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As we go to press the fighting wears on in Sierra Leone as the world community continues to debate the complex yet fundamental issues concerning peacekeeping and enforcement. The world appears to be caught ill prepared to co-operatively respond to yet another complex intrastate crisis. Since the establishment of the United Nations and its very first peacekeeping mission in 1948, basic issues, questions and themes have emerged and re-emerged: is humanitarian intervention a moral obligation of Member States of the United Nations? Is intervention based on humanitarian principles or national interests? Are nations willing to pay the political price of casualties when no “national interests” are at stake? What do we do when those on essentially humanitarian missions are targeted or drawn into the vortex of the very conflict they are attempting to manage? What role do armaments play in a peace operation?

Ironically, the issue of a standing UN force has its beginnings with the origins of the United Nations itself. Chapter VII of the UN Charter outlines the obligations of Member States regarding the provision of armed forces, assistance and facilities for maintaining international peace and security, and describes the necessary institutions to manage such a force. The complexity of the issue is evident in the fact that over fifty years later, the peacekeeping debate continues and a standing force has yet to emerge.

For this issue of *Disarmament Forum* we offer an in-depth examination of the difficult questions surrounding peacekeeping: the historical basis for a standing United Nations force, the effectiveness of burden sharing and regional efforts, verification of peacekeeping, civil-military relations and the privatization of peacekeeping/peace enforcement.

We are proud to highlight the work of UNIDIR researchers Eric Berman and Katie Sams, authors of *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities*, a comprehensive study of the concept of burden sharing in peacekeeping operations in Africa. Berman and Sams have produced an engaging and detailed account of African peacekeeping experiences; regional, subregional and ad hoc initiatives; the role of the United Nations and changes in its peacekeeping policies; and the contributions of non-African states to African peacekeeping. The publication concludes with practical recommendations for African capacity-building in both the short and long term.

On 27 April at UN Headquarters, UNIDIR launched the study to a packed room of delegates, UN officials, members of the press and NGOs. Under-Secretary-General Ibrahim Gambari (Adviser on Special Assignments in Africa), Christopher Coleman (Chief, Policy and Analysis Unit, Department of Peace-Keeping Operations), the authors and UNIDIR Director Patricia Lewis all spoke at the event. Berman and Sams have provided an excerpt for this issue of *Disarmament Forum*; details about the publication can be found on page 85.
Issue 4, 2000 of Disarmament Forum will be dedicated to next year’s Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference. The BWC is now twenty-five years old. Although many of the world’s well-developed biological weapon programmes have been dismantled, concern continues to rise about the illicit use of biological weapons by rogue states, non-state actors and terrorists. This issue of Disarmament Forum will include articles on a historical perspective on the BWC, the spectrum of possible outcomes of the current Protocol negotiations and the rates of change in biotechnology.

With support from the Ford Foundation, UNIDIR has reformulated its fellowship programme to annually host four visiting research fellows from a single region for a period of four to six months. Researchers will be chosen from the different countries that form the region of study. They will work collectively on a single research paper, focusing collaboratively on a particularly difficult question of regional security. The completed paper will feed into policy debates on the security of their region. Starting in the second half of the year, the Institute will welcome the first group of visiting fellows from South Asia. In subsequent years, UNIDIR hopes to attract fellows from West Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, Southern Africa, Central Europe, East Africa, North-East Asia and so on.

UNIDIR is also pleased to announce the publication of The Small Arms Problem in Central Asia: Features and Implications by Bobi Pirseyedi, a recent Visiting Fellow at the Institute. Although Central Asia has already been seriously afflicted by the proliferation, accumulation and misuse of small arms, the region has been largely ignored by the international community. This report attempts to highlight the gravity of the situation in the region by describing the ways in which the small arms problem manifests itself within the Central Asian context. UNIDIR would like to thank the Government of Finland for its generous support of Dr. Pirseyedi’s research at UNIDIR. Further information about the publication can be found on page 86.

UNIDIR’s tactical nuclear weapons project produced its preliminary research findings for the NPT Review Conference in New York in May, following a conference in Geneva on the subject in March. A publication on tactical nuclear weapons will be produced by UNIDIR later this year.

Just a reminder: Disarmament Forum is online before the paper copy is printed and distributed. For the most recent issue, check our website regularly: www.unog.ch/UNIDIR.

Kerstin Vignard
This is, once again, the season for international peacekeeping operations. And for Africa, it is a troubled season considering the difficulties being encountered with regards to present and potential United Nations Peacekeeping Operations such as in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), Western Sahara (MINURSO) and the Inter-positional Force for the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict. Hence, the debate on the various aspects of international peacekeeping including, in particular, issues relating to financing, equipment and logistic support, mandate of the forces and co-operation between the United Nations and regional organizations, is a very timely one.

In this regard, two recent publications have made significant contributions to our understanding of the complexities of international peacekeeping operations. William Shawcross’s *Deliver Us From Evil: Peace-Keepers, War Lords and World of Endless Conflict* and Eric Berman and Katie Sams’s *Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities* attempt to show that international responses to conflicts through peacekeeping have often created more problems than they solve. This is in contrast to the first generation of United Nations peacekeeping operations, which tended to have more precise objectives and were in general regarded as successful.

Of course, traditional conceptualization of peacekeeping involves two main areas: military observer groups and infantry-based forces. Both of these are aimed primarily at controlling cease-fire arrangements at the request of parties. These relate to situations where, for the most part, there is peace to keep. Hence, military observer groups, which are usually unarmed, are positioned to help promote conditions for successful political negotiations to proceed. Examples include two very early but still existing operations — namely the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), which was set up to supervise the 1949 armistice agreements after the Security Council call for an end to the Arab-Israeli war; and the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) which monitors the cease-fires between India and Pakistan, following hostilities over Jammu and Kashmir in 1965 and 1971. There are also the peacekeeping operations where infantry-based forces, usually armed with light weapons, are generally mandated to establish and control demilitarized or buffer zones in order to physically separate parties to a conflict. Examples include UN operations in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and along the Israeli-Syrian border, in Southern Lebanon (UNDOF).

However, the character of UN peacekeeping operations has changed considerably in recent years. Nowadays, UN forces are less frequently deployed in peacekeeping operations of the traditional type, i.e. an interposing force along a clear line of demarcation between two parties who have agreed to a cease-fire and who respect their arrangements. Furthermore, and unlike in times past, most UN peacekeeping operations are not purely military undertakings; they have developed into integrated, multifunctional operations as pointed out by the former Secretary-General in his “Position Paper on the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the UN”. Civil administration, including the monitoring of elections and human rights observance and police support, co-operation with field
services, humanitarian expertise, political negotiation and mediation, or combination thereof, now frequently form standard elements of international peacekeeping operations.

Indeed, most present day peacekeeping operations are increasingly deployed because of conflicts within states. Such operations are therefore inherently more complex and more perilous than the deployment of peacekeeping forces between states. In conflicts occurring within states, the UN has to deal with a multitude of actors of often ill-defined status and with unclear authority and command over the armed elements in the field. The UN has been called upon to deploy troops to contribute to the termination of an internal conflict or civil war in several cases, such as El Salvador, Cambodia, Rwanda, Angola, Mozambique, Liberia, Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The wave of conflicts occurring within state boundaries presents a new form of challenges to UN peacekeeping operations. These kinds of conflicts, mostly guerrilla wars without clear front lines, are usually fought not only by regular armed forces but also by armed militias and civilians with little discipline and in most cases ill-defined chains of command. These are the kinds of conflicts that generate a huge number of refugees and internally displaced persons requiring large-scale humanitarian assistance. In addition to this, these kinds of conflicts are often accompanied by the collapse of state institutions resulting in paralysis of governance, a breakdown of law and order, and general banditry and chaos. The implication of this is that any international peacekeeping initiative must extend beyond military and humanitarian tasks and must include the promotion of national reconciliation and resuscitation of governmental authority.

In view of the proliferation of conflicts in Africa, it is clear that the prospects of getting international support can only be enhanced if African leaders make serious efforts to address their own peace and security challenges. In this regard, the acceptance of this premise on the part of African states must be followed by a critical assessment of current policies and programmes for promoting peace and security on the continent in order to ensure greater successes in meeting those challenges. However, it would be a great pity that at a time when Africa is making serious efforts to promote peace and security in the continent (through SADC, ECOWAS, OAU) the international community fails to come up with the resources and imaginative policies and programmes to complement those efforts. After all, the UN Charter did not say that the Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security except when it concerns Africa.

It is also important to analyze the history, problems and prospects of peacekeeping efforts made by the regional and subregional organizations such as the OAU, ECOWAS, SADC, etc., and how the United Nations and the international community have complemented those efforts in establishing security frameworks and operationalizing them. In the final analysis, the goal is to develop and enhance African capacities for peace making and peacekeeping. The task before the international community is how to support such capacity-building efforts in Africa but to do it in a co-ordinated, timely and effective manner.

Finally, it is my hope that the analyses, general observations and the specific recommendations in this edition of Disarmament Forum devoted to peacekeeping would be generally realistic while also forward-looking. International peacekeeping operations have had a chequered past, especially in recent times. Let us hope that they will have a more secured future.

Under-Secretary-General Ibrahim Gambari
Adviser for Special Assignments in Africa
The last fifty years has seen continuously changing ideas regarding the UN’s role in peacekeeping and disarmament. There has been a shift from UN involvement in “classical” peacekeeping activities to a more challenging “second generation” of peacekeeping which encompasses far more various and complex challenges and activities — normally in the context of a failed state or intrastate crisis. Disarmament, once at the forefront of UN negotiations, has been overshadowed by issues such as development, the environment and human rights. Additionally, support for a standing force has waxed and waned considerably — and in some cases those who were once its firmest supporters are now its staunchest critics.

Yet, from the very origins of the United Nations, the idea of a UN permanent military force has periodically re-emerged. Some of the interest has been in direct connection with the UN’s successes and drawbacks in deploying military forces in crises such as Palestine (1948), Korea (1950), Suez (1956) and the Congo (1963), and more recently, the Gulf War (1991). The debate on an international force has also evolved at the rhythm of disarmament efforts: a fact often forgotten, an international force had originally been conceived in the UN Charter as a necessary complement to disarmament measures, a possible instrument of control and sanction.

In this article an attempt is made to retrace the link between disarmament objectives and provision for UN military forces in the UN Charter. The paper then focuses on the historical interconnection between proposals for international force and disarmament efforts simultaneously with the development of the UN peacekeeping machinery and doctrine. Finally, it will be seen that the link between disarmament and peacekeeping and proposals for international force is still viable today under a different form — in the efforts to address the challenges posed by the disarming of factions in internal conflicts.

International force as an organ of control and sanction

The UN, a phoenix born again from the ashes of the League of Nations, was the immediate product of the Second World War. As early as 1943, Harold Stassen, a signatory of the UN Charter and a pioneer in promoting the idea of UN Legion, suggested the creation of a ‘Keep the Peace Force’, to be directly recruited on a quota basis and ‘consisting of units of air, naval and mechanized
land forces made up of citizens of the United Nations’. The international force would not have supplanted military forces of individual nations, at least initially, but the importance of the latter could gradually decrease in proportion to the confidence placed in the ability of the UN Legion to enforce the code of justice, support UN administration of airways, seaways and trusteeships and ensure disarmament of potential aggressors.¹

On 14 December 1946, the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 41(I) regarding ‘the problem of security as closely connected with that of disarmament’ and therefore recommended ‘the Security Council to accelerate as much as possible the placing at its disposal of the armed forces mentioned in Article 43 of the Charter’. According to Art. 47, the Military Staff Committee (MSC) was ‘to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council’s military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament’. Art. 46 charged the Security Council (assisted by the MSC) with making plans for the application of armed force. Art. 26 provided that the Security Council shall be responsible for formulating — with the assistance of the MSC — plans to be submitted to the Members of the UN for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments.

The MSC was to consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the Permanent Members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee was to be invited to be associated with it when efficient discharge of the Committee’s responsibility required the participation of that Member in its work.

Although the ideals were prescribed in the UN Charter, the MSC (and the establishment of a standing force) floundered. The main problem, beyond the inherent limitations of the planned arrangements, appeared to be the implementation of the Charter system itself. As its realization ultimately depended on the goodwill of Member States on a case-by-case basis, the military provisions remained a dead letter. An additional aggravating factor was the beginning of the Cold War, making any agreement by the major powers on the subject of military forces highly hypothetical. Due to the failure to establish such forces, the MSC never played a significant role and has remained since 1948 ‘a meaningless ritual kept in notional existence for the sake of form’.²

The deadlock of the MSC over the question of an international military force seriously compromised any prospect for a system of arms regulation within the UN security framework. Yet, if the creation of an international military force was, from the very beginning, linked to sufficient national disarmament, it was only logical that any substantial progress made in the field of disarmament be accompanied by greater hopes that such a force could be established. As noted by Joseph Nogee, ‘[r]elying on the assistance of the same group to create both an international army and a system of arms regulation may seem unusual, but it was a natural consequence of what the major powers considered to be a necessary interconnection’.³ The subsequent ‘chicken and the egg’ debate, on whether an international force should be a precondition or the consequence of disarmament at the international level, would put in perspective the inherent contradictions of international relations.

Given the powerful character of the inhibiting factors, only a major crisis of international security — making it appear a vital necessity overriding all narrow considerations — could make the idea of a UN permanent military force become a potential option. In the very first years of the UN’s existence, two major crises would challenge the ability of the Organization to carry out its mission, both in terms of credibility and legitimacy: Palestine, in 1948 and Korea, in 1950.
The link to disarmament

The President of the American Federation of Justice, Ewing Cockrell, had suggested to Secretary of State Marshall and other Department officials on 4 October 1948 that the American Government press for a UN police force in the atomic energy control discussions proposed in Paris by the Soviet delegation. On 2 December 1948, President Truman, in a letter to Senator Elbert Thomas of Utah, wrote that he would ‘talk disarmament and talk it in dead earnest’ when there was a ‘sufficient police force for United Nations to maintain the peace of the world’. In a disarmed world — should it be attained —,’ said General Dwight D. Eisenhower on 23 March 1950, ‘there must be an effective United Nations, with a police power universally recognized and strong enough to earn universal respect’. The paradox, as explained by Frederick C. McKee, Chairman of the Committee on National Affairs of the American Association for the United Nations, was only apparent: ‘[E]ven if all the nations of the world consented to inspection and control of all weapons, it would still be essential that the United Nations has its own forces and weapons located at strategic points throughout the world to guard against inspection evasion and clandestinely armed conspiracies which might seize control of an unarmed world.’

Signs of an evolution of the idea of a UN permanent military force linked to disarmament appeared at the time of the Korea crisis. The enforcement action was, in the words of the Representative of New Zealand at the General Assembly, ‘the first time that anything approaching an international police force [had] been seen in operation’. Given the paralysis of the MSC, progress towards the establishment of a truly international force could only be achieved through the General Assembly which, under Art. 11 of the Charter, ‘may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security’. Such responsibility includes the ‘principles governing the regulation of armament’, regarding which the General Assembly may make recommendations to Member States, the Security Council or both.

Drawing lessons from an operation in which the MSC had played no role in the strategic direction of the action, the General Assembly approved on 3 November 1950 the Uniting for Peace Resolution. The resolution reaffirmed that the initiative in negotiating agreements for armed forces provided in Art. 43 of the Charter belonged to the Security Council. Yet the General Assembly did not exclude a possible failure of the Security Council to exercise its primary responsibility in the case of a threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression. In such cases, the General Assembly could make appropriate recommendations to Member States to restore international peace and security pending the conclusion of Art. 43 agreements.

The resolution also aimed at ensuring that the UN had at its disposal adequate means for this purpose. To this end, the General Assembly invited Member States to maintain elements within their own national armed forces so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made available for service as a UN unit, or units, upon recommendation by the Security Council and the General Assembly. At the same time, it established a Collective Measures Committee (CMC) to study and report to the Security Council and the General Assembly on methods that might be used to maintain and strengthen international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter, including a UN Legion.

Yet, if the UN were to prevent aggression, whatever its origin, a ‘UN Legion’ would never be enough. The only viable solution in the long run appeared to be disarmament. On 28 February 1951, a group of twenty-three American Senators and Representatives asked in a letter to President Truman that a plea be made at the UN General Assembly for peace through disarmament. Among the measures proposed was the establishment of a UN police force ‘superior in size and armament
to any force available to the member nations for maintenance of civil order’. \(^9\) For Katzin, in 1952: ‘it must be recognized that in the final analysis, and for so long as universal disarmament is not a major part of any overall United Nations collective security plan, the UN will always have to rely primarily upon the total resources of its member states to resist an act of aggression’. \(^{10}\)

The Suez operation in 1956, and the setting up of the UN Emergency Force (UNEF), demonstrated the advantages of a quickly deployable international force. While in 1957 the General Assembly declared total nuclear disarmament as the ultimate objective to be pursued, the abandonment of several disarmament proposals led experts to explore new paths in the connection between disarmament and a standing force.

**Disarmament: precondition or consequence?**

In 1958, India, in its opposition at the General Assembly to the idea of a directly recruited permanent force, explicitly linked the creation of an international police force to world disarmament. \(^{11}\) For the Indian delegation, preconditions for the establishment of a police force included, apart from world disarmament, the establishment of world law, the existence of ‘some sovereign authority that must be obeyed’ and the possibility of exercising sanctions — all conditions ‘which may take years to come about’. \(^{12}\)

The same year, Philip Noel-Baker, author of *The Arms Race — A Proposal for World Disarmament*, wrote: ‘Until recently, the creation of an international police seemed Utopian. With the success of the UN Emergency Force in Sinai, and the pledges of many governments to cooperate in the establishment of a standing UN Force, it has become real politics.’ \(^{13}\) Convinced that the organization of an international air police presented no particular technical problem, Noel-Baker saw it as a guarantee against aggression. Recalling that UNEF never exceeded 6,100 in strength, Noel-Baker proposed a relatively modest force of 10,000–20,000 to be rapidly expanded as disarmament progresses and needs demand. The air police, composed of directly recruited volunteers, could also perform other functions in maintaining peace and in serving a UN standing force to be created.

The force he imagined would have consisted of long-term volunteers, recruited individually by the UN, with quotas for different nations to ensure a fair balance. At least at the beginning, the commanding officer and staff would be chosen from among nationals of the middle and smaller states. The force would have exclusive loyalty to the UN, and should be paid, equipped and armed with funds borne on the UN budget. It should not be furnished with heavy arms. It should have permanent bases — training depots, leave stations, etc. — of its own, in a number of different countries. The main function of the force would be interposition and supervisory, wherever it might be required, similar to UNEF in the Sinai. Other functions might be guard duties, the supervision of demilitarized zones, and the protection of fissile material stockpiles maintained by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Ideally, the Director-General of the IAEA — which according to its statute is given responsibility for the safety of “strategic” distribution of stockpiles in different regions of the world — could use the international force. Noel-Baker was ready to go as far as accepting a UN international force with nuclear stocks. What was needed, he concluded, was a new ‘grand design and overall plan’. Such proposals, he wrote, were not ‘starry eyed’ idealism, but ‘plain, realistic, common sense’. \(^{14}\)

If a permanent international force appeared an ideal instrument of control and sanction in the context of disarmament, it was not necessarily clear what should come first: depending on the
perspective, the existence of a UN Peace Force could be seen as a precondition of, an instrument for or the ultimate consequence of disarmament. The UN continued to champion the importance of disarmament. In 1959, ‘general and complete disarmament’ was proclaimed by the General Assembly to be the ultimate aim of disarmament efforts. Indeed, the problem of arms control could not be isolated from the one of disarmament as the opportunities for — and the risks resulting from — cheating had increased with the existence of nuclear capabilities. The General Assembly placed on its agenda an item entitled ‘General and Complete Disarmament under Effective International Control’, while agreements on partial disarmament were pursued concurrently. The idea of an international permanent military force had found a new forum.

**THE NUCLEAR THREAT**

On 17 September 1959, a proposal was made before the General Assembly by the United Kingdom for a disarmament process in three stages. According to the proposal, an ‘international control organ’ would reach ‘its final form and attain full capability for keeping peace’ at the end of the process envisaged.15

Nikita Khrushchev’s address to the 799th Meeting of the General Assembly, on 18 September 1959, marked a turning point in the debate because it came from the Soviet block. States, he said, ‘should be allowed to retain only strictly limited police (militia) contingents — of a strength agreed upon for each country — equipped with light fire-arms and intended solely for the maintenance of internal order and the protection of citizens’ safety.’16 A few days later, the Danish Representative to the General Assembly declared: ‘In our opinion, UNEF has met with considerable success as to warrant giving serious consideration to at least some steps towards the establishment of a permanent United Nations force. The question of creating such a force is also connected to the problem of total disarmament.’17 A permanent UN force was seen as a means to enforce disarmament under effective international control, the logical corollary of the operation of an international law ensuring good order and of international authorities to prevent or suppress conflicts.18

The reflection on international force in connection with the threat of nuclear conflict reached a peak in 1961. The Soviet installation of surface-to-air missiles in Cuba, following Kennedy’s unsuccessful attempt to invade the country and overthrow Fidel Castro in April 1961, placed the United States at close range of Soviet weapons. The Bay of Pigs fiasco and the ensuing missile crisis focused the world’s attention on the dangers of the nuclear precipice. That year, the philosopher Bertrand Russell published *Has Man a Future?* in which he proposed the creation of a world government and of an international force, including the possibility of direct international enlistment and the manufacturing of weapons by the World Authority.19

**AMERICAN PROPOSALS**

The American response to Khrushchev’s disarmament proposal came in Kennedy’s optimistic address to the General Assembly of 25 September 1961. What the United States President proposed was not only a programme for general and complete disarmament, but also an international capacity to keep peace:
Peacekeeping: evolution or extinction?

The programme to be presented to this Assembly — for general and complete disarmament under effective international control — moves to bridge the gap between those who insist on a gradual approach and those who talk only of the final and total achievement. It would create a machinery to keep peace as it destroys the machinery of war. ... It would achieve, under the eyes of an international disarmament organization, a steady reduction in force, both nuclear and conventional, until it had abolished all armies and all weapons except those needed for internal order and a new United Nations peace force. And it starts that process now, today, as this talk begins.20

The American proposal for a ‘Peace Force’ was in fact only the earmarking by all Member States of specially trained and quickly available peacekeeping units in their armed forces to be on-call to the UN with advance provision for financial and logistic support. President Kennedy’s proposal was nevertheless heartily saluted by Nepal, Guinea, Pakistan and Greece at the General Assembly.21 Under American leadership, the question of disarmament became a leitmotiv of the various proposals for a permanent force made by individuals, researchers and scholars, paving the way for an ambitious American proposal at the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENCD)22 in 1962.

Two works are particularly striking of the efforts to promote the idea of a UN Peace Force in connection with disarmament: the 1958 plan proposed by G. Clark and L.B. Sohn in World Peace Through World Law and the study prepared by L.P. Bloomfield, A World Effectively Controlled by the United Nations, at the Institute of Defense Analysis (IDA), Washington, DC, for the United States Department of State.

The proposal by two American lawyers, Clark and Sohn, contained a detailed plan for a world police force sufficiently powerful and prompt to suppress any threat to the world’s peace.23 The plan, emphasizing the importance of a reliable world police force on the model of those used for the maintenance of order in large cities, rested on two assumptions:

• that a permanent and indisputably international force is necessary to take the place of national armaments; and
• that it would not be feasible to maintain an adequate world police force unless disarmament is universal and complete.

The force envisaged should therefore be built up parallel with, and proportionate to, the process of national disarmament that, according to the plan, should take place within a ten-year period. The concept was put forward together with a proposal for a revised UN Charter recognizing the primary responsibility of the General Assembly for the maintenance of peace and making provision for the measures to ensure compliance, including the use of the UN Peace Force.24 Drawing direct lessons from the experiences of Korea and Suez, the UN Peace Force would not be composed of national contingents but of individual volunteers recruited directly from all nations under a quota system by nationality. The proposed force would consist of two components: a full-time Standing Force of between 200,000 and 600,000; and a Peace Force Reserve, with a strength of between 600,000 and 1,200,000. To control the force, an Executive Council and a MSC of five persons appointed from the smaller nations was envisaged. Decision for enforcement action would rest with the General Assembly, except for emergency action decided by the Executive Council. Such actions would be limited to measures to prevent or suppress violent aggression or serious defiance of the UN authority.25

A World Effectively Controlled by the United Nations26 was published on 10 March 1962 by L.P. Bloomfield, then associate professor of political science and Director of the Arms Control Project at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. It is above all a discussion
of one particular form of a ‘stable environment’ — the UN as a global authority — and an attempt to sketch out the possible contours of such a system from the perspective of American interests. It undoubtedly paved the way for the American proposal later submitted to the ENCD. One of its merits is that it tackles the difficult question of feasibility. What Bloomfield had in mind was clearly supra-national institutions. Under the terms of the new international constitution, nations would be disarmed to police levels so as to be capable of ensuring only domestic security. Such national forces were derived from the present size of local, civil and state police, to which should be added national law enforcement personnel such as federal marshals, customs agents, border patrols and so on. Limited world government should, from this perspective, have sufficient powers ‘to monitor and enforce disarmament, settle dispute, and keep the peace’, including enforceable taxing powers to finance its political organs, a disarmament policy agency, and an international military force. The proposed international force would consist of 500,000 men, recruited individually and wearing a distinctive UN uniform. It would be composed of appropriately balanced ground, sea, air and space elements, including a nuclear component.

