# TABLE OF CONTENTS

**Editor's Note**

*Kerstin VIGNARD* ................................................................................................................ 1

**Special Comment**

*Oscar ARIAS* ....................................................................................................................... 3

**Human security in Latin America**

Human security: emerging concept of security in the twenty-first century  
*Francisco ROJAS ARAVENA* ................................................................................................ 5

Civilians and the military in Latin American democracies  
*Rut DIAMINT* ........................................................................................................................ 15

Colombia's human security crisis  
*Adam ISACSON* .................................................................................................................. 25

U.S. military programmes with Latin America and their impact on human security  
*Joy OLSON* .......................................................................................................................... 41

A regional perspective on the problem of small arms and light weapons  
*Luis Alfonso DE ALBA* ........................................................................................................ 49

**Resources concerning human security in Latin America**

compiled by *Jennifer FLAMENT* .......................................................................................... 53

**UNIDIR Activities** ........................................................................................................ 63

**Publications** .................................................................................................................. 71
‘Freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ have become the catch phrases of an approach to security called human security. Often referred to as ‘people-centred security’ or ‘security with a human face’, human security places human beings—rather than states—at the focal point of security considerations. Although some would claim that this approach is nothing new, human security is becoming mainstream. Today all security discussions demand incorporation of the human dimension.

The United Nations Development Programme’s 1994 Human Development Report is considered a key document in the evolution of this thinking. It stated ‘... like other fundamental concepts, such as human freedom, human security is more easily identified through its absence than its presence.’ While precise definitions are elusive, we can identify factors that contribute to human security (such as education, employment, health, and protection of human rights) and those that erode it (such as violence, disease, persecution and repressive political systems). The Centre for Human Security at the University of British Columbia is in the process of establishing an annual human security report, similar to the Human Development Report, which would help codify and further develop these concepts.

Perhaps there is no region that teeters more on the brink between human security and insecurity than Latin America. Although the region as a whole has made significant steps towards democratization and regional cooperation, in many countries the security of individuals has seen little, if any, improvement. The conflicts of the region are internal ones, economic crises abound, and governments struggle to combat violence. Latin America is also at the centre of many illicit activities, including drug production, money laundering and arms trafficking; civilian populations are often caught in the crossfire—both figuratively and literally. Critics would go as far as to say that some national and regional initiatives, including military training and the ‘war on drugs’, have been at the expense of the security of individuals. As Latin America faces numerous human security challenges, from small arms circulation to narco-trafficking, from human rights abuses to difficult civil-military relations, perhaps this region should be at the forefront of our thinking about human security.

The concept of human security offers us a new lens to examine Latin American security. In this issue of Disarmament Forum, our authors look at several of elements detracting from or contributing to human security, including small arms, external military influences and a case study of Colombia.

The third meeting of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Disarmament Education met in Geneva the week of 11 March. The group had a productive session, developing a draft of the report that will be presented to the General Assembly in its 57th session. Part of the week was set aside for external participation and interaction with educators, specialists, NGOs and interested parties concerned with education, disarmament and arms control. The fourth and final meeting of the group will be held in New York the week of 22 July.
UNIDIR’s 2002 Visiting Fellowship Programme is moving quickly towards its completion. The four Middle Eastern fellows have been extremely active, participating in and presenting at numerous conferences and workshops. On 23 May the fellows held a public conference entitled Rebuilding Peace: Future Strategies for Reconstructing Confidence between Israelis and Palestinians. They presented their research on empowering peace-orientated NGOs in Israel and Palestine; re-thinking people-to-people projects and grass-roots participation; and the potential role for education, labour and industry in reconstructing Israeli-Palestinian relations. UNIDIR will be publishing the results of their research later this year.

UNIDIR Senior Research Fellow Susan Willett has completed her first UNIDIR publication, Costs of Disarmament—Rethinking the Price Tag: A Methodological Inquiry into the Costs and Benefits of Arms Control. The book outlines the methodological difficulties of analysing the costs and benefits of arms control. She concludes that ‘many of the costs currently ascribed to arms control and disarmament, such as disposal and environmental clean-up costs, are attributable to the life cycle costs of weapon systems and arise with or without arms control treaties.’ In this way, the costs of armament have been underestimated and the costs of arms control overestimated—an interesting counter to the claim that arms control obligations are too expensive.

The research project Strengthening the Role of Regional Organizations in Treaty Implementation will be launched on 10–11 June with a workshop in Geneva. The objective of this project is to examine the capabilities and potential limitations of regional organizations in supporting and strengthening the effectiveness of arms control treaties and regimes. The June workshop will focus on the verification of treaties concerning weapons of mass destruction. The two-year project will result in numerous individual papers and a final research report to be published by the Institute.

Selection of staff for the project Weapons for Development: Lessons Learned from Weapons Collection Programmes is underway. The project will undertake detailed analyses of selected weapons collection programmes in order to advise policy-makers, donor countries, UN specialized agencies and NGOs on better strategies to collect weapons from civilians and former combatants. Case studies to be undertaken include collection programmes in Albania, Cambodia, Congo, Mali and Papua New Guinea.

UNIDIR has finally moved into its new offices! We are still located on the fifth floor of the Palais des Nations; our new office numbers are from A.511 to A.523. Our phone and fax numbers, as well as our email addresses, remain the same.

Kerstin Vignard
The concept of human security developed as a counterpoint to the idea of national security at a time when the latter was frequently being invoked by the Cold War superpowers to justify their incursions, invasions and general interference in the affairs of countries too small or too powerless to withstand their pressure. In the name of defending democracy (read capitalism) or of extending the revolutionary struggle for workers’ rights (read communism), national security became the passkey to open the doors of such countries as Nicaragua, Grenada, Afghanistan and Mozambique, to name a few; it was also the key used to lock up domestic resistance to superpower involvement in these poor countries.

Slowly but surely, progressive thinkers in the security and development communities got together and began promoting the notion of human security: the idea that fortified borders, armed conflicts and ideological domination do not necessarily lead to security. Security was recast as a concept that should be applied to individuals instead of states, and that approach led to certain logical assumptions. An individual, or a family, does not experience security if they do not command sufficient resources to feed, house and clothe themselves, or if they have to keep a careful watch on their comments in public for fear of being labelled traitors and resisters (and thus being subjected to the particularly cruel treatment reserved for such people in repressive states). Individuals and families are not secure if crime is rampant in their neighbourhoods, if economies spiral downwards out of control, or if natural disaster threatens at every turn with no coordinated government efforts at prevention. Security includes all of this.

As the concept of human security developed and was handled over the years in international conferences, agreements and action programmes, some began to feel that human security as such was too broad a term, and inclusive of too many different fields, to make a meaningful contribution to on-the-ground work in security. After all, nutritional security was the work of the World Food Programme, economic security the domain of the international financial institutions, environmental security of the United Nations Environmental Programme and other organizations in that field, etc. In practical terms, human security was simply too broad a concept to handle effectively.

While it is true that for programmes and organizations to be effective they must have a clear focus and specific goals and objectives, I believe that it would be a mistake to give up on the concept of human security altogether. Since the tragic events of 11 September, we have seen a forceful return to national security thinking, and the effect of this has been an increase in every category of military and defence spending, not just those that specifically target the threat of terrorism. In such an atmosphere, the call for human security must be louder than ever.

Even before this most recent resurgence of militarism, the situation was quite worrisome. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), which tracks military expenditures around the world, recorded decreases in military spending following the end of the Cold War, but the decrease was interrupted in 1996, and since 1998 there has been a clear upward trend in worldwide military
spending. The estimated total world military expenditure in the year 2000 was US$798 billion. By way of comparison, just $56 billion was spent on official development assistance that year. In the face of the devastating AIDS epidemic, Kofi Annan has asked for $7 to 10 billion a year from the international community to fight the disease. So far the U.S. has pledged $300 million to the fund, and other pledges are similar in size or smaller, which makes it unclear where the rest of the funds will come from, if they materialize at all. The amount of money required to provide universal primary education, 100% safe drinking water coverage, and food security around the world would be just a small fraction of what the world spends preparing for and fighting wars, yet up to now the international community has failed to come up with the necessary funds and the mechanisms to use them effectively. This is not due to a lack of resources, but rather a lack of solidarity and political will.

For many the link between disarmament and development is obvious, and human security provides the conceptual framework for explaining that link to others. The concept probably needs refining, but it remains a useful tool in the face of such staggeringly misguided priorities as those evidenced by the numbers cited above.

In Latin America, arguments for the human security approach abound. Chile’s so-called copper law feeds the military establishment while 20% of the population, more than three million people, live below the national poverty line. Plan Colombia has beefed up a military with a history of human rights violations and close cooperation with paramilitary groups that have committed massacres and displaced entire villages, while the legitimate needs of rural farmers are ignored in the eagerness to eradicate coca crops. Central America has seen some progress in reducing the size and influence of its militaries since the conflicts of the 1980s, but further reductions in Guatemala, Honduras and El Salvador seem unlikely, even in the face of recent droughts, earthquakes and epidemics that have weakened already desperately poor populations in those countries.

Such clinging to militaristic thinking displays both a lack of leadership and a lack of foresight on the part of the governments of the region. If the real needs of human beings were attended to, and parallel efforts were made to strengthen goodwill and diplomatic ties, there would be no need for the multi-billion dollar defence industry. Then again, perhaps this is precisely what makes powerful governments reluctant to embrace human security thinking. Poor families in Africa may show gratitude for aid, but they do not vote or contribute to campaigns in first-world democracies, while defence contractors do, and in no small amount. Perhaps this is an overly cynical or simplistic view, but it could be said to represent the worst possible scenario. In any case, those who truly want to see advances in the health, education, safety and well-being of the world’s poorest must take seriously the forces they are up against when it comes to setting funding priorities in governments and international governmental organizations. There is still a huge amount of economic interest in perpetuating national security thinking, and so the road will be long to reach the goal of convincing governments and other actors to adopt human security thinking and structure their priorities accordingly.

Dr Oscar Arias  
Former President of Costa Rica and 1987 Nobel Peace Laureate  
Founder, The Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress
Human security: emerging concept of security in the twenty-first century

Francisco Rojas Aravena

At the start of the twenty-first century, Latin America shows significant weaknesses in coping with the consequences of the process of globalization. Instability in the region has increased, and that has a significant effect on most of the population. Even though the main traditional security issues have been overcome in the region and Latin America has not made any substantial contribution to global instability, the region is far from having policies that promote people's security—human security. Moreover, the intra-national nature of conflicts increases the vulnerabilities of millions of Latin Americans. Today, the search for a common security concept in the region is a basic challenge for the Rio Group, for the Organization of American States and its Hemispheric Security Committee and for all the region's states. Civil society organizations and academic institutions, such as FLACSO, can play an important role in this task.

We are seeing the emergence of new transnational actors and non-state actors with significant capacities for global action. This is an important change in international relations and in the primacy of the interaction between various actors. The twenty-first century also demonstrates more strongly than in previous eras the need to solve the problems of millions of human beings who are adversely affected by enormous and growing political, economic, social, health, personal and cultural insecurities. A significant part of the world's population suffers from tremendous vulnerability in an unfair system with increasing regional and global interdependence. Consequently, (in)security is global, even though its manifestations may differ from region to region and from country to country.1

A core concern is to progress towards the construction of a new global order capable of placing human beings at its centre and for states, which continue to be the actors with the greatest relative power, to be able to efficiently guarantee people's security and contribute to overcoming the vulnerabilities and difficulties of hundreds of millions of human beings in accruing to progress and development.

Today there are increased opportunities for cooperation in the international system and in various geographic regions. The revolution in communications, the new wave of democracies around the world and globalization itself have contributed to universalizing the values and principles stipulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Promotion of, and respect for, this declaration requires increased partnerships and more cooperation.2

Approaching global politics from a human interest perspective, such as that developed by Mel Gurtov, allows one to compare value matrices. This value distinction originates from different theoretical perspectives.3 The realist theory looks at international problems and stresses conflict, which means that cooperation between the different actors is not properly gauged. The transnational ‘corporate-globalist’ view stresses economic aspects and the hegemony of a capitalist model of production and

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division of labour. Even though these ‘rules of the game’ establish overall preservation, they are seen to be a zero-sum game compared to other values. In the absence of any shared values, both realism and the corporate-globalist approach stress competitiveness as the basis for constant conflict and rivalry.

When one looks at the world with the new global humanist perspective, different values are stressed (see Table 1). The need for a more holistic approach means asking the core question: Who speaks for the planet? Based on this question, one looks for other approaches in international relations, which implies thinking about relations in the international system as a ‘people issue’.4

This approach means that one can relate different problems to new priorities. The main priority must be peace. This is directly associated with social aspects and economic justice, political justice, human governance and common responsibility for a balanced environment.

Table 1. Alternative values in main theories

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Realism</th>
<th>Corporate Globalism</th>
<th>Global Humanism</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Negotiation</td>
<td>Access</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>Hierarchy</td>
<td>Management</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mission</td>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>Equal opportunities</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Control</td>
<td>Consumption</td>
<td>Decentralization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regulations</td>
<td>Systems of alliances</td>
<td>Capitalism</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hegemony</td>
<td>Global culture</td>
<td>Basic needs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National mission</td>
<td>Egalitarian interdependence</td>
<td>Interdependence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Protectionism</td>
<td>Laissez-faire</td>
<td>‘One world’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Intervention</td>
<td>Integration</td>
<td>International rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structure</td>
<td>Maintenance of system</td>
<td>Maintenance of system</td>
<td>Transformation of system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Power blocks</td>
<td>Liberal order</td>
<td>Global order</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Conditions currently exist to form an international coalition of states and civil society organizations to support and promote projects aimed at establishing greater security for people and their development as the core of international security. The United Nations is encouraging this point of view by promoting international law that seeks to guarantee peace and governance and foster positive incentives. ‘An innovative international approach will be needed to address the source of insecurity, remedy the symptoms and prevent the recurrence of threats which affect the daily lives of millions of people.’5

The goal set by the United Nations in terms of security is a world free from fear. Achieving it entails acknowledging a new set of international circumstances, as typified by the diminished importance of interstate conflicts and increasing importance of intrastate conflicts. Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s Millennium Report, entitled We the Peoples,6 stresses that more than five million people died in this type of internal war in the 1990s. There were also mass migrations, refugee crises, destruction of infrastructure and environmental change. These events violate the basic human rights of millions of people and make it hard to create conditions for peace as the foundation for building a better world.

Analyses from the United Nations indicate that conflicts are more frequent in regions with poor countries, so the challenge of protecting more vulnerable populations is even greater. The above poses a global, and also regional, dilemma regarding the most suitable mechanisms for achieving stability, peace and fostering cooperation. Even though one cannot completely disallow intervention, it has shown that in most cases it is not the best option for settling conflicts. The same is true of the system of sanctions. In this framework, operations for maintaining and imposing peace must be reviewed. In the
type of conflict that emerges as the most relevant at the start of the twenty-first century, control of small arms becomes just as important as control of nuclear weapons. All of this marks a change in the perspective of the main international actors regarding situations of tension and conflict and, on a more general level, regarding security concepts.

The international system changed dramatically in less than a decade. Not only did the disappearance of the Soviet Union definitively mark this change, but there were also substantial changes that accumulated over time and are expressed with particular strength in the post-Cold War context. The number of state actors participating in the institutionalized international system has multiplied by at least four times since the United Nations was set up in 1945. We have seen the emergence of other actors with increasingly more influence on international relations—not just international agencies capable of changing their surroundings, but a series of transnational forces expressed with particular strength in multinational companies and non-government organizations. The communication explosion, technological advances and globalization itself have further accelerated the changes. This is mainly expressed in the state—the main actor—having less power.

States ceased to enjoy monopolistic control or to have the capacity to establish and promote actions in six basic areas.

- **Communications** are no longer controlled by the state. The Internet is the best example; radio and television are also good.
- **Technological development** depends more on the private sector than on the state. This affects investment capabilities from genetic techniques and cloning to technological developments designed for war.
- **Financial transactions** flow around the world and generate regional and global crises with little capacity for intervention by the state.
- **Although states reinsure investments**, their ability to control decisions about where to invest and from where to get investments is minimal.
- **International migration** and the ability to control the movement of people has also diminished.
- **Trade** has increasingly opened up, and states have evident problems to establish controls and restrictions.

The above means that threat perceptions have been generated that are different than traditional ones, and mechanisms of action to cope with them seem, and in many cases actually are, antiquated. The world has more information. Links are better. Political and social events in a country or region do not leave those who perceive them on the other side of the world indifferent. Economic decisions made in one part of the world have direct consequences on economic growth and sustainability in other areas. This evidences the existence of substantial changes in the basic concept of sovereignty and demonstrates the reduced capabilities of nations to cope with their main problems. Hence, coordinating policies, establishing regulations and generating international regimes based on shared values are essential points in designing a new international system for the twenty-first century. Only the ability to act jointly will enable states to recover their abilities to generate, together with other actors, a legitimate order capable of building a world free from threats and fear.

The basic concept that enables security to be understood in the post-Cold War period is the concept of cooperation. This concept emerges in all reports systematizing progress and interpreting the
changes in the world. It also plays an important role in divergent views, both for preventing and for promoting peace and international security. New problems that must be incorporated into the concept go beyond military aspects; hence, elements of cooperation are essential. The development of human security concepts must be placed within this framework.9

During the Cold War, Latin America was perceived, or perceived itself, within a conceptual framework defined by the bipolar conflict. The main threat was the extra-continental enemy. This reasserted tendencies from the pre-Second World War period. At the start of the twenty-first century, the region’s countries are immersed in a process of debating and reformulating concepts of security. A conceptual transition is taking place from a Cold War perspective that visualized an enemy expressed in strongly military actions carried out by a state, to a post-Cold War perspective in which threats are diffused, the weight of military factors has diminished and many of the threats appear not to be linked to state actors, and even not to be linked to any particular territory.

We can say in general, however, that the end of the Cold War has led to a reappraisal of the main theoretical matrices used to evaluate international problems.10 This will enable progress to be made towards a new paradigm that, while recognizing conflict and confrontation, places greater emphasis on working together. This change requires tremendous political will on the part of core actors and specific forms of coordination.

Development of theories about international regimes11 and about forming global public goods12 has acquired greater significance and importance, as have also contributions to negotiation theories13 and practical instruments to relieve tension.14 Theoretical exploration of this field will generate suitable knowledge to improve multilateral relations and the results arising from them, especially those results capable of changing relations in the international system, beginning with cooperative multilateralism.15

Human security: an emerging concept

New vulnerabilities demand holistic perspectives. The concept of security at the beginning of the century can be articulated based on relating the concepts of international security, state security and human security. The way in which that relationship is established will simultaneously meet global needs and the needs of states, people and peoples. To the extent that vulnerabilities and threats to international security increase, pressure will be put on states to take action in a context such as the one that we have defined, in which the state has less resources of real power. Hence, it is essential to foster more multilateralism—cooperative multilateralism, or correspondent multilateralism. In turn, interstate crises and conflicts affect human security and international stability. So it is essential to achieve stability in interstate relations by demilitarizing the links. Furthermore, human security demands are made on both the state and the international system. The influence of civil society organizations in promoting this level of security is essential.

Each dimension has its own logic. In international security, it is global aspects, interdependent markets and the weight of state actors, international organizations and non-state actors. Macro definitions are made at this level, and global and/or regional regimes are promoted. Stability is a public good to be encouraged.

State security is classical security and involves aspects linked primarily to sovereignty and border issues. The weight of military forces and the balance of forces, as well as concepts associated with dissuasion and defence take place at this level.
Human security addresses more local dimensions, although they involve large masses of humanity. It also addresses global issues, such as environmental matters and pandemics. These types of issues are not traditionally approached at the other two levels of security.

Building a holistic view requires emphasizing that each level must produce specific answers in at least three areas: use of force, prevention of conflicts and international cooperation. Increases in security at one level do not replace nor eliminate demands at other levels. On the contrary, insecurity at one of the three levels affects the other levels. From that point of view, human security is an emerging issue, which can give greater cohesion to interaction between international security and state security.

