

CHAPTER 2

DIPLOMATS, CIVIL SOCIETY AND ACADEMIA: SOME THOUGHTS ON THE LIMITS OF THE DISCOURSE

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SUMMARY

There is a large body of literature examining the nature and evolution of cooperation in the international system. This chapter briefly surveys some of this work to examine what it offers in terms of understanding the roles of diplomats and transnational civil society in multilateral processes in the arms control and disarmament field.

INTRODUCTION

An important question in international relations is why does cooperation among states emerge on some arms control and disarmament issues but not on others? Moreover, what circumstances favour its emergence? What strategies might foster cooperation?

There is a significant body of normative and empirical research aimed at understanding cooperation in the international system.² But it is not always clear how it applies to the work of practitioners in the multilateral arms control and disarmament field, who grapple with these questions in practical form on a continual basis.

One aspect of the existing literature on cooperation in the international relations context is that most of it stems from a view of international relations that often fails to take into account security challenges other than those posed by states to states. But the world has changed considerably since the end of the Cold War, the period from which a lot of that work dates. As we described in the *Disarmament as Humanitarian Action*

project's first volume of work, many contemporary problems of international security, such as small arms proliferation, terrorism and the diffusion of new technologies that could be turned to hostile use, are defined by their interconnections. This challenges the traditional ways states do business at the multilateral level. Most often, this results in policy recommendations that may not be central or even especially relevant to dealing with these issues.³ And, while these phenomena may not pose existential threats to states, they certainly pose humanitarian threats at the individual and community levels.

Also, there has been a great increase in the number of civil society actors and networks engaged in trying to influence global or transnational policy. Acknowledging the reality that these new forms of actors are present in many international policy-making contexts can offer important perspectives for:

- understanding the dynamics of multilateral disarmament work and the environment in which negotiators operate;
- considering the roles played by different actors—both in institutional and individual terms—in arms control and disarmament negotiation processes; and
- making practical and realistic suggestions to further their work.

In chapter 7 of this volume, Aurélia Merçay and John Borrie look at the potential for using scientific advances in understanding complexity to help multilateral policy makers frame more effective responses to problems of armed violence. In contrast, this chapter will briefly survey some of the literature examining international negotiations in terms of what it offers in understanding the roles of diplomats and transnational civil society in multilateral disarmament and arms control work. It is by no means comprehensive.

As it will become clear, there are competing ideas among academics in the international relations field about the causes and motivations for cooperation among states. The next section provides a brief overview of some of that literature.

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND THE STUDY OF COOPERATION

“Realism” largely developed in response to the failure of liberal principles to maintain peace in Europe after the First World War. Since the Second World War it has occupied a dominant position in the practice and study of international relations. There are two principal schools of thought within the realist paradigm: “traditional” and “structural” realism. Hans J. Morgenthau was dubbed as a leading figure of the former, while Kenneth Waltz is best known for his “structural” theories of realism (commonly referred to as neo-realism) in the 1980s.

Morgenthau’s theory of realism, as presented in his 1948 book *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, was a direct response to E.H. Carr’s challenge to create a “science of international politics”.⁴ In *Politics Among Nations* Morgenthau put forward a comprehensive theory of “power politics” applying the “positivist methodology of the ‘hard’ or natural sciences to the study of international relations”.⁵ His theory was built on the “philosophical basis of realist principles of human nature, the essence of politics, the balance of power and the role of ethics in foreign policy”.⁶ As John Lewis Gaddis described the approach in a later, revisionist critique:

The principal characteristics of this science were its reductionism—the argument that a drive for power inextricably rooted in human nature animated all politics—and its tough-mindedness—the assertion that a focus on power would free the study of international relations from the sentimentality, legalism, and irrelevant empiricism with which it had been afflicted.⁷

However, Kenneth Waltz, Richard N. Rosecrance and K. J. Holsti, among others, argued that Morgenthau failed to provide reasons why the “craving for power should necessarily take precedence over other human desires, or determine all human actions, or remain immutable for all time to come”.⁸ Just as importantly, “realism” provided no real recommendations for policy makers besides counselling them to “exercise prudence and restraint”.⁹

Waltz’s neo-realist theory of international relations that eventually followed was an attempt to bring traditional realism more into line with the current affairs of the day.¹⁰ As Scott Burchill explained:

A theory selects and organises facts, processes and relationships into a separate domain so that importance and significance can be identified. The isolation of one domain from another in order to study it is artificial, but this is an intellectual strength rather than a weakness. Although the effect of such a process is to simplify complex forces and relationships, this is the only way meaningful explanations can be reached. Accordingly, Waltz applied the same approach to the study of international relations. His “structural realism” argues that by “depicting an international political system as a whole, with structural and unit levels at once distinct and connected, neo-realism establishes the autonomy of international politics and thus makes a theory about it possible.”¹¹

In broad terms, neo-realism was built on two assumptions:

- the international system is anarchical (taken to mean the lack of common government in world politics); and
- states in the system are primarily interested in their own survival.¹²

Cooperation among states is difficult to achieve from a neo-realist perspective, even when states have common interests. This is because “the lack of a central world authority often deters them from incurring the reciprocal obligations that cooperation demands.”¹³

The neo-realist theory of cooperation, however, was soon challenged by proponents of the new school of “neo-liberal institutionalism”. Like neo-realists, neo-liberal institutionalists assumed that the international system is anarchic and states, as the dominant type of actor in the international system, interact with each other in order to maximize their gains.¹⁴ But, despite this, “neoliberalism draws very different conclusions about the potential for sustained international cooperation.”¹⁵ In the course of their work, for example, Robert Keohane and Robert Axelrod argued that states *can* overcome problems of anarchy to achieve the benefits of cooperation through the establishment of international institutions and regimes.¹⁶ Robert Axelrod in particular employed game-theoretic methods of analysis to illustrate the ways in which cooperation can be achieved in the international system. Indeed, a significant amount of literature on cooperation in the international system is derived from systemic and game-theoretic methods of analysis.¹⁷

However, game-theoretic types of analysis are only a small part of the burgeoning literature on negotiations. They have been sharply criticized for their limitations, and attracted some stigma because of associations with Rand Corporation and Pentagon strategic analysis in the first half of the Cold War (Rebecca Johnson and John Borrie also discuss game-theoretic approaches in their chapters in this volume¹⁸). Indeed, some of the claims made for game-theory inspired models were far too ambitious, and since the 1970s such approaches have gradually fallen from favour among many political scientists. Nevertheless, game-theoretic approaches were rehabilitated by other disciplines—among them economics, mathematical biology, psychology and new compound disciplines like behavioural economics and neuroeconomics—as new applications were recognized and information technology became more sophisticated, which allowed more extensive use of techniques like agent-based modelling.¹⁹ These techniques help to model the dynamics of social interactions in which actors' behaviour depends in part on the anticipated behaviour of others, making them useful analytical tools for studying cooperation in a wide range of contexts.²⁰

The "Prisoner's Dilemma" and other variations of two-person "games" offer a striking model of decision-making dynamics, especially in the field of international security.²¹ The Prisoner's Dilemma is "simply an abstract formulation of some very common and very interesting situations in which what is best for each person individually leads to mutual defection, whereas everyone would have been better off with mutual cooperation".²² As Jack Donnelly noted, "international relations are often marked by insecurity, competition, and conflict even when there are strong incentives to cooperate."²³

Indeed, part of Axelrod's interest in game-theoretic perspectives, as set out in *The Evolution of Cooperation*, derived from his concerns about understanding international security problems like nuclear arms control. In this sense his work shared certain similarities with the approaches taken by Rand Corporation analysts and American strategic planners throughout the Cold War, beginning with the mathematician John von Neumann.²⁴ But Axelrod's motivations were different, and he developed these approaches considerably further. In view of this, it is worth further discussing game-theoretic approaches, and their insights and limitations in the arms control and disarmament field.

GAME THEORY PERSPECTIVES AND MULTILATERAL ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS

There is no doubt that game-theoretic perspectives can be useful in understanding why cooperation evolves, or fails to evolve, in some arms control and disarmament negotiating processes by the way they characterize the interactive nature of individuals' behaviour. Backed by a wide range of real-world evidence, Axelrod demonstrated that cooperative behaviour can be achieved even in non-cooperative games like the Prisoner's Dilemma if competitors interact repeatedly.²⁵ Moreover, strategies of reciprocity like "Tit-for-Tat" (first introduced by Anatol Rapoport in a computer tournament organized by Axelrod) are highly effective when non-cooperative games are iterated.²⁶

