

Scratching the surface of a global scourge: the first five years of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms

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The largest ever gathering of heads of state and government took place at United Nations Headquarters in New York on 14–16 September 2005 to follow up on commitments made at the 2000 Millennium Summit. The outcome document of the 2005 World Summit contains 40 pages of undertakings on a wide range of issues, spanning development, peace and collective security, human rights and the rule of law, and the strengthening of the United Nations.¹ Among them nestles the following sentence:

We support implementation of the 2001 Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects.²

Taken at face value, this is a formulaic expression of support for an agreement adopted by all UN Member States one year after the Millennium Summit. When one considers, however, that this is one of only three references to “weapons” of any sort in the entire document,³ and that the document contains no references at all to disarmament, this brief statement of support takes on new meaning. In an era when world leaders largely disagree on how best to build international peace and security through arms control and disarmament, the issue of small arms and light weapons would seem to constitute an island of agreement.

This article has three aims. First, it examines the extent to which this global political support for the UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (henceforth referred to as the PoA) has translated into actual implementation during the almost five years since it was agreed by UN Member States, in 2001.⁴ Second, it assesses the extent to which the PoA is actually achieving its stated goals of curbing the illicit small arms trade and reducing the human suffering caused by it. Finally, it reflects on the principal challenges faced by the first UN conference to review implementation of the PoA, scheduled for 26 June – 7 July 2006.

This article cannot pursue these aims in too much detail; instead it uses broad brush-strokes to sketch an impression of the first five years of the PoA and of the principal challenges that lie ahead. The article makes three main arguments.

- While political support for the PoA, per se, remains strong, this has not translated into strong implementation of its provisions.

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- While it has stimulated and enabled an impressive range of activities around the world, it is unclear whether the PoA has made any significant impact to date on reducing the illicit small arms trade and the human suffering associated with it.
- The 2006 Review Conference must address two principal weak links: 1) between political support and implementation and 2) between implementation and impact.

2001–2006: maintaining momentum

It is striking that, following the agreement of the PoA in 2001, UN Member States—with the help of a range of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international organizations and research institutes—have managed to maintain a level of commitment to eradicating the illicit small arms trade similar to that which existed in the run-up to the 2001 conference. This is a significant achievement,

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given the competing priorities of other areas of disarmament and arms control and the fact that UN Member States might have been expected to “ease up” somewhat on the small arms issue after having put so much effort into negotiating an agreement in 2001.

The fact that a good deal of momentum has been sustained is due to a number of factors. The first is the follow-up mechanism built into the PoA itself, especially its request that states report on how they are implementing its provisions,⁵ and its undertaking to convene meetings of UN Member States every two years to consider implementation of the PoA. However, informal activities—often initiated and guided by NGOs and international bodies—have also demonstrated a remarkable degree of success in keeping states focused on their commitments of 2001 and in reminding them of the pressing need to continue to develop more effective global policy responses to the problem of small arms proliferation and misuse. The main initiatives—both formal and informal—are outlined below.

NATIONAL REPORTING ON POA IMPLEMENTATION

The PoA requests the UN Secretary-General to collate and circulate data provided voluntarily by states regarding their implementation of the Programme of Action.⁶ The PoA does not specify, however, how frequently states should report. Annual UN General Assembly resolutions have requested the Secretary-General to report to it, on a de facto annual basis, on information received from states on their implementation activities.⁷ This annual reporting requirement on the Secretary-General has, to some extent, created an auxiliary expectation that states should also report on their implementation activities on an annual basis.

Notwithstanding, the vast majority of UN Member States have not reported annually on their implementation of the PoA. In fact, at the time of writing, only five states had done so.⁸ However, 136 states have submitted at least one implementation report since 2001.⁹ The number of reports submitted has tended to spike during the years in which Biennial Meetings of States (BMS) have taken place, with 103 reports submitted during 2003 and 101 submitted by September 2005 (with more expected before the end of 2005).¹⁰

To assist states in reporting on their implementation of the PoA, the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), the UN Department for Disarmament

Affairs (UNDDA) and Small Arms Survey launched an initiative soon after the 2001 conference entitled “Capacity Development for Reporting to the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms”.¹¹ This provides a package of reporting assistance tools, including a PoA reporting template, designed to help states in reporting on PoA implementation. A dedicated helpdesk is also available to respond to states’ specific inquiries.

