INTRODUCTION

Since 2014, the Government of the Federal Republic of Somalia, in cooperation with UNIDIR, implemented a national Weapons and Ammunition Management (WAM) baseline assessment in Somalia. Led by national authorities, in particular the Office of National Security, this iterative inter-ministerial consultative process on WAM facilitated the design of national policies and plans, identified areas to be strengthened and presented recommendations for policy and programmatic responses to build a national framework governing the management of arms and ammunition. The consultations were held in an inclusive manner to build consensus and ownership at all levels of the federal system and foster political commitment for coherent nation-wide implementation. International partners, including donor states, UN agencies, and non-governmental organizations also took part in the consultations given their key support role to current WAM activities and to future WAM strategies within the context of the New Partnership and the Transition Plan.

This publication is an extract of the baseline assessment report developed in partnership with the Somali national authorities. It is a snapshot of the main findings and options identified for enhancing WAM in the Federal Republic of Somalia. It presents the status of strategic and operational WAM efforts as identified in Somalia during the baseline assessment, and highlights the practical recommendations provided to the national authorities.


**KEY STAKEHOLDERS**

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Note: The SNA, SPF, Custodial Corps, and NISA as well as regional forces are collectively referred to as the Somali Security Forces (SSF).

**METHODOLOGY**

UNIDIR defines WAM in a comprehensive manner covering the oversight, accountability and governance of arms and ammunition throughout their management cycle, including the establishment of relevant national frameworks, processes and practices for the safe and secure production and acquisition of materiel, stockpiling, transfers, end use control, tracing and disposal.

This holistic approach is essential in ensuring that efforts to better regulate arms and ammunition are undertaken in alignment with broader security sector, rule of law, armed violence reduction, counterterrorism, and peacebuilding processes, and not in isolation. Research emphasis is placed on national and regional approaches to WAM in pursuit of a national and regionally owned process, and to support a ‘bottom-up’ and evidence-based approach.

This Country Insight on Somalia is part of a series of Country Insights that seek to promote knowledge, and raise visibility and awareness on the WAM context, progress made, and areas for enhancement in the African States that have conducted WAM baseline assessments with support from UNIDIR. It is aimed to serve as a reference for international partners for providing assistance and technical support for improving weapons and ammunition frameworks in the relevant country.

Information contained in this Country Insight presents key findings and recommendations of the baseline assessment conducted between 2014 and early 2020. It does not reflect the progress made or any changes implemented after the assessment and should be taken to be indicative only of the situation at the time of the assessment.

Building on the multi-year WAM baseline assessments in Africa, UNIDIR in partnership with the African Union (AU) aims to enhance knowledge and dialogue among States, regional organisations, the United Nations and expert NGOs on good practices and lessons learned, as well as on the means and methods to further strengthen national and regional approaches to WAM in Africa.

**NATIONAL CONTEXT**

Somalia has experienced varying levels of armed conflict since 1992. Changing regional security dynamics combined with entrenched criminal networks have provided armed actors and terrorist groups with access to weapons and ammunition trafficked across Somalia’s long and porous land and sea borders. Following nearly two decades of conflict and a transitional period of government, the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) was established in August 2012. Since that time, the FGS, jointly with international partners and the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), has been fighting to degrade al-Shabaab, a non-State armed group designated by the Security Council as a threat to peace, security and stability in Somalia. In support of these security and stabilization efforts, the Security Council partially suspended, in 2013, the general and complete arms embargo that had been in place since 1992 to strengthen the FGS’ ability to provide security and combat insurgent threats.