Axelrod argued that "an important way to promote cooperation is to arrange that the same two individuals will meet each other again, be able to recognize each other from the past, and to recall how the other has behaved until now."²⁷ Enlarging the *shadow of the future*, that is increasing the certainty that there will be subsequent interaction, encourages cooperation among individuals as it makes the "future more important relative to the present."²⁸ In other words "The more future payoffs are valued relative to current payoffs, the less the incentive to defect today—since the other side is likely to retaliate tomorrow."²⁹

However, retaining analytical clarity and usefulness has been a challenge for these approaches when the number of actors being analysed is much larger than the number of actors in the two-person Prisoner's Dilemma or small-scale n -person games. It is reasonable to wonder how this characterization of the evolution of cooperation carries over into venues like the Conference on Disarmament (CD). Here, it is possible to think of the potential for emergence of cooperation both at the level of states and, perhaps necessarily, at the level of individual negotiators first. If trust and cooperation are gained through repeated interaction, what effect might diplomatic rotations then have on the outcome of negotiations? Indeed there are indications that short diplomatic rotations may impede progress and continuity in multilateral negotiations. Rebecca Johnson has suggested that:

As ambassadors and their staff are subject to rotation every 3–5 years, and most foreign ministers work on the principle of diplomats as non-

specialists, the likelihood of a significant proportion of ineffective representatives being engaged in the multilateral forum is high. There is also a demonstrated risk that effective personnel may be arbitrarily replaced regardless of whether negotiations are at a sensitive juncture.³⁰

Problems like these are not impossible to overcome, but they show that characterizing multilateral negotiations in rational terms can be far from easy. Another significant challenge is to reproduce the influence of social dynamics on individual perception and strategy in large groups in these situations. Insights into how collective behaviours or social norms emerge remain elusive, although so-called neuroeconomists like Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher, who are looking at such behaviours in laboratory conditions, may eventually shed more light on this, with potential application to negotiation theory.³¹

Indeed as P. Terrance Hopmann has noted, game-theoretic approaches have been most useful in analysing negotiations that are “highly transparent and mechanistic” or in bilateral or small group negotiations where it is possible to observe all aspects of the negotiation process.³² He wrote:

it has proven useful to analyze negotiating reciprocity in a kind of Richardson process model such as the tit-for-tat models developed by Anatol Rapoport and investigated by Robert Axelrod. Such models are most likely to be successful when the negotiation situation conforms to their basic assumptions: namely, that the actors are motivated by instrumental rationality and engage in some sort of formal bargaining process, and the goals and moves may be quantified and subjected to systematic analysis.³³

But multilateral arms control and disarmament negotiations are tricky endeavours that rarely conform to these basic assumptions. As Robert Putnam has observed:

Formally speaking, game-theoretic analysis requires that the structure of issues and payoffs be specified in advance. In reality, however, much of what happens in any bargaining situation involves attempts by the players to restructure the game and to alter one another’s perceptions of the costs of no-agreement and the benefits of proposed agreements.³⁴

Attempts to do so often take place through informal channels of diplomacy or activities. Indeed, in this way the structural context can itself serve to alter

negotiators' perceptions. Also, distinctive "communities of practice" emerge over time that may constrain these perceptions in other ways. Game-theoretic approaches have difficulty accounting for subjective perceptions in policy-making or the fact that, in practice, the psychology of making decisions can be extremely difficult to analyse.

TWO-LEVEL GAMES: AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING COOPERATION?

Another common assumption in game-theoretic approaches is that states are unitary actors that make decisions only in relation to other states in the international system. As such, no attention is given to the role of domestic considerations in cooperation at the international level.³⁵ In an attempt to rectify this failure, in the 1980s Putnam offered the "two-level game" approach as an alternative framework for analysis. As Ahmer Tarar described it:

The two-level game metaphor conceives of international bargaining as a multilevel "game". In addition to the bargaining directly going on between the executives of the countries (level I bargaining), the executives are simultaneously bargaining with domestic groups in their respective countries (level II bargaining), when their ratification is necessary for the agreement to be implemented.³⁶

However, are two-level games really a better reflection of decision-making at the international level? Peter F. Trumbore wrote that "One of the most compelling aspects of the two-level games approach is that it not only serves to explain the dynamics involved in international negotiations, it also challenges the realist paradigm which treats states as unitary actors, a perspective that continues to loom large in the international relations discipline."³⁷ As a framework for understanding the dynamics of international negotiations, two-level games provide a more detailed picture of the process than one-level games.