FORMAL AND INFORMAL MONITORING OF PoA IMPLEMENTATION

Although counting the number of states that submit reports on their implementation of the PoA can give an indication of the level of political will, only a closer examination of these reports, combined with independent research into implementation, can provide a picture of the extent to which UN Member States have implemented the PoA. Regular monitoring of implementation is crucial since it provides feedback to states on how far, quickly and comprehensively they are progressing. This should not only keep states focused on their goals, it should also encourage them to redouble their efforts in areas where implementation is not proceeding as planned.

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Monitoring of PoA implementation has both formal and informal components. The formal components are provided by the PoA itself through its recommendations 1) to convene meetings of UN Member States every two years to “consider” national, regional and global implementation of the PoA and 2) to convene a conference no later than 2006 to “review” progress made in implementing the PoA.¹² A number of informal monitoring activities have also emerged since 2001, two of which stand out in particular. The first is an initiative by UNDP, UNIDIR, UNDDA and the Small Arms Survey to analyse comprehensively the PoA implementation reports submitted by states, as part of a broader effort to assist states in their reporting on PoA implementation (see above).¹³ These analyses not only demonstrate to states that their reports are taken very seriously, they are also invaluable in identifying strengths and weaknesses in PoA implementation, priority areas for action (some of which are not even part of the PoA) and opportunities for matching the needs of affected states with the resources of donor countries—substantially increasing the usefulness of the Biennial Meetings of States as a benchmark for PoA implementation.

The second is a much more ambitious effort by the NGO coalitions Biting the Bullet¹⁴ and the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA)¹⁵ to involve NGOs from around the world in monitoring how UN Member States are living up to their PoA commitments. Their findings have been published in two substantial reports—known as *Red Books* because of their distinctive colouring—coinciding with the 2003 and 2005 Biennial Meetings of States.¹⁶ These reports are a valuable source of independent information on progress towards implementation of the PoA. The 2005 edition, for example, drew on the findings of more than 100 non-governmental contributors who examined PoA implementation activities in over 180 countries.

OTHER INITIATIVES IN SUPPORT OF THE PROGRAMME OF ACTION

A number of other informal initiatives also fulfil important functions in maintaining a high level of political support for the PoA and in promoting its implementation.

The Geneva Process on small arms

The Geneva Forum launched the Geneva Process on small arms following the 2001 conference to help ensure that international momentum on the issue did not fade. The Geneva Process engages governments, NGOs and international organizations in regular, informal consultations to promote and monitor PoA implementation.¹⁷

The New York Small Arms Forum

What is now known as the New York Small Arms Forum grew from a series of informal luncheon meetings to discuss various aspects of the small arms problem, in particular in relation to the PoA. Currently, the core group of the New York Small Arms Forum comprises nine governments (Canada, Colombia, Finland, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Sierra Leone, South Africa and Sweden), one UN body (the Department for Disarmament Affairs) and three NGOs (Amnesty International, Oxfam International and the Quaker United Nations Office). The group meets approximately every 4–6 weeks, is open to participation by other interested states, and often invites independent experts from civil society to lead its discussions.

The Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures

The Group of Interested States in Practical Disarmament Measures (GIS) grew from a 1997 UN General Assembly resolution on the Consolidation of Peace through Practical Disarmament Measures.¹⁸ The Group was established at the United Nations in March 1998 and meets four or five times a year in New York. The GIS—which, as well as interested developing and donor states, comprises relevant UN departments and, since late 2004, NGOs—provides financial and political support for implementing practical disarmament measures in post-conflict situations. Since the adoption of the Programme of Action, the GIS “has given an increasingly high priority to the Programme’s implementation”.¹⁹ The GIS acts as a kind of market place, putting donor countries in direct contact with countries, international organizations and NGOs that have concrete, small arms-related disarmament projects in need of funding.²⁰

