

# Getting the Conference on Disarmament back to substantive work: food for thought

UNIDIR

## *Purpose*

In late 2008, stemming from UNIDIR's work related to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) over the last decade,<sup>1</sup> Canada asked UNIDIR to reflect upon and identify potential options for getting the Conference back to work. Following discussions with a range of experts, including a diverse group of CD delegates from countries of various regions of the world, UNIDIR has produced this discussion paper. While this paper does not claim to offer solutions to the CD's difficulties, it is intended to encourage dialogue among CD Members to this end.

## *Introduction*

1 The CD's last decision to negotiate on substance (on fissile material, under the "Shannon mandate"<sup>2</sup>) occurred late in 1998. That decision was short-lived: since then the CD has been deadlocked. The Conference has not been inactive in the interim, but its efforts to obtain the consensus required by its rules of procedure to relaunch a negotiation on a fissile material treaty, or to take up any other substantive issue, have proved unavailing.

2 What are the causes of this long, unproductive period? Do they lie in the global security environment alone, or are they inherent to the CD? Has the Conference lost its relevance or importance? Are there new approaches that Member States might pursue to improve the chances of getting down to substantive work?

## *International security environment*

3 At the macro level, it is axiomatic that a body entrusted with sensitive issues affecting international and national security does not operate in a vacuum, removed from the realities of geo-politics at large.<sup>3</sup> Global security issues are no longer defined as clearly as they were during the Cold War. A number of intractable regional issues complicate the security environment, several of them having a global reach.

4 Barren periods of the kind currently being experienced by the CD are not unprecedented in the security arena. The Vienna conventional forces reduction talks continued for 16 years from 1973 without result until an improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States led

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This work was tabled by the Government of Canada at the formal plenary of the Conference on Disarmament on 26 March 2009.

to the conclusion of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe in late 1990. Nevertheless, already in 2009 the CD has heard the view that “We are at a pivotal time for nuclear disarmament. In the last weeks and months, we have seen a remarkable trend towards a renewed focus on international cooperation in general, and disarmament in particular”.<sup>4</sup> Such remarks might allude to the outcome of the United States’ presidential election and to the growing clamour from various international luminaries and civil society groups for progress to be made on nuclear disarmament, heralding, it is hoped, an imminent end to the CD’s unproductive phase.

### ***Enduring relevance and importance of the CD***

5 Assessing the relevance of the CD and its key issues in the current security environment is, of course, a matter of perception. Some Permanent Missions in Geneva are finding it a challenge in the face of the Conference’s prolonged impasse to keep their capitals interested in its workings. There are those who argue that the longer the CD’s inactivity, the less its value. They fear that it could, in effect, be acting as an obstacle to the emergence of alternative efforts toward nuclear disarmament goals. For others, this unfruitful period is simply a reflection of the complexity of the strategic backdrop. Meanwhile, for many, the CD’s latent importance is a more salient consideration than its relevance at any given point in time. The Conference’s past products, albeit of increasingly distant memory, underline the CD’s significance as well as its potential.

6 In this sense, the question of whether the CD retains its relevance for Members as a negotiating body or merely as a debating chamber is more a matter of timing than of evolution. At the time of writing (March 2009), the Conference is a negotiating chamber-in-waiting rather than a body that has regressed into a “talk shop”. The steady stream of high-level officials that address the CD has not declined in recent years and, in 2008, 20 dignitaries, including the UN Secretary-General, made statements to the Conference. Whether or not this is evidence of the abiding relevance of the CD, it is difficult to deny that the Conference remains important to many Members even if the level of attendance of heads of delegation has declined in recent years.

7 Some Members may have doubts about the topicality of the CD’s agenda, but its ongoing relevance is sustained by the understanding that “if there is a consensus in the Conference to deal with any issues, they could be dealt with within this agenda” (see also rule 31 of the Rules of Procedure). Moreover, the preamble to the agenda foreshadows the possibility of deciding at any time to “resume the review” of the CD’s agenda, an activity that once occupied Members for many years but less so since 2002 (although the annual report continues to include a chapter heading on this topic). (See further below for discussion of “core issues”.)

