

Regional approaches to small arms control: vital to implementing the UN Programme of Action

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In April 2004, countries of the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa signed the Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa¹ to set regional best practices and common standards to curb the threat posed by small arms. The year 2004 was also notable in the Americas, where the Inter-American Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives, and Other Related Materials (hereafter the OAS Convention),² signed in 1997 as the first international legally binding agreement on SALW, received several new ratifications. In West Africa, members of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) met in March 2005 to review a draft convention that would transform their voluntary Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons into a legally binding treaty.

In addition to these examples of initiatives undertaken to fight the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (hereafter small arms or SALW), the years since the adoption of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (hereafter PoA)³ have seen an encouraging increase in regional small arms control initiatives.

This paper argues that given the intentionally broad and substantively inclusive nature of the PoA, such regional approaches are an important facet of PoA implementation. Regional small arms measures have the potential to complement and strengthen the implementation of the UN Programme of Action, particularly because they allow regions to address small arms problems in the ways that are most suitable for them. It also makes clear, however, that despite positive developments and new initiatives, there is a lack of both political will and resources to address small arms problems at the regional level, and that further cooperation and assistance is needed in order to make regional organizations effective players in small arms control.

Framing the PoA: early regional small arms work

The importance of including regional and subregional organizations in the fight against small arms proliferation was already clear in the 1990s, when small arms and light weapons as a specific category was first taken up in the UN context. For example, in 1996 the Organisation of African Unity⁴

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initiated an in-depth study on ways to reduce small arms proliferation and to improve subregional cooperation in dealing with illegal arms smuggling.⁵ Regional agreements, especially in sub-Saharan Africa, the Americas and Europe, became part of the international process addressing problems related to the uncontrolled spread of and illicit trade in SALW.

With the 2001 UN Small Arms Conference approaching, many regional organizations wanted to shape the negotiations and contribute to international norm-setting by highlighting regional priorities. In Africa, the Bamako Declaration⁶ of December 2000 represented an important step forward in regional small arms action by showing a strong common commitment to addressing the critical problem of SALW proliferation on the continent. The existence of the Declaration then meant that African regional priorities were brought to the fore at the 2001 conference. Within the Organization of American States (OAS), the OAS Convention addresses regional concerns of narcotics trafficking and organized crime, and this was used as the template for the UN Firearms Protocol.⁷ The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol⁸ was adopted almost simultaneously with the UN PoA, and has become the first legally binding regional small arms agreement on the African continent. Since the 2001 conference, a number of important regional initiatives and agreements relating to SALW have been established, strengthened or revised.

Regional approaches are vital for effective PoA implementation

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has stressed the importance of seeking regional solutions to the small arms problem by noting that regional and subregional efforts to curb gun violence can pave the way for further action at the global level, leading to a wider implementation of the 2001 United Nations Programme of Action.⁹ Regional organizations have an important potential role in building consensus and momentum, and in advancing global norms. We have seen how regional instruments helped to shape the UN PoA and support its implementation, but the relationship between international and regional levels also works the other way around: having an international agreement on the illicit small arms trade has opened the door to further regional and subregional action.

In the UN Programme of Action, Member States undertake to combat the illicit trade in small arms and light weapons at three different levels: national, regional and global. States in the PoA undertake, inter alia, to establish, where appropriate, regional and subregional points of contact on SALW-related matters, as well as mechanisms at the regional level to facilitate cross-border customs cooperation and networks for information sharing among law enforcement, border and customs control agencies. They also agree to encourage the negotiation and strengthening of existing regional agreements and moratoria. While a large number of PoA provisions refer to states' domestic responsibilities for ensuring that legal weapons do not end up being traded illicitly, the PoA follows these with regional measures, such as the establishment of regional agreements and mechanisms of cooperation and information sharing.