The Transfer Controls Initiative

The Transfer Controls Initiative (TCI) focuses specifically on assisting states to strengthen controls over the export, import and transit of small arms and light weapons. Launched at the beginning of 2003,²¹ the TCI is led by the UK government with support from the governments of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden.²² In the short term, it aims to build support for the concept of common standards on transfer controls. It has organized numerous seminars at the regional and subregional levels to encourage states to implement effective transfer controls and to establish common ground on the nature of such controls.²³ At the 2006 Review Conference, the TCI hopes to see “recognition of the need for action at the national, sub-regional, regional and global level built into a strengthened UN Programme of Action ..., with a commitment to undertake further work if needed”.²⁴ This goal was reflected in the final communiqué of the 2005 meeting of G8 leaders, in which they agreed to “improve the effectiveness of transfer controls over small arms and light weapons, including

at inter alia the review conference of the UN Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons in 2006".²⁵

The Control Arms campaign

The Control Arms campaign—led by Amnesty International, IANSA and Oxfam—aims to put pressure on governments to implement strict controls on the possession and transfer of all arms. Launched in October 2003, a principal goal is to persuade governments to negotiate an Arms Trade Treaty that would “prevent arms from being exported to destinations where they are likely to be used to commit grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law”.²⁶ The campaign has produced a treaty draft that it hopes governments will use as a basis for negotiation.²⁷ It enjoys growing support from governments, with approximately 24 states now saying they support the negotiation of an Arms Trade Treaty.²⁸

The Small Arms Consultative Group Process

The Small Arms Consultative Group Process (CGP) was established in January 2003 by the Biting the Bullet consortium to develop guidelines to help national decisions on authorizing the transfer of small arms and on restrictions of transfers to non-state actors,²⁹ an issue that is not enshrined in the PoA. The CGP involves representatives of over 30 governments, the United Nations, regional organizations and NGOs and has met six times to date. In 2004, the CGP completed the first phase of its work, disentangling the issues and formulating constructive international approaches to the problems.³⁰ During the second phase, the CGP will focus on developing concrete proposals for possible action during the 2006 Review Conference.

The CASA mechanism

The United Nations Secretary-General established the Coordinating Action on Small Arms (CASA) mechanism in 1998 as a means of “minimizing duplication, pooling scarce resources and maximizing synergistic partnerships within the UN system, with regard to actions in the area of small arms”.³¹ The mechanism currently comprises 16 UN departments, agencies, programmes and funds.³² CASA has undertaken field missions to assist Member States in their implementation of specific aspects of the PoA, and has come to embody a significant focal point within the UN system for advocating coordinated interdepartmental approaches to a problem that affects many areas of the UN’s work.

How has the PoA been implemented?

INTERNATIONAL TRACING INSTRUMENT

The importance of being able to trace the global travels of illicit small arms was recognized early in the preparatory process for the 2001 conference.³³ Since most illicit small arms begin life as legal

weapons, being able to trace their movements would provide valuable clues as to how, when and where such weapons cross the threshold from the legal to the illicit market. This knowledge would allow governments to develop more targeted, and therefore more effective, policies for combating the illicit small arms trade.

The PoA makes two main references to tracing small arms. First, it requires UN Member States to ensure that “licensed manufacturers apply an appropriate and reliable marking on each small arm and light weapon as an integral part of the production process”.³⁴ Four years after the adoption of the PoA, however, only 50 states have legislation that requires marking as an integral part of the small arms production process.³⁵

Second, the PoA recommends to the UN General Assembly to study the feasibility of developing an “international instrument to enable States to identify and trace in a timely and reliable manner illicit small arms and light weapons”.³⁶ The General Assembly acted on this recommendation in December 2001 by requesting the UN Secretary-General to conduct such a feasibility study with the aid of a group of governmental experts.³⁷ This group reported back to the General Assembly in July 2003 that the development of an international tracing instrument was indeed feasible.³⁸ Accordingly, in December of that year the General Assembly established an open-ended working group on the matter.³⁹ This group met three times and adopted a draft instrument on tracing that was then adopted by the 2005 session of the UN General Assembly.⁴⁰

