

Connecting paradigms: MANPADS in the national and human security debates

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Man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS) have rocketed to prominence in the field of arms control. By virtue of their place in both the disarmament and small arms control debates, they are represented in both the national and human security paradigms. This article attempts to unpack how the MANPADS issue has gained this unique position, and what impact this is likely to have on its development.¹ It argues that MANPADS have achieved prominence because they resonate with new national security priorities post 11 September 2001. Their association with terrorism and connected issues such as weapons of mass destruction and rogue states has labelled MANPADS a national security issue and thrust them into the disarmament debate alongside major conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction. Uniquely though, MANPADS measures have also been firmly linked to small arms control and hence to the human security paradigm.

MANPADS benefit from having feet in both camps. On the one hand, their importance is continually reasserted by elevation into the broader missile control debate. On the other hand, effective measures against MANPADS recognize the similarities between controlling their proliferation and controlling small arms flows.

Does this link then suggest some kind of merging between the national security and human security paradigms? No, but it does suggest that the security agenda has changed and that today's threats to national security, including MANPADS, require broader-ranging responses than traditional disarmament measures. MANPADS proliferation, like the terrorism it has become associated with, has its roots in poor governance and insecurity and control measures must reflect these factors.

MANPADS in the human security paradigm

MANPADS AS SMALL ARMS

In the early 1990s a number of security challenges, previously overshadowed by the Cold War, came to prominence. The "new" wars of the 1990s were dominated by small arms, and their resounding impact on people contributed to the emergence of the concept of human security as a counterpoint to the dominant focus on state security.

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In 1995, the United Nations General Assembly asked the Secretary-General to appoint a panel of governmental experts to establish, among other things, the types of small arms and light weapons (SALW) used in the conflicts the UN responded to.² Portability was the chief criterion for inclusion in the panel's list. All of the weapons identified could be carried and operated by one person or a small team of individuals, possibly with the aid of a light vehicle. The weapons ranged from small arms such as pistols, assault rifles and light machine guns to light weapons including heavy machine guns, grenade launchers and portable launchers of anti-aircraft missile systems.³ The latter would become better known as man-portable air defence systems, or MANPADS.

Thus MANPADS are categorized as SALW. In contrast to larger missile systems, MANPADS are deployed alongside small arms and often stored in the same facilities. Their small size makes them easy to transport and easy to hide. They are primarily infantry weapons; they require no dedicated support vehicles, networked operation or associated infrastructure.

The UN Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (Programme of Action),⁴ agreed in 2001, is the most high-profile focus of small arms control, and while the programme does not refer to the SALW categories defined by the Panel of Governmental Experts, in the absence of any intention expressed to the contrary, it is broadly assumed to cover them.⁵ By association, the categories defined by the panel have come to define small arms and light weapons for the majority of policy makers, researchers and activists working on small arms issues. MANPADS are now an accepted part of the small arms control debate and hence the human security framework.

THE IMPACT OF THE HUMAN SECURITY PARADIGM ON MANPADS

The Programme of Action on small arms is worded explicitly to differentiate small arms control from national security issues. It states clearly that its aims "are without prejudice to the priorities accorded to nuclear disarmament, weapons of mass destruction and conventional disarmament".⁶ The term "national security" does not appear once in the programme.

Instead, the Programme of Action reflects a human security focus by making explicit reference to humanitarian and social impacts at the individual level.⁷ Small arms control, as defined in the Programme of Action, considers factors such as poverty and underdevelopment, organized crime, drugs trafficking and the trade in natural resources as contributing to small arms proliferation. These issues are all relevant to controlling the proliferation of MANPADS; MANPADS proliferation is also subject to many of the same dynamics as small arms proliferation, such as poor stockpile monitoring, weak economies and the associated demand for hard currency, and lack of security sector reform.

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All the same, the Programme of Action is arguably not the ideal forum for effective MANPADS control. The programme covers a wide range of issues, and many are largely irrelevant to MANPADS. Some of the more contentious issues, such as civilian possession of SALW, have had a spurious, and damaging, impact on the MANPADS debate.

