

Reviewing multilateral political agreements: precedents for the 2006 Small Arms Review Conference

Sarah PARKER

This paper analyses the process for reviewing multilateral political agreements with a view to establishing an understanding and expectation of what can (theoretically) be achieved at the 2006 conference to review the implementation of the 2001 Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (the PoA).¹ The analysis is based on an overview of follow-up processes of a number of United Nations conferences, as well as several conventions pertaining to disarmament (see Box 1, on the following page).

Background

During the negotiation of the PoA, there was heated debate and disagreement surrounding the process for review. The United States strongly objected to the inclusion of a mandatory Review Conference, arguing that such a mechanism “serves only to institutionalize and bureaucratize this process”.² Instead, the US advocated that “meetings to review progress on the implementation of the Program of Action be decided by member states as needed, responding not to an arbitrary timetable, but specific problems faced in addressing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons”. Ultimately, a paragraph was incorporated into the PoA that called for the General Assembly to “convene a conference no later than 2006 to review progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action”.

Notably, the text refers to a “conference ... to review” rather than a Review Conference, and there is speculation as to whether a distinction between the two concepts exists or, more specifically, whether the terms contemplate distinct processes of review. There is concern that when the 2006 conference is convened, some countries (in particular the United States) may try to prevent certain gaps in the PoA being addressed, especially those issues on which consensus could not be reached in the original negotiations. States may attempt to do this by arguing that the text of the PoA’s follow-up provisions does not contemplate or allow for substantive review of the PoA in the form of additions or amendments, based on an assertion that a conference to review is something less than a Review Conference.

Sarah Parker is a Project Associate with the Geneva Forum and is in the process of completing a master’s degree in International Law through the University of Sydney, focusing on international security, including terrorism and the use of armed force. This paper was initially prepared for the Geneva Forum residential seminar “Strategies for Strengthening the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons”, Glen Cove, New York, 30 September – 2 October 2005.

Box 1. List of conventions reviewed

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction (Mine Ban Convention), at <disarmament.un.org/rdb/apm-mbc-text.html>.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction (BTWC), at <disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf/44E6EEABC9436B78852568770078D9C0/FFA7842E7FD1D0078525688F0070B82D?OpenDocument>.

Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCWC), at <www.mineaction.org/docs/120_.asp>.

Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, at <www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/moontxt.html>.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), at <disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.nsf/44E6EEABC9436B78852568770078D9C0/0655D51A30692632852568770079DDA2?OpenDocument>.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction (CWC), at <disarmament.un.org/wmd/cwc/cwctext-english.pdf>.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), at <disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/NPT%20text-English.pdf>.

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof (Seabed Treaty), at <www.nti.org/e_research/official_docs/inventory/pdfs/.%5Captseabd.pdf>.

What is a Review Conference?

Although most multilateral political and legal documents include provisions for a review of implementation or follow-up, usually within a specified time frame, no single formula or phrase is universally employed in such follow-up or review provisions, and explicit reference to a Review Conference in the text is not common. In fact, in only one of the multilateral arms regulation and disarmament agreements reviewed for the purposes of this paper was there an explicit reference to a Review Conference in the follow-up provisions.³ What follows is an examination of the text of follow-up provisions in several treaties and multilateral agreements in an effort to understand exactly what is meant by “Review Conference”.