This outlook, which is greater than the sum of its parts, does not mean expanding the concept of security. To expand would entail militarizing different areas or ‘scrutinizing’ everything that is important. Rather, new perspectives imply better coordination between levels.

Four substantial elements need to be emphasized in today’s security landscape:

- International security extends beyond its military components;
- International security is transnational, global and interdependent;
- International security is produced by a plurality of actors, the state is no longer the exclusive actor; and
- International security in the twenty-first century has enlarged its agenda and demands that actors work together.

Emphasis on which factor has primacy in the human security, state security and international security trio may vary depending on the scenario. In most, the weight of coordination will fall on state security, because the state continues to be the main international actor. Yet some geographical regions, such as Africa, international security and its main actors could be a larger centre of influence. For example, the response capability of the international system might predominate in the face of political crises in weak or disappearing states.

The Secretary-General’s Millennium Report says that the world is progressing towards a new understanding of the concept of security. ‘Once synonymous with the defence of territory from external attack, the requirements of security today have come to embrace the protection of communities and individuals from internal violence.’ It adds, ‘The need for a more human-centred approach to security is reinforced by the continuing dangers that weapons of mass destruction, most notably nuclear weapons, pose to humanity: their very name reveals their scope and their intended objective, if they were ever used.’ In rethinking and reformulating the notion of security, a more comprehensive concept that is capable of addressing the different aspects that affect and influence the life and death of human beings needs to be built.

Starting in 1994 the multilateral system began to develop a concept of human security that has been receiving increasing attention in multilateral agencies. It is being transformed into a point of reference for the main global security trends of the twenty-first century. As a matter of fact, the 1994 Human Development Report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) presented its analysis on new dimensions of human security and defined them based on two main components—freedom from fear and freedom from want. The UNDP indicates that these two components form part of the origin and foundation of the United Nations. In this regard, it emphasizes that ‘the world can never be at peace unless people have security in their daily lives.’ The human security concept presented by the UNDP groups seven categories of threats that affect various spheres of action: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security.
The capacity to generate preventive measures\textsuperscript{18} is, therefore, the central point of international action and of the governing agencies of the international and regional systems.\textsuperscript{19} In this regard, the United Nations faces the urgent challenge and necessity to establish efficient strategies in preventing long- and short-term conflicts. Moreover, the United Nations is interested in increasingly targeting preventive actions in the sphere of international security as a crucial element in progressing towards a world free from fear. ‘As the United Nations has bitterly and repeatedly discovered over the last decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed.’\textsuperscript{20}

The legitimate delegation of authority by the United Nations for use of force is considered, therefore, to be a substantial instrument. As the same report then states, however, ‘force alone cannot create peace; it can only create the space in which peace may be built.’

This assertion is the basic link that allows one to reconsider the relationship between peace, the use of force and political conditions. Political will, restrictions on the use of force in dispute settlement and the development of efficient measures of dissuasion will make more space possible for politics and for building peace.

Human security is a wide-ranging concept that demonstrates the weaknesses and vulnerabilities of human beings, as well as their potential. Opportunities for growth and development are increasingly linked, yet can become sources of insecurity. Global interconnection acquires more significance and importance each day. Reducing risks implies greater coordination of national and global policies. The experiences of recent years show that it is essential to agree on the design and then on establishing and executing the international regimes that guarantee a consensual international order. It is the international regimes that can ensure protection for people. Vulnerabilities will be able to be overcome based on the action of international regimes. Coordinating policies inside international regimes will make it possible to increase opportunities for more equal development. Progress can only be made through collaboration. Cooperative global multilateralism and national democracies are the best guarantees to ensure development and protection for people.

Human security may be analysed and understood from different variables (see Table 2). In the basic document of the international seminar on ‘Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability’, professor Jorge Nef\textsuperscript{21} proposes at least five dimensions—ecology, economy, society, politics and culture. Each of these variables can be visualized at different levels. In this regard, I would like to emphasize how they are linked mainly to two crucial elements—globalization and the use of force. Examining these variables enables us to target and structure policy recommendations based on a concept, such as human security, that is still being developed and discussed.

Globalization has universalized such values as human rights, democracy and the market.\textsuperscript{22} This ‘universalization’ has a strongly western flavour. Associated technological and economic processes have generated greater global interdependence with both positive and negative aspects, such as increased trade, wider dissemination of scientific knowledge and more global information. There is also greater danger to the environment, terrorism has acquired a global dimension, organized crime is worldwide, and financial crises know no borders. Generating stability and global governance without proper institutions is hard. Significant deficiencies can be observed in this area. In turn, there is increasing differentiation and multiplication of international actors and that has a bearing on the degree of importance and means of power with which each one deals with the processes and seeks to influence future courses of action. A vision of the future is essential. In this framework within the international system’s current period, various different global concepts in specific areas such as security have not been honed.
Table 2. Variables implicated in human security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variables</th>
<th>Ecology (life)</th>
<th>Economy (wealth)</th>
<th>Society (support)</th>
<th>Politics (power)</th>
<th>Culture (knowledge)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Effects</td>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>Prosperity</td>
<td>Equality</td>
<td>Peace</td>
<td>Wisdom</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Disaster</td>
<td>Poverty</td>
<td>Inequality</td>
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<td>Dark side of</td>
<td>Refugees</td>
<td>Governance</td>
<td>Identities</td>
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<td>Globalization</td>
<td>associated effect, such as the</td>
<td>globalization and competition, more inequality</td>
<td>Migrations</td>
<td>Global regimes</td>
<td>Values</td>
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<td>Use of force</td>
<td>Bio-terrorism</td>
<td>Financial crisis</td>
<td>Polarization</td>
<td>Landmines</td>
<td>Intolerance and religious wars</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Cyberterrorism</td>
<td>Ungovernability</td>
<td>Child soldiers</td>
<td>Local identities</td>
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<td>Money laundering</td>
<td>Rebellion</td>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td>clashing with</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Citizen security</td>
<td>Traditional</td>
<td>national and global</td>
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<td>disarmament</td>
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Human security visualizes a new global order founded on global humanism. The core issue is to solve the population’s basic needs within the framework of globalization and interdependence. This delicate balance demands, on the one hand, a tendency to unify behaviour, consumption and ideals centred on universal values and, on the other, the requirement to recognize and respect diversity and particular identities and cultures.

We have seen, however, that globalization also increases differences and does not—in and of itself—meet any needs. It also has an adverse effect on cultural practices and national and local identities. All of this is taking place in a context of economic and social polarization in various areas of the world. The result is local ungovernability, which transfers instability to the global system and regional sub-systems. A ‘zero-sum’ security concept asserts that there is no absolute security and that the greater security of one actor must mean a greater degree of insecurity for another.

In the case of human security, we can assert that the vulnerabilities of one are manifested as vulnerabilities of all. For example, in Latin America this requires that we pay greater attention to and seek more alternatives for the Colombian conflict.

Security: Latin American perspectives

The various regions and countries of Latin America and the Caribbean evidence a high degree of heterogeneity. Nonetheless, we are considered a region. There are substantial differences among us and, in some cases, these are on the increase. There is, however, a broad base for cooperative action based on common languages and culture and expressed in shared interests in numerous areas.

One of the substantial deficiencies of our region is not being able to speak with one voice. We find it hard to coordinate positions and foster international or even regional projects in concert. Without increased coordination, there will be no possibility of influencing the design of global rules.23 Relaunching the Rio Group might go a long way towards this objective.
Numerous trends suggest, although with no guarantee, that Latin America can make a qualitative leap in the field of international security. These trends include:

- An important cycle of border conflicts has ended.
- Sub-regional cooperation and integration have increased and, hence, regional opportunities can be identified.
- Despite globalization, we are a marginal or rather a peripheral region where strategic issues are concerned. This opens up positive opportunities for new areas of cooperation.
- Latin America is a denuclearized region, as codified in the Treaty of Tlatelolco, free from weapons of mass destruction.
- We learned from the 1990s that international cooperation in security issues requires a design and architecture. The Cold War institutions have become obsolete.
- Although results have yet to be achieved, efforts have been made to create new security regimes and to design new public goods in that area.
- There is renewed dialogue in summit diplomacy; although the operational level is low, it has strong prospects.
- Primary progress in goodwill and cooperation in security issues takes place at the sub-regional level.
- Track II diplomacy has played an important role in the region. This type of diplomacy must be fostered and expanded.
- The more international security there is, the more democratic governance and human security will be emphasized.

In spite of the potential of these trends, there are important deficiencies that must be overcome. A primary goal is to build and develop a common concept of international security in the Americas. As a region, we need a holistic concept that is able to embrace aspects of traditional security together with new threats and incorporate levels and dimensions relative to human beings. Highlighting peace as an essential value is a constant task. Condemning terrorism and indiscriminate violence against civilians is a requirement and objective associated with the search for peace.

A common concept of Latin American security will give us:

- More cooperation, participation and interstate coordination, while at the same time reducing militarization and conflicts;
- Increased multilateralism, more capacity for partnerships and greater contact between actors dealing with the international agenda, i.e. ‘cooperative multilateralism’; and
- More coordinated action by civil society organizations and greater influence of society in issues that directly affect it.

Latin America has the opportunity to build a multilateral international security regime in the region. This will be able to cope with traditional interstate dimensions of security, the emergence of new threats and contribute to opening up spaces for settling intrastate conflicts.

Designing and defining goals is very important in a multilateral international security regime. The key, crucial element, however, is political will. New conflicts, the presence of new actors and proof of new risks require a new concept of security. It must be capable of providing early warning mechanisms,
spaces for strategic political dialogue as well as informal dialogue such as 'Track II' diplomacy. Re-examining coercive diplomacy will open up more space for democratic regions to coordinate policies.

In short, the international regime will be organized around common concepts that enable threats to be targeted and concerted courses of action to be designed; in other words, these actions will be to control threats in terms of defence, open up spaces for diplomatic dialogue and reduce risks to people. This will increase levels of human security and, therefore, classical security and global security as well.

Notes

6 Millennium Report, op. cit.
7 This increased with global terrorism, its impact and the fight to eliminate it.

The many changes of the past decade, among them the new legitimacy regarding the defence of human rights, non-state actors being included on national and international agendas, the settlement of conflicts by peaceful means and moves towards regional integration, have motivated a desire to see the role of the military in society redefined in the new democracies of Latin America.

Myths and changing realities

In 1996 Abraham Lowenthal and Jorge Dominguez said that, notwithstanding certain operational problems, deviations and setbacks, there was a major shift in the region towards democracy. Coups d’état, the traditional response to recurrent political crisis, seemed to have vanished from Latin America. The shift towards a democratic reordering of society at the beginning of the twenty-first century, however, has been erratic and over the past few years the institution-building landscape has been fogged by populist or incompetent presidents, unstable governments and governments of doubtful legitimacy. We have also witnessed new forms of military involvement in guises that preserve the semblance of democracy: military control of vast quantities of economic resources, intelligence services with close links to governments, military putschists following populist policies, paramilitary intervention in political disputes and control of society through the militarization of domestic law enforcement.

Although some countries have managed to subordinate (to differing degrees) the military under civilian authority, this does not necessarily mean that the management of defence policy is in the hands of civilian authorities. The return to democracy is thus leaving a gap in the civilian control of the armed forces and their adjustment to the rules of democracy. Military organizations have collectively lost a certain measure of their authority but their historical alliances with the dominant sectors of society have allowed them to continue to wield significant power. This logrolling is winning them prerogatives as a collective entity within the democratic framework. The military reacted possessively to the change in the state, striving to retain the resources that had historically been their own. They adjusted collectively to democracy, defending their legal and institutional privileges. Nowadays they have less scope to challenge the civilian authorities, although relations between civilians and the military have not yet settled down to clear communication through institutional channels.
Political and social rights may now be accorded greater weight but there is still a measure of arbitrariness, which is also an expression of the authorities’ confusion about assigning the military a mission consistent with the rule of law in a regional integration process. If the democracies in Latin America are to become entrenched, we believe that civilian management of defence must become established as state policy.

Civilian authority is built upon the knowledge and acquired skills of civil servants, congressional advisers and political parties. Yet in the period of democratic transition, we have seen emphasis on offering military leaders additional training. For example, the Pentagon (through its Southern Command) has offered several courses and training programmes specifically for the military and has failed to develop training programmes for civilian management of defence policy. Nor do the Latin American governments themselves offer formal civilian training programmes. The creation of a new civilian leadership based on genuine aptitude is crucial to the stability of Latin American democracies.

Accomplishments and errors throughout the region

Since the return of democracy to Latin America an attempt has been made to establish a new pact of civilian control, albeit incomplete, enabling the political elites to contend for power without the ‘blessing’ of the armed forces. In some countries this new hegemonic settlement has been a success, and political differences are settled through electoral competition; in others, instability predominates.

The restoration of democracy across the continent has been an erratic process. Peru’s inability to include its traditional elites within its modernization project has led to a recurrent crisis of political control, and power has been fragmented by the predominance of a marginal military sector. The support of President Fujimori by the armed forces made it impossible to institute civilian management of defence and, as a result, the armed forces have not remained on the political sidelines.

The recent military coup showed that populist and state-centred measures confront a fragmented society, each time with more violence. With nearly half of the population demanding his resignation, it was clear that Chávez failed to improve democratic procedures.

The crisis in political legitimacy in Paraguay—a paragon of the institutional imperfections found in the new democracies—surely needs no illustrating. The assassination of Vice President Argaña and the forced exile of President Cubas to Brazil in March 1999 attest to the violence used to settle political disputes in a country where the armed forces are privileged actors. It is also the military that is supposed to uphold ‘order’, and the lack of clear rules promotes the emergence of patriarchal leaders in the
Civilians and the military

place of party authorities. To round off this dismaying prospect, the Partido Colorado is simultaneously
the source of legitimacy, crisis and confrontation. With such a singular party structure, rebuilding any
kind of institutional consensus is virtually impossible.

In Uruguay, where the military problem seems to be less acute, there are still vestiges of the
privileges that the officers won while in power. Due to the breakdown of the two-party system and the
advances made by the Frente Amplio, a party with socialist origins, fears of the military have increased.
There are no spaces to challenge the civilian government but neither can the government establish
complete supremacy.4

The armed forces in Brazil are a segment of society, a political force to contend with and an
agency of the state; they have retained numerous functions, and this enables them to negotiate their
privileges and ensure they get their share of power in decision-making processes. The simplest sign that
civilian authority is paramount—defence policy run from a civilian ministry—was a complex process
marked by tensions between the government and the military. The political reshuffle of the late 1990s
appears to be based on the idea of preserving these features in association with a new reformist vision:
Brazil as a global player. This vision can be inferred from a statement by the Brazilian Foreign Minister:
‘The multilateral forums are certainly the best arena where Brazil can exercise, on a global level, its
competence in the defence of national interests. The play of alliances of a variable geometry, made
possible by a world of indefinite polarities, strengthens our participation in these forums, where we can
best develop our action potential in the formulation of rules and norms of conduct for the management
of the globalization space in every field of interest to Brazil.’5

In Ecuador, the constitutional government of Jamil Mahuad ended in January 2000 due to a
crisis of legitimacy supported by the military and indigenous populations. The country has had eight
presidents in less than three years (three of them for just one day).6 As an institution, the Ecuadorian
Armed Forces keep a tight hold on power. They mediated in the political crises affecting presidents
Abdala Bucaram and Jamil Mahuad, illustrating a peculiar authoritarian alliance between indigenous
and military authorities.

The country at the centre of most controversies is, without doubt, Colombia, where the situation
has been described as a case of the state lacking a monopoly of power. In actual fact, a success story of
weak armed forces not taking part in politics has resulted not in a stronger democracy but in a failure
of the design of the nation. The armed forces have increased their relative political autonomy in
matters of repressive activities and rather than demilitarize the conflicts; the peace policy followed by
the civilian authorities has made the armed confrontation worse. ‘Plan Colombia’ emphasizes military
power without providing convincing answers to how the administration of justice will be improved, the
safety of the general populace restored or transgressors punished,7 while stimulating a conflict in which
both the guerrillas and the military believe that greater military might will improve their negotiating
positions.8

The army in Chile is loath to give up power: the reordering process in Chile has thus been
conspicuously slow and deliberate. It is thanks to external factors that the civilian authorities have
recently appeared to be gaining legitimacy without the need to report to the military, which still considers
itself as the ‘guarantor’ of the state. In this case one element contributing to the difficulty of bringing the
armed forces under the control of the civilian authorities and making the country governable is the fact
that the military’s allies have a voice in a political coalition with a comfortable electoral margin.

As Ricardo Córdova points out, the power struggle in El Salvador was not settled around the
negotiating table, where none of the contending parties emerged with a clear victory. Democracy was
brought to El Salvador, and changes were made in its military policy, thanks to strong multilateral
support.9 But the violent exchanges that daily punctuate society,10 the high crime rate, the ineffectual
judiciary and the high levels of social inequality, although not posing a challenge to the political regime, are signs of an explosive disillusionment that the state in its current, still fragile condition is unable to keep in check.

The upsurge in political democracy in Guatemala is more the result of a collapse of authority than a reordering of the republic's armed forces. The country is emerging from peace negotiations that tend to hide a strong internal conflict. Additionally, a significant part of the largely indigenous populace is marginalized, illustrating the lack of consensus between the government and society. Control over the armed forces has been a tortuous affair of advances and retreats. The military conversion programme cannot undo the injustices of the authoritarian regime and, consequently, trust between society and the military is still a long way off. Although it has signed an agreement including democratic institution-building measures, the government has not developed the requisite skills to administer a democracy.

This overview of Latin America reveals glaring gaps in the entrenchment of democracy. There is no scope for military coups in the traditional manner, either in the state of countries' domestic affairs or in the international setting. There are, however, still deep rifts, which call for prudence in relations between the military and political forces. We know from experience that when political reshuffles are left incomplete the armed forces are a factor contributing to instability and tension. Although many in the military are not likely to take tanks into the streets as in Venezuela, a lot of them do not seem to understand that they are not the ‘protectors’ of political decisions, that they do not define the welfare of the nation, and that they cannot act according to their own interpretation of the rules of government.

In almost all the countries, the defence ministry's role as a creator of policy amid the various authorities of the state is limited. In part this is a response to a fear of reaction from the armed forces that would make the countries ungovernable. It also attests to an absence of civilian expertise in managing defence, an area that has always been in officers' hands. This lack of aptitude means that government officials are unable to present themselves to the military as legitimate negotiating partners. This hinders the development of a professional dialogue between civilians, elected officials and government agencies. In bilateral and pan-American meetings, in general, there are no professional exchanges between civilians. During bilateral talks between defence ministries, the technical points of the agenda are prepared and developed by the military. To achieve democratic management of defence policy it is necessary to have a dialogue between civilian officials. But the defence ministries have not trained people to manage this debate.

The lack of democratic control over defence is compounded by other shortcomings. For example, for the most part intelligence services have not been turned into civilian agencies independent of and unconnected to the military. Moreover in most Latin American countries there is no congressional oversight of intelligence service activities. The congresses have scant ability to evaluate either military activities or public spending on defence once funding has been assigned en bloc to each of the armed forces. These institutional shortcomings hamper the redistribution of authority by disrupting the recovery of powers that would safeguard legitimate democratic control.
Advances and setbacks

Various countries, among them Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador and Argentina, have made notable efforts to rise above the ideological issues that characterized their non-democratic periods. They have attempted to separate defence from domestic security functions so as to prevent the military from becoming a threat to society itself. The divide between public order and defence functions is a sensitive issue for the entrenchment of democracy.

There used to be no distinction between defence and domestic security in Latin America, where the armed forces ran the state and militarized police activities. The liberal tradition of supporting the role of civil society as a safeguard of a working democracy and as a check on the separation of power scarcely existed in Latin American countries. The state was subject to no limits. The principles of legitimacy were overturned and constantly challenged by the influence of military sectors. The armed forces became accustomed to wielding control over various parts of society. Under such arrangements, defence covered all aspects of the state, from issues of public order to questions concerning the economy and education.