In previous research conducted by the *Disarmament as Humanitarian Action* project, it was noted that examining multilateral negotiations "in terms of the functioning of a community of practice allows the possibility of structural problems arising in—and across—multilateral arms control and disarmament processes for reasons that are not premeditated in political or

diplomatic terms.”³⁸ Similarly, Putnam’s two-level games implicitly recognize that the dynamics of a professional group approximating a community of practice can, and do, affect the outcome of negotiations.³⁹ Asymmetries in diplomatic status within the community, for example, can affect the progress and outcome of a negotiation. Putnam noted that “Higher status negotiators are likely to dispose of more side-payments and more ‘good will’ at home, and hence foreigners prefer to negotiate with a head of government than with a lower official.” He went on to say that diplomats are “acting rationally” and not “merely symbolically, when they refuse to negotiate with a counterpart of inferior rank”.⁴⁰

Real-life examples in the arms control and disarmament field confirm this. For instance, Rebecca Johnson noted in her account of the negotiations of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT):

The difficulties for some ambassadors of maintaining a continuous presence in negotiations because of other responsibilities may have several negative effects. Day-to-day representation is often put in the hands of junior diplomats who may either err on the side of caution or alternatively act as loose cannons, reluctant to sell positions with which they disagree, while lacking the authority or flexibility to make policy concessions themselves. If other delegations are headed by ambassadors, less senior diplomats representing their governments in meetings are not regarded as having equal authority. This imbalance of power can lead to circular debates and considerable wasting of time.⁴¹

However, Putnam did not consider that states may deliberately choose to exploit this tactic in a negotiation, that the size and status of a delegation may sometimes be an indication of a state’s level of interest and desire for cooperation.

Moreover, Putnam’s two-level game framework was built on certain general assumptions that do not always reflect the realities of international decision-making, especially in the field of international security. One premise was that “if an agreement between the executives is finally reached and ratified, it will to some extent reflect the preferences of domestic groups in each country.”⁴² However, decisions made at the international level are sometimes largely independent of domestic considerations and domestic acceptance is often sought *after* a decision is made between executive authorities.

Putnam also conjectured that the executive can use the prospect of ratification failure to extract concessions from the other side. However, he failed to “ascertain the conditions under which a domestic constraint is or is not a bargaining advantage”.⁴³ Since Putnam first expounded his logic of two-level games in 1988, many academics have attempted to expand and develop his model in order to find these answers.⁴⁴ Indeed one advantage of Putnam’s original model is that it is amenable to such adaptations.

Nevertheless many academics have considered two-level games more a “metaphor than a full-fledged theory”.⁴⁵ In part, this is likely because these expanded models become complicated and unwieldy, which curtails their usefulness. The reality is that there are many “games” going on between actors that may have an impact in negotiations; describing and incorporating them is often difficult. And, analytically, it may be hard to consider a negotiation in isolation. This is because negotiating actors, such as a state, are often involved in multilateral negotiations in a variety of international contexts. As a result, a state failing to demonstrate cooperative behaviour in one negotiation may negatively impact their bargaining leverage in decision-making processes on other issues. Moreover, in characterizing executive authorities, there remains wide scope for improving understanding of bureaucratic and organizational factors that are often under-examined in analyses of multilateral decision-making, not least because it is difficult for academics to acquire this information through direct observation.

On a more practical level, Putnam’s two-level games approach does not provide many practical suggestions about ways to improve cooperation between arms control and disarmament negotiators. Instead, some of Putnam’s observations fuel the idea that diplomacy is a “black art”. He noted, for example, that a “smart negotiator” knows that decisions made at one level can affect the other level. Therefore, when the occasion does present itself, “clever players will spot a move on one board that will trigger realignments on other boards, enabling them to achieve otherwise unattainable objectives.”⁴⁶ Implicit in Putnam’s approach is that anticipating an opponent’s subsequent move may be as much the product of intuition as a coherent methodical strategy for negotiators.

Two questions that spring to mind, then, are “Who is a smart negotiator?”, and “Are the skills of a smart negotiator innate or can they be learned?” But, there are methodological difficulties in reaching firm conclusions about

what makes for a “smart” multilateral negotiator. For example, it is difficult to study the effects of informal diplomacy on cooperation at the international level, especially as these meetings are often confidential and no records usually exist. And, because multilateral negotiations are relatively unusual undertakings from a social perspective, a proper understanding about how the dynamics of negotiations form is still lacking among researchers, as mentioned earlier.