CONVENTIONS AND TREATIES

Generally, the text in multilateral conventions calls for the convening of a “conference ... to review” operation of the relevant instrument, including implementation. For example, Article VIII of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) stipulates that, five years after entry into force, “a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held ... in order to review the operation of this Treaty”.⁴ In some instances, both phrases are used. Article 18 of the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies states that, after five years, states parties may “convene a conference of the States Parties to review this Agreement. A review conference shall also consider the question of the implementation of the provisions...”. Similarly, Article VIII of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty states that after 10 years, “a Conference of the States Parties shall be held to review the operation and effectiveness of this Treaty... .On the basis of a request by any State Party, the Review Conference shall consider the possibility of permitting...”. The clear inference is that a “conference ... to review” and a “review conference” are interchangeable.⁵

This inference is supported by the fact that the UN and states parties refer to numerous follow-up conferences as Review Conferences. As mentioned above, the NPT calls for a “conference ... to review” every five years. One of the three decisions resulting from the 1995 Review and Extension Conference was on strengthening the review process for the treaty. This decision makes express reference to further “Review Conferences”: “The States ... decided, in accordance with article VIII, paragraph 3, that Review Conferences should continue to be held every five years and that, accordingly, the next Review Conference should be held in the year 2000”.⁶ The US Department of State, on its web site, refers to the review conference held in 2005 as the “2005 NPT Review Conference”,⁷ indicating that it does not in fact draw a distinction or that it has adopted the general practice of referring to follow-up conferences to review as Review Conferences.

POLITICAL AGREEMENTS

As with most of the conventions reviewed, follow-up provisions in multilateral political agreements often call for a conference to review implementation. Here again, there are instances where such conferences to review are referred to as Review Conferences. The United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices of 1979–1980 adopted a resolution in which it approved a Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices and submitted it to the Thirty-fifth Session of the General Assembly for adoption as a resolution. In the resolution submitted by the conference, it recommended that the General Assembly “convene a United Nations Conference under the auspices of UNCTAD for the purpose of reviewing all the aspects of the Set of Principles and Rules” five years after their adoption.⁸ General Assembly resolution 35/63, adopting the Set of Principles, decided to convene “a United Nations conference to review all aspects” of the Set of Principles in 1985.⁹

A series of UN conferences to review the Set of Principles followed. The official title of each conference has been The [X]th United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices. However, UN references to these conferences and the texts of the conference documents themselves utilize the term “Review Conference”. For instance, item 3 of the provisional agenda for the Fourth Conference to Review, relating to the adoption of rules of procedure for the “Fourth Review Conference”, proposed that the rules of procedure for previous conferences be used “in conformity with the *modus operandi*

followed by First, Second and Third Review Conferences".¹⁰ Similarly, in paragraph 5 of the Resolution of the Third Conference to Review, states parties call on governments to make efforts to increase the participation of experts "in the Fourth Review Conference".¹¹ Furthermore, on its web site, UNCTAD makes repeated references to the "Fifth Review Conference".¹²

Returning to the small arms PoA, here too are instances where the terms conference to review and Review Conference have been used interchangeably. For instance, the Secretary-General's report to the Sixtieth Session of the General Assembly makes reference to a group of governmental experts "to be established after the Review Conference to consider progress made in the implementation of the Programme of Action".¹³

There are indications that the US considers the 2006 conference to be a review conference. In each of the reports on PoA implementation submitted by the US in 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005, the US report summarizes commitments under section IV, paragraph 1 as "Review conference by 2006" and in the 2002 report refers to a "Review Conference by 2006".¹⁴ Admittedly, this is not conclusive proof that the United States regards that the requirement for a conference to review progress in 2006 means the convening of a Review Conference, and it may merely be a shorthand means of expressing the commitment. Nevertheless, it does lend support to the view that states use the terms conference to review and Review Conference interchangeably because they assume or indeed acknowledge that they are one and the same thing. And if they *are* one and the same, then their purpose and scope are also equivalent.

CONCLUSION

Conferences to review appear more commonly to be called Review Conferences in the context of conventions and treaties. Furthermore, conventions and treaties tend to call for a review of the "operation" or "all aspects" of the treaty, not just implementation. It may be, then, that it is more accurate or appropriate to call a conference a Review Conference where the aim is to review aspects *in addition* to implementation. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that, as discussed above, the

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conferences to review the Set of Principles arising out of the United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices are unanimously referred to as Review Conferences. Though the Set of Principles is a political agreement, the mandate, as set out in the General Assembly resolution, is to review "all aspects" of the Set of Principles.