8 In any event, the CD’s coherence has been consciously increased since 2006 through developments such as presidential continuity under which the six Presidents for the annual session have pooled their efforts to coordinate the activities of the Conference and to produce joint presidential proposals as well as term reports. Improved cooperation among Presidents has facilitated the development of informal work programmes (i.e., “schedules of activities”, or “organizational frameworks”) that span entire sessions of the CD rather than single months, resulting in valuable continuity that offsets concerns that operating the presidency “by committee” may result only in lowest common denominator leadership.

### ***Relevance in terms of the CD's status as the "single negotiating body"***

9 The General Assembly in 1978, during the First Special Session devoted to Disarmament (SSOD1), envisaged that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the forerunner to the Conference on Disarmament, would fill a "continuing requirement for a single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of limited size taking decisions on the basis of consensus".<sup>5</sup> The Assembly attached "great importance" to the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States in such a body.

10 In the 30 years that have elapsed since SSOD1, several disarmament treaties have emerged from processes other than the CD. The so-called Ottawa and Oslo agreements, on anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions respectively, resulted from negotiations that were purposely conducted outside another consensus-observing process, the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW).<sup>6</sup> Moving current CD issues to bodies that might have less stringent decision-making rules (i.e., in which voting may occur) has from time to time been mooted by some Members, notably after the Ottawa and Oslo processes. But such proposals have not gained ground. One possible reason is that it evokes memories of the removal of the Chairman's text of the draft CTBT from the CD to the UN General Assembly (see paragraph 31).

11 Would it be possible to remove any of the current crop of issues from the CD for negotiation elsewhere? The likelihood of launching a successful negotiation outside the CD on issues such as nuclear disarmament, fissile material, prevention of an arms race in outer space and security assurances is, in reality, limited because the nuclear-weapon states would almost certainly not participate. And, as was implicit in the 1978 decision of the General Assembly just mentioned, the negotiation of a treaty pertaining to nuclear weapons that did not involve at least some of the nuclear-weapon states would probably be futile.

### ***Relevance in terms of the membership of the CD***

12 Perhaps the most noteworthy aspect of the composition of the Conference is that it includes among its Members all those States that possess, or are thought either to possess or to have ambitions to possess, nuclear arsenals. Although expansion of the membership of the Conference is an issue that is noted annually in the CD's report to the UN General Assembly, arguments that the composition of this forum is either unbalanced, unwieldy or in some other respect deleterious are seldom voiced. On the other hand, if a topic such as an arms trade treaty were to be promoted in the CD, it could be claimed that this forum does not include among its Members the most affected states.

### ***Relevance of the "core issues"***

13 For almost a decade, the CD has focused on four core issues.<sup>7</sup> While there are differing views as to the "ripeness" of the four issues for negotiation (or even for "substantive discussion"<sup>8</sup>), it is difficult to conclude, given that they feature in all of the draft proposals for a programme of work since 2000, that these issues have lost their relevance, even if the weight attached to them varies from delegation to delegation.

14 Would it improve the prospects of finding consensus on dealing with the core issues if, as a confidence-building measure, the CD first negotiated an agreement on a less complex question? Have more topical issues emerged since the deadlock on the four core issues first emerged? It might be argued that issues pertaining to missiles (since the demise of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty), to military expenditure, to transparency in armaments (agenda item 7), and possibly to conventional

weapons such as anti-vehicle mines or man-portable air defence systems (MANPADS), could be pursued. But, apart from a US initiative to deal with persistent landmines,<sup>9</sup> no issue in recent years has been articulated as a CD proposal.

### *Current treatment of the four core issues*

15 The term “core issues” has no procedural significance in itself, but has simply become a convenient way to refer to the four issues that have featured in successive proposals for a programme of work since the “Amorim proposal” of 24 August 2000.<sup>10</sup> Do Members believe that there is scope to amend the latest such proposal, CD/1840, in such a way as to increase the prospects of finding consensus on this multiple and comprehensive approach? Or does an alternative approach need to be explored?

