

NGOs and disarmament: views from the coal face

David C. Atwood

On 25 July 2001, I sat in the public gallery in the Palais des Nations in Geneva as the delegation from the United States announced the American decision to support neither the 'composite' text nor the 'rolling text' of the draft Protocol to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC), in effect killing the Protocol after more than six and a half years of negotiations. In the gallery with me were a number of non-governmental organization (NGO) representatives, perhaps more than had been present at any other time in the years of the negotiations. Their involvement on that day, as had been the case in large part throughout the negotiations, was as spectators to this sad spectacle.

This day contrasted emotionally for me with the excitement I felt in December 1997 in Ottawa as more than 100 countries gathered to put their signatures to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and their Destruction (the Mine Ban Convention). Present on that occasion were hundreds of well-wishing and supportive NGO representatives, many of whom had been actively involved in the achievement of the convention through the 'Ottawa Process', celebrating this historic decision by governments to ban a whole weapons system and dedicating themselves to working alongside governments for the successful implementation of the convention.

These two examples demonstrate for me not so much the declining state of multilateral disarmament affairs over the last several years, although I think that something is seriously broken in that domain—with important implications for governments and NGOs alike in the coming period. Rather, I begin with these contrasting pictures to show in caricatured form two of the many realities of NGO engagement in disarmament affairs.

Because of these many realities, there are dangers in presuming to tackle a subject as broadly defined as 'NGOs and disarmament'. The generalizations and simplifications required risk calling the whole enterprise into question from the start. Also, as an NGO representative at one of the 'coal faces' of disarmament work—Geneva—my own picture of NGO involvement is limited and no doubt skewed by what I see and experience in this setting. Further, as someone toiling every day in the sparse vineyard of disarmament action, there is little time available to do the broader analysis within the field of disarmament, let alone the cross-field perspective, which would be useful—a dilemma shared by most NGO activists and a factor which itself limits the potential of our work.

These caveats notwithstanding, I offer in this piece a few observations which I hope might provide something of a framework for thinking about the involvement of NGOs in disarmament

David C. Atwood is Associate Representative for Disarmament and Peace at the Quaker United Nations Office, Geneva. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of the Quaker United Nations Office.

affairs and some stimulus for further research. First, while NGO involvement in disarmament affairs is long-standing, its current manifestations are part of a broader reality of transnational civil society engagement on issues of global concern. Second, disarmament has many dimensions and NGO engagement with these dimensions is not uniform and is sometimes contradictory. Third, NGOs play many important roles in advancing disarmament affairs, which go well beyond their very limited direct access to disarmament negotiations. Fourth, the experience of NGO engagement in the Ottawa Process is unique, but with important lessons for other disarmament issue areas and beyond. Finally, the present state of multilateral disarmament diplomacy is in a mess, and requires new kinds of thinking by NGOs and governments alike.

Non-governmental disarmament actors and international relations

Since twenty years or so ago, when NGOs were barely recognized as significant international actors by international relations scholars, there has been a growing understanding that non-governmental forces are increasingly important features of our global system, for better or for worse. The events of 11 September 2001 have put to rest any lingering doubts about the negative price that so-called 'non-state actors' are capable of exacting. Our concern here is not with these actors, however, although their importance is considerable in relation to the realities of weapons proliferation and weapons use in our world. Instead, the focus is on individuals, groups, bodies and organizations that seek to play a role in shaping arms control and disarmament processes nationally, regionally and internationally.

In an important study in the developing literature on the general subject area of transnational civil society, Florini and Simmons noted that 'Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), informal associations and loose coalitions are forming a vast number of connections across national borders and inserting themselves into a wide range of decision-making processes on issues from international security to human rights to the environment. ... Transnational civil society is a piece—an increasingly important piece—of the larger problem of global governance.'¹

NGOs concerned with disarmament and security-related issues make up an important part of this reality of transnational civil society, taking advantage of the possibilities for communication and organization which are now possible, combining forces in a variety of ways to transform global political agendas, becoming increasingly important actors alongside governments and international institutions in tackling transnational problems, and, along with their activity and influence, raising important issues of democratic accountability.

