action resources such as lessons learned on the PRSP in post-conflict countries.⁶ The target audience should be mine action staff but it should be disseminated more broadly.

FOR INTERNATIONAL DONORS

- Work to integrate mine action within your own government and even within your own ministry and agency first. It is not uncommon for two members of the same foreign ministry of the same country to hold opposing views on whether or not mine action should be considered a development issue, and even to express both views at different meetings of, for example, UNDP.
- If a mine-affected country approaches you for funding, and you have none available, put them in touch with the relevant country desk officer and see if assistance cannot be obtained this way.
- Meet with your country's representatives to the World Bank and the regional development banks and advocate for the integration of mine action into their programming and budgeting processes.
- Write to the government representatives of mine-affected countries who are stationed in your own country, and organize meetings between them and representatives of development institutions.

- When you visit your own embassy in a mine-affected country, brief not only the ambassador and mine-action officer but also the economic counsellors and other staff who deal with the international development institutions if it is not the same person.
- Meet with the country director of the World Bank and of the regional development banks when travelling on mission to mine-affected countries.

This list is by no means exhaustive. But it does represent some practical steps to move the process forward and continue the expansion of the mine action community.

As mine action moves farther into this realm, however, care must be taken not to embrace the tools of development indiscriminately. There are some risks. When Ethiopia requested a window for mine action of *up to 10%* of its US \$300 million reconstruction loan (hoping to use as little as possible) the government and UNDP found it extremely difficult to raise needed funds for its humanitarian mine action programme since donors felt it was blessed with a US \$30 million bounty.

Mine action should seek to incorporate development tools and seek development financing only where it assists in raising the human profile of the problem. To reiterate the UN policy, landmines are first and foremost a humanitarian concern and must be addressed from that perspective. Most governments, NGOs and the citizens of mine-affected countries would agree. So, for example, while there are some viable applications of traditional cost-benefit analysis in mine action, there are some very real dangers in relying on it heavily for prioritization. This is true especially with respect to assessing the value of land, post-clearance, by its economic output. A significant problem for many post-conflict countries is the marginalization of certain groups and this often can be exacerbated by the presence of mines. Economic output certainly can be an important indicator but it is crucial not to end up favouring more advantaged groups in the process. Afghanistan provides one good illustration. If you do a cost-benefit example of the output of clearing valleys in the west, lush with vineyards and apricot trees, versus the tough desert in the south then the west will always win. Yet in one case, the additional output from the orchard might bring enough cash to build a new section to the family compound. In the other, there may barely be no quantifiable economic output at all. People will grow just enough subsistence crops to live at a pitiful level, but at least they will live.

What is the value of a family's livelihood versus a cash crop? The debate is specific to each country and even each village. Theoretically one could also calculate the marginal rate of improvement in the living standard or nutritional intake of the orchard owner versus the desert dweller, however a cost-benefit analysis of the process required to arrive at a clear answer might argue against it. In the end it likely would not merit the additional time required by overburdened mine action managers. Should this reality activate the modern world's instinct to reach for automation, spreadsheets and easy formulas, the end result could be even worse. New techniques are counterproductive when they reduce analysis and thoughtfulness rather than spur new approaches. Yes, mine action is about development as measured by economic output and it also is about reducing vulnerability and permitting resettlement and many incalculable benefits. The point is to use discernment and sound judgement in deciding which approach will help people most.

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As for the teams of deminers in northern Chad, they still are clearing seemingly valueless areas that, once restored, will have significant value for the local population. They still are working in a financial situation familiar to many such mine action programmes, lurching from temporary stand-down to productivity with each new infusion of donor funding. Soon they hope not to be completely

dependent on foreign humanitarian aid as their government has agreed at long last to integrate mine action into its overall development plan, including its request to the World Bank, and to contribute funds from its own development budget as well.

Notes

1. United Nations, *United Nations Mine Action: a Strategy for 2001–2005*, A/56/448/Add.1 of 16 October 2001.
2. By the year 2015, all 191 Member States of the United Nations have pledged to reach the eight Millennium Development Goals. For a detailed description of the goals, see < <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/index.shtml>> .
3. *United Nations Policy on Mine Action*, annex II, para. 10, United Nations document A/RES/53/26, of 31 December 1998.
4. GICHD and UNDP, 2001, *A Study of Socio-Economic Approaches to Mine Action*, and its follow-on *Operational Handbook* published in 2002, both available on the page < <http://www.gichd.org/publications/index.htm>> .
5. This particular type of survey is conducted according to protocols established by a consortium of NGOs and UN agencies known as the Survey Working Group. A Landmine Impact Survey is a costly and time-consuming undertaking but should return benefits by helping mine action programmes target their resources more effectively and ultimately save time and money.
6. To name a few that are readily available on the web, *UNDP Support for Poverty Reduction Strategies in the PRSP Countries (2001)*, available at < http://www.undp.org/poverty/publications/docs/Poverty_UNDP_Support_to_PRS_Sep2001.pdf> ; *Policy Note: UNDP's Engagement in Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers*, < <http://www.undp.org/eo/documents/ADR/standard-documentation/policy%20notes/prsp.pdf>> ; Alison Scott, *Poverty Reduction Strategies In Conflict Countries: How Are They Different?*, < <http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/strategies/review/semseries/scott.pdf>> and many others on the World Bank's site.