In July and August 2018, the Government of Burkina Faso in cooperation with UNIDIR implemented a national Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) baseline assessment in Burkina Faso.

Led by national authorities, in particular the National Commission for the Fight against the Proliferation of Small Arms (CNLPAL), the objectives of this round of consultations were to establish a baseline of existing WAM activities and procedures in place, to identify areas to be strengthened, and to present recommendations for policy and programmatic responses to build a national framework governing the management of arms and ammunition.

The series of consultations offered the opportunity for representatives, experts and practitioners from various institutions and security agencies within Burkina Faso to engage in dialogue, build trust, and improve needed cooperation between them to design and implement a strong national WAM framework.

The exchanges and information provided in the course of the national consultation and bilateral meetings with senior representatives of relevant national institutions with WAM oversight, were consolidated into a report and shared with the Government of Burkina Faso to support its efforts in improving its national weapons and ammunition framework.

This publication is an extract of the baseline assessment report delivered to the national authorities of Burkina Faso. It is a snapshot of the summary of the main findings and options identified for the enhancement of Weapons and Ammunition Management in Burkina Faso.

It presents the status of strategic and operational WAM efforts in Burkina Faso as identified during the baseline assessment in the end of July and the start of August 2018 and highlights the practical recommendations provided to the authorities of Burkina Faso.
UNIDIR defines WAM in a comprehensive manner covering the oversight, accountability and governance of arms and ammunition throughout their management cycle, including the establishment of relevant national frameworks, processes and practices for the safe and secure production and acquisition of materiel, stockpiling, transfers, end use control, tracing and disposal. This holistic approach is essential in ensuring that efforts to better regulate arms and ammunition are undertaken in alignment with broader security sector, rule of law, armed violence reduction, counter-terrorism, and peacebuilding processes, and not in isolation. Research emphasis is placed on national and regional approaches to WAM in pursuit of a national and regionally owned process, and to support a ‘bottom-up’ and evidence-based approach.

This Country Insight on Burkina Faso is part of a series of Country Insights that seek to promote knowledge, and raise visibility and awareness on the WAM context, progress made, and areas for enhancement in the African States that have conducted WAM baseline assessments with support from UNIDIR. The series is aimed to serve as a reference for international partners for providing assistance and technical support for improving weapons and ammunition frameworks in the relevant country. Information contained in this Country Insight presents key findings and recommendations of the baseline assessment conducted in July-August 2018. It does not reflect the progress made or any changes implemented after the assessment and should be taken to be indicative only of the situation at the time of the assessment.

Building on the multi-year WAM baseline assessments in Africa, UNIDIR, in partnership with the African Union (AU) Commission and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Commission, aims to enhance knowledge and dialogue among States, regional organizations, the United Nations and expert Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) on good practices and lessons learned, as well as on the means and methods to further strengthen national and regional approaches to WAM in Africa.

Since the political transition period, crisis and the successful holding of presidential elections in 2017, Burkina Faso has faced significant security challenges and a deteriorating security situation. This has been marked by two crises in the sub-/regional level, namely the Libya crisis of 2011 and the Malian crisis in 2012, as well as the resulting asymmetric threats posed by armed non-state actors including terrorist groups, accompanied by increasing attacks and armed violence. Two major terrorist attacks took place in the Capital Ouagadougou, in January 2016 and in March 2018.

Burkina Faso has made strong efforts at the national, sub-/regional and international level to address these challenges. At the national level, in May 2018, the President of the Republic, Roch Marc Christian Kabore, gathered a High Council of National Defense, to lay the foundations for a reform of the security apparatus; building-up of security forces in the field to protect State representatives and the civilian population; and the announcement of a complete revision of the national defence law. At the sub-/regional level, Burkina Faso, together with Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, is a founding member of the Group of five Sahel States (Sahel G-5), which in 2017 created a joint military force (the FC-G5) to combat armed non-state actors including terrorist groups as well as transnational criminal networks in the sub-/region. Internationally, Burkina Faso is the top troop contributing country and fourth largest police contributing country to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), supporting the political process and security tasks in Mali, with which it shares its largest land border in the North of the country.