There is a certain irony in the history of the engagement of NGOs in disarmament affairs. Peace societies were among the earliest of what we now call international NGOs, dating back to the early part of the nineteenth century. Among the concerns of peace organizations have always been issues

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of the relation of armaments and militarism to the prospects for international peace.² Despite this long history of engagement, it is perhaps not too much of a generalization to argue that disarmament and security policy systems remain among the least penetrated by NGOs. However 'globalized' the world has become, governments continue to jealously guard their prerogatives when it comes to decision-making about weapons and weapons reduction. As Cathleen Fisher has noted in her important study

on NGOs in the nuclear disarmament debate, 'When core national security interests are involved, policymakers generally expect to retain tight control over decisions and ... publics have been largely content to let them do so.'³

Nevertheless, while there are factors that constrain the engagement of NGOs in disarmament affairs and shape their impact—perhaps more than is the case in other global issue areas such as the environment or human rights—this reality should not blind us to the variety of NGOs involved and the range of styles of activity in which they engage. As the global security debate moves from being simply defined in traditional national security/arms control terms to concerns about ‘human security’, the types of NGOs and the nature of their involvement also broadens and deepens.

Disarmament NGOs: a distinctive community?

There is a tendency by governments, international organizations and, at times, by NGOs themselves to speak of NGOs in a collective sense in relation to one global issue area or another, as in ‘environmental NGOs’, ‘human rights NGOs’ or ‘development NGOs’. While understandable in terms of trying to picture distinctive work and organize official relationships, this tendency disguises more than it reveals in terms of the enormous variety of types and purposes of NGOs engaged in an issue and tends to perpetuate the view of civil society as an adversary rather than a partner in tackling issues of global concern.

In the field of disarmament affairs, there are a number of perspectives from which speaking of ‘disarmament NGOs’ in this collective sense seems particularly inaccurate and unhelpful. The first reflects the variety of concerns that are included under the ‘disarmament’ umbrella. The international arms control and disarmament ‘agenda’ tends to be broken down into clumps of weapons systems or issue concerns: nuclear weapons proliferation, the militarization of outer space, ‘inhumane’ weapons, the arms trade, biological and chemical weapons, and so on. NGOs have tended to follow suit. While there are NGOs which work across a number of global issue areas or across a range of arms control and disarmament issues, there tends to be a high degree of specialization among NGOs around one weapon system or cluster of issues related to a weapons system like nuclear weapons. What this means is that NGOs have developed strategies and approaches to those particular areas, but there is little cross-fertilization with NGOs working on other areas. To illustrate, while there may be some NGOs that do some work both on nuclear weapons and on small arms (for example, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War), for the most part there is little overlap between these different ‘communities’. While this specialization has probably meant growing effectiveness by NGOs within a specific weapons area, there are costs to this in terms of the evolution of a more holistic and broadly based ‘security’ agenda and the development of a mutually supportive NGO constituency.

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Second, another dimension to this ‘clumping’ of NGOs around particular weapon or security issue areas is that NGOs are spread unevenly across these areas in terms of numbers, types and north-south distribution. For example, NGOs have been engaged on nuclear weapons concerns in great numbers and variety, from broad popular movements to specialist research communities to lobbying groups, for a large part of the last fifty years or so. A Review Conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) will draw literally hundreds of NGOs of these varieties. For easily explainable reasons, this broad nuclear disarmament ‘community’, however, has been largely, although certainly not exclusively, northern in character. On the other hand, chemical and biological weapons, also classified as weapons of mass destruction, have not attracted broad popular constituencies. Thus, it has been ‘expert’ groups and those promoting inter-governmental dialogue which have been most engaged in these weapons areas. The absence of a broad, popular constituency on biological weapons meant that six and a half years of negotiations by States Parties to the BWC took place

