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**Disarmament and  
Conflict Resolution Project**

**Small Arms Management and  
Peacekeeping in Southern Africa**

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## **Previous DCR Project Publications**

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Cambodia



# Preface

The UN peace operations in Angola, Mozambique and Namibia were all based on peace agreements between the warring parties. The agreements contained provisions for demobilization and disarmament of the warring factions. The basis for the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (1979-1980) was similar, except that demobilization was not accompanied by the collection/destruction of arms. Accounts of these operations -- of the demobilization and disarmament missions in particular -- are published by UNIDIR along with similar analyses of peace operations in other parts of the world.

In addition to the series of case studies, UNIDIR has conducted a number of inquiries into specific policy issues pertaining to disarmament in the framework of peace operations. This Report, focusing on Southern Africa, is the first in that series. It is comprised of contributions by Peter Batchelor from the Center for Conflict Resolution at the University of Cape Town; Christopher Smith from the Center for Defence Studies at the University of London; and Jakkie Potgieter from the Institute for Defence Policy in South Africa.

Peter Batchelor undertakes a comparative analysis of the successes and failures of peace operations in the region. In the cantonment areas, the collection, storage and destruction of arms were effectively conducted in some, but not all, cases. Still, this part of the demobilization and disarmament task has usually been among the manageable ones. It is more difficult to ensure that armed personnel actually report to the cantonment areas, and that weapons caches are not hidden. While Angola, Namibia and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe were all subject to arms embargos, the warring parties nevertheless had access to external sources of supply. This is another very difficult part of disarmament missions for which the UN has been inadequately equipped and prepared.

Christopher Smith takes a closer look at the flows of small arms in the region. While major conflicts have been successfully terminated if not resolved in recent years, they have left a large number of arms behind. In the framework of the UN peace operations, significant amounts of arms have been collected, but these probably represent only a small part of the totality of weapons. The demand for arms is of a political as well as a criminal nature, with the two forms displaying increasing overlap. It is fairly obvious that the ready availability of arms encourages violent solutions to problems, i.e., the development of cultures of violence. In South Africa, political and criminal forms of violence have been on

the rise, and it has become more difficult to determine where one ends and the other begins.

In 1995, UNIDIR published a Paper on Small Arms and Intra-State Conflict (UNIDIR Paper No. 34). Christopher Smith suggests ways in which the UN might become more effective in collecting and destroying arms. Jakkie Potgieter takes this further into a discussion of preconditions and modalities of regional peacekeeping and relief operations. Mr. Potgieter identifies a series of factors that must be considered and clarified for cooperative security arrangements to function properly. Cooperation and effective organization are essential if political instability, violent crime and weapons flows are to be reduced. Of fundamental importance is the realization that cooperative security can be cost-efficient as well.

While the DCR project focuses on the relationship between demobilization/disarmament and conflict resolution, the case of Southern Africa also underlines the role of disarmament in conflict *prevention*. Preventive action usually must build on several pillars, such as development aid, environmental assistance, social change through education programs, the development of political institutions, the training of civilian police, and arms control and disarmament. To succeed, comprehensive strategies must have a solid theoretical underpinning. Still, the right strategy may fail for lack of political backing. Sometimes, both elements are lacking: then the world drifts along without perspective. There is a need, therefore, for action programs that are comprehensive and substantive enough to set societies on the course of peace and development, yet modest enough to stay within realistic resource frames. This is a major challenge to the peoples of Southern Africa and their external cooperation partners.

UNIDIR takes no position on the views or conclusions expressed in this Report. They are those of the authors. The project leader, Virginia Gamba, and I are grateful to them for their contributions: UNIDIR has been happy to have such resourceful and dedicated collaborators.

Sverre Lodgaard  
Director, UNIDIR

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# **Project Introduction**

## **Disarmament and Conflict Resolution**

The global arena's main preoccupation during the Cold War centred on the maintenance of international peace and stability between states. The vast network of alliances, obligations and agreements which bound nuclear superpowers to the global system, and the memory of the rapid internationalization of disputes into world wars, favored the formulation of national and multinational deterrent policies designed to maintain a stability which was often confused with immobility. In these circumstances, the ability of groups within states to engage in protest and to challenge recognized authority was limited.

The end of the Cold War in 1989, however, led to a relaxing of this pattern, generating profound mobility within the global system. The ensuing break-up of alliances, partnerships, and regional support systems brought new and often weak states into the international arena. Since weak states are susceptible to ethnic tensions, secession, and outright criminality, many regions are now afflicted by situations of violent intra-state conflict.

Intra-state conflict occurs at immense humanitarian cost. The massive movement of people, their desperate condition, and the direct and indirect tolls on human life have, in turn, generated pressure for international action, most notably from the UN.

The reputation of the United Nations as being representative of all states and thus as being objective and trustworthy has been especially valued, as indicated by the greater number of peace operations in which it is currently engaged. Before 1991, the UN peace operations' presence enhanced not only peace but also the strengthening of democratic processes, conciliation among population groups, the encouragement of respect for human rights, and the alleviation of humanitarian problems. These achievements are exemplified by the role of the UN in Congo, southern Lebanon, Nicaragua, Namibia, El Salvador, and to a lesser extent in Haiti.

Nevertheless, since 1991 the United Nations has been engaged in a number of simultaneous, larger, and more ambitious peace operations in Africa, such as those in Angola, Namibia, Somalia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Liberia. It has been increasingly pressured to act on quick-flaring and horrendously costly explosions of violence. The financial, personnel, and timing pressure on the United Nations to undertake these massive short-term stabilising actions has seriously impaired the UN's ability to ensure long-term national and regional stability. The

UN has necessarily shifted its focus from a supporting role, in which it could ensure long-term national and international stability, to a role which involves obtaining quick peace and easing humanitarian pressures immediately. But without a focus on peace defined in terms of longer-term stability, the overall success of efforts to mediate and resolve intra-state conflict will remain in question.

This problem has gained some recognition and resulted in belated action by the international community. More and more organisations and governments are linking success to the ability to offer non-violent alternatives to a post-conflict society. These alternatives are mostly of a socio-political/economic nature, and are national rather than regional in character. As important as these linkages are to the final resolution of conflict, they tend to overlook a major source of instability: the existence of vast amounts of weapons widely distributed among combatant and non-combatant elements in societies which are emerging from long periods of internal conflict.

The reason why weapons themselves are not the primary focus of attention in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies is because they are viewed from a political perspective. Action which does not award importance to disarmament processes is justified by invoking the political value of a weapon as well as the way the weapon is used by a warring party, rather than its mere existence and availability. For proponents of this action, peace takes away the reason for using the weapon and, therefore, renders it harmless for the post-conflict reconstruction process. And yet, easy availability of weapons can, and does, militarise societies in general. It also destabilises regions that are affected by unrestricted trade of light weapons between borders.

There are two problems, therefore, with the international community's approach to post-conflict reconstruction processes: on the one hand, the international community, under pressure to react to increasingly violent internal conflict, has put a higher value on peace in the short-term than on development and stability in the long-term; and, on the other hand, those who *do* focus on long-term stability have put a higher value on the societal and economic elements of development than on the management of the primary tools of violence, i.e., weapons.

### **UNIDIR's DCR Project and the Management of Arms during Peace Processes (MAPP)**

The DCR Project aims to explore the predicament posed by UN peace operations which have recently focused on short-term needs rather than on long-

term stability. The Project is based on the premise that the control and reduction of weapons during peace operations can be a tool for ensuring stability. Perhaps more than ever before, the effective control of weapons has the capacity to influence far-reaching events in national and international activities. In this light, the management and control of arms could become an important factor in the settlement of conflicts, a fundamental aid to diplomacy in the prevention and deflation of conflict, and a critical component of the reconstruction process in post-conflict societies.

Problems within the process of controlling weapons have cropped up at every stage of peace operations, for a variety of reasons. In most cases, initial control of arms upon the commencement of peace operations has not generally been achieved. This may be due to the fact that political negotiations necessary to generate mandates and missions permitting international action are often not specific enough on their disarmament implementation component. It could also be that the various actors involved interpret mandates in totally different ways. Conversely, in the specific cases in which peace operations have attained positive political outcomes, initial efforts to reduce weapons to manageable levels - even if achieved - tend to be soon devalued, since most of the ensuing activities centre on the consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction processes. This shift in priorities from conflict resolution to reconstruction makes for sloppy follow-up of arms management operations. Follow-up problems, in turn, can result in future threats to internal stability. They also have the potential to destabilize neighbouring states due to the uncontrolled and unaccounted-for mass movement of weapons that are no longer of political or military value to the former warring parties.

The combination of internal conflicts with the proliferation of light weapons has marked peace operations since 1990. This combination poses new challenges to the international community and highlights the fact that a lack of consistent strategies for the management of arms during peace processes (MAPP) reduces the effectiveness of ongoing missions and diminishes the chances of long-term national and regional stability once peace is agreed upon. Nowhere is this more evident than in the region of Africa.

Given these considerations, the DCR Project believes that the way to implement peace, defined in terms of long-term stability, is to focus not just on the sources of violence (such as social and political development issues) but also on the material vehicles for violence (such as weapons and munitions). Likewise, the implementation of peace must take into account *both* the future needs of a society and the elimination of its excess weapons, *and also* the broader international and regional context in which the society is situated. This is because weapons that are not managed and controlled in the field will invariably flow over into neighbouring

countries, becoming a problem in themselves. Thus, *the establishment of viable stability requires that three primary aspects be included in every approach to intra-state conflict resolution: (1) the implementation of a comprehensive, systematic disarmament programme as soon as a peace operation is set-up; (2) the establishment of an arms management programme that continues into national post-conflict reconstruction processes; and (3) the encouragement of close cooperation on weapons control and management programmes between countries in the region where the peace operation is being implemented.*

In order to fulfill its research mission, the DCR Project has been divided into four phases. These are as follows: (1) the development, distribution, and interpretation of a *Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations*; (2) the development and publication of case studies on peace operations in which disarmament tasks constituted an important aspect of the wider mission; (3) the organization of a series of workshops on policy issues; and (4) the publication of policy papers on substantive issues related to the linkages between the management of arms during peace processes (MAPP) and the settlement of conflict.

Between September 1995 and May 1996, the Project foresees four sets of publications. The first of these will involve eleven case studies, covering peace operations in Somalia, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Bosnia/Croatia, Central America (ONUCA and ONUSAL), Cambodia, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Liberia and Haiti. The second set of publications will include nine policy papers, addressing topics such as Security Council Procedures, Mandate Specificity, Doctrine, Rules of Engagement, Coercive versus Consensual Arms Control and Demobilization Processes, Consensus, Intelligence and Media, and Training. A third set of publications will involve three papers on the relationship between arms and conflict in the region of Southern Africa. The last of the Project's published works will be an overarching policy paper summarizing the conclusions of the research and delineating recommendations based on the Project's findings.

### **Security in Southern Africa: The Proliferation of Light Weapons**

Southern Africa is adjusting to the process of transition to democracy. In South Africa the transition is still incomplete, both at the state level and at the level of civil society. Elsewhere, Angola is haltingly emerging from its long-standing civil war; Mozambique is coming to terms with the devastation wreaked by almost

a quarter of a century of war; and in Malawi and Zambia the transition from a de facto system of life presidency to a system of elected parliamentary rule is incomplete. In Lesotho there is a security threat to the elected government. There is therefore no common, institutionalised political value system in Southern Africa. While the region is increasingly interdependent economically, it is not yet interdependent with regard to matters of security and defence.

During the Cold War, superpower proxies on the African continent were flooded with weapons meant to defend the interests of their allies in Europe and elsewhere. The largest concentration of these weapons was in Sub-Saharan Africa and more especially in Southern Africa, which was an important area of Cold War confrontation. Following the end of the Cold War and, with it, the end of most conflicts in the area, the abundance of these weapons and their proliferation became a major threat to stability. The end of the Cold War has not served to diffuse conflict or eliminate threats to security in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the last four decades, the sub-continent has seen thirty-five major conflicts and almost ten million deaths. More recently, in Rwanda alone, the intensity and speed of genocide and epidemics claimed nearly one million lives.

The end of the Cold War did manage to reduce ideologically motivated conflict, although conflicts over democratisation, ethnicity and access to economic empowerment have often led to the outbreak of civil wars, lawlessness, anarchy and misery. Widespread political and socio-economic problems have helped to plunge the sub-continent into unprecedented instability and conflict - motivated neither by the drive for independence nor the end of colonial rule. The quest for democratisation and economic empowerment was essentially an internally-driven process supported by external forces such as former metropolitan powers, donor agencies, and international financial institutions. Ethnic confrontations, on the other hand, are attributable to a number of factors which may vary from country to country as a result of historical settings and varying geopolitical constellations.

Small arms currently spreading throughout the region include pistols, machine-guns, rocket launchers, anti-personnel grenades, and the dreaded AK-47 assault rifle. The proliferation of these weapons poses a serious threat to security in Southern Africa and the horn of Africa. In Southern Africa, weapons are smuggled from Mozambique and other former zones of military combat to South Africa, the country most affected by armed crime in the region.

An understanding of the proliferation of light weapons in Southern Africa at present requires a focus on three different issues. The first is the *initial influx* of weapons due to the massive arming of Sub-Saharan Africa by external powers during the Cold War and the linkages of these arms policies to ongoing national struggles for political determination. Another issue requiring examination is the

*second influx* of weapons (most of them light weapons) which characterised legal and illegal trading of weapons in the lax environment following the end of both the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Finally, a third issue of focus should be the *fluid movement of these weapons* across borders due to the impact of United Nations-brokered peace settlements in Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique, where the establishment of short-term peace took priority at the expense of disarmament.

The DCR Project's case studies on disarmament, or the lack thereof, during peacekeeping operations in recent years point to one of the three sources for massive flows of light weapons into the region of Southern Africa. In this respect, it is enticing to think that if part of the problem of the proliferation of light weapons in Southern Africa is due to ineffective disarmament efforts during multinational peacekeeping operations, part of the solution might lie in a more effective use of regional peacekeeping forces to ensure border controls aimed at reducing this flow.

My special thanks go to the authors of this volume, Peter Batchelor, Christopher Smith, and Jakkie Potgieter; and to the project staff at UNIDIR, especially our Information Officer, Kent Highnam; our Specialized Publications Editor, Cara Cantarella; and our Assistant Editor, Lara Bernini. We would also like to thank Michael MacKinnon, DCR Project Intern, Alessandra Fabrello, DCR Project Intern, and Anita Blétry, UNIDIR Specialized Secretary (Publications), for their assistance in preparing this volume for publication.

Virginia Gamba  
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Geneva, August 1995

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## List of Acronyms

ANC	African National Congress
ATF	Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
AVF	Afrikaaner Volksfront
BMATT	British Military Advisory Training Team
CCF	Ceasefire Commission
CCFA	Joint Commission for the Formation of the Armed Forces
CCFADM	Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force
CCPM	Joint Political-Military Commission
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIVPOL	Civilian Police units
CMF	Monitoring Force
CMVF	Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission
CORE	Commission for Reintegration
CSC	Supervisory and Monitoring Commission
ECOMOG	Economic Community Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FAA	New Army of Angola
FADM	Mozambican Defense Force
FMLN	Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Natcional
FIS	Front Islamique de Salut
FRELIMO	Frente da Lebertacao de Mocambique
FSU	Former Soviet Union
GIA	Groupe Islamique Armée
GPA	General Peace Agreement
IFP	Inkatha Freedom Party
IISS	International Institute for Security Studies
IRA	Irish Republican Army
MK	Umkhonto we Sizwe (Armed Wing of ANC)
MNR	Mozambican National Resistance
MPLA	Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ONUCA	United Nations Observer Group in Central America
ONUMOZ	United Nations Operation in Mozambique
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
ORH	Operation Restore Hope

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PF	Patriotic Front
PWA area	Pretoria, Witswatersrand and Vereeniging
RENAMO	Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
RPGs	Rocket Propelled Grenades
RSA	Republic of South Africa
RSF	Security Forces
SDU	Self Defense Units (ANC)
SLA	South Lebanon Army
SPU	Self Protection Units (Inkatha)
SRSO	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SWAPO	South West African People's Organization
SWAPOL	South West Africa Police
UDF	United Democratic Front
UNAVEM I	United Nations Angola Verification Mission I
UNAVEM II	United Nations Angola Verification Mission II
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UNITA	União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola
UNITAF	Unified Task Force
UNOMIL	United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG	United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
ZANLA	African National Liberation Army
ZIPRA	Zimbabwe People's Army

# Chapter 1

## Light Weapons and the International Arms Trade

*Christopher Smith*<sup>1</sup>

The most potent symbol of conflict and violence in the closing years of the 20th century is the AK47. There is more to this imagery than graphic footage to accompany CNN soundbites. The increasingly widespread incidence of low intensity conflict is rapidly becoming the major security threat of this era. Many states are failing in their efforts to minimize the political and social impact of insurgency, and the same category of weak and failed states often falter in the control of crime, especially the violent variety. Frequently, especially after a passage of time, insurgency and crime become closely linked.

