

# Contextualizing past, present and future challenges to the NPT regime

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In this age where crucial disarmament mechanisms remain blocked to the point of paralysis, it seems that actors throughout the international security community can scarcely agree on anything. Yet advocates across the spectrum—from counter-proliferation trumpeters to nuclear abolitionists—certainly agree on one truism: non-proliferation is facing one of its most formidable crises in the history of the nuclear age.

With only a few months remaining before the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference (RevCon), activists, analysts, experts and governmental representatives are seeking to understand what has gone wrong with the disarmament and non-proliferation regime, and how they can address the current challenges within the NPT system. Even as the oft-cited ‘cornerstone of disarmament’ has, for over thirty years, halted the proliferation of new nuclear-weapon states prophesized by John F. Kennedy, the current challenges are prompting the international community to scrutinize the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, doubt its current efficacy and seek to understand where things went so wrong.

After a short assessment of the missteps that contributed to the situation we are faced with today, it is time to ask ‘what can we now do right?’ What alchemy was at work in 2000 that facilitated the Thirteen Steps of the 2000 RevCon Final Document? What opportunities lay ahead of us that could create more favourable conditions for strengthening the regime?

## *Contextualizing current challenges*

### UNACCOUNTABLE PERMANENCE

Perhaps the fragile state of the NPT today is due in large part to what many would hail as one of the most significant successes of the post-Cold War world. In 1995, the States Parties to the NPT convened in New York, mandated to sentence the treaty to the pages of the history books or endow it with permanent life. Most recognized that the treaty did indeed prevent many states from acquiring nuclear weapons, just as it enticed some nuclear-capable states to disarm and reap the benefits of (non-nuclear status) membership. Yet not all states parties were convinced that an unconditionally and indefinitely extended treaty was in the best interest of disarmament. After much debate, it was agreed

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that the indefinite extension would be adopted as part of the package of decisions that characterized the 1995 RevCon's success, thus prolonging the NPT's claim to the 'cornerstone of disarmament' crown.

Upon adoption of the indefinite extension, RevCon President Jayantha Dhanapala mollified the doubtful and warned the Nuclear-Weapon States (NWS) that with such an extension comes 'permanence with accountability', a phrase borrowed from Canadian Ambassador Chris Westdal. The indefinite extension was not to be interpreted as a free pass for the NWS to continue to possess nuclear weapons. This warning, however, was undermined from the start, as evident in the fact that the United States had already invested considerable political and economic capital in its Stockpile Stewardship programme, thereby ensuring its long-term nuclear-weapons capability.<sup>1</sup>

As the 2005 RevCon approaches, some Non-Nuclear-Weapon States (NNWS) have appropriated Dhanapala's prosaic warning, employing it in the most recent Preparatory Committee (PrepCom)

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meeting in April-May 2004. South Africa, Mexico and Algeria were among those who reminded the NWS of the 1995 bargain, statements that could be interpreted as a hint of forewarning: the NPT is in existence today due to the promise of permanence with accountability.<sup>2</sup> So long as that stipulation remains unheeded, the NWS run the risk of damaging the NPT's credibility and, as a consequence, the chances for indefinite NNWS compliance.

## WITHER THE NAM?

Others attribute the weakening of the NPT, in some degree, to the NNWS themselves.

The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), historically one of the most vocal champions of nuclear disarmament, suffered a blow to its disarmament support when India, with Pakistan in immediate pursuit, tested nuclear weapons in May 1998. The final statement of the ensuing 1998 NAM summit failed to condemn the nuclear tests and, as a result, weakened the NAM's stand and credibility on nuclear disarmament. Some perceive the NAM's ineffectual nuclear disarmament stance as a result of re-prioritization; to many non-aligned countries, more immediate security threats stem from, for example, economic and environmental issues.<sup>3</sup>

While the efficacy of NAM pressure may have waned, it is perhaps their strategy, rather than the force of their pressure, that has indeed faltered and therefore contributed to the growing inefficacy of their leverage. In the lead-up to the 2004 NPT PrepCom, for instance, NAM leaders exhausted themselves in the futile battle for an agenda for the mostly ineffective UN Disarmament Commission, rather than shoring up support and strategy for highly important issues to be addressed at the PrepCom, such as negative security assurances and a subsidiary body on nuclear disarmament at the 2005 RevCon.