The United States proposed in early 1962 the establishment of a UN force in the drafts of the comprehensive and ambitious disarmament treaty submitted to the ENCD in Geneva on 18 April 1962. Entitled Outline of the Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World, it made provision for an international military force and effective procedures for the peaceful settlement of disputes. According to the Outline, disarmament would be implemented progressively and in a balanced manner. This way, no state or group of states could at any stage obtain a military advantage. To ensure this, the national disarmament process would be accompanied by a gradual strengthening of the UN. Disarmament would be accomplished in three stages, the first and second stages to be carried out over a total period of six years each, the third stage as promptly as possible within an agreed period. Stage I would be initiated by the United States, the Soviet Union, and other agreed states. During Stage I, the parties would agree on:

- examination of the experience of the UN leading to a further strengthening of UN forces for keeping the peace;
- examination of the feasibility of promptly conducting the agreements envisaged in Art. 43 of the UN Charter; and
- conclusion of an agreement for the establishment of a UN Peace Force in Stage II, including definitions of its purpose, mission, composition and strength, disposition, command and control, training, logistical support, financing, equipment and armaments.

During the same period, parties to the Treaty would also agree on the establishment of a standing UN Peace Observation Corps. The Corps, of which elements would be based in selected areas throughout the world, would be dispatched promptly to investigate any situation that might constitute a threat to peace. During Stage II, involving the participation of the most significant states, the UN Peace Force would be established and progressively strengthened, while arrangements for the expansion of the UN Peace Observation Corps would be agreed upon. Towards the end of Stage III, in which all states possessing armaments and armed forces would be involved, the UN Peace Force would have been strengthened to the point where no state could challenge it.

The Outline was presented by the American government as ‘far-reaching’. The proposal, its promoters apparently believed, could be put into effect quickly and would meet the objections made to earlier plans while satisfying the security needs of all participating nations. It represented a ‘total approach’, the main ambitious objective being not so much the destruction of arms, but rather the elimination of war and the building of a secure and lasting peace. Arms reduction was envisaged
as part of a more general peace-building process, including measures to enable the UN to become an effective agency for keeping the peace in a disarmed world.

The various American proposals for a UN Peace Force also shared a number of weaknesses. Very ambitious in their objectives, they were based on general principles, mainly that disarmament and the development of a ‘peacekeeping machinery’ designed to enforce it are two sides of the same coin. Yet they provide little information on the actual design of the institutions envisaged. In particular, the actual recruitment, composition and control of the proposed Peace Force are never discussed in detail. Moreover, the definition of the rules of international conduct relating to disarmament, essential to determine the situations in which the UN Peace Force should be used, is left to interpretation.

Several other official proposals for a UN Force were also made in 1961–62 in connection with disarmament talks. The East-West Conference in Warsaw, meeting between 3 and 6 February 1961, adopted the principle of an international police force to replace national armed forces. On 17 March 1961, the Final Statement of the British Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meeting in London called for a ‘substantial and adequately armed military force’ to be established.

STANDING OR AD HOC FORCE?

By the early 1960s, the idea of an ad hoc ‘Peace Force’ had already eclipsed proposals for permanent military forces at the disposal of the UN for peacekeeping or enforcement purposes. The UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) contributed to discouraging supporters of a more permanent arrangement. Ad hoc peacekeeping had demonstrated a number of advantages, very often by default. First of all, the UN’s involvement was considered heavily dependent on the existence of a sufficient coalition of Member States to deal with an issue, which would in any case reduce the number of actual instances of involvement. Second, in UN peacekeeping, the use of force was considered undesirable and unlikely to secure its objectives. The limited attempts to use force during the Congo operation were to remain an exception and raised endless controversies. There did not exist any consensus among Member States except for limited peacekeeping-type operations. In addition, the Secretariat could staff additional operations from existing ones, such as the UN Truce Supervision Organization or UN Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). While a small number of states were regularly willing to provide troops,31 some countries, especially those in Scandinavia, had undertaken to provide them with special training and had even designated specific stand-by units for peacekeeping missions. Therefore, for all the above mentioned reasons, until the end of the Cold War the idea of a standing UN force in relation to peacekeeping was only tentative.

Even if ONUC in the 1960s had contributed to discouraging supporters of a more permanent international military arrangement, at the same time widely shared hopes for a larger UN role were echoed.32 Ad hoc peacekeeping had started to demonstrate its limits. ONUC was the first UN intervention in the context of a failed state.33 Among actions for which traditional peacekeeping troops appeared ill-prepared or inadequate were: preventing border clashes from breaking into full-scale war; discouraging third parties from supplying military equipment to parties to the conflict; intervening for humanitarian purposes, including providing sanctuary for non-combatants who seek shelter during civil wars and attempting to quell internal conflicts that have genocidal tendencies; enforcing international norms within countries; and monitoring and enforcement of arms reduction.

The UN Operation in the Congo (ONUC) contributed to discouraging supporters of a more permanent arrangement. Ad hoc peacekeeping had demonstrated a number of advantages, very often by default.
Even for interposition purposes, availability of forces proved problematic: in the case of the second UN Emergency Force (UNEF II), for instance, only a transfer of troops from UNFICYP ensured immediate deployment. Worse, the ‘peacekeeping only’ doctrine was becoming contradictory with some of the basic principles and values of the UN. The injury and death of innocent people in the Lebanese civil war in 1976, the Nigerian civil war (1967–70), the conflict leading to the creation of Bangladesh (1971), the violence in Northern Ireland, and the Kampuchean exodus and tragedy (1979–80) demonstrated the need for international law enforcement.34

During the Cold War’s East-West tension the main advantage of a truly international force was its potential impartial character, and therefore perceived increased legitimacy to control and implement disarmament. As the Cold War started to wind down, the interest for ‘general and complete disarmament under UN control’ lost its intensity and therefore the disarmament aspect of a UN force lost its audience. In 1987, mentioning proposals for a special UN Preparedness Review Group to be created for increased readiness of UN troops, Ernst Haas noted that ‘None of these ideas seems timely, given the growing indifference to local wars on the part of many UN Members and the continuous effectiveness of peacekeeping, ad hoc though it is, under conditions when a consensus for action does exist’. After carefully analyzing the question of whether ad hoc procedures sufficed for successful peacekeeping at that time, he concluded ‘It appears as if the ad hoc arrangements now prevailing can do the job’.35 Whether the world community’s peace and security can be ensured by the lowest common denominator of agreement remains a doubtful proposition. Yet the link between proposals for peacekeeping efforts, disarmament processes and international force has not totally disappeared: it has taken a different track, parallel to the evolution of international security.

From ‘general and complete disarmament’ to the disarmament of factions

With the end of the Cold War, the focus on global disarmament started to fade away, and so did the debate on an international force for disarmament of states. The new challenge was the disarmament of groups, parties and factions within the boundaries of a state, either following a peace accord (as in Cambodia), the facilitation of a humanitarian operation (as in Somalia) or the protection of potentially threatened civilians (as in Bosnia). The question of disarmament of factions within states or failed states in the context of emerging internal conflicts has become a serious concern. Today’s internal conflicts are seen as a potential threat to international peace and security, and an international force could be a solution for disarmament in internal situations. Beyond the impartiality and legitimacy offered by an international force during the Cold War, today’s international force seeks the necessary credibility to effectively disarm factions in intricate situations within the borders of states or failed states. Therefore, this period has seen a revival of the idea of a UN permanent military force, in connection with the ‘re-invention of collective security’ at the time of the Gulf War and with the multiplication of internal conflicts.

To be successful, such “second generation” peacekeeping operations often require the use of land troops, which is likely to involve casualties. In Somalia, the Turkish General Cevic Bir made it clear that the failure to disarm the factions was due not only to the lack of troops and equipment, but also to the willingness of some of the contributing countries to accept the level of violence and the losses in terms of human lives in a conflict where they have no direct interest.36 The death of eighteen American soldiers on 3 October 1993 led to the American withdrawal from Somalia. Similarly, the loss of ten Belgian soldiers led to the departure of the Belgian contingent from Rwanda.

The question of disarmament of factions within states or failed states in the context of emerging internal conflicts has become a serious concern.
in April 1994 at a time when UN military presence was most needed. As strikingly summarized by
the Representative to the UN of one of the countries most involved in UN military operations, the
Netherlands: ‘We are quite willing to do something, but it mustn’t cost too much money or the lives
of our troops. And since the UN is entirely dependent on our generosity, all this has a direct and
paralyzing effect on the working of the Organization. One of our soldiers counts for more than the
fate of ten thousands Bosnians.’37 Not so long ago, the debate on whether to use ground troops to
intervene in Kosovo had a similar logic. Recent proposals for an international force to be placed at
the disposal of the UN therefore concentrate on the advantage of direct recruitment of troops by
the UN, in particular for the purpose of disarming factions in the context of internal conflicts.

The studies by Carl Conetta and Charles Knight are, from a military point of view, the most
elaborate and far reaching. A first model was published by the two authors on 1 October 1995
under the title Vital Force, A Proposal for the Overhaul of the UN Peace Operations System and for
the Creation of a UN Legion. This study was shortly followed by Design for a 15,000-person UN
Legion, presenting a somewhat less ambitious version of the Vital Force proposal.38

Initially conceived by its authors in 1992, Vital Force is part of an attempt to ‘define the
requirements for successful UN peace operations and to articulate the necessary components of
institutional renovation and reform’.39 As others before them, Conetta and Knight reached the
conclusion that ‘if the goal is a truly rapid, multilateral capability for peace operations, there is no
substitute for a UN standing force’. What they therefore recommend is the development by the UN
of a ‘peace operations legion that can meet rapid deployment requirements and that can add a
highly skilled, well-equipped, cohesive and reliable complement of troops to three or four
multinational peace operations simultaneously’. Based on the authors’ analysis of requirements —
especially in the cases of Somalia, Cambodia, the Balkans and Rwanda — a UN capability to
deploy and continuously maintain 15,000 troops would be sufficient to play such a leading or
supportive role, thereby filling the gaps in recent peace operation deployments.40 Making provision
for troop and unit rotation, the proposed force would comprise a total of approximately 43,750
personnel in all, of which 32,650 would be deployable, allowing the UN to field up to 16,350
troops continuously. For missions such as the protection of safe areas and the disarmament of factions,
a light mechanized infantry battalion, two light armoured cavalry troops, two artillery batteries and
one air defence company could be added, thus constitute a 5,000-person reinforced brigade. In
such cases, the UN Legion would be equipped with eighteen light tanks, sixteen 155-mm field
pieces, thirty-three medium-heavy mortars, twelve mobile air defence systems, eighteen armed
scout helicopters and some 200 other combat vehicles mounting a variety of weapons.

Carl Kaysen and Georges W. Rathjens, both members of the Defense and Arms Control Studies
Program of the Center for International Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, have
convincingly argued in favour of a 15,000 strong force. On the basis of case studies of the UN’s
involvement in the Congo, Yugoslavia, Somalia and Cambodia, they came to the conclusion that
‘the world community could have, and in some instances likely would have, responded to each of
these five crisis with greater effectiveness had a well-trained and equipped all-volunteer UN force
been available’.41 Kaysen and Rathjens propose what they believe is the ‘most realistic, effective,
and politically feasible response to the hesitation of governments to commit their forces to UN
operations: a modest standing UN military force composed entirely from volunteers from Member
States as a sort of “UN Foreign Legion”’.42 While Conetta and Knight paid much attention to the
structure, composition and organization and deployment of the force, Kaysen and Rathjens focused
more on the possible comparative advantages and the political feasibility of a directly recruited
military force under UN command.

Taking into account both the political context and the operational constraints, Kaysen and
Rathjens envisage a force of 15,000 maximum of which 11,000 would be deployable, 5,500 being
deployable for long periods at a time. The annual cost of the force was estimated between US$ 1.25 and US$ 1.5 billion, the cost for equipment and facilities accounting for about 25% of the total cost, not including the preparation and maintenance of a base. An estimated US$ 1.5 billion could also be necessary for initial equipment of the force, although one could expect substantial savings to be made by acquiring equipment from countries downsizing their military forces. Logistical capacities would be provided by Member States (essentially the United States). Among the tasks expected to be carried out by the force would be establishing, monitoring or supervising cantonment areas, demilitarized zones or buffer zones between warring parties, which may involve interposition by the force; and the support, supervision or implementation of a process of disarming and demobilizing warring factions.43

While admitting that a standing UN force is no panacea, Kaysen and Rathjens came to the conclusion that a UN military volunteer force could have made an important difference had it been available for situations such as the Congo in the 1960s, and more recently in Yugoslavia, Somalia, Cambodia and Rwanda. In the Congo, the force might have helped obviate problems such as the withdrawal of several African military contingents. In Yugoslavia, a UN military volunteer force would have strengthened the position of Lord Carrington and Cyrus Vance and could have served to take enforcement actions against Serb forces flouting UN injunctions proscribing attacks against ‘safe areas’ and interference with humanitarian assistance in Croatia or Bosnia. In Somalia, the initial humanitarian relief mission could have been accomplished in less than one year without intervention of the United States Marines Corps, even though a much larger force would have been required to reach the wider objectives in the long run. In Cambodia, the force could have been deployed immediately after the Paris Agreement, thus facilitating an early start of the disarmament process and helping deter disorder. In all those situations, rapid deployment, better equipment and training, but also less sensitivity on the part of governments to the issues of casualties and national command would, according to the authors of the study, have given a clear advantage to a UN military volunteer force over other types of existing forces.

In addition to those already mentioned, proposals for international force after the Cold War included the Dutch promotion of a UN Brigade, the Canadian concept of a Standing Emergency Group and Stassen’s United Nations — A Working Paper for Restructuring, which included a revised Charter with a UN Legion.44 Rather than providing immediate solutions, such proposals once again highlighted the limits of the international system, including the non-democratic structure of the Security Council, the need for prior development of regional intervention capacity and the limited capacity of the UN to intervene in all types of situations.

**Conclusion**

The reflection on a UN force carried out in the 1950s and 1960s in relation to plans for general and complete disarmament was far from useless. It highlighted the contradictions inherent to proposals for an international force, and made clear the interconnection between peacekeeping and disarmament efforts. Peacekeeping efforts during this time had underscored the importance of a favourable security environment and proper disarmament prior to the setting up of major humanitarian or democratization and peace-building operations.
The realization of the proposed system of general and complete disarmament during the Cold War rested on a fundamental dilemma: the subordination of states to a world government appeared impossible without the end of communism; at the same time, if the communist dynamic was greatly abated, the incentive for world government among Western countries might well be lost. Being paradoxically ‘unattainable when needed, and unneeded when attainable’, such a world ‘effectively controlled’ by the UN could only come about by the brink of war or a war combined with the general disappearance of communism.

Proposals for an international force, whether related to peacekeeping, disarmament or both, reflect both the weaknesses and potential of the United Nations. As once noted by Inis Claude, the UN Charter is an incomplete document as ‘it postpones to the future — a future that shows no sign of arriving — the agreed allocation by states of military contingents to function as coercive instruments of the United Nations’. Yet, clearly, ‘the first essential of a police force is that its power should be so considerable, and that of its opponents so negligible, that any contest will be virtually won before it has begun’. From this point of view, even the system of on-call forces envisaged by the UN Charter in Art. 43, assuming that it could be implemented, would not provide a sufficient basis for collective security, both in terms of readiness and of capacity for sanctioning any aggressor, simply because its functioning is dependent on the goodwill of one or several of the major powers. Collective security is therefore a ‘circular proposition, demanding the prior satisfaction of requirements which can be satisfied only after collective security has become successfully operative, and purporting to solve problems by means which assume that the problems have already been solved’. Such contradictions are the expression of a necessary interconnection, the fact that if the issue of disarmament is at the heart of international security, so is the question of international force.

Strikingly enough, the idea of a UN permanent military force is basically a Western invention, and its discussion has essentially been limited to Western circles. The historical ‘swinging’ evolution of American foreign policy, from Idealism to Realism, is also a factor in the evolution of the debate. In some ways, could not the extreme polarization of the debate itself also be symptomatic of a latent ‘Western’ conception of the world that tends to negate inherent contradictions of reality, privileging one principle over the other, force over ideal norms or vice versa? After all, one of the first consequences of Christianity — the dominant ideology of the West for centuries — has been the setting aside of Manichaeism, a philosophy based on a dualistic conception of the world. Major modern ideologies produced by the West such as Fascism, Nazism or Communism, may be seen as nothing more than the recurrent expression of a refusal to accept inherent contradictions of reality, putting their hopes in the victory of either one State, one race or one social class over others.

One of the major lessons of the history of the idea of a UN permanent military force is that the implementation of ideal norms and international law in human communities is a lengthy process with two apparently contradictory dimensions: cyclic, through recurrence of major crises, and linear, through gradual progression. Another lesson is that both the two major perspectives of international relations, realism and idealism, tend to utopianism when they are so extreme as to underestimate the importance of either one or the other essential parameters of world politics: force and the balance of power on the one hand, ideal norms and law on the other. At a time when major ideologies are believed to have become obsolete, it may be wise to put in question our ways of apprehending the world, and start approaching history and world politics in a more balanced and comprehensive way.
Notes


2 Eric Grove, UN Armed Forces and the Military Staff Committee, A Look Back, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, p. 181. As observed by Richard Connaughton: ‘The UN Charter establishes the principle that peace-enforcement measures may be legally sanctioned and initiated through UN headquarters. If force is to be applied at the behest of the United Nations, it surely needs a dedicated, professional military staff to consider contingency and ongoing planning. It is incongruous to maintain fully staffed headquarters in a central region where it has been agreed that minimal prospects of general conflict exist, while the one organization legally empowered to deploy forces is embarrassed by a poverty of military support staff’. R. Connaughton, Military Intervention and UN Peacekeeping, in N. Rodley, ed., To Lose the Bands of Wickedness. International Intervention in the Defence of Human Rights, Davies Memorial Institute, London, Brassey’s, 1992, p. 194.


7 Speech by Mr. Webb (New Zealand), General Assembly, Seventh Session, Plenary Meetings, 380th Meeting, 16 October 1952, General Assembly Official Records, para. 13, p. 34.

8 General Assembly res. 377 (V) A of 3 November 1950.


12 Ibid., p. 438.


14 Ibid., p. 438.

15 Statement by Mr Lloyd (United Kingdom), General Assembly, 14th Session, Plenary Meetings, 798th Meeting, 17 September 1959, New York, General Assembly Official Records, para. 59, p. 25. The British plan was saluted by Nogee as a proposal for the creation of a ‘peace force’ and as ‘a new feature of the Lloyd Plan’: ‘Though not entirely novel, it does constitute a departure from recent efforts at disarmament. It marks a revival of the plan envisaged by the authors of the United Nations Charter linking disarmament with collective security’. J. Nogee, op. cit., p. 292.

16 Address to the General Assembly on 18 September 1959, General Assembly, 14th Session, Plenary Meetings, 799th Meeting, General Assembly Official Records, para. 76, p. 36.


Peacekeeping: evolution or extinction?


The ENCD constituted a reorganization of the negotiating functions of the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which had been established in 1959 and in which East and West were represented in equal numbers. With the addition of eight non-aligned members, the ENCD held its first conference in 1962. The name of the ENCD (1962–1969) changed to Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in 1969 as the membership was expanded to twenty-six nations, and further expanded to thirty-one in 1975. The CCD (1969–1978) became the Committee on Disarmament in 1979, and the Conference on Disarmament in 1984. *The United Nations and Disarmament — A Short History*, New York, United Nations, 1988, p. 3.


Those countries who participated most regularly in UN peacekeeping operations between 1946 and 1984 were Canada (twelve operations), Sweden (ten), Norway (nine), Italy (nine), Denmark (eight), Finland (eight), United States (eight), Australia (seven), Netherlands (six), Ireland (five), New Zealand (five) and India (five). E. Haas, Collective Management of International Conflict, 1945–1984, in *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security*, Dordrecht, Boston, Lancaster, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987, p. 40. The total number of countries which participated in peacekeeping operations is fifty-four states. See also H. Wiseman, *The United Nations and International Peacekeeping: A Comparative Analysis*, in *The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security*, op. cit., p. 303.


Herbert Nicholas, prophetically drawing lessons from the operation, concluded: ‘Future Congos cannot be ignored simply because they were not dreamed of in the philosophy of San Francisco. This is not to say that the United Nations ought to get into every situation where internal breakdowns occur; if such crises can be settled without intervention, so much the better. But if they threaten international peace and security, the United Nations cannot side-step them on any narrowly legalistic ground.’ H.I. Nicholas, UN Peace Forces and the Changing Globe, *International Organization*, vol. 17, no. 2, Spring 1963, p. 336.

35 Ernst Haas, op. cit., p. 44.


37 N. Biegman, We Can't Do Without It, Global Rights, Autumn 1995, p. 7. Such a situation is also well summarized by F.T. Liu: ‘There is no doubt that when involved in a complex civil war situation, where normal government structures have collapsed, a UN operation may need to use force or a credible threat of force to accomplish its mission. Under the present system, however, where operations must be set up hastily with troops provided by contributing nations on a purely volunteer basis, the UN is often unable to mount the force it needs. Few governments are willing to make their soldiers available for combat duty in conflicts that do not involve their national interest.’ F.T. Liu, Using Force: When and Where. The Job of the Blue Helmets, Work in Progress, vol. 14, no. 3, June 1995, p. 4.


40 Ibid., p. xii.


43 Ibid., pp. 218–19.


46 Ibid., p. 237.

47 Ibid., p. 259.
The founders of the United Nations, in Chapter VIII of the Charter of the United Nations, envisaged an important role for regional organizations in the maintenance of international peace and security. It is increasingly apparent that the United Nations cannot address every potential and actual conflict troubling the world. Regional or subregional organizations sometimes have a comparative advantage in taking the lead role in the prevention and settlement of conflicts and to assist the United Nations in containing them.

Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 1 November 1995 from Improving preparedness for conflict prevention and peace-keeping in Africa

Within the context of the United Nations primary responsibility for matters of international peace and security, providing support for regional and subregional initiatives in Africa is both necessary and desirable. Such support is necessary because the United Nations lacks the capacity, resources and expertise to address all problems that may arise in Africa. It is desirable because wherever possible the international community should strive to complement rather than supplant African efforts to resolve Africa’s problems.

Kofi Annan, 13 April 1998 from The causes of conflict and promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa

Peacekeeping in Africa: the growing demand and dwindling United Nations supply

African regional and subregional organizations have an important role to play in the promotion of peace and security on their continent. The United Nations Security Council has relied on them excessively, however, in large part because it has been reluctant to authorize United Nations peacekeeping operations. Although there is merit to strengthening indigenous capabilities, the issue of whether Africans are prepared for the challenge of assuming primary responsibility for responding to conflicts is another matter. What can African states and organizations do to enhance their peacekeeping capabilities? How can the international community better tailor its initiatives to the needs of African actors?

The much-hailed “African renaissance” with the end of apartheid and other promising changes throughout the continent in the mid-1990s has been increasingly called into doubt. Indeed, given Africa’s pervasive social and economic problems, many have questioned whether this optimism was called for in the first place. Recent developments suggest that a greater degree of pessimism is warranted. In 1998, for example, the outbreak of armed conflicts throughout Africa prompted *Africa Confidential* to label the year an “*annus horribilis.*” Horrible it may have been, but the situation was to grow even more dire. The extreme barbarity of wars and frequency of coup d’états during the first six months of 1999 have been such that 1998 may be viewed in retrospect as a period of relative calm.

The prospects for African peace and security are disheartening. African states still suffer from the enduring legacy of colonialism. The end of the Cold War has created a power vacuum conducive to the rise and spread of internal violence. African leaders have also contributed to the problems facing their nations. It is proving increasingly difficult for the state to respond to economic, social and security challenges. Some states have “failed” and others are in steep decline. The proliferation of weapons, especially small arms, as well as the migration and displacement of large numbers of people have all contributed to the spread of armed conflict. In several instances, conflicts that started on a national level have spilled over into neighbouring countries or have assumed regional dimensions.

Ironically, at a time when the demand for peacekeepers is growing, the supply of United Nations Blue Helmets has shrunk drastically. In the early 1990s, United Nations peacekeeping expanded exponentially in both size and scope. In addition to serving as a buffer between warring factions, the new operations assumed such diverse responsibilities as disarming combatants, repatriating refugees, instilling a respect for human rights, holding elections and even nation-building. Some of these tasks proved exceedingly difficult and controversial. The missions also became much more costly on both human and financial scales. For mostly political reasons, the accomplishments of United Nations peacekeeping operations were minimized and their shortcomings emphasized.

In the wake of the difficulties experienced by the United Nations in Somalia in 1993, however, the Council has largely abandoned large-scale, multifaceted peace operations, replacing them with smaller and more specialized monitoring missions. The figures provide dramatic evidence of this downsizing. In 1993, more than 75,000 Blue Helmets were deployed in United Nations peacekeeping operations; by mid-1999, that number had been reduced to fewer than 12,000. In Africa, the reduction has been even starker: in 1993, United Nations peacekeeping forces numbered almost 40,000; in June 1999, they had dwindled to less than 1,600. Between 1989 and 1993 the Council authorized ten United Nations peacekeeping operations throughout Africa; over the next five years, only five were established. Whereas there were seven concurrent United Nations peacekeeping operations on the continent in 1993, in June 1999 there were three.