A critical aspect of the trend towards political and military violence is the increasing availability of 'weapons of war' - light weapons and small arms which were originally produced and procured for use primarily by armed forces. Increasingly, these weapons are being made available to and are being acquired by a range of sub-state actors and organizations such as criminals, smugglers and militant groups. This has been an evolving trend over many years and decades; it is not purely a post-Cold War phenomenon. Nevertheless, the impact and social cost of light weapons proliferation has greatly increased since the superpowers withdrew their patronage to developing countries following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Over the course of the Cold War period, military technology flowed from North to South as the superpowers and their allies attempted to influence political processes in regions of the Third World, especially to countries and governments which held geo-political significance. The tools of influence were varied, sometimes apparently benign in the shape of economic and infrastructural aid and

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<sup>1</sup> The following report, published under the auspices of the UNIDIR project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, is the result of research conducted by the author through the North-South Defence and Security Programme at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London. The light weapons project, which forms a part of the programme, is funded by the Winston Foundation for World Peace and the Rockefeller Family Associates. The author would also like to thank the members of the police and security forces in South Africa and Namibia for their valuable assistance with this project and their willingness to provide data.

assistance, and sometimes blunt, in the form of outright military intervention. Perhaps the most consistent and important of these tools of influence was the supply of military technology, especially during the 1950s and 1960s.

Arms transfers became increasingly commercialized after the oil shocks of the 1970s, for a variety of inter-related reasons. Thereafter, both supply and demand increased dramatically. During the 1970s, the increasing need on the part of all major arms suppliers to export arms coincided with the dominant economic conditions in most parts of the Third World. In 1973, oil prices rose by 400% and doubled again in 1978-79. This rapid accumulation of wealth by the OPEC states opened up a massive market for defense exporters. Other developing countries financed their arms imports either by drawing on reserves or through a positive net flow of capital on their balance of payments. Thus, directly or indirectly, these arms imports were financed through borrowing from official bilateral and multilateral sources and the international capital market.<sup>2</sup> The result was a sharp rise in the dollar value of the international arms trade which drew the attention of several organizations and individual analysts; the international arms trade came to be seen as one of the most significant geo-political phenomena of the late-1970s.

Somewhat later, during the early-1980s, following growing suspicions that a number of ambitious developing countries were pursuing programs to develop weapons of mass destruction - India, Pakistan, Israel, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa - non-proliferation issues rose in stature and importance. India's nuclear test in 1974 was especially important in moving nuclear proliferation up the international political agenda. This was followed by Pakistan's clandestine program designed to gain access to nuclear weapons blueprints and the requisite technologies in the late-1970s/early-1980s, and the infamous double flash picked up by a Vela satellite overflying the South Atlantic pointed to a possible nuclear test by Israel or South Africa.

It is the flow of these military technologies - conventional and non-conventional - which has dominated the political agenda for almost half a century. Attempts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and manage the flow of conventional military technologies are intended to avoid both political and military regional imbalances and a loss of comparative advantage developing out of technology transfer.

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<sup>2</sup> See the author's "Third World Arms Control, Military Technology and Alternative Security", in T. Ohlson, *Arms Transfer Limitations and Third World Security*, Oxford: SIPRI/OUP, pp.60-61.

Completely and unequivocally overlooked during this period was the associated transfer of light weapons, for two reasons. First, received wisdom tended to focus exclusively upon the significance of *concentrated* firepower, not its diffusion. Thus, it was the fear of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands or the implications of F-16 fighters replacing worn out F-5s which caught public attention. Although many arms deals involved the transfer and sale of light weapons, their significance was barely considered.

Second, there were sound, practical reasons for allowing the flow of light weapons not to drift onto the research and analysis agenda. From every angle, light weapons were, and still are, impossible to map and measure with the precision which the research community came to expect, for several reasons.<sup>3</sup> A large proportion of light weapons transfers were covert and not necessarily government-to-government, either. Almost devoid of obsolescence, light weapons can and do change hands many times, which means that there are far more suppliers than higher up in the military technology chain. Until recently, the Enfield .303 was a widely-held firearm in a large and diverse number of developing countries, even though most were produced in the United Kingdom during the inter-war years and the now-ubiquitous AK47 design first went into production nearly fifty years ago, in 1947.

Similarly, there are many more producers of light weapons and ammunition than there are of major weapons systems. The AK47 is produced by a wide range of countries other than the former Soviet Union, including many East European and East Asian countries. A passable version of the AK47 is even produced in the North West Frontier Province in Pakistan using considerable dexterity and worn out lathes originally imported from the UK well before independence in 1947. In sum, the time, effort and resources which would have been required to map and measure flows of light weapons on a global scale were both unavailable and, in any case, believed to outweigh both the intellectual and political benefits of tracking the weapons.

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<sup>3</sup> Several attempts were made, even by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - none came to fruition.

## I. Failed States, Patterns of Conflict, Peacekeeping and Light Weapons

Since the end of the Cold War, the international security landscape has changed beyond recognition. The Doomsday clock has been turned back, for the moment at least. East-West negotiations proceed apace, despite the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been agreed, a Chemical Weapons Convention is in place, and prospects for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty look excellent.

Arguably, as well, the threat of conventional war is receding. Many countries still deploy and procure advanced conventional weapons, and border skirmishes are common enough. But the wars which once punctuated regions such as the Middle East and South Asia are diminishing. Over the past five years, for example, relations between India and Pakistan have been consistently bad, due primarily to the situation in Kashmir. Interestingly, however, there have been few indications that this latest stand-off might result in open warfare.

Amongst the many reasons for this decline, including better diplomacy and techniques and strategies for long-term conflict resolution, the economic factor is significant. Few countries can now afford the economic cost of conventional war, for two reasons. First, the majority would be forced to fight alone, without the economic or *matériel* support of one or the other superpower. Second, both bilateral and multilateral lenders and donors are capable of much greater influence in the political domain, which potentially includes taking a policy stance on security issues.

In the future, therefore, the international community will be called upon to deal with - or not, as the case may be - a very different type of conflict. The possibility of major conflicts will continue to exist, especially in Asia, but they will be few and far between. It is the need to devise ways and means of preventing low-intensity conflict which will occupy the efforts of the international community, the United Nations in particular.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, to a great extent, these conflicts will involve the use of light weapons.

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<sup>4</sup> Not surprisingly, there is a considerable amount of literature in this area. For a recent overview see, D. Ramsbotham, "The Changing Nature of Intervention: The Role of UN Peacekeeping", *Conflict Studies No. 282*, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, August 1995.

Paradoxically, the decline in the incidence of conventional warfare has not led to either a diminution of conflict or a rise in security. On the contrary, various areas of the international system have descended into chaos, violence and literal anarchy, which has duly given rise to the concept of 'failed' states.

The nation-building efforts which followed decolonization were always uneven processes, with successes in some quarters often paralleled by abject failures in others. The geo-political interests of the superpowers often masked the extent to which new states were fundamentally weak and, therefore, vulnerable to threats and actions from sub-state actors and organizations. In effect, superpower involvement and their economic and *matériel* largesse masked the weakness of nation-building in many areas. This weakness gave rise to 'quasi-states', which were nothing like their more robust West European counterparts. As the Cold War drew to a close, the superpowers began to adjust downwards the levels of political, military and economic support they were able or prepared to offer former allies in the erstwhile Third World - the abrupt rejection of Pakistan by the United States is an excellent case in point, or Cuba by the former Soviet Union, albeit for different reasons.

To a certain extent, the Cold War exacerbated rather than just masked the limitations of state building. On the one hand the superpowers frequently lent excessive support to regimes which lacked legitimacy and popular support, which effectively retarded key elements of nation-building, especially the growth of civil society. It was not until the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 that US foreign policy-makers made any discernible effort to confront these contradictions. Another associated outcome was the impact of arms transfers. Economically, high defense expenditures and the import of major weapons systems may have in many cases slowed development, or worse.

The import of light weapons may have had less of an economic impact, but they still amounted to a major source of instability. As the superpowers drew back from countries such as Somalia and Afghanistan, the respective governments lost the little control they previously enjoyed. Domestic rivals, who were themselves divided, acquired the weaponry to fight both their governments and amongst themselves. One of the most significant political results of the widespread proliferation of light weapons amongst the warring factions was the diminution not just of central authority but also of the traditional foundation for order, namely the clan and tribal elders.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> M. Ayoob, *The Third World Security Predicament: State Making, Regional Conflict, and the International System*, London: Lynne Rienner, 1995, p.172.

The collapse of organized force and the loss of control over weapons was an exceptionally important ramification of the withdrawal of superpower activity. Yet, there were other reasons as well for the growth in conflict. Arguably, one important development was the shocks endured by structural adjustment programs, where the impact upon the poorest sections of developing countries has been especially severe. The 1980s was a remarkable decade in the world of economic development policy. The prevailing Keynesian approaches to economic aid and development policy were brusquely overturned as part and parcel of the neo-classical revolution which swept through a number of OECD countries and the international organizations which were broadly influenced by the West, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.<sup>6</sup>

From the early-1980s on, both bilateral and multilateral aid donors have made the provision of economic aid conditional upon economic reform on the one hand and democracy on the other. In essence, a host of developing countries were cajoled into a series of far-reaching economic reforms following the onset of the international debt crisis. The International Monetary Fund in particular placed immense pressure upon indebted countries to curb excessive government expenditure which had been the cause of budget deficits and inflation, over-valued currencies (which made imports cheap and exports expensive), disproportionate imports and inattention to supply-side economics. In addition, and at a later date, the 'good government' agenda took shape amongst the donor community. Not content just to enforce developing countries' change in direction on economic policy, donors also decided to ensure that democracy took root as well. For the multilateral donors, the key was administrative reform to curb corruption and promote transparency and accountability. For bilateral donors, the agenda was more overt and focussed upon democracy, human rights and participation.

The whole process of structural adjustment served to make the poor much poorer as government spending was cut to the bone and subsidies disappeared. Whilst the economic policies which led to the crises of the 1980s were also responsible for increasing poverty, the early adjustment policies were sufficiently inflexible to make a further impact upon poverty, as incomes fell and social services were cut back.

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<sup>6</sup> In the summer of 1985, the World Bank's publication, *Research News*, ran the headline: "New Research Priorities: The World Has Changed - So Has the Bank". J. Toye, *Dilemmas of Development: Reflections on the Counter-Revolution in Development Theory and Policy*, Oxford: Blackwell, 1987, p.47.

Inevitably, if not predictably, the further social, political and economic impoverishment of the poor in developing countries has exacerbated ethnic tensions - the so-called 'default option' - which occur following the breakdown of civil society when basic needs are unfulfilled.<sup>7</sup> Other forms of conflict have increased as well - criminality, communal violence and low intensity conflict, for example. Throughout the Cold War, latent causes of conflict undoubtedly lay barely hidden below the surface. The economic and political shocks engendered since 1980 have brought these conflicts to the surface.

The susceptibility of weak states to ethnic tensions, secession and outright criminality has been at immense humanitarian cost, which has left failed states largely dependent upon intervention by and assistance from the international community. This dependence, coupled with a rigid belief in the sanctity of the nation-state, has compelled the international system to invest heavily in ever-expanding peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations in an attempt to minimize human suffering, both short- and long-term.

Within the peace-keeping community it is becoming widely accepted that the ability to disarm warring factions is a critical component in the success of peace-keeping operations. So far, the focus of peacekeeping operations has centered primarily upon humanitarian relief and thereafter upon restarting democratic processes. If, however, warring parties are not disarmed, the prospects for democracy and the growth of civil society will be greatly diminished. The role of light weapons in the undermining of traditional forms of authority has already been noted. In addition, if weapons stay in the system, soldiers, militia and militants who find themselves on the losing side can readily resort to violence to derail processes in which they stand to lose - as in the case of UNITA in Angola, or Hekmatyer in Afghanistan. Furthermore, light weapons tend to empower criminals of all types, which jeopardizes the safety of individuals and communities.

It is against this backdrop that interest and concern over stocks and flows of light weapons has emerged, to overtake interest in other forms of military technology transfer and proliferation. In many parts of the world, governments and national security forces, both strong and weak, and UN peace-keeping operations now face individuals and organizations which are comparatively well-armed, with assault rifles, anti-personnel mines, grenade launchers and stocks of ammunition which often add up to a significant possession of firepower.

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<sup>7</sup> The "default option" is Jack Snyder's phrase, coined in "Nationalism and the Crisis of the Post-Soviet State", *Survival*, Vol. 35, No. 1, Spring 1993.

Moreover, quite apart from the dangers to peace-keeping personnel and those they are mandated to protect, a failure to disarm warring parties and collect weapons can jeopardize the work of a peace-keeping operation both during, and more significantly, after a UN operation has been completed.

The scale and importance of the contemporary threats facing national and multinational security forces from sub-state actors and organizations are without precedent. There is now an urgent need to make sense of the processes which enable these groups and individuals to gain access to light weapons and, in turn, to construct policies to both control and prevent the proliferation of light weapons. Without this knowledge and insight, it will not be possible to undergo operations designed to ensure the stability and security of individuals, states and the regions in which they are located.

## **II. The Characteristics of Light Weapons**

The proliferation of light weapons is determined by a series of characteristics which combine to set the problem apart from other forms of military technology.<sup>8</sup> Light weapons have historically been produced in abundance, so much so that there are no reliable estimates available from government or non-governmental sources to ascertain scale and levels of production. In relative terms, this is not the case with weapons platforms.

Compounding the problem of gauging scale of production is the degree to which licenses to produce light weapons and ammunition have spread beyond the major weapons producers. To produce or reverse-engineer light weapons of limited sophistication does not require advanced industrial expertise or infrastructure. Countries such as Pakistan and Singapore which have struggled to produce major weapons systems have fewer difficulties and more success in producing certain types of light weapons, including anti-personnel land-mines.

In addition, crude but effective weapons can be produced independently. The ability of frontier workshops in northern Pakistan to reverse-engineer AK47s and Enfield .303s has already been noted. In some areas of India, there exist thriving rural gun factories, producing crude weapons from bicycle frames and the

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<sup>8</sup> Light weapons include small arms such as pistols, rifles, assault rifles and sub-machine guns; light and medium machine guns; certain types of heavy machine guns (HMG) with a calibre not exceeding 12.7mm/0.5" (after which an HMG will be classified as a canon); anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles. Also included in this category are mortars, mines and grenades.

steering housings from trucks. In South Africa, simple pipeguns are being used as effective, short-range shotguns. The IRA produced their own mortars which proved to be adequate for use against large targets, such as Heathrow airport.

Finally, compounding problems of quantification are the large number of diverse weapons which currently fit into the categorization of light weapons. Major weapons systems are relatively easy to group and classify around the concept of the weapons platform - essentially a tank, ship, aircraft or missile system. Light weapons tend to be a residual classification which fit into the category they are in because they do not fit into those which exist already.

Light weapons have a number of characteristics which lend themselves to rapid and frequent movement, both across borders, between social organizations and amongst individuals. First, they are by definition light, which facilitates cheap and easy transportation and covert movement. Light weapons can be easily concealed and smuggled, across borders and within countries, using the most rudimentary forms of transportation. In South Asia weapons have been moved using mules and camels across the India-Pakistan border and shipped to the Tamil Tigers using small boats.<sup>9</sup> In Southern Africa weapons are smuggled across borders in the fuel tanks of cars or in concealed compartments in freight trucks. Light aircraft are also known to have been used. In Puerto Rico and Ireland small arms have been sent by mail.

Light weapons can be very cheap, which opens up demand from a much larger cross-section of groups and individuals, even in very poor parts of the world. In most areas of the world, light weapons tend to command high prices, but in other parts the availability is so widespread and the sellers often so impoverished that the cost of weapons and ammunition can be extremely low. In Uganda, an AK47 can be procured for the same cost as a chicken. Inside Mozambique and Angola, an AK47 complete with a couple of clips of ammunition can be bought for less than \$15.00, or for a bag of maize. At these prices almost anyone can own an illegal firearm.

Light weapons have very little built-in obsolescence. In the case of major weapons, a degree of control can be exerted by the supplier through limiting the initial supply of spare parts. With some countries, the US operates a 'short leash' policy that effectively circumscribes the ability to deploy weapons systems without the approval of the supplier, which is expressed through the supply of

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<sup>9</sup> Arms smugglers in South Asia move weapons using camels who know certain routes across borders and do not require their owner to be on hand to guide them. There are similar stories from the Horn of Africa.

spare parts. Whereas an aging F-5 requires an inventory of 60,000 spare parts to remain operational, an AK47 has only sixteen moving parts. In the case of most light weapons, durability and low maintenance are integral features. They are easy to maintain and rarely break down. If the condition of a light weapon deteriorates, it can usually be brought back to working order through elbow-grease rather than refurbishment.

