

Paving the bridge between disarmament and development: resources generated by the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention

Kerry BRINKERT

The United Nations 1987 International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development reported that while disarmament and development ‘have a close and multidimensional relationship’, the two are ‘distinct processes’.¹ The matter of anti-personnel mines undoubtedly underscores the former point, but it does so in a way that suggests an interrelationship, rather than distinction, between disarmament and development processes. This close connection was foreshadowed in the early 1990s when organizations like Human Rights Watch highlighted that while anti-personnel mines are arms, they are also barriers to development in that ‘the presence of mined regions can seriously cripple the ability to build a post-war economy, through, for example, disabling transport and communication systems, and preventing agricultural endeavours.’²

Given how anti-personnel mines imply an interrelationship between disarmament and development, it logically follows that the international instrument of choice for those wishing to address the totality of the matter was one incorporating characteristics of both disarmament and development. The desire for such an instrument was realized on 18 September 1997 when the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction was adopted.³ This instrument obliges its member states to disarm—requiring them to forever surrender the use of anti-personnel mines and to destroy existing stockpiles. But it also commits states to take action to address the fact that anti-personnel mines ‘obstruct economic development and reconstruction, inhibit the repatriation of refugees and internally displaced persons, and have other severe consequences for years after emplacement.’⁴ The convention requires that mined areas be marked, monitored, fenced and cleared, that mine risk education be provided to populations in affected areas, and that steps be taken to provide for the care, rehabilitation and reintegration of landmine victims.

In essence, the convention’s potential has been that of a bridge between the disarmament and development processes. However, the convention cannot live up to its full potential in connecting these two destinations without one important element: the resources that are necessary to pave this bridge and hence truly complete the project of conclusively resolving the concerns related to anti-personnel mines. To date, two important characteristics of the convention have lent themselves to ensuring that the necessary resources have been generated. On one hand, individual *state responsibility*—in the sense that no supranational authority exists to oversee implementation and enforce compliance—means that individual mine-affected states must take full ownership over identifying their landmine problems, developing plans to address these problems and reaching out for assistance

Kerry Brinkert is the Manager of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention’s Implementation Support Unit (ISU) at the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD). This paper is based largely upon data collected and reports drafted by the ISU in the context of the support provided to the Resource Mobilisation Contact Group Coordinator.

if necessary. On the other hand, *partnership*—as articulated in Article 6 of the convention—makes it clear that a variety of actors stand ready to help.

The purpose of this paper is to indicate that the convention truly is living up to its promise in large part because state responsibility and partnership have interrelated in such a way that significant resources have been generated since the convention's entry into force. This paper aims to highlight *what* has been generated (although acknowledging that what is also at stake is *how* this has been used). While money and the traditional donor community are certainly key elements, the matter of resources to ensure the implementation of the convention is not as simplistic as a one-way flow of money from relatively wealthy, unaffected countries to relatively poor, mine-affected counterparts, nor is it about money alone. Finally, this paper suggests various means to ensure a sustainability of resources with a view to ensuring that the convention fulfils its true potential as a bridge between development and disarmament.

Resources provided by donor states to mine-affected states

Article 6 of the convention states that 'each State Party in a position to do so shall provide assistance'—assistance for mine clearance and related activities, mine risk education, the care and rehabilitation of landmine victims, and the destruction of stockpiled anti-personnel mines. An overview of available information on the resources provided by the convention's States Parties to mine-affected countries indicates that both sizeable contributions have been made in the context of the convention and that a broad range of countries have defined themselves as 'in a position to do so'. Between 1997 and 2002, over US\$ 800 million in contributions has been recorded on the part the convention's States Parties that have supported mine action efforts in other countries. What is equally remarkable is that those countries that have defined themselves as 'in a position to do so' extend beyond traditional donor states to include a total of thirty-six States Parties, including countries from all regions of the world.⁵

In addition to contributions flowing directly from the national budgets of States Parties, between 1997 and 2002 over US\$ 160 million in support of mine action has been provided by the European Commission, an organization of which all but one of its members is a signatory to the convention. During the same period, nine states that have not yet joined the convention contributed over US\$ 425 million. Thus, in addition to a vast majority of states not party to the convention having exhibited behaviour that indicates a certain level of respect for the convention's disarmament objectives (e.g., by not using or producing anti-personnel mines), many of these states are acting in a manner consistent with the convention's development objectives by allocating sizeable funds for mine action.