This new agreement on tracing small arms is the first global instrument to be generated as a direct result of the PoA and, as such, is a welcome sign of progress in combating the illicit small arms trade. The instrument has two principal weaknesses, however. First, like the PoA itself, the tracing instrument is not legally binding but is rather a voluntary political commitment. Second, it does not cover small arms ammunition, thus curtailing the effectiveness of the instrument.⁴¹

SLOW PROGRESS ON ILLICIT SMALL ARMS BROKERING

The PoA is rather vague when it comes to committing states to combating illicit small arms brokering. Under the PoA, states undertake to “develop adequate national legislation or administrative procedures regulating the activities of those who engage in small arms and light weapons brokering”.⁴² However, as of June 2005, legislative controls over arms brokers existed in only 32 of the UN’s 191 states.⁴³ The

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PoA also commits Member States to “develop common understandings of the basic issues and the scope of the problems related to illicit brokering”⁴⁴ and delegates this task to the UN General Assembly.⁴⁵ The General Assembly, however, was slower to take up the issue of brokering than that of marking and tracing, largely because some Member States opposed the idea of conducting work on both issues simultaneously, ostensibly on the grounds that doing so would place an inordinate strain on the financial and human resources of some Member States.

It was not until December 2003 that the General Assembly first requested the Secretary-General to conduct broad-based consultations with states, regional and subregional organizations, international agencies and experts in the field on “further steps to enhance international cooperation in preventing, combating and eradicating illicit brokering in small arms and light weapons”.⁴⁶ Four such consultations were organized by UNDDA in New York and Geneva between May and July 2004.⁴⁷ At the end of the year the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue these consultations with a view to establishing a group of governmental experts on brokering after the 2006 Review Conference but no later than 2007.⁴⁸

Assuming the international community does decide to negotiate a new international instrument on brokering, such an instrument is not likely to see the light of day until at least 2009, eight years after the agreement of the PoA. Given that illicit small arms brokering played a central role in putting small arms on the international agenda in the first place, it is surprising to say the least that UN Member States have not taken more decisive action on this issue.

ASSESSMENT OF OVERALL IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT

Given that, on average, around 1,400 people die every day as a result of gunshot wounds⁴⁹ and that, every year, the lives and livelihoods of countless thousands more are adversely affected by the proliferation and misuse of small arms, there can be no room for complacency in taking action to eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and the human suffering caused by it.

Not only is the overall picture of PoA implementation patchy and weak, it is unclear whether the PoA has so far made any significant impact.

By mid-2006, the PoA will have been in existence for five years. It is therefore reasonable to expect that, by then, states will have made substantial progress in implementing its provisions. It is also reasonable to expect that this implementation will have translated into a reduction both in the illicit small arms trade and in the human suffering associated with it. Given the pace of progress to date, however, it is unlikely that the 2006 Review Conference will satisfy these expectations. Not only is the overall picture of PoA implementation patchy and weak, it is unclear whether the PoA has so far made any significant impact.

At the 2003 BMS, many analysts were willing to give states the benefit of the doubt when it came to following up on the commitments they made at the 2001 Small Arms Conference. Most NGOs, for example, were willing to concede that, even though the “glass remains 95 per cent empty” when it came to PoA implementation, “at least the glass has been slightly filled”.⁵⁰ They noted “significant progress since 2001 in implementing the PoA” and recognized that “the momentum for action on SALW trafficking, proliferation and misuse that was generated during the lead-up to the July 2001 UN Conference on Small Arms [had] largely been maintained”.⁵¹ Similarly, an analysis of the implementation reports submitted by states to the 2003 BMS concluded that, “in spite of some shortcomings, notable progress in PoA implementation is underway in many countries”.⁵²

By the second biennial meeting in 2005, however, the performance of states in implementing their PoA commitments was subjected to a much more critical and impatient appraisal. The 2005 edition of the *Red Book*, for example, while noting “substantial implementation activities across much of the world”, laments “how little has so far actually been achieved in many respects. In much of the world, the glass is still 95% empty, and two more years have passed by”.⁵³

It is difficult, however, to square the *Red Book*'s conclusions with its content, which documents in impressive detail work that is being carried out around the world by governments, civil society organizations, regional and subregional organizations, and other international bodies to curb the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. Even by the 2005 *Red Book*'s own admission, “there are many useful ongoing activities, and significant progress in some issue areas and regions”.⁵⁴ If this is the case, then governments would deserve some increase on the 5% “grade” accorded to them in 2003.