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largely unknown to the general public, resulting in limited pressure at the national level to shape government positions. Despite the huge percentage of government budgets which they consume and despite their growing destructive capacity, so-called conventional weapons receive extremely little multilateral governmental attention and there is also only a small NGO transnational conventional weapons constituency, centred mainly in arms exporting countries around national arms sales policies. On the other hand, anti-personnel landmines (APMs) and small arms, subsets of conventional

weapons, have drawn the concerted attention of NGOs in many parts of the world and from across a range of constituencies beyond traditional arms control and disarmament groups. There are many causal factors behind these illustrations that deserve to be 'unpacked' or analysed. The point here, however, is to demonstrate the uneven nature of NGO engagement in disarmament affairs.

Another obvious factor in this world of disarmament NGOs is that they, like NGOs involved in the whole range of global issue concerns, will often differ among themselves not only on strategy in relation to a particular weapons policy direction but also even on the desirability of a particular direction. Rebecca Johnson has recently catalogued, for example, what she describes as the 'bitter chasm' that opened between nuclear weapons 'arms controllers' and 'abolitionists' in the 1990s in terms of nuclear disarmament strategy.⁴ Cathleen Fisher describes the influential role of 'counter-reformers' among NGOs in the nuclear debate in the United States in the 1990s.⁵ Recently, at the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, NGOs presented two diametrically opposed faces to government delegates. The first was made up of NGOs from development, human rights, humanitarian and disarmament NGOs from many parts of the world, who wished to see the conference not only legitimize the fundamental importance of concerted international action on small arms but also commit states to specific courses of action. A second, the so-called 'firearms community', saw the conference as a major threat to the perceived 'rights' of gun owners and shooting sportsmen and worked equally vigorously to minimize the outcomes of the conference. Rarely are NGOs so united that they are willing or able to speak with one voice, although coalitions and joint campaigns do get close to this. The International Campaign to Ban Landmines stands out among NGO initiatives in recent years in presenting to the international diplomatic community a near solid front.

While the above descriptions could have been written by anyone remotely involved with NGOs concerned with disarmament issues, I am struck by the relative absence of literature which attempts to go beyond case studies of NGO engagement in particular disarmament areas, most of which seem to concentrate on the nuclear disarmament field. There is, therefore, a job to be done to describe more fully this reality, to investigate factors behind it, and to analyse how these factors influence the nature of the involvement of NGOs in shaping disarmament outcomes.

'Access' isn't everything

As noted earlier, there are few other global issue areas where NGOs have a smaller official role than they do in disarmament affairs. To give an example, despite their major engagement with nuclear weapons concerns, NGOs have virtually no official role in the work of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, the sole global multilateral disarmament negotiating forum. They have struggled hard for some kind of officially recognized role in other disarmament fora, such as the Review Conferences of the NPT and the BWC, where what they have achieved remains severely

circumscribed. The kind of limited role there should be for NGOs proved to be a major debate among governments in the preparatory process for the recent UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms. The only real breach in the general practice of exclusion has been in the APMs process, where, as will be noted later, a genuine partnership of governments, international organizations and NGOs has operated to produce not only the Mine Ban Convention but also determined steps to implement it.

The official relationship between multilateral disarmament institutions and NGOs is badly out of tune with current realities in international relations and with current needs. New approaches are necessary. However, an exclusive focus on the question of the relative lack of formal NGO 'access' to multilateral disarmament badly distorts the reality of the many important roles that NGOs can and do play in disarmament affairs. Nor does the fact that nation-states still jealously guard the security agenda mean that disarmament NGOs have no impact. It is impossible in this space to go into detail about the types of NGO engagement in different disarmament spheres of action or to assess their relative importance. Other articles published in this *Disarmament Forum* illustrate various dimensions of this engagement. But a brief overview can give an indication of the many ways in which NGOs are engaged at the national, regional and international levels, despite formal disarmament mechanisms being largely closed to them.⁶ Among the critical roles that NGOs can play are the following:

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- generating public awareness;
- constituency building and campaigning at the national and transnational levels;
- 'reframing' issues;
- policy agenda-building and policy development;
- developing and changing norms;
- lobbying/advocacy;
- exchanging and targeting of information;
- researching and expert policy advising;
- monitoring and evaluating actor behaviour;
- developing 'Track II' initiatives; and
- implementing policy.