Changes on the international scene are promoting a security agenda that covers new risks such as drug trafficking, migration and terrorism—areas in which public order and defence issues tend to overlap. The overlap has perhaps a lesser effect on the institutional order in developed countries, but in Latin America it is allowing the armed forces to become involved without the institutional counterbalances that exist in consolidated democracies. What in developed countries might look like progress towards security for the general population poses, in many Latin American states, a growing threat to the entrenchment of democracy and a window of opportunity for the military to intervene in domestic affairs. The issue is well illustrated by the ‘war on drugs’. Involving the military in efforts to combat drug trafficking tends to stunt the incipient formation of regulatory channels in the design of defence policy. The armed forces in the region are conducting drug-control missions without any clear policy having been formulated by defence ministries or the topic having been debated in national congresses. As a result, efforts to combat drug trafficking are giving the military additional scope to act autonomously and leading to de facto involvement without the required mandates from the civilian authorities.

Meanwhile, the political elites in Latin America have left incomplete the definition of a security framework that clearly establishes the mission of the armed forces. The prospect of cooperative security was developed in the early 1990s, the goal being to encourage the establishment of communication channels and to build trust on the basis of the principles of equality, justice and reciprocity. This approach managed to create a framework for confidence- and security-building measures both in the Americas through the Organization of American States, and in bilateral relations through joint operations by armed forces.

More recently the notion of human security has emerged: it runs counter to earlier thinking by placing the individual, not the state, at the centre of political decisions. The 1994 Human Development Report produced by Mahbub ul Haq for the United Nations Development Programme was the first to articulate the concept of human security, now championed by the Governments of Canada and Switzerland in particular. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development adds a further element to these ideas, one stemming from the recognition that violent conflicts adversely affect development and cooperation programmes. Hence it explores the connection between the economy and security, pursuing structural stability in the sense of total respect for the rule of law and human
rights, economic and social development backed by dynamic, representative institutions that can handle change and settle differences without recourse to violent conflict.\textsuperscript{18}

Unfortunately, these approaches—which represent very encouraging improvements over the notions of defence traditionally applied by Latin American armed forces—have not been translated into specific statements of doctrine. The armed forces continue to be trained on the basis of criteria similar to those used during the Cold War. However, within this uncomfoting panorama we must acknowledge a new element with very positive effects: participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions.

Peacekeeping missions give a boost to democracy since members of the military get to know and work alongside officials and citizens from a variety of countries, thereby acquiring a better understanding of the choices and beliefs encountered in other cultures. This diversity and openness encourages greater tolerance, which is one element of the democratic mindset. Being run by civilian governments and the United Nations, peacekeeping missions make for greater civilian control over defence. Those responsible for administering contributions to peacekeeping missions are national officials from diplomatic missions to the United Nations who receive requests from the Security Council and pass them on to their respective governments. This strengthens various internal negotiating mechanisms among agencies, thereby reducing the weight of the military in decisions on questions of security.

Participation in peacekeeping missions has given renewed legitimacy to officials who have lost the esteem of their compatriots; it is one of the most promising ways of bringing the military under supervision and control. Yet despite its stated intention to collaborate in the democratization of Latin America’s armed forces, the United States Southern Command has notably omitted the encouragement of peacekeeping missions from its prescriptions for the region.

Some countries have been relatively active in peace operations, while others have been reticent or indifferent. Among the Latin American countries, Argentina has been the most active, within involvement rising from twenty observers in 1988 to more than 1,400 troops in 1994. If it continues to apply its troop rotation scheme, more than 50% of its career military personnel will have served in United Nations operations by the year 2002. Uruguay has provided the longest-standing and second largest contribution to the United Nations from Latin America—the largest in relation to the size of its armed forces. Some 900 Uruguayan troops served in the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) in 1998. By 1999, Brazil had contributed 12,000 troops to peacekeeping operations. At the end of the Gulf War the Chilean air force provided a helicopter squadron to monitor the border zone between Iraq and Kuwait, and since 1991 it has taken part in six missions. Bolivia, Ecuador and El Salvador have also sent personnel, and some of these officers have been trained at the Argentine Joint Peacekeeping Training Centre (CAECOPAZ).

Concerns and alarms

Changes in military institutions in a number of Latin American countries have come more in response to a need to reform the state than to a new definition of defence within the framework of democratic government. The effects of this have been positive inasmuch as the executive has imposed its authority on military institutions, but there has also been a downside in the emergence of new forms of military power. For example, one way to bestow the military fresh advantages is to transform the armed forces into entrepreneurial organizations.
Back in the days of authoritarian governments the military already performed political and administrative tasks such as managing state- and jointly owned enterprises. This allowed them to establish connections with the groups in power, maintain contacts, hold information about private economic activity, and handle discretionary resources unseen and unsupervised by society. As administrators of their own social welfare institutions, the armed forces have pursued an aggressive investment policy—which has left some military personnel in possession of economic holdings of startling size.

The irruption of the military into private manufacturing and marketing meant that extensive resources were being manipulated without congressional supervision or instructions from defence ministries. The consequent autonomy allowed the military to compete with the state (as in Ecuador) or influence its decision-making process (as in Honduras).

For instance, the Ecuadorian Army Industry Department (Dirección de Industrias del Ejército de Ecuador, DINE) owns steelworks, a hotel management and tourism chain with sophisticated (Marriott) hotels, the local dealership for General Motors, a mining company, a fishing company, the Rumiñahui Bank, and several factories making items for military use, among other companies and activities in the capital market. Contrary to the situation in developed countries where the private sector competes in defence manufacturing, thus making greater transparency and supervision a must, the military in Ecuador has been set up as a holding company that has a monopoly not only on power but also on the economy. As entrepreneurs, military personnel are not taxpayers and they make use of their public institutions to secure tax exemptions.

It is not certain that the military are contributing to the betterment of society, whatever the former Ecuadorian Minister of Defence may say on the subject: ‘The holdings of the DINE business group are the result of its corporate activities in which it has invested its own resources which in no sense were ever part of the budget of the state or the land forces; their consolidation is the fruit of that joint participation by the public and private sectors, when the objectives that prompt it are consistent with the transparent attitude of their members—which is aimed at the common good, seeking to help to solve the problem of unemployment and contribute [towards] the finances of the state through the large inputs made every year by the industrial corporations in the group.’

The situation is similar to that in Central America as described by Brenes and Casas: ‘The Central American generals accepted a loss in political influence in exchange for two things: impunity for human rights violations and silence on the subject of their personal and institutional finances.’ Such activities create circuits ungoverned by regulation and, hence, unlikely to attract penalties. According to this study, the Honduran and Guatemalan armed forces’ banks are among the leading banking institutions in Central America.

In the case of Honduras, the armed forces are the eighth most influential business group in the country. Leticia Salomón draws attention to the difficulties this situation creates within the business community, which complains of unfair competition since the armed forces can reduce their costs of production thanks to the exemptions granted by the state. Besides this, in both Honduras and El Salvador the defence budgets are secret and only the congresses know how much money has been allocated to them in total.

Since the changes dreamt up by the Sandinista revolution, followed by the modifications imposed by President Violeta Chamorro, many public sector entities in the orbit of the Nicaraguan army have been privatized. The deal was a tacit concession allowing the army to regain privileges in exchange for accepting the new political rules of the game. The upshot is a powerful institution where military personnel are allowed to own construction firms, furniture manufacturers, fishing companies and airlines. Additionally, the senior ranks receive preferential distribution of estates and ranches as post-war compensation.
Corrupt administration of national resources has also been reported in Peru. In a communiqué issued in response to the repatriation of Fujimori’s intelligence secretary Vladimiro Montesinos, Lt. Col. Ollanta Tazo, the head of the military uprising on 29 October 2000, justified his action in pursuit of a clean-up in Peruvian politics: ‘Montesinos’s circle of top generals who have grown rich on drug trafficking, gun-running and other shady deals very seriously threaten the health of the Peruvian army and people and, in consequence, the very existence of Peru as a sovereign nation state.’24 When the daily paper Liberación published stories of the two million dollars that Montesinos had in Wiese Bank in Switzerland, President Alberto Fujimori told EFE, the Spanish news agency, ‘the income found is the profits earned by a legal advisory business in which Montesinos is a partner, which operates independently of the activities of the adviser of the SIN (National Intelligence Service).’25

Despite such justifications, concerns about corruption continue. For example, Camilo Soares, the young Paraguayan leader of the conscientious objector movement, has denounced the military for managing corruption.26 Another sign of military corruption can be seen in the proliferation of airstrips in areas under military control. It is reported that an unusual amount of loading and unloading, possibly due to smuggling and drug trafficking, goes on in these areas.27

Once the armed forces lost the discretional use of the state-owned economic resources that they had managed when in power, their payroll fell. This has triggered an alarm about a dangerous ‘proletarianization of the officer class’ as they have looked for alternative ways of keeping at their disposal enough assets to allow them to decide independently what they spend. The results of this kind of autonomy in the market in countries with clear institutional shortcomings are further attenuated transparency and public supervision. Everything is for sale—personal protection, economic security and deals awarded to individuals who, through exploitation of their institutional advantages, can compete unfairly with the private sector while at the same time extend their influence on society in other ways.

Closing observations

Almost all governments have made conspicuous attempts to overcome their authoritarian pasts but have been much less effective in organizing the management of defence in accordance with the parameters laid down by multilateral organizations. The mandate to stabilize democracy has been firm and clear throughout the region. The governments of Latin America have taken up this challenge together with the need to reform the organization of the state, rationalize the various state agencies, conduct financial reforms to strengthen their economies, and open up their markets under conditions too competitive for local patronage networks. In many cases these measures have been combined with efforts to restore peace and reintegrate combatants into society. Though they have met with varying degrees of success, these measures have propelled democracy forward while checking the resistance of the armed forces to governmental decisions, and generated tensions when governments have proved unable to satisfy the demands of different sectors of society.

In the democratic transition process, foreign pressure has pushed for state reform and domestic pressure for improved living conditions. Setting up a ministry of defence responsible for running the armed forces has not been a priority. In view of this fact, during the reform process an opportunity has been missed to make the military accountable to civilian rule. The result is the construction of imperfect democracies, capable of functioning with an autonomous centre of power.
As an institution, the armed forces hold a monopoly on violence to defend the state against external threats. This power is delegated to them by the executive on the basis of constitutional mandates. At the same time some functions, such as the promotion of senior officers and budget allocations, are determined by congress. Because of the nature of the functions they perform, the military responds to a mandate stemming from the contract between elected officials and the electorate. This is what gives civilian control of the military its legitimacy. Besides, having mechanisms available to curb an institution whose principal mission is the legal use of violence within the confines of the state is an important principle in a democratic country.

The military can only really be accountable and kept in check if there are available personnel with the skills necessary to design the appropriate policies, if institutions have their own experts who can evaluate matters from perspectives other than the military one, and if society can legitimately voice its interests on the subject. In Latin America, however, defence questions have always been the preserve of the armed forces themselves and a few civilians associated with them.

The question of civilian versus military power is part of a broader vista covering reform of the security sector and linked to economic development, the efficiency of the public sector and improvements in the quality of life for the general populace. The countries undergoing deep economic crises have not laid thorough plans to reallocate defence spending in accordance with a definition of military doctrine and the military’s missions. At most there have been payroll cuts and structural trimming—cutting where cuts could be made, not where they should.

Governments need to show a determination to exercise their authority, creating the means for and organizing the management of defence. The rules and regulations authorizing civilian management of defence do not exist in Latin America. Although the armed forces are formally assigned to operate under the hierarchical and functional authority of the executive branch, in practice they are allowed to retain autonomy of action. The governments of the region have not yet come to terms with the dangerous situation this has created. In order to ensure stability they have failed to govern each of the institutions that make up the state, and it is this relinquishment of power that ultimately weakens the consolidation of democracy.

This is a perverse feature of the legacy of military ascendancy, which can be addressed only by including a variety of civil society organizations—both national and regional—in the debate on, definition of, and in decisions affecting the thrust of military doctrine. In that way, we could forge a civilian community independent of the armed forces that would view the role of the military as a matter of state policy, as indeed it should be viewed.

Notes


4 For example, the former Commander-in-Chief of the army during the rule of President Lacalle, Lt. Gen. Daniel García, remarked that the armed forces were the president’s last resort, and it would not be wise to trim their budget. La República, Montevideo, sección política, 3 December 2000.

5 Lecture by Ambassador Celso Lafer, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, at the Rio Branco Institute, Brasília, 12 April 2001. Translation by the Brazilian Embassy in Washington, DC.


8 ‘Crisis in the Andes. Unravelling Democracy’, op. cit.


11 It should be recalled that even while democracy was being introduced the President, José Luis Serrano, suspended the constitution, dissolved congress and the supreme court, dismissed the Procurator-General and the Human Rights Procurator, and suspended the Elections and Political Parties Acts by decree on 25 May 1993.


13 Rut Diamint (ed.), Control civil y fuerzas armadas, op. cit., ch. 1.

14 This approach derives from the report of the Brandt Commission, supplemented by the approach taken by the Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues chaired by Olof Palme in 1982, which sought to reduce the confrontation between East and West by proposing a model of shared security.

15 According to the United Nations, confidence-building measures refer in the main to military matters and are designed to help build trust and establish firmer relations among states with a view to facilitating arms reductions and disarmament. United Nations, Department for Disarmament Affairs, 1989, Los armamentos y el desarme, Geneva, December.

16 See for example the Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research, http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/hpcr/human_security.htm


18 Ibid, p. 17.

19 Dirección de Industrias de Ejército, 1999 (brochure).

20 Tarqui [review of the Armed Forces of Ecuador], Quito, Ecuador, October 1999.


25 Liberación, Lima, 17 December 1999, p. 3.


27 Clarín, Buenos Aires, 24 April 1996, p. 3
One of Colombia’s oldest and most frequently cited human rights groups, the Colombian Commission of Jurists (CCJ), compiles thorough statistics on the human rights situation in this South American country. In its most recently published report, the CCJ found that political violence in Colombia claimed 3,538 lives between April and September 2000—twenty people per day. As recently as early 1998, the CCJ was reporting ten political murders per day. Fed by a brutal, multi-front war between the security forces, the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) and the ELN (National Liberation Army) guerrilla groups and AUC (United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia) paramilitary organization, the intensity of Colombia’s political violence has doubled in less than three years.1

The CCJ report adds, ‘five of the twenty daily victims were killed in combat, including civilians and combatants. The other fifteen were killed in their homes, in the street or at their place of work. More than fifteen percent of them lost their life due to the actions of the guerrillas. The other 85 percent died at the hands of the Colombian state and the paramilitaries’.2

In 2001, the conflict forced 342,000 people from their homes—about 1,000 people every day, according to Colombia’s Consultancy for Human Rights and Displacement (CODHES).3 In the last ten years, approximately 1.2 million people have been forcibly displaced, out of a population of 40 million; the majority are children.4 By most measures, only Sudan and Angola have larger internally displaced populations. About eight people per day are kidnapped for ransom, mostly by leftist guerrillas.5 Yet the conflict only accounts for a fraction of the killing in what is one of the world’s most violent countries: in all, 26,250 people were murdered in Colombia in 2000, at least 75% of them by common criminals, not political groups.6 The increasing violence and lawlessness place Colombia’s crisis at the top of the Western Hemisphere’s human security agenda.

A divided country

By rights, Colombia should be neither a poor nor a violent place. It is blessed with a wealth of natural resources, from oil to minerals to forests. It has extensive coasts on two oceans, and its people are known for their energy and inventiveness. It is tragic that a country with so many natural advantages should be the site of so much bloodletting.

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Looked at another way, though, Colombia is a very difficult place to govern, with a population so deeply divided that it might appear almost pre-programmed for conflict. One of the starkest divisions is economic. With the top 10% earning forty-two times what the bottom 10% earns each year, Colombia is one of the world’s most economically unequal countries. About 3% of landholders control 70% of all farmland. These numbers are reflected in Colombia’s social reality; as in much of Latin America, a small, non-inclusive elite has historically dominated the economy and political system.

Ethnicity is another societal fault line. One out of every three Colombians is non-European and non-mestizo. At least 26% of the population is Afro-Colombian and 5% is indigenous. These ethnic groups, however, are barely represented among the country’s economic and political power-holders.

The country has also been kept divided by its geography. Twice the size of France, Colombia is broken up by three chains of the Andes Mountains, rivers, swamps, jungles and other natural barriers that keep people apart and make Bogotá, the capital, seem very far away. The central government has always been weak, exerting little control over much of the country’s territory and providing very few services beyond a few cities. Local strongmen—whether generals, landowners, political bosses, ‘narcos’, leaders of paramilitary groups or guerrilla fronts—have frequently held more regional power than the national government.

With all these divisions, wars have been frequent. Colombia fought major civil wars in 1828, 1839–42, and 1899–1903 (the ‘Thousand Days’ War’, which claimed 100,000 lives, and during which Colombia lost its province of Panama to a U.S.-backed independence movement). About 300,000 died during a decade of rural political-party violence that began in 1948, a period that Colombians simply call ‘la violencia’.

The combatants

La violencia never came to a definitive end. Both of Colombia’s main leftist guerrilla groups are nearly forty years old. Both are involved in peace talks with the Colombian government. Together, they are responsible for about 15% of all conflict-related murders and the majority of kidnappings; their routine violations of international humanitarian law have drained nearly all sources of domestic and international political support.

The larger of the two is FARC, with at least 17,000 members and significant power in much of the countryside. FARC was founded in 1964, a lineal descendant of Liberal Party and Communist peasant self-defence groups that operated in rural Colombia during la violencia.

FARC grew rapidly during the 1990s, to the point where by 1996 it was able to carry out battalion-size hit-and-run attacks on military installations and small cities. This is mostly due to the guerrillas’ practice of forcibly ‘taxing’ all economic activity wherever it is strong enough to do so. Taxes on the rapidly growing number of coca producers in rural Colombia explain much of the expansion in the guerrillas’ war chest and, as a result, their increased military might.

FARC and the Colombian government were engaged in peace negotiations from January 1999 to February 2002. The talks, which were not accompanied by a cease-fire, achieved very little and collapsed in an atmosphere of mistrust and escalating guerrilla and paramilitary violence.

Colombia’s second-largest guerrilla group is the ELN. Formed in the mid-1960s by radical students and priests following the Cuban model of guerrilla rebellion, the group today has about 3,000 members.
Colombia’s human security crisis

The ELN takes less funding from the drug trade, and a paramilitary campaign of massacres and forced displacements have cost the group control over some of its historical strongholds in the past few years. The ELN has especially targeted foreign multinationals doing business in Colombia, frequently attacking the country’s oil and energy infrastructure. The group is in the early phases of a peace process with the government, with a series of meetings in Cuba planned during the first half of 2002.

While FARC began its operations in southern Colombia, both groups have operated extensively north and west of the Andes, where the vast majority of Colombians live. By the early 1980s, years of guerrilla extortions and kidnappings had exhausted many of the cattle ranchers and landowners in departments like Antioquia, Córdoba, Sucre, Bolívar, Cesar and Santander. Many were willing to sell their properties at depressed prices, and at the time they had a ready supply of buyers. Colombia in the early 1980s was becoming a centre for processing and smuggling cocaine, and a newly rich wave of drug lords needed legitimate investments—namely land—to launder their profits. With so many willing buyers and sellers, Colombia witnessed what some analysts have called a ‘reverse land reform’ in its northern departments.10

These drug lords turned cattle ranchers, along with whatever original landowners remained, adopted a different approach to the guerrillas who were extorting them. They organized and armed so-called self-defence groups, what today we call paramilitaries.

Groups like ‘Death to Kidnappers’ (MAS) and the ‘Peasant Self-Defence Groups of Córdoba and Urabá’ (ACCU) were trained and organized with significant input from the Colombian army throughout the 1980s. Military officers helped create local groups, shared intelligence and carried out joint operations with the self-defence squads.

It soon became evident, though, that the paramilitaries did not attack guerrillas very often. The groups’ preferred targets were civilians in guerrilla-controlled areas, which they viewed as the FARC and ELN base of support, the sea in which the guerrillas swim. Their numerous massacres, forced displacements and assassinations of leftist political leaders caused the paramilitaries to be declared illegal in 1989.