Nevertheless, there are instances where conferences with a mandate to review implementation (as is the case with the review of most political agreements) are also referred to as Review Conferences. Whether this is by accident or design, it appears that state actors, non-governmental organizations and academics alike¹⁵ do not distinguish between the concepts. For the remainder of this paper, therefore, the term "review conference" will be used to cover both concepts.

What happens at a review conference?

The simple answer to this question is that it depends on the mandate of the outcome document calling for a review or follow-up. As mentioned, conventions and treaties tend to call for a review of all aspects or the operation of the agreement, including implementation. Political documents, on the

other hand, tend to call for a review of implementation, with some providing a detailed list of elements to be addressed in the review, and others simply stating that a review of implementation must take place.

So, for instance, paragraph 138 of the Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the 1990s stipulates that the follow-up should focus on five main elements, including analysing and comparing experience and lessons learned—from formulating and implementing policy framework and from the functioning of country-level coordination arrangements, and monitoring, in particular the involvement of women in the implementation of the Programme of Action.¹⁶ It also invites the General Assembly to consider holding a third conference “to make comprehensive appraisal of the implementation of this Programme and to decide on subsequent action”.¹⁷

The Programme of Action for Least Developed Countries produced by the Third Conference on Least Developed Countries contained entirely different review provisions. They focused on linking national, regional and global monitoring, and noted that, through the review processes, the actions identified in the Programme of Action will be regularly adapted to new and evolving developments.¹⁸ The Third Conference’s Programme of Action also suggested the Economic and Social Council put the issue of review of the Programme of Action on its annual agenda, and invited the General Assembly to consider holding a Fourth Conference “in order to make a comprehensive appraisal of the implementation of this Programme and to decide on subsequent action”.¹⁹

In the context of the small arms PoA, the provisions of the review clause are sparse. It simply calls for a conference “to review progress made in the implementation”.²⁰

There is no mention of “deciding on subsequent action”, for example, nor is there a list of specific elements to be considered or addressed. On the one hand, the limited text could be interpreted in a restrictive sense as only contemplating a review of how far countries have got in terms of implementing the PoA (by looking at various country reports, for instance), but not providing scope for future action.

This intention seems unlikely, given that this function is already carried out by the biennial meetings, which are designed to “consider” implementation at the national, regional and global level. Furthermore, given that the long-term goal of the PoA is to eradicate the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW), it seems unlikely that the review process was intended to be restrictive, without the possibility of further action. Instead, the text could be interpreted as providing a very broad mandate. By not including *any* specific elements to be addressed, it could be inferred that nothing is excluded. A liberal interpretation of the purpose of the review conference is supported by an analysis of review processes in theory and practice.

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REVIEW PROCESSES IN THEORY

A good overview of the theoretical purpose of a conference to review implementation of a multilateral agreement outcome is provided in General Assembly resolution 57/270 B, entitled “Integrated and coordinated implementation of and follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic and social fields”.²¹ The resolution was inspired by the report of an ad hoc working group that had investigated the subject of implementation and found that, following a decade of various conferences and summits, “progress in implementation has been insufficient and therefore the time has come to vigorously pursue effective implementation”.²² In fact, the General Assembly deemed the issue so important that it decided to include in its annual agenda a specific item on implementation.²³

Chapter IV of the resolution, entitled “How best to address the review of the implementation of the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits, including format and periodicity”, stresses that reviews should:

- 1) assess the progress made in the implementation of commitments;
- 2) provide the occasion to reaffirm the goals and objectives agreed upon at those conferences;
- 3) share best practices and lessons learned; and
- 4) identify obstacles and constraints encountered, actions and initiatives to overcome them and important measures for the further implementation of their programmes of action, as well as new challenges and emerging issues.²⁴

Paragraph 26 of the resolution emphasizes that a review should, “inter alia, identify constraints and obstacles faced in relation to implementation”. Presumably this could include constraints or obstacles in the form of inadequate drafting or gaps in the provisions in the outcome document of the conference.

