Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project

Small Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa

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Preface

The UN peace operations in Angola, Mozambique and Namibia were all based on peace agreements between the warring parties. The agreements contained provisions for demobilization and disarmament of the warring factions. The basis for the Commonwealth Monitoring Force in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe (1979-1980) was similar, except that demobilization was not accompanied by the collection/destruction of arms. Accounts of these operations -- of the demobilization and disarmament missions in particular -- are published by UNIDIR along with similar analyses of peace operations in other parts of the world.

In addition to the series of case studies, UNIDIR has conducted a number of inquiries into specific policy issues pertaining to disarmament in the framework of peace operations. This Report, focusing on Southern Africa, is the first in that series. It is comprised of contributions by Peter Batchelor from the Center for Conflict Resolution at the University of Cape Town; Christopher Smith from the Center for Defence Studies at the University of London; and Jakkie Potgieter from the Institute for Defence Policy in South Africa.

Peter Batchelor undertakes a comparative analysis of the successes and failures of peace operations in the region. In the cantonment areas, the collection, storage and destruction of arms were effectively conducted in some, but not all, cases. Still, this part of the demobilization and disarmament task has usually been among the manageable ones. It is more difficult to ensure that armed personnel actually report to the cantonment areas, and that weapons caches are not hidden. While Angola, Namibia and Rhodesia/Zimbabwe were all subject to arms embargos, the warring parties nevertheless had access to external sources of supply. This is another very difficult part of disarmament missions for which the UN has been inadequately equipped and prepared.

Christopher Smith takes a closer look at the flows of small arms in the region. While major conflicts have been successfully terminated if not resolved in recent years, they have left a large number of arms behind. In the framework of the UN peace operations, significant amounts of arms have been collected, but these probably represent only a small part of the totality of weapons. The demand for arms is of a political as well as a criminal nature, with the two forms displaying increasing overlap. It is fairly obvious that the ready availability of arms encourages violent solutions to problems, i.e., the development of cultures of violence. In South Africa, political and criminal forms of violence have been on
the rise, and it has become more difficult to determine where one ends and the other begins.

In 1995, UNIDIR published a Paper on Small Arms and Intra-State Conflict (UNIDIR Paper No. 34). Christopher Smith suggests ways in which the UN might become more effective in collecting and destroying arms. Jakkie Potgieter takes this further into a discussion of preconditions and modalities of regional peacekeeping and relief operations. Mr. Potgieter identifies a series of factors that must be considered and clarified for cooperative security arrangements to function properly. Cooperation and effective organization are essential if political instability, violent crime and weapons flows are to be reduced. Of fundamental importance is the realization that cooperative security can be cost-efficient as well.

While the DCR project focuses on the relationship between demobilization/disarmament and conflict resolution, the case of Southern Africa also underlines the role of disarmament in conflict prevention. Preventive action usually must build on several pillars, such as development aid, environmental assistance, social change through education programs, the development of political institutions, the training of civilian police, and arms control and disarmament. To succeed, comprehensive strategies must have a solid theoretical underpinning. Still, the right strategy may fail for lack of political backing. Sometimes, both elements are lacking: then the world drifts along without perspective. There is a need, therefore, for action programs that are comprehensive and substantive enough to set societies on the course of peace and development, yet modest enough to stay within realistic resource frames. This is a major challenge to the peoples of Southern Africa and their external cooperation partners.

UNIDIR takes no position on the views or conclusions expressed in this Report. They are those of the authors. The project leader, Virginia Gamba, and I are grateful to them for their contributions: UNIDIR has been happy to have such resourceful and dedicated collaborators.

Sverre Lodgaard
Director, UNIDIR
Acknowledgements

The DCR Project takes this opportunity to thank the many foundations and governments who have contributed with finance and personnel to the setting up and evolution of the research associated with the Project. Among our contributors the following deserve a special mention and our deep appreciation: the Ford Foundation, the United States Institute of Peace, the Winston Foundation, the Ploughshares Fund, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, and the governments of Argentina, Austria, Brazil, Finland, France, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America.
Project Introduction

Disarmament and Conflict Resolution

The global arena's main preoccupation during the Cold War centred on the maintenance of international peace and stability between states. The vast network of alliances, obligations and agreements which bound nuclear superpowers to the global system, and the memory of the rapid internationalization of disputes into world wars, favored the formulation of national and multinational deterrent policies designed to maintain a stability which was often confused with immobility. In these circumstances, the ability of groups within states to engage in protest and to challenge recognized authority was limited.

The end of the Cold War in 1989, however, led to a relaxing of this pattern, generating profound mobility within the global system. The ensuing break-up of alliances, partnerships, and regional support systems brought new and often weak states into the international arena. Since weak states are susceptible to ethnic tensions, secession, and outright criminality, many regions are now afflicted by situations of violent intra-state conflict.

Intra-state conflict occurs at immense humanitarian cost. The massive movement of people, their desperate condition, and the direct and indirect tolls on human life have, in turn, generated pressure for international action, most notably from the UN.

The reputation of the United Nations as being representative of all states and thus as being objective and trustworthy has been especially valued, as indicated by the greater number of peace operations in which it is currently engaged. Before 1991, the UN peace operations' presence enhanced not only peace but also the strengthening of democratic processes, conciliation among population groups, the encouragement of respect for human rights, and the alleviation of humanitarian problems. These achievements are exemplified by the role of the UN in Congo, southern Lebanon, Nicaragua, Namibia, El Salvador, and to a lesser extent in Haiti.