CIVIL SOCIETY ACTIVISM IN ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT PROCESSES

The literature derived from game-theoretic and two-level game analyses provides only a partial picture of the dynamics of multilateral decision-making. As such, there has not been much attention paid to the roles that civil society practitioners play in international decision-making processes. However, civil society activism in international negotiations was not commonplace when most of the work on cooperation discussed above was produced. Since the end of the Cold War, civil society actors have become more active in many international negotiations and, particularly in the environment and human rights fields, have become more accepted voices.⁴⁷ In the arms control and disarmament field, civil society practitioners occupy a more tenuous position, but their roles have sometimes been significant nevertheless.

The literature on civil society in the arms control and disarmament field is comprised largely of individual case studies of various civil society campaigns.⁴⁸ Most of these analyses come from civil society practitioners themselves. It is not easy to get a sense of civil society activism in the arms control and disarmament field by just relying on these individual accounts. Indeed, civil society activists play different roles and serve in different capacities in each process, which makes generalizations difficult.

In analysing non-governmental organization (NGO) roles, David Atwood identified in 2002 many shortcomings in the literature on civil society activism, and noted areas for further exploration and research.⁴⁹ He noted in particular the “need for greater understanding not only of the history of NGO involvement in particular disarmament issue areas but also of the factors, both in the environment in which NGOs are working and internal to NGOs themselves, which have affected the nature and effectiveness of

their engagement”.⁵⁰ In his chapter in this volume, which takes his analysis further, he argues that “Anti-personnel landmines mechanisms apart, NGOs simply are not—nor are they likely to become—central players in a formal sense in multilateral disarmament processes, at least in the short run.”⁵¹

There certainly appears much to be done in researching how civil society actors contribute to multilateral processes. For instance, one largely unexplored topic concerns NGO participation on government delegations. At the 2005 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) Review Conference, for example, some NGO representatives were invited by governments to join their delegations as advisers and consultants (as in previous NPT review meetings).⁵² In many cases these individuals were prominent academics or members of well-known policy think tanks in their respective countries. This was also the case in other processes such as the 1995 Review Conference of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW): in addition to the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) addressing plenary meetings of the CCW review and playing an active role as information providers and lobbyists, some NGO representatives were also part of states’ official delegations to the preparatory meetings and review conference sessions.⁵³ Likewise, in her account of NGO participation in the Mine Ban Convention process, Nicola Short noted that “several governments included NGOs in their delegations: nine in Oslo, eight in Brussels.”⁵⁴ The same is true of some states in the UN Programme of Action process on small arms and light weapons.

One reason for the lack of research into the influence (or lack thereof) of such NGO roles could be that these representatives have been too few to attract much notice or extensive analytical consideration. It could also be argued that, by serving in their personal capacity, these individuals do not really represent the views of “civil society”. Better understanding of the impact these individuals have on decisions made at the multilateral level would be useful especially in comparison with the level of effectiveness of NGO efforts to influence policy-making in other ways.⁵⁵

Anecdotal evidence from the 2005 NPT Review Conference, for instance, seems to suggest that NGO representatives on delegations can have significant influence in opinion-shaping at the multilateral level. In her analysis of the proceedings, for example, Rebecca Johnson pointed out the success of the adviser to the Kyrgyzstan delegation who was “responsible for some useful proposals on controlling and preventing access to [highly

enriched uranium], which were taken up by a number of delegations in a working paper".⁵⁶ In contrast, observations on the work of civil society activists on the fringes of the Conference were not as positive. Harald Müller wrote:

There was no civil society protest against the devaluation of the Treaty conducted by the diplomats. The NGOs performed bravely during their various workshops and seminars, exposed their brochures and pamphlets, reported day by day on the proceedings, cultivated their contacts with their delegates, and held, occasionally, rather boring press conferences, just as if this [Review Conference] were business as usual. Apparently, the shocking, alarming events and the potentially fatal consequences did not come to their attention.⁵⁷

CONCLUSIONS

This brief literature review suggests that academic research provides useful insights into multilateral negotiations in general terms. The bulk of most of the practically relevant literature on civil society in multilateral negotiations, on the other hand, is informed by experience but not much theory—a shortcoming of contemporary research in international relations that has still to be properly remedied. Methodological frameworks for analysis developed to date are clearly not yet a compelling alternative for policy makers. Richard Price has even wondered if the existing academic research on civil society activism, more generally, is of use to practitioners or is destined to be read only by fellow academics. He also questioned whether any of the knowledge generated through scholarship in that field was something practitioners themselves have not already learned through trial and error.⁵⁸

Arguably, academic researchers are not obliged to provide diplomatic negotiators and others with practical advice or recommendations. Certainly, the analyses offered on occasion by practitioners themselves appear to have been more focused on the practical needs of negotiators and civil society activists. But as this chapter and others in this volume highlight, good policy research, backed by broader insights, continue to be needed if progress is to be made in the multilateral arms control and disarmament field.