16 The most pressing amendment involves the treatment of fissile material. It centres on the prospects for including an assurance that a mechanism for verifying compliance with the terms of a fissile material treaty will be explicitly recognized as part of the negotiations, an aspect that was crucial in the development of the Shannon mandate. It is believed that, ultimately, securing this ingredient is more fundamental than the issue of seeking a prior understanding on the scope of the treaty—that is, whether it would be confined to future production of fissile material or would also encompass existing stocks. The readiness of some Members to enter negotiations under a mandate that is silent on both the issues of verification and scope is severely limited, notwithstanding the fact that other Members regard it as unthinkable that they could somehow be constrained from raising these matters during the negotiation.

17 It cannot be taken for granted that a fissile material mandate that includes the negotiation of a verification mechanism will be sufficient on its own to break the deadlock. Some Members can be expected to seek assurances that other core issues will be accorded appropriate treatment—that is, that the pursuit of one topic will be linked to the pursuit of one or more other issues.

### *Linkages*

18 Linkages raise a number of questions, not all of which are seen to have clear answers. For example, is the making of linkages, in essence, a negotiating device for preventing or delaying progress on one or more issues or, in other words, for prolonging or perpetuating deadlock? Are linkages simply a means of ensuring that, if and when the impasse is overcome, the schedule of activities of the Conference will allow scope for pursuing issues that are subject to a mandate that falls short of a negotiating mandate? Is the linkage in fact motivated by the need to secure “negotiating coin” to ensure that an issue or issues of vital interest to one or more delegations will not fall by the wayside when substantive work actually begins?<sup>11</sup>

19 Depending on the degree of flexibility that might accompany the making of linkages, there are two practical matters that would come into play. First, it is hard to imagine that two or more of the core issues could be dealt with simultaneously. The complexity of the subject matter of each of the core issues is such that, irrespective of whether their treatment began as a “negotiation” or a “substantive discussion”, even the largest delegations could be hard pressed to service more than one of them at the same time.

20 Secondly, it should be possible, nonetheless, to develop an understanding that issues other than the one under negotiation would be allocated sufficient time in an operational framework or schedule of activities that could have built into it specific opportunities for taking stock, a structured occasion

for minority interests to be voiced and, if a consensus existed, addressed. While it would be implicit that such a review might allocate more or less time for the treatment of these other issues, it would also imply that those Members that sought to take such issues forward would have to be active in promoting and sustaining debate on them.

### *“Programme of work”*

21 If it does not prove possible for Members to coalesce around CD/1840 or any amendment to it, the question arises whether a less complicated vehicle can be developed in which to carry the Conference forward. A current frustration for many Members is that, in the absence of consensus on what is clearly a complex programme of work, the Conference lapses into virtual inertia. Serious progress on any of the issues covered by the proposal depends on the flexibility of a small minority who may be quite content with a stalled process.

22 In these circumstances, is it realistic to expect those who are withholding consensus to put forward only amendments that will improve the prospects of securing consensus? More fundamentally, is a “programme of work”, in the form that it has taken in recent years, serving a useful purpose? What is the value of a programme of work of the kind that has pre-occupied the CD since the tabling of the Amorim proposal (CD/1624) in 2000 and that, with refinements, has evolved into CD/1840? Would reversion to single-issue mandates such as the Shannon example facilitate the CD’s efforts to agree a work programme?

23 The assumption that the CD’s programme of work must contain mandates of the kind found in proposals tabled since the Shannon mandate is questionable. Rule 28 requires the CD to establish its programme of work “which will include a schedule of its activities” on the “basis of its agenda”.<sup>12</sup> Nothing about mandates is mentioned: the activities must, however, deal with matters covered by the agenda. That rule took its current form in 1990 via CD/1036, which was adopted by the CD on 21 August of that year. One of the activities identified in the schedule of activities is “establishment of subsidiary bodies”. This comes from paragraph 5 of CD/1036 in which it is stipulated that the “establishment of subsidiary bodies and their mandates is a deliberate act on which a decision has to be expressly taken by the Conference”. Mandates, thus, are a creature not of the programme of work but of subsidiary bodies.