Still others attribute NAM's weakened involvement to the strong role that the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) has played in recent years.<sup>4</sup> In 1998, the Foreign Ministers of Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Slovenia, South Africa and Sweden issued a Joint Declaration calling for a 'new agenda' toward a nuclear-weapon-free world. The NAC—a diverse group of states from nearly every continent—raised the bar for disarmament expectations by calling upon the NWS and the nuclear-weapons-capable states '... to give a clear commitment to the speedy, final and total elimination of nuclear weapons.' This new agenda, while decidedly more ambitious than other proposals for disarmament put forth in 2000, was regarded as more 'credible' than those set forth by the NAM, which included predictable calls for timeframes for disarmament.<sup>5</sup> The subsequent General Assembly resolutions

sponsored by the NAC served to aggregate support for the New Agenda position.<sup>6</sup> In the months leading up to—as well as during—the 2000 RevCon, the negotiating power of the NAC was formidable, and enabled the necessary pressure to persuade the NWS to agree to the Thirteen Steps, including, most notably, to the ‘unequivocal undertaking’ embodied in Step Six. While adoption of the Thirteen Steps was indeed a victory for the NNWS and for the cause for disarmament, some NNWS objected to the opacity of the NWS-NAC negotiation process and to the compromises that NAC made on their behalf.

### DISARMAMENT? WHAT DISARMAMENT?

To many it appears that the United States has all but dropped the pretence of working towards disarmament. Unverifiable and reversible arms control measures, like that embodied by the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT or Moscow Treaty), seem to be the only offering coming from the United States. Non-proliferation initiatives, supplemented by counter-proliferation policies, appear to have supplanted the United States’ interest in concrete disarmament measures. According to Under Secretary of State John Bolton, the ‘cornerstone of disarmament’ would be more effectively utilized if only States Parties could concentrate on suspected cases of proliferation, rather than focusing on, as he deemed them, ‘Article VI issues which do not exist.’<sup>7</sup>

The policy of the other NWS has settled into a comfortable, if not tiring, refrain: they are willing to undertake further disarmament measures pending much larger cuts from the two biggest arsenals—those of Russia and the United States. In the absence of any verifiable and meaningful reductions coming from the former Cold War adversaries, the smaller NWS are looking to maintain and even upgrade their existing arsenals, which remain, as they perceive it, justified in the shadows of the American and Russian stockpiles.<sup>8</sup>

### UNDERMINING MULTILATERALISM

Concurrent with the shift in focus away from disarmament and towards non-proliferation and counter-proliferation, multilateral mechanisms, long since paralysed from any substantive progress, have been circumvented in favour of ad hoc plurilateral initiatives to halt the spread of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.<sup>9</sup> While these initiatives can and do make vital contributions to disarmament and non-proliferation, and while creative thinking and new approaches to combat these threats are welcome and needed, an over-reliance on plurilateral responses undermines the multilateral institutions that have been built up over the past half century by sending a negative signal to the international community. This preference for plurilateralism implicates an impatience with multilateralism and a distaste for the compromises inherent within such processes.

An example of this sentiment is embodied in the debate surrounding the recent Security Council resolution on weapons of mass destruction. First proposed by the United States in December 2003, the draft underwent intensive consultations amongst the Permanent Five (P5) for months. Original drafts failed to include even the slightest reference of disarmament, although the P3 (the P5 less China and Russia) acknowledged that they were willing to concede a reference to it in the preamble, and anticipated that the non-permanent members would insist upon it. When the non-permanent members, backed by throngs of civil society actions,<sup>10</sup> demanded a more active role for disarmament in the draft, the P3 balked, crying foul at the ‘linkage’ that would be made between disarmament obligations and the non-proliferation obligations. Member States would not feel compelled to comply, they reasoned,

if the disarmament obligations went ignored. Such messy linkages were sure to undermine the intent of the resolution: to halt transfers of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and its related material to non-state actors.