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Regional action on small arms is vital: small arms trafficking cannot be fully controlled by individual countries on their own, as illicit trade is nourished by porous borders. Traffickers are quick to adopt trade routes where national controls are weak and will take advantage of insufficient cooperation between border control authorities or differences in national regulations. The importance of regional-level action in small arms control has been highlighted in various independent studies,¹⁰ which have underlined that small arms pose different problems to different regions, and that states have varying financial and material resources at their disposal to respond to these problems. Regional initiatives can help states both to gather the necessary financial support and share technical resources.

Effective regional and subregional agreements can therefore be critical for creating effective national responses to international measures. Regional organizations have proven valuable in bringing together relevant actors, building bridges between different aspects of the problem, and fostering regional police and border cooperation. The Southern African Regional Police Chiefs Co-operation Organisation (SARPCCO), a forum comprising all the police chiefs from the Southern African region, has successfully integrated a regional approach to fighting crime and illicit small arms. Its subcommittees organize regular training for police officers at the regional level, and it is currently studying possibilities for harmonizing gun legislation in the region. The equal partnership opportunities created by SARPCCO activities have also proven extremely important to the development of regional capacity and intergovernmental confidence throughout Southern Africa.¹¹

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In addition to enhancing cooperation and coordination between law enforcement agents and border controls, regional cooperation has improved SALW control measures and helped combat illicit trade by working toward the harmonization of national firearms laws. In the Pacific, for example, the Pacific Islands Forum¹² Regional Security Committee has made great progress in developing arms control measures, as demonstrated by the Honiara Initiative¹³ and the Nadi Framework.¹⁴ The development of model legislation is part of a common regional approach to weapons control. Key features of the model legislation include uniformity and harmonization of penalties, import and export regimes, stockpile management, firearms safety training, weapon disposal and licensing checks.¹⁵ By developing model legislation, regional organizations can prove valuable in establishing regional best practices and norms on specific aspects of the PoA. In South-East Europe, small arms control measures have increased in number and quality thanks to the support of the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC),¹⁶ which has developed a set of standards on small arms control for the region.

As noted in the Programme of Action, regional organizations can prove valuable as hubs of cooperation for global action: in view of the limited national resources available for direct PoA implementation, many organizations have proven active in arranging small arms meetings and creating political dialogue to pave the way for international negotiations. In Southern Africa, for example, the Technical Committee on Small Arms, established by the states party to the SADC Protocol, acts as a forum for sharing best practices, providing mutual assistance on stockpile management, security and safety measures and sharing experiences on issues such as cost-effective methods to destroy surplus weapons. Through such work, the Committee establishes a regional standpoint and thus contributes to the advance of international negotiations.

In the best cases, regional instruments can support global norm-building by creating an effective institutional framework to lead and coordinate small arms action in a specific region. Many regional organizations have followed the PoA's recommendations and started to coordinate implementation by appointing a regional contact point for small arms action. While in some regions the work of these contact points has been encouraging, there have also been difficulties: just like at the national level, in some cases regional focal points exist only on paper, and in reality have no effect on the small arms work conducted in a region.

In general, regional organizations suffer from problems similar to those of Member States in implementing the PoA: often, a lack of resources and expertise hinders effective implementation. And although regional activity can be valuable in supporting international and national action, examples have shown that half-implemented regional instruments can in fact prove detrimental to small arms action and PoA implementation. If left under-implemented or weak, regional agreements can become only paper commitments with no real reference to the situation on the ground, and no visible impact. Such toothless instruments can create confusion over responsibilities, and result in reporting—or worse, implementing—fatigue among states.

From crime to conflict—regional priorities

Regional responses to controlling the illicit trade in SALW differ in both their scope and applicability, reflecting national and regional priorities, but also differences in how the core of the SALW problem is perceived. Regional position-setting and publicizing of regional best practices is expected to intensify during the first months of 2006, as countries prepare for the first Review Conference of the Programme of Action, scheduled for 26 June – 7 July 2006.