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Although resolution 57/270 B does not list the PoA in its Indicative Programme of Work and it specifically relates to conferences and summits in the “economic and social fields”, there is no reason why the principles enshrined in the resolution should not be considered important guidelines for the implementation of any UN conference outcome. Interestingly, agenda item 46 of the General Assembly’s Sixtieth Session, inspired by this resolution, is entitled “Integrated and coordinated implementation of and

follow-up to the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits in the economic, social and related fields”²⁵ (emphasis added), and this forms one of the agenda items under which the 2005 World Summit issued its final outcome document.²⁶ The document makes references to the implementation of outcome documents of many of the world conferences discussed below, and gives specific support to the implementation of the PoA in paragraph 94, under the heading “Peacekeeping”.

In the Secretary-General’s report *Integrated and Coordinated Implementation of and Follow-up to the Outcomes of the Major United Nations Conferences and Summits in the Economic, Social and Related Fields* to the Fifty-ninth Session of the General Assembly,²⁷ the Secretary-General emphasized the interlinked nature of development and the interdependent nature of the outcomes of UN conferences held since 1990. “To realize the internationally agreed development goals, including those contained in the United Nations Millennium Declaration, and the outcomes of the major United Nations conferences and summits, the implementation and follow-up processes must be carried out in a complementary, coherent and coordinated manner across sectors at all levels.”²⁸ Notably, the Secretary-General did not distinguish conferences and summits specifically addressing economic and social affairs, but addressed UN conferences in general. It is clear, therefore, that implementation of the PoA should be considered within this coordinated system, and that the principles of resolution 57/270 B apply to it.

REVIEW PROCESSES IN PRACTICE

There has been a number of world conferences on major global issues, including women, population, sustainable development and human rights, since the founding of the United Nations. Generally speaking, each of these conferences has produced an outcome document setting out states parties’ goals and commitments, as well as provisions for a review of the progress of implementation of those commitments. Conferences to review progress are usually recommended every five years, although

some are left to the discretion of the General Assembly. Subsequent conferences have reviewed the progress and implementation of the outcome documents of their predecessors, and produced their own declarations and programmes of action for the next stage in the evolution of these rights and obligations. Indeed, the strategy of producing new or supplementary texts in the form of annexes to the PoA, rather than renegotiating the existing text, was suggested and supported by a number of participants at a Geneva Process meeting of 15 September 2005, during discussions about the 2006 review conference.

In some instances, the review of implementation has been conducted at a Special Session of the General Assembly. For instance, the five-year review following the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, or the Earth Summit) was conducted by the Special Session of the General Assembly to Review and Appraise the Implementation of Agenda 21, which produced the Programme for the Further Implementation of Agenda 21.²⁹ Similarly, the five-year review of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) was conducted by a Special Session of the General Assembly to review progress towards meeting the ICPD goals, which produced Key Actions for the Further Implementation of the Programme of Action of the ICPD (or ICPD+5).³⁰

In other cases, a UN Commission is allocated responsibility for reviewing the progress of implementation. So for instance, following the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, the General Assembly mandated the Commission on the Status of Women to integrate into its work programme a follow-up process to the Conference, in which the Commission should play a catalytic role, regularly reviewing the critical areas of concern in the Platform for Action produced at the Fourth World Conference. Similarly, the Commission on Population was modified as a result of the ICPD, becoming the Commission on Population and Development. Its role is to monitor, review and assess the implementation of the Programme of Action of the ICPD. Following the UNCED, the UN General Assembly established the Commission on Sustainable Development to monitor overall implementation of the Earth Summit agreements by governments, businesses, non-governmental organizations and others.

The Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and the Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS) was established by the United Nations General Assembly in 2001 through resolution 56/227. The main part of its mandate is to further the implementation of the Programme of Action for Least Developed Countries,³¹ the (Barbados) Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States (BPoA)³² and the Almaty Programme of Action.³³ UN-OHRLLS' assistance in the implementation of these Programmes of Action has included preparation of the Roadmap for the Implementation of the Almaty Programme of Action.³⁴

What we witness through an analysis of the outcome documents of the various review conferences and Special Sessions is a gradual expansion and strengthening of states parties' commitments to stated rights and goals, and progress from generic, goodwill undertakings toward specific obligations. So, for instance, at the Twenty-third Special Session of the General Assembly in 2000, governments reaffirmed their commitment to the goals and objectives set down in the Nairobi Forward-Looking Strategies for the Advancement of Women and the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action (adopted by the Third and Fourth World Conferences on Women, respectively).³⁵ They also committed themselves to further actions and initiatives identified in the review process to overcome the obstacles and challenges to full implementation of those documents. The Special Session then adopted the Political Declaration and Further Actions and Initiatives to Implement the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action in which governments committed to continued and additional steps to achieve the objectives of the Platform for Action.³⁶

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At each stage of the review process, there is a reaffirmation of commitments made in previous outcome documents, an analysis of obstacles encountered in attempts to implement those documents, as well as identification of further action and initiatives necessary to achieve full implementation of commitments and overall objectives. What can also be clearly observed is the adaptation to emerging issues and changes in the global political and economic environment. The Conference on Women is again a good example. The focus of negotiations in the 2000 Special Session was on issues that had gained importance since 1995. In addition to the 12 areas of particular concern that featured repeatedly in earlier documents, participants proposed and agreed on new forms of action, including women's access to decision-making in peacekeeping processes, changing patterns of migratory flows, new technologies, and violence against women including trafficking and in armed conflict.³⁷ Similarly, preceded by four World Conferences, the ICPD involved a shift in emphasis from demography and population control to sustainable development and the recognition of the need for comprehensive reproductive health care and reproductive rights; strong language on the empowerment of women; a reflection of differences in values and religious beliefs; a reaffirmation of the central role of the family; and recognition of the needs of adolescents.³⁸

Conclusion

Whether it is merely a shorthand way of writing “conference to review” or whether there is a conscious belief that the two phrases mean one and the same thing, there is strong evidence to suggest that, in practice, the terms “Review Conference” and “conference to review” are used interchangeably. Support for this assertion can be found in multilateral legal and political agreements. Admittedly, the term Review Conference is more commonly used in the context of conventions and treaties than political agreements, and it may be more appropriate to associate Review Conference with conferences to review *all aspects* of an instrument, not just *implementation*, since the mandate for review conferences in conventions usually covers this broader scope.

Follow-up conferences to political agreements differ in that they are usually one in a series intended to develop and build on broad concepts, such as “sustainable development”. They produce new outcome documents with a view to developing, progressing, evolving and strengthening states parties' commitments to aspirational goals such as improving the status of women. Arguably, this practice provides the process of review with greater flexibility and adaptability, since attempts to expand on or add to obligations and commitments made at a review conference of a political agreement are not restricted, for instance, by legal constraints such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.

It seems that this level of flexibility is precisely what the United States was aspiring to, since its objections to a mandatory review process for the small arms PoA purportedly centred around a preference for a more flexible approach and a belief that a mandatory system would “bureaucratize” the system and be incapable of responding to realities and “specific problems faced in addressing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons” as and when they arose. There is no suggestion in the rhetoric that the US objected to *substantive* review of the PoA. On the contrary, the United States' stance supports a mechanism that calls for meetings to review progress on implementation “as needed” to respond to “specific problems” faced in addressing the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons which could, arguably, include weaknesses or inadequacies in the PoA itself. It would therefore seem a little contradictory were the US to attempt to claim that the review process contemplated in the PoA does not allow for an increase in or strengthening of commitments, or an inclusion of new areas if those areas respond to specific problems faced in addressing the illicit trade in SALW.