But the state did little to disband them. Their collaboration with the Colombian military was pushed underground somewhat, but it continues to this day at the local brigade and battalion level. This phenomenon has been documented thoroughly, by reports released in 2001 alone by the U.S. State Department, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, and all major non-governmental human rights organizations.11 Today, the Colombian Commission of Jurists credits the paramilitaries—most of whom have united under an umbrella organization, the United Self Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC)—with about 80% of all political murders in Colombia.12

The paramilitaries are the fastest growing of Colombia’s armed groups, increasing from about 4,000 in 1998 to at least 10,000 today. They have made significant territorial gains, moving from traditional strongholds like northwestern Colombia and the Middle Magdalena region to town centres in many long-time guerrilla strongholds in southern Colombia and elsewhere. The paramilitaries also fund themselves through the drug trade, and not just because Colombia’s drug lords are among their long-time benefactors. Like the guerrillas, the paramilitaries tax coca and heroin poppy in areas where they are strong. The so-called ‘political director’ of the AUC, the media-savvy Carlos Castaño, has admitted in interviews that his group gets about 70% of its funding from the drug trade.13
The drug trade

While the drug trade has been an important factor in Colombian political and economic life for two decades now, it has changed significantly since the 1980s and early 1990s, when the Medellín and Cali cartels dominated the trade. As recently as the first half of the 1990s, relatively little coca—the crop that is refined into cocaine—was actually grown in Colombia. While the cartels made Colombia the centre of coca processing and smuggling, the plants themselves were grown in Bolivia and Peru. The large, vertically integrated cartels bought it, refined it and delivered it to first-world markets.

This arrangement broke down in the early to mid-1990s, making it more difficult to grow coca in Bolivia and Peru. Internationally funded alternative-development programmes had some impact by giving peasants legal economic opportunities. Law-enforcement efforts in Colombia (as well as some deal-making on extraditions and prison conditions) dismantled the large cartels; the smaller organizations that succeeded them lacked the international reach of their predecessors. Alberto Fujimori, Peru’s president at the time, cooperated with the United States on what became known as the ‘you fly—you die’ policy of shooting or forcing down suspected drug-smuggling aircraft (this policy has been suspended since an April 2001 incident that brought the accidental shoot-down of a planeload of U.S. missionaries near Iquitos, Peru). These factors combined to make it too costly to fly coca base out of Peru and into Colombia for processing.

The drug trade failed to wither away, of course, as demand for cocaine in the United States and other consumer countries remained largely unchanged. During the mid-1990s, coca cultivation moved directly into Colombia, the country where the plant had long been refined into cocaine. Colombia now grows more coca than all other source countries combined.

In the early and mid-1990s, the largest coca growing zone in Colombia was around Guaviare department, on the northern fringe of Colombia’s Amazon-basin jungle. Guaviare is typical of the zones in southern Colombia where coca is grown. It was largely uninhabited, at least by non-indigenous people, until the second half of the twentieth century. By the 1970s its forests and savannahs were
home to a few thousand people who were either seeking land in this ‘agricultural frontier’ or fleeing the violence in the north.

The Colombian government did not follow these settlers to Guaviare. The area remained wild, mired in neglect, without good roads or infrastructure, basic services like education and medicine, justice or law and order. Colombia’s guerrillas operated freely.

The region’s residents, nearly all of them small landholders, tried their hand at legal crops, such as rubber, corn, yucca and palm oil. High market prices brought occasional ‘bonanzas’, but these economic bubbles were short-lived and fragile. Without credit, technical assistance, marketing advice or farm-to-market roads, farmers in Guaviare found that their sales could not even cover the cost of inputs and transporting produce to market.

In the late 1970s or early 1980s, local residents say, enterprising narcotics dealers arrived and showed them how to grow marijuana, then coca and heroin poppy. Instead of a truckload of yucca, a simple procedure involving chemicals like gasoline and cement could turn a field full of coca leaves into a few kilos of profitable coca paste, eliminating the challenge of transporting goods to market. With these illegal crops, the growers suddenly had several buyers to choose from, offering good prices in cash and credit toward future harvests. The zone’s residents remained small landholders, but were able to enjoy almost a middle-class lifestyle, with houses in town, electricity, indoor plumbing, perhaps a motorcycle.¹⁴

The ‘source zone’ strategy (1990s)

Coca growing took off in Guaviare in the mid-1990s. The United States government responded quickly, devoting more of its drug-interdiction budget to the ‘source zone’ (as opposed to the ‘transit zone’, countries like Mexico or Haiti through which drugs are transported). In 1995 Washington launched in earnest an aerial fumigation programme, based in the departmental capital of San José del Guaviare, which continues to this day. Dozens of civilian contractor pilots recruited by a Virginia company called DynCorp fly over the area spraying Round-Up™—a mixture of the herbicide glyphosate and additional compounds, called surfactants, that allow glyphosate to penetrate the plants’ leaves and roots.

The area’s residents have long claimed that spraying on their food crops has sickened them and their animals, particularly with respiratory and gastrointestinal ailments and skin inflammations. The U.S. and Colombian governments insist that glyphosate is safe, though the health and environmental impact of glyphosate combined with surfactants such as POEA and Cosmo-Flux remains in dispute.¹⁵

The U.S. contractor spray pilots operate at some risk, because FARC is active in the Guaviare and shoots at them with small-arms fire. (Spray planes were hit by ground fire fifty-six times in 2000, though no casualties resulted.)¹⁶ The contractors’ proximity to the conflict has raised concerns in the U.S. Congress, particularly after a February 2001 incident in which a DynCorp search-and-rescue team found itself in a fire fight with FARC guerrillas in Curillo municipality, Caquetá department.¹⁷

For protection, the fumigation planes fly accompanied by Colombian National Police (CNP) helicopters and aircraft, all bought and maintained by the United States. Due in part to this programme, throughout the 1990s the CNP, particularly its counter-narcotics division (DIRAN), received nearly all U.S. anti-drug assistance. Colombia’s armed forces, hampered by corruption and human rights allegations and largely uninterested in the anti-drug mission, got only a few million dollars’ worth of aid each year, much of it training.
The United States committed what turned out to be a crucial error with the Guaviare fumigation programme. The spraying was never accompanied by a dollar’s worth of alternative development assistance to help the affected peasants make the transition to legal crops. The stated reason for this approach was a refusal to fund aid programmes in areas not completely under Colombian government control. The effect, however, was to make desperate peasants still more desperate by taking away their main economic opportunity.

Of course, coca growing was not necessarily the only viable economic choice available to Guaviare residents. They could always join FARC or paramilitaries, which support their fighters economically, and the U.S. spray programme probably won many recruits for illegal armed groups. Coca growers had another choice as well: to relocate to a safer spot.

Apparently, many of them did exactly that. Peasants moved out of the spray planes’ range, deeper into the jungle and deeper into FARC-controlled territory, cutting down thousands of acres of virgin rainforest along the way. While the fumigation programme brought a reduction in coca growing in Guaviare, by the late 1990s the epicentre of coca cultivation moved south and west to the departments of Caquetá and especially Putumayo, closer to the Ecuadorian border.

This zone has been considered FARC territory since at least the early 1980s, due less to guerrilla conquest than to a lack of Colombian state presence. The guerrillas’ strength led U.S. officials to determine that, due to security concerns, the contractor-and-police fumigation model could not be duplicated in Putumayo. Instead of questioning its overall approach, the Clinton Administration decided to encourage a much larger counter-narcotics role for the Colombian military.

‘Plan Colombia’ (1999–2001)

By 1998 this shift was eased not only by the coca trade’s southward migration, but also by the election of a new Colombian president. U.S. officials viewed Andrés Pastrana as someone they could work with and a welcome change from his predecessor, Ernesto Samper, whose apparent acceptance of Cali cartel campaign funds had brought U.S.-Colombian relations to their lowest point in decades.

Pastrana came into office in August 1998 in a moment of optimism. He made peace talks with guerrilla groups his highest priority, and sought to accompany negotiated reforms with what he called a ‘Marshall Plan’ of development for Colombia’s countryside. The new president presented the plan’s broad outlines to potential international donors in a document called ‘Plan Colombia’. The document made no mention of aerial fumigations or military activities, only development efforts.18

During a state visit to Washington in October 1998, Pastrana sought to interest U.S. officials in his Marshall Plan. He found few willing to commit hundreds of millions of dollars to programmes that did not appear to promise immediate results in the war on drugs, particularly in a conservative U.S. Congress suspicious of foreign-aid programmes.

Pastrana’s visit, along with a December 1998 meeting of the region’s defence ministers in Cartagena, made much more progress on another front. At the December meeting, U.S. Defence Secretary William Cohen and Colombian Defence Minister Rodrigo Lloreda announced the first major U.S. assistance for the Colombian military in several years. The two ministers agreed to set up a ‘counter-narcotics battalion’ in Colombia’s army—900 men, vetted to ensure clean human rights records—whose responsibility, Lloreda explained, would be to ‘support the police of Colombia in counter-narcotics
operations'. The new battalion would be based at Tres Esquinas, on the border between Caquetá and Putumayo departments, which by then had replaced Guaviare as the centre of Colombian coca cultivation.

The new battalion began training in April 1999. By that time, the term Plan Colombia had largely disappeared from Bogotá political discourse, as Pastrana’s development plan had faded for lack of international interest.

In fact, by mid-1999 doubts about Colombia’s peace process had already begun to spread: FARC had frozen the talks shortly after they began, Defence Minister Lloreda had quit to protest a continuation of the guerrillas’ demilitarized zone, and a guerrilla offensive in July alarmed many. When the new defence minister, Luis Fernando Ramírez, and Armed Forces Chief Gen. Fernando Tapias visited Washington in July 1999 requesting $500 million in military assistance—a heretofore unheard-of sum—U.S. officials were listening. In mid-July, U.S. ‘Drug Czar’ Barry McCaffrey circulated a memo to his Cabinet colleagues laying out a plan for about $600 million in new assistance to Colombia’s military and police. The largest outlay in McCaffrey’s plan would increase the Colombian military’s ability to operate in the Putumayo region.

After a period of inter-agency discussion, the Clinton Administration was ready to increase its military assistance commitment. In an August 1999 visit to Bogotá, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Thomas Pickering told Pastrana that the United States would ‘sharply increase aid if he develops a comprehensive plan to strengthen the military, halt the nation’s economic free fall and fight drug trafficking’, according to the Washington Post.

By late September 1999 a new Plan Colombia, an English document with a significant security and counter-narcotics component, was circulating in Washington. Though vague on specifics, it was understood that the Plan, a Colombian government initiative ‘for peace, prosperity, and the strengthening of the state’, would cost $7.5 billion, $4 billion from Colombian funds and $3.5 billion from the international community’s contributions.

Since it first emerged, critics and supporters of Plan Colombia—which was not available in Spanish until February 2000—have argued over the extent of the U.S. role in its origins. In the Plan’s defence, a 2001 monograph from the U.S. Army War College explains: ‘Contrary to speculation in the media, the Plan was authored by a Colombian—Jaime Ruiz, Chief of Staff for Pastrana, who holds a doctorate from Louvain and an engineering degree from the University of Kansas, has an American wife, and speaks flawless English, wrote the plan in a week in English.’ Whether or not a single person indeed created a plan to pacify and develop an entire country in a single week, Washington’s influence on the Plan’s design cannot be discounted.

On 11 January 2000, President Bill Clinton introduced the U.S. contribution to Plan Colombia to the U.S. Congress as an ‘emergency supplemental’ budget bill. While Colombian officials explained that about 25% of the overall $7.5 billion plan would go to the country’s security forces, with the rest going to economic and social programmes, Clinton’s bill was the exact opposite. What became known as the Plan Colombia aid package called for $1.3 billion in emergency aid for 2000 and 2001, of which $860 million benefited Colombia (the rest went to neighbouring countries and U.S. counter-drug agencies). Of that $860 million, 75%—$642 million—went to Colombia’s military and police. Including already-planned aid, the Center for International Policy’s most current estimate of U.S. aid to Colombia from 2000 to 2002 is $1.35 billion in military-police assistance (79%) and $363.5 million in economic-social assistance (21%).

The centrepiece of this military-aid component was a dramatic expansion of the counter-narcotics battalion strategy begun in December 1998. Since the Plan Colombia aid package became law in July
2000, U.S. funds have created two more battalions, forming a 2,300-man counter-narcotics brigade in the Colombian Army, based in the Putumayo coca-growing zone. The units are receiving about seventy-four helicopters, at a combined cost in excess of $400 million: thirty 1970s-era UH-1 ‘Huey’ utility helicopters delivered in 1999 and 2000, fourteen sophisticated UH-60 ‘Blackhawk’ helicopters delivered in January 2002, and about thirty more upgraded ‘Huey II’ helicopters, which are to begin delivery in February 2002. (Colombia’s police have received two more Blackhawks, and are to get about twelve Huey IIs.)

The units’ objective, explains an October 2000 White House report, is to ‘establish the security conditions needed’ to implement counter-drug programmes such as fumigation and alternative development in Putumayo. To fulfil this objective, what U.S. documents describe as ‘the push into southern Colombia’ will require U.S.-supported military units to carry out offensive operations against Colombian guerrillas. Critics have pointed out that this mission closely resembles counter-insurgency, a qualitative change that brings the United States closer than ever to Colombia’s war.

The aid package has brought a significant build-up of the U.S. presence in and around Colombia. Trainers and intelligence-gatherers (most from U.S. Special Forces units), spray-plane pilots, mechanics, logistics personnel, radar operators and others work with Colombian military and police counterparts at several bases in southern Colombia. Others work at a half-dozen radar sites in remote parts of the country, looking for suspicious drug-smuggling aircraft. Concerned members of Congress placed in the 2000 law a limit of 500 uniformed U.S. personnel and 300 private contractors who could be present in Colombia at any given time. The State Department claims that the U.S. military presence on the ground in Colombia has never exceeded about 400, but pressured Congress to increase the cap of 300 contractors, arguing that the delivery of new helicopters requires a greater presence of mechanics and other support personnel. In the 2002 aid package, discussed below, Congress lowered the military cap to 400, and increased the contractors’ maximum to 400.

**Concerns about the strategy**

Though it enjoyed the support of the Democratic Clinton Administration and Republican leaders in Congress, the Plan Colombia aid package was nonetheless controversial. Among the concerns that made it one of the most contentious U.S. foreign-policy issues in 2000 and 2001 were the possibility...
Colombia's human security crisis

of escalated military involvement, doubts about fumigation's impact and effectiveness as an anti-drug strategy, human rights consequences, damage to Colombia's peace talks, and lack of international support.

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Colombia has more than doubled. The U.S. anti-drug strategy has so far shown itself effective only in moving cultivations around geographically: from Bolivia and Peru to Guaviare, then to Putumayo.

Fumigations under the new plan began in Putumayo in late December 2000, and U.S. officials claim that 84,000 hectares of Colombian coca—a record number—was sprayed with glyphosate in 2001. While even the policy’s advocates do not predict a decrease in Colombia’s total coca cultivation in 2001, complaints of health and environmental damage, as well as wrongful spraying of legal crops, have proliferated.

As alternative development programmes have been slow to get started in fumigated zones, many of the region’s residents have packed up and left; some have gone across the border into Ecuador, but many others appear to have gone elsewhere in Colombia’s vast Amazon-basin jungles, where they have cut down new forest and planted new coca. Shortly after the first wave of fumigation in Putumayo, press coverage described new coca growing in Nariño department to the west, in a zone residents have taken to calling ‘Little Putumayo’. Spraying in Putumayo may prove effective only in displacing coca elsewhere in Colombia—or even over borders into neighbouring countries.

Human rights groups continue to be concerned about the possibility that U.S. assistance may contribute to abuses of the civilian population. Due to the Colombian military’s well-documented ties to the paramilitaries, as well as the impunity enjoyed by officers credibly alleged to have been involved in abuses, the U.S. government was unable to certify that its aid recipients met a series of human rights conditions that Congress included in the 2000–2001 aid package law. President Clinton chose to waive the conditions, as the law allowed, citing ‘the national security interest’.

The military-paramilitary relationship appears to be disturbingly close in Putumayo, the destination of most U.S. military aid. While the new counter-narcotics brigade so far faces no allegations of paramilitary collaboration, existing units in this area—especially the 24th Brigade of the Colombian Army—face credible allegations of close ties to the AUC. In an October 2001 report, Human Rights Watch alleged that the Putumayo-based 24th Brigade even took payoffs from paramilitary leaders in exchange for its collaboration.

More concerns arise from the impact the new U.S. military assistance had on the defunct talks with the FARC. The announcement of the Plan Colombia aid package certainly soured talks with FARC at a moment when the two sides were working to undo decades of mistrust. The announcement of a major aid package strengthened hard-line opponents of negotiation on both sides of the negotiating table: FARC leaders who opposed the talks and distrusted government motives from the start, and government and military leaders who viewed the aid as a sign that further concessions in the talks would not be necessary.

More warning signs are evident in the European allies’ and Latin American neighbours’ reluctance to offer the Plan Colombia strategy an open endorsement or additional assistance. To date, Europe has offered only about $300 million in non-military aid to Colombia, and most of that is intended as ‘support for Colombia’s peace process’ and specifically not considered a contribution to Plan Colombia. The United States accounts for nearly all of the total international contribution to Plan Colombia, which was originally expected to total $3.5 billion. The lack of support is best explained by disappointment at being excluded from the plan’s design, discomfort with the large U.S. military component, and lack of interest in what has never been a priority aid destination for most European donor countries.
The ‘Andean Regional Initiative’ (2001-2002)

By April 2001, few of the Plan Colombia aid package’s helicopters had yet been delivered, and
the Bush Administration had yet to nominate many of its key Latin America policy-makers. His
administration’s aid request to Congress for 2002 therefore did not include any new hardware or
battalions, and was largely seen as a continuation of the strategy put in place by the Clinton
Administration.36

The main difference in the 2002 request was an increased focus on Colombia’s neighbours. The
Bush Administration sought to sell its aid request as part of a regional approach, preferring the term
‘Andean Regional Initiative’ to Plan Colombia. While 70% of Colombia’s portion of this request
(combining the foreign aid and defence-budget outlays) benefited
military and police operations, most of the aid for neighbouring
countries was more evenly balanced between military and social
priorities. Nonetheless, the administration’s aid request still called
for steep increases in military and police aid to Peru (82% over
2000–2001 levels), Bolivia (20%) and Ecuador (63%).37

Like aid levels, the U.S. presence in the countries bordering
Colombia is also increasing. In 1999 and 2000 the Clinton
Administration brokered agreements for the use of air bases at Manta, Ecuador and Aruba and Curacao
in the Netherlands Antilles. (A third site in Comalapa, El Salvador, began operations in 2001.) Both
‘Forward Operating Locations’, less than 200 miles from Colombian territory, host daily surveillance
and signals-intelligence flights that monitor drug production and smuggling from the air in the northern
Andes and southern Caribbean.38 Many observers, particularly in Ecuador, worry about future pressure
to change the sites’ purpose if the U.S. mission in Colombia should shift to counter-insurgency.

In Peru, the United States maintains a near-constant training presence in the Amazon port of
Iquitos, where a U.S.-built Joint Riverine Training Center assists Peruvian Navy and Police efforts to
control river traffic.39 Iquitos, along with other Peruvian sites like Andoas and Pucallpa, also hosts radar
sites and runways for the two countries’ aerial interdiction programme. This programme has been on
hold since the accidental shooting down of a planeload of U.S. missionaries in April 2001.

The Andean Regional Initiative faced a U.S. Congress that was more sceptical than it had been a
year earlier during the Plan Colombia debate. The final version of the 2002 bill cut about one-seventh
from the Bush Administration request, and conditioned the delivery of aid on human rights standards
(with language a bit weaker than the year before, but with no waiver) and the impact of fumigations.
Attempts to cut military assistance from the package came close to passage in the House of
Representatives, gaining the support of most of the Democratic Party, and an attempt to undo military
aid cutbacks failed in the Senate.