In total over the last six years, approximately US\$ 1.4 billion has been spent by states and the European Commission in support of mine action being undertaken in other states. This fact on its own is remarkable, but equally so is the fact that the annual total amount of recorded resources provided by these actors has remained relatively constant over the last several years.

Although the amount of funds generated in the context of the fulfilment of the aims of the convention is no doubt impressive, money should not be considered analogous to a broader conceptualization of resources. Some States Parties to the convention that are not considered to be traditional donors have made meaningful contributions to this effort. For example, Argentine military personnel have carried out demining and explosive ordnance disposal operations in Kuwait as part of a UN peacekeeping mission. Experts from Brazil have participated in mine action efforts in Central America and Angola. Malaysia's Defence Cooperation Programme includes a component to help train developing countries in demining and mine destruction.

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Mexico has been a long-standing participant in the Pan American Health Organization's Tri-Partite Victim Assistance and Socio-Economic Reintegration programme. And, peacekeepers from Uruguay have cleared vast tracks of mined land in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁶

Resources provided by mine-affected states

Often overlooked is the fact that the mine-affected States Parties themselves have made substantial contributions to addressing the humanitarian impact of landmines within their borders. While many of these states are relatively poor and include some of the world's least developed economies, they have acted in a manner consistent with the convention's emphasis on state responsibility, demonstrating full ownership over their development issues related to anti-personnel mines by allocating sizeable domestic resources.

In 2002 and 2003, twenty-one of the mine-affected States Parties responded to a questionnaire on mine action resources.⁷ The information contained in their responses indicates that these states have applied more than US\$ 180 million in mine action funding and in-kind resources since 1997. Indeed, in many of these countries the annual financial commitment to mine action has grown over time to the point when in 2002 these twenty-one States Parties dedicated resources to mine action valued at more than US\$ 41 million.

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A variety of domestic resources for mine action exist. In addition to funds having been allocated to mine action programmes and mine action centres in state budgets, the armed forces in many instances have made significant contributions to mine action. Nicaragua is an important case in point, having dedicated to its mine action effort the equivalent of over US\$ 15 million in military salaries, equipment and transportation between 1997 and 2002.⁸ State-owned enterprises also can play a significant role in providing resources for mine action. In Peru, for example, state-owned electrical utilities have contributed to the mine action effort by investing funds in clearing mined areas where high-tension electrical towers are located.⁹ In Croatia, public companies allocated 5.8 million euro in funding for mine action between 1998 and 2002.¹⁰

Resources obtained by mine-affected states from development banks

In acting upon their responsibility to pursue the disarmament and development aims of the convention within their own countries, some mine-affected States Parties also have recognized that the World Bank and the regional development banks should be considered important means of acquiring resources. This is logical, when one considers that the World Bank is one of the world's largest sources of development assistance.

According to the World Bank, resources in 2003 were being provided by it to forty 'conflict-affected countries' with a view to supporting efforts 'to assist war-torn populations, resume peaceful development, and prevent relapse into violence.'¹¹ Many of these war-torn countries are mine-affected States Parties and some of them have already accessed World Bank loans in support of their mine action efforts. Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of the first cases. On 31 July 1996 approval was granted for US\$ 7.5 million in financing from the World Bank Group's International Development

Association for a mine action programme, which the World Bank noted needed to be understood as part of, and closely coordinated with, the overall reconstruction and economic recovery programme in Bosnia and Herzegovina.¹²

Another South-Eastern European state that experienced war in the 1990s, Croatia, also has made extensive use of World Bank lending opportunities to clear landmines in the context of development. In at least two instances, Croatia has incorporated mine action into larger World Bank supported development projects. For example, the 37.8 million euro loan for the Reconstruction Project for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem includes a 3.2 million euro mine clearance component, which is necessary to achieve the other flood control, waste water management and nature protection objectives of the project.¹³ In addition, the approximate 100 million euros received by Croatia in World Bank financing for its Emergency Transport Project included over 20 million euros to clear landmines, which the World Bank noted was 'an essential first step in the repair and reconstruction of infrastructure networks.'¹⁴

In addition to its lending activities, some World Bank programmes provide grants. Afghanistan, for example, benefited from a US\$ 350,000 grant from the World Bank's Post-Conflict Fund, which supported the production of a detailed cost-benefit analysis on the socio-economic impact of mine action in that country.¹⁵

Resources shared between mine-affected states

Another sometimes overlooked resource is the capacity that has been developed in some mine-affected countries, which logically could be of benefit to other mine-affected states. In fact, in many cases this capacity already has been shared by mine-affected States Parties.