24 It can be concluded from this that, in the 1990s, the CD saw the programme of work as consisting mainly of a schedule of activities quite separate from the question of mandates of subsidiary bodies. Indeed, in 1990, the agenda of the Conference (CD/963) encompassed a programme of work that constituted a schedule of activities and an outline of items on which it proposed to focus, including improved and effective functioning. The approach adopted in CD/963, of equating the notion of a programme of work with a straightforward planning mechanism setting out the activities for the year based on fulfilling the CD’s agenda, had the advantages of reducing the number of decisions to one and simply allowing work to flow as circumstances allowed. The Conference needs to ask itself whether it has consciously abandoned its former approach and, if so, why.

25 “Programme of work” is not a term of art. The rules of procedure prescribe no format except that the work programme must contain a schedule of activities, taking into account recommendations of the General Assembly, proposals presented by Member States of the CD, and decisions of the Conference. Examples of such decisions taken in the past are CD/1547 (fissile material) and CD/1380 on the negotiation of a nuclear test ban (under mandate CD/1238).

26 To repeat, Members are not obliged to develop a programme of work that embodies mandates. A programme of work need be nothing more than a list of projected activities accompanied by a timetable according to which those activities will be addressed. Mandates setting out the objectives of the negotiation (or substantive discussion) and the mechanisms by which those objectives would be pursued might be developed separately, as in the case of the Shannon mandate.

27 In this sense, the substantive work of the 2006, 2007 and 2008 sessions emerged from a work programme that comprised a set of activities. Deepening those activities is a matter that stands to be determined more by the will of Members than by any procedural device. Indeed, it might be the will of Members, explicit or tacit, that work would proceed, say in formal and informal plenaries, without any mandate at all, although should the Conference exercise its discretion under rule 23 to establish a subsidiary body, it is required to define a mandate for that organ.

28 Where the Conference believes that there may be a basis to negotiate a draft treaty warranting the formation of a subsidiary body, the actual mandate or mandates, rather than the programme of work, would define the objectives of the CD in respect to those issues covered by that mandate or mandates. The work programme would simply set out the details and timing of the conduct of business for pursuing those objectives. Such an approach would not necessarily avoid disagreements over proposed mandates nor prevent linkages being made, but it might help with the management of divergence on those fronts. It would offer the opportunity through individual mandates to remove explicit, written linkages.

### *Decision-making*

29 It is a fundamental reality in the Conference—recognized implicitly in the inclusion of the consensus rule<sup>13</sup> in the CD's Rules of Procedure—that every Member should be entitled to protect vital national security interests. How a Member should properly exercise its right to block consensus nonetheless warrants examination, with a view to developing a new, less restrictive, community of practice or “culture”.

30 The Blix Commission on Weapons of Mass Destruction recommended that the CD should adopt its programme of work by a qualified majority of two thirds of the Members present and voting and that it should also take its other administrative and procedural decisions in the same manner.<sup>14</sup> There is a view in the Conference that national security interests would not be placed in jeopardy merely through the adoption of a programme of work. As Jozef Goldblat has argued, “There is no risk in adopting veto-free procedures, because no conference or organization can impose treaty obligations on sovereign states through voting”.<sup>15</sup> A Member of the CD that, after participating in the negotiation of a treaty in that body, chooses to stand aside from the outcome is perfectly free to do so.

31 There is, however, another perspective held within the Conference. Some Members are loath to commence a process—a “slippery slope”—over which their control may be subjected to external pressures including from NGOs but also from actions by other Members, as was the case when the Chairman's text of a draft CTBT was lifted out of the CD and tabled in the UN General Assembly shortly after it had failed to attract consensus in the Conference. This has made some Members very nervous about being led down a particular path unless they are sure they have a really good view of—and grip on—the map.