A new administration mulls counter-insurgency

Despite the anti-guerrilla aspects of U.S.-funded operations like the ‘push into southern Colombia’,
Washington has so far operated on the assumption that counter-insurgency— involvement in the
‘quagmire’ of Colombia’s messy war—is a mission to be avoided. While being ‘tough on drugs’ plays
well before a domestic audience, most politicians have avoided endorsing a nakedly counter-insurgent
approach, which would raise too many uncomfortable questions about escalation, ‘slippery slopes’,

While 70% of Colombia’s portion of this request (combining the foreign aid and defence-budget outlays) benefited military and police operations, most of the aid for neighbouring countries was more evenly balanced between military and social priorities.
exit strategies and the danger of a ‘new Vietnam’. (While some congressional Republicans for years have urged Washington to get into the counter-insurgency business, they were relegated to a hard-line fringe during the Clinton years.) Officials from both the Clinton and the Bush Administrations alike have sought to assure Congress and the public that they have no intention of crossing an invisible line between the anti-drug and anti-guerrilla missions. According to the U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, Anne Patterson, ‘The political stomach for going into the counter-insurgency business is zero. It is not going to happen’.40

The line between the missions has blurred, though, as Colombia’s peace process has stumbled and fresh allegations have emerged of FARC ties to the drug trade. ‘The United States … should stop pretending that it is only supporting a campaign against the drug traffic in Colombia’, the Washington Post editorialized on 3 January 2001. ‘If it is to continue training and equipping the Colombian army, the new administration cannot avoid involvement in the larger Colombian conflict’.41

Colombia’s armed groups are increasingly being viewed as threats to U.S. national security. Washington is not likely to continue tolerating high levels of instability in a nearby country that is Latin America’s fourth-largest economy and fifth-largest U.S. trading partner. Colombia is also the United States’ seventh-largest source of imported oil, and probably has more untapped and unexplored oil reserves than any country in the hemisphere.42 Other natural resources of great international value, all of whose exploitation is hindered by instability, include coal, natural gas, gold and precious gems, timber, and two coasts close enough to entice possible builders of alternatives to the very crowded Panama Canal.

As the Bush Administration established itself over the course of 2001, key voices began to question the anti-drug emphasis. The new defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, was known to be sceptical about involving the military in counter-narcotics. An influential June 2001 study by the Rand Corporation think-tank and funded by the Air Force was severely critical of U.S. anti-drug policy in Colombia, calling instead for a greater commitment to counter-insurgency. ‘The U.S. program of military assistance to El Salvador during the Reagan Administration could be a relevant model’, the study suggested.43

By mid-2001, as more Bush nominees arrived in key policy-making posts, officials acknowledged that they were in the midst of a ‘formal review’ of the Colombia policy it had inherited from the Clinton Administration. Assistant Secretary of Defence Peter Rodman stated in August that officials were making ‘agonizing decisions’ about whether the United States’ interest in Colombia is ‘just narcotics, or is there some wider stake we may have in the survival of a friendly democratic government’.44 Secretary of State Colin Powell’s scheduled 11 September visit to Bogotá was viewed as a key step in this review process.

The ‘war on terrorism’

Secretary Powell’s visit, of course, was postponed indefinitely. The 11 September attacks and subsequent war in Afghanistan knocked Colombia from the nation’s front pages for months. The policy review was frozen and the U.S. strategy was put on ‘autopilot’.

As the Afghanistan effort winds down, however, the debate over U.S. counter-insurgency support to Colombia is gathering momentum, fuelled by the February 2002 breakdown in talks with the FARC. The new international context, of course, is also fuelling consideration of a possible shift. Viewed through the lens of anti-terrorism, Colombia—with its three groups on the State Department’s list of foreign terror organizations—sticks out prominently on a map of the world.
U.S. officials’ rhetoric has grown more bellicose in the wake of the terror attacks. Both U.S. Ambassador Anne Patterson and Senator Bob Graham (chairman of the Intelligence Committee) have publicly compared FARC to the bin Laden terrorist organization. Secretary of State Colin Powell told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in October 2001 that bin Laden’s al Qaeda exemplifies a terrorist group against which an international alliance could be sustained, adding that FARC and Ireland’s Real IRA ‘probably meet a similar standard’. The State Department’s coordinator for counter-terrorism, Francis Taylor, told reporters on 15 October 2001 that FARC, ELN and AUC ‘will receive the same treatment as any other terrorist group, in terms of our interest in pursuing them and putting an end to their terrorist activities’, adding that the United States will employ ‘all the resources’ available to do so, including, ‘where appropriate, as we have done in Afghanistan, the use of military force.’ Key Congressional leaders responded positively to President Pastrana’s November request to use existing counter-narcotics aid to fight armed groups; House Drug Policy Subcommittee Chairman Mark Souder of Indiana told reporters, ‘It is not just narcotics. It has developed into terrorism and we need to fight terrorism in our hemisphere’.

The Bush Administration’s response was foreseen in its 2003 aid request to Congress, made public on 4 February 2002. Combining aid through foreign assistance and estimated defence-budget outlays, Colombia would get over $520 million in military and police aid and $164 million in social and economic aid in 2003. For the first time since the Cold War, the administration seeks a significant amount of non-drug military assistance for Colombia. The Foreign Military Financing (FMF) programme—used in recent years mostly to provide grant military aid to the Middle East—would provide $98 million to help Colombia’s army protect the Caño Limón-Coveñas pipeline, which runs from Arauca department to Sucre department in northeastern Colombia. Much oil in this pipeline belongs to Los Angeles-based Occidental Petroleum. Colombian guerrillas attacked the pipeline 166 times in 2001.

A ‘supplemental’ budget request introduced 21 March 2002 would go still further. In addition to an extra $6 million to begin the pipeline-protection programme immediately, the bill contains language that would fundamentally change the U.S. mission in Colombia, officially crossing the line between counter-narcotics and counter-insurgency as a matter of law. The request would allow all past, present and future military and police aid given through anti-drug programmes to be used ‘to support a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats to [Colombia’s] national security.’

The U.S. government is clearly at a strategic turning point, and the new proposal would multiply the number of potential targets against which U.S.-provided military equipment and U.S.-supported units can be employed. Washington is likely to witness a thorough debate in 2002 about greater involvement in Colombia’s conflict.

This debate must include an honest assessment of the size of the effort that would be needed. While the Rand Corporation and others hold up U.S. support for El Salvador in the 1980s as a possible model, they often neglect to recall that it took twelve years and nearly two billion dollars of military aid to achieve only a stalemate in El Salvador, after fighting killed 70,000 people and exiled over a million. Colombia has fifty-three times the area and eight times the population of El Salvador. The cost of a ‘successful’ counter-insurgency campaign in Colombia could be nightmarishly high, whether measured in dollars or lives.

Human rights are a second reason to pause before plunging into counter-insurgency. There are few guarantees that military aid—whether weapons, intelligence or lethal skills—would not get misused against innocent civilians. It is possible to imagine, for example, that intelligence...
providing to Colombia’s military about guerrilla movements in a village could find its way to paramilitaries who then massacre the villagers. Other than weak legislative protections, little exists to prevent an expanded U.S. military aid programme from contributing, directly or indirectly, to such abuses.

It is also unclear that a predominantly military approach can bring the security, governability and reform needed for a stable democracy to flourish in Colombia. Since the country is simply too large for the armed forces ever to maintain a permanent presence in all of its territory, military aid must be seen as a small piece of a much bigger puzzle. Not until Colombians are made to feel like stakeholders in a system managed by an accountable, responsive state will insurgency and criminality stop looking like attractive options.

First steps towards human security

Concrete proposals for building Colombian human security would be the subject of a much longer paper. However a few general principles deserve brief mention. While there is a role for Colombia’s military, the international community must focus more strongly on professionalizing and strengthening Colombia’s civilian state institutions. This could be made possible by increasing international support for peace negotiators, judges and prosecutors, human rights and anti-corruption activists, honest legislators, reformist police and military officers, muckraking journalists and others who want to build a real, functioning democracy. Alternative development, infrastructure programmes and other state investment can create the conditions for a functioning legal economy in neglected rural areas. Drug-consuming countries must spend more money at home on efforts to reduce demand, which most studies indicate is most effectively achieved by offering treatment to addicts.49

Decisions made in the next year or two will determine whether Colombia’s peace process can stop the fighting, whether real reforms can take root, and whether the human rights nightmare documented by the Colombian Commission of Jurists can come to an end. Colombia needs the international community’s help to emerge from its long, complicated human security crisis. But the international community must be prepared to use, with great patience, a sophisticated and complex set of tools. The sledgehammer of counter-insurgency only promises to do more damage.

Notes

2 Ibid.
Colombia’s human security crisis


12 Comisión Colombiana de Juristas, op. cit.


39
U.S. military programmes with Latin America and their impact on human security

Joy Olson

When one thinks of U.S. military involvement in the world, Latin America is not the first place that comes to mind. During the 1980s and early 1990s, U.S. support for military efforts in Central America received much attention as the Cold War played itself out in the Western Hemisphere. Since the end of the Cold War, little public attention has been given to U.S. military programmes with Latin America. However, the U.S. military relationship with Latin American nations is well entrenched, widespread and has a significant impact on human security in the region.

This article will describe current U.S. military programmes with the Western Hemisphere and look at the implications of training programmes, mission expansion and weapons transfers for human rights and democratic development, two important aspects of human security.

The current U.S. presence in the region

During the course of a year, reports indicate that about 50,000 U.S. military personnel rotate through Latin America. While some personnel are stationed in the region for longer periods, the majority of troops are there on a short-term basis as part of U.S. military exercises, humanitarian assistance programmes, training programmes or counter-narcotics efforts.

The U.S. military’s ‘forward presence’ or semi-permanent presence in Latin America changed significantly in 1999, when the United States returned the Canal Zone to the nation of Panama. As well as housing the Panama Canal, the ‘Zone’ was home to a number of U.S. military facilities, including Howard Air Force Base, the headquarters of the Southern Command (Southcom), Rodman Naval Station, Fort Clayton and others. The activities carried out in these facilities all had to move. Rather than move them to a single location, they were split up. The Headquarters of Southcom went to Miami, while the U.S. Army South went Fort Buchanan and the Special Operations Command South went to Roosevelt Roads, both in Puerto Rico.

One of the biggest changes in the U.S. military presence in Latin America brought about by closing the Panama bases was the development of Forward Operating Locations (FOLs). FOLs are a location out of which the United States can conduct counter-narcotics surveillance flights. There are currently four FOLs, in Aruba, Curacao, El Salvador and Ecuador. In each country the United States negotiated a ten-year agreement for the use of existing commercial airfields to allow for the presence of U.S. personnel and equipment to facilitate the tracking and interdiction of drugs on their way to the

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United States. While the negotiation of each agreement caused certain controversy, the civilian government in each country affirmed the agreement.

Two other examples of ‘forward presence’ predate the closing of the Canal Zone, the Soto Cano Airbase in Honduras and the Guantánamo Bay Naval Station in Cuba. The United States began using the Soto Cano Airbase during the 1980s when the United States was heavily involved in the military conflicts in the neighbouring countries of El Salvador and Nicaragua. Soto Cano is not technically a U.S. base or a ‘permanent’ presence; once again the United States has an agreement with the Honduran government for the use of an existing Honduran military facility. Specific activities carried out at the base include military exercises, humanitarian and civic assistance projects, disaster relief and support for counter-narcotics operations.

The U.S. Navy has maintained a presence at Guantánamo Bay Naval Station since 1903 and U.S. withdrawal from the base is not mandated by the existing agreement. According to the base’s official web site, the base provides support for U.S. contingency operations in the Caribbean, support for counter-narcotics operations, and houses certain migrants. At present, it is best known as the holding facility for captured Taliban and al Qaeda prisoners.

Military aid and sales programmes

The United States has four different ways to provide military equipment to Latin America: Foreign Military Financing (grants for military purchases), direct commercial sales (negotiated directly between the foreign government and the arms manufacturer), foreign military sales (a commercial sale negotiated with U.S. government assistance), and the transfer of excess defence articles. Total transfers in each of these categories vary greatly from year to year, and from country to country. Recently, Colombia has been the principal recipient of military hardware from the United States, much of it provided in grant form, but military purchases have been substantial. The United States has provided Colombia with about a billion dollars in police and military assistance in the last few years. (See article by A. Isacson in this issue for a more detailed look at the Colombian situation.)

That said, Latin America is not a major arms purchaser from the United States compared to Europe or the Middle East. However, U.S. arms manufacturers still consider it an important market and were instrumental in lobbying for a change in U.S. law in 1997 that lifted a twenty-year-old ban on the sale of U.S.-produced high-technology weapons to Latin America. There was an expectation that soon after the ban was lifted, Chile would be the first to execute a major sale. The sale of ten F-16 fighter jets to Chile by U.S. producer Lockheed Martin has only just now been approved in 2002.

Training

While consistently reliable data is unavailable, official sources indicate that in 1999 the United States trained about 13,000 Latin American military personnel. That figure certainly increased in 2000 and 2001, during which the United States trained entire battalions in Colombia. Rather than a precise figure, because much information on training is currently classified, this number should be viewed as an indicator of the large-scale nature of U.S. military training in the hemisphere and the importance that the United States gives this training.
Training takes place in various ways: individuals are chosen for training and brought to U.S. military training institutions to receive individual courses, training is also carried out in the region by individuals or small groups of U.S. trainers sent to train a group of military personnel, and in the case of Colombia, entire new counter-narcotics battalions were formed with the help of U.S. training. The types of courses given also vary greatly, including everything from infantry training to learning about new technologies for equipment maintenance, or how to maintain weapons systems, to courses designed to teach and promote military justice systems.

Training also occurs for different reasons. The traditional U.S. foreign military training programme is known as the International Military Education and Training (IMET) programme. Through IMET foreign military personnel are allowed to take regular courses in U.S. military training institutions, where courses are given in English. In the case of Latin America, courses were also given in Spanish at the U.S. Army’s School of the Americas and the Inter-American Air Force Academy. The School of the Americas had been the subject of protest for many years because the school had trained a number of Latin American military personnel who later went on to commit serious human rights violations. In 2000, the Army decided to formally close the school and open a new institution, without the baggage of history, in the same location. The new school is called the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation and is once again a training facility focused on Latin America, providing courses in Spanish. A few hours of human rights training is included in every course offered by the new school.

Training is also provided for counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism purposes. In recent years, counter-narcotics have become one of the principal rationales for training. At present, the majority of foreign military training of Latin Americans is for counter-narcotics purposes. With the enhanced U.S. focus on counter-terrorism, the increased financing of existing counter-terrorism programmes and the establishment in December of 2001 of a new military training programme (the Counter-terrorism Fellowship Program), this rationale for training is likely to capture an increased percentage of overall training.

**U.S. military programmes in Latin America**

With the exception of Mexico, the U.S. military’s relationship with Latin America is governed by Southcom, and it coordinates the related programmes and activities. During the 1980s the U.S. military had a clear mission, which was to fight the Cold War in the Western Hemisphere. During the 1990s Southcom’s role was redefined, and now includes counter-narcotics work and humanitarian assistance as well as regular exercises. These days, Southcom maintains close relationships with every Latin American military with the exception of Cuba. These relationships generally involve offers of U.S. training, assistance with analysis of defence needs and the purchase of defence articles, and coordination of multinational training exercises. Southcom could be facing another redefinition of its role as the United States focuses on issues of ‘homeland defence’ and will likely undergo a process of command structure reorganization and redirection of resources.

One of the main vehicles for rotating U.S. military personnel through Latin America is known as ‘Humanitarian and Civic Assistance’ (HCA). HCA is considered a training programme for U.S. military personnel. During HCA training exercises, the U.S. military sends large numbers of reservists and others to practice transferring themselves and their equipment to another country. While in country, they perform humanitarian activities, building schools, digging wells and vaccinating children. However, the humanitarian by-product of these exercises is considered by the military as secondary to the
primary mission—training. These training exercises are also carried out in response to natural disasters in the region as a means of providing humanitarian assistance.

Today, the U.S. military in Latin America is often known for its role in counter-narcotics activities. Since 1989, the U.S. Department of Defense has been the single lead agency in the detection and monitoring of drugs coming into the United States. The United States maintains a significant network of radar sites and FOLs, and carries out intelligence processing for counter-narcotics purposes. Within each country, the U.S. military seeks partners with whom to work to fulfill its counter-narcotics mission. This means training and coordination with, and often weapons transfers to, host nation military and/or police forces. The impact of the military’s counter-narcotics mission is seen most vividly in Colombia, where the United States has been instrumental in helping the military develop and implement its counter-narcotics strategy by training, equipping and providing intelligence to entire new battalions.

**Human security**

In light of the existing military conflicts in the world today, many would consider the issues presented for human security in the U.S. military relationship with Latin America to be rather benign. However, in reality, the issues in Latin America go to the heart of the role of militaries in democratic societies. In the last thirty years, Latin America has had too much bitter experience with militaries involved in civilian governance. Although in most Latin American countries today, the possibility of the military forcibly taking control of the government seems remote, the roles taken by the militaries at this time can either enhance or diminish civilian structures and credibility—and, in the end, help make or break the success of democracy in this hemisphere.

**Alternate roles**

As the U.S. military’s Cold War role subsided at the end of the Central American conflicts, its presence in Latin America began to change focus. The U.S. military began to emphasize ‘alternative’ roles for itself—roles not directly related to external defence—and encouraged Latin American militaries to do the same. Alternate roles in Latin America include counter-narcotics, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, fire fighting and other activities. All of these are functions that the state must provide its citizenry. However, the important question is should these be military or civilian roles and does the military role expansion in some way risk democracy and human security? Here we will examine two ‘alternative’ military roles, counter-narcotics and humanitarian assistance, and the implications these roles have on democratic institutions.

**The Drug War**

In 1989, the U.S. Congress made the Department of Defense the lead agency for the detection and monitoring of drugs coming into the United States. Within the confines of U.S. borders, the detection and eradication of drugs is in the domain of law enforcement. Since 1878, the United States has adhered to the Posse Comitatus Act as a fundamental guideline establishing the division of civilian and military functions. This law generally prohibits the involvement of defence personnel in domestic
law enforcement. The principle being applied is that civilian police perform law enforcement functions and the military defends the state against external threats. In essence, the U.S. military is not to be used as a force against U.S. citizens. However, the concept of Posse Comitatus, which is strictly abided by domestically, is not applied to the roles the United States promotes for foreign militaries through engagement and training programmes.

It is the U.S. military’s job, in conjunction with the Coast Guard, to stop drugs from entering the United States. Many other civilian agencies are also involved, but the military is the lead agency and they take seriously their congressionally mandated responsibility. The U.S. military has to find effective partners in Latin America to help it carry out its mission, and very clearly encourages Latin American militaries to adopt domestic counter-narcotics roles. The United States collects intelligence about the air and sea traffic of suspected drug shipments, but does not have the legal authority to make arrests in the territory of other nations, so they need a partner on the ground or at sea who, using good intelligence, can interdict shipments.

Take El Salvador as an example. After the war, the role of the military in domestic matters was highly restricted. However, in 1999 the military was given a counter-narcotics role. Shortly thereafter, the United States signed a ten-year agreement with El Salvador to use the Comalapa Airbase for counter-narcotics surveillance flights. Once the role had been established, it was clear that the Salvadoran Navy was not well equipped to be a partner in interdiction efforts, so the FOL agreement was followed by the transfer of a significant amount of excess defence articles from the United States for use by the Salvadoran Navy, beefing up its interdiction capabilities. A similar process took place when the Mexican military’s counter-narcotics role was expanded to include interdiction in the mid-1990s. Once the military’s involvement in interdiction was established within Mexico, the United States undertook an extensive military training programme and equipment transfer aimed at enhancing counter-narcotics capabilities.

The drug problem within the hemisphere is very real, and a threat to human security in and of itself. It plagues most countries of the hemisphere with a variety of ills including addiction, corruption, violence and other illicit activities. However, defining the hemispheric narcotics problem as a ‘war’ has serious implications for human security as well. Wars are fought by militaries, and require military solutions, training and weapons. A number of Latin American countries have quite recent histories of military rule, and coming out of these periods they have restricted the internal roles of their armed forces. The counter-narcotics role expands the militaries’ parameters for domestic action.

