

CHAPTER 1

DISARMAMENT AS HUMANITARIAN ACTION: FROM PERSPECTIVE TO PRACTICE

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SUMMARY

This paper provides background to the others in this volume, including the way in which the analyses of contributors relate to one another, and to the broader theme of disarmament as humanitarian action.

INTRODUCTION

The ancient Greek historian Thucydides wrote that war is a violent teacher.¹ War, in Thucydides' case, was the Peloponnesian conflict between the Greeks during the fifth century BC, in which he participated.² Yet, in terms of sheer destructiveness, no era has been more violent than the twentieth century. Mass slaughter became industrialized on the battlefields of the Somme and Verdun, in the cinders of Hiroshima and Dresden, the rubble of Stalingrad and Nanking, and in death camps and killing fields from Auschwitz to Cambodia and Srebrenica. So enormous was the death toll of the Second World War in just one country, the Soviet Union, that the number killed and injured there is difficult to pinpoint, even to the nearest million deaths.

The figures we do have fail to fully convey the "indirect" costs of armed conflict.³ The privations of the war effort for civilians on both sides because of rationing and blockade in the First World War, for instance, exacerbated the influenza pandemic in 1918 and 1919 that carried off more lives than the conflict itself. Knock-on humanitarian effects are clearly recognizable in today's conflicts, in which a lack of access to clean water, adequate food and medical supplies, combined with infrastructural damage, result in

greater civilian misery and mortality due to malnourishment, disease or insecurity than battlefield deaths of combatants would imply. A recently published study in the medical journal *The Lancet* demonstrated that nearly four million people—mostly civilians—have died as a result of the ongoing conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁴ In late 2005, the United Nations Secretary-General's report to the Security Council on the protection of civilians in armed conflict noted:

In the new warfare that has emerged, the impact of armed conflict on civilians goes far beyond the notion of collateral damage. Targeted attacks, forced displacement, sexual violence, forced conscription, indiscriminate killings, mutilation, hunger, disease and loss of livelihoods collectively paint an extremely grim picture of the human costs of armed conflict.⁵

Among the challenges created by armed conflict for civilized societies are those of alleviating its most atrocious effects on human beings. The establishment of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in 1863, after the grisly horror of the battle of Solferino between the Austrian and French armies four years earlier, is often seen as the point at which the modern humanitarian community first began to emerge. That community has grown and widened its ambit hugely in the century and a half since the ICRC's establishment. The ICRC now jostles for position alongside a vast range of other entities that assist the sick and wounded in war, deliver relief supplies and lobby the media, international forums, national governments and the person on the street for attention and resources.

This explosion in humanitarian activity since the Second World War has been variously welcomed, resented and exploited by governments for their own purposes. From simply describing compassionate activity, guided by neutrality and impartiality to relieve suffering in war, humanitarianism had, by the turn of this century, become co-opted into the rhetoric of military intervention in places as diverse as Somalia, Kosovo and East Timor. Indeed, it has been argued that the contemporary humanitarian movement is in crisis—that it has overreached its original mission by trying to seize slippery new mantras for action, such as human rights and development. In the process, David Rieff has argued, the humanitarian community has allowed itself to become hijacked by the interests of the major powers—a heavy price to pay. He has observed that international humanitarian law and human rights norms, although never previously as advanced or as

widespread as they were by the mid-1990s, were of no practical benefit in preventing mass killing in Rwanda under the nose of the international community. When Yugoslavia disintegrated during the mid 1990s, major military powers only stepped in to end the killing when Western governments perceived their national interests to be at stake.⁶

Humanitarian concern at the suffering inflicted with weapons has, historically, often prompted the development of disarmament or arms control treaties. The 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use of asphyxiating gases on the battlefield is a case in point. An ICRC appeal to the belligerents of the First World War against the use of these weapons in 1918 signalled a rising tide of public disgust as people saw their nations' youth return from war ruined by poisonous substances such as phosgene, chlorine and mustard gas that had been inflicted on them.⁷ In helping to persuade states to outlaw gas weapons, such public sentiment ultimately aligned with utilitarian arguments from military perspectives: once the initial advantage of deploying gas munitions wore off as the other side took countermeasures (including retaliating in kind), chemical weapons had proven to be of little strategic advantage to the First World War's belligerents. As a result, the emergence of this new norm provided a curious foretaste of alignments between humanitarian and utilitarian perspectives much later in the century, for instance to stigmatize anti-personnel mines in the 1990s.