32 Given these dynamics, and the fact that consensus would be needed to amend the consensus (or any other) rule, any relaxation of rule 18 seems unlikely. In addition, the risk that a process in the CD might be removed to an alternative forum cannot be eliminated. On the other hand, it may be possible in practice to offer comfort to those Members that fear a slippery slope by subjecting work in progress to points of review by way of regular opportunities for stocktaking and by the familiar reassurance that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed”.

33 Consensus does not require unanimity. A decision may be taken by consensus despite reservations on the part of a Member or Members so long as such a reservation is not tantamount to an objection. Rule 25, which provides, in effect, that approval of reports does not require that every view contained in a report has to be agreed by every Member, is also relevant.

34 It is noted that when reference is made in the CD to the “prerogative” of the President, this can be assumed to apply to the general, unwritten responsibility of a chairperson to exercise leadership. In the CD, there is a tradition of cautious, consultative leadership in which decisions are filtered through regional groups (see paragraph 40 below). The advent of the P6 presidential collegium has not yet changed this practice, and Presidents continue to refrain from testing consensus directly from the podium except on anodyne matters (e.g., admission of “interested States not Members of the Conference” under rule 32).

### *Civil society/NGOs*

35 Engagement with civil society has long been a divisive issue in the Conference. The rules of procedure contemplate only limited interaction with organizations and bodies of any kind,<sup>16</sup> and warrant updating to bring them more into line with other disarmament forums. In the case of NGOs, a re-examination took place in 2004 but in practical terms gave NGOs little more than was already available to them as members of the public, offering the prospect of addressing one informal plenary meeting per annum once the Conference had adopted a programme of work.<sup>17</sup> Constructing an approach more in line with other multilateral disarmament practice would enable the CD to take into account civil society perspectives and the value that engagement with NGOs tends to bring, which UNIDIR researchers have recently argued elsewhere is potentially considerable.<sup>18</sup>

36 This issue is perhaps best illustrated by the annual request of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) to address the CD on International Women’s Day by way of reporting on its annual seminar dedicated to the work of the CD (a point that is often overlooked). Unable to agree that WILPF should deliver its own address, the Conference instead witnesses the CD President read it out during a plenary meeting. That the WILPF paper should be read by the chair of the body to which this major disarmament NGO is wishing to report is seen by many as patronizing and demeaning to women and to the Conference itself.

37 Rather than agreeing to treat the Women’s Day address as a specific case standing on its own merit (i.e., as an outcome of a seminar specifically focused on the CD), the issue has become symbolic of the need for a broad change in policy toward greater civil society participation. It is not inevitable that the two decisions must be linked; yet the Conference has found itself unable to find a way forward either on this specific case or on the broader one of engagement with civil society.

38 On the issue of interaction with civil society in general, at least two questions warrant attention:

- (i) is the 2004 decision of the CD still tenable given that, five years later, no programme of work has emerged? It is arguable that the situation of enduring deadlock in the CD indicates

the need for increased contact with and outreach to the broader international community rather than continuing insulation from it; and

- (ii) what is the rationale for the CD being more exclusive than Meetings of States Parties to the NPT, BTWC and CCW? To overcome the concern of some Members that only “relevant” NGOs should be permitted to have access to the CD, a *modus vivendi* between the CD and civil society could be established quite easily, for example, through the NGO Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.<sup>19</sup>

39 Settling these matters should not be allowed to dominate the Conference’s activities, and might be carried forward in concert by the P6 or by a “friend” enlisted by them through consultations on elements such as:

- (i) determining the formality of the level of engagement with civil society, that is, via a formal session of the CD “on the record”, or in informal plenaries;
- (ii) determining the regularity of opportunities for engagement, for example, once or twice an annual session or once a term (i.e., three times an annual session);
- (iii) deciding whether the Women’s Day address is to be treated separately from the practice of broader engagement with NGOs; and
- (iv) settling upon a formula for receiving statements (whether in formal or informal plenaries) from NGOs deemed to be “relevant” or from the Geneva NGO Committee on Disarmament as a whole.