For example, both Honduras and Nicaragua have indicated that they have contributed to the mine action effort in Peru. For its part, Peru has stated that it has the capacity to participate in demining as part of peacekeeping operations. Yemen has stated that it is having discussions regarding how it could apply its extensive experience, knowledge and capacity to tackle the landmine problem in Lebanon. Chad has indicated that other African countries have expressed an interest in learning from its experience.¹⁶

Recently, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) highlighted its active involvement in facilitating cooperation amongst mine-affected states. Through its Mine Action Exchange Programme—or MAX—the UNDP has provided a practical means of fostering cooperation between mine-affected countries with a view to building relationships, sharing lessons learned and hopefully avoiding costly mistakes. To date Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Croatia and Mozambique have benefited from this programme and planned beneficiaries include Albania, Cambodia, Somalia and Yemen.¹⁷

Resources provided by the private sector

In addition to the resources provided by donor states, or allocated, borrowed or shared by mine-affected states themselves, another important source of mine action funding is the private sector. While information on this support to mine action is more difficult to obtain, it is possible to account for more than US\$ 11 million in contributions to mine action by private sector actors over the past six years. What is most remarkable about private sector contributors is the diversity of actors involved in supporting mine action.¹⁸

Three kinds of actors stand out. The first type includes those humanitarian and development organizations that both raise and use private sector funds. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) is an important example. Through its Special Appeal for Mine Action, between 1999 and 2001 the ICRC raised over CHF 7 million from sources other than national governments or national Red Cross societies—approximately 12% of the funds generated by the Appeal.¹⁹

The second type of actor that plays a key role in generating private sector funds includes those actors who exist primarily to raise or channel funds for the use of others in the field. One of the first and most successful examples is the Adopt-a-Minefield programme. This programme provides a means for individuals, communities and corporations to ‘adopt’ minefields in various mine-affected countries, thereby ensuring their clearance and return to productive use. To date this programme, in part with the support of matching government funds, has raised US\$ 8.38 million.²⁰ Working in partnership with Adopt-A-Minefield and other initiatives is the Canadian Landmine Foundation, which similarly provides the private sector an avenue to direct funds in support of the aims of the convention. The Canadian Landmine Foundation has raised, again with the backing of matching funds from the public sector, over CDN\$ 2 million since 1999.²¹

The third type of actor in this field is probably the most important as it includes the private sector actors which provide funds directly to mine action programmes or organizations like the ICRC, or which channel the funds through mechanisms like Adopt-A-Minefield. Global networks of service-minded volunteers, like Rotary International and the Soroptimist International, have contributed millions of dollars to mine action since the convention’s establishment.²² Roots-of-Peace has tapped into the philanthropic spirit of the California wine industry, which has resulted in several American vintners and other corporations contributing sizeable sums to turn ‘mines to vines’.²³ Numerous private sector actors, including diverse organizations such as Daewoo, the Girl Scouts, UEFA and Diners Club Adriatic, have also contributed to global mine action.²⁴

International institutional development

Another somewhat overlooked resource is the breadth of international institutional developments that have been made since the convention’s establishment. One such type of development is the establishment of multilateral funding channels, which in many cases greatly facilitates the flow of funds from donor to mine-affected state. The Organization of American States (OAS) has played—and continues to play—an important role in both raising funds and ensuring that they make a difference in the mine-affected countries of Central and South America. This has been particularly indispensable in a region where direct funding of mine action operations would not be possible for many donors given that mine action often is conducted by the military. In South-Eastern Europe, the International Trust Fund established by Slovenia has channelled significant funds to mine action programmes. In addition, the United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Assistance in Mine Action has served to channel over US\$ 78 million in mine action funding since its establishment.²⁵