Nevertheless, "the actual negotiations of most of the recent arms control and disarmament treaty regimes have been motivated primarily by national and international security concerns".⁸ The same can be said of the development of regulating the means and methods of warfare through international humanitarian law with which it is intertwined, most famously through the Geneva Conventions that are so important but which have become endangered in our "age of terror".⁹

Common to all of these norms, once negotiated, is that they sometimes fail during actual conflict. It might seem odd, then, to be considering disarmament as humanitarian action. If humanitarianism is in crisis, what can humanitarian approaches really offer to multilateral practitioners in tackling complex multilateral arms control challenges? These are, after all, negotiations in which the stakes may be as high as national sovereignty or survival. A related issue is whether there is evidence that humanitarian approaches to security have offered anything lasting or versatile so far, more than a decade after the United Nations Development Programme argued

for human security in its 1994 Human Development Report.¹⁰ If war is a violent teacher, to paraphrase Thucydides, and if humanitarian action is about alleviating its worst effects on civilians, what can we learn from the application of these approaches over the last decade to current disarmament challenges?

Multilateral disarmament and arms control paradigms certainly need to draw new inspiration from somewhere. As noted in the preceding volume, they have achieved scant success over the last decade, despite pressing political imperatives.¹¹ Examples include the thwarted efforts to strengthen the Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons Convention through legally binding measures to increase confidence in compliance with it, and the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to agree on a programme of work so as to begin negotiations on fissile materials (the next agreed step in the process of nuclear disarmament). Since our last volume was produced in 2005, the five-yearly review of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)—the legal cornerstone of international efforts to prevent the cascading spread of nuclear weapons—failed to achieve anything substantial, despite serious challenges to the NPT regime, including the nuclear activities of Iran and North Korea.¹² Moreover, after a promising start on explosive remnants of war, states deliberating in the context of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), at the time of writing, appear to have run out of steam in addressing the humanitarian effects of “mines other than anti-personnel mines” (MOTAPM) or cluster weapons.

BIPOLAR DISORDER

Where limited progress in the disarmament and arms control domain has been achieved over the last decade, it tends to have been accompanied by humanitarian approaches, with assistance from international organizations, field-based practitioners, academic researchers and transnational civil society. One crucial element of these approaches is an increased emphasis on the individual and the community as referent points for security, alongside traditional national security perspectives. Another element of this disarmament as humanitarian action is the involvement of practitioners from the field. This has enriched the work of government representatives by helping them to understand the challenges at hand and suggesting policy options to address them.¹³

Andrew Mack has noted that “most UN officials simply do not have time to read academic research publications and, unlike the World Bank, the UN in any case lacks a research culture”: the same is true of diplomatic negotiators and many representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the international security context.¹⁴ There is a disconnection between much of the academic discourse on international security-related matters, including in disarmament, and what actually goes on in the negotiating chamber.

This disconnection is more than a shame: it has important ramifications for multilateral effectiveness. For example, involvement in disarmament and arms control work is relatively transient for most diplomatic participants. For my part, I have actively followed these issues for about a decade, which is not a long time. Yet I have observed, on average, almost three “generations” of diplomatic rotation in Geneva and New York during that period.¹⁵ Foreign service personnel tend to pride themselves on being generalists anyway; as its lack of success continues, arms control issues must seem even less attractive as a long-term career focus for many diplomats. In the face of continual lack of progress or exclusion, NGOs too tend to shift their attention elsewhere. Mack noted further that, in multilateral work, “Policy tends to be formulated on the basis of mandates, precedents and politics, rather than research findings.”¹⁶ Moreover, without outside interest or sufficient cognitive diversity, this will only increase at the expense of goal-oriented solutions. This is not good. Understanding all of the aspects Mack has referred to can be difficult in a short timeframe without deeper context, which knowledgeable practitioners often do not write down—at least not for general consumption.¹⁷

As a consequence, two main poles of conventional wisdom seem to have emerged among multilateral practitioners where humanitarian perspectives on disarmament issues are concerned. The first emphasizes the epochal nature of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in particular as a new model for diplomacy. This can be traced, in part, to the presentation of the Nobel Peace Prize to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and its coordinator, Jody Williams, in 1997. Euphoria at that time, especially among NGOs, perhaps obscured the intended meaning of her analysis about the potential applicability to other contexts of the ICBL’s way of working. Williams herself noted that “A core strength of the Campaign, which still seems ill-understood by many, has always been its loose structure. The ICBL is a true coalition made up of independent

NGOs”.¹⁸ The key ideas here are “loose structure” and “independent”, which suggest the importance of a willingness and ability to adapt. However, an unchallenged assumption by many participants in multilateral processes since then—among representatives of governments, as well as NGOs and researchers—is that emergent government–civil society partnerships in the future on security-related issues will resemble the “Ottawa Process” that led to the Mine Ban Convention, with a reincarnation of the ICBL at its spearhead.