Nevertheless, since 1991 the United Nations has been engaged in a number of simultaneous, larger, and more ambitious peace operations in Africa, such as those in Angola, Namibia, Somalia, Mozambique, Rwanda, and Liberia. It has been increasingly pressured to act on quick-flaring and horrendously costly explosions of violence. The financial, personnel, and timing pressure on the United Nations to undertake these massive short-term stabilising actions has seriously impaired the UN's ability to ensure long-term national and regional stability. The
UN has necessarily shifted its focus from a supporting role, in which it could ensure long-term national and international stability, to a role which involves obtaining quick peace and easing humanitarian pressures immediately. But without a focus on peace defined in terms of longer-term stability, the overall success of efforts to mediate and resolve intra-state conflict will remain in question.

This problem has gained some recognition and resulted in belated action by the international community. More and more organisations and governments are linking success to the ability to offer non-violent alternatives to a post-conflict society. These alternatives are mostly of a socio-political/economic nature, and are national rather than regional in character. As important as these linkages are to the final resolution of conflict, they tend to overlook a major source of instability: the existence of vast amounts of weapons widely distributed among combatant and non-combatant elements in societies which are emerging from long periods of internal conflict.

The reason why weapons themselves are not the primary focus of attention in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies is because they are viewed from a political perspective. Action which does not award importance to disarmament processes is justified by invoking the political value of a weapon as well as the way the weapon is used by a warring party, rather than its mere existence and availability. For proponents of this action, peace takes away the reason for using the weapon and, therefore, renders it harmless for the post-conflict reconstruction process. And yet, easy availability of weapons can, and does, militarise societies in general. It also destabilises regions that are affected by unrestricted trade of light weapons between borders.

There are two problems, therefore, with the international community's approach to post-conflict reconstruction processes: on the one hand, the international community, under pressure to react to increasingly violent internal conflict, has put a higher value on peace in the short-term than on development and stability in the long-term; and, on the other hand, those who do focus on long-term stability have put a higher value on the societal and economic elements of development than on the management of the primary tools of violence, i.e., weapons.

**UNIDIR's DCR Project and the Management of Arms during Peace Processes (MAPP)**

The DCR Project aims to explore the predicament posed by UN peace operations which have recently focused on short-term needs rather than on long-
term stability. The Project is based on the premise that the control and reduction of weapons during peace operations can be a tool for ensuring stability. Perhaps more than ever before, the effective control of weapons has the capacity to influence far-reaching events in national and international activities. In this light, the management and control of arms could become an important factor in the settlement of conflicts, a fundamental aid to diplomacy in the prevention and deflation of conflict, and a critical component of the reconstruction process in post-conflict societies.

Problems within the process of controlling weapons have cropped up at every stage of peace operations, for a variety of reasons. In most cases, initial control of arms upon the commencement of peace operations has not generally been achieved. This may be due to the fact that political negotiations necessary to generate mandates and missions permitting international action are often not specific enough on their disarmament implementation component. It could also be that the various actors involved interpret mandates in totally different ways. Conversely, in the specific cases in which peace operations have attained positive political outcomes, initial efforts to reduce weapons to manageable levels - even if achieved - tend to be soon devalued, since most of the ensuing activities centre on the consolidation of post-conflict reconstruction processes. This shift in priorities from conflict resolution to reconstruction makes for sloppy follow-up of arms management operations. Follow-up problems, in turn, can result in future threats to internal stability. They also have the potential to destabilize neighbouring states due to the uncontrolled and unaccounted-for mass movement of weapons that are no longer of political or military value to the former warring parties.

The combination of internal conflicts with the proliferation of light weapons has marked peace operations since 1990. This combination poses new challenges to the international community and highlights the fact that a lack of consistent strategies for the management of arms during peace processes (MAPP) reduces the effectiveness of ongoing missions and diminishes the chances of long-term national and regional stability once peace is agreed upon. Nowhere is this more evident than in the region of Africa.

Given these considerations, the DCR Project believes that the way to implement peace, defined in terms of long-term stability, is to focus not just on the sources of violence (such as social and political development issues) but also on the material vehicles for violence (such as weapons and munitions). Likewise, the implementation of peace must take into account both the future needs of a society and the elimination of its excess weapons, and also the broader international and regional context in which the society is situated. This is because weapons that are not managed and controlled in the field will invariably flow over into neighbouring
countries, becoming a problem in themselves. Thus, the establishment of viable stability requires that three primary aspects be included in every approach to intra-state conflict resolution: (1) the implementation of a comprehensive, systematic disarmament programme as soon as a peace operation is set-up; (2) the establishment of an arms management programme that continues into national post-conflict reconstruction processes; and (3) the encouragement of close cooperation on weapons control and management programmes between countries in the region where the peace operation is being implemented.

In order to fulfill its research mission, the DCR Project has been divided into four phases. These are as follows: (1) the development, distribution, and interpretation of a Practitioners’ Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament and Demobilization during Peacekeeping Operations; (2) the development and publication of case studies on peace operations in which disarmament tasks constituted an important aspect of the wider mission; (3) the organization of a series of workshops on policy issues; and (4) the publication of policy papers on substantive issues related to the linkages between the management of arms during peace processes (MAPP) and the settlement of conflict.

Between September 1995 and May 1996, the Project foresees four sets of publications. The first of these will involve eleven case studies, covering peace operations in Somalia, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, Bosnia/Croatia, Central America (ONUCA and ONUSAL), Cambodia, Angola, Namibia, Mozambique, Liberia and Haiti. The second set of publications will include nine policy papers, addressing topics such as Security Council Procedures, Mandate Specificity, Doctrine, Rules of Engagement, Coercive versus Consensual Arms Control and Demobilization Processes, Consensus, Intelligence and Media, and Training. A third set of publications will involve three papers on the relationship between arms and conflict in the region of Southern Africa. The last of the Project's published works will be an overarching policy paper summarizing the conclusions of the research and delineating recommendations based on the Project's findings.