African efforts to promote peace and security: numerous but limited

African states have made noticeable strides over the past decade in assuming primary responsibility for promoting peace and security. They have recognized the grave threats to their security and are well aware of the Security Council’s reluctance to become meaningfully involved in conflicts on their continent. Recognized African organizations such as the Organization of African
Keeping the peace in Africa

Unity (OAU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as well as ad hoc coalitions of African states are striving to become more self-reliant in responding to armed conflict and complex humanitarian emergencies in their midst. Towards this end, they have shown a greater willingness to prepare for and undertake diplomatic and military actions.

The OAU has created new institutions and provided for greater financial resources to address armed conflict on the continent. The Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, established in 1993, institutionalized an informal structure and gave a smaller body of member states a mandate to make decisions that previously could only be taken by consensus among all fifty-three members. The decision to deploy the OAU Observer Mission in the Comoros, taken at the ambassadorial level of the Central Organ, represents an important achievement. The newly created OAU Peace Fund has succeeded in securing crucial funding for various peace and security initiatives. The OAU Secretariat’s Conflict Management Division is slowly acquiring the skills and equipment necessary to support OAU peacekeeping initiatives.

Members of ECOWAS have played a pivotal peacekeeping role in the subregion through the ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). Since its creation in 1990, ECOMOG has intervened militarily in three subregional conflicts — first in Liberia, then Sierra Leone, and most recently in Guinea-Bissau. In both Liberia and Sierra Leone, ECOMOG responded when no other body was willing and proved committed to remaining engaged. Although ECOMOG did not achieve its objectives in Guinea-Bissau, it is nevertheless illustrative of the institutional progress that ECOWAS has made. Importantly, the agenda in that mission was not dictated by a single member state. The composition of the force and its adherence to a mandate are significant advances that bode well for ECOMOG’s future. Similarly, ECOWAS member states’ decision to establish the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, and Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security confirms their intention to abandon their ad hoc peacekeeping approach.

SADC member states have also exhibited a growing interest in responding to conflicts in their subregion. In 1996, they established a formal framework for addressing peace and security issues known as the Organ for Politics, Defence and Security. Since then they have continued their efforts to resolve the impasse over the Organ’s structure and functioning. Even without a working mechanism for addressing peace and security issues, SADC members have undertaken important peacekeeping training and other capacity-building initiatives. In addition, SADC member states have fielded multinational operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Lesotho.

Several other African subregional groupings have moved towards establishing peace and security frameworks. The Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) created an informal body called the Council of Common Defence in 1990. East African Co-operation (EAC) members undertook a successful joint peacekeeping exercise in 1998 and are presently considering a draft treaty to set up the East African Community, which provides a possible basis for joint military operations. In 1999, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) established a mechanism to promote, maintain and consolidate peace and security in their subregion known as the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa (COPAX). The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) has played a mediation role in Somalia and the Sudan since the early 1990s, and the IGAD Partners Forum has generated financial and international political support for these efforts since its creation in 1997. The Treaty of Non-Aggression, Assistance and Mutual Defence (ANAD) has decided to form a subregional peacekeeping force.

To date, however, these African regional and subregional responses have achieved only limited success. The OAU remains saddled by its legacy of non-intervention. The Mechanism has succeeded, therefore, in ensuring that the OAU deploys peacekeepers in very few instances, and then only on...
a very modest scale. The financial and operational shortcomings that plagued the OAU peacekeeping initiative in Chad twenty years ago have not been overcome. Conflict prevention — rather than its management or resolution — will continue to represent the area in which consensus has the greatest chance of being attained. Election monitoring missions will continue to be the most prevalent OAU field undertaking. Thus, even if the Conflict Management Division’s Early Warning System were to become operational, it would not likely have a profound effect on the OAU’s operational performance. Timely and appropriate decision-making is — and will remain — a much more pressing problem for the Organization to address than early warning.

Of the African subregional organizations, ECOWAS has made the most progress in fielding a credible peacekeeping force, but each of its interventions has had troubling aspects and implications. ECOMOG exacerbated the civil war in Liberia, and its involvement there contributed to the civil war in Sierra Leone. The force’s limitations in Sierra Leone have also prolonged that conflict. ECOMOG’s inability to deploy a sizeable force in a timely manner in Guinea-Bissau set the stage for the subsequent coup. In addition, a lack of adequate financial and human resources casts doubt upon the organization’s ability to fund and oversee a framework as ambitious as the proposed Mechanism. Beyond these concerns, potential troop contributors might find it less attractive to participate in an ECOMOG force that was subject to strict controls.

Although SADC members have co-operated in peacekeeping training and other capacity-building endeavours, the organization itself has been effectively sidelined in the domain of peace and security due to the non-functioning of the Organ and broader subregional tensions. Until the conflict over the Organ is conclusively resolved, subregional peacekeeping initiatives will be largely divorced from SADC. Moreover, the recent interventions of SADC members in DRC and Lesotho have exacerbated existing subregional tensions and created new ones. The military capabilities of SADC members and the political standing of South Africa on the continent make SADC potentially very significant in the domain of peace and security, but current divisions are forestalling this eventuality.

No other African subregional organization is prepared to undertake large-scale multifaceted peacekeeping operations. UMA’s Council of Common Defence has never convened, and its members have tacitly agreed not to intervene diplomatically, let alone militarily, on divisive “domestic” issues in member states. Although EAC members could conceivably field a peacekeeping operation in the near future, any such initiative would be quite limited in both scope and duration. ECCAS cannot be expected to respond in any meaningful way to crises within and among its members. IGAD’s efforts will remain limited to mediation and negotiation. ANAD’s plans for a standby peacekeeping force are not likely to materialize in view of financial limitations and other subregional peacekeeping developments.

Recognizing that working through a regional or subregional organization is not always feasible or practical, African states have continued to intervene militarily on the continent outside of formal organizations. Like regional and subregional efforts, such interventions highlight the growing political willingness of African countries to undertake peacekeeping operations. The historical examples of the two Moroccan-led forces in Zaire, the Nigerian operation in Chad, and the military involvement of Southern African countries in Mozambique, as well as the more recent examples of the Inter-African Force to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements (MISAB) in the Central African Republic and the proposed mission in Congo (Brazzaville) show that much has and can be achieved outside of African regional and subregional organizations. As MISAB attests, an ad hoc coalition of states can make a positive contribution to regional peace and security by deploying peacekeepers.
Yet these examples of ad hoc initiatives also underscore African limitations in undertaking peacekeeping operations. In order to participate in ad hoc peacekeeping operations, African countries have typically required substantial Western assistance. When the necessary financial and logistical support is provided, African peacekeepers are largely successful. If that assistance is not given, as in the case of Congo (Brazzaville), or is withdrawn, as in the case of MISAB, African countries have not managed to assume such responsibilities themselves.

**African peacekeeping experience and military capabilities explain predicament**

African experience in various United Nations peacekeeping operations and Western-led multinational forces, while vast, underscores the problems they have encountered when undertaking missions on their own. African countries contributing formed units to these missions have tended to provide infantry battalions with modest assets. More often than not, they have deployed with and remained operational as a result of outside assistance. Very few African countries have provided specialized units to such undertakings. Although African countries do not take part in United Nations peacekeeping operations for the monetary benefits — evident from their willingness to deploy troops in numerous non-UN operations — the absence of financial support severely undermines their ability to function effectively.

It follows then that many of the difficulties that African organizations and ad hoc coalitions have encountered when fielding their own forces are related to the military capabilities of participating states. Few African countries are capable of deploying a battalion for a peacekeeping operation or multinational force without significant assistance. In addition, most do not possess specialized units with sufficient equipment or expertise to provide such necessary services as engineering, communications, medical or movement control. African countries whose militaries do possess some of these skills are hard-pressed to make them available for extended periods of time. With few exceptions, African countries cannot project force great distances. The ability to sustain a sizeable force presents a more significant obstacle. Whereas it is possible to utilize civilian assets to assist in the initial transport of troops and some matériel, it is much more difficult to redress shortcomings in command and control, logistics and resupply. It has even proven difficult for African countries to deploy with the desired level of self-sufficiency.

**Western programmes to develop African capacities: a partial answer**

Aware of the problems but nonetheless unwilling to intervene militarily themselves, a number of Western countries have designed programmes to develop African peacekeeping capabilities. The initiatives vary considerably in terms of their levels of financial and political commitment as well as their primary emphases. Nevertheless, most provide training, equipment or financing to African countries, either directly or through African regional organizations.

Among the capacity-building initiatives, American, British and French programmes are the most substantial and well developed. The African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) of the United States provides peacekeeping training and related non-lethal equipment to African countries on a bilateral basis. France conducts subregional peacekeeping training exercises, provides classroom instruction and pre-positions heavy equipment in designated locations in Africa through its Renforcement des capacités africaines de maintien de la paix (RECAMP). The African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme of the United Kingdom focuses primarily on education and training.
Largely in response to criticisms from African states, Western countries have begun to coordinate their capacity-building programmes. In May 1997, France, the United Kingdom and the United States announced their “P-3 Initiative”, which sought to begin a dialogue with African countries as to how to best promote peace and security on the continent. An added goal was to foster and harmonize donor countries’ assistance in this effort. In December 1997, a meeting was held at United Nations Headquarters in New York to discuss the individual programmes of the P-3 as well as those of other countries and to listen to African concerns. At this meeting, the P-3 Initiative gave way to a larger group of interested states, which has convened on subsequent occasions to share information and co-ordinate activities.

The P-3 Initiative has fulfilled some of its objectives. A number of Western countries have begun to develop programmes to enhance African peacekeeping capabilities and to provide logistical assistance to African peacekeeping contingents. A crucial dialogue has begun between potential donor and recipient countries and organizations. Both African and non-African countries are more aware of what is needed and what is being offered. The greater degree to which this information is being made available has led to increased transparency and co-operation.

However, the desired and necessary “partnership” between Western and African countries has yet to be established. Many African states remain sceptical of Western capacity-building initiatives. The fact that the United Nations Working Group for Enhancing Peacekeeping Training Capacity in Africa had not become operational one year after it was proposed shows Africa’s apprehension. The initial planning meeting in January 1999 reached no agreement on a mandate or terms of reference for the proposed Working Group. Subsequent meetings scheduled for May and June 1999 were postponed. The inability to designate a focal point within the United Nations has complicated matters but does not explain the failure of the Group to convene. Rather, African countries have stalled because they do not want their participation to be misinterpreted as unqualified approval for Western policies.

African countries’ concerns are understandable. The reality underlying many capacity-building initiatives is that Western countries, by and large, are unwilling to become involved militarily in African conflicts. By providing African countries with peacekeeping-related training, instruction and equipment, Western states hope to obviate their need to intervene directly in Africa.

In order to truly make Africans more self-sufficient, the provision of peacekeeping-related equipment and logistical support is crucial, yet these are the least developed aspects of current Western initiatives. Supplying the type and amount of military equipment as well as the level of logistical support that might enable African peacekeepers to respond effectively to crises on their continent is neither financially nor politically feasible at this time; providing low-level training and instruction is. France’s RECAMP concept is exceptional among the most sizeable Western capacity-building initiatives in that it includes the pre-positioning of significant peacekeeping-related matériel in various locations on the African continent. The equipment that was placed outside Dakar in conjunction with RECAMP’s February 1998 regional peacekeeping exercise, Guidimakha, has since been used in two peacekeeping missions. By contrast, the United States furnishes only a small amount of non-lethal equipment to ACRI participants and the United Kingdom provides no equipment through its Peacekeeping Training Support Programme. Many other Western capacity-building programmes also focus primarily on providing training to African troops rather than equipment.

When matériel and logistical support are forthcoming, they usually arrive only after the African force has suffered a significant setback. For example, most of the United States support for ECOMOG’s
efforts in Liberia materialized six years into the conflict. The 1999 matching grant of US$ 16 million that the United Kingdom made available to support Sierra Leone and ECOMOG operations was offered after ECOMOG had suffered numerous casualties and had threatened to withdraw.

Although the needs of African countries are well known, bilateral Western capacity-building initiatives respond principally to domestic political concerns, not African limitations. ACRI originated as the African Crisis Response Force to permit the United States to work towards resolving African conflicts without having to commit its own troops. The largest United States Defence Department programs that provide training and education for African recipients are designed primarily for the benefit of American armed forces. RECAMP owes its origins in large part to France’s intention to withdraw many of its troops stationed in Africa and achieve a cost savings while trying to retain its influence. Financial limitations have as much to do with the Peacekeeping Training Support Programme’s emphasis on “training the trainer” as does coherent policy. The desire of Denmark’s Minister for Defence to carve out a high-profile role for himself helps to explain the surprisingly large scope of the Danish programme. Canadian support for the International Organization of the Francophonie (OIF) and the Zambakro Peacekeeping Training School in Côte d’Ivoire is in part based on the Quebec issue. Domestic considerations also motivate and constrain other countries actively involved in developing African peacekeeping capabilities.

Similarly, the African capacity-building and military assistance programmes of the multilateral organizations generally reflect the interests and concerns of their members. Reluctant to become actively involved in African conflicts, organizations such as the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), the Commonwealth and OIF have focused their attentions on conflict prevention. They have made little concrete progress in the way of developing African peacekeeping capabilities. Both the EU and the WEU spoke of fielding a peacekeeping operation of their own or providing logistical support to an African force for Eastern Zaire in late 1996, but those plans were unrealistic given some of their members’ concerns. The Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries contemplated deploying a force in Guinea-Bissau, but that proposal was not viable in view of the financial and military limitations of its members.

The implications and origins of Western policies should not detract from their merits. Indeed, current programmes have many positive aspects. Western countries have displayed a renewed (if revised) interest in Africa, and the resources they are channelling into Africa should not be dismissed. The various initiatives also impart valuable practical and theoretical skills to participants. Moreover, Western countries have proven willing to alter their programmes in response to perceived shortcomings and criticisms. Importantly, Western and African states have begun to co-operate between and among themselves on peace and security issues.

**Short- and medium-term approaches needed**

Nevertheless, there remains a significant disparity between Africa’s inabilities and needs, on the one hand, and the West’s abilities and predispositions on the other. African countries largely possess the troops and the will to intervene, but not the means. Western countries, for their part, are still pursuing policies that primarily reflect their own needs and are reluctant to devote the requisite resources with the speed the situation demands, if at all. Western programmes’ current emphasis on capacity-building represent a long-term approach at best. Col. François Dureau, the Chief of Staff of the Military Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General, supports capacity-building programmes’ goals in general but warns...
that too much should not be expected of them in the short term. He stresses that the time-frame for African countries and regional organizations to capably assume responsibility for peacekeeping operations on their continent is not “two, three or five years, but rather twenty, thirty or fifty years.”

Granted, the challenges to African peace and security defy simple solutions. Yet current approaches have been oversold and are at best a partial response. There is much that Western and African countries can do — both unilaterally and collectively — to strengthen African peacekeeping capacities in the short and medium terms.

**ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY AFRICAN STATES AND ORGANIZATIONS**

*African states must place a greater emphasis on staffing their organizations with sufficient personnel to assume new responsibilities.*

Subregional organizations are creating mechanisms with inadequate regard for the ability to run them. In the ECOWAS Secretariat, for example, the “Department” of Legal Affairs, which has also been responsible for supporting ECOWAS peace and security initiatives, consists only of a director and a deputy director. Similarly, staff of the OAU’s Conflict Management Division has not grown commensurately with the new demands it has been asked to meet. Fifteen people, including both professional and support staff, are insufficient to run the Conflict Management Centre’s twenty-four hour Situation Room, let alone the entire Division. African organizations must recruit and train adequate qualified personnel to handle the greater demands being placed on their secretariats.

*African states need to concentrate on making incremental progress and resist the temptation to jump from one ambitious plan to another without effect.*

African regional and subregional organizations should be more pragmatic about what they can and cannot accomplish in the short and medium terms. Overly ambitious plans divert scarce resources from more realistic projects. For example, ECCAS has created overlapping and ill-defined peace and security structures with insufficient regard for how they will operate and how its Secretariat will service them. Rather than creating new mechanisms, ECCAS members should now concentrate on making existing ones operational. In the short term, efforts to secure funding for joint peacekeeping training exercises or to establish an Early Warning Mechanism should be abandoned; member states should focus instead on developing COPAX and strengthening the ECCAS Secretariat. ECOWAS has also initiated several projects that appear far-fetched in view of present and foreseeable limitations. Its subregional Security and Peace Observation System, which is to comprise four Observation Monitoring Zone field offices, seems well beyond the organization’s current capabilities, as does a standing peacekeeping force. ECOWAS members would be better served to put such plans on hold and first concentrate on developing other aspects of the Mechanism, particularly the proposed Mediation and Security Council and numerous reforms to strengthen the Secretariat.
ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY NON-AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND ORGANIZATIONS

In the absence of a meaningful dialogue between donor and recipient countries, those providing assistance to develop African peacekeeping capacities should meet among themselves as an interim measure.

If donor countries are better informed about their respective programmes, they are likely to use their limited funds more intelligently rather than reduce their aid. Western countries have successfully teamed up on several occasions to provide peacekeeping training. Both African and Western countries have benefited from this co-operation. The United Kingdom is sponsoring African participants at the French-supported peacekeeping training centre in Zambakro and is also providing British Military Advisory and Training Team instructors for its courses. The United States agreed to cover the costs for several Africans to attend the British-assisted international peace support operation course held at the Ghanaian Armed Forces Command and Staff College in the second half of 1999. Portugal will assist with translations for lusophone participants at seminars sponsored by the African Center for Strategic Studies, as well as with some conference documentation. Because African fears of being further marginalized should not be dismissed, however, Western countries need to be transparent in their collaboration.

Donor countries should provide funding for conflict resolution efforts first and “early warning systems” second.

At present, the greatest challenge in promoting African peace and security is to find a meaningful response to existing conflicts and work to contain them. Broadly speaking, preventive diplomacy is a worthwhile and intelligent policy option. Several programmes billed as “preventive,” however, have been oversold — particularly “early warning systems”. Yet many donor countries and organizations devote significant scarce resources to these initiatives — often at the expense of more pressing and deserving conflict resolution efforts. Providing funding for peacekeeping missions to manage and resolve ongoing conflicts should take priority over providing funding for elaborate and expensive initiatives to collect and analyse data.

ACTIONS TO BE TAKEN BY THE UNITED NATIONS

The Security Council must provide greater oversight and guidance to regional arrangements that intervene militarily in the promotion of peace.

While it may not always be practical or possible for the Security Council to give prior authorization for a regional organization or ad hoc initiative to deploy troops, the Council should require all such undertakings to provide it with timely and relevant information on their activities and the situation on the ground. Reporting requirements should be reasonable and clearly stated.
Regional forces must be better sensitized to the needs and activities of international humanitarian relief organizations that work alongside them.

The Security Council should review its practice of authorizing small military observer missions to serve alongside regional peacekeeping forces.

The deployment of United Nations military observers to complement non-UN peacekeeping forces is more likely to create new tensions than to serve as either a useful check and balance or a confidence-building measure. The regional force feels that it is being unfairly scrutinized. If the United Nations observer mission is critical in its reporting, tensions will increase. Because the small observer mission is sometimes dependent on the larger regional mission for security, there is a tendency to withhold criticism to maintain good relations. When security is not or cannot be provided, United Nations observer missions withdraw — at great financial and political cost. Another problem of this approach is that such small, largely ineffective observer forces provide the Council with a pretext that it is meaningfully engaged in trying to resolve a conflict when it is not.

The Security Council should authorize specialized United Nations contingents to serve within regional peacekeeping forces.

Ask an African regional organization or a coalition of ad hoc states what kinds of United Nations assistance would best support their peacekeeping initiatives, and they are not likely to answer "military observers". Yet that is exactly what the Council offers. Military observers respond to the Council’s concerns, not those of the regional force. What African countries lack are specialized units with sophisticated or expensive matériel, such as aircraft, communication or engineering equipment. A well-equipped and trained signals unit would be an especially welcome addition to African operations, given that such initiatives often lack reliable communication links between headquarters and contingent or sector commands. Similarly, a well-equipped logistics unit would also be helpful in light of the operational shortcomings African operations face. The command structure of the force would potentially be a delicate issue, which should be addressed prior to the force’s deployment. Under such a scenario, the Council would be making a much better investment as formed units cost the United Nations much less than similar numbers of military observers. In addition, the Council would create a more symbiotic relationship between the United Nations and the regional or ad hoc force.

**Conclusion**

In summary, the recent enthusiasm for deferring to African states and organizations to promote peace and security on their continent is misguided. While former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali accurately asserted that the United Nations “cannot address every potential and actual conflict [emphasis added],” it is important to stress that the Security Council no longer tries to address many potential and actual conflicts. The Council’s reliance on burden-sharing is particularly troubling as concerns Africa, where the demand for peacekeepers is arguably the greatest and the
indigenous supply faces the most obstacles. Secretary-General Kofi Annan was correct to point out that the United Nations “lacks the capacity, resources and expertise to address all problems that may arise in Africa.” Yet the same might be said — only more so — of its new African “partners”. African organizations and ad hoc undertakings face many of the same challenges as United Nations peacekeeping operations plus numerous additional obstacles. African and Western efforts to develop African peacekeeping capabilities provide a basis upon which to build, but the United Nations Security Council must also reassert itself in peacekeeping on the continent.

Notes

5 Interview with Col. François Dureau, Chief of Staff, Military Adviser’s Office, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 22 June 1999, New York.
6 The following seven recommendations are among more than twenty that are offered in Peacekeeping in Africa: Capabilities and Culpabilities.
Militar and humanitarian organizations share common roots in war. Indeed, modern humanitarianism was founded on the battlefield. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was established after the battle of Solferino in the nineteenth century while the First World War and the civil war and famine which followed it in Russia gave rise to the establishment of the Save the Children Fund and the American Relief Association. Similarly, the Second World War produced a number of humanitarian agencies including Oxfam and CARE. As Slim noted, “For the last 100 years, militarism and humanitarianism have represented two sides of the same coin — humankind’s inability to manage conflict peacefully”. While the military waged war, the humanitarian organizations followed in their wake, mopping up as and when they could. Given their common presence on the battlefield, there has always been some contact between military forces and humanitarian organizations, but this was always clearly defined and limited by their distinct roles.

Since the end of the Cold War, the international military response to internal war and its attendant suffering has fundamentally changed from a war-fighting to a peace-making paradigm. International militaries, usually authorized by the UN Security Council, now seek to come between all sides in a civil war, by exercising their own brand of impartiality, in the name of peace and humanity. Consequently humanitarian interventions are now conducted by a wide array of international actors (UN agencies, NGOs, international humanitarian organizations, variants of UN forces and regional military alliances such as NATO) and the use of force is an option in, but not a determinant of, humanitarian intervention.

As the political space for humanitarian intervention has increased, so too has the perceived need. There is every reason to expect that the twenty-first century will experience conflict as frequent and serious as the 1990s given the political difficulties in addressing their root causes (the growing wealth-poverty divide, environmental constraints, weapons proliferation). Humanitarian intervention will likely form an integral part of the Western strategy of ‘liddism’ — the attempt to keep the lid on emerging conflicts — and military and civilian actors will, no doubt, routinely rush to meet the global humanitarian challenge.

Appreciating the dynamics of the civil-military relationship in this new context requires an understanding of the shared interests in co-operation as well as the inherent tensions which result from the different structures, cultures, competencies, methods and resources of the several parties concerned.

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Introducing the actors and defining terms

For purposes of brevity, this article divides humanitarian actors into two sectors — ‘the military’ and ‘civilian humanitarians’ — yet neither is monolithic and each represents a set of very diverse institutions. Military force may take different forms and vary in force size, structure, capability and posture. Some might include units of a largely civilian nature as well as contingents of an entirely military character. Military assets fall under UN, NATO or national commands, and national forces differ in competence and professionalism. This diversity has great implications for the division of roles and nature of co-operation, which will be explored below.

Civilian humanitarians are usually divided into three main groupings: UN agencies, the ICRC and the wider Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and international and national NGOs. The UN agencies and the ICRC are properly described as intergovernmental organizations since they are mandated by agreements drawn up between states. These international legal instruments give UN agencies and the ICRC specific mandates and operating procedures which help ensure that their operational relationships with the military are clear-cut, if not easy.

While the proliferation of international NGOs during the 1990s is well documented and literally hundreds have been employed in high profile emergencies such as Rwanda, Somalia and the Balkans, a relatively small number of large international relief NGOs collectively receive the majority of relief-assistance funding. National NGOs and international NGOs with other areas of expertise such as human rights monitoring or relationship-forging peacebuilding work are included in the far more numerous group of smaller NGOs. The role and size of the NGOs are thus important factors in determining the level of co-operation with the military.

Shared interests

In so far as humanitarian intervention seeks to integrate traditional military capabilities into a response to human need, the military and civilian aspects of humanitarian intervention support a common long-term goal of promoting human security in societies marked by conflict. Often, military and civilian actors also share a common understanding of the limits of humanitarian action. Both emphasize that humanitarian assistance and military intervention do not provide a solution to political emergencies and war. Leaders of the military, UN agencies, the ICRC and NGOs agree that their interventions are no substitute for political settlements and long-term commitments to just development. Indeed, they often feel that they are ‘set up’ as substitutes for tough political action and then scapegoated for failures often beyond their control.