The other extreme, which is equally unrealistic, is that the Ottawa Process was strictly a one-off, with no further application or relevance to informing multilateral practitioners in framing and responding to international security challenges. I have heard many colleagues say that anti-personnel mines were “special” because a strong and easily understood case could be developed to show that their negative humanitarian impacts far outweighed their military utility in the way that these weapons were being used, particularly in internal conflicts.¹⁹ This is true. Some, however, have also extrapolated it to mean that anti-personnel mines have no military utility at all. Several major military powers remain outside the Mine Ban Convention, such as China, India, Pakistan, the Russian Federation and the United States, and they clearly still consider otherwise, using military utility as a justification for their continued retention of anti-personnel mines. (Alongside this, they inevitably contend that their mines are used in such a way as to avoid endangering civilians.) This may, in part, be specious rationalization, as some supporters of the global ban on anti-personnel mines claim. But propagating the erroneous view that anti-personnel mines are without military utility per se unnecessarily discounts the potential lessons we can learn from the Mine Ban Convention for dealing with the humanitarian effects of other weapon systems. It marginalizes the Mine Ban Convention’s relevance as an example from which to draw appropriate lessons.²⁰

The truth dwells somewhere between the two poles I have mentioned. We need, of course, to be careful of how we interpret history and the process leading to the Mine Ban Convention, which will never be duplicated. We also need to be clear about why this is so: the Ottawa Process was the product of a particular set of circumstances that will not be the same for other issues, be they MOTAPM, cluster munitions, incapacitating biochemical agents or aspects of small arms and light weapons (SALW). Yet, we can certainly learn from its successful experience.

Each context in which a new norm is developed is unique, but that does not mean it cannot have broader applicability—the main case in point being the CCW. Over the three decades of the evolution of the CCW regime, it has applied similar procedural rules, as well as other methods of work, to a plethora of weapon systems unrelated to one another, from incendiary weapons to anti-personnel mines and blinding lasers. Clearly, weapon-specific processes have not limited the acceptability of the CCW as an ongoing working forum for its states parties. (Regrettably, however, there is undeniable merit to the view that states are more willing to negotiate restrictions in the CCW when they feel a weapon’s military utility has passed, is declining, or will never be crucial.)²¹

There is pressing need to strip away the misleading rhetoric of both poles about the applicability of humanitarian perspectives to disarmament and arms control work. In our first volume, Vanessa Martin Randin and I examined six recent multilateral processes—three on arms control, and one each on climate change, tobacco control and migration—to see what we could learn from them in terms of dynamics. What things in common (if any) contributed to negotiating success in them? It was clear, even from our limited exercise, that there are recursive elements (both good and bad) of diverse multilateral negotiations that practitioners can learn from, despite differences in their substance and political contexts.

HUMANITARIAN PERSPECTIVES

The same is true of the three multilateral processes on which our contributors focus their analyses in this volume. The impact of humanitarian perspectives is examined in the work of the CCW over the last decade, the 1997 Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, and efforts in the context of the 2001 United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (Programme of Action).²²

In the preceding volume I explained that humanitarian and human security perspectives should not be regarded as freestanding alternatives to orthodox national security referent points. Instead, they represent different wavelengths at which to see security-related problems and thus supplement existing standpoints. When one thinks of these standpoints, it is often the “realist” international relations tradition that springs to mind:

For “classical” American realists such as Reinhold Niebuhr, George Kennan, and Hans Morgenthau, international security was always an overt normative objective and an explicit goal in their writings and politics. For neo-realists like Kenneth Waltz, it has tended to be a more tacit aim, quietly driving their ostensibly positivist analysis. The tragic view of realists has come from their paradoxical conviction that the major war they seek to prevent derives from an international anarchy that can never be overcome.²³

Realist approaches are very persuasive, and largely appeal to common sense. Consequently, realist or neo-realist views are tacitly shared by a wide number of multilateral diplomats—at least the ones I have worked with.