In the resulting resolution, disarmament and non-proliferation are presented as two distinct and separable goals, as if one could be achieved in the absence of the other. A second, more troubling, consequence of the separation of disarmament from non-proliferation is that when backed by the P5, non-proliferation can be construed as an issue of the nuclear elite, rather than a goal that promotes the security of all. Regrettably, calls during the debate on the resolution for inclusion of guidelines and a foundation for future multilateral negotiations that take the concerns of all states into account went unheeded.<sup>11</sup>

The circumvention of multilateral processes serves to undermine coordinated and sustained efforts undertaken by all actors within the international community. Over-reliance on ad hoc plurilateral initiatives—such as the Proliferation Security Initiative—could exacerbate the paralysis that has gripped the multilateral mechanisms and divests the political will necessary to remedy them. Correspondingly, when states are able to participate more directly in the decision-making process, and when their concerns and priorities are incorporated in the new policies, the results are more comprehensive, efficacious and enduring. States feel more ‘ownership’ of the goal of the resolution (or treaty), thereby enhancing prospects for compliance.

#### BLOWS TO CIVIL SOCIETY

A further element that has retarded significant progress in disarmament has been the steady weakening of civil society engaged in these issues. In the 1980s, anti-nuclear protests were able to attract millions of supporters. With the fall of the Iron Curtain came the disintegration of a strong, unified and populous disarmament movement, leaving only a core group of activists. When the threat of all-out nuclear war between the superpowers subsided, the myth of the ‘end of the nuclear threat’ took root in the popular movement and society at large.

Today, most people associate the word ‘nuclear’ with that of terrorism, Iran, North Korea or other states relegated to the Bush Administration’s ‘Axis of Evil’. Anti-nuclear activists are spending much time and energy explaining to their compatriots in the peace movement that the NWS’ continued reliance on these weapons is not only inciting their adversaries to pursue their own weapons procurement, but that the threat of nuclear warfare ensures that peace will always be just out of reach.

The 1995 indefinite extension decision has also left a legacy of division within the core group of activists, analysts and nuclear watchdogs. It articulated a spectrum of advocacy wherein, at one end, internationally focused activists talk of nuclear abolition and a future Nuclear Weapons Convention, while at another end, nationally focused analysts concentrate on more limited arms control measures, such as nuclear de-alerting.

This unresolved debate could be construed as a contributing factor to the fragmenting of support for the arms control and disarmament agendas. The disarmament advocates believe that the limited arms control measures, including the indefinite extension, have subverted the obligation to disarm; meanwhile, arms control groups look upon the internationalists as naive dreamers, entangled in their utopian visions of a world free from nuclear weapons.

Regardless of where they are situated on the spectrum, many of these groups are facing one of their worst financial crises to date. Like the general public, the major funders underestimate the continued

threat posed by *existing* nuclear weapons. Those that continue to fund nuclear-weapons policy research and advocacy generally ignore groups that focus on internationally negotiated efforts toward the complete elimination of nuclear weapons in favour of those focusing on a 'threat reduction' approach.

#### MEDIA COVERAGE

These challenges—the loss of interest by the general public, strife within the NGO community, the lack of proper funding to disarmament groups—are exacerbated by the dearth of coverage by the mainstream media.

The media has a critical role to play in informing the public of security threats. However, during the 2004 NPT PrepCom, for instance, the *New York Times* failed to run a single article on the events taking place at the UN. The general public was completely unaware of what was at stake, what the parties to the treaty were doing, and how their action (or inaction, as it resulted) would affect nuclear policy around the world.

Throughout the mainstream coverage on suspected proliferation in Iraq, North Korea, Iran and elsewhere, the linkage between proliferation and the lack of disarmament has been widely ignored, relegated to the occasional op-ed or letter to the editor. This deficiency serves to reinforce the myth that existing arsenals have nothing to do with the rise of proliferation, and exculpates the NWS from the role that their nuclear policy plays in the decision of additional states to seek nuclear weapons.

#### MILITARIZING SOCIETY

Finally, today's world is marred with the growing militarization of both NWS and NNWS. The Western world, joined by many allies in the Southern hemisphere, finds itself in an ongoing, indefinite and undefined 'war on terror', a mentality that requires a permanent military economy, supplying as much justification for the continued reliance on nuclear weapons as the heaviest-handed nuclear-weapons advocate could want. A permanent war negates the hopes for the long-overdue realization of Article 26 of the UN Charter—the promise of the Security Council to formulate plans to promote international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources.