The States Parties themselves have also led the way in institutional development with a view to supporting both the fulfilment of their individual responsibilities and the convention’s emphasis on partnership and cooperation. While Article 6 of the convention provides a sound basis for cooperation, at an early stage the States Parties agreed that something more was needed to bring the words of this article to life. At their first annual meeting in 1999, the States Parties established the Intersessional Work Programme, which involves Standing Committees serving as forums ‘to engage a broad international community for the purpose of advancing the achievement of the humanitarian aims of the Convention.’²⁶ One year later the States Parties established the Coordinating Committee to more

effectively coordinate the Intersessional Work Programme. And in 2001, the States Parties mandated the establishment of an Implementation Support Unit, which was created in part based upon the notion that 'by relieving the [States] Parties of administrative and routine functions, a small dedicated support unit should enable a more efficient allocation of resources while contributing to the effective implementation of the Convention.'²⁷

Another type of institutional development relates to emergence of tools to enable mine action to be undertaken more effectively and efficiently. For example the Landmine Impact Survey has been developed as the first-rate means of assisting the most mine-affected states in defining their landmine problem, improving national planning and priority setting, and establishing baseline data for measuring progress. The Information Management System for Mine Action has been developed by the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining as the state-of-the-art data management tool designed to assist with the management of the information needed to implement efficient and effective field programmes in mine action. In addition, the International Mine Action Standards, created 'to improve safety and efficiency in mine action by providing guidance, by establishing principles and, in some cases, by defining international requirements and specifications', have assisted in professionalizing mine action.²⁸

Sustaining the effort

The resources generated to date have been impressive, but much more needs to be done. This fact was recognized by Norway when, in September 2002, it presented a non-paper proposing a set of actions to be undertaken in advance of the convention's First Review Conference in 2004 in order to 'address all aspects of how to secure sufficient funding for reaching the aims of the Convention.'²⁹

As was noted in the Norwegian paper, an important element in sustaining the effort rests with current donor countries renewing their financial commitments. A week before it presented its paper, Norway already had turned its words into action in that it pledged to maintain the same level of funding in coming years as it had contributed in the past to mine action. In making this announcement, it was noted that 'predictable funding levels are the only way in which to ensure that the momentum gained by the Convention over the past five years is not lost, and forms the cornerstone for designing and implementing (mine action) programmes.'³⁰ Three months later, Canada joined Norway in renewing its commitment when its foreign minister announced a CDN\$ 72 million, five-year replenishment of the Canadian Landmine Fund.³¹

While mine action-specific funding commitments remain important at this early stage in the life of the convention, States Parties have recognized that mine action funding should be part of, not distinct from, overall development programming. As Canada stated in February 2003: 'Development

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is a multi-faceted and increasingly inclusive notion The real question, then, is not where does the landmines issue fit into the development context, but *where doesn't it?*³² Increasingly, donors—as well as funding channels like the United Nations—are talking in terms of mainstreaming or integrating mine action into ongoing, normal operations.

Mine-affected states are being encouraged to integrate mine action into broader national development plans and poverty reduction strategies. 'Integrating mine action into national development programmes or national strategies for poverty eradication would demonstrate that mine-affected countries are giving mine action programmes high priority [and hence] such a priority setting may lead

to increased funding to mine action programmes from bilateral development partners and multilateral institutions.’³³ Some mine-affected states already have picked up on this point. For example, in an annex to its draft Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) prepared for the World Bank, Bosnia and Herzegovina has included a detailed strategy on demining as a sector priority.³⁴

Incorporating mine action into PRSPs signals to donors the importance that a mine-affected state attaches to addressing the development challenges posed by mines. The responsibility rests with the mine-affected state in question to consider where mine action fits into its poverty reduction plans and to what extent. However, given the leading role played by the World Bank in working with states to develop PRSPs, the World Bank perhaps could do more to advise mine-affected countries of the importance of mainstreaming and integration in the aim of ensuring the sustainability of their mine action efforts. It was noted at the May 2003 meeting of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention that such matters are the domain of in-country World Bank officials.³⁵ This may therefore suggest a lack of a policy imperative from headquarters to ensure that mine action is given full consideration by relevant states in developing and implementing poverty reduction strategies.