### Security in Southern Africa:
The Proliferation of Light Weapons

Southern Africa is adjusting to the process of transition to democracy. In South Africa the transition is still incomplete, both at the state level and at the level of civil society. Elsewhere, Angola is haltingly emerging from its long-standing civil war; Mozambique is coming to terms with the devastation wreaked by almost
a quarter of a century of war; and in Malawi and Zambia the transition from a de facto system of life presidency to a system of elected parliamentary rule is incomplete. In Lesotho there is a security threat to the elected government. There is therefore no common, institutionalised political value system in Southern Africa. While the region is increasingly interdependent economically, it is not yet interdependent with regard to matters of security and defence.

During the Cold War, superpower proxies on the African continent were flooded with weapons meant to defend the interests of their allies in Europe and elsewhere. The largest concentration of these weapons was in Sub-Saharan Africa and more especially in Southern Africa, which was an important area of Cold War confrontation. Following the end of the Cold War and, with it, the end of most conflicts in the area, the abundance of these weapons and their proliferation became a major threat to stability. The end of the Cold War has not served to diffuse conflict or eliminate threats to security in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the last four decades, the sub-continent has seen thirty-five major conflicts and almost ten million deaths. More recently, in Rwanda alone, the intensity and speed of genocide and epidemics claimed nearly one million lives.

The end of the Cold War did manage to reduce ideologically motivated conflict, although conflicts over democratisation, ethnicity and access to economic empowerment have often lead to the outbreak of civil wars, lawlessness, anarchy and misery. Widespread political and socio-economic problems have helped to plunge the sub-continent into unprecedented instability and conflict - motivated neither by the drive for independence nor the end of colonial rule. The quest for democratisation and economic empowerment was essentially an internally-driven process supported by external forces such as former metropolitan powers, donor agencies, and international financial institutions. Ethnic confrontations, on the other hand, are attributable to a number of factors which may vary from country to country as a result of historical settings and varying geopolitical constellations.

Small arms currently spreading throughout the region include pistols, machine-guns, rocket launchers, anti-personnel grenades, and the dreaded AK-47 assault rifle. The proliferation of these weapons poses a serious threat to security in Southern Africa and the horn of Africa. In Southern Africa, weapons are smuggled from Mozambique and other former zones of military combat to South Africa, the country most affected by armed crime in the region.

An understanding of the proliferation of light weapons in Southern Africa at present requires a focus on three different issues. The first is the initial influx of weapons due to the massive arming of Sub-Saharan Africa by external powers during the Cold War and the linkages of these arms policies to ongoing national struggles for political determination. Another issue requiring examination is the
second influx of weapons (most of them light weapons) which characterised legal and illegal trading of weapons in the lax environment following the end of both the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Finally, a third issue of focus should be the fluid movement of these weapons across borders due to the impact of United Nations-brokered peace settlements in Angola, Namibia, and Mozambique, where the establishment of short-term peace took priority at the expense of disarmament.

The DCR Project's case studies on disarmament, or the lack thereof, during peacekeeping operations in recent years point to one of the three sources for massive flows of light weapons into the region of Southern Africa. In this respect, it is enticing to think that if part of the problem of the proliferation of light weapons in Southern Africa is due to ineffective disarmament efforts during multinational peacekeeping operations, part of the solution might lie in a more effective use of regional peacekeeping forces to ensure border controls aimed at reducing this flow.

My special thanks go to the authors of this volume, Peter Batchelor, Christopher Smith, and Jakkie Potgieter; and to the project staff at UNIDIR, especially our Information Officer, Kent Highnam; our Specialized Publications Editor, Cara Cantarella; and our Assistant Editor, Lara Bernini. We would also like to thank Michael MacKinnon, DCR Project Intern, Alessandra Fabrello, DCR Project Intern, and Anita Blétry, UNIDIR Specialized Secretary (Publications), for their assistance in preparing this volume for publication.

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Geneva, August 1995
Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project

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<tr>
<td>ANC</td>
<td>African National Congress</td>
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<tr>
<td>ATF</td>
<td>Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms</td>
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<td>AVF</td>
<td>Afrikaaner Volksfront</td>
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<td>BMATT</td>
<td>British Military Advisory Training Team</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCF</td>
<td>Ceasefire Commission</td>
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<td>CCFADM</td>
<td>Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defence Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CCPM</td>
<td>Joint Political-Military Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIVPOL</td>
<td>Civilian Police units</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMF</td>
<td>Monitoring Force</td>
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<td>CMVF</td>
<td>Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission</td>
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<td>CORE</td>
<td>Commission for Reintegration</td>
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<td>CSC</td>
<td>Supervisory and Monitoring Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community Monitoring Group</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAA</td>
<td>New Army of Angola</td>
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<td>FADM</td>
<td>Mozambican Defense Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>FMLN</td>
<td>Frente Farabundo Martí para la Liberación Nacional</td>
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<td>FIS</td>
<td>Front Islamique de Salut</td>
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<tr>
<td>FRELIMO</td>
<td>Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique</td>
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<td>FSU</td>
<td>Former Soviet Union</td>
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<td>GIA</td>
<td>Groupe Islamique Armée</td>
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<td>GPA</td>
<td>General Peace Agreement</td>
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<td>IFP</td>
<td>Inkatha Freedom Party</td>
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<td>IISS</td>
<td>International Institute for Security Studies</td>
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<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>MK</td>
<td>Umkhonto we Sizwe (Armed Wing of ANC)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>Mozambican National Resistance</td>
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<tr>
<td>MPLA</td>
<td>Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUCA</td>
<td>United Nations Observer Group in Central America</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONUMOZ</td>
<td>United Nations Operation in Mozambique</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPEC</td>
<td>Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORH</td>
<td>Operation Restore Hope</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
PF Patriotic Front
PWA area Pretoria, Witswatersrand and Vereeniging
RENAMO Resistencia National Mocambicana
RPF Rwandan Patriotic Front
RPGs Rocket Propelled Grenades
RSA Republic of South Africa
RSF Security Forces
SDU Self Defense Units (ANC)
SLA South Lebanon Army
SPU Self Protection Units (Inkatha)
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary General
SWAPO South West African People's Organization
SWAPOL South West Africa Police
UDF United Democratic Front
UNAVEM I United Nations Angola Verification Mission I
UNAVEM II United Nations Angola Verification Mission II
UNDP United Nations Development Program
UNHCR Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNITA União Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola
UNITAF Unified Task Force
UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
UNTAC United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTAG United Nations Transition Assistance Group
UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
ZANLA African National Liberation Army
ZIPRA Zimbabwe People's Army
Chapter 1
Light Weapons and the International Arms Trade