These are the characteristics which distinguish the trade in light weapons from the trade in major weapons systems. In terms of security and stability, however, the crucial fact about light weapons is that once control is lost and these weapons enter other networks - military, political or criminal - the bulk are irretrievable. Concealing light weapons is not difficult once they have been acquired; caches can be broken up and individual weapons hidden in either urban or rural settings. A good example of light weapon irretrievability is the CIA's failed program to retrieve the Stinger missiles from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Despite offering a buy-back program totalling \$65 million dollars, the agency has yet to secure a complete system, even though the majority of Stingers appear to have remained in the area. Of additional interest in the case of the Stinger is the strong possibility that some, many, or even all of the missiles will have ceased to be operational. Stingers employ two power packs, one for launch and another for guidance. Having been in the field now for seven or more years and stored under variable conditions by mujahideen commanders whose knowledge of high technology systems is limited at best, the power packs are likely to have degraded.

The clear differences between light weapons and other forms of military technology imply that methods and policies to control further proliferation will differ greatly from other forms of arms control. The key aspect of controlling light weapons in the interests of security focusses less on preventing governments and security forces from gaining access, in part because the widespread, existing availability and affordability of most light weapons for governments makes such gestures futile. On the contrary, the most important aspect of control turns on a very different aspect of proliferation. Across the international system, the proliferation of light weapons gives greatest cause for concern when they cease to be in the control of security forces and become the charge of sub-state actors and organizations. This is the point at which control is crucial.

### III. The Global Proliferation of Light Weapons - Stocks and Flows

#### Europe and the Former Soviet Union

The main source of concern regarding the present and future supply of light weapons is the former Eastern bloc and the former Soviet Union (FSU). Weapons are flowing out of and around this region in considerable quantities. The destinations and networks are numerous. Many weapons are flowing towards Europe, others into Central Asia and beyond. Russian arms traffickers have extended their operations to include heavy weapons.<sup>10</sup> Prague is now recognized as an established center for Russian and East European arms traffickers. The Ukraine has become an important conduit for arms and narcotics, given its pivotal link between Europe, Asia and the Middle East.<sup>11</sup>

Most of the Baltic states, especially Lithuania, are experiencing a sharp increase in criminal activity. The murder rate in Russia is almost double that of the United States, in line with the sharp rise in violent crime. The strength and scope of organized crime in Russia and the surrounding regions is also increasing. Several powerful organized criminal networks, mostly of ethnic origin, are associated with the sale of illegally procured weapons. In addition, organized crime in the Baltic states is strongly linked to drug trafficking, money laundering, counterfeiting currency and car racketeering.<sup>12</sup>

Recently, the demand for illegal weapons in and around the Baltic states has eased somewhat. It is assumed that most criminal groups now possess sufficient firepower. In response to this decreasing demand, arms traffickers are turning their attention to Western Europe and other parts of Eastern Europe, the Balkans in particular. The major concern in Eastern Europe is over arms shipments to the former Yugoslavia and the enforcement of UN sanctions and the arms embargo imposed upon the whole of Yugoslavia since September 1991. The embargo has been consistently broken, especially from the East. Weapons move relatively

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<sup>10</sup> A. Labor, "Fancy a MiG-29? It's Yours For \$8m", *The European*, 21-27th April 1995. See also, J. Borger, et al, "Booty Parade for Sharp Shooters", *The Guardian*, 27th November 1993.

<sup>11</sup> INTERPOL, *Third International Symposium on Firearms and Explosives*, Lyons: INTERPOL, 7th-9th September 1994, p.10.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* Recent suggestions that organized crime is becoming interested in the smuggling of fissile materials, however, are probably exaggerated. See *Strategic Survey 1994/95*, Oxford: International Institute for Strategic Studies/OUP, Oxford, 1995, p.27.

unhindered into most parts of the region from numerous sources, both governmental and private. For example, in July 1993 twelve containers of weapons, including automatic rifles, were discovered at Maribor airport in a shipment masquerading as a shipment of humanitarian aid from Sudan. The weapons were bound for Bosnia via Croatia. Further investigation revealed that a Sudanese national had paid for their transportation, which was organized by an Austrian national on behalf of a Bosnian client.

Other examples of the embargo violation abound. Considerable amounts of weapons are moving into Macedonia, to which at least four established supply networks are known to exist: via Salonika, via Croatia and Bulgaria, via Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and via Albania. Weapons produced in private workshops in Croatia are being exported out of the region, mainly into Western Europe.<sup>13</sup> More recently, there have been concerns that the US has been supplying weapons to the Bosnian Muslims.<sup>14</sup> The Croats have recently acquired MiG-21s which clearly bear the camouflage markings of the East German Air Force.<sup>15</sup> Political support from external powers tells only half of the former-Yugoslavia story - recently Slovenian police issued charges against six people, including former ministers, in connection with the smuggling of arms labeled humanitarian aid into Bosnia and Croatia.<sup>16</sup> Up to one million gallons of jet fuel crosses from Albania to Serbia each day.<sup>17</sup>

For weapons moving both in and out of Eastern European states, the Czech Republic capital, Prague, has been an important focal point, even though the majority of the weapons traded never touch Czech soil. Most of the weapons are supplied by Russian army officers, exploiting networks which were built up during the Afghan war. The cash generated by arms sales is laundered in either Moscow or Israel, and has amounted to some \$4.3 billion in recent years, according to recent estimates.<sup>18</sup>

Arms trafficking is made much less difficult by the relaxation of border controls within the European Union; in the past, approximately 80% of illegally

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<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.10-11.

<sup>14</sup> T. Ripley, "Bosnia C-130 Suspected in Covert Flights Row", *Flight International*, 8-14th March 1995.

<sup>15</sup> Paul Beaver from the Jane's Information Group quoted on Radio Free Europe, 24th March 1995, *Yugoslav Daily Survey*, Belgrade, No. 811, 27th March 1995.

<sup>16</sup> *Wall Street Journal Europe*, 18th April 1995.

<sup>17</sup> R. Bonner, "Albania's Lakeside Smugglers Help Fuel Serbian War Machine", *The Guardian*, 4th April 1995.

<sup>18</sup> N. Thorpe, "Where the Best Gun-Runners Go Clubbing", *The Observer*, 2nd July 1995.

imported weapons had been seized at borders.<sup>19</sup> In addition, the EU has made little progress in the harmonization of national laws and regulations on the manufacture, sale and possession of firearms and explosives. The current political wrangling over the establishment of EUROPOL will slow efforts to halt the flow of illegal weapons into EU countries and indicates just how difficult it will be to harmonize firearms policies.

The window of opportunity to control the flow of weapons into EU countries may be closing, although this appears not to be reflected in political and bureaucratic concern. From 1990 to 1993 German officials reported an increase of 119% in arms trafficking, based upon seizures. The United Kingdom has experienced a dramatic increase in violent crimes involving firearms. Firearms offenses in England and Wales have doubled over the past decade, to over 13,000 annually.<sup>20</sup> A recent armed robbery in Cumbria involved the use of a Czech-made version of the Uzi submachine-gun.<sup>21</sup> A weapons amnesty in Greater Manchester led to the surrender of 620 weapons, one of them a Chinese assault rifle, presumed to be a Type-56.<sup>22</sup>

Obversely, there is also a threat that the failure to regulate the weapons currently under the control of the IRA will create problems for the UK, Ireland and other parts of the EU. Success depends upon whether the British government and the IRA can agree upon how the IRA's weapons should be controlled given the IRA's belief that the decommissioning of weapons amounts to de facto unconditional surrender. Recent reports that the IRA might off-load onto the black market are almost certainly misplaced.<sup>23</sup> It is more likely that the IRA quartermasters will maintain close control over weapons stocks, given the fact that there exist groups and individuals within the Six Counties who have little interest or investment in the peace process. Less doubtful, however, is the size of the IRA's arsenal - it is widely recognized that the IRA possesses substantial stocks of weapons, ammunition and explosives.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>19</sup> INTERPOL, *op. cit.*, p.6.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, p.13.

<sup>21</sup> A. Levy, "SAS Guns for Sale in High Street", *The Sunday Times*, 24th September 1995.

<sup>22</sup> "Guns Amnesty", *The Times*, 7th July 1995.

<sup>23</sup> T. Squitieri, "IRA May Dump Arsenal on the Black Market", *USA Today*, 6th March 1995.

<sup>24</sup> D. Sharrock, "Huge Arsenal in IRA Bunkers", *The Guardian*, 7th March 1995.

### Asia

In North East Asia, national governments are relatively untroubled by the type of arms trafficking which has occurred in other regions of the world. In Japan, the implementation of anti-Boryokudan (organized crime) legislation passed in 1992 has led to a decrease in incidents involving firearms. Neither North or South Korea appear adversely affected by increased arms trafficking.

In South East Asia, arms trafficking does present more problems. The internal situation in Malaysia is stable despite the fact that Malaysia shares a common sea and land border with Thailand and is linked by a causeway to Singapore. Nevertheless, Malaysia does seem to be an important conduit for arms trafficking from Thailand to Singapore. Thailand is a major source of weapons in this region, especially the south. However, most of the weapons are small arms, primarily revolvers, and there is little evidence of organized arms trafficking. In Singapore gun control laws are extremely tight and are based upon a presumption of guilt if any person is found to be in possession of two or more unlicensed weapons. Obversely, however, some 60,000 vessels visit the Port of Singapore each year and there are numerous points of entry for illegal weapons, especially across the straits of Johore. Following the recent crack-down on Muslim extremists there, the Philippine government is negotiating an extradition and legal assistance pact with the government of Pakistan to prevent the flow of arms, funds and training to the rebels.<sup>25</sup>

Nor is China immune from firearms trafficking; in mid-1995 the Chinese authorities seized large caches of weapons and explosives from the northern region of inner Mongolia, including nearly half a million detonators, 144,500 kilograms of dynamite and 1,751 illegal firearms.<sup>26</sup> China also has its own fair share of illegal arms bazaars, such as in the market town of Baigou, where illegal weapons are widely available, together with, for example, police roadblocks and uniforms.<sup>27</sup> In Japan it is virtually impossible to own a firearm legally, and there appears to be little demand for illegal weapons, except from organized criminal gangs. Recently, Japanese police intercepted a shipment of illegal handguns and ammunition being smuggled by sea into Japan, allegedly destined for crime

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<sup>25</sup> N. Cumming-Bruce, "Manila Tries to Cut Muslim Arms Route", *The Guardian*, 29th April 1995.

<sup>26</sup> "Chinese Seize Arms in Raids", *The Asian Age*, 18th July 1995.

<sup>27</sup> "Gangsterville", *The Economist*, 11th June 1994.

syndicates.<sup>28</sup> The Domsday cult, *Aum Shinri Kyo* (Supreme Truth), responsible for the recent gas attacks on the Tokyo subway, was known to have a firearms production capability.<sup>29</sup> In addition, bazookas and grenades were found in the possession of cult members.<sup>30</sup>

Since the emergence of a powerful campaign to ban the export and production of anti-personnel landmines, Cambodia - where one in 263 members of the population are amputees - has become a metaphor for the human cost which results from indiscriminate anti-personnel landmine usage and flagrant disregard for decommissioning responsibilities. The concern over mines in this part of the world has, however, obscured a related problem regarding light weapons proliferation.

In 1991, the four Cambodian warring parties concluded a peace agreement in Paris, which gave a wide range of powers to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) for the implementation of a peace process, a cease-fire in particular, the oversight of elections and both disarmament and demining. Although UNTAC attempted to implement the arms control provisions set out in the Paris Agreements, it was largely unsuccessful. First, the ability to control the flow of weapons to the Khmer Rouge and from across the Thai border was negligible. Second, the military component of UNTAC understood the disarmament process to be a function of the election process; the demobilization and disarmament of 70% of the warring parties was considered an essential condition for the passage of a free and fair election, which was UNTAC's primary mission. When it became clear that elections could be successfully concluded without disarmament taking place, the program was virtually abandoned. In sum, the UNTAC mission committed similar mistakes made by peacekeeping operations elsewhere (see below) - disarmament was too slow, compromised over time and gradually downgraded in importance.<sup>31</sup>

Towards the end of the Cambodian conflict it became clear that arms trafficking in and around the region was on the increase as demand from Burmese rebels and narcotics smugglers from within the Golden Triangle rose. During this

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<sup>28</sup> "Gun Smuggling in Japan", *The Asian Age*, 18th July 1995.

<sup>29</sup> "Weapons Unit of Aum Cult Seized", *The Asian Age*, 9th May 1995.

<sup>30</sup> W. Sakurai, "Bazookas and Hand Grenades in Japan's Cult Armoury", *The Asian Age*, 2nd June 1995.

<sup>31</sup> United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), *Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization During Peacekeeping Operations*, UNTAC Operation, Geneva: UNIDIR, unpublished survey responses. I am also grateful to Eric Berman for his comments on the UNTAC operation.

period, arms traffickers made substantial profits of 150-1,000% by selling off M16s for \$200-320.<sup>32</sup>

Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, Cambodia inadvertently inherited significant numbers of light weapons following the US withdrawal in 1975, including 150,000 tons of ammunition and in excess of 2 million small arms (see Table 1).

**Table 1: Light Weapons Abandoned by the US in SE Asia in 1975**

	<b>Vietnam</b>	<b>Cambodia</b>	<b>Total</b>
.45 M1911A1 pistols	90,000	24,000	114,000
5.565mm M16A1 rifles	791,000	155,000	946,000
Other rifles	857,580	104,000	961,580
7.62 M60 GMPG	15,000	320	15,320
40mm M79 grenade launchers	47,000	18,500	65,500
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,800,580</b>	<b>301,820</b>	<b>2,102,400</b>

Source: IRSAIS, Vol. I, No. 1, November 1989, p. 17.

By far the most severe problem in Asia is confined to the Indian sub-continent. South Asia may only be flooded with illegal weapons in some regions, but, nevertheless, the diffusion of light weapons is a major problem, which looks set to become much worse in the future.<sup>33</sup>

In South Asia, the proliferation of light weapons, especially AK47s, throughout the region has risen significantly over the past few years. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the CIA set up an arms pipeline through Pakistan to ensure the mujahideen acquired sufficient firepower to mount a defense against the Soviet armed forces. Throughout the 1980s, tens of thousands of tons of weaponry and ammunition flowed through the pipeline, which was controlled by

<sup>32</sup> IRSAIS, Vol. I, No. 4, August 1990, p.7.

<sup>33</sup> For a complete picture of the problem in South Asia see the author's "The Diffusion of Light Weapons in South Asia", *London Defense Studies 19*, London: Center for Defense Studies, October 1993.

the Pakistan Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) department. By prior arrangement, the CIA ensured the delivery of weapons and played no part in the process thereafter. In addition, for a number of reasons, the Saudis, the Chinese and the Israelis made contributions, but at least 50% of the weapons, though not of US origin, were paid for by the US government. All in all, some \$8 billion worth of light weapons were pumped through the pipeline.

The pipeline ran from Karachi and Rawalpindi, depending upon whether the weapons arrived by sea or by air. It had many junctures because it involved several different forms of transportation - ship, train, truck and pack animal. Continuous loading and unloading of the weapons allowed the pipeline to leak prodigiously. This merely encouraged the US to step up the flow, rather than address the reasons for the leakages and, further, the possible impact upon the region. No action was taken, even when it became clear that control over the flow of Stinger surface-to-air missiles was in sharp decline. It has been estimated that only 30% of the weapons introduced into the pipeline reached their intended destination.

As the main actor in the process, the ISI acquired the bulk of the plunder - a former head of the ISI once admitted that his organization had 3 million Kalashnikovs packed and greased and hidden away in caches along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Some of the stocks are almost certainly being drip-fed onto the illegal market in Pakistan. Arms have also been used for political purposes, to fuel the growing anarchy in Karachi and to supply Sikh and Kashmiri militants across the border in India. Lately, the flow of weapons into the Punjab has dwindled to virtually nothing following the emasculation of the Kalistani militant movement, but the flow of weapons into Kashmir proceeds apace, accompanied increasingly by militants either directly from or trained in Afghanistan. It remains unclear as to whether any of the militant groups have access to surface-to-air missiles, including the Stinger.

Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan five years ago. Pakistan, especially the North West Frontier Province, is now awash with weapons, the bulk of which originated in the Afghan pipeline. In the virtually lawless North West Frontier Province, ownership of an AK47 is now *de rigueur*, where once the tribals sported Enfield .303s and more ancient models.<sup>34</sup> Land disputes now involve the use of mortars and RPGs. Several hundred Stingers are in the system - these weapons are more than capable of bringing down a commercial aircraft. They can

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<sup>34</sup> T.R. Moreman, *The Arms Trade and the North-West Frontier Pathan Tribes, 1890-1914*, London: Department of War Studies, Kings College, unpublished manuscript, 23 pp.

be purchased in Afghanistan and some parts of Pakistan and have certainly been acquired by the Iranians. At this juncture, nobody knows whether they are still in working order after so many years in the field but most, including commercial air lines, prefer not to take the risk. International flights leaving Islamabad initially fly south to avoid the Hindu Kush and, despite the tremendous cost and loss of profit, commercial flights from South East Asia avoid Afghanistan entirely by flying around the south west coast of the Indian subcontinent.