Security continues to be defined in the context of 'nations', despite the progress of globalization, the growing number of NGO and government initiatives for local and regional security. Many activists, analysts and UN staffers, as well as some governments, have begun to advocate for shifting the disarmament and security debate away from national security and toward a framework predicated on human security. A human security approach offers 'an alternative way of seeing the world, taking people as its point of reference, rather than focusing exclusively on the security of territory or governments.'<sup>12</sup>

A human security framework focuses on the threats to personal and communal safety, rather than the defence of borders.<sup>13</sup> Efficacy of the human security framework is evident in the near-global ban on anti-personnel landmines, the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the protection of refugees, progress in small arms control, and the campaign against human trafficking.<sup>14</sup> Despite these achievements, the human security approach has rarely been applied as a framework for nuclear weapons and disarmament.

## *What to do next?*

Having recognized some of the deep-rooted challenges facing the disarmament regime, we now must attempt to locate some avenues of agency so that we do not relinquish the opportunity presented by the 2005 NPT RevCon.

### REINFORCE THE LINKAGES

Of all of the recent backsliding, perhaps none is as interminably damaging as the de-linkage of disarmament from non-proliferation. This separation carries serious implications for the goal of disarmament, which is the ultimate goal of the NPT. It is forcing a false division among various governments and civil society groups and seemingly pitting progress in disarmament against that in non-proliferation. With the most powerful states firmly entrenched in the latter camp, NNWS and civil

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society groups feel compelled to harp only on the disarmament requirements of the NPT. This polarization damages both disarmament and non-proliferation goals. The non-proliferation measures of the treaty are an indivisible means to the goal of nuclear disarmament. Disarmament will remain unattainable in the absence of multilateral-based, effective and verifiable non-proliferation measures. Likewise, without verifiable, irreversible disarmament, the treaty is doomed to failure.

Each of the recent non-proliferation measures—including Security Council resolution 1540, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative and the Proliferation Security Initiative—is divorced from the principles and objectives of disarmament. Their efficacy, especially in the long run, will remain dubious so long as they are not paralleled with disarmament programmes at the unilateral, plurilateral and multilateral levels.

We must utilize every opportunity presented to reinforce the linkage between disarmament and non-proliferation. The heads of state or foreign ministers of the NNWS should articulate this linkage in their statements to the fifty-ninth session of the General Assembly. Some NNWS might even want to consider a draft resolution in the First Committee on vertical proliferation, with a preamble that emphasizes the link between getting rid of weapons and preventing others from acquiring them. NGOs must use all creative approaches at their disposal to make this linkage clear.

### DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY

New approaches to disarmament must be discussed at next year's RevCon. The most obvious way to facilitate this discussion is through a subsidiary body of Main Committee I to deal specifically and solely with nuclear disarmament. There have been repeated calls for such a body, not only at the 2004 PrepCom, but also in a recent European Parliament resolution.<sup>15</sup>

All delegates engaged in debates next year must practice what former United States Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and former British Member of Parliament Robin Cook called 'person-to-person' diplomacy.<sup>16</sup> Diplomats employing this approach seek first the perceptions of their colleagues and then attempt to understand their needs, their security concerns and their expectations, without placing any outright demands on them. In this way, they are in a better position to engage their counterpart in an attempt to harmonize each other's agendas.

The 2000 Review Conference, widely regarded as the watermark of nuclear disarmament diplomacy, was a diplomatic achievement precisely because of the NAC's person-to-person approach. Direct negotiations with the NWS, taking a non-belligerent yet firm approach, comprised the primary basis upon which the positive outcome of the Review Conference was founded.

This person-to-person approach, for instance, should be applied by all NNWS when dealing with the NWS, particularly the United States. For instance, rather than continue to insist in public settings on the merits of reporting in the NPT context—an issue to which the United States has been highly adversarial—the champions of reporting would do better if they demonstrated how reporting could benefit the goals of export controls and verified civilian nuclear programmes, two of the top priorities of the United States. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative, announced by United States Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham in Vienna in May 2004, calls for a comprehensive database of research reactors and fissile materials around the world. Regular reporting, such as mandated by Step Twelve of the 2000 Final Document, could contribute to this work immeasurably.

#### A ROADMAP FOR DISARMAMENT

NWS and NNWS alike could use a boost to the credibility of their commitment to disarmament. This applies also to the nuclear-capable states outside of the NPT regime.