### ***Regional groups***

40 A method of work of the CD that is criticized by Members from time to time is the manner in which regional groups are being used.<sup>20</sup> Intended essentially to facilitate consultation between the President and Members on organizational matters, regional groups have assumed a role that is seen by many Members as having the effect of weakening if not circumscribing presidential authority. This is because it has become a matter of practice for Presidents to filter any potentially contentious issue through the regional groups while the dynamics within and among the groups have compounded, rather than facilitated, the task of finding consensus. Perhaps as a result, the formation of cross-regional groupings or informal groupings in the margins of the CD to develop more cooperative ways of promoting and brokering compromises among the key players is becoming more frequent.

### ***Options for resuming substantive work***

41 Whether or not changes in the international security environment soon emerge or CD/1840 can ultimately be successfully amended and adopted, the Conference might consider the following key options.

- (a) Laying the foundations for future work by building on the results of the informal debates on the agenda items. This would be done through a discussion that had as its purposes:
  - (i) drawing conclusions about the comparative “ripeness” of core issues for more intensive treatment. The reports of the item coordinators and of the P6 offer sources for this activity;
  - (ii) identifying elements of each of the core issues that would be central to any negotiation or “substantive discussion” that would follow; and
  - (iii) identifying sources and potential sources for helping to deepen understanding of those central elements. The compilations produced by the Secretariat in 2006 are an obvious

point of reference. Another means might be to develop open-ended groups of experts from whom informal advice on the parameters of technical issues would be sought.

Pursuing option (a) has the virtue of engaging directly on matters of substance. The options below are of a more procedural nature (although matters of procedure in the CD are almost impossible to divorce from considerations of substance).

- (b) Determining whether a basis for future work can be laid through means other than via a formal programme of work. Sustaining a topic or topics through focused discussions in plenary meetings (formal or informal) is a course of action open at any time to Members that are committed to pursuing such topics in the absence of consensus on a formal way forward (see rule 19). That is, as with any international negotiation, it is always open to those delegations most interested in the subject matter to act in concert by promoting texts, coordinating interventions on them, and generally driving the issue forward; or
- (c) Departing from the current practice of developing a programme of work that seeks to embody actual mandates. As previously mentioned, a programme of work may simply be a list of projected activities set within a timeframe. In the absence of the emergence of a new momentum from plenary meetings (see (b) above), mandates setting out the objectives of a negotiation or substantive discussion and the mechanisms by which those objectives would be pursued might be developed separately, drawing on an approach that has served the Conference well in the past.