Fisher's study on NGOs and the nuclear weapons debate in the 1990s illustrates a number of these roles. She notes that, although the general goals of nuclear disarmament remain a long way off, NGO action was essential to what movement there was in the 1990s.

'First, NGOs succeeded in making Cold War nuclear policies, postures, and doctrines a topic of sustained, serious debate for several years within the US strategic community and in important international fora. The depth and eventual scope of this debate among experts would have been inconceivable absent NGO activism. ... NGOs made significant progress toward reframing the debate about nuclear risks—an essential step toward achieving more ambitious objectives. ... NGO analysis helped to focus attention on new nuclear

dangers ... [M]any proposals explicitly recognized that progress toward nuclear abolition could only be achieved if certain conditions were met. ... Second, NGOs helped to secure important changes in state policy and behaviour. ... Persistent public pressure from the nongovernmental community as well as quieter track-two diplomatic efforts probably helped facilitate these desired outcomes. ... Third, the nongovernmental community helped to strengthen the international norm against proliferation Finally, the nuclear debates of the 1990s further weakened the claim of governmental experts and officials to a monopoly of expertise and wisdom on the nuclear issue.⁷

In her comparative case study of the roles played by Pugwash Conferences and the Parliamentarians for Global Action in the nuclear debate in the 1990s, Jackie Smith further illustrates factors that can be seen to be important to the impact of particular NGOs on policy change. Smith notes that:

‘Although they appear to lack internal democracy and fail to truly represent the views of a broad cross-section of society, both Pugwash and Parliamentarians for Global Action perform tasks that are essential to the operation of more democratic global institutions. They do so by: (1) providing information to a broader public than might otherwise have access to information related to nuclear security policies; (2) cultivating transnational identities which help individuals perceive common stakes in political decisions occurring beyond the national level; (3) monitoring government behavior in order to hold them accountable to their formal and informal agreements; and (4) developing tactics that enable influence attempts by groups and individuals who are otherwise disenfranchised from bilateral and multilateral decision processes.’⁸

These illustrations demonstrate that despite the perceived ‘straightjacket’ within which NGOs concerned about disarmament issues work, they can be seen to be important players in the game of policy influence and change. One recognition of this importance is the fact that in the last two decades, disarmament-focused NGOs have been awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace three times—International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War in 1985, the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs in 1995, and the International Campaign to Ban Landmines in 1997.

There is a need for greater understanding not only of the history of NGO involvement in particular disarmament issue areas but also of the factors, both in the environment in which NGOs are working and internal to NGOs themselves, which have affected the nature and effectiveness of their engagement. Case studies and comparative analyses are beginning to address this need, as the above examples show. For policy officials and NGOs alike, there is a concomitant need to examine this record and learn from it.

What can we learn from the Ottawa Process?

The Ottawa Process is remarkable as an example of the essential role that civil society organizations can play in global policy transformation, even in defence and security issue areas, as both forceful advocates and constructive partners.

It is perhaps a sign of the relative paucity of progress in arms control and disarmament in recent years, despite the end of the Cold War, that the achievement in 1997 of the Mine Ban Convention stands out so forcefully. But quite apart from the obvious importance of what has been achieved in banning a whole weapons system in an agreement which now has more

than 120 States Parties, the Ottawa Process also is remarkable as an example of the essential role that civil society organizations can play in global policy transformation, even in defence and security issue areas, as both forceful advocates and constructive partners.