The onus is upon the NWS to demonstrate to the world that they are indeed committed to a world without nuclear weapons. Even if they believe that the current security environment is not conducive to nuclear abolition, they are obligated to 'pursue in good faith'—and 'unequivocally', at that—plans for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. All nuclear-capable states should begin developing unilateral plans for disarmament. What would disarmament look like in the United States? In France? In China? In India? What conditions would have to be met in order for them to start seriously dismantling—in an irreversible manner—their nuclear stockpiles? Each NWS should be drawing up these plans, perhaps with the intention to present them before the sixtieth anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. Such an effort would signify that they are committed to disarmament, that they are thinking about it and planning for it, and will implement it when they feel the time is right. It would give disarmament advocates—on the non-governmental as well as the governmental side—something to work with, a point of reference and food for thought.

Meanwhile, the NNWS should be drafting their own plans for how they could contribute to the global disarmament process, plans that also incorporate serious and verifiable non-proliferation initiatives. Through these contributions, the NNWS can set the bar for real progress on disarmament while enticing the NWS to participate by linking it to creative, multilateral non-proliferation programmes.

#### CONCRETIZE FUTURE AGREEMENTS

The neglect of the Thirteen Steps confirms that future agreements must include milestones and timeframes for implementation. 'Gentlemen's agreements' no longer suffice in an era marked by shifting alliances, regime overhauls (in democratic as well as non-democratic societies), and growing discontent with a unipolar world. Milestones and timeframes—in both disarmament as well as non-proliferation measures—would strengthen existing enforcement and verification mechanisms on both sides of the security spectrum, and benefit the security concerns of *all* states. Diplomats must focus their efforts in convincing their contemporaries of this truth.

## SUPPLEMENTAL PROGRESS

Challenges to disarmament and non-proliferation cannot be sufficiently addressed by a sole treaty or in a single forum. Movement on several interrelated fronts is required, at the unilateral, bilateral, multilateral and plurilateral levels. As we attempt to ascertain how best to address the nuclear disarmament deficit, progress in other disarmament fora could supplement our approach and propel progress within the NPT framework.

Similarly, more must be done to strengthen the severely inadequate missile regime, which now lacks any sort of universal, legally binding mechanism. The current regime consists primarily of the Hague Code of Conduct, devoid of any missile reduction stipulations. The non-proliferation goals of the NWS would be served by limiting the number of missiles that any country could have. Caps, in conjunction with a universal register of missiles in national arsenals, would greatly enhance the recent attempts at halting the transfer of weapons of mass destruction and their related materials. Support should also be generated for regional approaches to missile control.

More must also be done to convince the United States and other hold-outs of the link between disarmament and development.<sup>17</sup> Non-proliferation goals would be well-served through addressing the security concerns of poorer states. Understanding the security concerns, perceptions, needs and motives of potential proliferators (citizens as well as government officials) is perhaps a more effective, less costly and safer way to curb proliferation, in contrast to the present pre-emption policies of some states that have already mired this century in war.

## REFRAMING THE NUCLEAR DEBATE

A reassessment of security needs could be facilitated by two emerging perspectives: human security and gender analysis.

As stated above, a human security framework, while at the heart of other successful disarmament initiatives, has yet to set the context for discussions of nuclear weapons and disarmament.

The independent Commission on Human Security (CHS) defined a framework of human security as one that protects 'the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment.'<sup>18</sup> Furthermore, the CHS noted that threats to people's security are not always a threat to state security. In this way, a human security approach entails a more comprehensive assessment of security needs.

A security approach with nation-states at its focal point concentrates on protecting borders and ensuring that state's hold on power (on the international stage as well as with its own people); an approach that puts the daily security of human beings at its centre has very different priorities. A human security framework looks at what human beings need to feel secure in their daily lives. Do they have enough to eat? Are they literate, educated and able to make life choices? Are they comfortable walking the streets, free from the fear of gun violence, sexual violence or racial violence? Do they feel safe travelling outside of their native areas, without fear of retribution for what their government has done to others in their name?

Human security also involves analysing how people *don't* define security. Most people do not define security through the destruction of other human beings, nor would their definitions include the threat of nuclear annihilation. Moreover, when people define security through means such as availability

of health care and education, they are more likely to view nuclear weapons as a source of *insecurity* as they recognize that resources for economic and social needs are diverted for armaments.