The observations summarized below were made during the consultative process, which examined nine pillars of WAM and are drawn from comments and priorities set out by the participants.
# OVERVIEW OF WAM ENHANCEMENT OPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Number of Options</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Legal Framework</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>National Coordination Mechanism</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Transfer Controls</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Physical Security and Stockpile Management</strong></td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Weapons Marking</strong></td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Record Keeping</strong></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Processing &amp; Tracing of Captures, Seized &amp; Collected Weapons</strong></td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Civilian Possession (Including Weapons Collection)</strong></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Destruction</strong></td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Number of Options: 48**
TECHNICAL PILLAR 1: LEGAL FRAMEWORK

KEY FINDINGS

- Burkina Faso has a solid, long established and increasingly complex legal framework and national legislation on arms control and management. As of August 2018, the Burkina Faso Government was undertaking a review process to strengthen its domestic legal architecture, in line with international and regional instruments. The process focused on two key draft national laws. The first is the draft law to domesticate the provisions of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) into national law, with decrees ready for its application, and the second is the draft national law on the arms regime in Burkina Faso. During the July/August 2018 consultative process, this legal review process was ongoing.

- At the time of the assessment, there was an opportunity for Burkina Faso to strengthen its domestic legal architecture during the parliamentary process to vote on these two pieces of important legislation, and their subsequent adoption by the Government. Once adopted, Burkina Faso will have to ensure the full and effective implementation of both new laws, as well as take steps to sensitize and raise awareness among all relevant national stakeholders and the civilian population of these changes in the legal framework.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

1. Continue to work on the review process for the elaboration and adoption of the national legislation on arms and ammunition in Burkina Faso.

2. Inform and sensitize national actors as well as the civilian population on the national legislation on arms and ammunition, in collaboration with civil society organizations.

3. Once adopted, ensure full and effective implementation of the new national legislation on arms and ammunition.

4. Ensure the effective implementation of follow up mechanisms on temporary import authorizations for civilian arms and ammunition of professional foreign hunters.

5. Find a solution to take into account arms held by armorers and private security companies which do not fulfill the detention permit criteria.

6. Elaborate and disseminate largely a compendium of national legislation on arms and ammunition in Burkina Faso.

7. Introduce proof of training in weapons use as part of the process of application and obtention of a license to hold or carry a weapon.

TECHNICAL PILLAR 2: NATIONAL COORDINATION MECHANISM

KEY FINDINGS

- The coordination of national policy, strategy, and action plans, including with relevant programmes and operations, is essential for achieving effective WAM in Burkina Faso. The Burkinabe national coordination mechanism is composed of two key national authorities: the High Authority on Arms Imports Control and Their Use (HACIAU); and the CNLPAL. HACIAU is the competent national authority for the ATT, covering the import and use of conventional arms and their ammunition/munitions including small arms and light weapons (SALW); the CNLPAL is the national authority with a mandate, mission and scope covering the control of SALW and ammunition.

- The UNIDIR assessment team recognized a need for Burkina Faso to clearly communicate to regional and international partners and actors the mandates, roles, responsibilities and assistance needs of both the HACIAU and the CNLPAL, with a view to strength-
enhancing the national coordination mechanism. There are also opportunities: (i) to explore, define and establish linkages between the increased and centralized National Intelligence Agency (ANR) and its inclusion in the national WAM institutional architecture; (ii) seek financial support for the establishment and operationalization of an Armed Violence Observatory (OVA); and (iii) to link the operationalized platform for identification, reconciliation and police information/analysis (IRAPOL) with arms and ammunition registries and data.

**OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT**

8. Enhance the capacities of the different institutions involved in weapons and ammunition management so that they can assume their State tasks down to the decentralized level.

9. Communicate funding needs to national authorities as well as financial and technical partners for increased resource mobilization for weapons and ammunition management.

10. Enhance information exchange between the different institutions involved in weapons and ammunition management for enhanced efficiency of their operations and activities.

11. Accelerate the operationalization of IRAPOL specifically with regards to weapons and ammunition management.

12. Continue outreach and resource mobilization for the creation and operationalization of an OVA and integrate it into the national institutional architecture governing weapons and ammunition management.

**TECHNICAL PILLAR 3:
TRANSFER CONTROLS**

**KEY FINDINGS**

- Burkina Faso’s regulation of conventional arms transfers, including its systems of import control and end use/r control, is often described as a good model in the West Africa sub-/region, with a dedicated national authority (i.e. HACIAU), as well as a coordinating and information-sharing mechanism. HACIAU has inter alia developed its own end use/r documentation and is the competent national authority for the full and effective implementation of the ATT. The implementation of the Treaty has been highlighted as one of the key priorities to enhance the regulation of arms transfers including import and end use/r controls.