The principal factors driving civil-military co-operation do not stem from shared analysis or long-term goals. Rather, necessity has been the mother of co-operation and the most intense civil-military relationships have been formed at the field level, usually when the military has stepped in to fill gaps in civilian capabilities. Increased military involvement in humanitarian actions has not, however, always resulted in improved collaboration. To understand the potential and the limitations of the relationship it is first necessary to highlight the fundamental differences of the two sets of institutions.
Institutional diversity

POLITICIZATION

The military has traditionally been designed for war in pursuit of national or collective political interests. Forces are paid and trained to use regulated violence to accomplish objectives set by governments. Thus military action is always essentially political in nature, although mission statements may include reference to politically ‘neutral’ humanitarian goals.

In contrast, one of the principal purposes of civilian humanitarian organizations is to relieve suffering equally to all on the basis of need. This requires maximum access to all populations which, in turn, demands that the organizations are perceived as being neutral, with no political agenda.

This fundamental difference results in an inevitable tension between military and civilian humanitarian work where the implications for civil-military co-operation depend on the perceived politicization of the military mission and the level of consent it enjoys from the parties involved. When levels of consent among the local populations run low or the military is perceived as a party to a conflict, civil-military relationships become strained and civilian humanitarians distance themselves from the military.

The link between consent and the civil-military relationship is well documented. In 1995 Weiss ranked all recent humanitarian operations in order of consent level, identifying a spectrum of consent with Cambodia, Mozambique and El Salvador at the high end and Bosnia and Somalia at the low end. His findings confirmed that the more closely associated a civilian agency is with an unpopular international military force, the less room for manoeuvre the agency has and the more problematic the civil-military relations become.6

Kosovo offers a recent and extreme example of how politicization can infiltrate the neutrality of humanitarian activities in various ways. A comprehensive study of NATO and the humanitarian action in the Kosovo crisis7 notes that NATO military action and military/paramilitary activities on the ground in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) meant that virtually the entire humanitarian community left the battlefield as the air campaign began, whereas “After the battle, reconstituting humanitarian operations became more subject to political considerations by host and donors alike.” Moreover, “the efforts of some humanitarian agencies to distance themselves from the political context of NATO’s involvement were largely unsuccessful”.8 For example, some agencies such as Médecins Sans Frontières chose not to accept funding from NATO states, while others tried to demonstrate that they worked with both sides of the conflict by establishing offices with region-wide responsibilities. Yet, despite their efforts, these agencies did not receive a greater welcome by the Serbian authorities whose attempts to frustrate humanitarian access were seen to be evidence of political backlash. The effects of the politicization of the Kosovo humanitarian intervention are still felt today with the result that the NGOs with the best access in Serbia are now Greek, Russian and Polish.

While the Kosovo example demonstrates the adverse effects of the loss of consent for the work of civilian humanitarian operations, these organizations differ in their approach to managing the problem. While some agencies are committed to limiting the political incursions on their humanitarian space, others view the politicization of humanitarianism as inevitable given the links between the political will needed to respond to such crises and the politicization that results from the excessive intrusion of political factors. Consequently, some actors argue that the humanitarian space will always be delimited by political factors and that, given this fact, they should simply seek to mount
programmes wherever possible. Moreover, given that civilian and military agencies have a common interest in maintaining the consent of the parties, some suggest that they may be able to co-operate to this end. Rather than being perceived solely as an area of tension in their relationship, both parties might usefully co-operate in the framing of joint policy aimed at maintaining and nurturing consent while preparing for different levels of operational association in response to changing levels of consent.

DIFFERENCES IN STRUCTURE AND WORKING METHODS

Military institutions place a high value on command and control, top-down hierarchical organizational structures and clear lines of authority, discipline and accountability. They place great value on logistics, and substantial resources are dedicated to the acquisition of assets and training of personnel to ensure that they can function independently under the most adverse circumstances. The military’s approach to problem solving is generally directive and coercive.

While these structures and approaches are fundamental and reflect the common war-fighting heritage of military forces, the experience of peacekeeping has led to certain modifications in approach and force structure. For example, forces such as the Canadians are known for their diplomatic and negotiation skills acquired during extensive training for peacekeeping and implemented according to carefully tailored Rules of Engagement. Similarly, the long history of British experience in low-intensity conflict situations has engendered a familiarity with civil-military interaction and negotiation. Moreover, the presence of units of civilians or reservists with civilian skills was said to help bridge the cultural gaps between military and civilian institutions and make collaboration easier in Kosovo. Thus, training and force composition can make some militaries more conducive to civil-military collaboration than others.

Humanitarian organizations are less hierarchical and more participatory in their style of decision-making and operations than the military. They pay more attention to the process by which they accomplish operations, partly because they attach more importance to long-term impacts, but have fewer back-up resources and engage in less contingency planning to ensure that short-term objectives can be met quickly.

These structural differences are particularly evident in the distinct approaches of the military and civilian organizations to direct civilian assistance. The military’s approach is informed by security rather than long-term development considerations. For instance, military infrastructure projects for the local civilian populations rarely consider the long-term management implications of what they construct or repair. Rather, such ‘civil affairs projects’ (as they have been known in the United Kingdom and the United States) are essentially public relations exercises designed to reap hearts and minds returns to further a security objective. Thus the military’s short-term, non-participatory approach is often a source of operational tension with the civilian agencies engaged in similar activities informed by considerations of development.

Just as some military structures are more conducive to civil-military collaboration than others, some civilian agencies have operational experience and practices which are more conducive to collaboration with the military than others. In the Kosovo case, UN agencies and NGOs that were operational partners of UN agencies were more comfortable with military culture than NGOs without such partnerships. Similarly, other NGOs with worldwide programmes and histories of UN collaboration interacted with more readiness than did smaller, crisis-specific groups. Thus, while
fundamental differences in structure and approach exist between military and civilian agencies, there is clear evidence that the modification of military practices for peace support missions and the institutional socialization gained through the shared experience of working together can help bridge the structural and cultural gaps and facilitate co-operation.

It also appears that both the military and civilian organizations recognize the value of increased institutional socialization and are working to improve their knowledge of each other in so far as this might assist collaboration. This has long been recognized within the UN context, but is relatively new within NATO structures. For example, military staff from NATO’s Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and representatives of large humanitarian organizations have recently agreed on extended visits to each others’ headquarters to familiarize themselves with their counterparts’ working methods. Similarly, NATO is in the process of revising its peacekeeping training programmes provided by the NATO school in Oberammergau (for military and civilian participants) to improve civilian and military knowledge of each others’ policies and practices. The Alliance has also recognized the utility of involving civilian actors in the planning process. Practical steps to achieve this are limited by military secrecy but include the involvement of civilian agencies in the conduct of military exercises such as NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic’s exercise Open Road and in the planning of future exercises.

Such initiatives may improve the chances for collaboration but they cannot ultimately merge the differences between them. Indeed, the fundamental challenge to managing civilian and military collaboration concerns how best to preserve certain differences by agreeing a clear division of labour reflecting the comparative advantages of the two sets of institutions. This is the challenge taken up in the following section.

Civil-military relationships: complementary or competitive?

The distribution of tasks between military and civilian institutions has often proceeded according to the essentially ad hoc and fluid concept of ‘gap filling’ whereby the military takes on tasks for which civilian agencies have no competence or which they can not fulfil in the short-term. The military conduct of civilian tasks is therefore designed to be a stop-gap measure only and should be handed over to civilian agencies as soon as possible. Thus, while there is inevitably some degree of overlap in the tasks of the two sectors, the military is clearly meant to complement rather than compete with the work of its humanitarian counterparts. More specifically, military tasks in the humanitarian sphere can be divided into three groups, each involving different degrees of overlap with civilian activities.

Fostering a climate of security for civilian populations and humanitarian organizations

Controlling violence

Military forces are clearly effective at guaranteeing security against military opposition and they are therefore well suited to bringing down the levels of violence between organized military formations and providing occasional back-up to policing tasks. They are not, however, generally suited to
controlling riots and civilian disturbances such as those witnessed recently in Mitrovica in Kosovo although the military does include special forces which can be usefully employed for these tasks. One of many such examples was the UN Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium’s (UNTAES) employment of a Polish riot control company. In general, gendarmeries or international civilian missions may be more suited for dealing with large-scale civil disturbances or armed and organized criminal elements. By their nature, most international military interventions provide an incomplete solution to physical security shortfalls and problems generally result from capability gaps in the international provision of paramilitary and police elements rather than capability overlaps with civilian organizations.

Providing protection for the relief effort

One key task of the military is to provide protection of populations or of relief agencies in a context of forceful containment and/or resolution of conflict as in Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Many view the provision of security, allowing relief agencies to conduct their work, as the principal role of the military in humanitarian interventions, and one in which there is no overlap between military and civilian competencies. Relief agencies rely on military assistance to avoid the severe problems of divergence of assistance and to avoid intimidation by parties to a conflict. Thus as long as these agencies continue to operate in mid-war, some form of accommodation with the military seems inevitable. Given the negative consequences of politicization to civilian humanitarian work, however, the nature and level of civil-military security relationships will vary. In general, the level of collaboration will be indirectly proportional to the politicization of the military actions.

Supporting the work of civilian humanitarian agencies

This involves the provision of technical or logistical support such as transport and work on basic infrastructure (water, power and roads). The large scale of flight which sudden massive violence can set in motion (Iraq 1991, Rwanda 1994, Zaire 1996), the protraction of a vicious siege (Sarajevo) or the inaccessibility of militarized terrain (Somalia) has resulted in civilian organizations relying on military assistance in the transport of people and relief supplies. While some aid organizations have argued that they have a demonstrated edge in the movement of people, the scale of the demand for transport means that military conduct of this task will generally be welcomed by civilian institutions.

The military also conducts security-related support tasks such as demining and demobilization. While the level of collaboration of civil and military organization in the conduct of these tasks depends of the level of consent towards the military, the civilian organizations generally welcome this form of military support and do not contest military competence in this area, as the recent Kosovo case highlights. Early in the Kosovo crisis (April 1999) the Secretary General of NATO and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees agreed, after an exchange of letters, that NATO would provide support in the areas of logistics (airlift co-ordination support, port and airport off-loading, and warehousing), camp construction, transportation of refugees and relief supplies, and road repairs and maintenance. According to the Minear, van Baarda and Sommers study, aid agencies were highly appreciative of the security protection and logistical support which NATO provided. Indeed, criticism of NATO’s support focused on its Kosovo Force’s (KFOR) reluctance to accept responsibility for further support tasks such as demining (it limited its mandate to military demining) and on the priorities which the military chose to allocate to various tasks. For example, many aid agencies in
Albania and Macedonia would have preferred that a higher priority be awarded to road repair and transit centre construction than to camp construction.

**Providing direct assistance to those in need**

The greatest competition over humanitarian turf is in the area of direct assistance to civilian populations. Military ‘seepage’ into the traditionally civilian humanitarian domain raises questions about the appropriate boundaries between military and civilian action. Aid agencies often perceive civic action by the military as evidence of the militarization of humanitarianism, claim that it is in direct competition with their work and are critical of its quality and cost-effectiveness. These charges will be dealt with in turn.

*The militarization of humanitarianism?*

From the perspective of the military, civic actions help improve the popularity of military engagement among local populations and thereby contribute positively to maintaining consent and obtaining peace support objectives. There is, however, considerable national variation in how much importance is accorded these tasks. In the German case, for example, historical caution to engage in security tasks abroad has recently given way to enthusiasm for domestically popular military civic action. The scale of the civic activities of the German brigade in Prizren, Kosovo demonstrates this. The unit had an estimated 5 million DM from government and private sources and was described by another KFOR officer as “acting like a huge NGO doing projects”. In contrast, other KFOR units usually had fewer resources and some chose to employ their troops by conducting projects that were not priorities for NGOs.

From the perspective of the donors, there is no evidence of a universal trend privileging military over civilian partners. In the majority of humanitarian interventions within the UN context, very little development aid has been channelled through military institutions to conduct direct assistance projects. There are notable exceptions however. During the emergency relief phase of the Kosovo crisis, for example, where the military presence massively outnumbered the civilian presence in the field, states expressed a clear preference for military and bilateral agencies over humanitarian and multilateral ones. British, Greek and German KFOR contingents received grants for projects from their respective bilateral aid ministries which would have normally gone to UN agencies or to NGOs.

*Military competence for direct assistance*

The competence of the military to carry out civilian direct-assistance tasks has often been called into question by civilian organizations. Recent examples from Kosovo include the German KFOR contingent’s programme of providing 8,000 hot meals per day to Kosovar Albanians, which was criticized for its cost (in)effectiveness and for creating dependency. Other controversial projects included the construction of unsuitable refugee camps or of expensive ‘state-of-the-art’ houses, problematically located opposite UNHCR tent shelters. Similarly, a large polyclinic constructed by one national military contingent was criticized for functioning at cross-purposes with broader health efforts in the area. Taking stock in October 1999, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako
Ogata noted “instances in which assistance [that] was provided directly by the military sometimes to gain legitimacy and visibility had undermined co-ordination and deprived civilian humanitarian agencies of effectiveness and clout”. She concluded that “the military should support but not substitute for agencies with humanitarian mandates”. The common conclusion in the Kosovo case is that improved co-ordination mechanisms and more disciplined attention to comparative advantage would have made for a more effective international response.

Cost-effectiveness

Civilian organizations often argue that their own direct assistance operations offer better value for money than those of the military. This claim has been supported by some studies such as a UN evaluation of the Rwanda operation, but the lack of a detailed financial breakdown of military operations and the lack of an established methodology for determining what costs should be included in such calculations often make it difficult to reach conclusions on the issue.

The challenges of co-ordination and co-operation

The fundamental differences in the values, structures, approaches and skill sets of civilian humanitarian and military institutions will make any organizational solution to civil-military co-operation difficult. So too will the intrinsic difficulty of operating in a mid-war or crisis situation where a multitude of practical, protection and political problems need to be addressed in a volatile environment. In preparing for and functioning in such environments, however, there are still choices to be made regarding how far, at what level, and by which mechanisms the civil-military relationship can and should be formally managed.

The ad hoc approach

In most humanitarian emergencies in the 1990s, the approach to civil-military co-ordination was essentially improvisational and pragmatic. As such it evolved over time in response to specific co-ordination or co-operation needs on the ground. There is certainly merit and appeal to this approach. Some argue that every crisis is occasion-specific and circumstance-specific and that its unique characteristics mean that strategies and structures for civil-military relations need to reflect the specific circumstances. In this approach, activities should be undertaken by military and/or military actors according to the peculiarities of the political and military situation in-theatre and the levels of resources available and committed from outside. Activities should be allocated according to simple, high-level consultation mechanisms as with the Solana-Ogata exchange of letters in the Kosovo crisis and refined over time through basic consultative mechanisms in the field such as those provided by NATO’s Civil-Military Co-operation (CIMIC) (described in a following section). Training would be crucial, since it would help prepare actors for their responsibilities, sensitize the military and humanitarian actors to each other and nurture the necessary skills to improvise appropriately and quickly. In this way ‘humanitarian space’ and ‘military space’ would be tailored to the specific circumstances and any problems associated with overlapping competencies or politicization would be accepted matter of factly as essentially unavoidable.
By contrast, there are various proposals that seek to structure the military and civilian components of humanitarian interventions with the aim of improving short-term humanitarian effectiveness and/or its longer-term contribution to peacebuilding. In general, these approaches include suggestions for managing civil-military collaboration at the strategic or policy level and/or at the operational level. Each is taken in turn below.

Managing co-operation at the strategic level

One more strategic approach to humanitarian intervention would involve a division of labour carefully constructed in advance according to the comparative advantages of civilian and military institutions. For example, the primary task of the military would be the provision of security and support for the work of humanitarian organizations would play a secondary role. The provision of direct assistance to civilian populations would only be undertaken in rare cases. Such a division of labour could be agreed in advance in bilateral and multinational Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and would ensure that civilian organizations knew the extent and limits of the support they could expect to receive from the military. However, without proposing a mechanism for tailoring these broad agreements to a specific context and ensuring that the operation has the appropriate resources to fit this pre-arranged mix, this proposal begs the question of how the military and humanitarian organizations might organize their division of labour in response to a specific crisis with limited resources.

Another suggestion aimed at minimizing the politicization of humanitarian effort would be to insist on a national division between military providers of humanitarian assistance and those engaged in offensive military action, although this is unlikely to prove politically popular. Alternatively, the political aspect of military engagement could be reduced if the action was conducted by a standing special force that did not rely on crisis-specific troop contributions from states. Such a nascent force already exists in the form of the Multinational UN Stand-by Forces High-Readiness Brigade (SHIRBRIG) which can be employed in fifteen to thirty days for peacekeeping duties for up to six months. However, while such a force might help humanitarian agencies to operate in situations where there is insufficient political will to contribute national troops, it is unlikely that nations would choose to develop this model in place of multilateral peacekeeping operations.

Thomas Weiss, reviewing an extensive study of humanitarian interventions, argues that “Rather than extant feudal arrangements, a single body is necessary to set priorities, to raise and distribute resources, and to co-ordinate emergency inputs”. But he goes on to explain how national calls for central co-ordination are disingenuous in light of their desire to wave national flags over assistance rendered. The same point is elegantly expressed by David Last, “Everyone wants co-ordination, but no one wants to be co-ordinated by others”. Thus while some kind of unified solution is well-argued and logical, there are fundamental political obstacles in the way of its implementation.

Such political difficulties are amply demonstrated by the challenges to co-ordination within the military and humanitarian sectors. Significantly, one of the recommendations of the Minear, van Baarda and Sommers study on the Kosovo crisis was to strengthen co-ordination among military...
actors and humanitarian actors, quite apart from the interaction of these two sets of institutions with each other. Reacting to the widespread impression that KFOR has little idea of what its national components are doing and to their widely divergent national approaches to CIMIC and humanitarian assistance, the study highlighted the need to improve military co-ordination and to address the unevenness and inconsistencies among national military contingents. Similarly, improved co-ordination among the relief agencies would help tackle issues of inconsistent programming and uneven professionalism in the humanitarian sector. They conclude that “a new seriousness about co-ordination by all parties is likely to be the test of whether a serviceable humanitarian architecture can be designed and implemented.”

In the absence of an overarching structure providing co-ordination at higher levels, many agree that humanitarian operations can compensate, at least in part, by working from the bottom up to create appropriate structures at the operational level. Indeed this is where the most progress has been made so far.

Managing co-operation at the operational level

The UN has had extensive experience of working in the field with civilian actors and has used a variety of mechanisms in its efforts to resolve the difficulties of co-ordinating military, police and civil activities on the ground. Although each operation is different, lessons have been ‘formally’ learned through retrospective lessons-learned exercises, but all too often these are not implemented in the next crisis — which usually involves a new constellation of actors.

NATO has also learned a number of lessons through its experience in Bosnia and Kosovo. Unlike the UN, its military-civilian interface has a single name: Civil Military Co-operation (CIMIC). This is defined as “The resources and arrangements which support the relationship between NATO commanders and the national and/or regional/local authorities, civil and military, and civil populations in an area where NATO military forces are or plan to be employed. Such arrangements include co-operation and co-ordination with non-governmental or international agencies, organizations and authorities.” Over the past ten years, NATO has reformed and adjusted the CIMIC concept to embrace all elements of the civil-military interface. It has specific CIMIC assets such as specialized CIMIC staff attached to every commander and CIMIC centres for co-ordinating civil-military cooperation in the field. While the development of CIMIC within NATO reflects a growing appreciation of the importance of civil-military co-operation, this is not often reflected in the wider military structures. CIMIC officers are often frustrated, for instance, by the fact that key staffing decisions still prioritize plans and logistics over the increasingly important functions performed by civil-military affairs structures.

The key role that CIMIC plays in structuring civil-military relations in NATO operations makes it worthy of more detailed attention. CIMIC tasks are divided into three operational stages: pre-operational, operational and transitional.

Pre-operational tasks

These include planning, advice to the chain of command and educating the force. There have been significant advances in the conduct of these tasks in response to the Bosnia experience. While NATO does not involve civilian agencies directly in the formulation of contingency plans, it has
developed mechanisms for consultation at this level. Indirectly, civilian organizations and NGOs participate in planning through their participation in military exercises. Similarly, NATO is updating its training programmes so as to familiarize civilian and military personnel with each other’s institutional structures, resources and working methods.

Nevertheless the recent experience of the Kosovo crisis indicates that there is still room for improvement in advanced planning. Specifically, planning should enable civilian organizations to have input into decisions which relate to the priorities accorded to military humanitarian support tasks. When these decisions were being made in the early stages of the relief effort in Kosovo, civilian and military organizations found timely consultation difficult in the absence of functioning co-ordination structures.

**Operational tasks**

The core operational tasks of CIMIC are communication, co-ordination, exchange of information, setting up of agreements, assessment and operations. In addition there are a host of ‘specific responsibilities’ supported by the involvement of functional specialists, which include gap-filling tasks normally carried out by civilian organizations. Once they were up and running, these co-ordination mechanisms and the military conduct of support tasks were considered successful by both humanitarian and military partners in the Kosovo case.

A final sub-group of operational tasks are the ‘implied tasks’ which “focus on empowering local and international civilian support agencies to assume full authority for civil implementation”. Tellingly, there are no concrete tasks identified for this role in the CIMIC doctrine, which is perhaps part of the reason why NATO has and continues to experience such difficulty in implementing the final, ‘transitional’ stage of CIMIC operations.

**Transitional tasks**

These tasks are supposed to smooth transition to civilian authorities or organizations and the termination of the military’s involvement. The identified tasks, which include planning for transition to civilian authorities and closing CIMIC offices, require that such alternative structures have been put in place.

The greatest acknowledged difficulty of CIMIC operations relates to the implementation of these exit strategies in the absence of the construction of alternative civilian structures. Last attributes this difficulty in handing back responsibilities to a capability gap in peacebuilding — “a gap in our ability to rebuild the trust that permits co-operation between the parties”. He argues for a unified solution at the local level within a manageable area. Within such communities a third party would have the capacity for controlling the full spectrum of violence and building relationships in the areas of security provision, development, governance and reconciliation. By arguing for a confluence of civil and military operational boundaries and for increased participation of local actors and peacebuilding facilitators in such community-based structures, this proposal seeks to maximize the potential for innovative civil-military co-operation at the local level and intertwine it with initiatives to build local governance, security and reconciliation capacities.
Conclusion

The dynamics of the civilian-military relationship reflect a host of factors including the structure, culture and skill sets of the actors involved as well as the specific humanitarian needs and the political context of the operation. Faced with fundamental structural differences and interests as well as widespread reluctance to cede any element of project or operational control, it is tempting to conclude that the only way to manage these relationships is to try to maximize consultation and co-operation throughout an operation, at every level in an *ad hoc* way.

Nevertheless the logic of structured co-ordination is compelling and should lead to efficiency gains and greater respect for the comparative advantages of civilian and military actors. Given the formidable political and structural constraints on achieving these levels of synergy and co-ordination at a strategic level, the most promising way forward is to experiment with improved models for co-ordination at the operational level where the need is often most obvious.

There is no single solution to managing civil-military relations at this level either, yet if humanitarian operations are to improve, we need to structure and learn from each operational experiment more systematically. It is only in this way that operations will be able to build on past experiences and lessons learned by different actors.

Notes

7. Minear, van Baarda and Sommers, op. cit.
8. Ibid., p. 55.
9. Ibid.
11. These tasks were identified in correspondence between NATO Secretary General Javier Solana and UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata on 21 April 1999.
12. Reported in Minear, van Baarda and Sommers, op. cit., p. 28.
17. Minear, van Baarda and Sommers, op. cit., p. 104.
The verification and monitoring of peace accords is a subject that has received little attention. Given the inextricable connection between the monitoring and verification of peace accords and their potential success or failure, as well as the explosion of verification and monitoring operations since the end of the Cold War, this is a surprising gap.

A recent conference at Wilton Park, co-sponsored by the Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), sought to discuss and highlight the various issues associated with the verification and monitoring of peace accords and to raise questions for further study. Some of the issues discussed include the connections between the different verification and monitoring requirements such as human rights monitoring and civilian police monitoring, the effect of the political environment (e.g. high tension versus low tension) on the verification and monitoring situation, and the role and impact, if any, of new methodologies and technologies. This article will provide an overview of the issues associated with the verification and monitoring of peace accords, first by discussing the overall trends in the verification and monitoring of peace accords during and after the Cold War and then by dealing with specific issues and questions related to the current debate about peace accords.

The verification and monitoring of peace accords is primarily, though not exclusively, undertaken by the United Nations in the form of peacekeeping or peace enforcement operations. This article focuses on UN operations but the issues discussed also apply to operations established to monitor and verify peace accords outside of UN auspices.

What is the distinction between the monitoring and verification functions? Monitoring is the process of gathering information about a particular activity. This can be done either by human beings or by technological means, depending on the situation. Technical means can include on-site methods, such as monitoring devices at a nuclear power plant, or remote methods, as in the case of satellite surveillance. Monitoring may be highly directed, that is specifically targeted at detecting a particular type of activity, while ignoring everything else, or it may be general, as in the case of the proverbial British Bobby on the beat.