Using gender as an analytical lens offers a second way to examine security needs and might facilitate this necessary paradigmatic shift towards human security. 'Gender analysis begins with people, their experiences and their lives, rather than with notions of state security' and 'offer(s) critical approaches to the concept of national security grounded in military superiority and the threat of the use of force.'<sup>19</sup> Gender perspectives enable us to move away from militarized notions of security, thereby facilitating disarmament processes of weapons, both large and small.

If states are to live up to the obligation codified in Step Nine (e) of the 2000 Final Document, which calls upon all NWS to seek 'A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies', they must understand the role that gendered perceptions play in their security policies. For example, Indian filmmaker Anand Patwardhan's documentary 'War and Peace' examines the reactions of Indians and Pakistanis immediately after the South Asian nuclear tests in May 1998. One of the most common reactions of men on the streets of Delhi, Mumbai, Islamabad and Karachi was one of exuberance and pride in their country. Many men spoke of 'feeling like a man' due to the tests, or that the show of nuclear power allows their country 'to play with the big boys'. So long as these perceptions of strength and masculinity remain affixed to nuclear weapons—in India and elsewhere—it will be difficult if not impossible to persuade governments to relinquish them.

Understanding the motives of those who seek nuclear weapons will help disarmament advocates to adjust their approaches and strategies. So long as armaments are equated with security, no international fora will make progress in disarmament. Such a gendered perception must be dispelled in the face of the perpetual conflict and ever-increasing arms expenditures that terrorized the twentieth century and threaten the century that lies before us.

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#### STRENGTHENING CIVIL SOCIETY

While many governments regard NGOs as a homogenous bloc, the dozens of groups that are represented at the NPT conferences and meetings are quite diverse. Other disarmament NGOs never make the trip to New York or Geneva meetings at all, focusing their advocacy in their own communities and capitals.

The success of the 2000 Review Conference was in large part due to the unprecedented unity and organization of these different groups, all supporting the position of the New Agenda Coalition.

This organization and unity must be replicated in the upcoming months and throughout the 2005 RevCon. NGOs should be building linkages to other groups in the peace movement and to the general public, as well as launching major initiatives to engage the media in these critical issues.

Governments must lend as much support to these groups as possible. For those which are not in the position to directly fund projects undertaken by civil society groups, it is important that they engage civil society in their consultations and provide them with the information that they need to effectively advocate for disarmament. In turn, NGOs can supply governments with resources, expertise and analysis that supports effective engagement with other governments during the NPT consultations and debates.

This past PrepCom, while a failure in terms of consensus-based recommendations for the RevCon, did witness a significant achievement: the unprecedented access of NGOs to the cluster debates. NGOs

have been left out of the debates due to an erroneous interpretation of Rule 44.4, which was finally recognized as such after South Africa made a point of order during the first week of the PrepCom. The hostility of some states to increased transparency and NGO access was palpable, however, and states must be prepared to stand their ground if this access is challenged.

## Conclusion

All hope is not lost. While indeed we may stand at a historical crossroads for disarmament, the international peace and security community has nudged out achievements in bleak times before. The 2000 Final Document was achieved in the shadows of challenges such as the South Asian nuclear tests, resumed nuclear testing by China and France, a stalemated Conference on Disarmament, and three consecutive failed PrepComs. It is neither inconceivable nor naive to believe that the current divisions, stale disarmament programmes and ongoing vertical proliferation will be just the sort of catalyst needed for real political will to emerge. Understanding our current dilemma, as well as the missteps of the past, is the only way to find any hope for the future.