A prime example of this occurred at the 2006 Review Conference of the Programme of Action, in which states failed to make further progress on controlling MANPADS. It is unclear from an outsider's perspective why there was no agreement, but it is plausible that MANPADS were victims of the general antagonism in the conference: dissatisfied with the Programme of Action in general, some states used the MANPADS issue to express their discontent. As there has been progress on the MANPADS issue

elsewhere, this “false opposition” was evidence that the Programme of Action could be a negative influence on the MANPADS debate. A 2006 Conference on Disarmament seminar report recognized this, noting that “there was an argument for doing more work [on MANPADS] outside the complex agenda of the Program of Action”.⁸

The statement recognizes that MANPADS differ greatly from most other SALW. MANPADS, like anti-tank guided weapons (also included as SALW by the panel of governmental experts), are guided weapons.⁹ They are technologically more sophisticated, of higher monetary value, and have greater political significance than other SALW. As a consequence, they are used more rarely in contemporary armed conflict. They proliferate infrequently in civilian hands and are rarely used for the predation and crime that characterizes armed violence in many societies. Therefore, as the case of the Programme of Action shows, attempting to address MANPADS uniquely as a small arms issue may not prove effective for their control.

Nonetheless, MANPADS should remain within the small arms debate, as they still share much in common with other SALW. Indeed, the most comprehensive MANPADS controls to date are firmly grounded in small arms control. The Wassenaar Arrangement’s Elements for Export Controls of MANPADS—and by extension the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Principles (which are based on the Wassenaar elements)—are a commonly recognized gold standard.¹⁰ Importantly, they include measures that have the potential to address the local dynamics of proliferation, such as theft from state arsenals or diversion by unscrupulous individuals. Such avenues of loss are common sources of small arms proliferation and measures to control them necessitate initiatives aimed at stopping loss at the grass-roots level.

In terms of technology, cost, political significance and applications, MANPADS share more similarities with major conventional weapons than they do with small arms. Their physical proliferation, however, responds to the dynamics common to most SALW.¹¹ Qualitatively, MANPADS lie midway between conventional weapons and small arms.

An uncomfortable fit: MANPADS as a national security issue

While MANPADS may differ from most other small arms, they also differ considerably from major conventional weapons that are traditionally considered under the rubric of national security.

The United Nations Register of Conventional Arms, a voluntary mechanism to encourage arms transparency, comprises armaments that are the backbone of a state’s offensive and defensive capabilities. For example, tanks, armoured combat vehicles and large-calibre artillery systems are the basic elements of a massed ground assault or response. Combat aircraft and attack helicopters comprise the core of a state’s air power. Warships are the nucleus of naval power. Missiles and missile launchers, “capable of delivering a warhead or weapon of destruction to a range of at least 25 kilometres”, are fundamental to the offensive and defensive capacities of states.¹² These weapons have been, and remain, the primary subjects of the national security paradigm.

In 2003, the United Nations General Assembly decided to include MANPADS in the register.¹³ Hence they are included in discussions at the Conference on Disarmament, alongside weapons that are at the heart of states’ security concerns.¹⁴ But MANPADS differ from the other weapons in the register on two counts. Above all, they are complementary to the large weapons listed above and not a core part of a state’s military capability. In offensive terms, although they are potent weapons, MANPADS have more of a harassing role against aircraft than one of sustained attack. They would not be the primary means used by one state to cripple the air force of another. On the defensive side,

man-portable air defence systems are the infantry's last defence against air power—a measure to be used only when larger, more capable air defences are inoperable or limited in reach.

MANPADS perform different roles and share little in common with the weapons that are usually considered of importance to national security. This is acknowledged: the inclusion of MANPADS in the register was noted as an “exception” that recognizes the high importance of MANPADS but underlines that their inclusion should not set a precedent for further changes.¹⁵ In some ways it also recognizes that, while the political significance of MANPADS is high, it is of a different kind than that of its “missile and missile launcher” counterparts of category VII.

Why therefore have MANPADS moved into the national security spotlight? One possible reason is that they are technologically advanced enough to pose a threat to air power. In doing so, they threaten the technological and military superiority of the most powerful states. In the hands of weak states or non-state actors, MANPADS could redress the balance of power—albeit in a limited set of circumstances. The MANPADS threat to coalition aircraft in Afghanistan and Iraq is but one example. Russian experience in Chechnya, where MANPADS have been used to shoot down military helicopters, is another.¹⁶ In this sense, it would be quite logical to assume that, as instruments of asymmetric warfare, MANPADS are worthy of consideration under the rubric of national security.

However, MANPADS are not unique among small arms in posing such a threat. A number of other light weapons have also proved a serious threat to technologically sophisticated and powerful armed forces. Take, for instance, rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPGs). Technologically less advanced than MANPADS, RPGs nonetheless have been used to shoot down two US UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters in Somalia in 1993,¹⁷ and were employed against armoured vehicles in Afghanistan and Iraq.