Christopher Smith

The most potent symbol of conflict and violence in the closing years of the 20th century is the AK47. There is more to this imagery than graphic footage to accompany CNN soundbites. The increasingly widespread incidence of low intensity conflict is rapidly becoming the major security threat of this era. Many states are failing in their efforts to minimize the political and social impact of insurgency, and the same category of weak and failed states often falter in the control of crime, especially the violent variety. Frequently, especially after a passage of time, insurgency and crime become closely linked.

A critical aspect of the trend towards political and military violence is the increasing availability of 'weapons of war' - light weapons and small arms which were originally produced and procured for use primarily by armed forces. Increasingly, these weapons are being made available to and are being acquired by a range of sub-state actors and organizations such as criminals, smugglers and militant groups. This has been an evolving trend over many years and decades; it is not purely a post-Cold War phenomenon. Nevertheless, the impact and social cost of light weapons proliferation has greatly increased since the superpowers withdrew their patronage to developing countries following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Over the course of the Cold War period, military technology flowed from North to South as the superpowers and their allies attempted to influence political processes in regions of the Third World, especially to countries and governments which held geo-political significance. The tools of influence were varied, sometimes apparently benign in the shape of economic and infrastructural aid and

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1 The following report, published under the auspices of the UNIDIR project on Disarmament and Conflict Resolution, is the result of research conducted by the author through the North-South Defence and Security Programme at the Centre for Defence Studies, King's College, London. The light weapons project, which forms a part of the programme, is funded by the Winston Foundation for World Peace and the Rockefeller Family Associates. The author would also like to thank the members of the police and security forces in South Africa and Namibia for their valuable assistance with this project and their willingness to provide data.
assistance, and sometimes blunt, in the form of outright military intervention. Perhaps the most consistent and important of these tools of influence was the supply of military technology, especially during the 1950s and 1960s.

Arms transfers became increasingly commercialized after the oil shocks of the 1970s, for a variety of inter-related reasons. Thereafter, both supply and demand increased dramatically. During the 1970s, the increasing need on the part of all major arms suppliers to export arms coincided with the dominant economic conditions in most parts of the Third World. In 1973, oil prices rose by 400% and doubled again in 1978-79. This rapid accumulation of wealth by the OPEC states opened up a massive market for defense exporters. Other developing countries financed their arms imports either by drawing on reserves or through a positive net flow of capital on their balance of payments. Thus, directly or indirectly, these arms imports were financed through borrowing from official bilateral and multilateral sources and the international capital market. The result was a sharp rise in the dollar value of the international arms trade which drew the attention of several organizations and individual analysts; the international arms trade came to be seen as one of the most significant geo-political phenomena of the late-1970s.

Somewhat later, during the early-1980s, following growing suspicions that a number of ambitious developing countries were pursuing programs to develop weapons of mass destruction - India, Pakistan, Israel, Brazil, Argentina and South Africa - non-proliferation issues rose in stature and importance. India's nuclear test in 1974 was especially important in moving nuclear proliferation up the international political agenda. This was followed by Pakistan's clandestine program designed to gain access to nuclear weapons blueprints and the requisite technologies in the late-1970s/early-1980s, and the infamous double flash picked up by a Vela satellite overflying the South Atlantic pointed to a possible nuclear test by Israel or South Africa.

It is the flow of these military technologies - conventional and non-conventional - which has dominated the political agenda for almost half a century. Attempts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and manage the flow of conventional military technologies are intended to avoid both political and military regional imbalances and a loss of comparative advantage developing out of technology transfer.

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Completely and unequivocally overlooked during this period was the associated transfer of light weapons, for two reasons. First, received wisdom tended to focus exclusively upon the significance of concentrated firepower, not its diffusion. Thus, it was the fear of nuclear weapons falling into the wrong hands or the implications of F-16 fighters replacing worn out F-5s which caught public attention. Although many arms deals involved the transfer and sale of light weapons, their significance was barely considered.

Second, there were sound, practical reasons for allowing the flow of light weapons not to drift onto the research and analysis agenda. From every angle, light weapons were, and still are, impossible to map and measure with the precision which the research community came to expect, for several reasons. A large proportion of light weapons transfers were covert and not necessarily government-to-government, either. Almost devoid of obsolescence, light weapons can and do change hands many times, which means that there are far more suppliers than higher up in the military technology chain. Until recently, the Enfield .303 was a widely-held firearm in a large and diverse number of developing countries, even though most were produced in the United Kingdom during the inter-war years and the now-ubiquitous AK47 design first went into production nearly fifty years ago, in 1947.

Similarly, there are many more producers of light weapons and ammunition than there are of major weapons systems. The AK47 is produced by a wide range of countries other than the former Soviet Union, including many East European and East Asian countries. A passable version of the AK47 is even produced in the North West Frontier Province in Pakistan using considerable dexterity and worn out lathes originally imported from the UK well before independence in 1947. In sum, the time, effort and resources which would have been required to map and measure flows of light weapons on a global scale were both unavailable and, in any case, believed to outweigh both the intellectual and political benefits of tracking the weapons.