Verification, on the other hand, is always directed. Verification is the use of information to make a judgement about the compliance of parties with the terms of an agreement. In the case of peace agreements, verification is the process by which compliance of the parties to the terms of such accords is judged. It encompasses the gathering of information, including by monitoring,
well as directly from the parties themselves, and the use of such information to make judgements about some or all of the aspects of the agreement’s implementation. The concept of verification therefore includes those persons or bodies charged with making compliance judgements and the processes they use to make them. In the case of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) mission, for instance, such persons and bodies included: the Military Mixed Commission, which made judgements about the military aspects of compliance; the Human Rights Component, which made judgements about the parties’ compliance with various human rights conventions and laws; the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, Mr Akashi; the Secretary-General himself; and, ultimately, the UN Security Council.3

Cold War to post-Cold War trends

Since the end of the Cold War there has been a definite change in the scope and nature of missions established to monitor and verify peace accords. During the Cold War, operations were generally oriented towards cease-fires. Sometimes there were other measures associated with the cease-fire, such as buffer zones and demilitarization, but by and large the monitoring of a cease-fire was the central part of the mandate. Second, during the Cold War, there tended to be a relatively limited connection between the political processes associated with negotiating the peace accords and the implementation process. The UN might have a mandate to supervise a cease-fire, for example, while the negotiations on developing a formal agreement or more comprehensive peace agreement would go on under other, non-UN auspices.4

With the end of the Cold War, the nature of these operations changed in three basic ways. First, while monitoring a cease-fire remains a central part of the mission, the scope and complexity of missions associated with peace accords has expanded dramatically. These operations now involve overseeing the demobilization and disarmament of troops, often including guerrilla groups, and their re-integration into society or into newly formed armed forces. Recent operations have involved sanctions monitoring as well as monitoring of no-fly zones, additions that have brought naval and air forces, until recently infrequent participants in the peace accord monitoring business, into the equation. Beyond the military measures, missions associated with peace accords are now often tasked with election monitoring, monitoring and training of local police, and human rights monitoring.5 These tasks involve civilian, police and military observers. So not only has the scope of the operations expanded, this expansion has brought with it an increase in the number and types of actors involved in monitoring peace accords.

Second, the entire process, from negotiating a peace accord through to monitoring and verifying its provisions, has become much more integrated than was the case during the Cold War. The UN is now increasingly involved in the entire process, including the negotiation of an accord, its implementation, and the post-conflict peace-building phase.6

Third, the post-Cold War period has been marked by an increased willingness of the Security Council to authorize the use of force in peace operations, and has done so in situations where disarmament and demobilization tasks are being undertaken. The authorization of the use of force beyond self-defence complicates the verification and monitoring environment considerably.

In the midst of these changes, however, two characteristics of these operations have remained as they were during the Cold War. First, the role of the military observer remains central to verification...
and monitoring tasks. The simple physical presence of a third party continues to have an important impact in these operations. The monitor acts as a symbol of the commitment and concern of the international community. In that way, the monitor’s presence can deter actions and violations as well as give greater gravity to violations when they do occur.

Second, a basic package of multi-layered verification and monitoring mechanisms, from which given accords and operations draw on for specific missions, has also remained constant. Each mechanism serves its own purpose but also supports and reinforces other mechanisms. These mechanisms include, inter alia, observers, information provided by the parties (baseline information), inspections to confirm the accuracy of the information (baseline inspections), information provided by outside parties, ongoing inspections, ongoing patrols and observation to ensure the maintenance of cease-fires and/or agreed troop levels or positions, aerial surveillance, and the use of a joint commission process.

The role of technology

Technology has brought some improvements to verification and monitoring procedures. For example, advances in global positioning system (GPS) and mobile telephone technologies have improved communications abilities in the field, including making it possible to know the exact location of observers in remote locations and to ensure secure communication. The development and availability of mobile telephones in particular has been important for monitors in high-risk situations. Digital cameras have made it possible to record events or sites and download the images at a central data collection point within a short time frame, thus facilitating faster, more effective data collection and verification decision-making. And, public access to satellite imagery at reasonable prices is now an option for a wide variety of actors, including the UN and NGOs.

The improvements in speed and capabilities of information technology, in combination with developments in aerial and space surveillance technologies, may make it possible to develop more capable, less intrusive, means of mechanical (rather than human) monitoring in the near future. For example, technological developments may make it possible to supplement, and in some cases replace, the military observer role with highly capable twenty-four hour means of observation of cease-fire lines and buffer zones. Similarly, technological developments may make it possible to develop remote surveillance of weapons storage sites, production facilities and other military sites.

Because some of these technological developments are only just becoming available the potential impact of technology is an open question. One of the arguments in favour of new technologies is that they will help to decrease the level of intrusiveness of monitoring and verification procedures. Military observers, for example, though technically only present to observe and monitor defined areas or actions, are able to take in a lot of other information about activities in the area in which they are based, inadvertently or otherwise. Those in favour of technological monitoring argue that using technologies specifically designed to monitor certain activities, such as whether or not a buffer zone perimeter line is crossed, eliminates the possibility that other information is being gathered at the same time, thus decreasing the level of intrusiveness involved in the monitoring.

The argument works both ways, however. For those on the receiving end, technological monitoring can be seen to pose the same threat as human monitoring with respect to gathering information beyond the designated tasks. How are those on the receiving end to be certain that unmanned sensors, for example, do not include the capability to gather other information? This issue suggests that when technological options are being considered in monitoring and verification
situations there will need to be some provision for demonstrating to those being monitored that the technologies being used are only being used for the purposes specified.

Technological monitoring offers some other potential advantages. In particular, the idea of unmanned surveillance, either on the ground or by air, may act as a significant deterrent to violations because it adds a level of uncertainty as to when the monitoring will be occurring or because the monitoring is occurring on a continuous twenty-four hour basis.

At first glance, it seems possible that using technological monitoring methods that can take the place of human monitors will contribute to reducing the costs of missions. It is not evident, however, that this will be the case, at least in the short term, since the cost of developing these technologies and then purchasing and using them will be high. Technologies such as mobile phones and digital cameras, which are widely available and relatively inexpensive, supplement and augment the human monitoring aspects of the mission and as such they do not have a significant impact on the cost of the mission.

While technology has contributed to improving the ability of monitors to carry out their tasks, technological developments have not changed the fundamental nature of the multi-layered procedures and mechanisms used in verifying peace accords.

**Verification and the use of force**

With the end of the Cold War, the United Nations Security Council became increasingly willing to authorize the use of force in UN operations and it has done so in situations that involve verification of tenuous cease-fires, disarmament of troops and demobilization. These are often referred to as peace enforcement operations. In these operations the Security Council has added a specific authorization of the use of force beyond self-defence to what is otherwise a peacekeeping operation. This means that the operation must retain its impartial nature but, at the same time, retain the option to use force against one or more of the parties in certain circumstances. This complicates the verification environment enormously. For those on the receiving end, it is difficult to separate the verification tasks from the enforcement aspect of the mission. The verifiers are placed in a position where their determination about compliance with the military aspects of the peace accord may have a direct effect on whether or not a decision to use force is made. In these conditions, the possibility that monitors may be attacked or otherwise retaliated against becomes significantly higher than in traditional peacekeeping missions.

The negative experiences in both the Somalia and Bosnia missions have contributed to a reassessment and debate about whether or not the use of observers is compatible with situations in which force might be used. The images, particularly in Bosnia, of peacekeepers being held hostage in retaliation against the use of force by the United Nations have long staying power and, quite rightly, have prompted questions about the impact a use of force authorization has on a peacekeeping mission. On the one hand, the willingness of states to place their forces in potentially dangerous situations sends a signal of seriousness about their commitment to ensuring the requirements of a peace accord are fulfilled. On the other hand, if the situation deteriorates and force must be used
and peacekeeping troops are retaliated against, it may ultimately undermine the mission since states contributing troops may decide to pull their forces out of the operation, thereby weakening the mission and the level of international commitment to the process.

In the wake of the experiences in Bosnia, Somalia and East Timor, some states have determined that they will not send their troops into similar situations unless they are heavily armed, or that they will simply not contribute their troops to these kinds of operations. This is to some degree a response to the casualties and risks incurred as part of these operations, but also a response to an increased unwillingness to accept situations where observers must stand by helplessly while violations of the peace accord and/or of human rights go on. If these trends hold, it may create a situation where unarmed or lightly armed observers are no longer used in situations where there is a possibility that force might be used.

**Information management**

The increased complexity of post-Cold War operations associated with peace accords, along with the increased use of technological collection methods such as digital cameras, generates a much more significant information flow than in Cold War operations. Consequently, the requirements for information control and processing are significantly greater. For example, the human rights monitoring aspects of the Kosovo Verification Mission created a tremendous amount of data that needed to be maintained in a searchable database. The mission had to create an information control system at the same time as the data was being collected. And, because of the nature of the information being collected the data had to be secure from those who might want to destroy or abuse the information.

The information control question is made more complicated by the presence of a number of actors in a given operation, especially in light of the recent trend involving increased participation by regional organizations. The fact that more actors are collecting information adds to the need for adequate information processing and analysis. Regional organizations are not the only new actors who have become a regular part of the verification context. Increasingly, NGOs are part of the context in which these missions occur. The increased availability of technology such as digital cameras, Internet technology and mobile telephones means that NGOs also have the ability to gather — and disseminate — good quality information about what is happening on the ground. As this trend develops it may create situations in which there are multiple visions of what is happening in the field being presented to the public and to decision-makers. This is a factor that those running the operation will have to deal with.

Because UN operations are all ad hoc and, therefore, start from scratch each time, information systems must be established anew each time an operation begins, and each operation starts without the benefit of information collection in advance of the operation’s beginning. The efficiency of these operations could be improved if the UN was able to collect and analyze information about potential mission locations on an ongoing basis. This is an unlikely development, however, as Member States have an inherent resistance to allowing the United Nations to undertake anything that might be even remotely considered to be independent intelligence gathering. Nonetheless, once operations are up and running they often establish, out of necessity, their own intelligence gathering functions.
Resources

A consistent and significant problem for these operations is the lack of adequate personnel and equipment resources to fulfil the requirements of the mission. This is a problem that extends to all aspects of the operation, including civilian police monitoring, human rights monitoring as well as the monitoring and verification of the military aspects of peace accords. For example, of 9,000 civilian police positions currently mandated by the United Nations, only half have been filled. When the Kosovo Verification Mission was being established, 1,100 monitors were committed to be part of the operation but only 800 actually arrived. Indeed, this is a problem that seems endemic to UN operations. Aside from the obvious problems this raises for carrying out the mandate, this compounds the challenges associated with situations where there is a possibility that force might be used, making a difficult situation even more problematic if there are not sufficient personnel and equipment. This is not a problem that will be readily resolved as, by definition, these operations are dependent on voluntary contributions from Member States.

A verification centre

One of the consistent themes in this discussion is the implications of the ad hoc nature of these operations. In addition to the complications this presents, already discussed above, the ad hoc nature of the operations also means that there is no formal transfer of information, procedures or lessons learned from one operation to another. This gap is especially problematic given the complex and complicated nature of peace operations in the post-Cold War environment.

One way of dealing with this problem might be to establish a verification centre. Such a centre could be used to work on a variety of verification-related issues and to act as a clearinghouse of information. For example, a verification centre could develop standard verification protocols for use in peace accords and could undertake generic planning for basic kinds of operations. Such a centre could also provide support and information for training potential monitors and verifiers. In the case of the Kosovo Verification Mission, for example, a training programme was established in the field on short notice. If a verification centre was in place it could either provide the training required or provide personnel to go to the location and facilitate the training there.

A verification centre could also be used to help with the information flow associated with peace operations by providing established procedures and technologies for processing and analyzing the information. In theory, such a centre could also undertake research and analysis on an ongoing basis on potential operation locations and contexts in order to facilitate preparedness should an operation be authorized. This function, however, is likely to appear too close to intelligence gathering for the comfort level of UN Member States.

If nothing else, a verification centre could provide a valuable contribution by acting as a centre for the collection, analysis and dissemination of “lessons learned” from past and ongoing operations. This would, at least in part, provide a way in which the experience — good and bad — of operations could be built into planning and implementation of the disarmament and verification procedures of future operations. One way in which this could occur is for the verification centre to undertake debriefing of key personnel immediately after they leave an operation and then again some time (six to twelve months) later after they have had time to decompress and reflect on their experience in
the operation. The debriefings could occur at the verification centre or experts from the centre could travel to the new location of the personnel in question and interview them there. Lessons learned processes already occur in many militaries and in some regional organizations, as well as in the United Nations. The results of these could be shared with the verification centre, which could act as a kind of clearinghouse for states seeking information and assistance.

Summary

This overview suggests a number of issues for further study. First, the role of technology is an issue that should be explored further. Technological developments will continue to be made and a sustained in-depth examination of the potential impact this might have on the verification equation in the future is required. Is it possible, for example, that technological developments might yet change the nature of the verification framework, or is the role of the observer so critical as to be permanent? Second, the consequences that the use of force has and has had in these operations needs to be examined. The experiences of Somalia and Bosnia have had a clear impact on decision-makers in states that contribute to such operations. The extent of that impact and what it means for future operations needs to be elucidated as does the question as to whether and in what circumstances it makes sense to use unarmed or lightly armed observers in situations where force might be used.

The enduring nature of the basic framework of mechanisms used as the foundation for designing and implementing verification missions is indicative of the importance of verification to these operations. Compliance with the military aspects of peace accords and cease-fire agreements goes to the heart of the willingness of the parties to a conflict to move forward towards a peaceful resolution. Verification and monitoring of that compliance is, therefore, absolutely critical to a successful outcome. For that reason, it is vital that the existing gap in the research field be addressed.

Notes

1 The Canadian government has consistently urged that the UN should deal more thoroughly and effectively with the issue of verification. The 1995 report of a UN group of experts noted that “it is only in recent years that verification per se has been recognized as a normal part of peace and security operations” and called for work on this issue. Verification in All its Aspects, Including the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification, Report of the Secretary-General, A/50/377, 22 September 1995.

2 Some monitoring and verification of peace accords occurs outside the auspices of the United Nations. Examples include the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai, the Commonwealth Observation Force in Zimbabwe, the Military Observation Mission on the Ecuador-Peru border (MOMEP), the Peace Monitoring Group in Bougainville and the International Force in East Timor (INTERFET).

3 These definitions and examples come from Trevor Findlay, Executive Director of VERTIC, “Opening Address to Wilton Park Conference on the Monitoring and Verification of Peace Agreements,” 24 March 2000.

4 Examples of this include the various Middle East peace processes. For example, the United Nations undertook the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) mission but the political negotiations relating to the resolution of the conflict often occurred under the auspices of the United States.

5 Early post-Cold War examples include the UN operations in Namibia (UNTAG) and in Cambodia (UNTAC).

6 For example, in Mozambique UN advisors played a role in the negotiation of the peace accord, providing advice on the nature and details of the verification provisions.

7 Examples include UNOSOM II in Somalia as well as operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina before and after the Dayton peace accord (UNPROFOR, UNTAES, IFOR, SFOR).

Figures from discussions at the Wilton Park conference.

In this role, a verification centre could usefully liaison with the Situation Centre at the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the United Nations Headquarters in New York.
The 1990s witnessed the increasing use of private military and security companies in a number of contexts within conflicts. Companies such as Military Professional Resources, Sandline International and Defence Systems have been hired by governments, private corporations and humanitarian agencies to provide — depending on the circumstances — a range of security and military services including: combat and operational support, military advice and training, arms procurement, logistical support, security services, intelligence gathering and crime prevention services. Used in conflict environments it is difficult to distinguish the two kinds of companies, although private military companies are associated more with activities designed to have a military impact, whereas private security companies are primarily concerned with protecting individuals and property. A number of companies, however, provide both sorts of services. To date, private security and military companies have been used by multilateral peacekeeping organizations only to perform logistical, support and some security functions.

One could argue that the activities of private military and security companies have revealed many of the shortcomings of the UN and other multilateral organizations in responding to a growing number of crises and that they could be used to take up the slack where these bodies are unable or unwilling to intervene. Serious concerns have been raised, however, about private companies being involved in peacekeeping operations of a military nature — as their activities are seen by some to resemble those of mercenaries. The UN in particular does not see them as a feasible option.

This paper assesses the present and potential role of these companies in peacekeeping operations. After examining the arguments for their use and current examples of their involvement in peacekeeping activities, it highlights a variety of concerns associated with their use, which suggest they are unlikely to receive greater acceptance by policy-makers in the near future.

Private military companies — a possible solution to peacekeeping challenges?

A principal reason given for the increasing use of private military and security companies in the 1990s has been the UN Member States’ unwillingness or inability to respond to a burgeoning number of crises. The rationale for using these companies is that they offer solutions to the political, financial and institutional constraints faced by the UN and other bodies.

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POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS

Since the end of the Cold War many western governments (with the United States at the fore) have been increasingly reluctant to commit their national troops to multilateral peacekeeping missions unless key interests are at stake, because of the political storm that would erupt back home if there are casualties. This trend became evident after the ill-fated intervention in Somalia in 1993 and was displayed quite vividly again in Kosovo last year when most allied countries were unwilling to provide ground troops to the NATO campaign. Bilateral interests have also receded with France and other ex-colonial powers removing their troops from former territories and colonies. The fact that France did not intervene after the recent military coup in Côte d'Ivoire is telling in this regard.

Against this backdrop private military companies have shown a willingness to intervene in many of the hostile environments of little strategic interest to the key global powers, while appearing not to suffer the same political constraints as governments in incurring casualties. As opposed to national troops, there is not the same public outcry when privately contracted military personnel are used because their motivation is essentially financial and not to ensure national security. There have been reports suggesting that deaths of private military company personnel have received far less attention than those of national forces. Losses incurred by DynCorp, a firm used by the United States in Colombia, for example, apparently received minimal attention when compared with the death of five active-duty American service personnel in a plane crash in the same country last year. Most — but not all — companies are, however, adverse to taking on contracts in which their personnel would play a specific combat role and risk casualties.

LACK OF CAPACITY AND SHORTAGE OF FUNDS

The UN and other multilateral organizations also simply have not had the capacity or the necessary funds to cope with providing for peacekeepers on a continual basis in many of the conflict zones around the world. The number of UN peacekeepers dwindled substantially by the latter part of the 1990s; although the figure for UN troops grew from 10,000 in 1989 to 70,000 in 1995, it had fallen to 19,000 by 1998. The recent peacekeeping plan in Kosovo has also revealed a lack of capacity in certain areas. Originally, it included 4,780 police officers who were to come from forty-two counties and work under the direction of the UN, but by January 2000 there were only 1,970 officers committed with concerns about where the remainder would be found. In view of these capacity problems, private security and military provide another potential pool from which personnel for peacekeeping operations may be found.

In addition, private firms are perceived as offering a more cost-effective way of providing the same number of personnel because of the savings usually associated with the private sector. Certainly the American government appears to be increasingly convinced by the cost benefits of using private contractors to conduct aspects of its military operations abroad. Its State Department, for example, has turned to Virginia-based Military Professional Resources (MPRI) to carry out large parts of its military training overseas, such as the Africa Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI). The purpose of ACRI is to create an indigenous peacekeeping force in Africa and MPRI is in the process of training a number of African militaries to this end. However, the American government has not thus far used such companies for its commitment to multilateral peacekeeping missions.
FAILURE TO ACT QUICKLY

Another problem bedevilling the UN and other multilateral organizations is an inability to act quickly when crises arise and to deploy peacekeepers fast. Because they are political bodies that require consensus on decision-making and are administered by large bureaucratic institutions, they can be slow in responding even when there is sufficient warning of looming crises. And in the event that there is in principle willingness to field a UN peacekeeping operation, getting agreements in place and forces mobilized to get to the conflict zone in time is extremely difficult. The preparedness of the Australian forces in East Timor is an exception to recent examples. The UN (or most other multilateral bodies) does not have a rapid deployment stand-by force that can be used on such occasions. It has been suggested that private security and military companies could be called upon and deployed much more quickly than traditional multilateral forces. Furthermore, calling upon private companies as and when they are needed could be far less costly than maintaining a permanently fixed stand-by force made up of national contingents from the UN Member States.

Current uses of private companies in peacekeeping operations

Despite the arguments in favour of using private security and military companies in peacekeeping operations, they have only been used in selective instances. This, in addition, has been ostensibly to perform benign functions such as logistical and other support functions rather than those with a security and military element. Three areas of activities in which these companies have worked in peacekeeping operations will be examined here: logistical and support services; security and policing functions; and military support.

LOGISTICAL AND SUPPORT SERVICES

Private contractors are used extensively in a variety of peacekeeping operations to provide logistical and support services. The firm Brown and Root, for example, is a major supplier to the American government and has won a contract for up to a billion dollars over five years with American NATO forces in Kosovo. The United States State Department has also contracted Pacific Architects and Engineers, working in conjunction with another American firm, International Charter, to provide logistical support to the ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the Nigerian dominated intervention force of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The British government, too, reserves the right to use private companies in its Memorandum of Understanding with the UN’s Department of Peace-Keeping Operations to provide some logistical functions.

SECURITY AND POLICING FUNCTION

Private firms have seldom been used to perform security and policing functions within traditional peacekeeping operations (those based on the principles of non-interference and impartiality aimed at providing a secure environment in which peace process may be fostered). The British company Defence Systems (DSL) has provided local guards to UN peacekeepers in Angola in the past.
The protection of humanitarian relief operations is considered part of peacekeeping responsibilities and is an area in which private security companies are involved in large and growing numbers, chiefly to perform security and policing functions. Large parts of the humanitarian industry have already been privatized, with contractors readily being used to undertake the enormous logistical tasks involved in humanitarian operations. DSL is a key player and has been hired by a number of UN humanitarian agencies, including the UNICEF and the World Food Programme, to provide protection for their personnel and property.¹¹

The international community often does not have a response to what are called ‘complex emergencies’ other than the provision of humanitarian assistance. If the host government is unable to provide a safe passage for the delivery of aid and the international community is reluctant or unable to intervene militarily, the onus is on humanitarian agencies to be responsible for their security arrangements. The imperative to do so is particularly pressing with the alarming increase in recent years of violent attacks against humanitarian aid workers, particularly those working for the UN. In 1998, the number of civilian UN workers killed exceeded UN military causalities for the first time.¹² Since 1992, 184 UN staff members have died in service; of those 98 were murdered, but only two perpetrators have ever been brought to justice. The safety of staff is now a major concern for donors and agencies alike. Two UN task forces have been set up to address the problem, and in February 2000 the UN appointed a co-ordinator to help improve security measures to protect its personnel in areas of conflict.

The use of private security companies represents one option for humanitarian agencies in devising their security arrangements. In the majority of cases they are used to protect personnel and property near duty stations in situations where law and order have broken down, rather than where armed conflict exists. Most agencies are adverse to using armed escorts (of which private security companies constitute one example) as this undermines their impartiality within the conflict upon which their humanitarian action is based. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, for example, would only consider using armed protection for relief convoys in exceptional circumstances.¹³ The use of armed escorts arguably heightens rather than reduces security risks. Insecurity is so bad in some situations, though, that agencies are faced with the stark dilemma of either abandoning civilians or seeking arrangements with private security companies to enable aid to be delivered.
Private security and military companies have only rarely been used to perform tasks of a military nature usually associated with regular troops and personnel. One of the rare examples occurred in October 1998 when the American government used a private firm, DynCorp, to provide the American military contingent in the OSCE’s mission to verify the withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo prior to the NATO intervention. The American government used the company because it did not want to send its own troops into a conflict situation unarmed; using a private firm served as a way of avoiding the political risks associated with such action. Although DynCorp’s personnel were unarmed, it was the first time an American firm had been used in a combat area, which raised a number of eyebrows amongst analysts and commentators who felt that the United States was not taking its responsibilities seriously and distancing itself from the operation.

The activities of private military companies in Sierra Leone and their involvement with ECOMOG provides the best example thus far of private military companies being associated with peacekeeping operations. A number of private security and military companies, including Gurkha Security Guards, Control Risks Group, DSL and Executive Outcomes, were particularly active in Sierra Leone throughout much of the 1990s — although up until 1997 their services were mainly hired by the government of the moment or international mining companies operating in the country. In 1997 and 1998, though, the British-based private military company Sandline International began to coordinate efforts with ECOMOG in attempt to restore Tejah Kabbah, the deposed and democratically elected President of Sierra Leone. This included personnel providing logistics, intelligence and air support.

The implementation by Sandline International of operation “Python”, which included the transfer of thirty-five tonnes of military equipment from Bulgaria to ECOMOG forces, ended the activities of the company in Sierra Leone. The shipment of weapons was in contravention of the UN Security Council sanctions imposed on Sierra Leone at the time, causing a scandal in the United Kingdom and an inquiry into whether the company had received authorization from the British government. This episode represented the end of a period in which private military companies had become particularly involved in a number of conflicts in Africa and arguably prospects for such companies featuring more in peacekeeping operations have receded since then.