Europe has been an active player in developing international and regional standards on SALW control. In Europe, action is taken within the European Union (EU), and the other major regional agreement guiding small arms action is the OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons.¹⁷ This comprises a comprehensive range of measures to address the proliferation of SALW, and has the potential to contribute quite substantially to the implementation of the UN Programme of Action. Compared with the UN PoA, the OSCE states have undertaken additional efforts with regard to arms export control and export documentation policies, including arms brokering and end-user verification procedures.

In an effort to control weapon supply, Europe is promoting stricter international controls on the legal weapon trade. Over recent years, as well as taking the lead in several small arms initiatives covering marking and tracing, common arms export criteria and brokering, European countries have undertaken reviews of their legislation, for example with regard to new measures for the domestic control of arms

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brokering. The EU Joint Action on small arms,¹⁸ adopted in 1998 and amended in 2002, commits the EU to aim to build consensus on the establishment of restrictive national weapon legislation for small arms, including penal sanctions and effective administrative control over small arms measures. Other elements of the EU policy framework to combat the spread of small arms are the Code of Conduct on Arms Exports, the common position on brokering and the use of arms embargoes. The new EU member states have been active in reviewing and updating their weapons legislation to comply with the EU Code of Conduct.

During the past few years, Africa has become the focus of global small arms action. Armed conflicts, arms smuggling, crime and their related problems have alerted not only countries from the region, but have also drawn increasing funding from other states. Compared with the relatively low level of awareness of SALW issues in 2001, there have been some positive developments in sub-Saharan Africa, with two-thirds of countries having established national focal points on SALW at the time of writing. Subregional instruments in sub-Saharan Africa include the ECOWAS Moratorium, SADC Protocol, ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African States) and Nairobi Protocol, all of which, since 2001, have established regional focal points to coordinate SALW action.

Unlike the PoA, African regional instruments place heavy emphasis on civilian possession and subregional harmonization of weapon laws. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) and weapon collection programmes are taking place in several countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Uganda, and public awareness is being raised through destruction and amnesty programmes as well as community programmes promoting the culture of peace. 2004 marked specific progress in Eastern and Southern Africa with the signature of the Nairobi Protocol and the entry into force of the SADC Protocol. Together, these two instruments, with nearly identical language formulation, commit almost half the continent's nations to developing strong, harmonized regulation of civilian possession and use of small arms.¹⁹

In North Africa, the main challenges for small arms control relate to the monitoring and policing of borders, as well as building the capacity of law enforcement agencies. Despite a series of regional

meetings on small arms control (meetings on PoA implementation in Algeria and Egypt 2003, and Tunisia 2004), the issue of SALW control has generally not been addressed in a comprehensive manner. However, the League of Arab States has called on its member states to increase cooperation and coordination on small arms-related matters, and has established an SALW control department to facilitate this task.

The UN PoA has not led to any coordinated subregional governmental action aiming at PoA implementation in Asia, despite growing concern about the proliferation of illicit small arms. In Asia, awareness of the small arms problem is driven by its relation to transnational organized crime and terrorism:²⁰ one instrument dealing with SALW proliferation is the Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, developed within the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). In Central Asia, many countries have made revisions and amendments to their national legislation since 2003.²¹ Large stockpiles of weapons from the Soviet era have become surplus, placing weapon collection and destruction, as well as stockpile management, at the top of the small arms control agenda in Central Asia. Despite not having an Asian regional organization devoted to small arms issues, there does seem to be some active regional cooperation in border management and police cooperation, mainly thanks to OSCE assistance.