It seems clear from our analysis of review processes for other UN conferences that the PoA and the goal of eradicating the illicit trade in SALW in general are at the very early stages of what could be a long process spanning several decades. These other processes provide us with an opportunity to learn and identify ways to strengthen and perhaps accelerate implementation of the PoA. For instance, other conferences seem to have benefited from having stronger frameworks such as a Special Session of the General Assembly to review implementation, the establishment of a Commission, the involvement of an existing Commission, or even the establishment of an Office of the High Representative.

Of course, not all these options may be feasible in the context of the PoA, and in the end, whatever semantic debates emerge regarding a distinction between a “conference to review” and a “Review Conference”, or the scope of the review mandate, what can and will be achieved at the 2006 conference will depend on the political will of the participants. Tacit agreement with this sentiment is echoed in the comment by the United States representative to the Geneva Process meeting on 15 September 2005, who noted that, while the United States agreed that certain areas in the PoA needed to be strengthened, if the focus at the 2006 conference turned to contentious issues, areas of consensus might be lost. Ultimately, anything is possible if states parties agree to it, regardless of an absence of capital letters!

Notes

1. Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. Adopted 20 July 2001. Reproduced in the *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*, New York, 9–20 July 2001, UN document A/CONF.192/15, pp. 7–17. See also <disarmament2.un.org/cab/poa.html>.
2. John R. Bolton, United States Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Affairs, *Statement to the Plenary Session of the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects*, 9 July 2001, at <www.un.int/usa/01_104.htm>.
3. Article 12 of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction stipulates that “[a] Review Conference shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations five years after the entry into force of this Convention. Further Review Conferences shall be convened by the Secretary-General of the United Nations if so requested”.
4. The other agreements reviewed that have follow-up provisions tend to follow this formula of “conference ... to review”.
5. The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof similarly uses the phrases “conference to review” and “review conference” interchangeably in Article VII.
6. Final Document: Part 1, 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 17 April – 12 May 1995, New York, June 1995, UN document NPT/CONF.1995/32 (Part 1), at <disarmament.un.org/wmd/npt/1995dec1.htm>.
7. See US Department of State, *2005 NPT Review Conference*, at <www.state.gov/t/np/wmd/nnp/c10602.htm>.
8. The Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices. Part II: Resolution Adopted by the United Nations Conference on Restrictive Business Practices on 22 April 1980, at <r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/cpolicy/docs/CPSet/cpsetp2.htm>.
9. UN General Assembly resolution 35/63 of 5 December 1980, at <r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/cpolicy/docs/CPSet/cpsetp3.htm>.
10. *Adoption of the Rules of Procedure of the Fourth Review Conference*, UNCTAD document TD/RBP/CONF.5/2, 6 September 2000, at <www.unctad.org/en/docs/trbpcconf5d2.en.pdf>.
11. Third United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices, Geneva, 13 November 1995, UNCTAD document TD/RBP/CONF.4/14, 28 November 1995, at <r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/cpolicy/docs/rbpcconf4-14en.pdf>.
12. For example, see “Key Issues” and the Opening Statement by Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi, Secretary-General of UNCTAD on UNCTAD’s web site for the Review Conference, at <www.unctadxi.org/templates/Page____2921.aspx>.