Virtually anyone, foreign or national, can acquire weapons in the North West Frontier Province, providing the vendors are convinced that neither the ISI or the CIA are involved. Illegal arms bazaars flourish openly around Peshawar and offer assault rifles, mortars, missiles and even anti-aircraft systems. Slowly, these weapons are turning up in other parts of Pakistan and beyond. In Karachi, much of the present chaos and violence is the responsibility of political gangs which openly sport, and use, illegal assault rifles. In late-May, Karachi witnessed one of its worst days over several months of violence. Within a day, 28 people were killed during a pitched battle between the MQM(A) and the Pakistan Rangers. The security forces have been threatened by rocket launchers, anti-tank rockets, light machine guns and assault rifles. These and the weapons used in the recent shooting of US citizens almost certainly originated in the Afghan pipeline.

Weapons are also finding their way into other parts of the India subcontinent. The underworld in Karachi is closely linked to the underworld in Bombay. Weapons are coming across the border and through the Rajasthan desert. Arms traffickers are finding a good market amongst Muslims who, in the wake of the communal violence sparked by the destruction of the Ayodhya mosque in December 1992, no longer feel that the Indian security forces are adequately concerned for the safety of Muslims, with some justification. So, they are turning to the black market for self-defense. There are a growing number of reports of arms seizures in urban centers with sizeable Muslim populations - Surat, Bombay, and Hyderabad, for example. Bihar, arguably the most violent state in India, is also similarly affected. Police intelligence sources estimate that there are 100,000 guns in the area, of which only 25,000 are licensed. Whilst most are crude, country-made weapons or dated rifles, acquisitions of more sophisticated weapons are on the increase. In the main, weapons are used for political coercion, but violent crime is on the increase - in early-1995 one criminal group resorted to the use of landmines.

Whilst the main movement of weapons is from northern Pakistan through into India via either Kashmir or Rajasthan, there are other conduits. Weapons from the Sri Lankan conflict are starting to reach India. Here there are two major routes, one from the Middle East through India to the coastline of Tamil Nadu,

and another from South East Asia (Hong Kong, Bangkok and Singapore) to the northern shores of Sri Lanka. As in the case of the conflict in Afghanistan, weapons will outlast the conflicts for which they were intended.

In addition, routes into South Asia from the east are especially porous. The borders which separate India from Nepal, Bangladesh and Burma can be crossed with relative ease - the India-Burma border is virtually open and a well-known smuggling route for precious and semi-precious stones. Bangladesh is known to have a growing gun control problem which is fuelled by high levels of political violence centered upon university campuses. Significantly, however, ammunition is extremely difficult to find in Bangladesh.

### **Latin America**

The primary demand for light weapons in Latin American countries is criminal, rather than political. In addition, Latin America never really developed as a military Cold War theater in the same way as South Asia or Africa. Consequently, there have been no consistent sources of supply or pipelines because patterns of demand have invariably been subnational and the suppliers commercial.

As might be expected, Bolivia and Colombia have experienced major problems with firearms proliferation, especially in relation to narcotics trafficking; the Medellin Cartel has a military wing. The types of weapons which are in circulation in South America are eclectic, and there are no real patterns of supply.

Of considerable interest to the US authorities is the growing problem of drug traffickers accessing the illegal and legal market for US handguns via Panama. This is also a growing problem in Mexico where rival narcotics factions have been involved in violent confrontations using illegally procured and highly advanced war weapons. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has recently established a link between the easy availability of weapons within the US, due to existing gun control laws, and regional security.

Many of the weapons abandoned by the United States during the withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 were acquired by the Cuban government in exchange for foodstuffs, especially seafood. Thereafter, over the course of the 1980s, these weapons found their way first to the Sandanistas in Nicaragua and then to the FMLN in El Salvador. Other sources of light weapons were a number of H&K and FMBP G3s discarded by the Portuguese when Mozambique and Angola were granted independence. In addition, several other Latin American and Caribbean

countries received weapons originally discarded in Vietnam, including Chile, Colombia, Grenada, and Panama.<sup>35</sup>

Following the summit meeting in Guatemala of the five Central American Presidents in August 1987, the Esquipulas II Agreement was adopted as the framework for peace, national reconciliation and democratization throughout the region. This was followed by an expression of support from the UN Security Council (Resolution 637 (1989)) and, duly, a UN-sponsored peace process and the establishment of The United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA).<sup>36</sup> In March 1990, the Security Council authorized an enlargement of ONUCA's mandate and the addition of armed personnel in order for it to play a part in the voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan resistance. Of critical importance to the peace-keeping process which ensued, the weapons handed over by the Contras were destroyed in situ.<sup>37</sup> By late-1990, over 18,000 weapons had been destroyed and more than 22,000 personnel demobilized.<sup>38</sup>

Obversely, the experience in El Salvador was somewhat different. By March 1995, the Secretary General reported that the ONUSAL mission was largely failing to ensure FMLN adherence to the disarmament agreements contained in the peace accord. The FLMN had, since the cessation of hostilities, kept large quantities of weapons in El Salvador and neighboring countries. Whilst ONUSAL military observers had located and destroyed a number of illegal weapons caches, progress was considered slow. Moreover, efforts by the Government were equally frustrating. Although approximately 2,000 weapons were seized during the first three months of 1995, the voluntary surrender program had proved unsuccessful which in turn prompted the Government to consider a buy-back program.<sup>39</sup> There is very little evidence at the time of writing to suggest, either way, that 'weapons of war' have or have not proliferated beyond the reach of either the state or the peace keeping forces. However, a recent report states that more than 260,000

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<sup>35</sup> E. Ezell, "The Cuban Connection: Guns by the Ton", *IRSAIS*, Vol. I, No. 1, November 1989, pp.10,11.

<sup>36</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-keeping*, Geneva: United Nations, 1990, pp.389-393.

<sup>37</sup> *United Nations Focus: United Nations Role in the Demobilization of the Nicaraguan Resistance*, UN Department of Public Information, July 1990.

<sup>38</sup> *United Nations Observer Group in Central America, Report of the Secretary General*, Security Council Document S/2 1909, 26th October 1990, pp.10-13.

<sup>39</sup> *Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in El Salvador*, S/1995/220, 24th March 1995, pp.2-3.

military small arms remain in private hands and demobilized soldiers and former rebels are being blamed for rising crime levels.<sup>40</sup>

### Middle East and North Africa

The availability of light weapons in the Middle East is probably much less than might be expected, given the history of conflict throughout the region. In Lebanon, the civil war has benefited from the ongoing peace process between Israel, the PLO, Jordan and Syria. But a 'mini-war' still rumbles on involving the South Lebanon Army (SLA) on the one hand and *Hizbollah* on the other. As has been the case in other low-intensity conflicts (see above), this may be a means, albeit temporary, of controlling light weapons. Conversely, given the nature and history of the conflict in Lebanon, it is more likely that weapons are freely available and ownership widespread. Nor are the weapons of war controlled by *Hizbollah* especially limited - the standard counter-measure against Israeli or SLA action is to fire *Katyusha* rockets over the security zone and into northern Israel.<sup>41</sup>

In the inevitably slow passage towards peace in the region, the importance of controlling weapons, firearms and explosives cannot be underestimated. Since the signing of the Israel-PLO peace agreement in September 1993, over 120 Israelis have been killed by knife, gun or bomb.<sup>42</sup> While it may be too late to prevent *Hamas* from acquiring the type of *matériel* it requires to conduct a campaign of terror, violence and bloodshed, the need to control the illegal proliferation of light weapons is considerable. A 'local' arms race resulting in the arming of militant vigilante Jewish settler groups could derail the peace process completely.

If light weapons in the Middle East threaten the peace process itself, there is a relatively small threat of illegal trafficking outside the region, although Israel is a significant producer of light weapons and illegal shipments for commercial gains have been documented.<sup>43</sup> In North Africa, the situation is somewhat different. In Algeria, the military government has been virtually paralysed by the *Front Islamique de Salut* (FIS), which itself is threatened by the more radical Groupe Islamique Armée in the contest for the moral highground of Islamic

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<sup>40</sup> "El Salvador Guns", *Jane's Defense Weekly*, 3rd May 1995.

<sup>41</sup> "Israel's Forgotten War in South Lebanon", *The Economist*, 15th-21st July 1995, p.53.

<sup>42</sup> See IISS, *Strategic Survey 1994/95*, Oxford: OUP/IISS, 1995, p.136.

<sup>43</sup> M. Klare, *Light Weapons Diffusion and Global Violence in the Post-Cold War Era*, (Paper presented to the Pugwash Conference on the Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 21-23 October 1995), p.20-21.

fundamentalism. Weapons supplies for the FIS have largely been obtained from attacks on military and police facilities.<sup>44</sup> However, it is entirely possible that the FIS or the GIA have decided to punish France for its support for Algeria's military government. Following the December 1994 Air France hijack by Islamic militants, speculation has risen that Islamic fundamentalists have commenced a program of terrorism in France, similar to IRA operations on the UK mainland in the 1980s. There is also strong evidence pointing towards the increase in the supply of weaponry into some of the main metropolitan suburbs. The FIS is alleged to receive most of its weapons from Sudan, which is said to operate as an arms warehouse, holding weapons from the Islamic world and distributing them to Muslims in Algeria, Uganda, Egypt, Zaire, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia.<sup>45</sup>

While the attentions of radical Islam within Algeria are focussed upon the former colonial power, the other major power in the Maghreb, Libya, is focussing more on the South. In recent years a large number of light weapons have been transferred by the Khaddafi regime to Chad in support of the Goukouni Weddeyye rebels. It is also strongly suspected that Libyan weapons have flowed south-west, to West African states.

Egypt is much more of an enigma. There have been persistent rumors that Egypt is a main supplier of arms to the SPLA in the Sudan, given that relations between Cairo and Khartoum are unequivocally cool. Moreover, there is also a growing suspicion that Egypt is a major supplier of ammunition throughout the African continent. The motive is unclear and will remain so until suppliers and patterns of trade are deciphered. However, these types of transfers, from countries such as Israel and Egypt, give a useful indication of regional ambitions, in the same way that the transfers of major weapons systems illuminated the foreign policies of the superpowers during the Cold War.

### **Underdevelopment and Conflict: Africa in the 1990s**

The African sub-continent is undoubtedly one of the most conflict-ridden and underdeveloped regions of the world and exhibits many of the symptoms which exacerbate the proliferation and impact of light weapons. Indeed, some pundits argue that the sub-continent is beyond salvation.<sup>46</sup> Without doubt, the

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<sup>44</sup> IISS, *op. cit.*, p.140.

<sup>45</sup> "Sudan Spreads Islamic Extremism", *Foreign Report*, 15th June 1995.

<sup>46</sup> The epitome of this view can be found in R.D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crime, Overpopulation, Tribalism, and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the Social Fabric of Our Planet", *The Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994, pp.44-76.

scale of recent economic decline throughout the entire sub-continent has been uneven but on the whole exceptionally debilitating.

Until recently, Africa was an active theater for superpower confrontation as both sides of the ideological divide struggled to attain influence as a result of the post-colonial upheavals. These upheavals left none of the subregions unaffected - from the Biafran civil war in Nigeria to the protracted and drawn out wars of national liberation in Angola and Mozambique. During the Cold War, most countries received military aid from either one of the superpowers, or France or Britain.

Although there were major exceptions in the cases of Nigeria and South Africa, the majority of African armed forces in West Africa could neither afford, acquire nor assimilate extremely advanced military technology, especially after the commercialization of the international arms market in the 1970s and devastating economic collapse in the 1980s. In addition, the characters of African wars, both civil and regional, have tended to emphasize the use of light weapons and artillery.

The 1980s was a devastating decade for Africa. Following years of poor government, high aid, poor growth rates and then, in the 1980s, falling output finally let loose the forces of economic retrogression. This was followed by a period of structural adjustment, which, to many observers, amounted to little more than structural maladjustment. The resultant cocktail of famine, conflict, alienation, crime and under-development has sent Africa further back, in development terms, than ever thought possible. Even World Bank officials admit that it could be forty years until the sub-continent returns to per capita income levels of the 1970s.

At present, and on balance, the sub-continent is failing to survive the political changes of the post-Cold War era. Recently, Africa's post-colonial cushions have collapsed. The patronage from Moscow and Washington has disappeared and aid donors now demand 'good governance' from corrupt or mismanaged regimes which were once, but are no longer, tolerated. The result has been the partial and sometimes complete collapse of the state and, along with it, civil society - Somalia, Rwanda and Zaire epitomize the failed states of the late-twentieth century, characterized by economic and technological decline, the collapse of education, politisation of the civil service and the erosion of the judiciary.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>47</sup> M. Holman, "Africa is Striving for a Fresh Start", *Financial Times Supplement: Africa - A Continent at Stake*, September 1993.

Both a cause and an effect of this decline has been violent conflict. The African sub-continent typifies the way in which armed conflicts are being transformed into untidy and unstructured affairs where boundaries are blurred and the victims and costs widespread. In many parts of the sub-continent, the availability of light weapons has had a crucial impact upon conflicts and the humanitarian cost of conflict, as well as political outcomes.

### ***West Africa and the Horn***

Where the northern edge of the African subcontinent meets North Africa is one of the more prominent civilisational 'fault lines' where racial, ethnic and religious differences have combined to propel countries such as Chad and the Sudan into debilitating, complex and seemingly unending civil wars.<sup>48</sup> Many of these conflicts have been extended and defined by the transfer of light weapons from regional powers. Nor has the United States resisted the temptation to realize political gains through the supply of light weapons - witness the support extended to the government in Liberia and to rebel forces in the Sudan. The combined impact upon collapsed civil societies and failed states has been immense.

The availability of light weapons has defined the course of conflict in West Africa, especially Liberia. Soon after the outbreak of conflict, light weapons from an array of sources were transferred to the warring factions. Charles Taylor, for example, realized approximately \$8 million a month from the exploitation of natural resources in the areas under his control prior to the outbreak of war, a significant proportion of which was used for the purchase of light weapons. The main suppliers to the Doe regime and rebel army led by Charles Taylor were the United States, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire, South Korea, Libya, Taiwan and Israel. Subsequently, Charles Taylor supplied the rebel forces in Sierre Leone.<sup>49</sup>

Moreover, the peacekeeping forces in Liberia, the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), have, so far, utterly failed to

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<sup>48</sup> The most popular, but not necessarily the first, proponent of the faultline thesis as a paradigm for understanding post-Cold War patterns of insecurity can be found in S.P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp.22-49.

<sup>49</sup> A. Alao, and A. Sasu, *Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation and Civil Society in West Africa*, Department of War Studies/Center for Defense Studies, unpublished manuscript, June 1995, 38p.

successfully disarm anything like the required or projected number of people.<sup>50</sup> Few conflicts in Africa have been as violent or brutal as the Liberian civil war; 150,000 people have lost their lives, 2.5 million people are homeless, and the infrastructure has suffered enormously. Above all, however, there are 50,000 to 60,000 male and female soldiers, some 25% of which are children, and bizarre killers are still roaming the towns and countryside.<sup>51</sup> From the beginning of 1995 until early June, only 190 Liberian combatants had been disarmed.<sup>52</sup>

The scale of light weapons proliferation in West Africa prompted the President of Mali to request the Secretary-General in October 1993 to undertake a fact-finding mission to put forward ideas to prevent Mali from being further affected by this trend. The mission to Mali took place in August 1994 and concluded that the problem had to be addressed not on a country-by-country basis, but on a regional level. This prompted a follow-on mission to neighboring West African states in February/March 1995.

The recommendations of the mission were interesting. While recognizing that Mali was not yet a state on the brink of failure, it saw that time was nevertheless running out. The proliferation of small arms could only be controlled if other countries in the region became involved, namely, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Sierre Leone. Furthermore, the mission advised that further democratic structures could only be put in place once a secure security environment had been established.<sup>53</sup>

In the Sudan, where an especially savage civil war has raged since 1983 and claimed some 1.3 million lives, fighting between government forces and the SPLA proceeds apace, fuelled by weapons imported from abroad. The government was until recently bankrolled by the government in Iran and by wealthy Saudis, on an individual basis. Weapons of highly limited sophistication have been received from China and used with extreme brutality against targets in the South.

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<sup>50</sup> J. Mackinlay and A. Alao, "Liberia ECOMOG and UNOMIL Response to a Complex Emergency", New York: United Nations University, 1995, 65p. provides an excellent overview, with a particular focus on disarmament.