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In the Americas, special emphasis has been placed on reducing small arms-related crime, violence and narcotics trafficking, as already seen in the OAS Convention. The region also fights crime through the Central American Integration System (SICA), established in 1995 to reduce small arms-related crime, violence and the availability of weapons. As in Europe and Central Asia, reviews of small arms legislation are being undertaken in many OAS countries, with a focus on the humanitarian impacts of small arms. Many small arms programmes are currently being implemented in the region, often in cooperation with civil society organizations, and are mainly concerned with weapon collection and destruction and the raising of public awareness. Regional challenges remaining relate to gun crime and the smuggling of weapons. OAS member states have reported a need for more assistance in SALW control, especially in capacity building, gathering data on small arms-related crime, and control of possession.²² Despite being part of the OAS, the Caribbean subregion has not been active in implementing the Programme of Action, probably because of scarce resources and other priorities.

Regional approaches pushing forward the global agenda

The Programme of Action, a politically binding agreement adopted by consensus at a high political level, has a number of weaknesses. Implementation of its paragraphs is left to the voluntary actions of Member States—the PoA contains no sanctions for non-compliance or passivity, nor any monitoring mechanism to measure the level of implementation. A number of regional instruments—most notably the OAS Convention, the Nairobi Protocol and the SADC Protocol—have gone further than the PoA in being legally binding. Apart from the UN Firearms Protocol, which is the first legally binding global agreement on small arms, but has a fairly narrow scope, regional agreements are the only legally binding agreements on the issue.

Some regional agreements have taken a more comprehensive approach to SALW control than the PoA, for example by including ways and means to link the illicit arms trade and proliferation to the fight against terrorism, transnational crime and trafficking in illicit goods. The SADC Protocol, signed in 2001, covers a more comprehensive range of SALW issues. As the first legally binding agreement on SALW control in Africa, it could complement the UN PoA and become an effective tool in addressing the problems caused by small arms in the region. So far, however, the implementation of the Protocol has

left much to hope for. Definitions of actions that states have agreed to undertake at the national level have been vague, and states parties have not always understood the Protocol commitments in the same way.

The Nairobi Protocol expands upon the provisions of the UN Programme of Action and other agreements by adding greater specificity as to the exact nature of controls that must be introduced, for example in addressing civilian possession it requires that states parties incorporate into their national laws a ban on civilian ownership of automatic and semi-automatic rifles. Given the recent adoption of the Protocol, it is too early to measure the extent to which it will become an active tool in improving SALW control in the Eastern Africa subregion. The OAS Convention contains broad definitions of firearms and explosives, and model regulations. One of its main weaknesses, however, is its narrow scope: it is restricted to commercial transfers and ignores government transfers. It also has a limited mandate that focuses on crime control, but neglects the causal relationship between illicit trafficking, organized crime and armed conflict. The OSCE Document, on the other hand, is “only” politically binding, but establishes clear norms, principles and measures to be followed by OSCE participating states on the issue of small arms and light weapons, for example regarding information exchange on the export and import of weapons.

The UN Small Arms Conference process was not able to achieve agreement on specific commitments relating to civilian possession of small arms in the PoA, but it is widely agreed that the issue is highly relevant: in their national reports of 2003, 67% of Member States that reported referred to civilian possession of small arms.²³ The scope and stringency of national firearms laws and their enforcement, however, varies considerably. Regulating civilian possession has been identified as a priority

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area for the development of regional and international minimum standards: standards should be established at the regional level to promote consistent and effective national laws.²⁴ A number of regional instruments already contribute to this establishment of regional standards. Both the SADC Protocol and the Nairobi Protocol provide for the total prohibition of civilian possession and use of all light weapons, automatic and semi-automatic rifles and machine guns. The Bamako Declaration and the Andean Plan²⁵ recommend that their states parties criminalize

the illegal possession and use of small arms and light weapons in their national legislation. And the Nadi Framework recommends that the possession and use of firearms and ammunition be strictly controlled, including through licensing and registration.

A further failing in the negotiation of the UN Programme of Action was the lack of any consensus on restricting SALW transfers to non-state actors. Substantial progress has been made toward agreements on this issue in regional fora.