## Notes

1. See also John Borrie and Vanessa Martin Randin (eds), 2005, *Alternative Approaches in Multilateral Decision Making: Disarmament as Humanitarian Action*, UNIDIR; John Borrie and Vanessa Martin Randin (eds), 2006, *Thinking Outside the Box in Multilateral Disarmament and Arms Control Negotiations*, UNIDIR; and John Borrie and Ashley Thornton, 2008, *The Value of Diversity in Multilateral Disarmament Work*, UNIDIR.
2. Named after Canadian Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon, Special Coordinator on fissile material 1994–1995; see Conference on Disarmament, *Report of Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon of Canada on consultations on the most appropriate arrangement to negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices*, document CD/1299, 24 March 1995. See also Conference on Disarmament, *Decision on the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee under item 1 of the agenda entitled “Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament”*, document CD/1547, 11 August 1998.
3. See also Conference on Disarmament, *Final record of the eight hundred and sixty-first plenary meeting*, document CD/PV.861, 21 September 2000, statement by Abdelkader Bensmail, p. 17:  
Multilateral disarmament forums have always evolved over the years in response to changed political realities. The Conference on Disarmament is no exception in this respect, and the difficulties it now faces are not due to what is perceived by some as the rigidity of its rules of procedure, of its working methods and the group system. They are rather a reflection of the complexity and the dynamics of contemporary international relations, and therefore all the efforts should focus on the creation of a political climate conducive to the full use of the Conference as a negotiating forum, in particular the restoration of the minimum harmony among the major players.
4. Statement to the CD plenary on 17 February 2009 by Espen Barth Eide, Deputy Minister of Defence, Norway.
5. General Assembly, *Resolutions and decisions adopted by the General Assembly during its 10th special session*, 23 May–30 June 1978, UN document A/S-10/4, 1978, para. 120.
6. Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.
7. These are: fissile material, nuclear disarmament, prevention of an arms race in outer space, and negative security assurances.
8. The most recent proposal for a programme of work, CD/1840, differentiates, in terms of treatment of various core issues, between “negotiation” and “substantive discussion”. CD/1840 contains, in the manner of some of its predecessors, a hierarchy of treatment of issues in which a fissile material treaty would be the subject of “negotiations” while the other issues would be the subject of “substantive discussions on”, as for nuclear disarmament, or “substantive discussions dealing with” in the cases of the prevention of an arms race in outer space and of negative security assurances.
9. See Conference on Disarmament, *Final record of the nine hundred and sixty-second plenary meeting*, document CD/PV.962, 29 July 2004, statement by Jackie Sanders, pp. 5–7.

10. Conference on Disarmament, *Proposal on the Programme of Work for the 2000 session of the Conference on Disarmament*, document CD/1624, 24 August 2000.
11. For background, see Rebecca Johnson, "Changing Perceptions and Practice in Multilateral Arms Control Negotiations", in John Borrie and Vanessa Martin Randin (eds), 2006, *Thinking Outside the Box in Multilateral Disarmament and Arms Control Negotiations*, UNIDIR, pp. 74–76.
12. Conference on Disarmament, *Rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament*, document CD/8/Rev.9, 19 December 2003, p. 4:
  27. At the beginning of each annual session, the Conference shall adopt its agenda for the year. In doing so, the Conference shall take into account the recommendations made to it by the General Assembly, the proposals presented by member States of the Conference and the decisions of the Conference.
  28. On the basis of its agenda, the Conference, at the beginning of its annual session, shall establish its programme of work, which will include a schedule of its activities for that session, taking also into account the recommendations, proposals and decisions referred to in rule 27.
  29. The provisional agenda and the programme of work shall be drawn up by the President of the Conference with the assistance of the Secretary-General and presented to the Conference for consideration and adoption.See also Conference on Disarmament, Decision on the improved and effective functioning of the Conference on Disarmament, document CD/1036, 21 August 1990, para. 6 and 7.
13. Conference on Disarmament, *Rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament*, document CD/8/Rev.9, 19 December 2003, rule 18.
14. See the Final Report of the Blix Commission, contained in General Assembly, Letter dated 2006/06/29 from the Permanent Representative of Sweden to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, UN document A/60/934, 10 July 2006, paragraph 58.
15. Jozef Goldblat, "The Conference on Disarmament at the Crossroads: To Revitalize or Dissolve?", *Nonproliferation Review*, vol. 7, no. 2, 2000, pp. 106–107.
16. See Conference on Disarmament, *Rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament*, document CD/8/Rev.9, 19 December 2003, rules 41 and 42.
17. See Conference on Disarmament, *Final record of the nine hundred and forty-sixth plenary*, document CD/PV.946, 12 February 2004.
18. See John Borrie and Ashley Thornton, 2008, *The Value of Diversity in Multilateral Disarmament Work*, UNIDIR.
19. Comprising WILPF, International Peace Bureau, QUNO, GIPRI, IPPNW, World Veterans Federation, Afro-Asian Peace and Solidarity Organization, WMD Project, International Fellowship of Reconciliation, Risho Kosei-kai, and Soka Gakkai.
20. There are three regional groupings comprising Members of the Non-aligned Movement (known in the CD as the G21), Eastern European States, and Western European and Other States, and, as a separate entity, China.