**Future trends**

The privatization of certain activities in peacekeeping operations is already a reality in a number of contexts. During the mid-1990s, the suggested successes in Angola and in Sierra Leone of perhaps the most well-known private military company, the South Africa-based Executive Outcomes, to help shift the tide of seemingly intractable conflicts inflicting both countries, led a number of commentators to suggest that private military companies had succeeded where the UN had failed and that they should perhaps be used by the UN to help enforce peace settlements. A representative of Executive Outcomes boldly claimed that they could have helped prevent the Rwandan genocide in 1994 and acted where the UN had floundered.
Despite the battlefield success of some private military companies, they have been in decline since the late 1990s and their prospects for being included in future peacekeeping missions in a significantly larger role look bleak. In January 1999, Executive Outcomes announced its closure, with representatives citing a quite implausible reason — the new semblance of peace and stability across Africa — for their decision to terminate business. The more likely reason for their closure is the introduction of anti-mercenary laws in South Africa in 1998 and a general lack of acceptance by the international community of their activities.

In June 1998 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan indicated that he had considered the possibility of engaging a private firm in separating fighters from refugees in the Rwandan refugee camps, but did not feel the world was ready to privatize peace. It is unlikely that the UN and other multilateral organizations will move far from this position in the foreseeable future. In February 2000 Sandline International announced that it had become a registered supplier in the UN Common Supply Database used by a number of UN and UN-related organizations seeking specific contracts. But apart from this ostensibly service-oriented role, private military companies have received only a lukewarm response from peacekeeping organizations, particularly the UN. There are a few clear reasons that help to explain the receding popularity of the concept of using private military companies within peacekeeping contexts.

**Growing Commitment by the International Community to Peacekeeping**

The principal reason is perhaps the renewed commitment of the international community to deploy peacekeeping troops that has been witnessed in the last few years. The high profile cases of private military companies performing peace-enforcing roles in Angola and Sierra Leone in the mid-1990s has arguably served as a wake-up call to the UN and other multilateral organizations to boost their efforts and capabilities for responding to emerging crises. In large part this has been a question of political will. As Funmi Olonisakin has argued in reference to the use of Executive Outcomes in Sierra Leone, “the decisive use of force offered by private security companies is not beyond the capability of multinational armies if given the political backing.”

Although the number of UN peacekeepers declined substantially up until 1998, there has been a reversal in this trend in the last two years. In April this year the number of UN peacekeepers in the field reached its highest level since 1995 with missions in Sierra Leone, East Timor and another planned for the Democratic Republic of the Congo. UN and other peacekeeping forces are now either present or are in greater numbers in countries in which private military companies have been active in the past, including Sierra Leone and Papua New Guinea. The emergence of regional and sub-regional peacekeeping mechanisms (usually led by a specific regional hegemonic power) and the consequent devolution of peacekeeping responsibilities away from the UN has produced alternative peacekeeping capabilities. These factors combined have essentially rendered private military companies redundant in a number of contexts.

**Shortcomings and Concerns**

Notwithstanding the UN and other regional bodies’ deployment of more peacekeeping missions in recent years, there are many shortcomings and concerns associated with private security and
military companies being used in peacekeeping operations that help explain why they have not featured more.

Too small

To begin with, private military companies are simply too small to be involved in peacekeeping operations in a significant way. The size of many tasks that make up peacekeeping operations, such as those being planned by the UN in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, is arguably beyond the capability of most private military companies. It is doubtful whether there is a company that exists at the moment that could recruit and deploy the thousands of personnel needed to patrol entire conflict areas. It would also be difficult to portion up different parts of specific peacekeeping operations to the responsibility of a private military company. Integration with national force contingents would also no doubt be problematic. For these reasons it is perhaps understandable why private security companies have been used more in humanitarian operations than those of a more traditional peacekeeping nature.

Political obstacles

Although private military companies might appear not to possess many of the political constraints of traditional peacekeeping forces, it is only the UN Security Council (through exercising Chapter VII of the UN Charter) that can authorize peacekeeping missions. Using private military companies does not obviate this requirement nor overcome many of the political difficulties faced by the Security Council. Even if it became feasible to use a private military company in a given instance, it is highly unlikely that the UN Department of Peace-Keeping Operations would be either willing to recommend their use to Member States or accept if a Member State wished to use a company based in its territory as part of its contingent. Many national contingents would simply be unwilling to work alongside private companies or cede operational control to them. Arguably a necessary antecedent to the use of private military companies in UN peacekeeping operations is the establishment of a UN standing force of which they could form a component. A standing force has many proponents who feel that it is the only way the UN can effectively and quickly respond to crises, but would be anathema to powerful states such as the United States and Russia as it would represent a step towards unpalatable world government.

Mercenary associations

Because private military company personnel are involved in foreign conflicts for essentially financial gain, they may be considered mercenaries in the traditional sense of the word. The UN has repeatedly condemned the use of mercenaries and there is an International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries. Therefore, for its peacekeeping missions and regional operations that the UN Security Council must authorize, to be seen as using mercenary elements would smack of hypocrisy. The UN Special Rapporteur on mercenaries, Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, has said that private military companies “cannot be strictly considered as coming within the legal scope of mercenary status”. Nevertheless, until there is greater clarity as to the definition
of a mercenary and how private military company personnel might be distinguishable from them, there will be continued unwillingness on the part of the UN and other bodies to hire their services.

**Accountability**

There are serious concerns about who would be accountable for the actions of private military companies when used in multilateral peacekeeping operations. While the UN is responsible for its peacekeeping missions, it relies on the accountability of national contingents to their national governments for any wrongdoing. With the use of private companies the lines of accountability are not at all clear. This would make it hazardous for the UN in the design of peacekeeping operations as they would ultimately have to answer if something goes wrong. This is not to say that private military company personnel may not be professional nor that there are not problems with the conduct of traditional peacekeeping forces, but in the absence of proper provisions for accountability there are potential dangers with their use.\(^3\)

It has been suggested that a regulatory body could be set up under the auspices of the UN to register and monitor the activities of private military companies. Such a mechanism would certainly help set important precedents for needed transparency in the international market for private security and military companies by assisting in the development of internationally agreed standards for companies to meet. However, the UN would first need to see major advances in terms of supplier countries providing regulations for companies operating out of their territory before it could play a significant regulatory role itself. If the UN or another multilateral organization were to accredit companies, this might appear as if it has the power to authorize their use — which is clearly not the case. Nevertheless, there is an extremely important role to be played by the UN in helping to report and monitor the conduct of private security and military companies to ensure that their activities do not violate human rights or international humanitarian law. The dangers the activities of private security and military companies pose to the protection of human rights in the absence of proper regulation and control is something that has featured more and more in the analysis of the UN Special Rapporteur on mercenaries, who reports to both the UN Commission on Human Rights and to the General Assembly. In its current wording, however, the mercenary mandate in the Commission on Human Rights that supports his work does not make reference to private security and military companies nor does it reflect the subtle challenge they present to the protection of human rights. The mandate of the Special Rapporteur will be reviewed in 2001. It is important the Commission broadens the remit of the mandate to incorporate these companies and ensure that it co-ordinates the UN’s response to this issue.

**Conclusion**

The privatization of peacekeeping functions is a reality but mainly confined to logistical and support services and some security and policing functions. There has been a clear lack of acceptance of private companies being used for activities of a military nature. Although private security and military companies emerged in the 1990s as an option for the UN and other multilateral organizations to perform peacekeeping operations, a greater willingness on the part of the UN to deploy
peacekeeping troops in the last two years has rendered their services redundant in a number of contexts. Additionally, there are numerous problems associated with their use in terms of their capacity to perform peacekeeping missions, the mercenary character of their activities and lack of accountability such that they are unlikely to receive greater acceptance in the near future.

Nevertheless, the UN and other multilateral organizations still have to address a number of challenges if they are to respond effectively to a mounting number of crises around the world. Propelled by recent critical reports on UN action in the Rwandan genocide of 1994 and the 1995 fall of Srebrenica in former Yugoslavia, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has set up an independent commission of experts to examine UN peacekeeping operations, past and present, and make recommendations to improve them in the future. It is important that the lessons to be learnt from the recent examples of private security and military companies being used in peacekeeping environments be considered in this exercise and those problems that have been highlighted here be addressed.

Notes


2. DynCorp has 17,500 employees, 550 operating facilities around the world and an annual revenue of $1.3 billion.


15. The British contribution to the OSCE mission came from seemingly more traditional means in the form of retired military personnel with international experience. Apart from not having been administered by a private company, though, it is difficult to see a substantial difference to the contribution provided by DynCorp.


22 Speech given by the Secretary-General at Ditchley Park, United Kingdom, 26 June 1998 (Press Release SG/SM/6613).
23 http://www.sandline.com/site/index.html
25 UN News Service, 12 April 2000.
28 UN General Assembly resolution 44/34, 4 December 1989.
30 In August 1999 the UN announced steps to help ensure UN peacekeepers adhere to the principles of the Geneva Conventions after a number of reported instances of UN troops violating the principles of international humanitarian law.
Summing up Disarmament and Conversion Events

Military actions — like the war over Kosovo, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, Chechnya and the fighting in East Timor as well as in other parts of the world — were the key security-related events during the year of 1999. In Europe, the Kosovo war was seen as especially devastating, though it was, in fact, less so than some of the much longer-lasting wars in Africa. However, the fact that NATO issued itself a mandate to intervene in Kosovo set a precedent which will have consequences in the future: a first example may have been Russia’s military action in Chechnya. In contrast to these wars, disarmament and conversion made comparatively few headlines, although much practical work was underway to manage the process of military downsizing, and this work is continuing.

The horrific atrocities of these conflicts — destruction and mass deportation, ‘ethnic cleansing’, tens of thousands of people killed, and hundreds of thousands wounded or uprooted and stranded as refugees — are of great concern. In addition, nuclear weapon developments are particularly worrying: the recent trends in nuclear arms control and conversion are far from encouraging and there is not much reason to predict that the near future will look brighter. Nuclear arms control negotiations and disarmament are implicated by two disturbing trends. First, they are shackled by outdated and timid approaches that have remained stuck in the mire of Cold War ideology even though the Cold War ended a decade ago. Nuclear arsenals are still treated as the captives of an arms control agenda and of agreements whose origins date back three decades to when two nuclear superpowers were engaged in a race for quantitative and qualitative superiority. Secondly, the United States — as the dominant military power — is taking increasingly unilateral decisions to modernize its own nuclear arsenal and to depart from functioning arms control treaties.

In October 1999, the American Senate’s rejection of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) — which is supposed to put an end to nuclear testing — sent shock waves through the international community. This is not the end of nuclear arms control but the decision is both a danger — since it calls the entire nuclear arms control architecture into question — and a challenge — since it offers an opportunity to fundamentally rethink the approach adopted in the gradual but insufficient reductions of the past. The initially strong current of quantitative nuclear disarmament of
the early 1990s had already slowed down before the Senate decision. Once more the future of nuclear weapons looks like a global minefield: in addition to the uncertain future of the CTBT, there is the continuing difficulty of safeguarding Russia’s vast arsenal of weapons of mass destruction along with weapons material, technology and know-how. India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions have developed into a nuclear and missile arms race in South Asia and possibly beyond. North Korea’s nuclear and missile policy continues to be unpredictable. Iraq’s lack of cooperation with weapon inspections mandated by the United Nations Security Council remains an unsolved problem. Israel’s nuclear arsenal is still outside any international agreement. American relations with Russia and China have deteriorated, frayed by the air war over Kosovo. American plans to build a missile defence system have caused concern among other nuclear powers and the international community and put one of the cornerstones of functioning arms control — the Anti–Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 — into question. While the ailing Russian military flexes its military muscles and re-emphasizes the value of nuclear weapons to prove its superpower status, China has invested strongly in new missile systems and is developing a second-strike capability. Against the backdrop of these adverse developments, the future of non-proliferation (first codified by the Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT) is being systematically challenged. The problem is intensified by the fact that there is widespread complacency, if not apathy, among the public at large concerning nuclear developments.

Not all was doom and gloom in 1999, however. In the area of conventional weapons, a revised treaty on limiting conventional armed forces in Europe (CFE) was agreed upon against many odds at the OSCE summit meeting in November 1999 in Istanbul. Although the accord leaves many contentious issues unresolved and many loopholes still open, it was an important step. It amounts to a new, and lowered, agreed balance of offensive forces in Europe, revising the 1990 CFE Treaty which was negotiated and agreed upon when two antagonistic military blocs still existed. Ratification and implementation of this agreement will be a challenging process and — in view of the fundamental security change in Europe — falls far short of what could and should have been changed, namely adjustment to the disappearance of confrontational military blocs. However, against the background of recurring crises in Russia, the CFE Treaty adds an element of stability and direction at a time of uncertainty and unpredictability.

On a global scale, fewer resources — finances, weapons and personnel — are invested into the armed forces and their arsenals than in previous years. The military burden is now below 2% of the global gross national product (GNP) as compared to over 5% at the end of the 1980s. In quantitative terms, global disarmament is continuing, though at a slower pace, as the statistics presented in this conversion survey reveal. This frees resources for other, non-military purposes — an important contribution to effective conversion. Positive changes have also occurred in the area of practical disarmament. The majority of countries are continuing to decrease their military expenditures; promising peace agreements are being implemented; demobilized soldiers are being supported in their reintegration into civilian life; and ground-breaking initiatives have been launched on such pressing issues as child soldiers, landmines and small arms. These initiatives have not solved basic security and human development problems, but they are important steps in the right direction. Downsizing and restructuring of the defence industry and redevelopment of bases and other military facilities have continued as well. Although dismantling military structures and ridding the world of the legacy of arms build-ups of the past is costly, the long-term social and economic effects of military downsizing are positive.

With a number of ‘old’ wars continuing unabated and violent, newly erupted internal and international conflicts added, one should not overlook the fact that conflict prevention, management and peacekeeping have had a beneficial effect in many regions of the world. The initial establishment of a government in Northern Ireland after three decades of bombs, bullets and bloodshed; scaling down fighting and avoiding protracted large-scale fighting or a full-scale war between the two nuclear
powers, India and Pakistan, over Kashmir in 1999; and the recent ending of long-lasting internal wars in Sierra Leone and Papua New Guinea may serve as positive examples although, in all these cases, disengagement, cease-fires or an emerging peace process are no guarantees against a re-emergence of violence and military action. However, they provide encouraging signs in situations where all too often conflicts are sought to be resolved by military force.

Military Intervention, Crisis Prevention and the Economics of Violence

Crisis prevention at the international level has always played a role, although it has often been blocked by the antagonisms of the Cold War. It was intensified in the 1990s, with the United Nations being called upon to carry out an unprecedented number of peacekeeping operations. Much more is expected of the United Nations today than simply providing a buffer between warring parties. Increasingly the UN is expected to break the cycle of violence, assist in building new nations and to support states in their efforts to uphold the rule of law. Crisis prevention and conflict management have become important tools of international politics, although a number of the measures used to solve crises have proven unsuitable for containing or halting acts of violence. At the same time, some of the United Nations peacekeeping operations did not meet the international community’s high expectations (particularly in Somalia and Bosnia, but also the inactivity in Rwanda). During the last few years, rather than strengthening the United Nations capabilities to fulfil its task, its role in conflict prevention has been further undermined. As a result — and intensified by a lack of human and financial resources — the United Nations has been scaling back its global responsibilities. Thus, the UN can still not guarantee a real and sustained commitment to assist when needed. Fresh international support is required to give the UN an upgrade and better tools to do the job.

Crisis prevention and conflict management activities are presently characterized by contradictory trends. Advocated originally as a corollary to preventive diplomacy, the nature of conflict prevention has changed considerably. While preventive diplomacy was the buzzword of conflict prevention in the early 1990s, now armed intervention is often being called for — and at a much earlier stage in the conflict. Bosnia, Rwanda, Kosovo and East Timor illustrate this trend. These examples also show that interventions to prevent humanitarian catastrophes are often not possible (due to a lack of consensus or political will) or do not meet their goals. In addition, the question recurs as to who has the right to intervene militarily on behalf of the international community to stop crimes against humanity, and what situation merits foreign intervention? Vexing questions have to be answered and tough choices made to decide between military intervention, other punitive measures or proactive non-violent means that are usually not as effective in the short term. The urgency for military intervention is often the result of earlier omissions and neglect in conflict prevention.

With the UN Security Council deadlock of early 1999 over the appropriate reactions required to end the atrocities in Kosovo, a new quality has been added. The unilateral NATO military action — undertaken without a UN mandate — might serve as a precedent for similar actions elsewhere. But the question remains: What can be done when one or several Security Council members veto (or threaten to veto) a military action?

At the same time — and somewhat in contradiction to the trend of early military intervention — a new range of instruments has been added to meet the short- and long-term requirements for both pre- and post-conflict situations. It is promising to observe that conflict prevention and management is now being openly discussed and increasingly practised as an integral part of development policy. A host of different actors (multilateral organizations, bilateral donors, NGOs and so on) are engaged in humanitarian and emergency aid, reintegration of refugees, rehabilitation
of physical, social and economic infrastructures, social sustainability programmes, promoting reconciliation, and in building civil society — tools which they consider important in preventing violent conflicts or managing conflicts. At the beginning of this new century, prevention of violent conflicts encompasses both removing the root causes of conflict and preventing the re-emergence of conflicts after the end of a war.

All too often, however, policies adopted by international actors are far from coherent and consistent. Despite best intentions, they may even contribute to the conflict and an increase in violence. The most perverse side of such contradictory policies surfaces in the public eye when UN ‘blue helmets’ are confronted in their peace-enforcing operations by weapons which have been supplied by the very governments now trying to curb the violence. The most recent of numerous examples is East Timor.

Although it is common knowledge that it is cheaper to invest in conflict prevention than to repair war damages, it is nevertheless extremely difficult to secure the funds required for conflict prevention programmes. Governments, international organizations and aid agencies apparently find it easier to allocate or raise resources to deal with wars which have already broken out and for war damages than to mobilize the means to prevent conflagrations. The resources available for conflict prevention are a fraction of the cost of wars and the rebuilding of war-torn societies. The cost of the war over Kosovo illustrates this fact: NATO’s war costs alone are estimated to have amounted to US $3–4 billion; in addition the cost of maintaining the peace, via the international peacekeeping forces, is projected to be US $2–3.5 billion annually. The European Union has estimated the cost for reconstruction at US $7 billion for the first three years; the total might amount to as much as US $30 billion.

During the Cold War, the economic interests of the military-industrial complex played an important role in fuelling the arms race. Arms production and sales are still a profitable business, even though quantities have been reduced at the global level. Moreover another economic aspect of wars and violence has unfortunately gained in importance over the last few years: privatization of violence and the use of military force have become important tools to push economic interests. Licit and illicit economic activities are enforced by the use of weapons. Such activities range from privatization of internal security functions to the extraction of natural resources — oil, gold, diamonds, tropical wood, etc. — and individual criminal acts, such as bank or car robberies, to organized crime like the drug trade or Mafia structures. As an increasing number of people find it difficult to make a ‘decent’ living within the regular economy, violence and the use of force have become a means to secure individual survival. Unlawful use and civilian possession of military-style weapons is a growing problem.

While economic interests in producing, buying and selling weapons remain, wars are often fought — and violence is carried out — with relatively simple and cheap weapons. The ready availability of weapons — in part a negative by-product of disarmament and military downsizing — has led to widespread violations of human rights and untold suffering. In many regions of the world anybody who wants to obtain weapons, for whatever purpose, has almost unlimited access to small and light arms. To try to solve the flow of small arms exclusively by tightening up export controls will not work. The problem has to be tackled simultaneously on the supply and the demand side. It is of particular importance to address the circulation of arms, criminal possession and misuse.
**BICC Findings**

**GLOBAL DISARMAMENT — SLOWING DOWN**

Global disarmament and conversion continued towards the end of the 1990s, although at a slower pace. According to BICC’s statistics, the military sector has been reduced by 30% during the last decade — 2% in 1998, the most recent year for which comparative data of 156 countries is available. This rate of reduction is half that of the first half of the 1990s. Of the four components of the BICC Conversion, Disarmament, Demilitarization and Demobilization (BIC3D) Index — military expenditures, weapons holdings, military personnel and employment in the defence industry — the largest recent contribution to disarmament came from decreases in weapons holdings and employment in arms production (3% each in 1998), while the overall amount of armed forces personnel almost stagnated.

**MILITARY EXPENDITURES — GRADUAL REDUCTIONS AGAIN**

Global military expenditures are estimated to have amounted to US $671 billion in 1998, 61% of which were being spent in NATO countries. Contrary to many expectations, military expenditures were reduced again in 1998 by almost 2%, having increased slightly the previous year. Various quite different developments are driving this trend. The current decrease in global military expenditures is mainly due to reductions in the United States and Russia, two countries which planned to increase military expenditures in 1999, thus most likely reversing the trend again. However there are some countries and regions that were never greatly affected by the general trend to disarm, particularly the Middle East and countries in Asia which continued to increase their military budgets, and now represent about one-quarter of global military expenditures.

**REORIENTATION OF MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT — INITIATIVES BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR**

Global military research and development (R&D) expenditures are stagnating at a level significantly below that of the late 1980s. Most of the reduction was due to the collapse of military R&D in Russia. In OECD-member countries, defence R&D spending has remained at a high level — only about 18% below the level at the end of the Cold War. The modernization of weapons technology remains a high priority in some key countries. The United States is by far the largest spender on military R&D in the world, accounting for almost two-thirds of the global total. A clear trend can be observed in that new weapons technology development is increasingly based on commercially developed civilian technology. Private-sector R&D has also been stimulated both by the ‘peace dividend’ and the reuse of formerly military expertise, R&D institutions, and of persons with knowledge relevant to civilian applications. The reorientation of military research and development has predominantly been shaped by the private sector and where this sector is weak, as in Russia, reemployment of military R&D resources has been limited.
CONVERSION OF THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY — RESTRUCTURING STILL CONTINUING

The partial return of demand for weapons in some countries is improving the economic prospects for arms-producing companies. However, the defence industry worldwide has continued to be under pressure to consolidate and restructure. Defence industry employment also continued to shrink: almost 450,000 jobs were lost in 1998; from a peak of 17.6 million employees in 1987, the industry had shed more than half by 1998. At present, total employment is estimated at less than 8.3 million. The large defence conglomerates in the United States are struggling to integrate the companies they acquired earlier. In Western Europe, consolidation gained momentum in 1999 as two major groups of companies emerged as the dominating military aerospace and electronics organizations. In other segments of the arms market and in other countries, consolidation and restructuring are less advanced. The defence industry in Russia continues to struggle although export-oriented companies have gained from the devaluation of the ruble. Further employment losses — and thus demand for civilian reemployment of former defence workers — can be expected both in western market economies as well as in Russia.

MILITARY PERSONNEL AND ITS DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION — STILL BEHIND SCHEDULE

The total number of armed forces personnel worldwide declined considerably and continuously from its 1987 peak of 28.8 million to 22.0 million by 1998. This marks a 24% decline in total since 1987. However reductions were much less dynamic than in other areas, particularly defence industry employment. Although reductions in military personnel nearly stagnated in 1998 — viewed against the general trend of disarmament and conversion — it can be expected that further downsizing of armed forces personnel is likely to take place over the next few years. Of all the regions in the world, Europe has had the most drastic cuts in force levels over the past decade. While it represented 33% in 1987, Europe now accounts for only 26% of the world’s soldiers. Reductions were concentrated in those countries that had announced and begun demobilization and force reductions in earlier years. In absolute numbers, the largest reductions took place in countries such as China, Russia, Germany, the United States, Iraq, Viet Nam and Ethiopia. Africa experienced a reversal of the downward trend, mainly due to mobilizations in Eritrea and Ethiopia, two countries at war, while Angola attempted two major demobilization efforts, both of which failed. BICC statistics reveal that the number of soldiers in Central and South Asia has actually increased over the past decade; half of the world’s soldiers are now serving in Asian armies. Other, more positive major demobilization events in 1999 — although far from being fully implemented — have been seen in Cambodia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone and Tajikistan.

BASE CLOSURES AND REDEVELOPMENT — PRACTICAL WORK AHEAD

Many successes have been achieved inasmuch as former military sites have been successfully redeveloped. In recent years, however, political and public interest in base closure activities has waned. One example of this has been the conclusion of the European Union’s KONVER II programme. Although political interest and support have declined at the international and national levels, the challenge of finding sustainable reuses for former sites remains significant for regional and community leaders in many countries. One example of this is Panama, where authority over the former bases of
the American armed forces was handed over to Panama. The process of base closure and reuse has
lagged behind reductions in some other military sectors, mainly because of the complexity and the
long-term time frames involved in redeveloping former bases and other military facilities. However,
base redevelopment is a promising road to conversion, as it offers a variety of different opportunities
for economic activity. One of the most encouraging signs is the fact that often — if the political and
economic fabric is right — more new civilian jobs are created on former bases than existed previously.
Base closure and redevelopment remains a long-term task for two reasons: first, practical and viable
non-military alternatives have not been found for many closed bases which may be more difficult to
redevelop due to lack of economic potential or because of intensive environmental degradation.
The process of redevelopment especially lags behind in transition countries. Second, financial
constraints in several countries and the plans of the military indicate that additional bases will be
freed by the military in the near and medium term. Despite many common characteristics of site
redevelopment, the diversity of geographic, environmental, economic and political factors from site
to site (and country to country) makes it difficult to ‘patent’ a set site redevelopment process.
Nevertheless, valuable experience for assisting redevelopment has been gained at the international
level.