Notes

- ¹ The author would like to thank David Atwood, John Borrie, Eoghan Murphy and Ashley Thornton for their comments and assistance with this paper.
- ² Robert Axelrod, "The Emergence of Cooperation among Egoists", *The American Political Science Review*, vol. 75, no. 2, American Political Science Association, 1981, pp. 306–318; Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, Basic Books, 1984; Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions", *World Politics*, vol. 38, no. 1, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985, pp. 226–254; Kenneth Oye, "Explaining Cooperation under Anarchy", in Kenneth Oye (ed.), *Cooperation under Anarchy*, Princeton University Press, 1986; Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism", *International Organization*, vol. 42, no. 3, Cambridge University Press, 1988; Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses", *World Politics*, vol. 44, no. 3, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992; See for example Arthur Stein, *Why Nations Cooperate: Circumstances and Choice in International Relations*, Cornell University Press, 1994; Charles Kegley, Jr. (ed.), *Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge*, St. Martin's Press, 1995; Stephen Majeski and Shane Frics, "Conflict and Cooperation in International Relations", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 39, no. 4, Sage Publications, 1995, pp. 622–645; Scott Burchill et al., *Theories of International Relations*, Palgrave, 2001; Thomas Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict*, Harvard University, 2003; and Steven Brams, *Game Theory and Politics*, Free Press, 1975, rev. ed., 2004.
- ³ See John Borrie, "Rethinking Multilateral Negotiations: Disarmament as Humanitarian Action" in John Borrie and Vanessa Martin Randin (eds), *Alternative Approaches in Multilateral Decision Making: Disarmament as Humanitarian Action*, UNIDIR, 2005, pp. 7–37.
- ⁴ Morgenthau used the phrase "science of politics" as the title for chapter 2 in the second edition of *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, published in 1954 (taken from footnote 7 of John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War", *International Security*, vol. 17, no. 3, The MIT Press, 1992/93, p. 7).

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- 5 Scott Burchill, "Realism and Neo-Realism", in Scott Burchill et al., *Theories of International Relations*, Palgrave, 2001, p. 77.
- 6 Martin Griffiths, *Fifty Key Thinkers in International Relations*, Routledge, 1999, p. 36.
- 7 John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War", *International Security*, vol. 17, no. 3, The MIT Press, 1992/93, p. 7.
- 8 *Ibid.*, p. 11.
- 9 Stanley Hoffmann, "International Relations: the Long Road to Theory", in James Rosenau (ed.), *International Relations and Foreign Policy: A Reader in Research and Theory*, Free Press, 1961, pp. 423–424, as mentioned in John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War", *International Security*, vol. 17, no. 3, The MIT Press, 1992/93, p. 11.
- 10 See Scott Burchill, "Realism and Neo-Realism", in Scott Burchill et al., *Theories of International Relations*, Palgrave, 2001, p. 88.
- 11 Scott Burchill, "Realism and Neo-Realism", in Scott Burchill et al., *Theories of International Relations*, Palgrave, 2001, p. 89. Burchill takes the quotation from Kenneth Waltz, "Realist Thought and Neo-Realist Theory", *Journal of International Affairs*, vol. 44, no. 1, Columbia University, 1990, p. 33.
- 12 Christian Reus-Smit, "Constructivism", in Scott Burchill et al., *Theories of International Relations*, Palgrave, 2001, pp. 210–211.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 212.
- 14 But while neo-liberals argue that states cooperate in order to maximize their absolute gains, neo-realists like Joseph Grieco argue that states are also interested in achieving *relative* advantages. Neo-realists believe that the neo-liberal proposition is short-sighted for this reason. See Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism", *International Organization*, vol. 42, no. 3, Cambridge University Press, 1988, pp. 485–507. See also Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses", *World Politics*, vol. 44, no. 3, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992, pp. 466–496.
- 15 Christian Reus-Smit, "Constructivism", in Scott Burchill et al., *Theories of International Relations*, Palgrave, 2001, p. 211.
- 16 Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions", *World Politics*, vol. 38, no. 1, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985, pp. 226–254.