## Notes

1. At the time of the 1995 Review Conference, many NGOs and some governments opposed the unconditional indefinite extension of the treaty based on the American Stockpile Stewardship programme. See M. Veiluva et al., 1995, 'Laboratory Testing In a Test Ban/Non-Proliferation Regime: Above Ground Experiments Threaten Compliance with Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty', Western States Legal Foundation and Greenpeace International, April, at < [www.wslfweb.org/docs/agex.htm](http://www.wslfweb.org/docs/agex.htm) > .
2. All statements from the 2004 PrepCom are available at < [www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/statements.html](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/statements.html) > .
3. J. Simpson, 2004, 'The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Back to the Future?', *Disarmament Forum*, no. 1, pp. 9–16, at < [www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2015.pdf](http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2015.pdf) > .
4. As suggested by T. Rauf, 2004, *Towards NPT 2005: An Action Plan for the 13 Steps*, Monterey Institute for International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, at < [cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/npt2005.pdf](http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/npt2005.pdf) > .
5. *Ibid.*
6. In 2003, the NAC omnibus resolution garnered a vote of 133 to 6, with 38 abstentions; the resolution on Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons garnered 128 to 4, with 43 abstentions.
7. Statement by the United States during the General Debate of the 2004 PrepCom, at < [www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/usa27.pdf](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/usa27.pdf) > .
8. Reaching Critical Will, Western States Legal Foundation and the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy presented an overview of current trends in vertical proliferation at an NPT workshop at the Indonesian Permanent Mission to the United Nations New York in March 2004. The paper based upon the presentation is available at < [www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/context04.pdf](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/context04.pdf) > .
9. Ideas for this section were developed through the NGO presentation 'Beyond the NPT: Recent initiatives to prevent proliferation', delivered at the 2004 NPT PrepCom in New York. The presentation was drafted by this author and John Burroughs of Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policy, and edited by a group of over twenty NGOs. The presentation is available at < [www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/NGOpres.html](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/NGOpres.html) > . The list of participating NGOs is available at < [www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/NGOpres.html#NGOs](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/legal/npt/prepcom04/NGOpres.html#NGOs) > .
10. Abolition 2000, a network of over 2,000 NGOs working toward the abolition of nuclear weapons, was at the forefront of civil society action during the debate on the resolution on non-proliferation. Statements from their press conference, memos to the network, letters to the Security Council members, as well as statements from governments during the open debate, can be found at < [www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/SC/SC.html](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/SC/SC.html) > .
11. Read the Abolition 2000 letter of appeal to Security Council members at < [www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/SC/Abo2000\\_SC\\_letter.pdf](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/SC/Abo2000_SC_letter.pdf) > .
12. Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 1999, *Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing World*, Ottawa, at < [www.summit-americas.org/Canada/HumanSecurity-english.htm](http://www.summit-americas.org/Canada/HumanSecurity-english.htm) > .

13. Human security, as defined by the Canadian Consortium on Human Security. See < [www.humansecurity.info/CCHS\\_web/ABOUT/en/Human\\_Security.php](http://www.humansecurity.info/CCHS_web/ABOUT/en/Human_Security.php)> .
14. See < [www.humansecurity.info/CCHS\\_web/ABOUT/en/Human\\_Security.php](http://www.humansecurity.info/CCHS_web/ABOUT/en/Human_Security.php)> .
15. The European Parliament resolution of 26 February 2004 is available at < [europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/200401/p106017.htm](http://europa.eu.int/abc/doc/off/bull/en/200401/p106017.htm)> .
16. M. Albright and R. Cook, 2004, We Need a Global Attack on Nuclear Proliferation, *Los Angeles Times*, 5 July, at < [www.nuclearpolicy.org/NewsArticle.cfm?NewsID=1639](http://www.nuclearpolicy.org/NewsArticle.cfm?NewsID=1639)> .
17. At the fifty-eighth session of the General Assembly First Committee, the United States was the only country to vote against draft resolution 58/L.29 on 'Relationship between Disarmament and Development', stating in their explanation of vote 'that disarmament and development are two distinct issues that do not lend themselves to be linked.' Their explanation of vote to 58/L.29 can be found at < [www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com03/res/resindex.htm](http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/political/1com/1com03/res/resindex.htm)> .
18. The Commission on Human Security was chaired jointly by Sadako Ogata, former UN High Commissioner for Refugees and Amartya Sen, Nobel Laureate. See Commission on Human Security, 2003, *Human Security Now*, New York, at < [www.humansecurity-chs.org/index.html](http://www.humansecurity-chs.org/index.html)> .
19. The United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs Gender Mainstreaming Action Plan, at < [disarmament2.un.org/gender/gmap.pdf](http://disarmament2.un.org/gender/gmap.pdf)> . For an in-depth discussion of the Action Plan, see A. Marcaillou, 2003, *Disarmament Forum*, no. 4, pp. 47-52, at < [www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art1997.pdf](http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art1997.pdf)> .