However, like the national security referent points they tend to bolster, such realist approaches have their inevitable limitations. Campbell Craig, whom I quoted above, has also noted that international security politics, particularly since the 11 September 2001 attacks, “verge on the inexplicable to American realists”.²⁴ The same can also be said of the diplomatic variety of realist. The Hobbesian-derived view of the world that nation-states operate in their rational best interests in a situation of international anarchy is a good fit at an inter-state level of analysis. But the new challenges of an interconnected world—including the spread of infectious diseases such as HIV/AIDS and avian flu, international terrorism, the illicit trade in small arms, the propagation of malicious computer viruses or hacking on the Internet, refugee flows, and people and drug trafficking—confound traditional “command and control” views of achieving security. They often follow rules that are different from the rational realist conception, and are difficult to square with the orthodox means of achieving policy solutions.

A related point made in the last volume was that because these emerging security challenges revolve on their interconnections, rather than the innate properties of strategic objects like nuclear warheads or bombers, individual intent needs to be taken greater account of.²⁵ This is not an approach that diplomatic negotiators, who are often more used to developing “top-down” macro-regulatory models, are necessarily familiar with.

The paper that follows next in this second volume of the Disarmament as Humanitarian Action series is entitled “Mitigating the Effects of Armed

Violence Through Disarmament: Counting the Human Costs”, by Christian Ruge. His analysis draws on his varied experience as a Fafo researcher in the field. In an era in which perpetrators of violent and horrific acts—such as those of 11 September 2001—arm themselves with box cutters and are prepared to fly planes filled with civilians (and themselves) into buildings, he suggests that a better understanding of the various sources of insecurity, for states and their citizens, would assist policy makers and diplomats in developing new and more adequate responses to these threats, and ways to work toward this.

In particular, Christian’s paper discusses the potential for empirical research into sources of insecurity to assist policy processes such as multilateral disarmament and arms control negotiations. He focuses on the roles that social science-based empirical research and policy development may play in assisting the development of collective responses in multilateral negotiating, as well as how improved understanding of the humanitarian consequences from use of certain weapons can broaden discussions of their military utility with reference to the CCW, Mine Ban Convention and small arms processes. In the course of this analysis he discusses the gulf often found between academic and policy research and the multilateral work I mentioned above, and how it could be minimized to offer negotiators a broader knowledge base for addressing practical challenges.

In a complementary analysis, Rosy Cave takes a closer look at the term “new model of diplomacy”, often used to describe the dynamics between civil society and governments during the Mine Ban Convention negotiations. Her analysis compares the Ottawa Process with the CCW Protocol negotiation process on ERW a few years later. Was the “new” diplomacy that delivered the Mine Ban Convention successfully replicated in the latter process, or was it, indeed, just a “one-off”? Drawing from her extensive experience as a policy researcher on mines and ERW, Rosy concludes that there were several differences, despite some of the same governments and NGOs being active in both processes. These differences include the nature of relations between NGOs and states, and the level of development of NGO campaigning in the two contexts. In Rosy’s assessment, there are lessons that multilateral practitioners can learn by comparing the Ottawa and CCW ERW processes, especially in enhancing the ongoing work on cluster munitions. Those concerned with these issues, including NGOs, need to ask themselves some hard questions regarding the effectiveness of their approaches and how they might be more innovative.

Nevertheless, there is no doubt that the Mine Ban Convention represents an unprecedented combination of disarmament and humanitarian goals, even if aspects of subsequent arms control processes in which there is humanitarian interest should be emulated in spirit, rather than to the letter. Since 1997, states parties' compliance with the Mine Ban Convention is, in part, due to the advocacy efforts of the ICBL and its verification tool, *Landmine Monitor*. Their impact can also be seen on non-states parties who appear, in many cases, to be changing their behaviour to conform to the prohibitions set forth by the Convention. In her paper in this volume, Mary Wareham—one of the ICBL's key organizers and a central figure in the development of *Landmine Monitor*—considers the effectiveness of the Landmine Monitor project in monitoring implementation of the Convention as an example of disarmament as humanitarian action.