- There is a need and opportunity to sensitize exporting States, through the appropriate channels and under relevant frameworks (e.g. ECOWAS, AU, UN), to respect Burkina Faso’s transfer regulations, including its import and end use/r control system and the required documentation. In addition to supporting robust action by the Government against the illicit and/or illegal selling of arms and ammunition, further opportunities exist to support the Government’s efforts to enhance border security and controls. This requires building the capacity, including the equipment, of the defence, police and other security forces stationed at border posts; increasing the involvement of the civilian population and communities living adjacent to borders in support of border controls and management; and enhancing cross-border cooperation with neighboring States to control and manage weapons and ammunition.

**OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT**

13. Sensitize, in appropriate forum, civilian arms importers as well as exporting State authorities, on the national and regional (such as the ECOWAS Convention) frameworks governing arms transfers, imports / deliveries to civilians, including on the requirements for an end use certificate (“certificate d’utilisation finale”), a final destination certificate (“certificate de destination finale”), and an ECOWAS exemption certificate (“certificate d’exemption de la CEDEAO”).

14. Enhance cross-border cooperation with neighboring States.
TECHNICAL PILLAR 4:
PHYSICAL SECURITY AND STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT

KEY FINDINGS
• Burkina Faso, in cooperation and with the support from the Mines Advisory Group (MAG), has since 2015 been conducting risk assessments on more than 60 storage sites and ammunition depots; and also ‘enhanced physical security’ reviews of 30 weapons storage sites and depots leading to rehabilitation/refurbishment, construction or container solutions. With support from the UN Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament (UNREC), a set of standard operating procedures (SOPs) have also been developed, and national defence, police and other security forces have been trained in their use. Since 2016, a PSSM strategic five-year plan has been developed by the CNLPAL with the involvement of all relevant national stakeholders and technical experts and with specialized assistance from the Small Arms Survey and MAG.
• There is a need and an opportunity to develop and implement a resource mobilization strategy for the adequate financing of the PSSM strategic plan and its implementation, both through a dedicated national budget, as well as through regional and international assistance and partners. Implementing the PSSM strategic plan, coupled with a strong monitoring and evaluation mechanism to measure progress, should remain a priority area for WAM in Burkina Faso in order to build further capacity in PSSM and to enhance national practices and procedures, including in remote areas affected by attacks from armed groups including terrorist groups. Adopting national SOPs, and continuing to disseminate them across the defence, police and other security services, is another option for consideration of the Government.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

15. Enhance the capacities of different national authorities and defense and security services in the area of border security.

16. Take assertive action against the illicit and/or illegal selling of arms and ammunition.

17. Sensitize and involve the populations adjacent to borders in the arms and ammunition management and control activities, in order to contribute to the securitization of borders.

18. Develop and implement a resource mobilization strategy for the adequate financing of the PSSM strategic plan, in cooperation with regional and international partners.

19. Work to enhance adherence of international and regional actors to the specific PSSM national action plan.

20. Enhance the safe and secure management and control of substances and explosive components used in mines and carriers.
TECHNICAL PILLAR 5: WEAPONS MARKING

KEY FINDINGS

• The weapons marking process was initiated in Burkina Faso in 2015, with assistance and support from UNREC and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). In August 2018, there were seven marking machines in Burkina Faso located in the capital city, which were at the disposal of the CNLPAL. The machines and equipment were mobile. Firearms marking operations were begun under the National Police, and up to 12,000 firearms were reportedly marked by July/August 2018 with operations ongoing as of August 2018. Burkina Faso adheres to the ECOWAS marking format. Officers from different defence, police and other security forces have already been trained in marking practices. High-level military authorities of Burkina Faso had hitherto not been receptive to weapons marking, but have recently accepted the marking of military weapons, slated to begin once the marking of firearms of the National Police has been finalized. There were, however, no provisions or plans that allow for marking of newly imported arms into Burkina Faso, and no specific plan to operationalize and expand the marking process and operations nationally.