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3 Several attempts were made, even by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute - none came to fruition.
I. Failed States, Patterns of Conflict, Peacekeeping and Light Weapons

Since the end of the Cold War, the international security landscape has changed beyond recognition. The Doomsday clock has been turned back, for the moment at least. East-West negotiations proceed apace, despite the collapse of the former Soviet Union. The indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been agreed, a Chemical Weapons Convention is in place, and prospects for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty look excellent.

Arguably, as well, the threat of conventional war is receding. Many countries still deploy and procure advanced conventional weapons, and border skirmishes are common enough. But the wars which once punctuated regions such as the Middle East and South Asia are diminishing. Over the past five years, for example, relations between India and Pakistan have been consistently bad, due primarily to the situation in Kashmir. Interestingly, however, there have been few indications that this latest stand-off might result in open warfare.

Amongst the many reasons for this decline, including better diplomacy and techniques and strategies for long-term conflict resolution, the economic factor is significant. Few countries can now afford the economic cost of conventional war, for two reasons. First, the majority would be forced to fight alone, without the economic or matériel support of one or the other superpower. Second, both bilateral and multilateral lenders and donors are capable of much greater influence in the political domain, which potentially includes taking a policy stance on security issues.

In the future, therefore, the international community will be called upon to deal with - or not, as the case may be - a very different type of conflict. The possibility of major conflicts will continue to exist, especially in Asia, but they will be few and far between. It is the need to devise ways and means of preventing low-intensity conflict which will occupy the efforts of the international community, the United Nations in particular. Moreover, to a great extent, these conflicts will involve the use of light weapons.

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\(^4\) Not surprisingly, there is a considerable amount of literature in this area. For a recent overview see, D. Ramsbotham, "The Changing Nature of Intervention: The Role of UN Peacekeeping", Conflict Studies No. 282, London: Research Institute for the Study of Conflict and Terrorism, August 1995.
Paradoxically, the decline in the incidence of conventional warfare has not led to either a diminution of conflict or a rise in security. On the contrary, various areas of the international system have descended into chaos, violence and literal anarchy, which has duly given rise to the concept of ‘failed’ states.

The nation-building efforts which followed decolonization were always uneven processes, with successes in some quarters often paralleled by abject failures in others. The geo-political interests of the superpowers often masked the extent to which new states were fundamentally weak and, therefore, vulnerable to threats and actions from sub-state actors and organizations. In effect, superpower involvement and their economic and *matériel* largesse masked the weakness of nation-building in many areas. This weakness gave rise to ‘quasi-states’, which were nothing like their more robust West European counterparts. As the Cold War drew to a close, the superpowers began to adjust downwards the levels of political, military and economic support they were able or prepared to offer former allies in the erstwhile Third World - the abrupt rejection of Pakistan by the United States is an excellent case in point, or Cuba by the former Soviet Union, albeit for different reasons.

To a certain extent, the Cold War exacerbated rather than just masked the limitations of state building. On the one hand the superpowers frequently lent excessive support to regimes which lacked legitimacy and popular support, which effectively retarded key elements of nation-building, especially the growth of civil society. It was not until the election of Jimmy Carter in 1976 that US foreign policy-makers made any discernible effort to confront these contradictions. Another associated outcome was the impact of arms transfers. Economically, high defense expenditures and the import of major weapons systems may have in many cases slowed development, or worse.

The import of light weapons may have had less of an economic impact, but they still amounted to a major source of instability. As the superpowers drew back from countries such as Somalia and Afghanistan, the respective governments lost the little control they previously enjoyed. Domestic rivals, who were themselves divided, acquired the weaponry to fight both their governments and amongst themselves. One of the most significant political results of the widespread proliferation of light weapons amongst the warring factions was the diminution not just of central authority but also of the traditional foundation for order, namely the clan and tribal elders.\(^5\)

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The collapse of organized force and the loss of control over weapons was an exceptionally important ramification of the withdrawal of superpower activity. Yet, there were other reasons as well for the growth in conflict. Arguably, one important development was the shocks endured by structural adjustment programs, where the impact upon the poorest sections of developing countries has been especially severe. The 1980s was a remarkable decade in the world of economic development policy. The prevailing Keynesian approaches to economic aid and development policy were brusquely overturned as part and parcel of the neo-classical revolution which swept through a number of OECD countries and the international organizations which were broadly influenced by the West, such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.6

From the early-1980s on, both bilateral and multilateral aid donors have made the provision of economic aid conditional upon economic reform on the one hand and democracy on the other. In essence, a host of developing countries were cajoled into a series of far-reaching economic reforms following the onset of the international debt crisis. The International Monetary Fund in particular placed immense pressure upon indebted countries to curb excessive government expenditure which had been the cause of budget deficits and inflation, over-valued currencies (which made imports cheap and exports expensive), disproportionate imports and inattention to supply-side economics. In addition, and at a later date, the 'good government' agenda took shape amongst the donor community. Not content just to enforce developing countries' change in direction on economic policy, donors also decided to ensure that democracy took root as well. For the multilateral donors, the key was administrative reform to curb corruption and promote transparency and accountability. For bilateral donors, the agenda was more overt and focussed upon democracy, human rights and participation.

The whole process of structural adjustment served to make the poor much poorer as government spending was cut to the bone and subsidies disappeared. Whilst the economic policies which led to the crises of the 1980s were also responsible for increasing poverty, the early adjustment policies were sufficiently inflexible to make a further impact upon poverty, as incomes fell and social services were cut back.

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Inevitably, if not predictably, the further social, political and economic impoverishment of the poor in developing countries has exacerbated ethnic tensions - the so-called 'default option' - which occur following the breakdown of civil society when basic needs are unfulfilled. Other forms of conflict have increased as well - criminality, communal violence and low intensity conflict, for example. Throughout the Cold War, latent causes of conflict undoubtedly lay barely hidden below the surface. The economic and political shocks engendered since 1980 have brought these conflicts to the surface.