There are several factors which made this easier in the case of APMs than it would be in nearly any other weapons area. However, these factors, while suggesting the uniqueness of this experience, do not detract from the lessons that can be learned from it.

First, essential to the creation of the political will necessary for what has been achieved on the APM issue has been the broad popular support for action to be taken, made possible in part because the issue itself is clear: the impact of the use of APMs is visible and shocking and what needs to be done is easily grasped. The simplicity of the issue and message was effectively used by the International Campaign to Ban Landmines to capture public opinion, necessary to move governments to take action on the APM problem.

Second, APMs, even from the perspective of those who most ardently defend their continued possession, are weapons of relatively minor importance from a military security perspective. This made it easier for the primacy of the humanitarian costs over military importance to be accepted by many governments. Also, the lesser importance of this weapons system from a military point of view probably facilitated independent action by a number of middle power states because such action did not threaten key relationships in the way that other, more centrally important weapons systems might.

Third, APMs are a relatively discrete weapons system, having a mainly defensive function, lending itself to a 'ban' solution. Although other weapons systems, such as the range of other small arms and light weapons, can be perceived to have important humanitarian and development consequences, control rather than ban solutions are more appropriate because of the range of types of weapons involved and their perceived continued utility.

Because of these factors, 'doing an Ottawa' would be less likely in other weapons systems areas. However, this landmines experience contains important characteristics which are not without relevance to other areas. For example, in the APM ban process we can see the important role that NGOs can play in reframing an issue, in this case from one largely defined as a traditional military security issue to one principally defined by its humanitarian dimensions. This reframing, in part through the ICBL's strategy of the 'shaming' of actors who continued to produce, transfer and use this indiscriminate weapon, was essential in eventually drawing a sufficient number of states in the direction of a ban. While this may be more difficult in other areas, there are important lessons here for future work on small arms and on weapons of mass destruction.⁹

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In the work on APMs, it was largely humanitarian actors who drove the process inside the heart of a traditional defence issue and it was these humanitarian actors that made all the difference. It can probably quite safely be argued that if work on landmines had been left to traditional peace and disarmament NGOs, even the Revised Protocol II on landmines of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, rather than being the catalyst for what became the Ottawa Process because of its perceived weakness, would have been unlikely to have been achieved in 1996. The further involvement of other types of NGOs—human rights, development, humanitarian—in arms control and disarmament processes will without a doubt shift the ways in which issues are defined, however much more difficult this may be than in the area of APMs. In the small arms area, this transformation is beginning to take place, although it is my own view that the broad range of NGOs now concerning themselves with small arms have to date insufficiently culled the landmines experience for what it can teach them.

A further characteristic of the process leading up to the Mine Ban Convention and into the implementation period has been the remarkable partnership achieved between NGOs, committed governments and international organizations. While there are real reasons why this partnership

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process would be more difficult in other areas, what the landmine experience should be teaching disarmament NGOs is that, while nothing can replace the advocacy and even confrontation roles that NGOs must play in policy change, much can be accomplished by developing strategic partnerships with key government players. What governments should be learning is that NGOs are not always the threat that they perceive them to be and, in addition to NGOs calling for public pressure on issues they care about, engaging NGOs in creative ways can actually assist the achievement of desired outcomes. A critical laboratory worthy of further possible insights for other areas is the tripartite nature of the Mine Ban Convention's inter-sessional work programme and the considerable informal role which NGOs play in monitoring compliance with the norm that the convention has now established. What States Parties have discovered is that they have not lost control of what essentially remains their process by making NGOs active partners.¹⁰