The FGS has taken concrete steps since its establishment to develop systems, infrastructures and human capacities to manage weapons and ammunition in compliance with its obligations under international instruments, including the partial suspension of the arms embargo, and its broader efforts to strengthen the security sector. With support from bilateral partners, United Nations entities and regional organizations, improvements were made, particularly at the federal level, to increase accountability over transfers as well as the physical security of weapons and ammunition prior to distribution down the supply chain.
Despite the significant progress made, Somalia’s security institutions continue to contend with considerable resource constraints that are further compounded by the dynamic security situation. Nevertheless, and in demonstrating its continued commitment to enhance WAM and address the remaining challenges, the FGS defined its WAM agenda for the period 2020–2025. This includes closing the procedural gaps in the safe and secure distribution of weapons and ammunition to SSF across the country and building human expertise within the different security institutions. The FGS also prioritized strengthening WAM procedures, infrastructures and technical capacity at the Federal Member State level.
TECHNICAL PILLAR 1: LEGAL & REGULATORY FRAMEWORK

KEY FINDINGS
- The presidential decree of 18 September 2018 on the Control of Arms and Ammunition of the National Army serves as the primary national framework on WAM and regulates the process for acquisition, management and distribution of weapons to the security forces in an accountable and transparent manner. The decree is implemented through a set of nine standard operating procedures (SOP) covering: 1) general armoury procedures; 2) armoury procedures for weapons; 3) armoury procedures for ammunition and explosives; 4) accounting of weapons, ammunition and explosives; 5) marking of weapons; 6) destruction of weapons and ammunition; 7) transport of weapons and/or ammunition; 8) reception and documentation procedures at Halane armoury; and 9) management of captured weapons. The decree, together with the SOP, provides the basis of the current national WAM framework in Somalia.
- Regarding a legal framework governing civilian-owned firearm, the FGS drafted two acts in 2017 to regulate civilian ownership of small arms and weapons of private security companies. These acts were developed to address the gaps in the existing Public Order Law of 1963, considered obsolete and inadequate to address contemporary security challenges. The timely finalization and adoption of the two acts, and the subsequent outreach and awareness raising of the population regarding these laws, will further advance efforts to govern arms and ammunition throughout the country.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT
1. Elaborate a WAM strategy building on the Presidential Decree and national security frameworks to give further strategic direction
   - ONS; MoD; MoIS; MoJ; NISA; FMS; International partners
2. Review, as appropriate, and adopt relevant Acts (e.g. civilian possession of small arms & Private Security Companies Acts)
   - ONS; MoJ; MoIS; FMS; International partners
3. Review Defence and Police Acts to ensure adequate WAM component integration
   - ONS; MoD; MoIS; MoJ; International partners
4. Identify and utilize interim WAM measures at State and community levels
   - ONS; MoD; MoIS; FMS; International partners
5. Plan and carry out public and community sensitization on existing and forthcoming normative frameworks
   - ONS; MoJ; MoIS; FMS; International partners

TECHNICAL PILLAR 2: NATIONAL COORDINATION BODY

KEY FINDINGS
- The ONS is the entity designated to coordinate and oversee WAM. In 2019, the ONS appointed a new National Focal Point (NFP) to support the coordination and planning of WAM throughout the national security forces and relevant ministries. Between 2014 and 2017, ONS convened quarterly meetings of the Arms and Ammunition Management Steering Committee (AAMSC) to facilitate national and international coordination, cooperation and assistance regarding WAM at the strategic level. Relevant national ministries, security forces and international partners regularly participated in the AAMSC during this period.
- In June 2019, ONS, in cooperation with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region, the Horn of Africa and Bordering States (RECSA), set out a road map to enhance national coordination mechanisms among relevant ministries and security forces, including on matters relating to the coordination of activities relevant to...
OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

6. Strengthen coordination modalities for regular consultations between FGS institutions & FMS stakeholders, as well as with international partners/donors

ONS; FMS; International partners/donors

7. Undertake outreach and consultations with FMS administrations and institutions to build political support for coherent national action on WAM and facilitate the establishment of sub-regional coordination structures through the Regional Security Offices

ONS; FMS

8. Strengthen the capacity of RSO to coordinate action among FMS institutions through sensitization and training

ONS; FMS; International partners

9. Establish a national coordinating mechanism to steer, coordinate and oversee all matters relating to WAM in the country and lead a whole-of-government approach to the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of effective and sustainable WAM strategies and interventions