The UN instrument on SALW traceability, as proposed by a group of governmental experts, is politically rather than legally binding on Member States. It is unlikely to have any effective monitoring mechanism and it does not cover ammunition in its scope: regional institutions have more or less been left to take their own proactive approaches to developing effective tracing instruments.²⁶ Countries of Southern Africa have appointed a task force to promote the development of a regional, standardized process for the marking of firearms.

The need for regional capacity building

The capabilities of individual states and regional organizations to assess and address problems of armed violence, small arms availability and trafficking vary. Among regional organizations, general reasons for lack of success in small arms control are the absence of political commitment and of

resources. For example, the practical impacts of the ECOWAS Moratorium and the OAS Convention remain minimal, despite the strong political commitment expressed on paper.²⁷ The international community has responded to some aspects of the problem but significant work remains to be done to target small arms and their proliferation properly.

The nature and content of the Programme of Action, or its relationship to regional implementation and different subregional and regional commitments, are not always clear to members of regional organizations and in many Member States, awareness of small arms problems, let alone knowledge of the means to address small arms problems, remains limited to the few individuals who were involved in negotiating agreements. To ensure regions make a positive contribution to PoA implementation, further practical action is needed at the regional level.

Regional organizations have expressed the need for more support in actual field-level implementation of the PoA, and called upon states in the Northern hemisphere that are currently active in small arms control matters to help them. This is not to say that support to regional organizations has been absent during the first four years of PoA implementation: several states have supported regional initiatives controlling SALW proliferation within the framework of PoA follow-up process. For example, the Framework of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) has attracted significant political and financial support, particularly through the G8. The G8 Africa Action Plan welcomes NEPAD and calls for action to combat the proliferation and trafficking of small arms across the continent as well as action on DDR in post-conflict situations. The UNDP has a special programme to assist regional SALW control in Africa. Its Programme for Coordination and Assistance on Security and Development (PCASED) is the main body for implementation of the ECOWAS Moratorium at regional level, and has taken various actions to help implementation at national level, including coordination among national small arms commissions, assistance in formulating regional import and export regulations, and general firearms legislation.

A number of regional agreements require or recommend some kind of information exchange between member states. But these requirements, in addition to continuous national reporting on the Programme of Action have, in some countries, led to reporting fatigue, which ultimately undermines the implementation of both the regional instrument and the PoA. Depending on the outcome of the 2006 Review Conference, it will be essential to consider means of increasing mutual support between regional agreements and the UN PoA to optimize information exchange and project implementation.

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Toward mutually supportive national, regional and international action?

Despite significant regional developments during and before 2004, further efforts to strengthen regional action are necessary if we want to get the best out of the 2006 Programme of Action Review Conference and the process beyond it. Regional agreements on small arms should not be considered as an alternative to the PoA, but as an instrument to complement and reinforce it. On average, there is more evidence of serious and sustained measures to implement PoA commitments among members of the EU, OSCE, OAS, SADC and ECOWAS, and states that have signed the Nairobi Protocol and the Nadi Framework, than there is among states in regions with less effective or no regional framework for small arms action.²⁸

Regional action is crucial to prevent the illicit small arms trade. To date, however, active and meaningful regional agreements to combat SALW proliferation are still an exception, and most states are not members of a substantial regional arrangement. Moreover, input from experts shows that

implementation of regional agreements by governments remains uneven, and leaves loopholes from which illicit SALW traffickers profit.²⁹ Regional organizations need more resources and capacity to be able to mobilize and coordinate their activities, and to ensure the effective and thorough implementation of regional agreements. Currently, there exists no official mechanism allowing regional organizations to

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share information on their activities and problems in implementing the Programme of Action. A useful first step for such sharing and learning was a seminar organized by the Geneva Forum in January 2004 entitled "The Role of Regional Organisations in Stemming the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Sharing Experience and Drawing Lessons".³⁰ More such initiatives would be useful, as information exchange could help to reduce the inefficient use of resources by preventing duplication or overlap. In the immediate future, they could explore ways to establish a regular information exchange mechanism among regional organizations, for example through the networking of regional small arms focal points. Besides information exchange between regional organizations, all possible means to improve internal organizational practices, such as databases, best practices and monitoring mechanisms, should be explored to enhance the functioning of these organizations.