**Humanitarian Assistance**

In the military realm, humanitarian assistance takes many forms. It can mean militaries responding to disasters because of the equipment and manpower available to them. In these emergency situations, nations appropriately use every resource available to them to save lives. A form of humanitarian assistance that is of greater concern with respect to human security is the provision of social services as part of a military exercise. This technique has been common in times of war as a way to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of a local population, but in Latin America these programmes have continued well beyond the war years. They are now a standard and growing component of U.S. military programmes in the hemisphere, and commonly practised by many Latin American militaries.

The United States, through HCA programmes, conducts training exercises used to build roads and schools and provide medical assistance. In some ways, these programmes represent a positive indicator on the human security scale—children are vaccinated and wells are dug. However, the way...
the services are provided presents long-term problems. Communities are taught to turn to the military to get things done. If you can’t get the Ministry of Education to build you a school, you can turn to the military and get a response. This is precisely the wrong message for a region without stable democratic traditions.

On the part of the United States, enormous amounts of money are spent on these training exercises that result in the building of a school. In budget terms, it is explained that the school was simply an ‘incidental expense’ to the overall exercise, but imagine how it appears to the recipients. To them, the United States and the host nation militaries have just dedicated great resources to bring them a school, while the civilian government agencies normally responsible for providing this service have failed them. If only a small portion of the funds used to carry out these exercises were dedicated to the civilian institutions charged with providing the relevant services, the result could be a strengthening of these institutions for the long-term provision of assistance to rural communities.

Training and weapons transfers

In terms of human security, training and weapons transfers raise a number of issues. On the positive side, due in large part to protests in the United States over past training, there is now a component of human rights training provided to Latin American military personnel in many courses. This is a good thing and no doubt has an impact. Furthermore, U.S. law does not allow training or weapons to be given to units of foreign militaries that are credibly accused of human rights violations. This means that U.S. embassies around the world are required to screen the recipients of U.S. military assistance with the goal of not knowingly contributing to human rights problems. While implementation of the law has varied among embassies and is more effective in some places than others, it has raised the profile of human rights issues for the U.S. military.

On the less positive side, even well-intentioned training can have unintended consequences. While provided for one purpose, training and weapons can be used for other ends. Early in the El Salvador conflict the U.S. trained the elite Atlacatl Battalion. Over the years, this Battalion went on to commit the El Mozote massacre, killing some 900 civilians. Even if the U.S. military did not instruct them to commit these acts, once trained as an elite fighting group, the recipients used their new skills as they saw fit. The high level of training that the U.S. military is currently providing in Latin America will have unforeseen consequences. If history teaches us anything, it is that some of those trained by the United States will be involved in taking civilian lives that were not the intended targets of U.S. training.

Training given by the United States often directly crosses the civilian/military divide, blurring distinct roles important to long-term democratic stability. As previously mentioned, whereas the U.S. military and police roles inside of the United States are quite distinct, the U.S. military is allowed to train civilian police in foreign countries and carries out police training in Latin America.

Another consequence for human security is that weapons are expensive. While training is often provided by the United States in grant form, costly weapons drain scarce government resources. The planes scheduled for purchase by Chile cost U$663 million each. At a time of economic uncertainty in Latin America and with about 20% of the Chilean population living in poverty between 1994 and 2000, weapons purchases must be weighed against what else that money could provide the nation in social terms.
Finally, weapons, whether purchased or received through grants, do not disappear when conflicts end. The small arms provided to Central America to fight the wars of the 1980s are still circulating. The region is awash in cheap weapons. Rampant criminal activity and small arms violence diminish human security for the region’s population.

**Military-to-military contact**

The U.S. military spends a good deal of time in the Western Hemisphere working to enhance its relationship with the militaries of the region and their relationships with each other. Grants of training are a way to increase cooperative relationships. The current U.S.-Mexico military relationship is quite new (since the mid-1990s) and the United States has been careful to strengthen those ties. Hemispheric defence ministerials have also been used to promote transparency and cooperation. While familiarity and contact between the region’s militaries can reduce tensions, resulting in a positive on the human security balance sheet, the military-to-military relationship can also be used to promote alternative military roles. It should be monitored to ensure that the relationship itself is not complicating the local civil-military balance.

**The war on terrorism**

The 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States prompted the United States to move military and Coast Guard resources within the hemisphere. For example, ships that were once a part of the drug interdiction effort are now being used to guard the U.S. coastline and port facilities. This has prompted certain policy-makers in the United States to begin pursuing the idea of setting up a Latin American Navy that could have a number of responsibilities, including drug interdiction. Promoters of the idea see the proposal as a way to get Latin Americans to take more responsibility for fighting drugs and as a means of helping the United States with its war on terrorism. However, from the human security point of view there are high costs as well. Argentina has one of the largest navies in Latin America. This proposal could ‘encourage’ the Argentines to give their navy a counter-narcotics role. This role shift has been rejected by the civilian government until now, due to their country’s historic experience when military roles went dramatically beyond national defence and the military took over the government. Furthermore, certain Latin American navies, the Colombian Navy for example, have disturbing human rights records. If all nations were encouraged to participate, those with questionable human rights records would be operating alongside of those without. Greater economic resources would also have to be dedicated to this endeavour simply to accommodate the needs of ‘interoperability’.

**Conclusion**

There are positives and negatives on the human security balance sheet with respect to the U.S. military relationship with the hemisphere. Although not addressed in this article, civilian oversight of military programmes in the United States is weak and both oversight and civilian control of the military are weak within Latin America. One of the main criticisms presented here is that U.S. military programmes in the hemisphere can and do undermine civilian institutions. In an
environment in which civilian institutions and their position in relation to the military are not strong, this is a problem. Such is the case in much of Latin America. The strength of civilian institutions is critical to democratic development in the region. The U.S. promotion of expanded missions for the hemisphere’s militaries does not enhance civilian institutions or democratic stability in the long run.

Furthermore, not enough attention is being given to the long-term risks of U.S. military training and weapons transfers. The sale of F-16s to Chile may prompt its neighbours to seek similar technology. Spending money on high-tech weapons at a time of economic uncertainty and when basic human needs are not being met should be challenged by those in both the purchasing and the producing countries. Weapons and training have long shelf-lives. They are gifts that ‘keep on giving’ and not always for the good. Training given for counter-narcotics purposes can be identical to training given for counter-insurgency. How newly acquired skills are applied is entirely in the hands of the recipients, not those who originally funded the training. A share of responsibility for future acts weighs upon those who have brought new skills to a military force. The wisdom of consistently training large numbers of troops in a region with no serious cross-border conflicts should be challenged.

If the U.S. military relationship with Latin America were restructured with the long-term promotion of human security as its goal, the relationship would be much different than that we see today. It would show greater concern for the role that the Latin American militaries play in relation to their own civilian institutions and not promote mission expansion beyond matters of national defence, and certainly not promote new roles in countries where the civilian government is trying to limit the role of the military. It would be more cautious about training and weapons transfers, and show more concern about the need to limit military expenditures in states where a significant percentage of the population lives in poverty.
The new challenges to national and international security, as well as the nature of conflicts that characterize modern times, have proven the relevance of small arms and light weapons not only in the generation, continuation and aggravation of conflicts, but in the destabilization of institutions, democracy and development of countries and regions. This is why in recent years the international community has paid special attention to the problems posed by these weapons.

A few figures illustrate the dimensions of the problem: worldwide, there are approximately 500 million small arms and light weapons in circulation, which have taken the lives of more than half a million persons, mostly civilians, every year during the past decade. Approximately 20% of the weapons in circulation have been deviated to the illicit market.

Even though there is an increasing awareness of the problem posed by small arms, the response to this matter has not been easy or linear. It has been necessary to generate enough political will to face it and solve the complexities that derive from the multidimensional nature of the problem. The collaborative efforts of a number of governments and the active participation of civil society have been paramount.

Challenges

Two specific challenges needed to be addressed before we could expect progress on the small arms issue. First of all, it was necessary to recognize the problem as a global one, and accept that it needs a collective or at least an agreed response from the international community. The confidential treatment that domestic arms production often receives, the lack of control not only over national and international trade, but also over possession of these weapons, and national security considerations that seek to distinguish transactions made among individual owners from those between states or state-authorized entities, are some of the problems that hinder cooperation at the global level.

In contrast with the approach taken in response to other global issues, such as drugs, a number of states deny any international responsibility stemming from internal practices or policies that clearly
encourage an excessive availability of small arms and light weapons. In many cases, governments insist on considering weapons as any other commercial product, and thus refuse their control, especially at the national level.

Secondly, it has been necessary to deal with the absence of a clear definition of the types of weapons included in the category ‘small arms and light weapons’. For example, there are differences in the definition of the term ‘firearm’ agreed upon in the United Nations and in the Organization of American States (OAS).

**Numerous perspectives**

The complex problem posed by small arms can be approached from at least three different perspectives. There is a need to clearly distinguish among them, while at the same time emphasizing their complementary essence. All three perspectives have an important background in Latin America.

First, the manufacture and trade of small arms and light weapons has implications from a disarmament perspective, since their control and restriction reduce risks and threats to regional as well as international peace and security, and liberate resources for development. On the other hand, their widespread availability increases tensions in unstable regions, lengthens conflicts and generates a large number of post-conflict problems.

Secondly, in the fight against organized crime, the reduction of illegal activities related to the manufacture and trade of small arms and light weapons reduces violence, corruption, and social, economic and political instability within states, thus enhancing states’ capacities to face criminal and terrorist groups. It is important to note that the combat against organized crime, and more specifically against the problem of illegal drug traffic, has received a much higher priority than small arms.

Finally, from a human security perspective, the reduced availability of small arms and light weapons has a direct impact in diminishing abuses against civilians—the main victims of these weapons.

**Regional efforts**

Efforts to limit the excessive availability of legal weapons in Latin America are linked to initiatives in favour of self-restricting weapon acquisitions (promoted mainly by Mexico). While these are an important component of sub-regional confidence-building measures, there are no programmes or specific goals in regional organizations due to the opposition of some countries, particularly Brazil. Likewise, efforts to collect weapons from civilians in Latin America are limited. Programmes exist in Central America and in countries such as Brazil and Mexico under different modalities.

In this regard, Central American countries have developed ambitious weapons collection and destruction programmes as an integral part of peace agreements, recognizing that the existence and availability of weapons constitutes an obstacle not only for the implementation of the agreements, but for the strengthening of a safe environment after the conflict. Weapons collection programmes respond to post-conflict situations and have made enormous contributions to the stability of the region. Nevertheless, it is important to underline that illicit small arms and light weapons still pose an enormous problem in the sub-region and much remains to be done, since they are now associated with crime.
In other countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, weapons collection programmes have been developed to combat problems of urban violence, relying on civil society and mostly monetary incentives. These programmes, such as the one supported by Viva Rio in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil or by mothers’ organizations in some Mexican states (Puebla, Nuevo Leon and Chihuahua), have had very positive results. However, they continue to be limited inasmuch as they have a strictly domestic reach. They are commendable efforts that require broader institutional support to become permanent programmes and to be expanded beyond local areas.

The main obstacle for controlling the flow of weapons remains the considerable divergence amongst the United States and other American states with regard to the possession of weapons by civilians. The United States considers that the high availability of weapons enhances tensions only in unstable or conflict-prone regions, and thus it strongly opposes to limit or even regulate appropriately the access to weapons by civilians and other non-state actors. In contrast, other states have placed the small arms problem in a broader context linked to violence and they plead for a perspective in which weapons are subject to strict controls at the national and international levels.

This substantive difference can be clearly identified when contrasting the weapon-related policies and legislation of Latin American countries in general, against those of the United States and (to a lesser extent) Canada. However, the tendency in favour of regulation has made some progress in the region, and a process has been started to prohibit certain kinds of highly destructive weapons from being sold to private owners. But overall, important progress has been made in recognizing the global nature of the problem, and consequently, the need for multilaterally agreed actions. In other words, there is a recognition that the problem cannot be solved at the national level, and the principle of shared responsibility, which has developed in the framework of the international fight against drugs, has been accepted in the context of small arms and light weapons.

The Interamerican Convention

This awareness of the global implications of the problem is precisely what gave the cue to Member States of the OAS to agree on measures unprecedented in the international scene when they adopted the Interamerican Convention Against the Illicit Manufacture of and Trafficking in Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and other Related Materials. This convention, which was signed in 1997 and entered into force in 1998, emerged from a Mexican initiative supported by the Rio Group with the aim to combat one of the main problems of the hemisphere, through cooperation and recognition of the transnational impact of the issue.

The main purpose of the convention is to prevent, combat and eradicate the illicit manufacture of and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials by promoting and facilitating modification of domestic legislation and corresponding procedures, as well as a broader exchange of information and experiences between States Parties. It includes the obligation to establish as criminal offences under their domestic laws the illicit manufacturing of and illegal trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosives and other related materials. It also requires states to keep registers of transactions involving weapons and, most importantly, to obtain the consent of transit states and destination states for any operation involving weapons, ammunition or explosives.

The contribution of the convention to the debate on definitions is quite significant, for in addition to firearms as such—any barrelled weapon which can, is designed to or may be readily converted to expel a bullet or projectile by the action of an explosive, except antique firearms manufactured before...
the twentieth century or their replicas—it includes ‘any other weapon or destructive device such as any explosive, incendiary or gas bomb, grenade, rocket, rocket launcher, missile, missile system or mine’. This definition is much broader, for example, than the one agreed upon in the Protocol against Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, which complements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

Other aspects of the regional instrument that should be highlighted are its role in promoting hemispheric and multilateral cooperation in issues such as training, technical and judicial assistance, and exchange of experiences and information, as well as for its follow-up mechanism for implementation. This mechanism, known as the Consultative Committee, gives a permanent character to the issue of firearms, and it ensures the timely identification of obstacles and opportunities to achieve the full implementation of the convention. In addition, it facilitates the coordination of regional and sub-regional efforts, as well as those being developed in other parts of the world or on a global scale.

While addressing the manufacture and trade of firearms from the perspective of their relation to organized criminal groups, terrorism and drug traffic, the convention undoubtedly contributes to a reduction in the proliferation and the availability of weapons by including a number of measures that directly affect their legal manufacture and trade. The convention promotes transparency in international arms transfers, which in itself diminishes excessive availability of weapons. It is important to underline in this context that the convention comprises a strict regime for exports, transit and imports, backed by the Model Regulations also elaborated and approved in the OAS in its recognition of the need for governments to exert absolute control over operations involving small arms and light weapons.

Upon elaborating and signing the convention, the American states not only positioned themselves at the forefront in this matter, but they also set a reference point for other regions and drove forward the preparatory process of the United Nations Conference on Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects.

The compromises reached at the OAS with the United States, the world’s greatest weapon producer, later facilitated the negotiation of agreements with global outreach. Also, the necessity of full participation of other actors—including producers and consumers—to solve the problem has been underlined since the adoption of the OAS convention. This does not mean that the region has solved the problem. Many tasks remain to be done in order to consolidate the steps already taken and achieve irreversible progress. The ratification of the Interamerican Convention by all Member States of the OAS, and particularly by the United States and Canada, is the top priority. Furthermore, we must develop a culture against weapons at all levels of society and intensify campaigns to raise awareness in schools, the media and in government bodies to take further steps in the fight against proliferation.

Small arms and light weapons are unlikely to be ever prohibited, and yet their possession and use must be strictly limited and controlled—just as any other product with similar potential for individual damage and posing a threat to our society would be.

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We must develop a culture against weapons at all levels of society and intensify campaigns to raise awareness in schools, the media and in government bodies to take further steps in the fight against proliferation.
Resources concerning human security in Latin America

compiled by Jennifer Flament

The Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress http://www.arias.or.cr/Eindice.htm
The mission of the foundation is to promote just and peaceful societies in Central America and other regions. The site includes information and reports in Spanish and English about disarmament, human security, civil society, democracy and demilitarization. Also in Spanish.

Center for International Policy http://ciponline.org
CIP conducts education and research activities promoting a United States foreign policy based on international cooperation, demilitarization and respect for basic human rights. Site includes in-depth research materials on Columbia, Cuba, Haiti, demilitarization in Latin America, and general regional security issues. Also includes the online version of Just the Facts: a civilian's guide to U.S. defense and security assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, a joint project of CIP and the Latin America Working Group. Some articles available in Spanish.

Centre for Human Security at the Centre for the Study of Global Issues, University of British Columbia http://www.liucentre.ubc.ca/security/home.htm
This centre plans to create an annual report, similar to the UNDP's Human Development Report, that will focus on human security indicators. A good site to watch develop as the project grows.

Choike: A Portal on Southern Civil Societies http://www.choike.org/
Choike is a portal made from a Southern perspective that helps users to find information about issues of particular concern for developing countries. A good place to find links to non-traditional news sources.

Dialogo Centroamericano http://www.us.net/cip/dialogue/0901dia.htm
Archives (up to 1999) of a Central American publication on peace, disarmament and democracy. Contains articles about civil-military relations, regional security issues, and cooperative security. All articles are in Spanish.

Equipo Nizkor http://www.derechos.org/nizkor
Spanish human rights organization that works to increase the availability of information regarding human rights abuses in Latin America. Categorizes articles by theme and includes state-specific reports. Predominantly in Spanish, some articles in English.
FPIF is committed to advancing a citizen-based foreign policy agenda. Resources on the site include articles on drug control, self-determination, deforestation, women’s issues, economic development, and human rights.

Journal in Spanish focused on general hemispheric security issues, regional cooperation, civil-military relations, and human rights in the Americas.

Human rights organization with information about specific Latin American states and regional information, searchable by issue. Includes strong resources on child soldiers and arms concerns. Includes articles in English, Spanish, French and Portuguese.

Coalition working towards U.S. policies that promote peace, justice and sustainable development in the region. Site provides specific information concerning Cuba, Mexico, Columbia, Guatemala and El Salvador. The site also has information on drug control policy and arms control.

Social Watch is an international network of citizens’ organizations struggling to eradicate poverty and the causes of poverty, to ensure an equitable distribution of wealth and the realization of human rights. Site includes country and thematic reports, as well as an online social development indicator. All information is in English and Spanish; some information in Portuguese.

Part of the United States Army War College, SSI prepares studies and analyses to inform the U.S. Army as well as American leadership of policy options. Site includes various SSI publications dealing with U.S. interests in Latin America, such as ‘Security and Civil-Military Relations in the New World Disorder: The Use of Armed Forces in the Americas’ and ‘The United States and Latin America: Shaping an Elusive Future’.

The work of the centre is aimed at encouraging visions that can help to sustain disarmament, peace and development and at fostering the implementation of practical disarmament measures. The site provides summaries of workshops and seminars held by the centre as well as project descriptions. All information is in English, Spanish and French.

Works to strengthen NGOs in Latin America, influence US policy decisions and promote human rights. Site hosts analyses of US policy and current issues in specific Latin American countries, including recent news articles, as well as projects such as ‘Ensuring Security in Democratic Societies’, ‘Promoting Equitable Economic Development’ and ‘Defending Human Rights and Democracy’.
World Policy Institute's Americas Project  http://worldpolicy.org/americas/index.html

A human rights research and education centre seeking to influence policy proposals and increase understanding of relevant domestic and international policies. Other projects relevant to this topic include the Arms Trade Resource Center and the Cuba Education Project.

Civil-Military Relations


Pion-Berlin, David and Craig Arceneaux, 2000, Decision-Makers or Decision-Takers? Military Missions and Civilian Control in Democratic South America, Armed Forces and Society (San Marcos, Texas), vol. 26, no. 3 (Spring), pp. 413–36. Examines the shifting role of the armed forces in the region.

Columbia

Colombia Policy Briefs

Site created in response to the need for comprehensive information on Colombia and related US policy issues. An excellent site for a wide variety of information, including opposing viewpoints, as well as good links. Also in Spanish.


Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs)

Cheyre Espinosa, Juan Emilio, 2000, Medidas de confianza mutua: casos de América Latina y el Mediterráneo, Santiago de Chile, Centro de Estudios e Investigaciones Militares. A survey of CBMs adopted in Latin America and the Mediterranean region; includes texts of agreements.


Rojas Aravena, Francisco, 2000, América Latina, las medidas de confianza mutua y de seguridad regional: evaluación y perspectivas, Estudios Internacionales (Santiago, Chile), vol. 33, no. 129 (January/March), pp. 18–32. Discusses the role of CBMs in regional security.


56
makers and analysts from across the Americas assess the security threats to and agendas of different sub-regions and evaluate the potential for wider hemispheric cooperation.

Vera Castillo, Jorge, 1999, Política Exterior Chilena y MERCOSUR: Hacia una Seguridad Subregional con Medidas de Confianza Mutua (2000–2010), Estudios Internacionales (Santiago, Chile), vol. 32, no. 126 (May/Aug), pp. 70–128. Proposes establishing new relations between Chile and the Southern Cone Common Market, to include political cooperation, security and defence through the adoption of CBMs.

**Cooperative Security**

**Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean**

Site includes articles from the December 1999 international seminar on disarmament, ‘A New Latin America and Caribbean Agenda for the Next Millennium’, focused on regional security issues. Additionally, the site provides extensive information about global nuclear disarmament. In English and Spanish.


Brigagao, Clovis and Marcelo Valle Fonrouge, 1999, Argentina y Brasil: Modelo Regional de Confianza Mutua, Estudios Internacionales (Santiago, Chile), no. 125 (Jan-April), pp. 3–19. Examines agreement among military leaders concerning creation of a security and defence mechanism as part of the Southern Cone Common Market, and obstacles to advancing military cooperation at the regional level.

**Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL)**

FOCAL is an independent NGO dedicated to deepening and strengthening Canada’s relations with countries in Latin America and the Caribbean through policy discussion and analysis. Includes full text policy papers and reports. Site in English and French.

**Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL)**

The UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean works towards stronger economic relationships and cooperation among the states of the region. Analytical articles and statistics regarding regional economic cooperation are available in English and Spanish.

Klepak, Hal, 2002, Hemispheric Security After the Towers Went Down, report FPP-02-4, Ottawa, Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. This paper reviews the background of the inter-American security system and how it has reacted to recent events. It cautions that a rapid
and poorly conceived reaction to the attacks may herald difficult days for the region’s fledgling democracies. http://www.focal.ca/images/pdf/hsecurity.pdf

**MERCO SUR**

MERCO SUR aims to increase economic ties, strengthen interdependence and promote free trade. Economic statistics, the texts of relevant treaties and agreements, and information on regional economic cooperation are available in English, Spanish and Portuguese.

**Organization of American States**

General information in English and Spanish about issues affecting the region, its security, current events and cooperative action, including the texts of resolutions and treaties. The Committee on Hemispheric Security page includes specific information about the Organization’s work in the area of regional security. Some information also available in French and Portuguese.

Pion-Berlin, David, 2000, Will soldiers follow? Economic Integration and Regional Security in the Southern Cone, Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs (Coral Gables, Florida), vol. 42, no. 1 (Spring), pp. 43–69. Examines the impact of regional economic policies on defence policies in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and Paraguay and considers positive and negative aspects of regional defence initiatives.


Tulchin, Joseph S. and Ralph H. Espach (eds), 2000, Security in the Caribbean Basin: The Challenge of Regional Cooperation, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers. Addresses challenges to security, the role of the military in democracies, and US ties to the region. Also provides a theoretical and practical framework for the development of a more cooperative security system.

**US–Cuba Cooperative Security**

Each year, the Center for Defense Information organizes a delegation of U.S. military experts to meet with Cuban military and political officials in Havana to explore ways the two countries might cooperate on regional security concerns.

**Demilitarization**


Millett, Richard L. and Michael Gold-Biss (eds), 1996, Beyond Praetorianism: the Latin American Military in Transition, Miami, North-South Center Press. Uses case studies to examine the nature and roles of the region’s armed forces following the end of the Cold War, including discussion of hemispheric and regional security, peacekeeping and confidence-building, guerrillas, narcotics and terrorism.


**Military Aid, Military Training, Arms Sales**

**Arms Control Association**
http://www.armscontrol.org
Site contains reference materials on a variety of arms control issues and relevant news and opinion articles from the journal Arms Control Today. Full current and archived issues are available online.

**Arm Sales Monitor**
http://fas.org/asmp/library/armsmonitor.html
Publication of the Arms Sales Monitoring Project of the Federation of American Scientists. Focuses on US arms export policies and conventional weapons proliferation.


Latin America Working Group and CIP, 2001, Just the Facts: A Quick Tour of US Defense and Security Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean, Washington, DC, Latin America Working Group. This project seeks to help citizens understand and interpret the United States’ military relationship with the rest of the hemisphere. An excellent resource for those who oversee, analyse, critique and advocate changes in this relationship. Original 1999 edition and updates provide figures on defence and military assistance to Latin America and includes an online listing of relevant issues in the news. A summary is available in Spanish. http://www.ciponline.org/facts


**School of the Americas Watch**
http://www.soaw.org
Monitors the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation (formerly the School of the Americas), run by the U.S. military. The site provides information about the training of Latin American military officers at WHISC and human rights abuses committed by graduates.
SIPRI’s military expenditure database offers detailed information on over 160 countries.

Small Arms


Brenes, Arnoldo, 1998, El Comercio de Armas y los Derechos Humanos, Diálogo Centroamericano (San José, Costa Rica), no. 35 (November). Examines the relationship between the arms trade and human rights, and encourages the creation of an international code of conduct for arms transfer to decrease human rights offences. http://www.arias.or.cr/documentos/cpr/dialogo2.htm

Chloros, Alexander et al., 1997, Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Light Weapons Destruction in Central America, BASIC Papers, no. 24 (December). Argues that the failure to implement weapons collection and destruction measures in Central America has decreased the effectiveness of UN efforts and suggests recommendations for the future. http://www.basicint.org/bpaper24.htm

Der Ghougassian, Khatchik, 2000, Pequeñas Pero Peligrosas: La proliferación de las armas livianas y las políticas de control en el cono sur, Entrecaminos (Washington, D.C.). Describes the problem of small arms proliferation in Argentina and Brazil, including the role of governments and civil society and a call for increased regional cooperation. http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/clas/Pubs/entre/peligrosas.html

Dhanapala, Jayantha et al. (eds), 1999, Small Arms Control: Old Weapons, New Issues, Hampshire, UK, Ashgate. A collection of papers prepared for four regional workshops to inform the United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. Authors include academic, military, governmental and civil society experts.


International Action Network on Small Arms  http://www.iansa.org
IANSA is an international network of over 400 organizations from seventy-one countries working to
prevent the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons. Site contains global news briefs relating to small arms, a library and research centre for specific arms publications, and useful links resources on small arms. Most of the information is also available in Spanish and French.


Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers http://www.nisat.org
NISAT has databases on small arms production, transfers, policy and legislation, as well as resources on humanitarian law, security sector reform and arms production.

Small Arms Survey http://www.smallarmssurvey.org
The Small Arms Survey is an excellent source of impartial and public information on all aspects of small arms and light weapons. Site contains full text of SAS Occasional Papers as well as chapter summaries from the annual Small Arms Survey in English and French. There is also a good resource section with many reference documents from UN and multilateral fora.

Alliance of NGOs working for more responsible domestic and international policies on small arms.

UN resources and documents regarding the trade and proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Information available in English, French and Spanish.

Vivo Rio’s Disarmament Project http://www.vivafavela.com.br/desarme
Viva Rio is actively involved in activities to reduce urban violence in Rio de Janeiro and in Brazil. One of their goals is to halt the proliferation of small arms in the region. The site has a considerable amount of information in Portuguese about human security, disarmament, arms control and arms sales in Brazil and South America. Includes recent news relevant to these issues. Some articles available in English and Spanish.
UNIDIR ACTIVITIES

Strengthening the Role of Regional Organizations in Treaty Implementation

UNIDIR, in collaboration with the Monterey Institute for International Studies, has undertaken a project that focuses on strengthening the role of regional organizations in non-proliferation and arms control treaty implementation. Regional organizations could play a significant role in addressing questions of compliance related to WMD agreements.

The project will be launched with a small workshop in Geneva in June to discuss the existing verification system for WMD treaties and the gaps that regional organizations could potentially fill. Based on the findings from the workshop, authors will be selected and a series of consultations will take place with diplomats (in Geneva, Vienna and the Hague), academics, officials from multilateral treaty-implementing organizations (such as the IAEA, CTBTO and OPCW), and experts in the field of verification. Interviews with key experts on the operational capabilities and roles of their regional organizations will assist to round out the research.

The preliminary findings will be presented at an international meeting where academics, multilateral arms control and disarmament experts, non-governmental organizations, diplomats, and representatives from both regional and treaty-implementing organizations will be invited to discuss the papers. The Ploughshares Fund has generously contributed to the establishment of this project.

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Visiting Fellowship Programme

UNIDIR’s 2002 visiting research fellowship programme on regional security focuses on the Middle East. Four researchers have been invited to Geneva for a period of six months. The researchers are working collectively on a single research paper, focusing on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The visiting research fellowship programme helps generate regional cooperation and confidence building by allowing researchers to work alongside colleagues from the ‘other side’ of regional conflicts. The fellowship also provides an opportunity to interact with the UN Secretariat, government delegations, international organizations and non-governmental institutes, and contribute to UNIDIR’s wider research programme.

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Handbook on Verification and Compliance

Successful arms control in the Middle East—an essential component of the peace process—will require a thorough examination of the means to determine compliance and of the implications of regional verification mechanisms. In order to assist the process of ascertaining the necessary level and the approach to compliance monitoring in the Middle East, UNIDIR and VERTIC are producing a compendium of agreements and terms, in-depth analyses of approaches to verification, methods and technologies, and practical experiences. The book will be published in English and Arabic, in hard copy and electronic format (with hyperlink text).

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Tactical Nuclear Weapons

To support efforts to address and curb the problem of TNWs, UNIDIR has launched a long-term project that includes a series of seminars and publications as well as attempts to raise the problem of TNWs in the eyes of the wider public through the international media. Various aspects of this project
are carried out in cooperation with the Monterey Institute of International Studies and the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt.

For the ten-year anniversary of the 1991 unilateral declarations UNIDIR held a seminar at the United Nations Headquarters on 24 September 2001. The meeting generated a stimulating discussion and was extremely well attended. A seminar report is available on our website (www.unog.ch/unidir/tnw/TNW%20SEMINAR%20REPORT.pdf). This summary was also distributed at the 2002 NPT PrepCom in New York. More detailed proceedings will be published in 2002.

UNIDIR recently published two research reports on TNWs: Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Options for Control and Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Perspective from Ukraine (see publications section).

Additionally, UNIDIR has undertaken a study based on the recommendations presented in Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Options for Control. This report examines in detail and advances recommendations on codification as well as transparency and confidence-building measures related to the 1991 parallel unilateral declarations issued by the Presidents of the United States of America and the Russian Federation.

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Fissile Materials

The UNIDIR publication Fissile Material Stocks: Characteristics, Measures and Policy Options by William Walker and Frans Berkhout is intended to support the Conference on Disarmament in its thinking on the range of options available to deal with stocks of fissile material. UNIDIR has also commissioned a report on fissile material inventories to provide an up-to-date account of fissile materials, assess national policies related to the production, disposition and verification of fissile materials, and identify facilities and locations which might be subject to safeguards under a treaty. In March 2001, the Institute (in collaboration with the German Delegation to the Conference on Disarmament) held a meeting on the verification of a fissile material cut-off treaty.

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Participatory Approaches to Evaluating the Implementation of Humanitarian Landmine Action

Evaluating mine action programmes in terms of cost-effectiveness and efficiency has its merits in a donor community concerned with value for money in project implementation. But humanitarian mine action is by definition a qualitative process. It is designed to enhance human security, provide victim assistance and encourage ownership of mine action programmes in affected communities and regions. Traditional evaluation and monitoring techniques do not readily lend themselves to assessments of such qualitative goals and objectives. Participatory monitoring and evaluation techniques (PM&E) are more appropriate to this task. PM&E involves key stakeholders in identifying their needs and assessing the most appropriate options for meeting those needs. Experience has shown that participatory approaches improve the quality, effectiveness and sustainability of donor programmes’ actions and outcomes. By placing people at the centre of the monitoring and evaluation process, mine action efforts are guaranteed to empower local communities and encourage local ownership. The proposed pilot study is not only designed to pioneer PM&E approaches within the landmine community, but also to provide a unique opportunity for UNIDIR to help innovate bottom-up approaches to arms control implementation.

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The Costs of Disarmament

In order to present the cost-benefit analysis of disarmament, UNIDIR proposes to take key countries as examples and carefully research what their commitments to disarmament treaties mean to them in terms of financial and resource costs. In addition, the project will try to ascertain what each country perceives are the benefits brought to them through their participation in the agreements and whether there is consensus that there is a net gain to the state in question. The aim of the project is to achieve a better understanding of the costs and benefits of disarmament agreements with a view to assisting policy-makers decide how money is spent on such commitments, which budget lines are best structured to handle such spending and how states could approach this aspect of negotiations in the future.

A recent publication, Costs of Disarmament—Rethinking the Price Tag: A Methodological Inquiry into the Costs and Benefits of Arms Control, outlines the methodological basis of the research.

For more information, please contact:

Susan Willett
Senior Research Fellow
Peace-building and Practical Disarmament in West Africa

UNIDIR’s West Africa project focuses on promoting the role of West African civil society in the fight against the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

The project seeks to:

- Inform and raise awareness on the problem, notably security and humanitarian threats;
- Undertake locally based research with civil society groups and produce collaborative publications;
- Organize national and regional debates in West Africa to stimulate discussion on people-centred security and small arms proliferation;
- Build local capacities for peace and security research and light weapons monitoring regimes;
- Work for transparency and facilitate participation in decision-making and policy implementation;
- Enhance confidence-building and strengthen regional stability through community-based and cross-border arms control and peace-building; and
- Assist in the establishment of a culture of peace and disarmament.

The project operates in partnership with local non-governmental and community-based organizations. For the last two years the project has been working mainly in Sierra Leone and Liberia. For the coming two years, the project will enlarge its scope to Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso. Specific categories of people with high peace-building potential, such as women, young people, religious and traditional leaders, and the media, will be targeted as partners. Police forces and customs services will also be included.

Cooperating for Peace in West Africa: An Agenda for the 21st Century and Bound to Cooperate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone, two recent publications of the project, are described in detail in the publications section.

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Geneva Forum

The Geneva Forum is an intellectual space in which expertise on a broad range of disarmament issues is shared among government delegates, United Nations personnel, NGOs and academics. Experts from various fields of disarmament are regularly invited to share their knowledge in briefings, seminars and workshops. Such meetings provide disarmament negotiators with valuable opportunities to benefit from in-depth research and to interact with one another in a relatively informal atmosphere. The issues dealt with in Geneva Forum meetings reflect the priorities of the disarmament agenda at any given time. The aim is to provide negotiators with relevant information that will assist them in their disarmament work.

The Geneva Forum is expanding its work thanks to a generous grant from the Ford Foundation. New areas of activity will include increased networking between Geneva’s disarmament, human rights and humanitarian communities in order to discuss mutual interests in security and disarmament issues and to explore possibilities for coordination and collaboration. Also, in recognition of the important role that public opinion plays in advancing disarmament, the Geneva Forum will intensify its interaction with international media covering disarmament issues in Geneva.

The Geneva Forum has recently completed its Media Guide to Disarmament in Geneva—a succinct and practical tool to facilitate the work of media professionals by linking them with key sources of information. The Media Guide to Disarmament in Geneva includes contact information for hundreds of experts in disarmament, arms control and security issues who have agreed to act as points of reference for media enquiries. The guide is available on our website.

The first volume of collected Geneva Forum papers on the issue of small arms and light weapons has also been published (see publications section).

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UNIDIR Disarmament Seminars

UNIDIR occasionally holds small, informal meetings on various topics related to disarmament, security and non-proliferation. These off-the-record gatherings allow members of the disarmament community, missions and NGOs to have an opportunity to discuss a specific topic with an expert. Recent topics covered include: verification of nuclear disarmament, restoring momentum to nuclear disarmament, missile defences, disarmament as humanitarian action, deadlock at the Conference on Disarmament, fissile materials, and next steps for nuclear disarmament and arms control. Speakers at recent meetings have included: Jonathan Dean, Daryl Kimball, Soren Jessen-Petersen, Martin Griffiths, Randall Forsberg, Rebecca Johnson, Tariq Rauf, Mutiah Alagappa, Graham Andrew, Anatoli Diakov, Annette Schaper, Tom Shea, Alain Munier, Seiichiro Noburu, Munir Akram, Thomas Markram, Christopher Westdal, Yuri Kapralov, Fu Zhigong, Robert Grey, William Potter, Lewis Dunn, Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Harald Müller.
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**DATARIs**

In cooperation with SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), UNIDIR has developed an online database of disarmament, arms control, security and peace research institutes and projects around the world. The database can be accessed through UNIDIR’s website and institutes can update their information via a password. A new feature allows the inclusion of the names of the director and research staff.

If you would like your institute to be included in DATARIs, please contact:

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Coming to Terms with Security: A Lexicon for Arms Control, Disarmament and Confidence-Building is aimed at informing people on the body of arms control and disarmament terms that has developed over recent decades. There is so much information existing in the literature that a newcomer to the field can be overwhelmed and not know where to begin. UNIDIR intends this compilation to be a reference manual for the young and the experienced scholar alike.

In the future, the lexicon will be published in different languages—each bound together with the English version—so that the language and culture of arms control and disarmament become accessible to a much larger readership.

Introduction
Overview
The Big Picture on ‘Defence by other Means’
Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements (includes conventional, biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, as well as their delivery systems)
Building Trust and Confidence (CBMs)
Treaty Basics
Implementation of Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements (verification and compliance)
Index

Steve Tulliu and Thomas Schmalberger

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Sales number G.V.E.00.0.12
The last two decades have witnessed a growing determination in the efforts of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to consolidate the institutional capacity of the organization to prevent violence and manage crises. From the signing of a Non-Aggression Pact in 1978 to the establishment of a Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security in 1999, ECOWAS member states have endowed their organization with a rich and promising legal framework for conflict management. These efforts could be taken as an inspiration for the rest of the African continent struggling to extricate itself from a seemingly endless cycle of endemic violence. For that reason, these achievements deserve to be widely known and concretely encouraged.

Cooperating for Peace in West Africa: An Agenda for the 21st Century, a collection of ECOWAS legal instruments for peace and security, aims at making the endeavours of ECOWAS better known and supported by the rest of the international community. It is our wish that all those interested in the making of and the future of peace and security in West Africa, notably academics, researchers, students, diplomats, military and civilian experts in preventive diplomacy, would find in this compendium a useful tool for their work and a faithful companion in their quest for better knowledge of what is being done in terms of institutional peacebuilding in the Western part of the African continent. Preface by H.E. Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.

Anatole Ayissi
Editor

ISBN 92-9045-140-8
Sales number GV.E/F.01.0.19
Since the 1980s, Brazil has faced one of the worst small arms problems in the world. Drug and arms trafficking have led to increasing levels of violence in Brazilian society, notably in large cities such as São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro. This publication offers an account of the arms trafficking situation in Rio de Janeiro and the Brazilian Government’s response to it.

Local initiatives constitute a society’s front line of defence. In the case of Brazil, efforts to curb the flow of illicit firearms into the country, notably by addressing cross-border smuggling as well as sea routes, would be a good first step. Local initiatives, however, are not enough. Small arms trafficking involves many actors, from both inside and outside the country. To realistically address the firearms problem, concerted and co-ordinated action is needed at all levels—from local to international.

Detailing the specific case of a Latin American metropolis, this book serves as an excellent illustration that combating illicit firearms is a national, subregional, regional and global problem. The publication presents recommendations for increased co-ordination and response.