The final two papers in this volume focus on issues of SALW. Vanessa Farr is a UNIDIR researcher and activist with wide experience in the small arms domain—particularly on the gendered impacts of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes after conflicts have officially ended—as well as on gender and security sector reform, especially civilian arms control. Her analysis maps out some neglected aspects of small arms-related violence in the UN Programme of Action process. She observes that easy access to small arms is central to perpetuating social dislocation, destabilization, insecurity and crime in the build-up to war, in wartime, and in the aftermath of conflict. Small arms also hamper recovery efforts and compromise the capacity of humanitarian aid workers to go about their work. Moreover, small arms are misused within domestic settings as well as in public spaces, and they impact everyone in the community, albeit in different ways and for different reasons. One way to counter their effects, Vanessa argues, is to increase our understanding of the role played by the proliferation of SALW in reinforcing and maintaining gender-specific violence and power imbalances. This would have practical benefits for multilateral practitioners in implementing the Programme of Action (and other efforts at all levels) to curb the deleterious impacts of small arms on the security of human beings.

The final paper, my own, stems from the recognition that there are many forms of activity that contribute humanitarian perspectives beneficial to the work of multilateral disarmament and arms control. These contributions are not necessarily in the form of treaty processes, or even

formal mechanisms. A hallmark of humanitarian approaches to problem solving has been a focus on goals rather than processes: this means they are often ad hoc, unofficial and, to some extent, self-selecting coalitions of the willing. Some of these contributions, such as those of the Geneva Forum on small arms, have operated in *informal support* of official processes.²⁶

My paper briefly tells the story of the work of the Geneva Forum on small arms issues, and evaluates its impact on the achievement and subsequent implementation and monitoring of the Programme of Action.²⁷ It also considers the extent to which disarmament as humanitarian action characterizes the Forum's activities.

ENLIGHTENED SELF-INTEREST

All of the contributors to this volume have participated in the processes they analyse, and have experience in academic or policy research. Our intention is to try to unearth practical insights for other multilateral practitioners, rather than to produce academic treatises that will be left unread or ignored. We build on the realization that if multilateral disarmament and arms control processes are to be more effective, it is not enough simply to decry a perceived lack of political will or the cynicism of governments. Government representatives are, in many cases, open to new approaches and are similarly frustrated by their lack of progress over the last decade. Humanitarian perspectives and human security concepts can assist their work, but it needs to be demonstrated how to do this in specific terms. Otherwise, negotiating practitioners may in the end simply view humanitarian approaches to disarmament, such as the Mine Ban Convention, as a historical curiosity or soft, utopian ideal.

Humanitarian approaches are neither soft nor utopian. With typical frankness, Jody Williams argued, at a public debate organized as part of the work of this project in late 2005, that the only rational way to view security challenges in a globalizing world is in terms of "enlightened self-interest". Using human beings, as well as states, as referent points for security is entirely consistent with it:

The great [Franklin D. Roosevelt] in the United States, our president in the Depression and World War Two, is held up as the great hero of saving the poor. A lot of people think he was just a smart rich guy who

understood that the way he was going to save the country for the rich was by giving those poor little working slobbs enough money so they could mortgage their lives and work forever and pay the bank. It worked. Enlightened self-interest. I don't get how the rich nations of the world don't understand if they make the poor little slob have a little bit of hope for the future maybe he won't want to strap on a bomb on himself and blow you up because you've got all the stuff and he doesn't. That's human security. That is human security in my book. That is not utopian in the least.²⁸

One key challenge is to have a more constructive discourse on the merits of human security or humanitarian approaches to security challenges. The nation-state and national security concerns about sovereignty and survival are not going to fade away anytime soon; nor should they in most cases. However, the prospect of future conflicts and their humanitarian consequences, as well as the challenges posed by growing global interconnection, are not likely to recede in the foreseeable future either. These challenges require a better response, despite the upbeat message of the Human Security Report 2005 about the waning of inter-state conflicts since the retreat of colonialism and the end of the Cold War.²⁹

I began this paper by referring to Thucydides, who recorded the sense among Athenians and Spartans alike at the beginning of the three-decade long Peloponnesian War that it could be contained and fought in distant places, mainly through proxies. Instead, the long conflict saw the breakdown of the old order and the efficacy of traditional solutions to limit conflict. Long-standing military restraints dissolved into brutality and what we would describe as war crimes if they had occurred in the modern age.³⁰