Regional institutions can be strengthened in a number of ways. Where SALW action as integrated into already existing regional structures has proven ineffective, the door should be kept open for the establishment of new regional bodies or modification of old ones. This has occurred in the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa, with the transformation of the Nairobi Secretariat into a Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons (RECSA). RECSA will be responsible for the same tasks as the Nairobi Secretariat, but will have an independent legal identity, as opposed to the Nairobi Secretariat, which resided in the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Regional institutions need more resources; they also need to prioritize their objectives and thus the allocation of resources for PoA implementation. Given scarce resources, if clear priorities are not set, then commitments run the risk of remaining empty promises. Moreover, by mainstreaming small arms controls measures into other policy instruments, regional and international organizations can save resources *and* tackle related problems such as poverty eradication, DDR and security sector reform more efficiently.

While many would prefer more legally binding regional instruments on SALW, it is worth looking at information exchange aspects of politically binding agreements. The legally binding OAS Convention outlines measures to improve the control and monitoring of the legal manufacture and transfer of firearms and to improve the exchange of information among member states regarding the illicit trade in firearms. The OSCE Document, however, though politically binding, also contains annual information exchange and transparency measures that have proven vital in ensuring the practical implementation of agreed commitments. By keeping states parties informed of each others' activities, they are all aware of the level of implementation in each state and, if necessary, can apply a degree of pressure.

As discussed, many regional agreements go beyond the Programme of Action with regard to specific themes, such as civilian possession and transfer to non-state actors. The lead-up to the 2006 Review Conference will undoubtedly see an intensification of discussion on these points, and the discussion will be framed by those regional approaches already in place. Further issues to be elaborated include that of brokering controls, which apart from the EU common position, the OSCE Document and the Nairobi Protocol (covering Europe and Eastern Africa), are not prominently included in current regional instruments.

Regional policy responses to combating SALW proliferation remain limited, especially in North Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Continuous and enhanced efforts are needed to promote regional

action and initiatives in geographical areas where they are presently absent. These efforts should be complemented by simultaneously building the capacity of affected states within these regions to tackle small arms problems. National political will and international cooperation are vital to the control of the illicit trade in and proliferation of small arms. Strengthening international mechanisms and programmes, however, can only partially substitute for the absence of regional responses. We need meaningful, substantial regional agreements worldwide to ensure effective implementation of the PoA.