Introduction
Illicit Firearms in Rio de Janeiro
The New Brazilian Drive Against Illicit Trafficking
The Subregional and Regional Dimensions of the Fight Against Illicit Trafficking
Essential Additional Measures to Curb Illicit Trafficking in Firearms
Final Reflections

Péricles Gasparini Alves

ISBN 92-9045-139-4
Sales number GV.E.01.0.2
At the end of the Cold War, it was well understood that tactical nuclear weapons, which were forward-based and integrated with conventional forces, were a particularly dangerous category of nuclear weapons. A great deal of uncertainty remains today over the implementation of the 1991 unilateral declarations.

Since 1999, the spectre of tactical nuclear weapons has again been raised as a serious concern. The culminated response by Russia to NATO enlargement, the conflict over Kosovo, and United States proposals to modify the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, thus allowing national missile defences, has led to renewed interest in tactical nuclear weapons in Russia and to calls to remanufacture or modernize the existing tactical nuclear force within the near future. In addition, regional nuclear weapons developments, particularly in South Asia following the nuclear weapons tests by India and Pakistan in 1998, have fostered concerns over the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Asia and the Middle East.

It is clear, particularly when considering the possession of nuclear weapons by States other than the de jure nuclear weapon states, that the definitions of tactical nuclear weapons are inadequate. If strategic nuclear weapons are defined in terms of the capability and mission to hit the heart of an adversary’s homeland, then the range of these weapons is not always the key factor in their definition, neither is the explosive yield. In the United States-Russia dialogue on such weapons however, geographical range has been the overriding feature in attempts to delineate tactical from strategic. A number of critics argue that the subdivision of nuclear weapons into strategic and tactical is not as useful as treating all nuclear weapons collectively. Others feel strongly that the particular dangers of tactical nuclear weapons, with regard to their missions, command and control, are sufficient to warrant their separate and urgent treatment.

There is also the debate about the role of tactical nuclear weapons beyond the national boundaries of the possessor states, focusing much attention on tactical nuclear weapons in NATO Europe and on NATO doctrine. The large numerical superiority of Russian deployed tactical nuclear weapons and recent changes in Russian nuclear weapons doctrine were cause for increasing concern. A number of approaches to dealing with the tactical nuclear weapons issue are outlined in this book. It is hoped that these proposals will add value to the discussions and debates.

Harald Müller is Executive Director at the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Germany, where Annette Schaper is a Senior Associate in the Arms Control and Disarmament Group. William C. Potter is the Director of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies and the Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies, United States. Nikolai Sokov is also at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies.

Harald Müller, Annette Schaper, William C. Potter and Nikolai Sokov

Sales number GV.E.00.0.21
Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Perspective from Ukraine

After a decade in the background, the question of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) in Europe has begun to raise concern among politicians and the public. Although the problems of today are not as dramatic as those of the Cold War, when the threat of TNW use was ever present, TNW remain a cause for concern and must be addressed. The approaches used during the Cold War are no longer effective and new ones have not yet been devised.

This study is concerned with the present and future role of TNW in the new European security system as seen from Ukraine, a country which once had the world’s third largest nuclear arsenal stationed on its territory.

The study is the work of a team of researchers at the Dnipropetrovsk Branch of the National Institute for Strategic Studies led by Professor A. Shevtsov. A. Shevtsov writes on the problems that faced Ukraine in choosing the non-nuclear alternative. A. Gavrish contributes the analysis of the situation with regard to the tactical nuclear weapons possessed by NATO countries. A. Chumakov provides the corresponding analysis of the Russian arsenal. A. Yizhak presents the prospects for nuclear disarmament.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe: History of Deployment
Renunciation of Nuclear Weapons: The History of Ukraine
Tactical Nuclear Weapons in the New European Security System: To Be or Not To Be?
Prospects for Reducing the Role of Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe

A. Shevtsov, A. Yizhak, A. Gavrish and A. Chumakov
Bound to Cooperate:
Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone

The chapters of this book wrestle with fundamental questions of practical disarmament and peace-building in Sierra Leone. Although they were written prior to the May-June 2000 upsurge of violence in Freetown that led to the arrest of Foday Sankoh, these incidents underline the relevance of the authors’ analyses.

What links this series of research papers is the fact that all the authors are actors: they are Sierra Leonean civic leaders who are working for sustainable peace in their country. Each author is involved at one level or another in the search for a permanent peaceful resolution to the civil war, and a solution to the destabilizing influence of small arms and light weapons. In enabling these writers to get their views across, we hope to encourage a much-needed debate on security and security-sector reform in West Africa. We hope to enrich the understanding of Sierra Leone’s partners and donors. In the long run, we believe that this partnership approach will shore up the peace builders, and contribute to sustainable peace across the whole region.

This is the first in a series of books designed to feed into the debate on sustainable peace, security and development in West Africa. The next book in the series will present a collection of papers from civil society actors in Liberia. Depending on funding, we will publish similar studies by civil society in other ECOWAS countries.

Bound to Cooperate: Peacemaking and Power-sharing in Sierra Leone—Chris Squire
Arms Smuggling in Post-War Sierra Leone—Nat J.O. Cole
Arms Regulation—J.P. Chris Charley
Arms Control Policy Under Threat: Dealing with the Plague of Corruption—Abdulai Bayraytay
Peace by Other Means: The Missing Link in DDR Programmes—Michael Foray
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration in Post-War Sierra Leone—Francis Kai-Kai
Community-Based Disarmament and Post-Conflict Peace-building—Isaac Lappia
Women Against Weapons: A Leading Role for Women in Disarmament—Binta Mansaray
A Price for Peace? Justice and Reconciliation in Post-War Sierra Leone—Joe A.D. Alie

Anatole Ayissi and Robin-Edward Poulton
Editors
Sales number GV.E.00.0.20
African regional and subregional organizations have an important role to play in the promotion of peace and security on their continent. The United Nations Security Council has relied on them excessively, however, in large part because it has been reluctant to authorize United Nations peacekeeping operations. Although there is merit to strengthening indigenous capabilities, the issue of whether Africans are prepared for the challenge of assuming primary responsibility for responding to conflicts is another matter. What can African states and organizations do to enhance their peacekeeping capabilities? How can the international community better tailor its initiatives to the needs of African actors? This book answers such questions.

Part I of this book describes challenges to African peace and security and discusses the reasons why the United Nations Security Council has changed its peacekeeping policy. Part II examines African attempts to manage and resolve conflicts on their continent. Part III reviews African peacekeeping experience outside of African regional, subregional and ad hoc initiatives. Part IV describes and analyses efforts made by non-African states to address the deficit. The study concludes with a series of recommendations on how to make current approaches more effective. It provides concrete suggestions for strengthening African regional and subregional efforts and for improving Western capacity-building programmes. It also emphasizes that the United Nations must assume a greater role in both promoting and undertaking peacekeeping on the African continent.

Preface by the Secretary-General

PART I Setting the Stage
PART II African Organizations and Ad Hoc Initiatives
PART III Understanding African Peacekeeping Abilities and Limitations
PART IV Efforts to Develop African Capacities
Conclusion
Annexes and Selected Bibliography

Eric Berman and Katie Sams

Sales number GV.E.00.0.4
Although Central Asia has been seriously afflicted by the proliferation, accumulation and misuse of small arms, the region has been largely ignored by the international community. This report attempts to highlight the gravity of the situation in the region by describing the ways in which the small arms problem manifests itself within the Central Asian context. The study specifically focuses on the following issues: the factors generating demand for small arms; the external and internal sources of small arms; the routes through which arms and ammunition are transferred; the various types of small arms in circulation; the humanitarian, political and societal implications of small arms; and finally, the factors hampering the efforts to combat the small arms problem. The study concludes with remarks on the impact of small arms in Central Asia and on possible approaches for their control.

Afghanistan: Two Decades of Armed Conflict
   The Cold War Legacy
   Small Arms and the Taliban Ascendancy
   The Human Costs of Small Arms
The Conflict in Tajikistan
   The Civil War 1992-1997
   The Sources of Small Arms
   The Fragile Peace
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan: Small Arms and Latent Threats to Stability
   Weaponized Societies
   Potential Sources of Armed Internal Conflict

Bobi Pirseyedi

ISBN 92-9045-134-3
Sales number GV.E.00.0.6
Recognizing the threats to national security posed by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, West African States have sought to address the issue through a subregional grouping, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Inspired by the 'security first' approach, on 31 October 1998, in Abuja, all sixteen ECOWAS member states signed the Declaration of a moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons in West Africa.

The Moratorium — commonly known as the West African Small Arms Moratorium — entered into force on 1 November 1998, for a renewable period of three years. This Moratorium is an innovative approach to peace-building and conflict prevention. It is not a legally binding regime but rather an expression of shared political will. In order for the Moratorium regime to be effective, concrete measures need to be adopted to ensure that West African governments remember this political commitment and to mobilize national, regional and international support for its implementation. Located in Bamako, the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) is the designated implementation mechanism for the Moratorium.

On 23 and 24 March 1999, ECOWAS, the UN Development Programme and the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa hosted high-level consultations with West African and small arms experts to elaborate the modalities for the implementation of PCASED. This report outlines the various discussions that took place within both the Experts' Meeting and the Civil Society Meeting about these priority areas.

Jacqueline Seck

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

GE.00-00475
UNIDIR/2000/2
Small Arms Control: Old Weapons, New Issues

The twenty-nine papers collected in this volume were originally prepared for four regional workshops organized by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs to inform the work of the United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. These workshops were held during 1995–96. Most of the papers were updated in 1998. Authors include academic, military, governmental and activist experts.

The editorial committee consisted of: Jayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations; Mitsuro Donowaki, Ambassador and Special Assistant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan; Swadesh Rana, Chief, Conventional Arms Branch, Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations; and Lora Lumpe, Senior Researcher for the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).

The publication is divided into four parts:

Causal Factors and Policy Considerations
The Problem of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa
The Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
The Plague of Small Arms and Light Weaponry in South Asia

Jayantha Dhanapala, Mitsuro Donowaki, Swadesh Rana and Lora Lumpe
Editors

UNIDIR/Ashgate publication
In 1998, on the basis of the Shannon Mandate, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) established an ad hoc committee for negotiating a fissile materials treaty. The treaty is intended to achieve a ban on the production of fissile materials for military purposes in a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiably manner. Stocks of fissile materials have accrued transnationally due to armament and disarmament processes, as well as to civil uses of nuclear power. However, very little is known in the public domain about the nature, size and whereabouts of such stocks, and the complexities surrounding their regulation and control. UNIDIR’s report on fissile material stocks seeks to begin to redress this problem by providing factual background information on all of these important matters. The report categorizes and quantifies fissile material stocks, and examines the measures which have heretofore been developed regarding their control and management. The report also includes an overview of broad policy options available to states in addressing the stocks issue, which could prove valuable in informing negotiations in the CD.

**Fissile material stocks: function, scale and distribution**
- Characterization by type of inventory
- The scale, type and location of fissile material stocks

**Measures relating to fissile material stocks: recent developments**
- Military inventories: continuing absence of international regulation
- Transitional inventories: towards regulation and disposition
- Civil inventories: the extension of transparency

**Policy strategies and options**
- Stocks and the FMT: possible diplomatic approaches
- Possible measures for reducing risks posed by fissile material stocks

**Fissile materials and their production processes**
- International safeguards and physical protection

William Walker and Frans Berkhout

Sales no. G.V.E.99.0.15
ISBN 92-9045-131-9
United Nations peace operations have a tradition of several decades, and their scope and importance has increased markedly since the end of the Cold War. Peacekeeping operations, both of the traditional and the extended type, comprise monitoring tasks as a central part of their mandates. Agreements or resolutions, whether they demand withdrawal behind a cease-fire line, keeping a buffer zone demilitarized, or banning heavy weapons in control zones or safe havens, require that compliance is checked reliably and impartially. The more comprehensive the monitoring, the more likely the compliance. In practice, however, monitoring duties often require the surveillance of such large areas that United Nations peacekeeping units cannot provide continuous coverage. Thus, peacekeeping personnel are permanently deployed only at control points on the roads or areas deemed most sensitive. Minor roads and open terrain are covered by spot-check patrols. This creates many opportunities for infractions and violations.

Unattended ground sensor systems allow all this to change. Unattended ground sensors are suited to permanent, continuous monitoring. They can be deployed at important points or along sections of a control line, sense movement or the presence of vehicles, persons, weapons, etc. in their vicinity and signal an alarm. This alerts peacekeepers in a monitoring centre or command post, who can send a rapid-reaction patrol immediately to the site to confront the intruders, try to stop them, or at least document the infraction unequivocally.

Unattended ground sensor systems generally have not been used in peace operations. Thus, the wider introduction of unattended ground sensor systems in future United Nations peace operations requires fresh study from operational, practitioner, system design and legal perspectives. Sensors for Peace is an excellent first look at this timely issue.
Non-offensive defence (NOD) emerged as a proposed remedy to the military security problems of East and West during the latter part of the Cold War. Grounded in the notion of “cooperative security”, NOD is premised on the postulate that states in the international system are better off pursuing military policies which take account of each other’s legitimate security interests than they are in trying to gain security at each others’ expense. Competitive military policies which seek to achieve national security through a build-up of national military means may well be counter-productive and leave states more insecure. Seeking to procure national military security through a build-up of national armaments raises suspicions as to the purpose of these armaments, which in turn trigger countervailing armament efforts and ultimately lower the level of security for all. By making the defence of domestic territory the sole and clear objective of national military policies, NOD aims to strike a balance between the imperatives of ensuring adequate national military security and of avoiding provocation.

NOD aims towards national military defences strong enough to ensure adequate national military security, but not strong enough to be seen as threatening by others. The provision of adequate yet non-threatening military defence can be highly useful in a region such as the Middle East where political and military confrontations are inextricably linked, and where political settlement in the absence of military security is inconceivable. In the Middle East, NOD could reduce prevailing military tensions and open the way for broader political arrangements on the future of the region.

The introduction of NOD in the Middle East would not require that all Middle Eastern states adopt the same NOD model. Rather, each Middle Eastern state can select the particular NOD model most suitable to its requirements.

**Non-Offensive Defence in the Middle East?**

Bjørn Møller, Gustav Däniker, Shmuel Limone and Ioannis A. Stivachtis

Sales No. GVE.98.0.27
ISBN 92-9045-129-7
A Peace of Timbuktu:
Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking

Mali is admired for two recent accomplishments. The first is the country’s transition to democracy, which took place in 1991–1992. This effort included the overthrow of Mousa Traoré’s twenty-three year military dictatorship on 26 March 1991—a process of military and civilian collaboration which fostered national reconciliation, a referendum for a new constitution, and elections which brought to power Mali’s first democratically elected president, government and legislature. The second achievement is the peacemaking between the Government of Mali and the rebel movements in the northern part of the country: this process successfully prevented the outbreak of civil war and presents useful lessons in preventive diplomacy for the international community. The peacemaking culminated in a ceremony known as the Flame of Peace, when rebel weapons were incinerated in Timbuktu on 27 March 1996. This study of the events surrounding the uprisings in the North of Mali and the measures which restored peace (and those which will maintain it) is the result of a collaboration between the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

This peace process was remarkable for the way in which the United Nations agencies were able to help, discreetly dropping oil into the machinery of peacemaking. For a cost of less than $1 million, the United Nations helped the Malians to avoid a war, and lit the Flame of Peace. With less than $10 million, the United Nations became the leading partner of Mali’s Government and civil society, in peace-building, disarming the ex-combatants and integrating 11,000 of them into public service and into the socio-economy of the North through a United Nations Trust Fund. The experience shows that not only is peacemaking better than peace-keeping, but that it is much cheaper.

A Peace of Timbuktu includes in-depth coverage of the following topics:

- Mali’s History and Natural Environment
- The Build-up to the Crisis in Northern Mali
- The Armed Revolt 1990–1997
- Peacemaking and the Process of Disarmament
- The International Community as a Catalyst for Peace
- Ensuring Continued Peace and Development in Mali
- The Flame of Peace Burns New Paths for the United Nations

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has written the preface. The book includes maps, texts of relevant documents and laws, and a bibliography, as well as photographs by the authors and peace drawings by the children of Mali.

Robin Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf

Sales No. GV.E.98.0.3
ISBN 92-9045-125-4
Updated second edition available in French GV.F98.0.3
On 7 and 8 September 1998, UNIDIR held a private, off-the-record meeting on The Implications of South Asia’s Nuclear Tests for the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Regimes. This ‘track one and a half’ meeting was designed to address the needs of policy-makers—governmental and nongovernmental agents—in their assessment of the impact of the nuclear-weapons tests carried out by India and Pakistan in May 1998. The governments of Australia, Denmark, Italy, Norway, New Zealand and the United States generously sponsored the meeting.

More than fifty people from over twenty-five countries attended the conference. Each participant attended in his or her personal capacity as an expert and not as a representative of a country or a NGO. At the end of this two-day meeting, there was general agreement among participants that neither India nor Pakistan had enhanced its own security or international status by conducting the tests, but that the risk of nuclear war in the region is now greater. Also, it was recognized that the NPT and the CTBT had been in difficulty prior to the tests, although they remained the best solutions available to reduce potential for further conflict and therefore remained crucial. Finally, many participants expressed their concern that if India and Pakistan were rewarded in any way for demonstrating their nuclear capabilities, this may cause some NPT members to reassess their membership in the regime.

International response to the nuclear tests in South Asia was inadequate: there is a need for more coherent and collective action. Participants focused on practical suggestions to policy-makers to reduce the risk of war; to save the non-proliferation and nuclear arms control regimes; and to anticipate the effects of the tests on areas of regional tensions, particularly the Middle East.

The Responses to the Tests
Causes of the Tests
Consequences of the Tests
Regional Security
Consequences for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
Damage Limitation
Developing the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Agenda
Conclusions and Policy Options
Main Summary
Prevention of Nuclear War
Saving the Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Regimes
The Effects on Regional Tensions, Especially in the Middle East

GE.99-00415
UNIDIR/99/2
Since 1997, the Quaker United Nations Office, the Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research have collaborated in bringing expert presentations on issues in contemporary arms control and disarmament to the international community in Geneva. These presentations have been addressed to the members of the diplomatic missions in Geneva, and our goal has been to offer high-quality analytical perspectives on contemporary issues in a ‘user friendly’ format related to the policy development needs and possibilities of this particular community.

The focus of the Geneva Forum in 1998 and 1999 was the issue of small arms and light weapons. In this small volume, the reader will find the summary results of the seminars that were held between May 1998 and November 1999. We hope, through this volume, to reinforce the experts’ presentations by making them available to a wider audience.

Introduction

Conventional Arms Transfers: Surplus Weapons and Small Arms — Herbert Wulf

Illegal Arms in Albania and European Security — Chris Smith


The International Commission of Inquiry (Rwanda) — Eric Berman

The United Nations and Small Arms: The Role of the Group of Governmental Experts — Mitsuro Donowaki, Graciela Uríbe de Lozano & André Mernier


The Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers: West Africa and Beyond — Ole-Petter Sunde

War, Peace and Light Weapons in Colombia: A Case Study — Daniel García-Peña Jaramillo
Additional UNIDIR publications


Curbing Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Sensitive Technologies: An Action-Oriented Agenda, Péricles Gasparini Alves and Daiana Belinda Cipollone, eds., 1998, Sales No. G.V.E.98.0.8, also available in Spanish, G.V.S.98.0.8


National Threat Perceptions in the Middle East, by James Leonard, Shmuel Limone, Abdel Monem Said Aly, Yezid Sayigh, the Center for Strategic Studies (University of Jordan), Abdulhay Sayed and Saleh Al-Mani, 1995, Sales No. G.V.E.95.0.24.

Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the 21st Century, Péricles Gasparini Alves and Daiana Belinda Cipollone, eds., 1997, Sales No. G.V.E.97.0.29, also available in Spanish, Sales No. G.V.S.97.0.29

The Transfer of Sensitive Technologies and the Future of Control Regimes, Péricles Gasparini Alves and Kerstin Hoffman, eds., 1997, Sales No. G.V.E.97.0.10


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