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MANPADS AND THE NEW NATIONAL SECURITY PRIORITIES

MANPADS have become a national security issue by their association with other, higher profile, national security threats. They have found a place in the national security debate through a steadily growing number of speeches and texts that link them to threats such as terrorism (notably state-supported terrorism), rogue states and weapons of mass destruction.

The Federation of American Scientists' list of MANPADS documentation clearly demonstrates rising international interest in the subject after 11 September 2001.¹⁸ Notably, this reached a critical density following the 2002 MANPADS attack in Mombasa. This attack on an Israeli passenger aircraft re-emphasized the link between MANPADS and their potential use by terrorists.¹⁹ Attacks against civilian aircraft are not a traditional national security issue, but the use of MANPADS in Mombasa, combined with attacks against military targets in Chechnya and Iraq, arguably linked them to terrorism and to the threat to state security forces.²⁰

Virtually every regional and international measure to control MANPADS since 2002 has made explicit reference to the danger of terrorists acquiring MANPADS. This dimension of the debate has undoubtedly been pushed by the United States, but many states have expressed the same fears. The G8 Action Plan on MANPADS, for instance, expresses deep concern about MANPADS, “especially in the hands of terrorists or States that harbour them”; it stresses the determination of G8 leaders to

"strengthen ... joint efforts to curb terrorist threats against mass transportation", and leaders have undertaken to "[t]o ban transfers of Manpads [sic] to non-state end-users".²¹

By extension, this link with the war on terror has led MANPADS to be included in the renewed debate on weapons of mass destruction and "weapons of mass effect".²² Security Council resolution 1617 (2005) relates MANPADS, terrorism and weapons of mass destruction by expressing concern:

... over the possible use by Al-Qaida, Usama bin Laden, or the Taliban, and their associates of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS), commercially available explosives and chemical, biological, radiation or nuclear weapons and material, and encouraging Member States to consider possible action to reduce these threats.²³

The Secretary-General's report, *In Larger Freedom*, arguably expands on the theme by juxtaposing MANPADS with missile control, weapons of mass destruction and terrorism:

Member States should adopt effective national export controls covering missiles and other means of delivery for nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, rockets and shoulder-fired missiles [MANPADS], as well as a ban on transferring any of them to non-State actors.²⁴

Association with terrorism has thus pushed the MANPADS debate in new directions. International terrorism was such an amorphous concept that it was very difficult to launch a "war on terror" without targeting something tangible. Just as Iraq was labelled by some as a supporter of terrorism and hence a legitimate target after 11 September 2001, the MANPADS issue was linked firmly to state-supported terrorism. And as Al-Qaeda became synonymous with networked terrorism in the digital age, MANPADS became a symbol of the threat posed by this new, high-tech terrorist. The resonance of MANPADS with all these issues provides an explanation as to why they, in contrast to other light weapons, have been elevated to the national security podium.

The inclusion of MANPADS in the UN Register of Conventional Arms is arguably the most concrete example of a permanent ratcheting-up of the MANPADS debate into the national security paradigm. Including MANPADS in the register puts them (despite some opposition) on the agenda in the Conference on Disarmament; it places them firmly in the wider missile control debate;²⁵ and, most important, it means MANPADS are always linked to weapons that are traditionally the focus of national security. A 2006 Report of the Secretary-General notes that, among missile-related security concerns, MANPADS have been placed on an "equal footing" with ballistic missiles.²⁶ In short, MANPADS are of equal national security concern, therefore their control is imperative.

Such a position has not gone uncontested; some states have argued that MANPADS should be addressed only within the Programme of Action on small arms, citing a duplication of effort in the Conference on Disarmament (CD). For others, the inclusion of MANPADS has the potential to focus discussion away from "priority issues" in the CD.²⁷ But others justify MANPADS' presence in this forum by citing the potential for MANPADS to achieve some consensus on the missile debate, which has not moved significantly for some time.²⁸ Clearly, for some states, MANPADS are "patently a matter of disarmament", and for others they are less so.²⁹

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Regardless of the disagreement, both arguments confirm—and continue to reaffirm—the place of MANPADS within the disarmament debate. Indeed, the MANPADS issue may be becoming more firmly entrenched in the CD's broader missile control debate. There is no precedent of weapons having been removed from the register. MANPADS are unlikely to "descend" from their current position in the near future; they are firmly settled within the traditional disarmament framework.

THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY PARADIGM ON MANPADS

By placing MANPADS in the national security paradigm, the issue has benefited from greater levels of attention.

There are numerous regional and international initiatives to control MANPADS proliferation. But the political reasons that gained MANPADS their place in the disarmament debate have shaped many of the measures that have since been designed to control them. Issues of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction have combined to focus a number of MANPADS initiatives on the matter of state transfer to non-state actors. For example, the Bangkok Declaration aims to “confront the threat posed by terrorists” and commits leaders to “ban transfers to non-state end users”.³⁰ UN General Assembly resolutions in 2004 and 2005 recognized that controlling MANPADS has acquired “special importance in the context of the intensified international fight against global terrorism” and encouraged states, among other things, to “ban the transfer of [MANPADS] to non-State end-users”.³¹ There is a danger that this issue can dominate at the expense of other, more pressing concerns.

Available sources suggest that the direct transfer by states to non-state actors is in fact a relatively minor source of illicit MANPADS. For the most part, MANPADS enter the illicit sphere through theft or loss from state stocks.³² MANPADS are in the hands of around 105 states across the globe. A good portion of these stocks is undoubtedly insecure. In Africa, for instance, 29 countries stock MANPADS and their security has been verified in only four or five cases.³³ Bilateral and multilateral stock security initiatives have been undertaken in only 20 or so states to date.³⁴ Press reports of 17 MANPADS seizures from 2004 to 2006 suggest the following: 5 were of unknown origin; 2 could plausibly have originated in state to non-state transfers; but 6 had certainly been diverted from state arsenals, and a further 4 had probably been sourced this way.³⁵

State transfer to non-state actors builds consensus among diplomats, but for a reason—it does not require much political or strategic expenditure on the part of the majority of states to agree to controls, as very few of them engage in the practice.

There is a clear argument for broadening the focus of MANPADS control away from this one concern. The Secretary-General’s 2006 report on *The Issue of Missiles in All Its Aspects* recommends deepening the measures in General Assembly resolution 60/77 of 2005 and broadening adherence to existing multilateral MANPADS agreements.³⁶ Arguably this implies applying, to a greater extent, existing small arms control measures to MANPADS. While these measures may lack the high profile of a national security concern, they are more suitable to MANPADS control. Both paradigms, therefore, play a key role in controlling MANPADS proliferation.

The future for MANPADS: connecting national and human security paradigms

Two recent UN General Assembly resolutions, 59/90 and 60/77, juxtapose national security concerns and references to the Programme of Action on small arms. On the one hand, the resolutions accept that MANPADS are a national security concern by recognizing “the legitimate right of Governments to possess such weapons in the interests of their national security”.³⁷ On the other, both also emphasize “the full implementation of the Programme of Action”,³⁸ which, as has been noted, is quite distinct from traditional appraisals of national security.

The resolutions recognize that the MANPADS debate cuts across the divide. By acknowledging the national security concern, but also referring to the Programme of Action in the first operational

paragraphs, the two resolutions acknowledge the issue's high priority *and* tacitly propose measures that are firmly rooted in human security.

MANPADS are a halfway house; straddling the disarmament and small arms control debates, rather than being considered in one forum alone, is potentially of great benefit to their control. MANPADS' inclusion in the Wassenaar Arrangement is most notable in this respect. Most of the world's important arms exporting companies are members of the Wassenaar Arrangement. Under the Arrangement's Initial Elements, participating states agree to control all weapons in the Wassenaar Arrangement Munitions List "with the objective of preventing unauthorised transfer or re-transfers of those items".³⁹ Like the evolving MANPADS debate, the Arrangement is something of a halfway house. Importantly, it includes small arms and light weapons alongside major conventional weapons. And it recognizes the impact of weapons on the balance of state forces while also recognizing their implications for human rights.⁴⁰ The measures listed in the Arrangement and its Elements—both initial and later additions—reflect these dual concerns.

With regard to MANPADS, the Wassenaar Arrangement recognizes the similarities between small arms control and restricting MANPADS proliferation. Like the UN resolutions on MANPADS, the Arrangement's Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons (of which MANPADS are nominally a part)⁴¹ make reference to the Programme of Action (as an international agreement on small arms).⁴² *Unlike* the two UN resolutions, the Wassenaar Arrangement's guidelines are deeper in scope and binding. As discussed above, the Wassenaar-OSCE principles are an important step toward addressing MANPADS proliferation at source. They recognize the fundamental impact of stock insecurity on proliferation—emphasizing the role of the recipient state and its ability to protect against loss, theft and diversion.⁴³ In short, the measures go to the roots of proliferation—the political, economic and developmental reasons why some states are unable to keep control of their stocks.