<sup>51</sup> "Peace Among Warlords", *The Economist*, Vol. 336, No. 7931, 9th September 1995, p.67.

<sup>52</sup> *Eleventh Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia*, UN Security Council, S/1995/473, New York, 10th June 1995.

<sup>53</sup> *Mali Advisory Mission Report*, United Nations mimeo, August 1994, p.13.

The SPLA-Mainstream experienced serious problems acquiring weapons and ammunition through 1994. Towards the end of the year, however, stocks of ammunition and light weapons were obtained from either Egypt or Israel and, possibly, following a policy directive from Washington. Israel has also been involved in military training. Though Washington denies any set policy on arms transfers to the region - which would involve for the most part light weapons - Eritrea, Uganda and Kenya have all made requests to the US in recent months and supplies are likely the more the conflict in the Sudan spills across its borders.<sup>54</sup>

During the Somali civil war, most of the heavy weapons in the country were, according to the IISS, in a poor state of repair or inoperable.<sup>55</sup> However, some 30,000 people were killed by light weapons between January 1991 and December 1992. Around the same period, some 300,000 people died of starvation.<sup>56</sup> Although the heavy weapons in the possession of the Somali armed forces may have been inoperable, light weapons were not. Some 500,000 weapons abandoned by the Somali army as the civil war reached its peak in January 1992 quickly found their way into the struggle between forces loyal to General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi.<sup>57</sup> Weapons also flooded into Somalia after the collapse of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia.<sup>58</sup>

Significantly, disarmament was not seen as a part of the mandate provided by Operation Restore Hope (ORH), and the failure by the US to prioritize disarmament became a major source of tension between the UN secretariat and the US-led multinational operation in Somalia. Washington was concerned that if the mission mandate included disarmament, the length of the US mission as well as the risk factor would be increased. This, it was believed, could have eroded the considerable political consensus for ORH within the US. Therefore, Washington was only prepared to include disarmament in the mandate if the process was limited, voluntary and conducted on an ad hoc basis. The UN Secretariat, by contrast, saw disarmament as a priority program which had to be

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<sup>54</sup> "Sudan: Movement in the Minefield", *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 36, No. 3, 3 March 1995, p.3.

<sup>55</sup> "Relief Forces in Somalia Facing Country Awash in Small Arms", *Arms Control Today*, December 1992, p.20.

<sup>56</sup> C.E. Adibe, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Somalia*, Geneva: UNIDIR, unpublished draft (May 1995), p.13.

<sup>57</sup> M. Sahnoun, "Prevention in Conflict Resolution: The Case of Somalia", *Irish Studies in International Affairs*, No. 5, 1994, p.211, quoted in *Ibid.*, p.12.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p.65.

accomplished by UNITAF before a transition to UN command could be effected.<sup>59</sup>

Not only was the US responsible for discouraging the disarmament of the warring parties, but it actively contributed to an increase in the availability of firearms in the region. As a parting gesture, the US peacekeeping force donated 5,000 M-16 rifles and 5,000 handguns to the Somali police, which was seen at the time as a maladroit gesture in a country already flooded with weapons. Soon after, brand-new M-16s were sighted in the hands of criminals.<sup>60</sup>

### *Central Africa*

Since the end of the civil war in Rwanda, there has been a great deal of interest in the supply of weapons to and the circulation of weapons in and around the Great Lakes area. Following the 1990 invasion of Rwanda by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) from its base in Uganda, arms began to flow to both sides. The Hutu government was too poorly armed to resist the invasion by the RPF, which was both equipped and more or less led by Ugandan military personnel. This link dates back to the early-1980s when Tutsi exiles, known as the Banyarwanda, fled to Uganda. Following persecution in Uganda, many joined a guerilla movement led by Yoweri Museveni, which eventually took power in 1986.

Following the rapid transfer of weapons and troop support from France and military training and non-lethal supplies from Belgium, the Hutu government was able to counter the invasion. Thereafter both sides rushed to rearm, acquiring weapons from private sources and foreign governments. The Hutu government purchased AK47s from Russia, but the main bulk of equipment came from France, Egypt and South Africa.<sup>61</sup> In 1993, an exercise in preventive diplomacy produced the Arusha Accords but these were never implemented. Meanwhile extremists began to take control of the government and waged savage attacks against the Tutsi minority, amounting to genocide in the eyes of many international observers. The counter-attack by the Tutsi RPF routed the Hutus,

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<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.*, p.56.

<sup>60</sup> "Somalia: The End of the Chapter", *The Economist*, Vol. 350, No. 7856, 2nd April 1994, p.56.

<sup>61</sup> The latter deals contravened UN Security Council Resolution 558, forbidding the import of arms from South Africa.

who fled across the border into Tanzania in one of the largest movements of refugees in history.<sup>62</sup>

While the international community largely ignored one of the most savage conflicts since the end of the Second World War, it was left to the French to intervene. *Operation Turquoise* managed to instil a degree of stability in the west of the country but not for long. Nor was there any attempt on the part of the French to disarm the warring parties, which was hardly unexpected given France's role as a major arms exporter to Rwanda. On the contrary, France took no steps to prevent the UN arms embargo from being broken.<sup>63</sup>

Since the end of the conflict, there have been persistent rumors that light weapons are still finding their way into the area. Of particular concern, the Chinese have set up a 7.62mm ammunition plant in Uganda, 7.62mm being the appropriate calibre for an AK47.<sup>64</sup> Zimbabwe Defense Industries also has set up an ammunition plant with the assistance of the Chinese.

In June 1995 two of the world's foremost human rights groups, Human Rights Watch/Africa and Amnesty International, produced reports which offered persuasive evidence that France, China, South Africa, Zaire and the Seychelles were assisting in the rearmament of Rwanda's former Hutu army.<sup>65</sup> In response the UN has set up a Commission to investigate the situation and is due to report in early-1996. Nevertheless, the UN has been in possession of evidence for some time before the publication of these reports.<sup>66</sup>

Also, fears of a similar conflict in Burundi linger on. This has also promoted the interest of arms exports, notably from China. In May 1995 a Chinese ship carrying 152 tons of arms destined for the Tutsi-dominated government in

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<sup>62</sup> For a short but comprehensive account of the Rwanda tragedy see S.D. Goose and F. Smyth, "Arming Genocide in Rwanda", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 73, No. 1, September/October 1994, pp.86-96, and IISS, *Strategic Survey*, Oxford: IISS/OUP, 1995, pp.207-211.

<sup>63</sup> C. McGreal, "Paris Stands By as Arms Pour Through Eastern Zaire", *The Guardian*, 23rd June 1994.

<sup>64</sup> I am grateful to Robert Jarman, Defense Research and Analysis, London, for this information.

<sup>65</sup> *Rearming with Impunity: International Support for the Perpetrators of the Rwandan Genocide*, Vol. 7, No. 4, New York: Human Rights Watch Arms Project, May 1995.

<sup>66</sup> M. Huband, "UN Alert Urged as Arms Pour in for New Rwanda War", *The Observer*, 26th March 1995.

Burundi was prevented from unloading in Tanzania by the government.<sup>67</sup> France has called unsuccessfully for an arms embargo.<sup>68</sup>

### *Southern Africa*

Across the northern belt of the African sub-continent, light weapons are continuing to enter theaters of conflict, thereby adding to the existing stocks of weaponry in the continent as a whole. Further south, however, towards and including Southern Africa, flows of weapons have virtually ceased, with the exception of Angola. Despite the fact that the May 1991 Bicesse Accords prohibited both the government and UNITA from acquiring new weaponry, and despite the UN Security Council embargo on arms sales to UNITA in September 1993, weapons flowed into the region following the resumption of conflict. The return to conflict in late-1992 led to renewed procurement programs on both sides - facilitated financially on the government side by oil revenues, while UNITA exploited its access to Angola's diamond producing areas.<sup>69</sup>

On the government side, the majority of the procurement drive involved the acquisition of major weapons systems, such as T-55 and T-62 main battle tanks. However, one shipment destined for the government was known to have included four million rounds of 7.62 ammunition for AK47s; this shipment was well-documented following an incident when the cargo ship concerned, carrying weapons for Angola from the Czech Republic and the Russian Federation, was impounded in the British port of Plymouth.<sup>70</sup> In addition to the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic, other suppliers of light weapons to the government included Brazil (X-40 and X-60 rockets), North Korea (SA-2 missiles), Israel or South Africa (Galil or R4/R5 rifles), Nigeria (G-3 rifles), the US (anti-tank weapons) and Zimbabwe (indigenously produced ammunition).<sup>71</sup>

On the UNITA side, the three main traditional sources of weaponry were South Africa and the United States, plus the steady supply of weapons captured

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<sup>67</sup> "Ship Laden with Arms for Burundi Stranded in Tanzanian Port", *Agence France - Presse International News*, 3rd May 1995.

<sup>68</sup> "France for Burundi Embargo", *The Asian Age*, 15th April 1995.

<sup>69</sup> The ease by which both sides marshalled the financial resources to fund a renewed procurement drive is an excellent indication as to the country's economic and development potential.

<sup>70</sup> *Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections*, London: Human Rights Watch Arms Project/Human Rights Watch - Africa, November 1994, p.37.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.*, pp.35-47.

from the Angolan government. The US contribution of military aid was second only to what went through the Afghan pipeline to assist the Afghan *mujahideen*. However, in recent years, supplies from South Africa and the USA have declined substantially.<sup>72</sup>

Since the restart of the civil war, UNITA has been compelled to look for other, more covert supplies. Zaire has acted as both an outright supplier and a conduit, as has Namibia, to a much smaller degree. Russian and British arms dealers were thought to be involved, as were France, the Ukraine and Bulgaria. Many of the weapons were paid for using diamonds and necessitating the involvement of large mining companies, such as the De Beers diamond cartel.<sup>73</sup>

Elsewhere, there are two major and inter-related reasons for the cessation of weapons flows. First, conflicts throughout the region have either slowed or ended. The termination of civil wars in Angola and Mozambique, coupled with political change in South Africa, has reduced the demand for light weapons, at least in the quantities required following mass troop mobilization. Second, existing stocks comfortably outweigh demand, in regional terms at least.

At the same time, the termination of conflicts in Angola and Mozambique and the subsequent peace processes have given rise to a new phenomenon. The peace processes throughout the region have not been accompanied by either comprehensive disarmament or the adequate control of weapons by the appropriate authorities. As a result, literally millions of weapons are now relatively free to change hands because they are no longer required or controlled by parties to the civil wars. Within the region, new arms flows have developed, primarily from within Mozambique and to a lesser extent from Angola. The main destination for light weapons is now South Africa, where demand from political and criminal groups is considerable.

#### **IV. Peacekeeping and Arms Control in Southern Africa**

Over the course of the 1990s, Southern Africa has witnessed profound political change. The Mozambique civil war has ended and a democratic process has started following national elections in October 1994, the first in the country's

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<sup>72</sup> The weapons which formed the basis for the recent Cameron Commission enquiry were surplus light weapons which were sold to a Middle East-based middle man because the supply of arms to UNITA had been all but stopped.

<sup>73</sup> Human Rights Watch, *op. cit.*, pp.49-59.

history. At the time of this writing, the peace process in Angola is just about holding and plans for UNAVEM III are well-advanced. Perhaps of greatest significance, the democratic process in South Africa proceeds apace.

From an international perspective, the prospect for political stability and economic growth in Southern Africa is considered to be excellent.<sup>74</sup> To a great extent, the international community can, and indeed does, take some credit for these developments. Interest in the preservation of democracy is higher than anywhere else in the world, even including the trend elsewhere towards 'good governance' programs. It is undeniably clear that diplomatic and political efforts from the outside have assisted Southern Africa. Capital, both economic and political, is flowing into the country and there are no signs that members of the international community are tiring of the most important experiment in democracy since the end of the Second World War.

However, it is also the case that present and future efforts to achieve stability and security, both within the region and the individual countries concerned, have been seriously compromised by failures within the peacemaking processes to achieve the decommissioning of weapons.

### **Peacekeeping in Mozambique**

The history of the conflict in Mozambique has been documented extensively in recent years.<sup>75</sup> In the early-1960s Mozambique became engulfed in the tide of anti-colonialism which developed throughout Africa. A variety of independence movements were established over this period but the independence struggle only began to take shape in earnest when three independence groups combined in 1962 to form the Frente da Libertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO). In 1974, following the military coup in Portugal, the Portuguese government relinquished power in Mozambique and a FRELIMO-dominated national government took control.

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<sup>74</sup> For representative views of international optimism, see J. Spence, *Change in South Africa*, London: Chatham House, 1994; and K. Cole (ed.), *Sustainable Development for a Democratic South Africa*, London: Earthscan, 1994, 247p.

<sup>75</sup> See, for example, J. Hanlon, *Mozambique: The Revolution Under Fire*, London: Zed Books, 1985. For a more comprehensive analysis of the UNOMOZ operation see P. Batchelor, "Disarmament, Small Arms and Internal Conflict: The Case of Southern Africa", Geneva: UNIDIR, unpublished draft (July, 1995); and E. Berman, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Mozambique*, Geneva: UNIDIR, forthcoming.

The new government's strong stand against minority rule in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa quickly attracted the hostility of both regimes and Southern Rhodesia began to supply armaments and training to anti-governments forces inside Mozambique. In 1977, after Mozambique declared itself to be a Marxist-Leninist state and signed aid agreements with the USSR and Cuba, Southern Rhodesia began to channel covert military aid directly to MNR/RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance/Resistencia Nacional Mocambicana).

Following Zimbabwe's attainment of independence, support to RENAMO ceased but the resulting shortfalls were quickly made up by South Africa and a number of Western countries. Thereafter, RENAMO grew in size through the 1980s, supported as well by commando and air force raids by the South African security force. By the late-1980s RENAMO controlled wide areas of the countryside and Mozambique plunged into a full civil war.<sup>76</sup>

The General Peace Agreement signed in Rome by RENAMO and FRELIMO in October 1992 marked the formal cessation of the conflict in Mozambique. The civil war had been exceptionally violent and debilitating, with over one million casualties, an even larger number of refugees, and an economy comprehensively devastated by strife, mismanagement and corruption.<sup>77</sup>

The involvement of the UN grew directly out of the peace process, insofar as both sides agreed in Rome that the transition to peace should be monitored by the UN and was to last for two years. ONUMOZ was officially launched in 1992 with a mandate to structure and implement the demobilization of an estimated 63,000 government and 20,000 RENAMO troops.<sup>78</sup>

The disarmament of the warring parties was implicit in the concept of demobilization, insofar as demobilization involved the transfer of former combatants either into the new army or back into civilian life.<sup>79</sup> If combatants were to be reintegrated into the new national army, then personal weapons would be issued after reintegration. The need for disarmament prior to re-entry into civilian life is self-evident.

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<sup>76</sup> *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, New York: Department of Public Information, 1995, pp.7-13.

<sup>77</sup> C. Alden, "The UN and the Resolution of Conflict in Mozambique", *The Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1995, p.103.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p.105.

<sup>79</sup> J.P.B. Coelho and A. Vines, *Demobilization and Re-Integration of Ex-Combatants in Mozambique*, Oxford: Refugee Studies Program, QEH, 1995, p.1.

ONUMOZ peacekeepers in the field had a clear understanding of the disarmament component within both the original peace agreement and the relevant UN Security Council Resolution which set up ONUMOZ.<sup>80</sup> However, within the ONUMOZ mandate, guidelines as to what constituted disarmament, and how to achieve it, were absent. From the wording of the mandate, it would seem that the disarmament process was almost entirely subsumed under the definition of demobilization:

The term "demobilized soldier" means an individual who . . . subsequent to E-Day was demobilized at the decision of the relevant command, and handed over the weapons, ammunition, equipment, uniform and documentation in his possession . . .<sup>81</sup>

Nevertheless, to many ONUMOZ personnel working in the field, disarmament was a central feature of the agreement. It entailed the destruction of weapons and other appropriate forms of disposal. Disarmament was to cover only individual soldiers entering the assembly areas.<sup>82</sup>

The limitations of the ONUMOZ mandate with regard to disarmament stemmed from the linkage to demobilization. ONUMOZ was denied permission, by the rules approved by the Cease-Fire Commission, to collect and disable weapons outside the assembly areas. In so far as hidden caches and weapons outside the assembly areas were implicitly excluded, it proved impossible to undertake anything approaching a comprehensive disarmament of the warring parties, let alone civilians in a polity which had become deeply militarized and well-armed over the course of the civil war.

Overall, the mandate was insufficiently clear when it came down to small print. Linkage between disarmament inside and outside the assembly areas was lacking. Top-down changes to the mandate after demobilization virtually eliminated the 'one soldier-one weapon' principle, which was particularly significant in the light of reports to the effect that RENAMO was stockpiling weapons. Although changes did occur, the UN did not offer full support for these

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<sup>80</sup> The following information is taken from United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), *Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization During Peacekeeping Operations*, ONUMOZ Operation, Geneva: UNIDIR, unpublished survey responses. The author is grateful to Mira Berglund for research assistance on this part of the paper.