Two other features of the Ottawa Process are worthy of note here. These are less related to NGOs but are nevertheless factors which, however much more limited they might be in more complex, more critical weapons areas, are features with actual or potential application in other disarmament areas. The first, of equal importance to the various roles played by NGOs in achieving the convention, was the part played by the small core group of middle power states, which drove the political process between the first international meeting in Ottawa in 1996, when Canada challenged the international governments to complete a ban treaty in one year, and the second meeting in 1997 when more than 100 countries put their signatures to the new Convention. As one observer has noted, 'Without the ICBL, the core states would not have been able to mobilize the skills and resources of foreign social actors; without the core group, the ICBL would never have been able to engage in the diplomatic lobbying necessary to negotiate a convention.'¹¹ The other key feature critical to the achievement of the convention was, of course, the Ottawa Process itself, a deliberate decision to take the diplomatic initiative outside traditional disarmament fora and practices, including the 'consensus' rule. There are severe limitations to the application of this elsewhere, but the fact that it has happened and the fact that innovative processes have been established in the implementation of the convention provide a permanent, sharp contrast and useful irritant to the continuation of multilateral disarmament diplomacy settings and methodologies which are proving to be increasingly incapable of significant achievement.

As with the rest of this article, much has been too cursorily argued here. Of course 'Ottawa' is not replicable—for all sorts of irrefutable reasons. But my point is that if we fail to analyse this landmine ban experience—in all its richness—for what it can teach us, we will miss opportunities for seriously shaking up our thinking and practice as NGOs and governments as we enter a perilous period requiring new approaches, new practices and new attitudes.¹²

Listening to the future

I began this piece with two 'realities'. The first is a stark reminder of how broken our mechanisms for multilateral disarmament diplomacy have become. The story of the breakdown of the BWC Protocol negotiations is not unique and it would be incorrect to lay the blame for the present bankruptcy in the system totally at the doorstep of one actor, however powerful that actor is. The

second is a reminder of what can be done when sufficient common vision and purpose can be mobilized, based on global interests rather than narrow national power perspectives.

If traditional forms of multilateral disarmament diplomacy are becoming unworkable, how do we ensure that the alternatives are not simply a pure return to unilateral national solutions or bilateral arrangements which fail to take into account larger needs and interests? It is time for a greater examination of what is needed and possible in order to ensure that responses to the real issues of human security are advanced. Such an examination will reveal that, in some spheres, we have already figured out some ways forward and are doing it. Such an examination will also reveal the requirement for states to broaden their definitions of the questions involved and recognize that, in relation to many of the real security issues this planet is facing, it simply is no longer possible to cram these issues back into the traditional arms control/disarmament bottle. This was the real message of the July 2001 UN small arms conference, whether some governments chose to recognize it or not. Further, such an examination needs to include a serious consideration of the 'partnership' role of civil society organizations, so that growing numbers of states can cease to see such organizations merely as threats and come to understand that their real participation is a requirement if durable solutions are to be found.

But NGOs themselves need to begin think together more constructively and purposefully as well. I have spoken earlier of the diversity and clumped nature of disarmament NGOs. I have also spoken of the growing relevance of NGOs from outside the traditional arms control and disarmament 'box' to traditional security definitions and, equally, the importance of security-related issues to the spheres of development, human rights and humanitarian affairs. A common concern to all ought to be the current general state of disarmament diplomacy in relation to the threatening weapons realities which we all face. NGOs need to be learning more effectively from each other, from the strengths and weaknesses of each other's approaches, strategies and methodologies. This dialogue is long overdue and has barely begun.¹³