ONS; MoJ; MoIA; MOD; FMS; International partners

TECHNICAL PILLAR 3: TRANSFER CONTROLS

KEY FINDINGS

• In order to comply with the obligations incurred pursuant to the partial lifting of the UN arms embargo, the FGS established a procedure to centralize the imports authorization of weapons and ammunition. This centralized system allows for more efficient channelling of information to ONS for the purpose of Security Council notifications. More importantly, it allows for a better understanding of force capabilities within the context of implementing the Transition Plan. There are, at minimum, six procedural steps the FGS implements to control arms imports. First, prior to the import of arms or ammunition, an advanced delivery notification (ADN) is provided by ONS or the State or international, regional or subregional organization delivering assistance to the Security Council Sanctions Committee (five days in advance of any delivery into Somalia). Second, authority to import arms and ammunition has been centralized in the MoD—i.e. security services send a request for supplies to their respective ministries, which subsequently transmit the request to the MoD. The SNA has been designated as the responsible entity for overseeing the receipt of imports for all security services. Third, upon receipt of the arms supplies, a post-delivery confirmation (PDC) is provided by ONS to the Security Council Sanctions Committee within 30 days of the delivery. Fourth, newly imported weapons or ammunition are marked and registered at a central armory which serves as a central repository for all new supplies. Fifth, weapons and ammunition are issued to security forces upon authorization from the Chief of the Defence Forces. An issue and receipt system have been developed at the central armory to adequately control and oversee the initial distribution of imported weapons and ammunition. Finally, the sixth step pertains to monitoring the verification distribution and use.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

10. Embed the transfer authorization process in a legal and administrative framework to ensure effective and harmonized practices at the federal and state level

ONS; MoJ; MoD; FMS
TECHNICAL PILLAR 4:
WEAPONS MARKING

KEY FINDINGS

- As of late June 2019, a total of 20,240 weapons imported under the partial suspension of the arms embargo have been marked, either through a fixed marking programme at the central armory and at the MoIS, or through a SNA mobile marking team in Mogadishu. There are three marking machines at central armory—one is currently functional to mark all newly imported weapons, while the other two machines are planned for use in future mobile marking programmes. Additional office space was established in 2016 at the central armory in order to support marking operations.

- Additionally, all existing weapons in Mogadishu are marked either through a mobile marking programme or by relevant actors bringing their weapons to be marked at a designated location. In the case of weapons held by the SNA in Mogadishu, an SNA mobile marking team is deployed to SNA units to mark their weapons. For those weapons held by SPF and NISA in Mogadishu, their relevant units visit the MoIS Headquarters to mark their supplies. The MoIS currently holds three marking machines. The same procedure is applied to mark weapons held by private security companies (PSCs) and government officials. It must be noted however that control of weapons has often shifted from the SNA to the SPF to address gaps in the capabilities of the latter.

- The marking codes and methods utilized by the FGS are in conformity with the International Tracing Instrument (ITI) and the Modular Small Arms Control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC), formerly known as the International Small Arms Control Standards (ISACS). Marking databases are utilized for both fixed and mobile marking programmes to record information of the marked weapons.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

13. Integrate and consolidate marking records at respective Ministries and at ONS and RSOs
   
   Respective Ministries; ONS; RSOs

14. Continue to mark weapons at the time of imports and integration into force in line with existing SOPs
   
   ONS; MoD; MoIS; NISA

15. Develop marking and recordkeeping roll out strategy at FMS levels and develop the required operational and technical capacities
   
   ONS; MoD; FMS
TECHNICAL PILLAR 5:
RECORD KEEPING

KEY FINDINGS
• Logbooks have been designed and rolled out to security forces in Mogadishu. Furthermore, each security force has developed a revised issue and receipt system in order to obtain better oversight of the movement of weapons and ammunition through the chain of custody. Efforts have also been made to register arms in the possession of authorized civilian government officials and private security companies.