- ¹⁷ See Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses", *World Politics*, vol. 44, no. 3, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992, p. 467.
- ¹⁸ See Rebecca Johnson, "Changing Perceptions and Practice in Multilateral Arms Control Negotiations" and John Borrie, "Cooperation and Defection in the Conference on Disarmament", in this volume.
- ¹⁹ For instance, see Robert Axelrod, *The Complexity of Cooperation*, Princeton University Press, 1997.
- ²⁰ For example, researchers in Australia have developed a computer program that relies on game theory to produce a fairer outcome when dividing the property of divorcing couples. Instead of the traditional approach of dividing a couple's property in half, the system, called *Family Winner*, guides the couple through a series of trade-offs and compensation strategies. See "March of the Robolawyers" in *The Economist*, 9 March 2006.
- ²¹ For a brief description of the Prisoner's Dilemma game see John Borrie, "Cooperation and Defection in the Conference on Disarmament", in this volume.
- ²² Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, Basic Books, 1984, p. 9.
- ²³ Jack Donnelly, *Realism and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, 2000, p. 21. The italicized words are Donnelly's emphasis.
- ²⁴ William Poundstone, *Prisoner's Dilemma: John von Neumann, Game Theory and the Puzzle of the Bomb*, Anchor Books, 1992.
- ²⁵ Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, Basic Books, 1984, p. 126.
- ²⁶ An agent using the "Tit-for-Tat" strategy will initially cooperate then respond in kind to an opponent's last action. This means if the opponent previously was cooperative, the agent is cooperative. If not, the agent is not. However, Martin Novak's and Karl Sigmund's "Pavlov" strategy is one which many game theorists believe outperforms Tit-for-Tat. The Pavlov strategy dictates that "you should cooperate if and only if in the previous round you and your co-player have done the same." See Martin Nowak and Karl Sigmund, "A Strategy of Win-Stay, Lose-Shift that Outperforms Tit-for-Tat in Prisoner's Dilemma Game", *Nature*, 1993, vol. 364, no. 6432, pp. 56–58. In 2004 the Tit-for-Tat strategy was beaten in a computer tournament organized by the University of Southampton (for more information see <www.wired.com/news/culture/0,65317-0.html>). However there is still widespread uncertainty concerning the

applicability of these new strategies to real-life situations and more specifically to matters concerning international security.

- ²⁷ Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation*, Basic Books, 1984, p. 125.
- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 126.
- ²⁹ Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions", *World Politics*, vol. 38, no. 1, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985, p. 232.
- ³⁰ Rebecca Johnson, "Nuclear Arms Control through Multilateral Negotiations", in Nancy Gallagher (ed.), *Arms Control: New Approaches to Theory and Practice*, Frank Cass, 1998, p. 95. Admittedly this is not a problem only seen in arms control and disarmament. During the negotiations of the Migrant Workers Convention, for example, there were many changes in diplomatic personnel as well. Previous research has shown that such interruptions can be alleviated by keeping the chairperson of negotiations constant. But diplomatic rotation also compounds difficulties in forums like the CD where the chairpersons rotate on a frequent basis. See Vanessa Martin Randin and John Borrie, "A Comparison between Arms Control and Other Multilateral Negotiation Processes", in John Borrie and Vanessa Martin Randin (eds), *Alternative Approaches in Multilateral Decision Making: Disarmament as Humanitarian Action*, UNIDIR, 2005, pp. 67–129.
- ³¹ See Ernst Fehr and Urs Fischbacher, "Social Norms and Human Cooperation", *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, vol. 8, no. 4, Elsevier, 2004, pp. 185–189.
- ³² P. Terrence Hopmann, "Negotiating Data: Reflections on the Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Negotiation Processes", *International Negotiation*, vol. 7, no. 1, Martinus Nijhoff, 2002, p. 74.
- ³³ *Ibid.*
- ³⁴ Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games", *International Organization*, vol. 42, no. 3, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 454. See also Robert Axelrod and Robert Keohane, "Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions", *World Politics*, vol. 38, no. 1, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985, pp. 226–254.
- ³⁵ Helen Milner, "International Theories of Cooperation among Nations: Strengths and Weaknesses", *World Politics*, vol. 44, no. 3, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992, p. 467.