This apparent inconsistency can be explained by the fact that the *Red Books* conflate success in implementing the provisions of the PoA with success in reducing global gun violence. The 5% grade is based more on the conclusion that “the scale of the interventions is generally not sufficient to have more than a local or marginal impact on the problems of SALW trafficking, proliferation and misuse”⁵⁵

than on an objective assessment of progress made in implementing the provisions of the PoA. It is important when analysing implementation of the PoA to make the distinction between implementation and the impact of implementation. Both are important subjects of examination, but they are not the same. If UN Member States managed to fully implement all provisions of the PoA, but the illicit trade

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“Implementation” success is being confused with “impact” success in part because there is no set of tools to measure the impact of PoA implementation on curbing the illicit small arms trade and reducing the human suffering caused by it. Without such tools, it is difficult to say with any degree of certainty that

the PoA is actually achieving the results it was designed to achieve. While we can measure implementation by counting the number of countries that have appointed national points of contact for small arms issues, for example, this tells us nothing about the number of illicit small arms transfers thwarted or the number of lives saved as a result of doing so.

Many would in fact agree with the *Red Book* when it says that the PoA has had, to date, only a marginal impact on curbing the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. The International Committee of the Red Cross, in its statement to the second Biennial Meeting of States, argued that “we are still far from being able to conclude that the Programme of Action has saved lives on the ground or led to an overall reduction in the availability of illicit arms”.⁵⁶ But however useful the impressions of field-based international and civil society organizations regarding PoA impact, the fact remains that there exists little hard evidence on the effectiveness of the PoA. And without adequate tools to measure the impact of the PoA, our impressions will remain essentially subjective.

Nevertheless, the sobering assessments of NGOs and organizations such as the ICRC should serve as a stark wake-up call to the international community that, almost five years since the adoption of the PoA, it appears only to be scratching the surface of the global scourge that is the illicit small arms trade. They underline the importance of supplementing a narrow appraisal of how states are implementing their PoA commitments with a deliberate effort to measure the impact of such implementation on achieving the stated goals of the PoA—the reduction of human suffering caused by the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and the ultimate eradication of this trade.

Conclusion

The impressive level of political will and momentum that was generated between the mid-1990s and the 2001 Small Arms Conference has been largely maintained. This is due both to follow-up mechanisms built into the PoA itself, and to initiatives undertaken (often jointly) by governments, NGOs, international bodies and research institutes to promote implementation and sharpen the focus of the international community on the humanitarian and socio-economic impacts of the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. This momentum has not translated, however, into strong implementation of the PoA. Globally speaking, PoA implementation remains weak, patchy and ineffectual.

The main contribution of the PoA is that it provides a global framework that stimulates and enables a broad range of small arms control initiatives in various substantive issue areas and geographical regions. Almost five years after its agreement, however, little hard evidence is available to assess how the PoA is achieving its stated goals of eradicating the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons and of

reducing the human suffering caused by it. Without such evidence, it is reasonable to go along with the assessments of international and civil society organizations in the field that the PoA has only begun to scratch the surface of this global scourge.

The 2006 Review Conference must address these two weak links in the PoA regime—the link between declared political support for the PoA and actual implementation of its provisions, on the one hand, and the link between implementation and real world impact, on the other. To achieve this, UN Member States must not only come up with new ideas on how to accelerate implementation of the PoA, they must also strengthen the existing regime and develop adequate tools to measure its impact.