Notes

1. Ann M. Florini and P.J. Simmons, 'What the World Needs Now?', in Ann M. Florini (ed.), *The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil Society*, Japan Center for International Exchange, Tokyo, and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, 2000, p. 3. In addition to the very useful case studies of the strength of and limits to transnational civil society, it also contains a helpful annotated bibliography of current literature.
2. See, for example, Charles Chatfield, 'Intergovernmental and Nongovernmental Associations to 1945', in Jackie Smith, Charles Chatfield and Ron Pagnucco (eds.), *Transnational Social Movements and Global Politics: Solidarity beyond the State*, Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, NY, 1997, pp. 19–41.
3. Cathleen S. Fisher, *Reformation and Resistance: Nongovernmental Organizations and the Future of Nuclear Weapons*, Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington, DC, 1999, p. 67.
4. Rebecca Johnson, 'Advocates and Activists: Conflicting Approaches on Nonproliferation and the Test Ban Treaty,' in Florini, op. cit., pp. 49–81.
5. 'Although the Cold War had ended, the counter-reformers reasoned, the past was prologue when it came to the threats facing the United States and the role of nuclear weapons in countering those threats.' Fisher, op. cit., p. 27.
6. As noted earlier, a growing number of scholars are developing analytical tools for assessing issue action by non-governmental actors, including disarmament actors. Among the most useful recent publications are: Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Kikkink, *Advocacy Networks in International Politics*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1998; Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco (eds.), op. cit.; Florini, op. cit.; Fisher, op. cit.; Martin Shaw, 'Civil Society and Global Politics: Beyond a Social Movements Approach', *Millennium: Journal of International Studies*, vol. 23, no. 3 (Winter 1994), pp. 647–67; Thomas Risse-Kappen (ed.), *Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International Relations*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995; Richard Price, 'Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines', *International Organization*, vol. 52 (Summer 1998).
7. Fisher, op. cit., pp. 58–61.

8. Jackie Smith, 'Global Civil Society, Social Movement Organizations, and the Global Politics of Nuclear Security', revised version of a paper prepared for the United Nations University Symposium, 'The United Nations in the 21st Century: International Peace and Security,' 6–7 November 1996, Tokyo, Japan, p. 34.
9. See, for example, Richard Price's important work on norm-building in the area of chemical weapons, *The Chemical Weapons Taboo*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1997. Price, in his 1998 examination of the role of transnational civil society in the landmines process, discusses the part played by the ICBL and the International Committee of the Red Cross in what he terms 'reversing the burden of proof': 'Questioning the military utility of mines has helped to instigate a comparable shift [to that which has taken place in the environmental movement of successfully putting the burden on the polluter to demonstrate that no harm is being done to the environment] by making mine proponents publicly defend, to domestic and international audiences, what previously required no justification: the assumption that mines have military utility and thus pass the test of military necessity.' Price, 'Reversing the Gun Sights', op. cit., p. 632.
10. For further elaboration of these points, see David C. Atwood, 'Implementing Ottawa: Continuity and Change in the Roles of NGOs', *Disarmament Forum*, no. 4, 1999, pp. 19–31, and Atwood, *Promoting Compliance: Observations on the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention*, Occasional Paper No. 17, Geneva Centre for Security Policy, Geneva, 2000.
11. Maxwell A. Cameron, 'Global Civil Society and the Ottawa Process: Lessons from the Movement to Ban Anti-personnel Mines', paper presented at the conference 'The New Diplomacy: The United Nations, Like-Minded Countries and Non-Governmental Organizations,' 28–30 September 1999, Ontario, Canada.
12. One of the few attempts (of which I am aware) to look at factors which influenced the success of the landmines campaign in comparison with other campaigns is that provided by Don Hubert. In this brief study, Hubert examines the landmines campaign alongside the campaign for an International Criminal Court, the campaign to ban the use of child soldiers, and the small arms campaign. See *The Landmine Ban: A Case Study in Humanitarian Advocacy*, Occasional Paper #42, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Providence, RI, 2000.
13. What preparing this piece has revealed for me is that there is real need for research on the comparative experience of NGOs across a range of disarmament spheres as well as between disarmament and other areas of transnational civil society endeavour. If the inter-NGO dialogue and learning is to happen, this research needs to be prepared with NGO use in mind. NGOs in turn need to make use of the findings of this research for what it can teach them for their own work as well as for the enhancement of the inter-NGO dialogue which I have argued is necessary.