- ³⁶ Ahmer Tarar, "Constituencies and Preferences in International Bargaining", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 49, no. 3, Sage Publications, 2005, p. 383.
- ³⁷ Peter Trumbore, "Public Opinion as a Domestic Constraint in International Negotiations: Two-Level Games in the Anglo-Irish Peace Process", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 42, no. 3, Blackwell Publishing, 1998, p. 545.
- ³⁸ John Borrie, "Rethinking Multilateral Negotiations: Disarmament as Humanitarian Action" in John Borrie and Vanessa Martin Randin (eds), *Alternative Approaches in Multilateral Decision Making: Disarmament as Humanitarian Action*, UNIDIR, 2005, p. 16.
- ³⁹ A "community of practice" is taken to mean "a group of people who over a period of time share in some set of social practices geared toward some common social purpose". See John Borrie, "Rethinking Multilateral Negotiations: Disarmament as Humanitarian Action" in John Borrie and Vanessa Martin Randin (eds), *Alternative Approaches in Multilateral Decision Making: Disarmament as Humanitarian Action*, UNIDIR, 2005, p. 15.
- ⁴⁰ Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games", *International Organization*, vol. 42, no. 3, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 452.
- ⁴¹ Rebecca Johnson, "Nuclear Arms Control through Multilateral Negotiations" in Nancy Gallagher (ed.), *Arms Control: New Approaches to Theory and Practice*, Frank Cass, 1998, p. 96.
- ⁴² Ahmer Tarar, "Constituencies and Preferences in International Bargaining", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 49, no. 3, Sage Publications, 2005, p. 383.
- ⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 384.
- ⁴⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁴⁵ See for example Peter Trumbore, "Public Opinion as a Domestic Constraint in International Negotiations: Two-Level Games in the Anglo-Irish Peace Process", *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 42, no. 3, Blackwell Publishing, 1998, p. 545.
- ⁴⁶ Robert Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games", *International Organization*, vol. 42, no. 3, Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 434.
- ⁴⁷ See Constanza Tabbush, *Civil Society in United Nations Conferences: A Literature Review*, UNRISD, Civil Society and Social Movements Programme Paper Number 17, 2005.

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- ⁴⁸ See for example, Kenneth Rutherford, "A Theoretical Examination of Disarming States: NGOs and Anti-Personnel Landmines", *International Politics*, vol. 37, no. 4, Palgrave, 2000, pp. 457–478; Ken Rutherford, "The Landmine Ban and NGOs: The Role of Communications Technologies", *Transnational Associations*, no. 2, 2000, pp. 60–73; Rebecca Johnson, "Advocates and Activists: Conflicting Approaches on Nonproliferation and the Test Ban Treaty", in Ann Florini (ed.), *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000, p. 49–81; Nicola Short, "The Role of NGOs in the Ottawa Process to Ban Landmines", *International Negotiation*, vol. 4, no. 3, Brill, 1999, pp. 481–500; Daniel Feakes, "Global Civil Society and Biological and Chemical Weapons" in Mary Kaldor, Helmut Anheier and Marlies Glasius (eds), *Global Civil Society Yearbook 2003*, Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 87–117; Motoko Mekata, "Building Partnerships toward a Common Goal: Experiences of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines", in Ann Florini (ed.), *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000, pp. 143–176; Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Target Land Mines", *International Organization*, vol. 52, no. 3, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 613–644; John Borrie and Vanessa Martin Randin (eds), *Disarmament as Humanitarian Action: From Perspective to Practice*, UNIDIR, 2006; Don Hubert, *The Landmine Ban: A Case Study in Humanitarian Advocacy*, Watson Institute for International Studies, Occasional Paper No. 42, 2000; and Maxwell Cameron, Brian Tomlin and Robert Lawson (eds), *To Walk Without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines*, Oxford University Press, 1998.
- ⁴⁹ David Atwood, "NGOs in Disarmament: Views from the Coalface", *Disarmament Forum*, vol. 2, no. 1, UNIDIR, 2002, pp. 5–14.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 10.
- ⁵¹ See David Atwood, "NGOs and Multilateral Disarmament Diplomacy: Limits and Possibilities" in this volume.
- ⁵² These states included Belgium, Germany, Kyrgyzstan, New Zealand, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
- ⁵³ Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Target Land Mines", *International Organization*, vol. 52, no. 3, Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 624.

- ⁵⁴ Nicola Short, "The Role of NGOs in the Ottawa Process to Ban Landmines", *International Negotiation*, vol. 4, no. 3, Brill, 1999, p. 487.
- ⁵⁵ See, for instance, Richard Price, "Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics", *World Politics*, vol. 55, no. 4, Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003, pp. 579–606.
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