SURPLUS WEAPONS AND THEIR DISPOSAL — THE NEGATIVE BY-PRODUCT OF DISARMAMENT

The reduction of the various types of major conventional weapons remains the most dynamic
element of disarmament, at least in quantitative terms. Although reduced by over 3% in 1998,
major conventional weapon systems are still being deployed in military arsenals in large numbers.
The present stock of major conventional weapon systems is estimated at 425,000 pieces (roughly
one half of them deployed in developing, the other in industrialized, countries). The 1990s saw
huge reductions in weaponry around the world. Although this trend is also slowing down, further
advances in disarmament were made in 1999: the CFE Treaty was updated, the ban on anti-personnel
mines entered into force, and various initiatives were taken to combat the proliferation of small
arms. It can be expected that these initiatives will lead to further reductions in conventional weapons.
Weapon systems rarely have a civilian application, thus, their proper disposal and destruction is of
vital importance. The practice of the past decade of exporting surplus weapons in order to save
costs of destruction or to gain income is tantamount to simply exporting the problem. Used weapons
— still with a military value — are becoming increasingly available, often at low prices or even free-
of-charge. This trade in surplus weapons has become a problematic aspect of disarmament: if such
weapons are not converted, scrapped or ‘mothballed’, they often end up in areas of conflict.

Conclusion: the Need for a Changed Security Policy in a Changing World

Considering the historical changes in the global security environment, what is most striking
about the security policy and disarmament of the last decade is that they were so conventional and
inert and that few bold or innovative steps were taken. Out of anxiety and bureaucratic inertia the
armed forces and their arsenals, including nuclear arsenals, have not been fundamentally restructured.
Imprisoned in old ways of thinking and immobility, many military planners maintain military postures
at vastly exaggerated levels. True, disarmament has taken place on a large scale — 30% according to
this survey’s statistics — and most armed forces have been thoroughly reviewed and reassessed and
new military doctrines formulated, but despite all these activities there has been strong resistance to
change. Regardless of the identity crisis imposed on the military by the end of the Cold War, the basic structures of the largest armed forces in this world remain the same as they were before. Continuity and incremental reform have been the characteristics, rather than fundamental changes in a fundamentally changing world. Many European armed forces (East and West), for example, still look like they are facing an enemy on the other side of the Iron Curtain. Large stocks of heavy conventional weapons remain the backbone of many European ground forces. The nuclear powers have not given up their belief in the military value of nuclear weapons; they shy away from renouncing the nuclear option or settling for minimum deterrence with drastically reduced numbers of nuclear weapons, and nuclear weapons are still considered an integral part of military postures. Consequently, there is a danger that nuclear proliferation may increase again.

If the analysts’ assessments are correct that the primary security challenges in today’s world are no longer major conventional or nuclear conflicts, but internal wars, regional and ethnic conflicts, failed states, destabilized societies and the breakdown of the state’s monopoly on force, the question needs to be asked why the armed forces of many major and medium-sized powers and their role in wider concepts of conflict prevention and conflict management have not been changed more systematically. The fundamental questions of what the threats are, what armed forces can and cannot do to meet them, and how the military should be structured have not been fully answered and in some cases have not even been asked. If peacekeeping, peace enforcement and rapid reaction to humanitarian crisis, genocide and the atrocities of dictators are the foremost tasks for today’s security policy, then the reforms of security sectors during the last decade — including the armed forces, but also of diplomacy and development policy — have clearly been insufficient.

Many countries have serious reasons for wanting to cut their military arsenals further — scarcity of resources is only the most obvious factor. Quantitative parity in nuclear stockpiles has always been a misperceived concept. Even more so today, there is no sound security reason, either for the United States or for Russia, not to reduce their nuclear stockpiles considerably, that is, unilaterally and without a formal agreement. Cuts in the United States do not depend on Russian acquiescence, and Russia’s nuclear arsenal is being reduced in any event by attrition. Insistence on a parallel process is unnecessary and outdated. The dominance of American military technology both in conventional weapons and in weapons of mass destruction is so overwhelming that the intensified investment in new weapon technology can only be described as a race of the American military against itself. Costly weapon systems generate their own future. The United States alone accounts for 37% of the world military expenditure and continues to increase its share. It has long been time for Americans to have a lively debate on the sense of this policy.

The second-largest spender in the world is Japan, France is third and Germany fourth — all countries in the same group of ‘friendly’ states. What is the expectation of this huge military spending bill? What is the aim of the newly emerged debate that Europeans are allegedly spending too little on defence? A common European foreign and security policy, a European capacity for autonomous action backed by credible military forces, a European rapid-reaction corps — all the ideas which have been stimulated by the NATO war over Kosovo and the gap in American-European military capabilities — do not require additional funding. On the contrary, the availability of lavish financial resources during the last decade has prevented a unified or common European policy and made parochial and solo national action possible. The duplication of defence industry capabilities, uncoordinated procurement and inefficient — sometimes even contradictory — military policy have been the result. What is required is a thorough debate about the aims of a European foreign, security and peace policy, including the ‘demilitarization’ of security assessments and planning. Fewer, not more, finances will force the military and security planners to stop dragging their feet when it comes to suggesting the appropriate fundamental changes, and to cooperate at a European level.
For a number of other countries, the fundamental restructuring of their armed forces is also urgently required. Some of the truths of a changed security policy in a changed world will be difficult to accept: countries such as Russia or Ukraine, but even more so several developing countries which spend a substantial part of their GNP on the military, will have to accept that they cannot afford to maintain the type of armed forces they have had previously if they want to free the resources required for economic and social development. Their present course is a ruinously expensive effort.

Alternatives do exist. For disarmament to be viable there must be a long-term approach rather than a few stopgap measures. The first reason for this is to prevent war. But there is another important reason: the allocation of world resources is still seriously distorted; official development assistance continues to be a fraction of the amount spent on global military efforts. Similarly, in many countries development expenditure is below the level of investments in the armed forces. Although money is not the solution to all problems of human development, promoting expenditures for conflict prevention, peace and development and reducing the funding for war must be given a more prominent place on the international agenda. More fundamentally, the question must be raised as to which long-term security threats can be dealt with by military means. A lasting, viable disarmament process is required to free resources for development and to diminish the options for using the military in trying to solve political problems.

Conversion deals with the economic and social consequences of military downsizing and disarmament. The benefits achieved from conversion might also have an impact on the willingness to disarm. ‘Proactive conversion’, a term signalling that conversion is more than simply reacting to a military draw-down, could provide a means for preparing for disarmament. Conversion goes beyond the identification of opportunities. Conversion facilitates the productive use of scarce resources and — if well managed — reduces the risk of violent conflict. Well-managed conversion activities provide opportunities and can serve as catalysts for this type of transformation, making lasting human and economic development, and thereby peace and security, possible.

Building confidence in a fissile materials production moratorium using commercial satellite imagery

Hui Zhang and Frank von Hippel

One key building block in a comprehensive strategy to contain and eliminate nuclear weapons is the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), which would ban the production of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU) for nuclear weapons. However, negotiations on this treaty have been at an impasse in Geneva since 1993. Since realistically a FMCT will probably not come into force for some years, a moratorium on the production of fissile material for weapons should be encouraged in order to capture as many of the benefits of an FMCT in the interim.¹

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Four nuclear-weapon states (the United States, Russia, Britain and France) have announced that they have ended their production of plutonium and HEU for weapons and China has privately communicated that it has not been producing these materials for weapons since approximately 1991. A moratorium would therefore impact principally Israel, India and Pakistan, the only nations currently believed to be still producing fissile material for weapons. Confidence-building measures, especially in these tense areas, would enhance regional security and stability. Satellite monitoring of a voluntary moratorium could prove to be extremely useful as a confidence-building measure to verify whether or not a facility is operating.

**Monitoring a moratorium**

The shutdown of many plutonium-production reactors has been announced in connection with the declared American and Russian production moratoria. This includes all fourteen American plutonium-production reactors and ten of thirteen Russian plutonium-production reactors. Russia continues to operate three plutonium-production reactors to produce heat for regional populations. However, under a bilateral agreement, the plutonium that they produce is to be subject to American monitoring to verify that it is not used for weapons.

China is reported to have shut down its two plutonium-production reactors, although there has been no public announcement to this effect. France reportedly continues to operate the two Célestin heavy-water reactors to produce tritium for weapons and the Phénix breeder reactor as a civilian research reactor, and Britain continues to operate the 8 Calder Hall and Chapel Cross reactors to produce power. However, all of the operating British and French reactors except for the Célestin reactors are subject Euratom monitoring.

As a result of its production moratorium, France has also shut down its gaseous diffusion uranium-enrichment plants (GDPs) at Pierrelatte. Other GDPs and centrifuge enrichment plants (CEPs) in Europe are under Euratom safeguards. The United States had previously shut down its Oak Ridge GDP, is currently operating its Paducah and Portsmouth GDPs in tandem to produce low-enriched uranium (LEU) and has offered to subject them to IAEA safeguards. Russia had converted its GDPs to more energy-efficient CEPs by 1992 and is believed to be using them primarily to produce LEU for power-reactor fuel. It would be inconsistent with the American-Russian agreement, under which the United States purchases excess Russian weapons uranium after it has been blended to LEU, for Russia to be producing additional weapon-grade — or even weapons-useable — HEU (less than 20% U-235). It would increase confidence in the effectiveness of this agreement in achieving its objective of reducing the proliferation threat from Russia's stocks of excess HEU, however, if the United States and Russia were to enter into a bilateral arrangement to verify that their enrichment plants are producing only LEU.

Pakistan has reportedly been operating gas-centrifuges to produce HEU for weapons for more than a decade. The IKONOS image recently put on the web site of the Federation of American Scientists reveals that the new production reactor at Khushab, Pakistan is producing unsafeguarded plutonium. India is believed to be continuing to produce weapons plutonium with its two plutonium-production reactors at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center. And Israel is believed to be continuing to produce weapons plutonium with its reactor at Dimona.

In some cases, confidence in the declared moratoria is being or could be provided by international monitoring arrangements (by Euratom in Western Europe) or a bilateral monitoring arrangement (the not yet in-force American-Russian bilateral cut-off on the production of weapon-grade plutonium and the bilateral monitoring of the enrichment of the product from their uranium-
enrichment plants proposed above). In cases where such arrangements are not in force, however, satellite monitoring could provide additional confidence in a nation’s moratorium declaration. After describing the capabilities of the most recent generation of commercial imaging satellites, we present examples using recently declassified images of an equivalent resolution.

New, more capable commercial imaging satellites

Since the early 1960s, the use of telescopic cameras in space to verify arms-control agreements has been primarily the preserve of the United States and the USSR/Russia. The capabilities of these systems have recently been revealed through the Hubble telescope which, if flown just above the atmosphere and pointed downwards, could detect objects about 10 centimetres (4 inches) in size. However, prohibitively expensive, high resolution satellites have meant that most governments and NGOs were limited to much cheaper (and therefore lower resolution) images.

Starting in 1999, a new generation of commercial imaging satellites is being launched with 1m spatial resolution at visible wavelengths. Although still an order of magnitude less capable than military imaging satellites, the resolutions of these new satellites are an order of magnitude better than the 10–30m resolution of previous generation of commercial observation satellites, such as France’s SPOT and the American Landsat 4 and 5 whose capabilities for treaty verification have already been examined in previous studies. 4

Although we have not as yet had the opportunity to carefully analyze images of nuclear facilities taken by the new high-resolution commercial satellites, a large number of older images of such facilities with comparable resolution have become available as a result of the declassification of “Corona” panchromatic satellite images taken by American KH-4B intelligence satellites during the period 1967–72. 5 The spatial resolutions of these images are comparable to those of the new high-resolution commercial satellites. 6

The capabilities of thermal infrared (TIR) images of civilian satellites are also improving. In April 1999, Landsat 7, with a 60m spatial resolution, i.e. half of that of Landsat 5, was launched. In December 1999, ASTER, with a 90m spatial resolution but better temperature accuracy, was launched. This new generation of civilian satellites opens up the possibility that all interested governments and NGOs may participate in monitoring a fissile materials production moratorium. The following sections explain how the new commercial satellite imagery could be used for this purpose.

The Corona images

In 1995, anticipating the imminent public availability of images from new commercial imaging satellites, the United States declassified comparable images obtained in the late 1960s and early 1970s by the “Corona” KH-4B and earlier intelligence satellites. These satellites took numerous photographs of Soviet and Chinese nuclear facilities. John Pike and Charles Vick of the Federation of American Scientists have put some of these images on the FAS web site (http://www.fas.org).

We have examined these historical images to see how useful the new commercial satellite images could be in building international confidence in production moratorium declarations. We conclude that the images will be useful, at least for confirming that plutonium-production reactors and gaseous-diffusion uranium-enrichment plants have been shut down.
Figure 1 shows a Corona image of an area containing the three oldest Soviet/Russia plutonium-production reactors at Seversk (Tomsk-7). One can see clearly down inside some of the cooling towers in this image while others have white clouds of condensed water vapour coming out of them.

These are standard, natural-draft, evaporative cooling towers that operate by the “chimney effect”. The hot water from the reactors heats the air in the bottom of the cooling tower, which then rises, sucking cool replacement air into the bottom of the towers. The cooling capacity of the towers is increased by using evaporative cooling. Water is dripped through the warmed air in the base of the tower, absorbing the additional heat by evaporation.

A vapour cloud develops at the top of the tower because the saturated air cools as it rises. Furthermore, since the amount of water vapour that air can carry decreases rapidly with decreasing temperature, dilution of the plume can increase the degree of its super-saturation if the ambient air is not too dry. The excess water vapour condenses out in visible droplets — the same mechanism by which clouds form in the atmosphere. The cooling towers in Figure 1 with white vapour coming out of their tops were evidently in use, while the others were not. When the humidity is high, visible plumes can extend far downwind.

Figure 2. India’s two plutonium-production reactors dump their heated cooling water into the upper Bombay bay. Source: Research Reactors at Trombay (Bhabha Atomic Research Center, 1987).
The Russian government has stated that the reactors associated with the cooling towers in Figure 1 were shut down in 1990 and 1992. Today, therefore, there should be no condensation plumes coming out of the cooling towers. The same technique could be used to verify the shutdown of China’s first plutonium-production reactor near Jiuquan which, Corona photographs show, has six large cooling towers.7

Since these natural-draft cooling towers are usually very large (several tens of meters in height and more than 10m in diameter at the top) it is easy to identify them and their vapour plumes using 1m resolution images. Moreover, since it requires at least several weeks irradiation to produce a practical concentration of plutonium in reactor fuel, the several-day revisit time of current commercial satellites should be adequate for detection of operation.

For reactors with mechanical-draft cooling towers that drive airflow primarily by large fans instead of by the buoyancy of the heated air in the tall natural draft cooling towers, the visible plumes inside or over the towers could also be visible in the satellite images once the towers are operating. The February 2000 IKONOS image of the Pakistan Khushab reactor clearly shows the reactor’s mechanical-draft cooling tower. Vapour plumes are barely visible over some vents, indicating that the reactor was operating at the time. The power of this reactor has been estimated at about 40–70 MW, much less than the estimated 2,000 MW of the later Russian plutonium-production reactors. Israel’s plutonium-production reactor at Dimona, also estimated to be in the 40–70 MW range, is cooled with small mechanical-draft cooling towers that can be identified in Corona satellite photos. However, the dry desert air at the production site minimizes the presence of a condensation plume. Verifying the shutdown of this reactor using commercial imaging satellites may therefore be difficult.

**Imaging in the thermal infrared**

What about reactors that are cooled by water from a pond or river? Here, in most cases, commercial infrared imaging can be used to detect the warmed water.

Because the wavelengths of thermal infrared radiation are about twenty times longer than those of visible light, the resolution for any given optical system in the infrared is degraded by a similar factor. However, even such lower-resolution images can provide useful information. This was demonstrated in 1986 after the Chernobyl accident when Landsat 5 thermal images showed that all four reactors had been shut down. The flow of warm water into their common cooling pond had stopped. When the reactors were operating, the warm water was easily visible, even with Landsat 5’s 120m resolution, because the warm water flowed over a pond area of more than 10km² before cooling.8

Although India’s two plutonium production reactors at the Bhabha Atomic Research Center (see Figure 2) have a combined waste-heat output of only about 2% of that of the four Chernobyl reactors, it is quite likely that the hot-water plume that they release could be detected using Landsat 7 or ASTER.

The operating status of large GDP can also be determined using thermal infrared images. Figure 3 shows a Landsat 5 thermal image of the three huge process buildings of the American GDP at Portsmouth, Ohio. The buildings are arranged in an “L” configuration. The two in the long arm of the “L” are about 670m long and 200m wide. The building that makes up the short arm of the L is 300m wide.
At full capacity, the Portsmouth GDP consumes more than 2,000 MW of electric power — the output of two large nuclear-power reactors. Virtually all of this electrical energy is converted into heat in the process of pumping UF₆ gas through thousands of porous nickel barriers to enrich the gas in the lighter molecules containing the isotope U-235. Most of the waste heat is removed to cooling towers and some of it is vented with hot air through the roofs of the buildings. The temperatures in the process rooms under the roofs are still high enough, however (around 80°C or 175°F), to make the roofs of the buildings unusually hot. As seen in this image, this elevated temperature can be readily detected by existing satellite TIR imagery.

Figure 4 shows a Corona KH-4B image of China's GDP at Lanzhou. This facility is about one-tenth the size of the Portsmouth plant and has a reported enrichment capacity 1/25th as large. It is cooled by mechanical-draft cooling towers. Chinese officials have stated that HEU production at Lanzhou and a second GDP near Heping ended around 1987. More recently, they have stated that the Lanzhou plant is to be shut down. The Heping GDP may also be shut down as much more energy-
efficient centrifuge plants provided by Russia come online. Since Russia requires that the centrifuge plants be under international safeguards to assure that they are not used to make HEU for weapons, the shutdown of the Lanzhou and Heping plants would build confidence that China has indeed ended HEU production.

We have obtained a Landsat 4 thermal image of the Lanzhou plant area, taken on 3 February 1989. However, the plant is not visible at thermal wavelengths against the background. It is possible that it was not operating but, more likely, the resolution of the Landsat 4 thermal imager was not good enough. The Lanzhou building is only 60m wide, half the 120m resolution of the Landsat 4 thermal imager. If the plant is still operating, however, its warmth may be detectable by Landsat 7 or ASTER.

Under a moratorium, small, uneconomic CEPs, such as that operated by Pakistan at Kahuta, ought to be shut down. However, because of their small size and relatively low energy intensity, these plants do not require special cooling systems such as cooling towers. Also, the TIR imaging systems on current generation commercial satellites could not measure the roof temperature increase associated with their operation. Verification of their shutdown would most likely require on-site monitoring — although it might be possible to do this non-intrusively.

Of course, civilian imaging satellites are not a substitute for on-site verification of a future FMCT. In most of the cases that we have discussed, it would be possible to institute countermeasures to conceal the signatures. Cooling towers could be modified so that they did not produce a saturated plume; hot roofs could be cooled. Nevertheless, when a country announces that it has shut down a plutonium-production reactor or a gaseous diffusion plant, it will be worth checking the evidence provided by commercial-satellite images.

Notes

3 www.fas.org/nuke/guide/pakistan/facility/khushab.htm
5 See www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/facility/nuke/index
6 The KH-4B cameras took images on photographic film. For such a system, the most common definition of spatial resolution is based on its ability to resolve parallel dark bars. The spatial resolution definition used in this paper is that used for electro-optical sensors, the “instantaneous field of view” (IFOV) on the ground of a single system “pixel” detector element. This depends not only on the characteristics of the detector and of the optical system, but also the orbit height and the wavelength of the radiation to be detected. Approximately two pixels are required to present the same amount of ground information as one line pair at “normal” film contrast. Therefore, the 1m (3ft) IFOV images produced by the new commercial satellites are comparable to the 1.8m (6ft) resolution photographic images produced by the KH-4B. However, using digital image processing techniques, the 1m resolution images of the new commercial satellites can be made to appear clearer than those from the KH-4B satellites.
7 www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/facility/nuke
9 www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/facility/nuke/
VISITING FELLOWSHIP PROGRAMME

To better address issues of regional security and to help promote regional co-operation and development of indigenous research capacity, UNIDIR is extending its Visiting Fellowship Programme to host four researchers from a single region to work together at UNIDIR for four to six months per year. Researchers will be chosen from different countries that form the region of study. The focus of their research will be a particularly difficult aspect of regional security and it is hoped that the resulting research paper will feed into policy debates on the security of their region.

The Visiting Fellowship Programme for the year 2000 will focus on South Asia. In the second half of the year, UNIDIR will welcome its first group of researchers from the region. The fellowships will be allocated on a competitive basis, taking due care to obtain regional representation. The exact details of the research topic will be collectively decided between UNIDIR and the four fellows. In subsequent years, fellows will be attracted from other regions, such as West Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, North East Asia, Southern Africa, Central Europe, East Africa and so on.

For more information about UNIDIR’s Visiting Fellowship Programme, please contact:

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TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

UNIDIR, in cooperation with the Monterey Institute of International Studies and Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, has launched a research project on the urgent issue of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). The project addresses such topics as the definition of TNWs, numbers, the roles of TNWs in various military and political doctrines, and future measures to address the TNW problem. The project will be carried out over a period of nine months at UNIDIR. The Institute has commissioned
papers from experts and has coordinated the research and a research meeting. The preliminary findings of the study were circulated at the May NPT Review Conference. The project will result in the publication of a Research Report in the UNIDIR series and a “UNIDIR Brief” setting out the main findings of the study in succinct form for broad distribution.

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The Costs of Disarmament

In order to present the cost-benefit analysis of disarmament, UNIDIR proposes to take key countries as examples and carefully research what their commitments to disarmament treaties means to them in terms of financial and resource costs. In addition, the project will try to ascertain what each country perceives are the benefits brought to them through their participation in the agreements and whether there is consensus that there is a net gain to the state in question. The aim of the project is to achieve a better understanding of the costs and benefits of disarmament agreements with a view to assisting policy-makers decide how money is spent on such commitments, which budget lines are best structured to handle such spending and how states could approach this aspect of negotiations in the future.

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Peace-building and Practical Disarmament in West Africa

UNIDIR is currently running a project on peace-building and practical disarmament in West Africa. The project is undertaken within the framework of the West African Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons, signed on 31 October 1998 in Abuja (Nigeria). The project aims at strengthening the necessary participation of West African civil societies in the implementation of the moratorium. The broad objective is to build grass-root capacities
through research on peace and security issues and to empower ordinary citizens in such a way that civil society organizations become determinant constituencies for disarmament and arms control.

After several tours of the region by the Project Manager, a first collection of papers by selected authors from Sierra Leone is undergoing preparation for publication.

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**Information Technology Warfare**

As part of the response to General Assembly resolution 53/70 on “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security”, the Department of Disarmament Affairs and UNIDIR held a discussion meeting in Geneva on 25 and 26 August 1999. The meeting was attended by over seventy participants from more than forty countries.

The meeting aimed to raise awareness among Member States of security issues relating to developments in Information and Communications Technologies (ICT) and to initiate multilateral dialogues. The workshop provided the first forum of its kind at this level for governmental and non-governmental experts to discuss these issues. A summary is available on our website.

For more information, please contact:

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E-mail: jseck@unog.ch

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**UNIDIR Handbook on Arms Control**

UNIDIR is producing a handbook that will explain the major concepts and terms relating to arms control. The handbook will be used as both a primer for an audience with limited familiarity with arms control and as a reference for students, scholars, diplomats and journalists who are more experienced in arms control matters.
The handbook will be organized as a thematically structured glossary of approximately 400 terms relating to arms control. Each term is situated within its wider context so that, on the one hand, a specific term can be looked up quickly, and on the other hand, an entire issue can be covered. Cross-references to other terms and concepts will point the reader to relevant related issues. The researcher designing and drafting the handbook will be assisted by an editorial committee consisting of regional and arms control experts.

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Fissile Materials

In April 1999, UNIDIR published Fissile Material Stocks: Characteristics, Measures and Policy Options by William Walker and Frans Berkhout. The publication is intended to support the Conference on Disarmament in its thinking on the range of options available to deal with stocks of fissile material. Additionally, UNIDIR has commissioned a report on fissile material inventories to provide an up-to-date account of fissile materials, assess national policies related to the production, disposition and verification of fissile materials, and identify facilities and locations which might be subject to safeguards under a treaty.

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UNIDIR Disarmament Seminars

UNIDIR occasionally holds small, informal meetings on various topics related to disarmament, security and non-proliferation. These off-the-record gatherings allow members of the disarmament community, missions and NGOs to have an opportunity to discuss a specific topic with an expert. Recent topics covered include fissile materials, the prevention of war, peace-building in West Africa, reducing nuclear dangers, and biological and chemical weapons programmes. Speakers at recent meetings have included William Walker, Ambassador Jonathan Dean, Michael Krepon and Peter Batchelor.
DATARIs

In cooperation with SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute), UNIDIR has developed an online database of disarmament, arms control, security and peace research institutes and projects around the world. The database can be accessed through UNIDIR’s website and institutes can update their information via a password.