However, these measures are yet to be uniformly and consistently implemented.
• The FGS has also begun to integrate arms registration into the wider security sector biometric registration of the SNA, thereby linking individual weapons (including through their serial numbers) to individual biometric files of individual soldiers.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

16. Close gaps in weapons receipt and distribution records, and ensure that full details of recipient forces and the serial numbers of weapons are captured at the central armory level

ONS; MoD

17. Roll out procedures at the FMS level to record weapons and ammunition supplied and distributed to the security forces at the unit level

ONS; FMS; International partners

18. Establish a centralized electronic database to provide current information on imported weapons and ammunition and their distribution to federal and regional forces

ONS; MoD; MoIS; FMS; International partners

19. Consolidate efforts to link the WAM database with the biometric system of the SNA

ONS; MoD; International partners

TECHNICAL PILLAR 6:
PROCESSING & TRACING RECOVERED WEAPONS

KEY FINDINGS
• Pursuant to the arms embargo, the FGS, FMS and AMISOM are required to document and register military equipment captured as part of offensive operations or in the course of carrying out their mandates. The resolutions also mandate the Panel of Experts (PoE) to inspect these weapons prior to redistribution or destruction.

• Processing captured weapons is covered by an SOP developed in 2015 and updated in 2020, this includes procedures on storage, registration, tracing, and reporting. The Criminal Investigative Division (CID) of the Somali Federal Police and NISA are the primary entities responsible for processing recovered weapons in Mogadishu and its environs, whether incidents are related to crime or terrorism. In practice, whichever force is the first to respond typically takes ownership of the scene of the incident and manages any recovered weapons according to their own internal procedures. Both agencies maintain storage facilities for recovered weapons with associated records at their respective headquarters.

• Outside Mogadishu, the SNA and AMISOM have the primary responsibility for weapons recovered during operations. Recovered weapons are commonly integrated into its existing stockpiles or distributed to the forces to address capability gaps. However, most frontline units lack the proper infrastructure and training to meet the minimum requirements to properly inspect and register weapons prior to integration or disposal.

• On its part, AMISOM is also in the process of developing SOPs in line with the recently adopted AU Policy on the Management of Recovered Arms and Ammunition, and in compliance with the Security Council requirements.

• The ONS has announced plans to establish an analytic cell which when fully operational is expected to glean and analyse information pertaining to recovered weapons and to provide actionable information to FGS forces. The ONS has also expanded the scope of the Security Council-mandated Joint Verification Team to assist the FGS in documenting and analysing recovered weapons.
OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

20. Strengthen the implementation of the SOP on recovered weapons at the unit level, including through interim measures to adequately register weapons prior to redistribution

21. Develop specific procedures on integrating recovered weapons into FGS stocks bearing in mind other codes and practices for standardization of military equipment

22. Harmonize respective FGS and AMISOM SOPs on recovered weapons and to ensure proper documentation and timely handover to designated authorities at the respective sector levels

23. Conclude modalities to facilitate access by the PoE to recovered weapons and related records in line with the Security Council requirements

24. Dedicate resources to bolster operational and technical capacities, particularly at the sector/FMS level, to adequately manage recovered weapons and ammunition

25. Build national capacity to investigate and trace weapons, including through establishing and capacitating an analytic unit within the ONS and the future coordinating mechanism

TECHNICAL PILLAR 7: PHYSICAL SECURITY & STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT

KEY FINDINGS
- Since 2014, the central armoury in Mogadishu has served as the main processing point for the marking, recording, initial storage and distribution of imported weapons and ammunition. Progress was made to improve the security of weapon stocks through the construction of a second storehouse in Halane, where arms and ammunition could be stored separately. On its part, the SPF reportedly have dedicated storage capacity for weapons in 17 districts of Mogadishu. The SPF storages, including the main storage at the SPF headquarters, are built to store small arms and their ammunition, but not explosives. With regard to NISA, it currently has four storage sites: two at its headquarters in Mogadishu, one at the sector level, and one at its investigation division in Mogadishu. Similar to SPF, these facilities are suitable to store small arms and their ammunition only.
- In its efforts to establish an integrated supply chain security system at the FMS level, the FGS is currently negotiating possible support from international partners. The project is expected to be piloted in 1-2 FMS and will enable ONSA to cascade the control and accounting system to the state-level by establishing appropriate facilities that mark, record and store weapons and ammunition in a safe and secure manner.
- The primary method of disposing captured serviceable weapons and ammunition at this time is integration into national stocks. Previously, obsolete weapons were destroyed with assistance from international partners.
- The FGS currently does not have the capacity required to safely dispose of surplus or obsolete ammunition and explosives.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