The susceptibility of weak states to ethnic tensions, secession and outright criminality has been at immense humanitarian cost, which has left failed states largely dependent upon intervention by and assistance from the international community. This dependence, coupled with a rigid belief in the sanctity of the nation-state, has compelled the international system to invest heavily in ever-expanding peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operations in an attempt to minimize human suffering, both short- and long-term.

Within the peace-keeping community it is becoming widely accepted that the ability to disarm warring factions is a critical component in the success of peace-keeping operations. So far, the focus of peacekeeping operations has centered primarily upon humanitarian relief and thereafter upon restarting democratic processes. If, however, warring parties are not disarmed, the prospects for democracy and the growth of civil society will be greatly diminished. The role of light weapons in the undermining of traditional forms of authority has already been noted. In addition, if weapons stay in the system, soldiers, militia and militants who find themselves on the losing side can readily resort to violence to derail processes in which they stand to lose - as in the case of UNITA in Angola, or Hekmatyer in Afghanistan. Furthermore, light weapons tend to empower criminals of all types, which jeopardizes the safety of individuals and communities.

It is against this backdrop that interest and concern over stocks and flows of light weapons has emerged, to overtake interest in other forms of military technology transfer and proliferation. In many parts of the world, governments and national security forces, both strong and weak, and UN peace-keeping operations now face individuals and organizations which are comparatively well-armed, with assault rifles, anti-personnel mines, grenade launchers and stocks of ammunition which often add up to a significant possession of firepower.
Moreover, quite apart from the dangers to peace-keeping personnel and those they are mandated to protect, a failure to disarm warring parties and collect weapons can jeopardize the work of a peace-keeping operation both during, and more significantly, after a UN operation has been completed.

The scale and importance of the contemporary threats facing national and multinational security forces from sub-state actors and organizations are without precedent. There is now an urgent need to make sense of the processes which enable these groups and individuals to gain access to light weapons and, in turn, to construct policies to both control and prevent the proliferation of light weapons. Without this knowledge and insight, it will not be possible to undergo operations designed to ensure the stability and security of individuals, states and the regions in which they are located.

II. The Characteristics of Light Weapons

The proliferation of light weapons is determined by a series of characteristics which combine to set the problem apart from other forms of military technology. Light weapons have historically been produced in abundance, so much so that there are no reliable estimates available from government or non-governmental sources to ascertain scale and levels of production. In relative terms, this is not the case with weapons platforms.

Compounding the problem of gauging scale of production is the degree to which licenses to produce light weapons and ammunition have spread beyond the major weapons producers. To produce or reverse-engineer light weapons of limited sophistication does not require advanced industrial expertise or infrastructure. Countries such as Pakistan and Singapore which have struggled to produce major weapons systems have fewer difficulties and more success in producing certain types of light weapons, including anti-personnel land-mines.

In addition, crude but effective weapons can be produced independently. The ability of frontier workshops in northern Pakistan to reverse-engineer AK47s and Enfield .303s has already been noted. In some areas of India, there exist thriving rural gun factories, producing crude weapons from bicycle frames and the

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8 Light weapons include small arms such as pistols, rifles, assault rifles and sub-machine guns; light and medium machine guns; certain types of heavy machine guns (HMG) with a calibre not exceeding 12.7mm/0.5" (after which an HMG will be classified as a canon); anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles. Also included in this category are mortars, mines and grenades.
Light weapons and the International Arms Trade

Light weapons and the International Arms Trade

Light weapons have a number of characteristics which lend themselves to rapid and frequent movement, both across borders, between social organizations and amongst individuals. First, they are by definition light, which facilitates cheap and easy transportation and covert movement. Light weapons can be easily concealed and smuggled, across borders and within countries, using the most rudimentary forms of transportation. In South Asia weapons have been moved using mules and camels across the India-Pakistan border and shipped to the Tamil Tigers using small boats. In Southern Africa weapons are smuggled across borders in the fuel tanks of cars or in concealed compartments in freight trucks. Light aircraft are also known to have been used. In Puerto Rico and Ireland small arms have been sent by mail.

Light weapons can be very cheap, which opens up demand from a much larger cross-section of groups and individuals, even in very poor parts of the world. In most areas of the world, light weapons tend to command high prices, but in other parts the availability is so widespread and the sellers often so impoverished that the cost of weapons and ammunition can be extremely low. In Uganda, an AK47 can be procured for the same cost as a chicken. Inside Mozambique and Angola, an AK47 complete with a couple of clips of ammunition can be bought for less than $15.00, or for a bag of maize. At these prices almost anyone can own an illegal firearm.

Light weapons have very little built-in obsolescence. In the case of major weapons, a degree of control can be exerted by the supplier through limiting the initial supply of spare parts. With some countries, the US operates a 'short leash' policy that effectively circumscribes the ability to deploy weapons systems without the approval of the supplier, which is expressed through the supply of steering housings from trucks. In South Africa, simple pipeguns are being used as effective, short-range shotguns. The IRA produced their own mortars which proved to be adequate for use against large targets, such as Heathrow airport.

Finally, compounding problems of quantification are the large number of diverse weapons which currently fit into the categorization of light weapons. Major weapons systems are relatively easy to group and classify around the concept of the weapons platform - essentially a tank, ship, aircraft or missile system. Light weapons tend to be a residual classification which fit into the category they are in because they do not fit into those which exist already.

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9 Arms smugglers in South Asia move weapons using camels who know certain routes across borders and do not require their owner to be on hand to guide them. There are similar stories from the Horn of Africa.
spare parts. Whereas an aging F-5 requires and inventory of 60,000 spare parts to remain operational, an AK47 has only sixteen moving parts. In the case of most light weapons, durability and low maintenance are integral features. They are easy to maintain and rarely break down. If the condition of a light weapon deteriorates, it can usually be brought back to working order through elbow-grease rather than refurbishment.