• Several further opportunities exist to develop arms marking in Burkina Faso. First, the Government, e.g. via the HACIAU, in consultation with CNLPAL, could cooperate with exporting States to have weapons marked in those States in line with Burkina Faso’s marking format prior to their importation into Burkina Faso. Second, the Government, through the CNLPAL, could develop and implement a national programme aimed at incrementally marking all Burkinabe State-owned weapons.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

21. Develop a specific plan at the national level for weapons marking.

22. Put in place provisions and a procedure for the marking of newly imported weapons, in compliance with the law.

23. Raise awareness of national authorities at different levels on the advantages and benefits of weapons marking.

24. Continue to progressively mark the weapons of all security and defense forces.

25. Proceed to the marking of arms legally held by civilians, as well as the marking of collected and / or seized weapons.

26. Continue to build the capacity including through continuous training of national authorities as well as security and defense forces on weapons marking.

27. Acquire the means to be able to undertake marking on material other than steel.
KEY FINDINGS

- In 2018, each State entity or agency authorized to acquire, possess and use conventional arms and ammunition were required to maintain its own register of the exact arms and ammunition under its control and in its custody. The record-keeping systems were largely paper based, even though some entities had digitalized aspects of their recordkeeping system. In August 2018, records had to be kept for 10 years, in line with the law, but the subsequent draft national law included a provision to extend the record-keeping period. In 2018, the backing up of records (e.g. in paper or electronically) was not general standard-practice, and this was highlighted during the national baseline assessment as an area to be addressed.

- To strengthen its national accountability system, the Government of Burkina Faso is encouraged to identify a preferred method of record keeping that is practical and institutionally feasible. For example, to be comprehensive should the system of record keeping be centralized or a continuously decentralized. A national, centralized database that can collect and collate all weapon inventories, and which is administered by the competent State authority or authorities, should be the preferred option. Regardless of whether records are maintained in a centralized or in a decentralized manner, they must be accessible to competent State authorities.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>28.</th>
<th>Digitize gradually and fully all registers maintained manually into new electronic databases maintained by each security and defense force.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>29.</td>
<td>Allocate to the national authorities involved in the management of data on arms and ammunition with information management tools.</td>
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<tr>
<td>30.</td>
<td>Ensure the security of the electronic databases (i.e. through regular back-up security copies).</td>
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<tr>
<td>31.</td>
<td>Harmonize the databases of the different security and defense forces, including the informational elements included in each database.</td>
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<tr>
<td>32.</td>
<td>Maintain records in line with and respecting the relevant national legislation as well as regional and international instruments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33.</td>
<td>Establish a link between the central national register and the IRAPOL database.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
KEY FINDINGS

• Burkina Faso started to focus on systematic processing and, where deemed relevant and necessary, the tracing of seized, recovered or captured arms. There was still limited capacity, and in August 2018, practices and procedures in place related to both the systematic processing of these weapons, as well as domestic or international tracing operations. These must be decided by a competent State authority. During the national baseline assessment of July/August 2018, the Group of national stakeholders and experts noted that until recently, there was little knowledge and expertise among national authorities and experts on how to process seized, captured or recovered arms and ammunition. Given the asymmetric threat posed by non-state armed groups including terrorist groups in Burkina Faso, there seemed to be the political will to further enhance this domain of the national WAM framework.

• The Government, through HACIAU, in coordination with CNLPAL, is encouraged to continue the documentation, identification, and when deemed necessary the tracing, of seized and recovered weapons in Burkina Faso. Opportunities exist for receiving ongoing support from INTERPOL and the internationally specialized NGO Conflict Armament Research (CAR). Burkina Faso should clarify, or if needed, designate one or several national focal points for tracing, and communicate to other States and relevant organizations the designated national focal point(s) under relevant international instruments. The adoption and dissemination of SOPs for inspections, registration, documentation and identification of seized, captured or recovered arms and ammunition provides another opportunity for development.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

34. Accelerate the finalization, ownership and adoption of the standard operating procedure (SOP) on the profiling/identification and tracing of weapons as well as its implementation by all the defense and security forces.

35. Continue to identify and profile all seized weapons.

36. Identify and designate one or several focal points within relevant Ministries and institutions on the identification, profiling and tracing of seized and recovered weapons.

37. Develop a mechanism to share information and results of the identification and profiling, and, if applicable and undertaken, results of tracing operations on seized and recovered weapons.