As Ambassador Caroline Millar of Australia noted at a plenary meeting of the Conference on Disarmament:

The Wassenaar Arrangement's "Elements for export controls of MANPADS" provide very good guidance for what States can do to ensure effective control over the export and storage of MANPADS. Measures in the Elements include maintaining inventories of weapons and their serial numbers, restricting access to MANPADS-relevant classified information and storing missiles and firing mechanisms separately. Moreover, exporting States are to satisfy themselves of a recipient State's willingness and ability to implement effective controls over MANPADS. The need for such a measure was highlighted in the Australian seminar, which noted the proliferation threat from poor stockpile management.⁴⁴

Addressing MANPADS as part of the small arms issue is a reminder that effective MANPADS control requires measures that are "deeper" in scope than traditional arms control. At present, the Wassenaar-OSCE principles, with their links to the Programme of Action, offer a high standard of MANPADS control that could be used as the basis for future initiatives, such as further UN resolutions.

Conclusion

By virtue of the conceptual linkages that MANPADS share with state security concerns since 11 September 2001, they have become viewed as a national security concern in their own right. This has had a positive effect on the success of MANPADS controls. Including MANPADS in the disarmament debate heightens the profile of the issue and offers an avenue for it to develop outside of the potentially

limiting Programme of Action. As a small arms concern, the technical issues of MANPADS control can be appropriately addressed and controls can be more comprehensive.

In broader terms, the MANPADS debate typifies security concerns in the early twenty-first century. It is clear that national and human security issues are not as distinct as once thought. Just as international terrorism has its origins at the individual or community level, so too does the proliferation of MANPADS. Underdevelopment, poverty, poor governance and the associated ills of human insecurity are probably a stronger driving force for proliferation than transfers by states to non-state actors.

Notes

1. The author would like to express his sincere thanks to Glenn McDonald for his advice and support during the writing of this article. All errors are the responsibility of the author.
2. United Nations General Assembly resolution 50/70 B of 12 December 1995, UN document A/RES/50/70, 15 January 1996.
3. *Report of the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms*, in UN document A/52/298, 27 August 1997, paragraph 26.
4. Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, adopted 20 July 2001, reproduced in UN document A/CONF.192/15, and at <disarmament.un.org/cab/poa.html>.
5. Small Arms Survey, 2005, *Small Arms Survey 2005: Weapons at War*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 126.
6. Programme of Action, 2001, section 1, paragraph 17.
7. Programme of Action, 2001, section 1, paragraph 2.
8. Australia, *Summary Presented by the Chair of the Seminar on Preventing the Illicit Transfer and Unauthorised Access to and Use of Man Portable Air Defence Systems*, Conference on Disarmament document CD/1793, 31 August 2006, paragraph 9.
9. J. Bevan and S. Pézard, 2006, "Basic Characteristics of Ammunition: From Handguns to MANPADS", in S. Pézard and H. Anders (eds), *Targeting Ammunition: A Primer*, Geneva, Small Arms Survey, pp. 21–34.
10. Wassenaar Arrangement, Elements for Export Controls of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS), 12 December 2003, at <www.wassenaar.org/guidelines>, and OSCE Forum for Security Cooperation, Decision No. 3/04: OSCE Principles for Export Controls of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS), OSCE document FSC.DEC/3/04, 26 May 2004, at <www.osce.org/documents/fsc/2004/05/2965_en.pdf>.
11. Small Arms Survey, 2004, *Small Arms Survey 2004: Rights at Risk*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 78 and 88.
12. *Report on the Continuing Operation of the United Nations Register of Conventional Arms and Its Further Development* [referred to hereinafter as *Report on the UN Register of Conventional Arms*], in UN document A/58/274, 13 August 2003, Annex IV.
13. *Report on the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, 2003, op. cit., paragraph 112; United Nations General Assembly resolution 58/54 of 8 December 2003, UN document A/RES/58/54, 8 January 2004.
14. Just how far MANPADS has edged into the national security paradigm is illustrated by considering how the CD defines its role:
 Currently the CD primarily focuses its attention on the following issues: cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament; prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters; prevention of an arms race in outer space; effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons including radiological weapons; comprehensive programme of disarmament and transparency in armaments.
 United Nations Office at Geneva web site, Conference on Disarmament, *Disarmament: An Introduction to the Conference*, at <[www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/\(httpPages\)/BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9?OpenDocument](http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPages)/BF18ABFEFE5D344DC1256F3100311CE9?OpenDocument)>.
15. *Report on the UN Register of Conventional Arms*, 2003, op. cit., paragraph 108.
16. Small Arms Survey, 2004, op. cit., p. 90.
17. Mark Bowden, 1999, *Black Hawk Down: A Story of Modern War*, Berkeley CA, Atlantic Monthly Press.
18. Federation of American Scientists Arms Sales Monitoring Project, *MANPADS Proliferation*, at <fas.org/asmp/campaigns/MANPADS/MANPADS.html>, accessed October 2006.
19. Small Arms Survey, 2004, op. cit., pp. 77 and 88.
20. Small Arms Survey, 2004, op. cit., p. 90.