Notes

1. UN document A/60/L.1*, 20 September 2005.
2. *Ibid.*, paragraph 94.
3. The two other references to weapons in the outcome document of the 2005 World Summit mention anti-personnel landmines (*ibid.*, paragraph 95) and, for a second time, small arms and light weapons, this time in the context of transnational organized crime (*ibid.*, paragraph 111).
4. Reproduced in the *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*, New York, 9–20 July 2001, UN document A/CONF.192/15, pp. 7–17, also at <disarmament2.un.org/cab/poa.html>.
5. PoA, section II, paragraph 33.
6. *Ibid.*
7. UN General Assembly resolutions 56/24 V of 24 December 2001; 57/72 of 22 November 2002; 58/241 of 23 December 2003; 59/86 of 3 December 2004 (UN documents A/RES/56/24, 10 January 2002; A/RES/57/72, 30 December 2002; A/RES/58/241, 9 January 2004; A/RES/59/86, 10 December 2004).
8. As of September 2005, only Australia, Belarus, Hungary, Mexico and the United States had submitted reports annually since 2002. For lists of countries that have submitted reports between 2002 and 2005, see <disarmament.un.org/cab/salw-nationalreports.html>.
9. This number includes the Holy See, a UN Observer State. E. Kytömäki and V. Yankey-Wayne, forthcoming, *Implementing the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms: Analysis of the National Reports submitted in 2002–2005*, Geneva, UNIDIR.
10. Biennial Meetings of States were held on 7–11 July 2003 and 11–15 July 2005. For further information, see <disarmament.un.org/cab/salw-2003.html> and <www.un.org/events/smallarms2005>, respectively. Formalization of current practice—synchronizing PoA reporting with the BMS—is currently being informally discussed and could be considered at the 2006 Review Conference.
11. See <www.undp.org/bcpr/smallarms/PoA.htm>.
12. PoA, section IV, paragraphs 1(b) and 1(a). For an analysis of the mandate of the 2006 Review Conference, see the article by Sarah Parker in this issue of *Disarmament Forum*.
13. E. Kytömäki and V. Yankey-Wayne, 2004, *Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Analysis of the Reports Submitted by States in 2003*, Geneva, UNIDIR. A follow-up analysis of reports submitted to the 2005 BMS is due to be released in 2006.
14. The Biting the Bullet project is a joint initiative of three UK-based bodies, International Alert, Saferworld and the University of Bradford. See <www.saferworld.org.uk/publications/biting%20the%20bullet.htm> and <www.international-alert.org/our_work/themes/biting_the_bullet.php>.
15. IANSA is a global network of over 500 civil society organizations, see <www.iansa.org>.
16. Biting the Bullet and IANSA, 2003, *Implementing the Programme of Action 2003: Action by States and Civil Society*, at <www.iansa.org/documents/03poareport>; Biting the Bullet and IANSA, 2005, *International Action on Small Arms 2005: Examining Implementation of the UN Programme of Action*, at <www.iansa.org/un/bms2005/red-book.htm>.
17. For an analysis of the Geneva Process, see the article by John Borrie in this issue of *Disarmament Forum*.
18. UN General Assembly resolution 52/38 G of 9 December 1997, UN document A/RES/52/38, 8 January 1998.
19. Presentation by Germany to the 21st meeting of the Geneva Process on Small Arms, 28 June 2005.
20. For further information on the GIS, see <disarmament2.un.org/cab/pdm-gis.html> and <disarmament2.un.org/casa/gis/gis-july2005.htm>.
21. *Implementing the UN Programme of Action: Strengthening Export Controls*. Lancaster House Conference, 14–15