38. Enhance the coordination, the role and the capacity of the National Coordination Office of INTERPOL (Bureau de Coordination National d’INTERPOL) as well as the use of available INTERPOL tools (e.g. i-ARMS).

39. Pursue the building of capacity of national authorities on the profiling and tracing of seized and recovered weapons.

40. Develop a mechanism for the identification of seized and recovered weapons, for which, following a domestic tracing operation, the information has not been found in the registries of the defense and security forces, and for which an international tracing operation could be useful and necessary.

41. Develop or clarify a policy and a national procedure for the integration or the destruction of seized, recovered, received weapons.
TECHNICAL PILLAR 8:
CIVILIAN POSSESSION (INCLUDING WEAPONS COLLECTION)

KEY FINDINGS
- Weapons collection programmes, whether as part of voluntary disarmament or as a separate activity, remove illegal and unwanted SALW and their ammunition from communities by encouraging individuals—and communities as a whole—to relinquish them and rendering legal (e.g. through licensing or registration) weapons that may be held legally under national law. Such programmes had been carried out in Burkina Faso in the past but at the time of the assessment, there was no civilian voluntary disarmament (weapons collection) programme. This should be addressed because the Permanent Secretariat of the CNLPAL estimated that there were approximately 250,000 firearms in illegal circulation in Burkina Faso at the time of the national baseline assessment in 2018.
- The Group of national stakeholders and experts present during the July/August 2018 consultative process identified an opportunity to continue the programme for the voluntary civilian weapons surrender using a targeted, non-monetary, incentive scheme to enhance civilian community disarmament, relevant to the regional, national and local context. Another opportunity exists to enhance the capacity of different national authorities to develop secure documentation required for the application and the authorization to carry a firearm, and in particular to prevent their falsification and forgery.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

42. **Enhance the capacity of different national authorities to secure documentation required for the application and the authorization to carry an arm, to prevent their falsification and forgery.**

43. **Continue the programme for the voluntary civilian weapons surrender (weapons collection) to enhance the civilian community disarmament, while applying a specific approach adapted to the regional, national and local context.**
KEY FINDINGS

- According to available information in 2018, the last systematic weapons destruction was carried out in Burkina Faso in 2010. In 2018, there was no designated, permanent destruction site, nor adequate and sufficient equipment for arms destruction, including sufficient destruction machines, in the country. An evaluation and quantification at the national level of the stock of military arms as well as civilian weapons that were obsolete or non-serviceable, and which need to be destroyed, was ongoing at the time of the national baseline assessment of 2018. While there are trained personnel in defence, police and other security forces carrying out this task, a need for further assistance and training was emphasized.

- If not already existing, Burkina Faso would benefit from clear regulations or a policy across the State security forces to provide guidance on how arms and ammunition are to be identified for disposal, or what methods of disposal are to be used, and which authority is to decide on the latter two points. An opportunity exists for the Government of Burkina Faso to proceed to the destruction of obsolete or non-serviceable weapons, which would also free up capacity (e.g. personnel), infrastructure (e.g. storage space) and resources, which were not economically used at the time of the national baseline assessment in 2018.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

44. Act on national and international opportunities to acquire destruction machines.

45. Train national specialists/experts of the security and defense forces in the destruction of arms and ammunition.

46. Continue the evaluation and quantification at the national level of the stock of military weapons as well as civilian weapons that are obsolete, non-serviceable and to be destroyed.

47. Consider the possibility of re-cycling the material resulting from destroyed weapons (e.g. by the local industry and construction economy).

48. Ensure the availability and the sustainability of a national destruction capacity to proceed to regular destruction of obsolete weapons.
The exchange of good practices and lessons learned in strengthening WAM policy and practice in Africa seeks to enhance the knowledge of States, regional organisations and international partners on ways to establish and implement comprehensive national and regional frameworks governing the full lifecycle of arms and ammunition.

This publication presents a holistic approach to weapons and ammunition management with a special focus on Burkina Faso. This holistic approach to WAM contributes to achieving broader peace, security, and development goals including but not limited to conflict prevention, armed violence reduction, an accountable security sector, the protection of civilians and advancing the Agenda 2030.

UNIDIR encourages the Community of States, regional organisations and relevant international partners to examine the options suggested for enhancing WAM in each Country Insight and use them as a basis to inform the planning, implementation, and assessment of future WAM projects in the relevant country.

ABOUT UNIDIR

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems.

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