These are the characteristics which distinguish the trade in light weapons from the trade in major weapons systems. In terms of security and stability, however, the crucial fact about light weapons is that once control is lost and these weapons enter other networks - military, political or criminal - the bulk are irretrievable. Concealing light weapons is not difficult once they have been acquired; caches can be broken up and individual weapons hidden in either urban or rural settings. A good example of light weapon irretrievability is the CIA’s failed program to retrieve the Stinger missiles from Afghanistan and Pakistan. Despite offering a buy-back program totalling $65 million dollars, the agency has yet to secure a complete system, even though the majority of Stingers appear to have remained in the area. Of additional interest in the case of the Stinger is the strong possibility that some, many, or even all of the missiles will have ceased to be operational. Stingers employ two power packs, one for launch and another for guidance. Having been in the field now for seven or more years and stored under variable conditions by mujahideen commanders whose knowledge of high technology systems is limited at best, the power packs are likely to have degraded.

The clear differences between light weapons and other forms of military technology imply that methods and policies to control further proliferation will differ greatly from other forms of arms control. The key aspect of controlling light weapons in the interests of security focusses less on preventing governments and security forces from gaining access, in part because the widespread, existing availability and affordability of most light weapons for governments makes such gestures futile. On the contrary, the most important aspect of control turns on a very different aspect of proliferation. Across the international system, the proliferation of light weapons gives greatest cause for concern when they cease to be in the control of security forces and become the charge of sub-state actors and organizations. This is the point at which control is crucial.
III. The Global Proliferation of Light Weapons - Stocks and Flows

Europe and the Former Soviet Union

The main source of concern regarding the present and future supply of light weapons is the former Eastern bloc and the former Soviet Union (FSU). Weapons are flowing out of and around this region in considerable quantities. The destinations and networks are numerous. Many weapons are flowing towards Europe, others into Central Asia and beyond. Russian arms traffickers have extended their operations to include heavy weapons.10 Prague is now recognized as an established center for Russian and East European arms traffickers. The Ukraine has become an important conduit for arms and narcotics, given its pivotal link between Europe, Asia and the Middle East.11

Most of the Baltic states, especially Lithuania, are experiencing a sharp increase in criminal activity. The murder rate in Russia is almost double that of the United States, in line with the sharp rise in violent crime. The strength and scope of organized crime in Russia and the surrounding regions is also increasing. Several powerful organized criminal networks, mostly of ethnic origin, are associated with the sale of illegally procured weapons. In addition, organized crime in the Baltic states is strongly linked to drug trafficking, money laundering, counterfeiting currency and car racketeering.12

Recently, the demand for illegal weapons in and around the Baltic states has eased somewhat. It is assumed that most criminal groups now possess sufficient firepower. In response to this decreasing demand, arms traffickers are turning their attention to Western Europe and other parts of Eastern Europe, the Balkans in particular. The major concern in Eastern Europe is over arms shipments to the former Yugoslavia and the enforcement of UN sanctions and the arms embargo imposed upon the whole of Yugoslavia since September 1991. The embargo has been consistently broken, especially from the East. Weapons move relatively

12 Ibid. Recent suggestions that organized crime is becoming interested in the smuggling of fissile materials, however, are probably exaggerated. See Strategic Survey 1994/95, Oxford: International Institute for Strategic Studies/OUP, Oxford, 1995, p.27.
unhindered into most parts of the region from numerous sources, both
governmental and private. For example, in July 1993 twelve containers of
weapons, including automatic rifles, were discovered at Maribor airport in a
shipment masquerading as a shipment of humanitarian aid from Sudan. The
weapons were bound for Bosnia via Croatia. Further investigation revealed that
a Sudanese national had paid for their transportation, which was organized by an
Austrian national on behalf of a Bosnian client.

Other examples of the embargo violation abound. Considerable amounts of
weapons are moving into Macedonia, to which at least four established supply
networks are known to exist: via Salonika, via Croatia and Bulgaria, via
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria and via Albania. Weapons produced in private
workshops in Croatia are being exported out of the region, mainly into Western
Europe. More recently, there have been concerns that the US has been
supplying weapons to the Bosnian Muslims. The Croats have recently acquired
MiG-21s which clearly bear the camouflage markings of the East German Air
Force. Political support from external powers tells only half of the former-
Yugoslavia story - recently Slovenian police issued charges against six people,
including former ministers, in connection with the smuggling of arms labeled
humanitarian aid into Bosnia and Croatia. Up to one million gallons of jet fuel
crosses from Albania to Serbia each day.

For weapons moving both in and out of Eastern European states, the Czech
Republic capital, Prague, has been an important focal point, even though the
majority of the weapons traded never touch Czech soil. Most of the weapons are
supplied by Russian army officers, exploiting networks which were built up
during the Afghan war. The cash generated by arms sales is laundered in either
Moscow or Israel, and has amounted to some $4.3 billion in recent years,
according to recent estimates.

Arms trafficking is made much less difficult by the relaxation of border
controls within the European Union; in the past, approximately 80% of illegally

References:
13 Ibid., pp.10-11.
14 T. Ripley, "Bosnia C-130 Suspected in Covert Flights Row", Flight International, 8-
14th March 1995.
15 Paul Beaver from the Jane's Information Group quoted on Radio Free Europe, 24th
17 R. Bonner, "Albania's Lakeside Smugglers Help Fuel Serbian War Machine", The
18 N. Thorpe, "Where the Best Gun-Runners Go Clubbing", The Observer, 2nd July
1995.
imported weapons had been seized at borders. In addition, the EU has made little progress in the harmonization of national laws and regulations on the manufacture, sale and possession of firearms and explosives. The current political wrangling over the establishment of EUROPOL will slow efforts to halt the flow of illegal weapons into EU countries and indicates just how difficult it will be to harmonize firearms policies.