Notes

1. The Nairobi Protocol for the Prevention, Control and Reduction of Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa was signed on 21 April 2004, and will become legally binding when ratified by two-thirds of signatory states. The Protocol expands the UN PoA and regional agreements.
2. Available at <www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/a-63.html>.
3. Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. Adopted 20 July 2001. Reproduced in the *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*, New York, 9–20 July 2001, UN document A/CONF.192/15, pp. 7–17. See also <disarmament2.un.org/cab/poa.html>.
4. Currently African Union.
5. N. Stott, 2003, *Implementing the Southern Africa Firearms Protocol: Identifying Challenges and Priorities*, Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper no. 83, November, at <www.iss.co.za/pubs/papers/83/Paper83.html>.
6. Bamako Declaration on an African Common Position on the Illicit Proliferation, Circulation and Trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 1 December 2000, at <www.africanreview.org/docs/arms/bamako.pdf>.
7. Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, UN General Assembly resolution 55/255 of 31 May 2001, UN document A/RES/55/255, 8 June 2001, at <www.undcp.org/pdf/crime/a_res_55/255e.pdf>.
8. The Southern African Development Community Protocol on the Control of Firearms, Ammunition and Other Related Materials, at <www.grip.org/bdg/g2010.html>.
9. *Assistance to States for Curbing Illicit Traffic in Small Arms and Collecting Them. The Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects. Report of the Secretary-General*, UN document A/60/161, 25 July 2005.
10. See inter alia the Small Arms Survey yearbooks *Small Arms Survey 2002*, *Small Arms Survey 2003*, *Small Arms Survey 2004*, *Small Arms Survey 2005*, Oxford, Oxford University Press; and publications by Saferworld, International Alert and the Bonn International Center for Conversion.
11. B. Coetzee, 2005, "Building Capacity to Implement Small Arms Controls", *Focus on Arms in Africa*, vol. 4, no. 1, pp. 6–7, at <www.reliefweb.int/library/documents/2005/iss-afr-27jul.pdf>.
12. For more information on the Pacific Islands Forum, see <www.forumsec.org.fj>.
13. The Honiara Initiative on a Common Approach to Weapons Control, adopted by the 28th South Pacific Chiefs of Police Conference in 1998, directed that work be undertaken to produce a draft legal framework upon which common weapons control measures could be based.
14. Legal Framework for a Common Approach to Weapons Control Measures, 10 March 2000, at <www.smallarmssurvey.org/source_documents/Regional%20fora/Pacific%20Islands/Nadi%20framework.pdf>.
15. G.R. Pattugala, 2003, *Two Years After: Implementation of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms in the Asia-Pacific Region*, Geneva, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Occasional Paper, October, at <www.hdcentre.org/datastore/OccPaper.pdf>.
16. SEESAC aims to stop the flow and availability of SALW in South East Europe, consolidating achievements so far and supporting socio-economic conditions for peace and development in the region.
17. OSCE, Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 24 November 2000, at <www.osce.org/documents/sg/2000/11/673_en.pdf>.
18. EU Joint Actions of 17 December 1998 and 12 July 2002, EU documents 1999/34/CFSP and 2002/589/CFSP, at <projects.sipri.se/expcon/eusmja.htm> and <europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2002/l_191/l_19120020719en00010004.pdf>.
19. For a more detailed discussion on these two documents, see E. LeBrun, 2005, *Focus on Southern and Eastern Africa: A Tale of Two Protocols*, Geneva, Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, Background Paper no. 5, at <www.hdcentre.org/datastore/Small%20arms/Rio/SADC%20Nairobi%20Paper%20FINAL.pdf>. See also *Biting the Bullet* and IANSA,

- 2005, *International Action on Small Arms 2005: Examining Implementation of the UN Programme of Action*, at <www.iansa.org/un/bms2005/red-book.htm>.
20. See G.R. Pattagula, op. cit.
 21. E. Kytömäki and V. Yankey-Wayne, forthcoming, *Implementing the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms: Analysis of the National Reports submitted in 2002–2005*, Geneva, UNIDIR.
 22. This has been brought out in national reports on the implementation of the UN Programme of Action submitted to the UN by OAS member states.
 23. E. Kytömäki and V. Yankey-Wayne, 2004, *Implementing the United Nations Programme of Action on Small Arms and Light Weapons: Analysis of the Reports Submitted by States in 2003*, Geneva, UNIDIR.
 24. *Biting the Bullet*, op. cit.
 25. Andean Plan for the Prevention, Combat and Eradication of the Illicit Trade of Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, adopted 25 June 2003, Andean Council of Foreign Ministers decision 552, at <www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/treaties/dec/D552e.htm>.
 26. See the article by Peter Batchelor and Glenn McDonald in this issue of *Disarmament Forum*.
 27. *Biting the Bullet*, op. cit.
 28. *Biting the Bullet*, op. cit.
 29. Geneva Forum, 2004, *The Role of Regional Organisations in Stemming the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons: Findings of a Specialist Seminar, 29–30 January 2004*, Geneva, at <www.geneva-forum.org/Reports/20040129-30.pdf>.
 30. *Ibid.*