If you would like for your institute to be included in DATARIs, please contact:

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Geneva Forum

Together with the Programme for Strategic and International Security Studies of the Graduate Institute of International Studies and the Quaker United Nations Office, UNIDIR organizes an ongoing discussion series called Geneva Forum. Thanks to the generous support of the Government of Switzerland, Geneva Forum focuses on issues related to small arms and light weapons. Invited speakers deal with specific thematic and/or regional dimensions of the issue. Geneva Forum is an occasional seminar held at the Palais des Nations that addresses contemporary issues. The series targets the local missions and organizations in an effort to disseminate information on a range of security and disarmament topics. The series seeks to act as a bridge between the international research community and Geneva-based diplomats and journalists.

If you would like more information about Geneva Forum, please contact:

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African regional and subregional organizations have an important role to play in the promotion of peace and security on their continent. The United Nations Security Council has relied on them excessively, however, in large part because it has been reluctant to authorize United Nations peacekeeping operations. Although there is merit to strengthening indigenous capabilities, the issue of whether Africans are prepared for the challenge of assuming primary responsibility for responding to conflicts is another matter. What can African states and organizations do to enhance their peacekeeping capabilities? How can the international community better tailor its initiatives to the needs of African actors? This book answers such questions.

Part I of this book describes challenges to African peace and security and discusses the reasons why the United Nations Security Council has changed its peacekeeping policy. Part II examines African attempts to manage and resolve conflicts on their continent. Part III reviews African peacekeeping experience outside of African regional, subregional and ad hoc initiatives. Part IV describes and analyses efforts made by non-African states to address the deficit. The study concludes with a series of recommendations on how to make current approaches more effective. It provides concrete suggestions for strengthening African regional and subregional efforts and for improving Western capacity-building programmes. It also emphasizes that the United Nations must assume a greater role in both promoting and undertaking peacekeeping on the African continent.

Preface by the Secretary-General

PART I Setting the Stage
PART II African Organizations and Ad Hoc Initiatives
PART III Understanding African Peacekeeping Abilities and Limitations
PART IV Efforts to Develop African Capacities
Conclusion
Annexes and Selected Bibliography

Eric Berman and Katie Sams

Sales number GV.E.00.0.4
Although Central Asia has been seriously afflicted by the proliferation, accumulation and misuse of small arms, the region has been largely ignored by the international community. This report attempts to highlight the gravity of the situation in the region by describing the ways in which the small arms problem manifests itself within the Central Asian context. The study specifically focuses on the following issues: the factors generating demand for small arms; the external and internal sources of small arms; the routes through which arms and ammunition are transferred; the various types of small arms in circulation; the humanitarian, political and societal implications of small arms; and finally, the factors hampering the efforts to combat the small arms problem. The study concludes with remarks on the impact of small arms in Central Asia and on possible approaches for their control.

Afghanistan: Two Decades of Armed Conflict
   The Cold War Legacy
   Small Arms and the Taliban Ascendancy
   The Human Costs of Small Arms

The Conflict in Tajikistan
   The Civil War 1992-1997
   The Sources of Small Arms
   The Fragile Peace

Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan: Small Arms and Latent Threats to Stability
   Weaponized Societies
   Potential Sources of Armed Internal Conflict

Bobi Pirseyedi

ISBN 92-9045-134-3
Sales number GV.E.00.0.6
Recognizing the threats to national security posed by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, West African States have sought to address the issue through a subregional grouping, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Inspired by the “security first” approach, on 31 October 1998, in Abuja, all sixteen ECOWAS member states signed the Declaration of a moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons in West Africa.

The Moratorium — commonly known as the West African Small Arms Moratorium — entered into force on 1 November 1998, for a renewable period of three years. This Moratorium is an innovative approach to peace-building and conflict prevention. It is not a legally binding regime but rather an expression of shared political will. In order for the Moratorium regime to be effective, concrete measures need to be adopted to ensure that West African governments remember this political commitment and to mobilize national, regional and international support for its implementation. Located in Bamako, the Programme for Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) is the designated implementation mechanism for the Moratorium.

On 23 and 24 March 1999, ECOWAS, the UN Development Programme and the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa hosted high-level consultations with West African and small arms experts to elaborate the modalities for the implementation of PCASED. This report outlines the various discussions that took place within both the Experts’ Meeting and the Civil Society Meeting about these priority areas.

Jacqueline Seck

United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research
United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa

GE.00-00475
UNIDIR/2000/2
Small Arms Control: Old Weapons, New Issues

The twenty-nine papers collected in this volume were originally prepared for four regional workshops organized by the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs to inform the work of the United Nations Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms. These workshops were held during 1995–96. Most of the papers were updated in 1998. Authors include academic, military, governmental and activist experts.

The editorial committee consisted of: Jayantha Dhanapala, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations; Mitsuro Donowaki, Ambassador and Special Assistant to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan; Swadesh Rana, Chief, Conventional Arms Branch, Department for Disarmament Affairs, United Nations; and Lora Lumpe, Senior Researcher for the Norwegian Initiative on Small Arms Transfers (NISAT) at the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO).

The publication is divided into four parts:

Causal Factors and Policy Considerations
The Problem of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Africa
The Proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean
The Plague of Small Arms and Light Weaponry in South Asia

Jayantha Dhanapala, Mitsuro Donowaki, Swadesh Rana and Lora Lumpe
Editors

UNIDIR/Ashgate publication
ISBN 0 7546 2076 X
In 1998, on the basis of the Shannon Mandate, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) established an ad hoc committee for negotiating a fissile materials treaty. The treaty is intended to achieve a ban on the production of fissile materials for military purposes in a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally verifiably manner. Stocks of fissile materials have accrued transnationally due to armament and disarmament processes, as well as to civil uses of nuclear power. However, very little is known in the public domain about the nature, size and whereabouts of such stocks, and the complexities surrounding their regulation and control. UNIDIR’s report on fissile material stocks seeks to begin to redress this problem by providing factual background information on all of these important matters. The report categorizes and quantifies fissile material stocks, and examines the measures which have heretofore been developed regarding their control and management. The report also includes an overview of broad policy options available to states in addressing the stocks issue, which could prove valuable in informing negotiations in the CD.

Fissile material stocks: function, scale and distribution
Characterization by type of inventory
The scale, type and location of fissile material stocks
Measures relating to fissile material stocks: recent developments
Military inventories: continuing absence of international regulation
Transitional inventories: towards regulation and disposition
Civil inventories: the extension of transparency
Policy strategies and options
Stocks and the FMT: possible diplomatic approaches
Possible measures for reducing risks posed by fissile material stocks
Fissile materials and their production processes
International safeguards and physical protection

William Walker and Frans Berkhout

Sales no. GV.E.99.0.15
ISBN 92-9045-131-9
United Nations peace operations have a tradition of several decades, and their scope and importance has increased markedly since the end of the Cold War. Peacekeeping operations, both of the traditional and the extended type, comprise monitoring tasks as a central part of their mandates. Agreements or resolutions, whether they demand withdrawal behind a cease-fire line, keeping a buffer zone demilitarized, or banning heavy weapons in control zones or safe havens, require that compliance is checked reliably and impartially. The more comprehensive the monitoring, the more likely the compliance. In practice, however, monitoring duties often require the surveillance of such large areas that United Nations peacekeeping units cannot provide continuous coverage. Thus, peacekeeping personnel are permanently deployed only at control points on the roads or areas deemed most sensitive. Minor roads and open terrain are covered by spot-check patrols. This creates many opportunities for infractions and violations.

Unattended ground sensor systems allow all this to change. Unattended ground sensors are suited to permanent, continuous monitoring. They can be deployed at important points or along sections of a control line, sense movement or the presence of vehicles, persons, weapons, etc. in their vicinity and signal an alarm. This alerts peacekeepers in a monitoring centre or command post, who can send a rapid-reaction patrol immediately to the site to confront the intruders, try to stop them, or at least document the infraction unequivocally.

Unattended ground sensor systems generally have not been used in peace operations. Thus, the wider introduction of unattended ground sensor systems in future United Nations peace operations requires fresh study from operational, practitioner, system design and legal perspectives. Sensors for Peace is an excellent first look at this timely issue.

Introduction — Jürgen Altmann, Horst Fisher & Henny J. van der Graaf
The Use of Unattended Ground Sensors in Peace Operations — Henny J. van der Graaf
Questionnaire Answers Analysis — Willem A. Huijssoon
Technical Potentials, Status and Costs of Ground Sensor Systems — Reinhard Blumrich
Maintaining Consent: The Legality of Ground Sensors in Peace Operations — Ralph Czarnecki
Conclusions and Recommendations — Jürgen Altmann, Horst Fisher & Henny J. van der Graaf

Jürgen Altmann, Horst Fischer and Henny J. van der Graaf
Editors

Sales No. GV.8.98.0.28
ISBN 92-9045-130-0
The Implications of South Asia’s Nuclear Tests for Non-proliferation and Disarmament Regimes

On 7 and 8 September 1998, UNIDIR held a private, off-the-record meeting on The Implications of South Asia’s Nuclear Tests for the Non-proliferation and Disarmament Regimes. This “track one and a half” meeting was designed to address the needs of policy-makers — governmental and non-governmental agents — in their assessment of the impact of the nuclear-weapons tests carried out by India and Pakistan in May 1998. The governments of Australia, Denmark, Italy, Norway, New Zealand and the United States generously sponsored the meeting.

More than fifty people from over twenty-five countries attended the conference. Each participant attended in his or her personal capacity as an expert and not as a representative of a country or a NGO. At the end of this two-day meeting, there was general agreement among participants that neither India nor Pakistan had enhanced its own security or international status by conducting the tests, but that the risk of nuclear war in the region is now greater. Also, it was recognized that the NPT and the CTBT had been in difficulty prior to the tests, although they remained the best solutions available to reduce potential for further conflict and therefore remained crucial. Finally, many participants expressed their concern that if India and Pakistan were rewarded in any way for demonstrating their nuclear capabilities, this may cause some NPT members to reassess their membership in the regime.

International response to the nuclear tests in South Asia was inadequate: there is a need for more coherent and collective action. Participants focused on practical suggestions to policy-makers to reduce the risk of war; to save the non-proliferation and nuclear arms control regimes; and to anticipate the effects of the tests on areas of regional tensions, particularly the Middle East.

The Responses to the Tests
Causes of the Tests
Consequences of the Tests
Regional Security
Consequences for Non-Proliferation and Disarmament
Damage Limitation
Developing the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Agenda
Conclusions and Policy Options
Main Summary
Prevention of Nuclear War
Saving the Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Regimes
The Effects on Regional Tensions, Especially in the Middle East

GE.99-00415
UNIDIR/99/2
A Peace of Timbuktu: Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking

Mali is admired for two recent accomplishments. The first is the country’s transition to democracy, which took place in 1991–1992. This effort included the overthrow of Moussa Traoré’s twenty-three year military dictatorship on 26 March 1991 — a process of military and civilian collaboration which fostered national reconciliation, a referendum for a new constitution, and elections which brought to power Mali’s first democratically elected president, government and legislature. The second achievement is the peacemaking between the Government of Mali and the rebel movements in the northern part of the country: this process successfully prevented the outbreak of civil war and presents useful lessons in preventive diplomacy for the international community. The peacemaking culminated in a ceremony known as the Flame of Peace, when rebel weapons were incinerated in Timbuktu on 27 March 1996. This study of the events surrounding the uprisings in the North of Mali and the measures which restored peace (and those which will maintain it) is the result of a collaboration between the United Nations Development Programme and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

This peace process was remarkable for the way in which the United Nations agencies were able to help, discreetly dropping oil into the machinery of peacemaking. For a cost of less than $1 million, the United Nations helped the Malians to avoid a war, and lit the Flame of Peace. With less than $10 million, the United Nations became the leading partner of Mali’s Government and civil society, in peace-building, disarming the ex-combatants and integrating 11,000 of them into public service and into the socio-economy of the North through a United Nations Trust Fund. The experience shows that not only is peacemaking better than peace-keeping, but that it is much cheaper.

A Peace of Timbuktu includes in-depth coverage of the following topics:
• Mali’s History and Natural Environment
• The Build-up to the Crisis in Northern Mali
• The Armed Revolt 1990–1997
• Peacemaking and the Process of Disarmament
• The International Community as a Catalyst for Peace
• Ensuring Continued Peace and Development in Mali
• The Flame of Peace Burns New Paths for the United Nations

United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan has written the preface. The book includes maps, texts of relevant documents and laws, and a bibliography, as well as photographs by the authors and peace drawings by the children of Mali.

Robin Edward Poulton and Ibrahim ag Youssouf

Sales No. G.V.E.98.0.3
ISBN 92-9045-125-4
Updated second edition now available in French
Curbing Illicit Trafficking in Small Arms and Sensitive Technologies: An Action-Oriented Agenda

Illicit trafficking affects both the stability of states and the safety of their populations. There are no national or regional boundaries delimiting this type of traffic: the problem is truly global and has multifaceted ramifications. Curbing its further development and proliferation calls for a better assessment of the phenomenon and a new way of looking at problems and identifying solutions. In a world of growing interdependence, one of our greatest challenges today is making bold decisions establishing new priorities and starting innovative cooperative ventures, while changing old ways of thinking and working.

Issues and Aspects — Jasjit Singh
Weapons of Mass Destruction — Alfredo Luzuriaga
Trafficking in Delivery System Technologies and Components — Genaro Mario Sciola
Small Arms, Drugs and Terrorist Groups in South America — Silvia Cucovaz
Central America and Northern South America — Daniel Ávila Camacho
The Role of Manufacturers and Dealers — Carlos Fernández
National and International Initiatives — Wilfrido Robledo Madrid
African and European Issues — Stefano Dragani
Small Arms Trafficking, Drug Trafficking and Terrorism — Antonio García Revilla
The Role of Arms Manufacturers and Traffickers — Rubén José Lorenzo
Developing New Links with International Policing — Donald Manross
Border Patrols and Other Monitoring Systems — Julio César Saborío A.
The Role of State — Swadesh Rana
Nuclear Materials and Vector Components — Olivier Mahler
Nuclear/Radioactive Substances — Hiroaki Takizawa
Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Material — Pedro Villagra Delgado
Illicit Trafficking in Chemical Agents — Masashi Matsuo
Prospects and Strategies — Louise Hand
Awareness and Access to Biological Weapons — Malcolm Dando
Strengthening the Convention on Biological and Toxic Weapons — Louise Hand
The Role of Intelligence Services — José Athos Irigaray dos Santos
The Role of Export Controls in Addressing Proliferation Concerns — Sergei Zamyatin
Control Regimes for Toxic Chemicals and Pathogens — Malcolm Dando & Graham S. Pearson
Using Satellites to Track and Monitor Illicit Traffic — Panaiotios Xefteris & Maurizio Fargnoli
The Situation in Latin America — Marta Parodi
Other Regions in Perspective — Isabel Sarmiento
Strengthening International Cooperation — Patricia Salomone
Nuclear Issues — María José Cassina
Chemical and Biological Agents — Eduardo Duarte
A New Agenda for Control Regimes? — Luis Alberto Padilla
Final Recommendations — Eduardo Pelayo, Péricles Gasparini Alves & Daiana Belinda Cipollone

Péricles Gasparini Alves and Daiana Belinda Cipollone
Editors

English GVE.98.0.8 ISBN 92-9045-127-0
Spanish GVS.98.0.8 ISBN 92-9045-128-9
The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) through the initiative of regional parties, approved by the United Nations General Assembly, and endorsed by the relevant external states, is an important contribution to non-proliferation, disarmament and, above all, to international security.

Jointly with OPANAL (The Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean) and the Government of Mexico, UNIDIR convened an international seminar on “Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones in the Next Century” in Mexico City on 13–14 February 1997 — the thirtieth anniversary of the Treaty of Tlatelolco’s opening for signature. This book analyzes the role of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as the first effective expression of a NWFZ in a densely inhabited part of the globe. It also covers other NWFZs (existing or proposed). The relationship between NWFZs and peace processes, as well as cooperation among existing NWFZs, is also noted.

Towards the Consolidation of the First NWFZ in the World — Sergio González Gálvez
Precursor of Other NWFZs — Enrique Román-Morey
Tlatelolco and a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World — William Epstein
Actual Projection of the Treaty of Tlatelolco — Jorge Berguño Barnes
Major Paradigms of International Relations — Luis Alberto Padilla
Precedents and Legacies: Tlatelolco’s Contribution to the 21st Century — John R. Redick
The Treaty of Rarotonga — Makurita Baaro
The Pelindaba Treaty — Isaac E. Ayewah
The Bangkok Treaty — Arumugam Canapathy
A Nuclear-Weapon-Free Space in Central and Eastern Europe — Alyaksandr Sychou
A Possible NWFZ in Central Europe — Michael Weston
NWFZ in the Middle East — Nabil Elaraby
Middle East: Future Perspectives — Yitzhak Lior
Central Asia: Future Perspectives — Jargalsaikhan Enkhsaikhan
Denuclearization Efforts on the Korean Peninsula — Seo-Hang Lee
South Asia and the Korean Peninsula — Kim Chan Sik
Towards the Zero Option in Nuclear Weapons? — Thomas Graham, Jr.
A World Free of Nuclear Weapons in the Year 2020 — Antonio de Icaza
The Role Carried Out by the Zones Exempt from Nuclear Arms — Joëlle Bourgeois
Strengthening of OPANAL: New Challenges for the Future — Héctor Gros Espiell

Péricles Gasparini Alves and Daiana Belinda Cipollone
Editors

English Sales No. GVE.97.0.29 ISBN 92-9045-122-X
Spanish Sales No. GVS.97.0.29 ISBN 92-9045-124-6
The European security landscape is undergoing a profound transformation at present, and there is an increasing need to improve mutual understanding of regional security issues in a rapidly changing world. Institutes and related organizations working in the field of international security have an important role to play in this regard.

This book contains a forward-looking appraisal of how information technology can best serve institutes and the security dialogue. It addresses issues such as how to promote concrete cooperation between research institutes in Europe and North America. Of particular importance is the appraisal of present and prospective demands for cooperative ventures between and among institutes in Europe, the United States and Canada. It also provides insight on how to put together intellectual, human, material and financial resources to foster cooperation, notably in the identification of partners, information needs, connectivity issues and fund-raising strategies. In this respect, a number of innovative recommendations are made in a plan of action to increase cooperation in the late 1990s and well into the next millennium.

Assessing Partnership Initiatives — Andreas Wenger & Stephan Libiszewski
Identifying the Needs of International Organizations — Anthony Antoine & Gustaaf Geeraerts
Increasing Interregional Exchanges and Partnerships — Seyfi Tashan
Information Needs and Information Processing in International Security — Gerd Hagmeyer-Gaverus
A New Approach to Conflict Prevention and Mediation Processes — Albrecht A. C. von Müller
A European Information Network on International Relations and Area Studies — Dietrich Seydel
Appraising the Status of East/West Connectivity Problems — Zsolt Pataki
The Need to Improve Basic East-West Computer Equipment and Supplies — Christoph Reichert
Connectivity Issues: Political and Financial Constraints — Edward Ivanian
American and European Foundations: A Stock-Taking — Mary Lord
Assessing International Grant Making by US Foundations — Loren Renz
European Fund-Raising: Innovative Cooperation Schemes — Xavier Pacreau
Assisting the Development and Consolidation of Democratic Security — Francis Rosentiel
Preparing Tomorrow’s Research Establishments — István Szönyi
Joint Research Activities: The Bulgarian Experience — Sonia Hinkova

Péricles Gasparini Alves
Editor

Sales No. GVE.97.0.23
ISBN 92-1-100759-3
The Transfer of Sensitive Technologies and the Future of Control Regimes

This book comprises papers by fourteen international experts from the diplomatic, military and academic communities in which they identify tomorrow’s key technologies in both weapon systems and components, particularly emerging technologies that may become objects of control and constraint eight to ten years hence. This includes conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, but special attention is also given to sensor technologies and technologies for the collection, processing and dissemination of information. The authors attempt to identify cooperative technology transfer controls which are likely to forge new approaches to solve old problems. In this connection, the book presents imaginative and challenging ideas as regards the relationship between technology supplier and recipient states. This publication is essential to those who are interested in following the trends in the transfer of sensitive technologies in the next decade, as well as those concerned with the political and diplomatic issues related to such developments.

Foreword — General Alberto Mendes Cardoso
Major Weapon Systems — Ravinder Pal Singh
Chemical and Biological Weapons — Graham S. Pearson
Nuclear Weapons — Mark Goodman
Emerging Sensor Technology: Technology Transfer and Control — Leonard John Otten III
The Transfer of Space Technology — Masashi Matsuo
Impacts of the “Information Revolution” — Jeffrey R. Cooper
Chemical, Biological and Nuclear Weapons Enabling Technology — Michael Moodie
Launchers and Satellites — Mario Sciola
The Need to Ensure Technology Transfer — Jasjit Singh
Prospective Technology Transfer Controls — Alain Esterle
The Role of Intelligence Services — Rodrigo Toranzo
Intelligence Services and Non-Proliferation Control Instruments — The Brazilian Intelligence Service
The Export/Import Monitoring Mechanism (EIMM) — Frank R. Cleminson
Summary and Conclusions — Sverre Lodgaard

Péricles Gasparini Alves and Kerstin Hoffman
Editors

Sales No. GVE.97.0.10
ISBN 92-1-100744-5
Non-offensive defence (NOD) emerged as a proposed remedy to the military security problems of East and West during the latter part of the Cold War. Grounded in the notion of “cooperative security”, NOD is premised on the postulate that states in the international system are better off pursuing military policies which take account of each other’s legitimate security interests than they are in trying to gain security at each others’ expense. Competitive military policies which seek to achieve national security through a build-up of national military means, may well be counter-productive and leave states more insecure. Seeking to procure national military security through a build-up of national armaments raises suspicions as to the purpose of these armaments, which in turn trigger countervailing armament efforts which ultimately lower the level of security for all. By making the defence of domestic territory the sole and clear objective of national military policies, NOD aims to strike a balance between the imperatives of ensuring adequate national military security and of avoiding provocation.

NOD aims towards national military defences strong enough to ensure adequate national military security, but not strong enough to be seen as threatening by others. The provision of adequate yet non-threatening military defence can be highly useful in a region such as the Middle East where political and military confrontations are inextricably linked, and where political settlement in the absence of military security is inconceivable. In the Middle East, NOD could reduce prevailing military tensions and open the way for broader political arrangements on the future of the region.

The introduction of NOD in the Middle East would not require that all Middle Eastern states adopt the same NOD model. Rather, each Middle Eastern state can select the particular NOD model most suitable to its requirements.
This book sets out to clarify some of the prerequisites and modalities of a confidence-building process in outer space. It is the result of efforts undertaken by several experts on outer space matters who examine the role of earth-to-space monitoring in enhancing the safety of outer space activities and preventing the deployment of weapons in that environment. The book concludes by proposing the creation of an International Earth-to-Space Monitoring Network (ESMON) as the most appropriate means to improve both transparency and predictability in outer space activities.
Evolving Trends in the Dual Use of Satellites

Earth-observation, global-positioning, communications and other satellite data are playing increasingly important roles in international security events. This book evolved from discussions by various experts in different areas of satellite technology and applications who met to debate the evolution and implications of such dual-use events. Particular emphasis has been given to providing an understanding of the policy orientation of space agencies and private companies both in traditional and emerging space-competent states. Moreover, the book aims at improving the knowledge of manufacturers, suppliers, users and experts of each others’ capabilities and possibilities for cooperation. In this context, attention has been directed to a discussion on the different technical and financial aspects of satellite R&D, as well as the present and prospective markets for satellite data, particularly tomorrow’s dual use of satellites.

Satellite Capabilities of Traditional Space-Competent States — Masashi Matsuo
Satellite Capabilities of Emerging Space-Competent States — Gerald M. Steinberg
Current and Future Remote Sensing Data Markets — Arturo Silvestrini
Prevention of, Preparedness for and Relief of Natural Disasters — Olavi Elo
Satellite Data and Man-Made Events — Giovanni Cannizzaro & Paolo Cecamore
New Civilian Applications of Satellite Data — Kiran Karnik
Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management — D. Ignacio Barbudo Escobar
Verification of Arms Limitation and Disarmament Agreements — Claude Jung
Dual-use Satellites — Stanislav N. Rodionov
The Argentine National Space Plan — Genaro Mario Sciola
The Romanian Space Programme — Ion-Alexandre Plaviciosu
Policy Orientations of Space Agencies: the French Example — Jean-Daniel Levi
Economic Interests and Military Space Systems — Scott Pace
Regional Organizations: the Experience of the WEU — Horst Holthoff
UNISPACE III: An Expression of Diplomacy for Development — Raimundo Gonzalez Aninat

Péricles Gasparini Alves
Editor

Sales No. GVE.96.0.20
ISBN 92-9045-115-7
Recent UNIDIR Research Papers


No. 31  *Halting the Production of Fissile Material for Nuclear Weapons*, by Thérèse Delpech, Lewis A. Dunn, David Fischer and Rakesh Sood, 1994, 70p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.94.0.29.

No. 30  *The CTBT and Beyond*, by Herbert F. York, 1994, 21p., United Nations publication, Sales No. GV.E.94.0.27.


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