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In response to any criticism that the World Bank is not doing enough, though, it has been pointed out that the institution can only be as effective in any particular areas as its member countries direct it to be. Therefore, if the convention’s States Parties—128 of which are members of the World Bank Group—wish for the World Bank to place a greater emphasis on mine action, ultimate power rests with them.

Of fundamental importance in ensuring the sustainability of efforts being undertaken in the context of the convention is to ensure the resources are spent effectively and increasingly efficiently. Examining the effectiveness of the application of the hundreds of millions of dollars generated for mine action is crucial to obtaining a full picture of the global response to the landmine problem, but it is beyond the scope of this paper. However, in the context of discussing the sustainability of resources, it is important to note how productivity gains can be made and in many instances are being made.

With respect to making mine action more productive, it is known in Mozambique, for example, that the main factor that would increase productivity is more machinery for vegetation removal, followed by the use of more mine detection dogs.³⁶ Certainly this may imply an increased up-front investment, but with greater productivity returns in the future. One of the world’s leading demining organizations, Norwegian People’s Aid, has concurred that the procurement of dogs—as well as retraining to ensure mine detection and clearance are being undertaken in accordance with international standards—would increase costs in the short term, but would be necessary to make accelerated gains in the future.³⁷ In addition, both Norwegian People’s Aid and the HALO Trust have remarked that building local human resource capacity is essential to lower costs. As HALO’s Cambodia programme head has remarked: ‘Expats are expensive and keeping their numbers down is very important.’³⁸ Applying these sorts of lessons may be a crucial factor in maximizing existing and new resources, thus ensuring the sustainability of the effort.

Some resourceful conclusions

As noted above, one limitation of this paper is that it addresses only what resources have been raised and not how they have been used. Certainly another limitation is that while this paper has referred to resources being mobilized in the context of the convention, one cannot draw a cause-and-

effect relationship between the acceptance of the convention's obligations and the level of support being provided. What one cannot argue with, though, is the fact that 134 states—as of July 2003—have accepted the disarmament and development imperatives of the convention and that a sizeable number of them have defined themselves as in a position to provide assistance. In addition, a number of other actors—including states not party to the convention—have made significant contributions to the effort. When one considers the sum of all assistance generated since the convention's establishment, it is possible to account for resources totalling approximately US\$ 1.6 billion.

Certainly the vast majority of the funds raised have come from what one would consider traditional donors. This should not be surprising. After all, it is the traditional donor community which has the greatest ability to be in a position to provide assistance. However, focusing attention solely on money generated by donors masks the fact that ultimate responsibility rests with mine-affected states themselves and that these states are fulfilling their responsibility.

There has also been an inordinate focus on the sheer quantity of money generated. While money—and lots of it—is necessary, it will also be essential to ensure that funds get spent in the most effective way possible. The global level of funding has remained at a level much higher than one would

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have expected given that many years have passed since the apex of interest in the issue on the part of politicians and their electorates. Thus, if it can be assumed that global funding levels will decline over time, these resources will need to be applied in an increasingly effective way. In this regard, both the International Campaign to

Ban Landmines (ICBL) and its Landmine Monitor initiative may have a very important role to play in monitoring progress. While the ICBL has been very effective in focusing attention on the supply side of the resource issue (i.e., how much is generated), it perhaps could give increasing attention to better understanding the demand side of the equation (i.e., how much is required). In addition, while the Landmine Monitor has provided the global mine action community with comprehensive assessments of what the top donors have contributed to mine action, it too could enhance understanding by applying its unique research assets to assessments of the effectiveness of spending.

A final set of conclusions regarding the question of resources relates to offering words of caution about looking at this matter too simplistically. The international community is becoming more aware that resources to fulfil the aims of the convention relate to a multitude of sources and to more than simply money. In addition, as tempting as it may be to draw sweeping conclusions from a global overview of funding data, it must be pointed out that there are great risks in doing so. With respect to the demand side of the equation, each mine-affected country case is different—with different needs and capacities, different levels of productivity gains which have been made or can be expected, and different financial and economic factors such as changes in relative exchange rates, inflation rates and public and private sector investment capacity.