The effects of armed conflict—even the war between the ancient Greeks—teach us that we cannot afford to lose focus on the importance of the original humanitarian ideal of alleviating suffering in war, especially the suffering of civilians. And, if we can prevent this suffering and insecurity using the tools of international conflict resolution, disarmament and arms control, so much the better. Living, as some of us do, in relatively peaceful and prosperous societies in the early twenty-first century, it is easy to treat humanitarian suffering reported on television or in the pages of newspapers as distant problems. Humanitarian assistance is usually viewed as a matter of altruism—at least until “donor fatigue” and indifference set in. In the end,

however, humanitarian approaches, including their inclusion in disarmament and arms control, are a matter of enlightened self-interest because human suffering and insecurity are nearer our doorsteps in an interconnected world than we often imagine.

I share the disquiet of David Rieff about the selective attention of governments and the media to humanitarian crises I quoted earlier. Médecins Sans Frontières, in its list of the 10 most under-reported world hot spots of 2005, included, for example, the plight of people trapped by chronic wars in the Congo, Colombia, northern Uganda and Côte d'Ivoire; unrelenting crises in Somalia and southern Sudan; and the utter lack of research and development devoted to new HIV/AIDS tools adapted for impoverished settings.³¹ There are no simple solutions to this selectivity—although, as Brian Urquhart observed recently, the periodic inability of the UN Security Council to agree on much-needed action, and the reasons for it, would be a useful place to start.³² Nevertheless, understanding that self-interest is at stake, and being innovative with a view to channelling that intent productively, should help provide a handle on how to make multilateral disarmament and arms control work better than they do.

At the moment, the accumulated weight of precedent, procedure and institutional politics often acts as a circuit breaker that stops power from being translated into action in multilateral domains. Changing the light bulbs is not going to fix this. Reform of multilateral work must be more radical, and involve changing the way practitioners frame and respond to security challenges—something that the (much-needed) bureaucratic reform of institutions such as the UN cannot achieve alone. Viewing disarmament as humanitarian action can help to do that. Moreover, as the papers in this volume show, certain humanitarian approaches have actually been doing that for some time, and there are useful lessons to be learned from their examples.

Notes

- ¹ This sentiment has been translated in various ways. For example, in Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, translated by Rex Warner (London: Penguin, 1972), Thucydides' remark is quoted as "war is a stern teacher; in depriving them of the power of easily

- satisfying their daily wants, it brings most people's minds down to the level of their actual circumstances" (book 3, chapter 82, section 2, p. 242).
- 2 As a participant in the Peloponnesian War, Thucydides was known primarily as a naval commander. He was appointed strategos (general) in 424 BC and given command of a squadron of seven ships, stationed at Thasos. During the winter of 424/3 BC, the talented Spartan general Brasidas attacked Amphipolis, an important strategic city a half-day's sail west from Thasos, on the Thracian coast. Eucles, the Athenian commander at Amphipolis, sent for assistance to Thucydides. Brasidas, aware of Thucydides' presence on Thasos and his influence with the people of Amphipolis, and also afraid of help arriving by sea, acted quickly to offer moderate terms to the Amphipolitans for their surrender, which they accepted. When Thucydides arrived, Amphipolis was already under Spartan control, a failure for which Thucydides was exiled from Athens for a period of 20 years. During this time, he travelled and prepared his history.
 - 3 For obvious reasons, such research is difficult and the existing evidence to support any estimates is incomplete. Nevertheless, various estimates have been offered, although all must be treated with judicious scepticism. For discussion, see Part IV of "Counting the Indirect Costs of War", in the Human Security Centre's *Human Security Report 2005*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005, pp. 123–43. The report is available at <www.humansecurityreport.info>.
 - 4 On 7 January 2005, *The Lancet* published the results of an International Rescue Committee-led mortality survey in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, containing slightly revised data from the IRC mortality study initially released in December 2004. See <www.theirc.org/news/page.jsp?itemID=27819067>.
 - 5 United Nations Security Council, "Report of the Secretary-General on the protection of civilians in armed conflict", Security Council document S/2005/740 of 28 November 2005, pp. 1–2.
 - 6 David Rieff, *A Bed for the Night: Humanitarianism in Crisis*, London: Vintage, 2002. For a briefer exposition of Rieff's views, see David Rieff, "Humanitarianism in Crisis", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 6, November/December 2002, pp. 111–21.
 - 7 The full text of the ICRC's 1918 appeal is available at <www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/57JNQH>.
 - 8 Robert J. Mathews and Timothy L.H. McCormack, "The Influence of Humanitarian Principles in the Negotiation of Arms Control Treaties",