- January 2003, Chairman's Summary, at <www.smallarmssurvey.org/source_documents/Regional%20fora/Other%20fora/Lancaster%20House%20Jan%202003.pdf>.
22. UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office, *Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW): Transfer Controls*, paper circulated at the Second Biennial Meeting of States to Consider Implementation of the PoA, New York, 11–15 July 2005.
 23. To date, TCI seminars have been held in Argentina, Brazil, Peru, Nicaragua, the Bahamas, Kenya and Fiji. Further seminars are planned in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and East Asia regions. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
 24. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
 25. The G8 Gleneagles Communiqué, section on Africa, paragraph 10(f), at <www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/PostG8_Gleneagles_Africa,0.pdf>.
 26. Amnesty International and Oxfam International, 2003, *Shattered Lives: The Case for Tough International Arms Control*, at <www.controlarms.org/downloads/shattered_lives.htm>.
 27. Draft Framework Convention on International Arms Transfers, available at <www.iansa.org/documents/2004/att_0504.pdf> (working draft of 25 May 2004).
 28. For more information on the Control Arms campaign, see <www.controlarms.org>. The estimated number of states now supporting the treaty was derived from Simon Gray's blog at the Second BMS, <www.oxfam.org.uk/generationwhy/controlarms_blog>.
 29. Small Arms Consultative Group Process, 2005, Food for thought paper, July.
 30. Small Arms Consultative Group Process, 2004, Chair's Interim Report, *Small Arms and Light Weapons Transfers: Developing Understandings on Guidelines for National Controls and Transfers to Non-State Actors*, London, Biting the Bullet, May, at <www.saferworld.org.uk/iac/btb_interim_report.pdf>.
 31. Ms Hannelore Hoppe, Director DDA, CASA statement to the Second Biennial Meeting of States to Consider Implementation of the PoA, New York, 11–15 July 2005, at <www.un.org/events/smallarms2005/regional-intlorg-pdf/CASA%20statement%20by%20Ms.%20Hoppe.pdf>.
 32. For the full list of CASA members, see <www.un-casa.org>.
 33. France and Switzerland took the lead on this issue, circulating various documents during the preparatory process dealing with marking, tracing and record-keeping (UN documents A/CONF.192/PC/7, 17 March 2000; A/CONF.192/PC/25, 10 January 2001; A/CONF.192/PC/38, 23 March 2001).
 34. PoA, section II, paragraph 7.
 35. Biting the Bullet and IANSA, 2005, op. cit., p. 262.
 36. PoA, section IV, paragraph 1(c).
 37. UN General Assembly resolution 56/24 V, paragraph 10 (see note 7).
 38. *Report of the Group of Governmental Experts established pursuant to the General Assembly resolution 56/24 V of 24 December 2001, entitled "The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons in all its aspects"*, UN document A/58/138, 11 July 2003.
 39. UN General Assembly resolution 58/241 of 23 December 2003, UN document A/RES/58/241, 9 January 2004, paragraphs 8 and 9.
 40. International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons, adopted 17 June 2005. Reproduced in the *Report of the Open-ended Working Group to Negotiate an International Instrument to Enable States to Identify and Trace, in a Timely and Reliable Manner, Illicit Small Arms and Light Weapons*, UN document A/60/88, 27 June 2005. See <disarmament2.un.org/cab/salw-owwg.html>. For more on the negotiation of the Tracing Instrument, see the article by Peter Batchelor and Glenn McDonald in this issue of *Disarmament Forum*.
 41. For an analysis of the small arms ammunition question, see the article by Christophe Carle in this issue of *Disarmament Forum*.
 42. PoA, section II, paragraph 14.
 43. Biting the Bullet and IANSA, 2005, op. cit., p. 258. See also *Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk*, London, Oxford University Press, pp. 141–171.
 44. PoA, section II, paragraph 39.
 45. PoA, section IV, paragraph 1(d).
 46. UN General Assembly resolution 58/241, paragraph 11 (see note 39).
 47. For the results of these consultations, see <disarmament.un.org/cab/salw-48.brokering%202004.htm>.
 48. UN General Assembly resolution 59/86, paragraph 5 (see note 7).
 49. The Small Arms Survey has estimated that, annually, more than 200,000 people are murdered or commit suicide in the industrialized world using firearms and that at least 300,000 are killed by firearms during armed conflicts occurring in developing countries (*Small Arms Survey 2002: Counting the Human Cost*, London, Oxford University Press, p. 155). This estimate has been adopted by IANSA in the form of the slogan, "Every minute, someone is killed by a gun", see <www.iansa.org/action/toolkit.htm>.
 50. Biting the Bullet and IANSA, 2003, op. cit., p. 187.
 51. *Ibid.*

52. E. Kytömäki and V. Yankey-Wayne, 2004, op. cit., p. xvii.
53. *Biting the Bullet* and IANSA, 2005, op. cit., p. 315.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. International Committee of the Red Cross, *Report to the Second Biennial Meeting of States to Consider the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*, New York, 11–15 July 2005, at <www.un.org/events/smallarms2005/regional-intlorg-pdf/ICRC.pdf>.