Limitations and cautions notwithstanding, one cannot diminish the fact that the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention is a significant bridge between disarmament and development. While the points raised in this conclusion may suggest several additional avenues for research on the question of resources, it would be hard to argue with the fact that breadth of resources generated to date is paving this bridge and hopefully ensuring a timely arrival at both its disarmament and development objectives.

Notes

1. United Nations, 1987, *Report of the International Conference on the Relationship Between Disarmament and Development*, A/CONF.130/39, New York, 24 August–11 September, available on the page <<http://disarmament2.un.org:8080/cab/docs/aconf13039.pdf>> .

2. Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, *Landmines: A Deadly Legacy*, Human Rights Watch, New York.
3. Hereafter referred to as 'the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention' or 'the convention'. The convention also commonly is referred to as the Ottawa Convention (notwithstanding the fact that it was established in Oslo) or the Mine Ban Treaty (notwithstanding the fact that it prohibits only a subset of landmines—anti-personnel mines).
4. See the preamble to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.
5. Data in this and following paragraphs is based on that obtained in the course of supporting Norway, Coordinator of an informal *Resource Mobilisation Contact Group* established as a forum to discuss resource issues in the context of the convention, in the production of various information documents. The first of these documents was: Norway, *Resources to Achieve the Convention's Humanitarian Aims: A Preliminary Review*, document presented to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 3 February 2003. A revised version of this document was distributed in May 2003 and work continues to further update it for distribution in September 2003.
6. These examples have been drawn from International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 2002, *Landmine Monitor Report 2002: Toward a Mine-Free World*, Human Rights Watch, Washington. They first appeared articulated in this manner in Norway, *op. cit.*
7. The questionnaire was distributed by the Norwegian Coordinator of the informal Resource Mobilisation Contact Group.
8. Government of Nicaragua, response to the questionnaire distributed by the Norwegian Coordinator of the Resource Mobilisation Contact Group, 28 January 2003.
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10. Croatian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Croatian Mine Action Centre, 2003, *Funding Demining in the Republic of Croatia*, presentation to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 3 February.
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13. Republic of Croatia, 2003, *Reconstruction Project for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srijem: Mid Interim Report (Draft)*, February.
14. Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Croatian Mine Action Centre, 2003, *Funding Demining in the Republic of Croatia*, presentation to the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva, 3 February. See also, World Bank, 2003, *Project Portfolio: Croatia*, Zagreb, The World Bank Office, May.
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16. Norway, *op. cit.*
17. United Nations Development Programme, 2003, *Cooperation Among Mine-Affected Countries*, presentation to the Standing Committee on Mine Clearance, Mine Risk Education and Mine Action Technologies, Geneva, 14 May.
18. Norway, *op. cit.*
19. International Committee of the Red Cross, *Mine Action: Special Report*, Geneva, 1999, 2000 and 2001 editions.
20. Adopt-A-Minefield website, available at < <http://www.landmines.org/campaign/index-cam.asp> > , 11 July 2003.
21. Canadian Landmine Foundation website, available at < <http://www.canadianlandmine.org/clfProjects.cfm> > , 11 July 2003.
22. For example, the Rotary International website, < <http://www.rotary.org/newsroom/presscenter/regnews/euomide/central.html> > , indicates that Rotary Clubs in Switzerland and Germany raised more than US\$ 1.5 million for an ICRC prosthetics centre and prosthetics component factory in Cambodia, 11 July 2003.
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24. UEFA is listed as having contributed CHF 1,235,000 to the ICRC in International Committee of the Red Cross, *Mine Action: Special Report*, 1999, 2000 and 2001 editions. Daewoo, Diners Club Adriatic and the Girl Scouts are noted as donors that have channelled funds through the Slovenian-based International Trust Fund for Mine Action and Mine Victims Assistance in its newsletter, *Trust*, various editions.
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35. Author's notes based upon the oral presentation of Ian Bannon of the World Bank to the 12 May 2003 meeting of the Standing Committee on the General Status and Operation of the Convention, Geneva.
36. Email correspondence received by the author from Hugh Lawrence of the Mozambican National Demining Institute, 27 June 2003.
37. Email correspondence received by the author from Sara Sekkenes of Norwegian People's Aid, 23 June 2003.
38. Email correspondence received by the author from Richard Boulter of the HALO Trust, 23 June 2003.