<sup>81</sup> "General Peace Agreement for Mozambique", reproduced in United Nations Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1995, p.116.

<sup>82</sup> UNIDIR, *Practitioners' Questionnaire*, ONUMOZ Operation.

changes: one area in which UN support was lacking, for instance, was the destruction of ammunition.<sup>83</sup> Many of the UN's best efforts were contradicted because both FRELIMO and RENAMO attempted to frustrate the process and maintain possession of as many weapons as possible.<sup>84</sup>

In principle, both RENAMO and FRELIMO soldiers had to surrender their individual weapons. Representatives from both sides, as a part of the cease-fire agreement, were committed to supply the UN with complete inventories of troop strength, arms, ammunition, mines and other explosives. These inventories would be provided on E-Day, Eday+6, Eday+30, and every 15 days thereafter, but for the most part only from within the assembly areas.<sup>85</sup> Overall, the weaponry which was surrendered proved to be of very mixed quality. ONUMOZ either destroyed weapons if the quality was extremely poor or, if the condition was reasonable or better, they were sent to the Mozambiquan Defense Force (FADM) for storage. Mines and ammunition were destroyed at the local level; both were assumed to be unstable.<sup>86</sup>

By the end of the mission, the Secretary General reported on the disarming of the two sides:

ONUMOZ collected from the military and paramilitary forces, as well as from the general population, a total of 189,827 weapons, 43,491 of which belonged to the paramilitary forces. A limited amount of arms, ammunition and explosives was destroyed, while the remainder was transferred to the new Mozambican Defense Force (FADM).<sup>87</sup>

At the same time, however, it was not possible for ONUMOZ to complete the verification and monitoring process to ensure that the mission had conducted a clean sweep. It was therefore impossible to do anything more than speculate as to how much of a success disarmament had really been. By the end of the

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<sup>83</sup> In addition, when UNOMOZ requested an additional £35 million (approximately \$52.5 million) to ensure more comprehensive disarmament throughout Mozambique, the request was turned down in New York. I am grateful to Lt. Col. (Ret'd.) Clive Larkins for this information.

<sup>84</sup> UNIDIR, *Practitioners' Questionnaire*, ONUMOZ Operation.

<sup>85</sup> "Letter dated 19 August 1992 from the Secretary-General to President Chissano on the role of the United Nations in the Rome Peace Talks", in United Nations Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, p.99.

<sup>86</sup> UNIDIR, *Practitioners' Questionnaire*, ONUMOZ Operation.

<sup>87</sup> *Final Report of the Secretary-General on ONUMOZ*, S/1994/1449, 23rd December 1994, reproduced in United Nations Department of Public Information, *The United Nations and Mozambique 1992-1995*, pp.296.

operation it was abundantly clear that anything but a comprehensive disarmament program had been achieved.

Throughout the mission, disarmament efforts encountered considerable obstacles. The circumspect nature of the ONUMOZ mandate largely prevented the peacekeeping forces from tackling arms caches outside the assembly areas, which represented a significant proportion of the weapons at large inside the country. Although ONUMOZ was permitted a verification role, personnel and equipment were insufficient. One exception was the decommissioning of munitions, but there were too few explosives teams to destroy mines and ammunition. In addition, it was difficult in some places to transport large stocks of arms and ammunition due to insufficient means of transportation. This was especially the case in RENAMO areas, which were often more remote and inaccessible.

These problems were accompanied by additional complications. The ONUMOZ mandate did allow for coercive disarmament but it frequently proved impossible or inadvisable to enforce the surrender of weapons, which on occasion compromised both disarmament and control over the movement of weapons. Finally, ONUMOZ was unclear as to what its goal should be on the disarmament front. Nobody knew how many weapons were in circulation, so no one could tell when disarmament had been accomplished. Nor was it totally clear as to which organizations, ranging from the NGOs to the Mozambique police, should be, or indeed were, involved in the disarmament process.<sup>88</sup> When the UN left Mozambique in December 1994, some 40% of RENAMO's arms caches had not been verified by the UN Ceasefire Commission.<sup>89</sup>

The extent of the ONUMOZ success, or failure, depends in a large part upon the proportion of weapons which the mission managed to secure on a permanent basis. Temporary collection and storage at assembly areas could only be a part of the process, given the UN's agreed-upon departure date soon after the election. But the proportion of weapons which were permanently secured is difficult to determine, since the total number of weapons in the country at the time remains in question. The Secretary-General's report claims that marginally less than 190,000 weapons were collected and that the majority were of Soviet origin. By contrast, INTERPOL reports that some 1.5 million AK47s were distributed to the

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<sup>88</sup> UNIDIR, *Practitioners' Questionnaire*, ONUMOZ Operation. In the questionnaire returns, 7 respondents indicated that the police were involved in the collection of weapons, whereas eight returns stated that only UN observers were involved.

<sup>89</sup> "Underpaid, Underfed and Unruly", *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 36, No. 17, 14th April 1995, p.7.

civilian population over the course of the civil war.<sup>90</sup> More recently, a report has estimated that some 6 million AK47s are now available in Mozambique.<sup>91</sup> This may be too high; current estimates - received wisdom - suggest that the Soviet Union shipped between 0.5 and 1 million AK47s. There is no documentation available, however, to confirm or deny either of these figures.

Weapons brought into the country through other sources are also difficult to quantify. Statistics on transfers by Rhodesia and later by South Africa have also proved impossible to acquire. According to a former member of the South African Special Forces, the South African government supplied very large amounts of weapons to RENAMO, most of which were of Chinese origin<sup>92</sup> - probably in the form of stick hand grenades, mines, ammunition and Type 56 assault rifles.<sup>93</sup> What too of the support provided by independent right wing groups to RENAMO, or sales made by private contractors? Consequently, it is, and always has been, impossible to estimate how many light weapons were transferred into Mozambique.

Despite the claims made in the Secretary General's reports on ONUMOZ operations, the collection of weapons either possessed by or in the indirect control of the warring parties was unsuccessful. Moreover, the failures continued after the ONUMOZ operation had been concluded. When the UN forces left, a large number of weapons held in government armories or in the assembly areas were stolen and passed back into the civilian population. During the cantonment process, the weapons surrendered by troops were kept in special stores and keys were held by the camp commander and the ONUMOZ representative.<sup>94</sup> When ONUMOZ left, the camp commander would have enjoyed full control over the weapons store. Following the departure of the UN, civil-military relations in Mozambique were far from good - there were several mutinies in early-1995 over pay.<sup>95</sup> Many weapons stored in or close to the assembly areas, therefore, found their way into the hands of arms traffickers and criminals.

In summary, the failure of the ONUMOZ operation to undertake effective disarmament turns on several factors.

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<sup>90</sup> *Third International Symposium on Firearms and Explosives*, INTERPOL, Lyons, 7-9 September, 1994, p.8.

<sup>91</sup> *Africa Confidential*, *op. cit.*, p.7.

<sup>92</sup> Confidential information made available to the author, Johannesburg, June 1995.

<sup>93</sup> The Type 56 is a reverse-engineered AK47.

<sup>94</sup> Coelho and Vines, *op. cit.*, p.10.

<sup>95</sup> *Africa Confidential*, *op. cit.*, p.7.

- First, while the disarmament component was a central feature of the peace accord, the resources made available to fulfil this mission were clearly inadequate.
- Second, both RENAMO and FRELIMO failed on too many occasions to assist ONUMOZ, for both personal and broader political gain.
- Third, ONUMOZ failed to acquire a clear interpretation of how to fulfil disarmament. Reports from those in the field are often contradictory and admit to a degree of confusion.<sup>96</sup>
- Fourth, too few weapons were actually destroyed, despite the fact that the destruction of light weapons is neither difficult nor expensive - a hydraulic press mounted on the back of a four-wheel drive vehicle is perfectly adequate.<sup>97</sup>
- Fifth, far too little effort was made to ensure the continuity of the disarmament process after the ONUMOZ mission had been concluded. This could have been greatly assisted through the destruction of all weapons handed over to ONUMOZ, for which the new government could have taken responsibility and which the UN could have verified.
- Sixth, ONUMOZ had no mandate to act outside the assembly areas on disarmament; it could only decommission dangerous ordnance.
- Finally, conceptual clarity over the difference and overlap between demobilization and disarmament was clearly lacking, which may be a reason why so many arms caches were left untouched.

### **The Peace Processes in Namibia, Angola and Rhodesia**

In relation to the peace-keeping operation in Mozambique, other peace keeping operations have provided less of a negative regional impact. However, in the case of UNAVEM, a great deal depends upon to what extent the UN will be capable of learning the disarmament lessons of ONUMOZ to ensure that weapons are surrendered, controlled and secured.

The peace process in Angola was made possible by the end of the Cold War, especially following the withdrawal of Cuban troops. In late-December 1988 the UN established UNAVEM I through the endorsement of Resolution 626.

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<sup>96</sup> UNIDIR, *Practitioners' Questionnaire*, ONUMOZ Operation.

<sup>97</sup> Hydraulic or manual presses are used by the South Africa Police logistical unit in Pretoria to destroy illegal weapons captured in either South Africa or further afield, after which they are shipped to a foundry as scrap.

UNAVEM I was successful insofar as it was set up to verify the withdrawal of Cuban troops, which duly occurred by the end of May 1991.

UNAVEM II entered Angola with a different mandate and against a changed international backdrop. The overall purpose of UNAVEM II was to verify the arrangements set out in the cease-fire agreements and monitor the neutrality of the Angolan peace force, as set out in the Protocol of Estoril. At the outset, UNAVEM II was given a mandate to observe the cantonment of armies in certain areas and to verify the surrender of weapons by both armies. They were not responsible for searching out hidden weapons caches or for penalizing parties for non-compliance.<sup>98</sup>

The importance of disarmament to the overall success of UNAVEM II was unequivocal. Peacekeepers on the ground believed the disarmament component was designed to achieve several outcomes. It authorized the full disarmament of MPLA and UNITA forces, along with their demobilization and integration into the new army of Angola (FAA), prior to holding free and fair elections. It mandated the collection, storage and custody of all the armaments in the hands of the population by the national police force (UNAVEM II was charged with verifying the neutrality of the Angolan police force as set out in the Protocol of Estoril). In addition, the disarmament component authorized the mission to: prevent the entry of new weapons and lethal materials into the country; retain arms under control in the cantonment areas; sort weapons for later use by the new Angolan Army and destroy unserviceable weapons; and run the disarmament process in tandem with demobilization, completing the process before elections started.<sup>99</sup>

It is widely accepted that disarmament did not take place prior to the elections due primarily to the lack of trust by UNITA and the MPLA. UNITA kept approximately 30,000 troops out of the disarmament process, and the MPLA approximately 10,000. Existing problems were compounded by time delays of up to two months before any weapons collection took place. Personnel on the ground felt that they had not been briefed adequately on the UNAVEM II mandate, and there was no adequate timetable set out for UNAVEM II to monitor progress.

Within the collection areas, UNAVEM II had a limited mandate over the collection and storage of weapons. The initial peace accords designed to bring the

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<sup>98</sup> Y. Lodico, *The United Nations Angolan Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) and Prospects for UNAVEM III*, Stimson Center, forthcoming, p.11, 13.

<sup>99</sup> United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), *Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization During Peacekeeping Operations*, UNAVEM II Operation, Geneva: UNIDIR, unpublished survey responses.

civil war to an end were drawn up by UNITA and the MPLA. Funding for a major UN peace-keeping operation was impossible to secure. Consequently, when mistrust between the two sides surfaced, the disarmament process broke down. UNITA and the MPLA controlled weapons stocks in the assembly areas. In some cases, soldiers within the assembly areas retained their weapons. Ideally, UNAVEM II would have preferred to separate the weapons from the assembly points as originally envisaged in the peace agreement, but the warring parties were not prepared for this to happen. Even so, the financial resources would not have been available had this been a firm part of the UNAVEM II mandate. In sum, the UN role did not extend beyond the selection of arms to be destroyed or forwarded for the new armed forces, the verification of security during storage and transportation support.

The ramifications for UNAVEM II and for the Angolan state could not have been worse. Observers claim that preparations to restart the war began well before the elections. In Angola, the level of mutual mistrust was such that a successful election could not have been possible while both sides remained in control of their weapons.

In Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, the UN played no role in the termination of minority rule and the onset of democracy. Instead, the British government both brokered and oversaw the transition to peace and democracy. Of critical interest and importance, the British did not attempt to disarm the warring factions. It was recognized at an early stage that the nature of the country and the level of enmity which continued to exist between the several warring factions together made disarmament an impossible mission prior to the election.

After Mugabe's election victory in March 1980, a British Military Assistance Team was requested to help with the training and integration of the new armed forces. This required the disarmament, demobilization and integration of 18,000 ZANLA, 6,000 ZIPRA and 16,000 RSF personnel. By the time the Commonwealth Monitoring Force had left, a degree of co-operation and stability had been achieved, so much so that the operation was widely regarded as a success. Paradoxically, stability had been achieved because, rather than despite the fact that, attempts to disarm the warring parties were deliberately not made. A further decline into violence and conflict was avoided because the warring parties were persuaded that their security was underwritten.<sup>100</sup>

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<sup>100</sup> J. Giniifer, *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Rhodesia/Zimbabwe*, Geneva: UNIDIR, 1995.

The peacekeeping operation in Namibia was similarly successful. As in the case of ONUMOZ and UNAVEM, UNTAG's mandate contained a clear reference to disarmament. Statements by the UN and reports from the field all suggest that the disarmament component was carried out effectively and successfully.<sup>101</sup>

Peace-keeping operations in Southern Africa have returned some largely disappointing results regarding the commitment and ability to disarm the warring parties and thereby to offer continuity to peace-making processes. Success, as in the case of Namibia and Zimbabwe, may have contributed significantly to the relatively smooth transitions to democracy and the discernible diminution of violence. In the case of Angola, however, the failure to disarm the warring parties made the resurgence of civil war, and the massive humanitarian tragedy which followed, virtually inevitable. In Mozambique, the failure to disarm did not lead to a resurgence of war between RENAMO and FRELIMO. However, the growing availability of light weapons in the country and the region as a whole has been costly and debilitating because of its impact upon criminal and political violence.

The British succeeded in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in part through luck and also because the CMT showed far fewer signs of bureaucratic inertia and rigidity than has been evident in UN operations. ONUMOZ and UNAVEM II, by comparison, failed for a number of common reasons. First, disarmament was half-heartedly attempted without laying the necessary foundations of confidence-building and transparency. Second, disarmament was always incomplete. This is especially true with regard to the failure to destroy the weapons which were captured or to store them safely, which made rearmament a formality. Nor did the overlooking of weapons caches make much sense to the overall process. Third, the interpretation of the mandates in each case appears to have been flexible and unduly influenced by political exigencies on the ground and financial constraints in New York.

Nevertheless, the difficulties facing peacekeepers should not be underestimated. Under any circumstances, achieving the disarmament of warring parties so soon after the termination of a conflict is complex at best. Nor would any responsible faction leader consider the complete surrender of weapons in an uncertain political environment. It seems, however, that ONUMOZ and

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<sup>101</sup> United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, *op. cit.*, pp.341-388 and United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), *Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization During Peacekeeping Operations*, UNTAG Operation, Geneva: UNIDIR, unpublished survey responses.

UNAVEM could have done much more with a clearer mandate, more financial muscle and, beyond political will, a clear vision of the cost of failure.

## **V. Regional Peacekeeping: Implications for South Africa**

### **Firearms Trafficking and Weapons Proliferation**

One of the most important aspects of the transition to democracy in South Africa has been the nature of the conflict which brought an end to apartheid rule. First, the relatively successful - or bloodless - integration of the armed forces has provided a platform for internal security which cannot be overvalued. This has happened largely because the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK - the armed wing of the ANC) largely fought the South African Police, not the South African Defense Force. Second, the configuration of the conflict was somewhat unique in so far as the MK did not seek to acquire and control territory or key communication arteries. Instead, the intention was to raise the political and economic cost for the apartheid regime, both domestically and internationally. Of critical importance, this meant that few weapons were transferred into the country, although to some extent this changed with Operation Vula which involved arming the ANC in the townships.<sup>102</sup>

Consequently, when change came, South Africa had, in theory, an opportunity to ring-fence itself as a relatively gun-free society, despite the widespread possession of licensed firearms. This has not happened. Efforts to control the spread of legal and illegal firearms are failing with a rapidity that may yet have profound implications for the future stability of the republic. A major reason for this failure is the influx of weaponry from Mozambique and increasingly from Angola, to satisfy political and criminal demands. Weaponry is available at low prices and in abundant quantities, primarily because UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ failed so palpably to fulfil their mandates to disarm the warring parties over the course of the peacekeeping operations.