13. *Assistance to States for Curbing Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Collecting Them. The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. Report of the Secretary-General*, UN document A/60/161, 25 July 2005, paragraph 55, at <www.iansa.org/un/SG%20report%20on%20assistance%20to%20states%202005.pdf>.
14. These reports are available at <disarmament.un.org/cab/salw-nationalreports.html>—follow links to the relevant year and country.
15. Owen Greene, 2005, *Promoting Effective Global Action on Small Arms: Emerging Agendas for the 2006 UN Review Conference*, Discussion Paper, Biting the Bullet, July, at <www.international-alert.org/pdfs/btb_emerging_agendas.pdf>. Greene argues that the 2006 Review Conference “has a wide mandate to ... [c]onsider further measures to strengthen ... the PoA” (page 1), noting that “[t]hese are the customary mandate and roles for a UN Review Conference associated with an international agreement, whether it is politically or legally binding” (page 2).
16. UNCTAD, 1992, *Paris Declaration and Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the 1990s*, New York, United Nations, UNCTAD document UNCTAD/RDP/LDC/58, at <www.cinu.org.mx/temas/desarrollo/dessocial/ldc/ldc2_en.pdf>. (Outcome document of the Second United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, Paris, 1990.)
17. *Ibid.*, paragraph 140.
18. *Programme of Action for the Least Developed Countries for the Decade 2001–2010*, UN document A/CONF.191/11, 8 June 2001, paragraphs 92 and 93, at <www.unctad.org/en/docs/aconf191d11.en.pdf>. (Outcome document of the Third United Nations Conference on the Least Developed Countries, Brussels, 2001.)
19. *Ibid.*, paragraph 114.
20. PoA, section IV, paragraph 1.
21. Adopted 23 June 2003, UN document A/RES/57/270B, 3 July 2003.
22. *Ibid.*
23. *Ibid.*, paragraph 39.
24. *Ibid.*, paragraph 71.
25. UN document A/60/251, 21 September 2005, follow the link to the agenda at <www.un.org/ga/60/agenda/index.html>.
26. The other agenda item was item 120, “Follow-up to the outcome of the Millennium Summit”. UN General Assembly resolution 60/1, *2005 World Summit Outcome*, UN document A/RES/60/1, 16 September 2005, follow the link from <www.un.org/summit2005/documents.html>.
27. UN document A/59/224, 9 August 2004.
28. *Ibid.*, paragraph 2.
29. See General Assembly resolution S/19-2 of 28 June 1997, UN document A/RES/S/19-2, 19 September 1997.
30. See *Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Whole of the Twenty-first Special Session of the General Assembly*, UN document A/S-21/5, 1 July 1999.
31. See note 17.
32. *Programme of Action for the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States*, in the *Report of the Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of Small Island Developing States*, Bridgetown, 1994, UN document A/CONF.167/9, October 1994, pp. 6–49, at <www.sidsnet.org/docshare/other/BPOA.pdf>.
33. *Almaty Programme of Action*, in the *Report of the International Ministerial Conference of Landlocked and Transit Developing Countries and Donor Countries and International Financial and Development Institutions on Transit Transport Cooperation*, UN document A/CONF.202/3, 2003, pp. 10–23, at <www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/imc/Almaty%20Programme%20of%20Action.pdf>.
34. See <www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldc/Roadmap%20APOA.htm>.
35. See *Report of the World Conference to Review and Appraise the Achievement of the United Nations Decade for Women: Equality, Development and Peace*, Nairobi, 15–26 July 1985, at <www.un.org/womenwatch/confer/nfls/Nairobi1985report.txt>, and *Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women*, Beijing, 4–15 September 1995, UN document A/CONF.177/20, at <www.un.org/esa/gopher-data/conf/fwcw/off/a—20.en>.
36. UN General Assembly resolutions S-23/2 and S-23/3 of 10 June 2000, UN documents A/RES/S-23/2 and A/RES/S-23/3, 16 November 2000.
37. See ILO report, *Outcome of the Special Session of the General Assembly: Women 2000 – Gender equality, development and peace for the twenty-first century*, New York, 5–9 June 2000, document GB.279/ESP/4, November 2000, at <www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/gb/docs/gb279/pdf/esp-4.pdf>.
38. International Institute for Sustainable Development, *Earth Negotiations Bulletin*, vol. 6, no. 40, at <www.iisd.ca/vol06/0600000e.html>.