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- International Review of the Red Cross*, no. 834, June 1999, pp. 331–52, p. 350.
- ⁹ See, for instance, Adam Roberts, “Counter-terrorism, Armed Force and the Laws of War”, *Survival*, vol. 44, no. 1, Spring 2002, pp. 7–32 and Seymour M. Hersh, *Chain of Command*, London: Penguin, 2005.
- ¹⁰ See chapter 2, “New Dimensions of Human Security”, in United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 1994*, New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 22–46.
- ¹¹ John Borrie and Vanessa Martin Randin (eds), *Alternative Approaches in Multilateral Decision Making: Disarmament as Humanitarian Action*, Geneva: UNIDIR, 2005.
- ¹² See Rebecca Johnson, “NPT RevCon Ends Spinelessly”, from the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy report of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, 27 May 2005, available at <home.freeuk.net/nowpeace/NPTembassies_talks.htm>. See also Johnson’s more detailed subsequent analysis, “Politics and Protection: Why the 2005 NPT Review Conference Failed”, *Disarmament Diplomacy*, no. 80, 2005.
- ¹³ These issues are discussed in detail in our first volume.
- ¹⁴ Andrew Mack, “Plus ça change”, *Security Dialogue*, vol. 34, no. 3, 2003, pp. 363–67, p. 365.
- ¹⁵ Most diplomatic postings last from three to four years, on average. First postings for junior diplomats may be shorter.
- ¹⁶ A. Mack, 2003, op. cit., p. 365.
- ¹⁷ Diplomats do, of course, produce reporting in the form of diplomatic cables and memoranda for their own authorities at home in capital. However, as a rule these sources do not become public—if at all—for years or even decades.
- ¹⁸ See Jody Williams, “The International Campaign to Ban Landmines—A Model for Disarmament Initiatives”, 3 September 1999, available at <nobelprize.org/peace/articles/williams/>.
- ¹⁹ For example, see David C. Atwood, “NGOs and Disarmament: Views from the Coal Face”, *Disarmament Forum*, no. 1, 2002, pp. 5–14, at <www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art5.pdf>.
- ²⁰ This is especially so because assessments of the effects of weapons on the health and welfare of human beings should take into account, as a critical factor, the *context* in which a weapon is used. For a broader discussion see Robin M. Coupland, “Modelling Armed Violence: A Tool for Humanitarian Dialogue in Disarmament and Arms Control”, in J. Borrie and V. Randin (eds), 2005, op. cit., pp. 39–49.

- ²¹ See Chris af Jochnick and Roger Normand, "The Legitimation of Violence: A Critical History of the Laws of War", *Harvard International Law Journal*, vol. 35, no. 1, Winter 1994, pp. 49–95.
- ²² Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, in the *Report of the United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects*, New York, 9–20 July 2001, UN document A/CONF.192/15.
- ²³ Campbell Craig, "American Realism versus American Imperialism", *World Politics*, vol. 57, no. 1, October 2004, pp. 143–71, p. 144.
- ²⁴ Ibid.
- ²⁵ See John Borrie, "Rethinking Multilateral Negotiations: Disarmament as Humanitarian Action" in J. Borrie and V. Randin, 2005, *op. cit.*, pp. 17–23.
- ²⁶ The Geneva Forum is a joint initiative of the Quaker United Nations Office in Geneva, UNIDIR, and the Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, also in Geneva.
- ²⁷ This paper has also been published, in abridged form, in UNIDIR's quarterly journal, *Disarmament Forum*, no. 1, 2006, and is available at <www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2427.pdf>.
- ²⁸ Text and audio of Jody Williams' presentation, along with those of others participating in UNIDIR's twenty-fifth anniversary debate, are at <www.unidir.org/html/en/25th_anniversary.html>.
- ²⁹ See <www.humansecurityreport.info>.
- ³⁰ For a very useful history, see Donald Kagan, *The Peloponnesian War*, New York: Viking Penguin, 2003.
- ³¹ See <www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?objectid=BE061F07-955B-CE44-5F648905B87E0E57&component=toolkit.pressrelease&method=full_html>.
- ³² See Brian Urquhart, "Humanitarianism is Not Enough", *The New York Review of Books*, vol. 52, no. 9, 26 May 2005.