26. Conduct technical assessments at the FGS and FMS levels to determine capacities, gaps and establish a PSSM prioritization plan for all security forces
27. Clarify authorization process and procedures for disposal of surplus and unserviceable materiel, including at FMS levels, ensuring that process is feasible from logistics and safety point a view

ONS; MoD; MoIS; NISA; FMS; JVT

28. Development of an ammunition management system, capacity and infrastructures that includes technical surveillance to determine serviceability and conditions of weapons and ammunition, ammunition safety regulations, as well as training and mentoring of personnel

ONS; MoD; MoIS; NISA; FMS; JVT; International partners

29. Pursue a coordinated approach to training, including through conducting a training needs assessment and develop Training of Trainers programming for essential WAM measures

ONS; MoD; MoIS; NISA; FMS; JVT; International partners

30. Continue to roll out JVT programme and expand its locations to FMS levels, including through setting a bi-annual schedule in consultation with the security forces

ONS; JVT; MoD; MoIS; FMS

31. Consider the inclusion of senior SSF officials in the JVT to facilitate timely access and regularly sensitize field commanders on the JVT mandate

ONS; JVT; MoD

32. Consider complementary data-gathering and verification measures to overcome access restrictions to frontline positions; including unit-level verification by designated officers

ONS; JVT; MoD

33. Build buy-in and engagement for the JVT through training and sensitization programmes

ONS; JVT; MoD; MoIS; FMS

34. Establish an interministerial mechanism to ensure that the findings and recommendations of the JVT are regularly shared and timely addressed by the relevant decision-makers.

ONS; JVT; MoD; MoIS; FMS

TECHNICAL PILLAR 8: MONITORING & VERIFICATION

KEY FINDINGS
- The Joint Verification Team (JVT) was established in 2015 and consists of the security forces and experts from Conflict Armament Research. It is tasked with conducting routine inspections of the stockpiles, inventory records, and supply chain of weapons of government security forces for the purpose of mitigating the diversion of arms and ammunition to entities outside the security forces. In March 2016, the JVT conducted a preliminary baseline assessment of weapons and ammunition that the FGS had imported into Somalia since the partial lifting of the arms embargo in October 2013. In November 2016, the JVT commenced the verification phase of its work: conducting inspections of weapons and ammunition with deployed FGS forces in order to verify that weapons imported for the FGS had been delivered to the intended end-users. The JVT submits its verification reports on an annual basis to the Security council Sanctions Committee through ONS.

OPTIONS FOR WAM ENHANCEMENT

30. Continue to roll out JVT programme and expand its locations to FMS levels, including through setting a bi-annual schedule in consultation with the security forces

ONS; JVT; MoD; MoIS; FMS

31. Consider the inclusion of senior SSF officials in the JVT to facilitate timely access and regularly sensitize field commanders on the JVT mandate

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ONS; JVT; MoD; MoIS; FMS
The exchange of good practices and lessons learned in strengthening WAM policy and practice in Africa seeks to enhance the knowledge of States, regional organisations and international partners on ways to establish and implement comprehensive national and regional frameworks governing the full lifecycle of arms and ammunition.

This publication presents a holistic approach to weapons and ammunition management with a special focus on the Republic of Somalia. This holistic approach to WAM contributes to achieving broader peace, security, and development goals including but not limited to conflict prevention, armed violence reduction, accountable security sector, protection of civilians, and advancing the Agenda 2030.

UNIDIR encourages the Community of States, regional organisations, and relevant international partners to examine the options suggested for enhancing WAM in each Country Insight and use them as a basis to inform the planning, implementation, and assessment of future WAM projects in the relevant country.

ABOUT UNIDIR

The United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) is a voluntarily funded, autonomous institute within the United Nations. One of the few policy institutes worldwide focusing on disarmament, UNIDIR generates knowledge and promotes dialogue and action on disarmament and security. Based in Geneva, UNIDIR assists the international community to develop the practical, innovative ideas needed to find solutions to critical security problems.

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