21. *Enhance Transport Security and Control of Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS): A G8 Action Plan*, G8 Evian Summit, 1–3 June 2003, at <www.g8.fr/evian/english/home.html>, sections 1.2 and 1.6.
22. Weapons of mass effect can be loosely defined as “weapons capable of inflicting grave destructive, psychological, and/or economic damage ... [and] include chemical, biological, nuclear, radiological, or explosive weapons” (Homeland Security Advisory Council Weapons of Mass Effect Task Force, *Preventing the Entry of Weapons of Mass Effect Into the United States*, Washington, DC, Department of Homeland Security, 10 January 2005, at <www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac_wme-report_20050110.pdf>, p. 3).
23. United Nations Security Council resolution 1617 (2005), UN document S/RES/1617(2005), 29 July 2005, preamble.
24. United Nations Secretary-General, *In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights For All*, UN document A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, paragraph 101.
25. Consider, for example, MANPADS’ prominence in *The Issue of Missiles in All Its Aspects: Report of the United Nations Secretary-General*, UN document A/61/168, 20 July 2006.
26. *The Issue of Missiles in All Its Aspects*, 2006, op. cit., paragraph 27.
27. Conference on Disarmament, Final Record of the One Thousand and Second Plenary Meeting, document CD/PV.1002, 7 February 2006.
28. *The Issue of Missiles in All Its Aspects*, 2006, op. cit., paragraph 99.
29. Conference on Disarmament, 7 February 2006, op. cit.
30. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, *Bangkok Declaration on Partnership for the Future*, 21 October 2003, at <www.apec.org/apec/leaders_declarations/2003.html>.
31. United Nations General Assembly resolution 59/90 of 3 December 2004, UN document A/RES/59/90, 17 December 2004, paragraph 5; United Nations General Assembly resolution 60/77 of 8 December 2005, UN document A/RES/60/77, 11 January 2006, preamble.
32. Analysis of media reports of MANPADS seizures and their probable sources.
33. Small Arms Survey, 2004, op. cit., pp. 77 and 83.
34. Combined reports of bilateral and multilateral verification and stock security initiatives to date, 2004–2006.
35. Analysis of media reports of MANPADS seizures and their probable sources.
36. *This Issue of Missiles in All Its Aspects*, 2006, op. cit., paragraph 100 a and b.
37. Preambles of United Nations General Assembly resolutions 59/90 and 60/77, op. cit.
38. Paragraph 1 of United Nations General Assembly resolutions 59/90 and 60/77, op. cit.
39. Wassenaar Arrangement, Initial Elements (as amended and updated in December 2003 and July 2004), at <www.wassenaar.org/guidelines>, section III.
40. Wassenaar Arrangement, Elements for Objective Analysis and Advice Concerning Potentially Destabilising Accumulations of Conventional Weapons, 3 December 1998, at <www.wassenaar.org/guidelines>, section 1, paragraphs b and e.
41. MANPADS are included under section 8, “Small Arms and Light Weapons” of the Initial Elements (Appendix 3), although they are listed distinctly from the subcategories of “small arms” and “light weapons”.
42. Wassenaar Arrangement, Best Practice Guidelines for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 12 December 2002, at <www.wassenaar.org/guidelines>, section 1, paragraph 2.
43. Small Arms Survey, 2005, op. cit., pp. 130–136.
44. Conference on Disarmament, Final Record of the One Thousand and Thirty-Seventh Plenary Meeting, document CD/PV.1037, 24 August 2006.