In Mozambique, the departure of ONUMOZ permitted weapons to leak out of the assembly areas and into arms trafficking networks. In addition, around the country there are an unknown but large number of arms caches, unguarded and open to retrieval and resale. Some of these caches are sizeable - one recent discovery uncovered a farmhouse stacked with mines, RPGs, ammunition and

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<sup>102</sup> The author is grateful to Colonel Rocky Williams for these points.

AK47s.<sup>103</sup> Former RENAMO and FRELIMO soldiers have knowledge of and access to these caches. There is a considerable amount of evidence that senior officers from both sides have become actively involved in arms trafficking.<sup>104</sup> There also appears to be a good deal of ad hoc buying and selling. This may involve peasant farmers who uncover arms caches on their land or in the bush, or former soldiers who failed to surrender their personal weapons. Levels of poverty in Mozambique are driving many who own weapons, or can gain access to them, to sell them within the country for whatever price they can command.

There are several established conduits for weapons coming into South Africa from Mozambique.<sup>105</sup> The most direct route, though Komartiport, along the route which links Maputo to Johannesburg, is less used now than in the past. Other routes have proved much safer for smugglers and closer to potential markets. At present, these are:

- from the former Transkei to Southern Kwazlul/Natal, the Kwazlul/Natal Midlands, and Northern Kwazlul/Natal;
- from the former Transkei to the former Ciskei in the Eastern Cape, and to Gauteng, Kwazlul/Natal, and the Western Cape;
- from Mozambique via Swaziland to Northern Kwazlul/Natal and the Kwazlul/Natal Midlands;
- from Mozambique to Northern Kwazlul/Natal, via two temporary border posts near Ndumo Game Reserve and Kosi Bay; and
- from Mozambique to Eastern Transvaal and Gauteng.

The methods adopted by arms traffickers are far from sophisticated, but they often work. Border security posts are underfunded and understaffed. The Mozambique-South African border is exceptionally porous - even the Kaftan Fence is breached frequently and no longer carries a lethal electric current. Elsewhere along the border, the fence is crossed regularly - at certain points there are stiles. This makes smuggling weapons on foot feasible enough. A bag of weapons, usually wrapped in a nylon rice bag, can be hidden across the fence and collected at a later stage. Weapons are also brought in and sometimes sold by illegal immigrants - there are some one million Mozambicans in South Africa.

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<sup>103</sup> Video made available to the author by South African Police Intelligence, Pretoria, March 1995.

<sup>104</sup> See for example, M. Fried, "The Gun Run", *Cosmopolitan*, November 1994.

<sup>105</sup> Information made available to the author, Pretoria, June 1995.

The most frequently uncovered methods of arms smuggling and transportation are the following:

- Two vehicles, one acting as a transporter for weapons, the other as a pilot. The first vehicle will reconnoitre the route and warn the vehicle following of additional vigilance and surveillance by the border security forces, such as road blocks.
- Transportation of illegal firearms in luggage on passenger trains.
- Concealment of firearms and ammunition amongst heavy vehicle payloads which are exceptionally difficult to uncover, given the amount of freight which moves across the border. One shipment of weapons was uncovered in a truck full of frozen fish.
- Firearms and ammunition are concealed in the panels, tires, fuel tanks and luggage compartments of vehicles. An average-sized fuel tank can conceal up to fifteen AK47s, complete with magazines and ammunition.
- False compartments in vehicles.<sup>106</sup>

Swaziland has also become an important conduit for weapons from Mozambique. The borders between Mozambique and Swaziland are more porous than those between Mozambique and South Africa. The border post at Lomashasha is a major market center for light weapons, especially pistols (the Makarov, the Tokarev and the 9mm Browning) and AK 47s - one report put the Lomashasha market value of an AK47 in 1993 at \$6.00.<sup>107</sup> The Swazi security forces are less able to cope with arms trafficking than their South African counterparts, due primarily to inadequate budgets and poor staffing.<sup>108</sup> By comparison, AK47s and small arms retail on the illegal market *within* South Africa for substantially larger sums of money. In most areas the current price for an AK47 can be as high as R.1,500, which represents a potential profit of close to \$400 for each weapon.<sup>109</sup> Therefore, a cache of fifteen weapons, an amount commonly recovered in the fuel tanks of vehicles used for smuggling, could return a profit of up to \$6,000.

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<sup>106</sup> Information made available to the author, Pretoria, June 1995.

<sup>107</sup> T. Msengezi, "Illegal Arms Trade: An Ingredient for Crime", *Southern African News Features*, June 1993.

<sup>108</sup> Information made available to the author, Mbabane, November 1994.

<sup>109</sup> As of this writing, the exchange rate for the Rand equalled approximately 4 Rand for 1 U.S. dollar.

The South African security forces have been quick to address this growing problem, despite considerable institutional rancor between the police and the army. It is the South African Police Intelligence which is responsible for firearms trafficking control, and successful links have been made with the Mozambican police and the Swazi security forces - significantly, the Mozambican army is not included in arms trafficking operations. Following the establishment of a dedicated Firearms Investigation Unit in South Africa, active arrangements have been made with neighboring countries on two levels. First, there is a separate agreement with Mozambique, code-named 'Operation Rachel'. Joint operations have been underway now for over eighteen months, although a formal agreement between the two countries was not signed until March 1995, during President Chissano's visit to South Africa. There also exists a trilateral agreement which brings in Swaziland. These agreements provide for access to detainees for interrogation in whichever country they are detained by any party to the agreement; regular exchange of information; and constant contact at the field level.<sup>110</sup>

So far, joint operations have worked reasonably well, especially with regard to intelligence networks, which are seen by the South African Police as the most effective way of combating arms trafficking. Arms seizures have risen significantly in recent months. Between 1991 and 1994, seizures of AK47 and other rifles increased by around 50%, whereas seizures of pistols more than doubled. Seizures of 7.62 ammunition - the type required for an AK47 - increased in 1994 by two and a half times the amount in 1991 (see Table 2). A break down of the weapons seized within the countries which are co-operating in joint operations, as a result of intelligence and information-sharing, is also revealing (see Table 3).

Although seizures have increased, sources within South Africa are skeptical as to whether these represent an increase in the percentage of illegal weapons seized overall. It is impossible to say how much of the trade is intercepted, but police sources admit to believing that percentage seizure rates are extremely low. By comparison, the Indian police in the Punjab estimate having intercepted about 10% of the weapons transferred to Kalistani militants from Pakistan.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Information made available to the author, Middleberg, 4 November 1994.

<sup>111</sup> C. Smith, 1993, *op. cit.*

**Table 2: Seizure of Firearms, Ammunition, and Explosives in RSA, 1991 - 1994<sup>112</sup>**

	<b>1991</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1994</b>
<b>Rifles</b>				
AK47s	1,090	891	1,386	1,589
Other	1,773	968	1,792	2,297
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,863</b>	<b>1,859</b>	<b>3,178</b>	<b>3,886</b>
<b>Pistols</b>	2,227	2,557	4,628	5,397
<b>Revolvers</b>	1,465	1,203	1,894	2,364
<b>Ammunition</b>				
7.62	42,965	36,712	119,610	103,424
Other	17,953	33,080	1,178,425	203,367
<b>Total</b>	<b>60,918</b>	<b>69,792</b>	<b>1,298,035</b>	<b>306,791</b>
<b>Explosives</b>				
Hand grenades	265	381	230	481
Mortars	---	5	326	250
Limpet mines	126	46	8	7
PG 7s	4	14	78	37
Landmines	9	11	0	6
<b>Total</b>	<b>404</b>	<b>457</b>	<b>642</b>	<b>781</b>

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<sup>112</sup> CAICA, *Firearm Related Crime*, Pretoria: CAICA, April 1995, p. 2.

**Table 3: Seizure of Firearms and Ammunition  
by the South African Police in RSA,  
Transkei, Namibia and Mozambique, August 1993 - March 1995**

	<b>RSA</b>	<b>Transkei</b>	<b>Namibia</b>	<b>Mozambique</b>	<b>Total</b>
AK47s	186	2	105	433	726
Other	31	0	6	19	56
LMGs	3			3	6
Machine guns	20			25	45
Pistols	44			7	51
Revolvers	8				8
Shotguns	6				6
Handmade weapons	49				49
B10 Recoilless guns					1
RPG 7s		1		4	5
Mortar pipes (60mm)		17			17
Mortars	29	17	1	10	57
Projectiles	2	5		56	63

While the news from the Mozambique-Swazi-South Africa borders is somewhat encouraging, joint operations have had a negative impact elsewhere in the region, especially in Namibia. Since joint operations have been able to infiltrate arms smuggling networks working out of Mozambique, several of these networks have transferred their operations to Namibia. In recent months, the Namibian police have reported a significant surge in arms smuggling. The source of the weapons is Angola, where impoverished soldiers, mainly from UNITA, are offering weapons for sale in Runda, a small town just inside Namibia. The prices of these weapons are competitive with those offered in Mozambique: an AK47

retails for R.50 on either side of the Angolan-Namibian border, but can be as high as R.250.

Weapons smuggling through Namibia tends to take a different form than the trafficking from Mozambique. In Mozambique, the actual traffickers tend to be men using small vehicles. In Namibia, the traffickers are largely Xhosa women. A group of women, usually between 10 and 15 in number, will pool money to purchase ornaments which will then be transported to various parts of South Africa, as far away as Cape Town or Durban. Here, the ornaments will be bartered for clothing in urban areas. The clothes are then transported to Rundu, via Windhoek. In Rundu, the group will gather around what becomes known as the 'Xhosa tree', from where they will sell the clothing to raise money to purchase weapons. Alternatively, clothing might be exchanged for weapons. Increasingly, the sale or barter of drugs is also being used as a means of acquiring weapons.

The weapons are then shipped into South Africa, concealed in suitcases or hold-alls, either via the same transportation method or by heavy truck. If the journey starts by minibus, the weapons are transported only as far as Windhoek or Grunau. From there, a truck driver is paid to transport a sealed container across the border into South Africa while the owner of the weapons travels by minibus. The truck and minibus then *rendez-vous* across the border, usually around Upington, where the firearms are transferred to the minibus. If the original minibus is unavailable at Rundu, the traffickers will hitch-hike until they find a truck driver willing to transport the weapons across the border in exchange for payment. There are five main border crossing used by the traffickers - Rietfontein, Noenieput, Nakop, Onseepkans and Violsdrift. Weapons move across the border from Angola with extreme ease, due to the nature of the terrain - the border can be crossed almost everywhere at most times of the year using a four-wheel drive vehicle.<sup>113</sup>

Weapons from Angola are also reaching South Africa overland via Botswana. In addition, South African airports also report a rise in arms trafficking, from Mozambique, Angola and South Africa. Lanseria airport, close to Johannesburg, is a known conduit, as are Rand and Grand Central airports. Many aircraft which land in South Africa are never searched. This is especially true of small airfields, where customs desks are often unstaffed after office hours. Alternatively, pilots are known to have ways to avoid inspections of their aircraft.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>113</sup> Information made available to the author, Windhoek, March 1995.

<sup>114</sup> Information made available to the author, Windhoek, March 1995.

As in the case of policing the Mozambican border, the volume of trade and traffic renders the searching of the requisite percentage of vehicles impossible. Namibia has no access to sophisticated border security and detection technology. Dogs are used, but in the intense heat they can only be used for about twenty minutes before their effectiveness is reduced. Therefore, the police have come to rely increasingly upon the infiltration of arms trafficking networks by intelligence officers. This is dangerous and risk-laden work. It is also expensive.

A formal program of co-operation between Namibia and South Africa does not exist at present. There is an informal working group in place which is involved in joint operations and intelligence sharing. However, the size of Namibia and the extremely limited resources available to the Namibian police will continue to restrict success in preventing the increased flow of weapons from Angola to the south.

At present, the majority of weapons from Mozambique and Angola are smuggled into South Africa. However, since the decline of political demand for light weapons following the April 1994 elections, the authorities in Swaziland have noticed a sharp rise in the availability of relatively sophisticated light weapons in the country and a growing usage of these weapons in violent crimes. A similar trend is not yet discernible in Namibia, but a rise in violent crime may well be on the horizon. Neither country is equipped, either financially or institutionally, to cope with a marked rise in the proliferation of light weapons, which means the ability to curb violent crime will be limited.

In addition, there are other destinations for the weapons besides South Africa. Lozi militants in Zambia are in possession of some 30 rocket launchers from Angola.<sup>115</sup> In Malawi, law and order is in swift decline, in part due to the overspill of more than 40,000 demobilized but still armed Mozambicans, mostly ex-RENAMO troops.<sup>116</sup>

### **The Demand for Light Weapons in South Africa**

There are two basic sources of demand for light weapons, including small arms, in South Africa. The first of these is political; the second is criminal. Increasingly, the division between the two is becoming blurred.

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<sup>115</sup> "Arms Reach Lozi Secessionists", *MRB*, March 1995.

<sup>116</sup> "Gun Law on the Increase as Muluzi Marks One Year of Democracy", *MRB*, May 1995.

The unbanning of the ANC in February 1990 signalled the end of the apartheid system and a new era for South Africa. Contrary to expectations, the process of political transformation led to a marked *increase* in political violence: 1591 people died as a result of political violence in 1990, as opposed to 1403 the previous year during the height of the tension between the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).<sup>117</sup> In addition, political groups began to stockpile weapons on the understanding that political violence would increase in the future.

The violence in South Africa between the unbanning of the ANC and the election in 1994 centered upon southern Natal, the Natal Midlands, and the PWV area (Pretoria, Witswatersrand and Vereeniging). The conflict was, and still is, rooted in the rivalry between the ANC and the IFP, but there is strong evidence that, at the very least, individuals within the state provided weapons to the IFP to encourage the conflict and to politically weaken the ANC.<sup>118</sup> In July 1991 classified documents were exposed which revealed that the security police had paid R.250,000 to Inkatha to organize anti-ANC rallies. The most damaging allegations were those relating to the 'third force', which entailed a clandestine campaign to disrupt the negotiating process through acts of terror and the fuelling of sectarian township violence. Successive reports by the widely-respected Goldstone Commission criticized the South African state for encouraging political violence and in March 1994 implicated three SAP generals on charges of fomenting violence, including gun-running.

The process and direction of political change was also strongly resisted by the far right, especially the Afrikaaner Volksfront (AVF), which was responsible for some thirty bombings in the weeks leading up to the election.<sup>119</sup> The AWB was also actively engaged in stockpiling weapons, many flown into Lancera from Angola.

Inevitably, the process designed to disrupt the path of peaceful political change involved the acquisition and distribution of firearms. Over this period there were three main sources of weapons. First, theft from the security forces

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<sup>117</sup> M. Donaldson, *The Role of Firearms within the Changing Nature of South Africa's Political Violence*, Paper presented at the 2nd Annual International Seminar on Arms Control and Disarmament, Williamsburg, Pennsylvania, USA, 7th-18th September, 1994, p.12-13. The fatality figure in 1989 was a 22% increase over the 1988 figure (1,149) and a 112% increase over the 1987 figure (661), but only an 8% increase compared to the 1986 figure (1,298).

<sup>118</sup> L. Flanagan, "MI Links to Gun-Running", *Weekly Mail*, Vol. 10, No. 5, 4th-10th February 1993.

<sup>119</sup> "South Africa: The Generals are Nervous", *Africa Confidential*, Vol. 35, No. 4, 18th February 1994, p.4.

increased significantly. Raids on state arsenals netted supplies of explosives and firearms for right-wing organizations, including the Z88 pistol used in the assassination of ANC leader Chris Hani.<sup>120</sup> The homeland police and defense forces were alleged to have supplied weapons from their arsenals to sympathetic sources, and the Kwazulu police were alleged by the Goldstone Commission to have supplied pistols and G3 rifles to IFP members.<sup>121</sup> Second, homemade weapons, especially pipe-guns, are widely available in South Africa. These are crude shotguns which can be relatively easily produced from available materials, such as piping for plumbing. Finally, weapons - especially those of Soviet origin - are becoming widely available across the country through access to illegal markets. The majority of these weapons have come from either Mozambique or Angola.

It is extremely difficult to judge how much increased political violence before the 1994 election can be linked to weapons supplied from either Angola or Mozambique. The availability of weapons from existing domestic sources suggests that if individuals received weapons from external sources, the overall impact upon levels of violence would not have been great - these weapons would have added to rather than changed the nature of the conflict. However, the South African security forces have made the link:

The large amount of firearms confiscated in Natal can be attributed to the smuggling of armaments from Mozambique, Swaziland and Transkei into the RSA, as well as the ongoing power struggle between the ANC and the IFP.<sup>122</sup>

The second source of demand for light weapons has been from criminals. Levels of crime, especially violent crime, have increased dramatically in recent years. In addition, it is becoming more difficult to establish where political violence ends and criminal violence begins. A far higher proportion of crime in South Africa now involves the threat or use of a fire-arm. Of the 18,312 murders committed in 1994, 5,872 were committed with small arms and light weapons. During the same year there were 68,320 armed robberies, 43,168 involving the

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<sup>120</sup> B. Hickman, *Firearms Used with Deadly Effect in South Africa*, Paper presented at the 2nd Annual International Seminar on Arms Control and Disarmament, Williamsburg, Pennsylvania, USA, 7th-18th September, 1994, p.5.

<sup>121</sup> A. Minaar, *Guns Galore! The Proliferation of Illegal and Other Firearms*, Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, unpublished manuscript, June 1994, p.3.

<sup>122</sup> South African Police Department, *Annual Report of the Commissioner of the SA Police: 1993*, Pretoria: South African Police Department, p.113.

use of fire-arms. In 1994, seizures of rifles increased by 22.28% and pistols by 16.62% (see Table 4).

**Table 4: Comparative Statistics of Firearms Seized in RSA, 1993 - 1994<sup>123</sup>**

	January-December 1993	January-December 1994	Increase/Decrease (in %)
<b>Rifles</b>			
AK47s	1,386	1,589	+14.65
Other	1,792	2,297	+28.18
<b>Total</b>	<b>3,178</b>	<b>3,886</b>	<b>+22.28</b>
<b>Pistols</b>	4,628	5,397	+16.62
<b>Revolvers</b>	1,894	2,364	+24.82
<b>Home-made weapons</b>	1,994	3,123	+56.62
<b>Ammunition</b>			
7.62	119,610	103,424	+13.53
Other	1,178,425	203,367	-82.74
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,298,035</b>	<b>306,791</b>	<b>-76.36</b>
<b>Explosives</b>			
Handgrenades	230	481	+109.31
Mortars	326	250	-23.31
Limpet mines	8	7	-12.50
PG 7s	78	37	-52.56
Landmines	0	6	N/A

Available statistics, even those compiled by the authorities, do not disaggregate sufficiently to establish the sources of these weapons. Anecdotal evidence points to a vast increase in the availability of Soviet weapons, especially AK47s, and it can be assumed that the majority of these weapons came out of Mozambique and to a lesser extent, but increasingly, Angola. In the space of one month, a single arms trafficker was alleged to have moved 1,212 AK47s, 108

<sup>123</sup> CAICA, *Firearm Related Crime*, p. 2.

Makarov pistols, 2 Draganov rifles and 12,500 rounds of ammunition from Mozambique into South Africa.<sup>124</sup>

One of the most brutal recent developments in South Africa has been the rise of 'taxi wars'. South Africa has one of the worst public transportation systems in the world - a direct legacy of the apartheid era. For the majority of blacks, the only available forms of transport are the minibuses whose routes criss-cross the country, earning large profits for the taxi owners and the controllers of routes. Across the country, existing monopolies and oligopolies are under threat from new operators and clashes though 1994 became frequent and violent in the extreme. The preferred weapons are the AK47 and the 9mm pistol, and the use of G3s has often been reported. Taxi owners have employed the services of hit men to target both passengers and the drivers of rival firms - the police in Gauteng claim that hitmen are paid R.1,000 for the death of a passenger, R.2,000 for a taxi driver and R.4,000 for a taxi owner. Passengers and bystanders have frequently been killed in the cross-fire.<sup>125</sup> Taxi wars in the West Cape, Transkei and the East Rand have been linked directly to the demand for illegal weapons.<sup>126</sup>

### **Light Weapons Proliferation and Civil Society in South Africa and Swaziland**

Annual statistics on the seizure and use of fire-arms in South Africa show a steady increase. The impact upon civil society has been considerable.

First, South Africa is in the midst of an internal arms race which the security forces are almost powerless to prevent or stop; either legally or illegally, more South Africans are armed than ever before. Criminals now have access to an array of relatively sophisticated, and most certainly powerful, automatic firearms. South African citizens, especially whites, now fear that in the event of a criminal act against them, such as a mugging, burglary, rape, or car hi-jack, they will be confronted with this type of equipment. Consequently, they are acquiring gun licenses: 212,458 were issued in 1994 alone. (Every gun must have a license; an individual can hold up to thirteen licenses and licenses are issued for life.) At the

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<sup>124</sup> Fried, "The Gun Run", p.272.

<sup>125</sup> A. Minaar and S. Pretorius, *A Year of Living Dangerously: Hitmen, Corruption, Competition and Violence in the Taxi Industry During 1994*, Pretoria: Centre for Socio-Political Analysis and Human Sciences Research Council, unpublished manuscript, February 1995, p.2. This report is a comprehensive view of the taxi war phenomenon; a more detailed analysis of the same issue is forthcoming.

<sup>126</sup> Information made available to the author, Windhoek, March 1995.



In addition, the medical services have noted the cost of different types of gunshot wounds. One example offered compares a 9mm wound to that caused by an AK47, both to the abdomen. In the former case, after surgery to the upper bowel and stomach, the victim left the hospital after two weeks. The AK47 wound was far worse and required extensive surgery, two weeks in Intensive Care and a further twelve weeks of hospitalization. Moreover, once discharged from the hospital, the victim would have been incapable of functioning physically and psychologically as a normal person for the rest of his life.<sup>128</sup>

Wounds from high velocity rifles can be especially harmful. If the bullets are the 'tumbling' variety, they will enter the body and 'tumble' through the torso or limb, destroying internal organs and muscle tissue and shattering bone. A non-tumbling bullet fired from about 400m will have a similar effect if it hits bone, which prevents exit and redirects the bullet. Bullets can be adapted to tumble by removing the lead from the cartridge and replacing a small amount with mercury, to affect the equilibrium. Altering the shape of the bullet can create a similar effect. Alternatively, an ordinary bullet may tumble if it ricochets off a car or a branch, for example.<sup>129</sup> As a direct consequence of the increase in AK47 wounds, deaths from shootings show a sharp increase as well (see Table 5). Doctors based at the Baragwanath mortuary have noticed a significant increase in deaths caused by AK47s in recent months, but not as great as expected given the increased proliferation of these weapons in the area.<sup>130</sup> One possible reason is a shortage of ammunition.

**Table 5: Baragwanath Mortuary - Cause of Death<sup>131</sup>**

	<b>1991</b>	<b>1992</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1994</b>
<b>Shooting</b>	688	966	748	782
<b>Stabbing</b>	548	532	332	352
<b>Other</b>	1211	1927	1704	1730

<sup>128</sup> I am grateful to Mr Gareth Hine for this information. Witswatersrand Medical School, February 1995.

<sup>129</sup> I am grateful to Lt Col Jakkie Potgeiter for this information.

<sup>130</sup> Discussions held with the author at Baragwanath mortuary, February 1995.

<sup>131</sup> Data collected by the author, March 1995.

Second, an increasing failure to control the flow of illegal weapons into South Africa may yet contain some significant implications for democracy and civil liberties. Attempts to persuade and cajole citizens to hand over illegal weapons have not been successful - only 1,111 weapons have been recovered in this way.<sup>132</sup> As the situation grows less controllable, the government will be forced to consider alternative ways of dealing with the problem, as other governments have done before.

So far, national governments, security forces and international organizations have failed, understandably, to design strategies for recovering weapons once proliferation has occurred. There is a tendency to introduce draconian measures which dramatically raise the potential cost of arms trafficking. For example, after the end of the Nigerian civil war, light weapons became widely available throughout Nigeria. Armed robberies increased dramatically, which prompted the Federal Government to introduce the Armed Robbery and Firearms Decree. Under the decree, anybody found guilty of armed robbery was to be executed by a firing squad.

It is unclear as to what extent these laws reduced the level of arms trafficking. What did make a difference was economic development: when the Nigerian economy experienced an oil boom in the early 1970s, armed robberies decreased considerably. Relatedly, the proliferation of light weapons became an important issue once again from the mid-1980s on, after the country's economy took a downward plunge. The government's decision in July 1995 to execute 43 people convicted for armed robbery was widely applauded throughout the country.

Other countries have established similar stiff penalties in attempts to address the weapons problem. In Jamaica, penalties for the possession of illegal weapons are especially harsh, in response to the failure to prevent the spread of illegal firearms. Closer to South Africa, the Swazi authorities have already acted decisively by making the possession of illegal weapons a non-bailable offense. Moreover, convictions for crimes involving the use of 'weapons of war' have increased significantly in recent months.<sup>133</sup>

In South Africa, a debate over stronger measures to stem the tide of illegal arms smuggling has already started. There is already a muted debate over whether to extend the electric fence and whether to return the voltage to a lethal level. Currently, the South African Firearms Act contains a legal presumption that

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<sup>132</sup> Information made available to the author by Lt Col Vermeulen, Pretoria, March 1995.

<sup>133</sup> Interview with Judge Richard Hull, former Chief Justice of Swaziland, Mbabane, November 1994.

anyone caught with an illegal weapon in any type of vehicle will be assumed to be guilty of arms trafficking unless he or she can prove otherwise. The rewriting of the South African constitution will ensure a change of presumption in the Firearms Act from guilty to innocent. Currently, there are enough voices within the establishment to probably ensure that this change will be far from automatic, if it is made at all.<sup>134</sup>

It takes a minimum of imagination to follow the logic of such moves through to their conclusion. It may well be the case that the new South Africa may have to forego or compromise certain civil liberties to ensure internal security in the long term at this level. However, assuming that the arrangement will be a temporary one, the implications for civil liberties - especially freedom of movement and police powers for the searching of individuals and their property - are considerable. Another component which might be added to these considerations is the fact that blacks from the townships still tend to opt for unlicensed weapons, whereas whites usually seek licenses.

Third, the growing availability of weapons is influencing the criminalisation of politics. In the wake of attacks upon ANC members by Inkatha and other vigilante groups, which began in 1990, the ANC has permitted the establishment of Self-Defense Units (SDUs) in the townships. These SDUs grew out of the township structures set up in the 1980s to promote, protect and institutionalize the United Democratic Front. The initial aims of the SDUs were to protect against attacks and harassment by the security forces and vigilante groups. From mid-1993, as violence in the East Rand townships increased between Inkatha-supporting hostel residents and township inhabitants, Inkatha called for the creation of Self-Protection Units to counter the SDUs.

Increasingly, both of these organizations are either being infiltrated by criminals or are experiencing the criminalization of their membership. It has become increasingly difficult for the ANC to control the SDUs and prevent a resort to crime and banditry.<sup>135</sup> Some areas, such as Phola Park, have become "no-go areas" for the security forces, especially at night. Groups are known to commit armed robberies and to demand protection money. Car racketeering and arms smuggling are also common.<sup>136</sup> A large number of convicted arms smugglers involved in arms trafficking from the Angolan-Namibian border are from Phola

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<sup>134</sup> Information made available to the author, Pretoria, May 1995.

<sup>135</sup> G. Cawthra, *Policing South Africa: The SAP and the Transition from Apartheid*, London: Zed Press, 1993, p.200.

<sup>136</sup> A. Minaar, *Self Defense Units or 'Comtsotsi' Criminal Gangs*, Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council, unpublished manuscript, 1994, 10p.

Park.<sup>137</sup> There has also been a discernible blurring of the differences between organized crime and political activity in Natal.<sup>138</sup>

## VI. Conclusions: Peacekeeping, Arms Trafficking and Stability in Southern Africa

The inability of the United Nations to effect meaningful disarmament over the course of the ONUMOZ operation has already had far-reaching consequences for the region, South Africa in particular. In most respects, ONUMOZ was an extremely successful peacekeeping operation, especially so early along the learning curve. However, the task of disarming and decommissioning the warring factions was at best extremely partial, and it amounts to the largest and most significant failure of the operation. Without doubt, more and worse is yet to come as weapons continue to remain in circulation and to proliferate through the region.

Yet, internationally, the ONUMOZ experience is widely recognized as a success, primarily because the UN oversaw the transition from civil war to democracy and peace. Critics in Southern Africa often remark that a similar 'success' by UNAVEM III in Angola will be exceptionally destabilising for the region. Recently, the UN has decided to request the Angolan police force to control the disarmament process, which makes the future begin to look very much like the past. The growing interest of arms traffickers in the weapons from Angola is a major warning sign for the region, South Africa in particular.

The mandates for the peacekeeping operations in Mozambique and Angola both reflect a fundamental failure to elaborate on the importance of achieving disarmament, what disarmament should entail, and the criteria for success. If UNAVEM III is to avoid repeating the failures of UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ, it is essential for the UN to summon the political and financial resources to ensure that weapons are collected and successfully decommissioned.

It is clear that there are major problems facing peacekeepers in the field of disarmament. Inevitably, comprehensive disarmament will add to the human and financial costs of any operation. As both costs rise, public support for peacekeeping will diminish, especially in the United States, which will remain an

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<sup>137</sup> Information made available to the author, Windhoek, March 1995.

<sup>138</sup> A. Minaar, *Mafia Warlords or Political Entrepreneurs? Warlordism in Natal*, Pretoria: Centre for Conflict Analysis/Human Sciences Research Council, mimeo, December 1991, 50p.

important political actor into the future. Maintaining Congressional political support for peacekeeping operations in the future will be critical and much less likely if the loss of American lives rises.

Equally important, comprehensive disarmament will significantly increase political problems on the ground. Agreements to undergo demobilization are difficult to achieve - they depend upon trust. A salient precondition for building trust is the acknowledgement on the part of those undergoing demobilization that the process can be rapidly reversed if the peacekeeping efforts break down. This means that ex-combatants feel the need to remain close to their weapons, which should also remain in working order. Overcoming these problems is, arguably, one of the foremost tasks for those who negotiate peacekeeping mandates, and for those who control former combatants as well as the peacekeepers in the field. In order for these problems to be overcome, the disarmament process within peacekeeping must be better understood and more clearly defined and negotiated.

First, there should be a clear understanding of what disarmament means for a particular operation, as distinct from demobilization. The ONUMOZ mandate, for example, was unclear in this respect. Weapons collected within the assembly areas must be either destroyed at some point or removed to a place where leakage cannot occur, either during or after the peacekeeping operation. This may mean that the UN itself should keep tighter control, perhaps beyond the duration of the operation. It may also mean that weapons should be stored outside the country.<sup>139</sup>

Second, there should be a clear and unequivocal position on the destruction of weapons. In the case of light weapons, this is not an expensive task. Weapons platforms can be immobilized pending destruction. Arms embargoes should be implemented and enforced. Development aid should be used as a *quid pro quo* for weapons destruction. The desirability of voluntary or enforced disarmament should be considered primarily on the basis of the future security of the region, not on the basis of its short-term effect upon the peace-keeping operation.

Third, peacekeeping operations thus far have not received the financial resources to cover the cost of effective disarmament. In the interests of medium- and long-term security, this situation must change. The building or strengthening of civil society, which must follow in the wake of conflict resolution if the concept of peace is to have any positive meaning, cannot occur, or will be made immensely more difficult, if weapons have been allowed to proliferate amongst sub-state actors. One possible source of additional funding could be from

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<sup>139</sup> This is one possible answer to the current impasse affecting negotiations between the IRA/Sinn Fein and the British government.

concerned countries in the region which stand to lose if disarmament fails. Another source could and should be the original arms suppliers. Many external groups have transferred light weapons to combatants to further their own political and economic interests - arms pipelines are common enough features in any low-intensity conflict. When a conflict ends, however, arms suppliers take no responsibility for either the cost of disarmament or the impact upon civil societies when disarmament fails. This should change, but change can only happen in this quarter if the international community and international organizations enforce the 'polluter pays' principle in this field.

Fourth, the present linkage of disarmament to demobilization is clearly inadequate. Peacekeeping forces must address the existence of weapons caches; the 'one man-one weapon' principle which currently defines disarmament within peacekeeping must be broadened to include weapons at the disposal of the warring parties. The very nature of many of the conflicts in Southern Africa, most of which are low-intensity, called for the repositioning of weapons. Over the course of a war, there must exist a considerable measure of control over weapons and *matériel*. One of the fundamental tasks of any quartermaster is to maintain information on where weapons are stored and in what quantities. Failure to maintain this information will jeopardize operations in the field. Once a conflict ends, the networks which hold information on the location of weapons can be disbanded or quickly incorporated into political processes and therefore distracted. At this juncture, weapons can cease to remain under control, which in turn provides opportunities for arms trafficking.

Evidence from Mozambique testifies to the unknown but certainly large number and volume of weapons caches which remain. Most are outside the control of the new government; recently the South African police decommissioned twenty-five such caches. Mozambique illustrates graphically and tragically the cost of failure and the importance of disarmament and weapons decommissioning. This could yet compromise the process of political and economic reconstruction in Mozambique and the building of democracy in South Africa. Similar failures in UNAVEM III will spell greater problems for South Africa and for Namibia as well. Arguably, the future of the region and, therefore, the future of the sub-continent as a whole, depends upon redressing the mistakes made by ONUMOZ and upon ensuring that fears over disarmament in Angola are not realized.