The window of opportunity to control the flow of weapons into EU countries may be closing, although this appears not to be reflected in political and bureaucratic concern. From 1990 to 1993 German officials reported an increase of 119% in arms trafficking, based upon seizures. The United Kingdom has experienced a dramatic increase in violent crimes involving firearms. Firearms offenses in England and Wales have doubled over the past decade, to over 13,000 annually. A recent armed robbery in Cumbria involved the use of a Czech-made version of the Uzi submachine-gun. A weapons amnesty in Greater Manchester led to the surrender of 620 weapons, one of them a Chinese assault rifle, presumed to be a Type-56.

Obversely, there is also a threat that the failure to regulate the weapons currently under the control of the IRA will create problems for the UK, Ireland and other parts of the EU. Success depends upon whether the British government and the IRA can agree upon how the IRA's weapons should be controlled given the IRA's belief that the decommissioning of weapons amounts to de facto unconditional surrender. Recent reports that the IRA might off-load onto the black market are almost certainly misplaced. It is more likely that the IRA quartermasters will maintain close control over weapons stocks, given the fact that there exist groups and individuals within the Six Counties who have little interest or investment in the peace process. Less doubtful, however, is the size of the IRA's arsenal - it is widely recognized that the IRA possesses substantial stocks of weapons, ammunition and explosives.

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19 INTERPOL, op. cit., p.6.
20 Ibid., p.13.
Asia

In North East Asia, national governments are relatively untroubled by the type of arms trafficking which has occurred in other regions of the world. In Japan, the implementation of anti-Boryokudan (organized crime) legislation passed in 1992 has led to a decrease in incidents involving firearms. Neither North or South Korea appear adversely affected by increased arms trafficking.

In South East Asia, arms trafficking does present more problems. The internal situation in Malaysia is stable despite the fact that Malaysia shares a common sea and land border with Thailand and is linked by a causeway to Singapore. Nevertheless, Malaysia does seem to be an important conduit for arms trafficking from Thailand to Singapore. Thailand is a major source of weapons in this region, especially the south. However, most of the weapons are small arms, primarily revolvers, and there is little evidence of organized arms trafficking. In Singapore gun control laws are extremely tight and are based upon a presumption of guilt if any person is found to be in possession of two or more unlicensed weapons. Obversely, however, some 60,000 vessels visit the Port of Singapore each year and there are numerous points of entry for illegal weapons, especially across the straits of Johore. Following the recent crack-down on Muslim extremists there, the Philippine government is negotiating an extradition and legal assistance pact with the government of Pakistan to prevent the flow of arms, funds and training to the rebels.25

Nor is China immune from firearms trafficking; in mid-1995 the Chinese authorities seized large caches of weapons and explosives from the northern region of inner Mongolia, including nearly half a million detonators, 144,500 kilograms of dynamite and 1,751 illegal firearms.26 China also has its own fair share of illegal arms bazaars, such as in the market town of Baigou, where illegal weapons are widely available, together with, for example, police roadblocks and uniforms.27 In Japan it is virtually impossible to own a firearm legally, and there appears to be little demand for illegal weapons, except from organized criminal gangs. Recently, Japanese police intercepted a shipment of illegal handguns and ammunition being smuggled by sea into Japan, allegedly destined for crime

syndicates.28 The Doomsday cult, *Aum Shinri Kyo* (Supreme Truth), responsible for the recent gas attacks on the Tokyo subway, was known to have a firearms production capability.29 In addition, bazookas and grenades were found in the possession of cult members.30

Since the emergence of a powerful campaign to ban the export and production of anti-personnel landmines, Cambodia - where one in 263 members of the population are amputees - has become a metaphor for the human cost which results from indiscriminate anti-personnel landmine usage and flagrant disregard for decommissioning responsibilities. The concern over mines in this part of the world has, however, obscured a related problem regarding light weapons proliferation.

In 1991, the four Cambodian warring parties concluded a peace agreement in Paris, which gave a wide range of powers to the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) for the implementation of a peace process, a cease-fire in particular, the oversight of elections and both disarmament and demining. Although UNTAC attempted to implement the arms control provisions set out in the Paris Agreements, it was largely unsuccessful. First, the ability to control the flow of weapons to the Khmer Rouge and from across the Thai border was negligible. Second, the military component of UNTAC understood the disarmament process to be a function of the election process; the demobilization and disarmament of 70% of the warring parties was considered an essential condition for the passage of a free and fair election, which was UNTAC's primary mission. When it became clear that elections could be successfully concluded without disarmament taking place, the program was virtually abandoned. In sum, the UNTAC mission committed similar mistakes made by peacekeeping operations elsewhere (see below) - disarmament was too slow, compromised over time and gradually downgraded in importance.31

Towards the end of the Cambodian conflict it became clear that arms trafficking in and around the region was on the increase as demand from Burmese rebels and narcotics smugglers from within the Golden Triangle rose. During this

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31 United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), *Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization During Peacekeeping Operations*, UNTAC Operation, Geneva: UNIDIR, unpublished survey responses. I am also grateful to Eric Berman for his comments on the UNTAC operation.
period, arms traffickers made substantial profits of 150-1,000% by selling off M16s for $200-320.  

Vietnam and, to a lesser extent, Cambodia inadvertently inherited significant numbers of light weapons following the US withdrawal in 1975, including 150,000 tons of ammunition and in excess of 2 million small arms (see Table 1).

Table 1: Light Weapons Abandoned by the US in SE Asia in 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Vietnam</th>
<th>Cambodia</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>.45 M1911A1 pistols</td>
<td>90,000</td>
<td>24,000</td>
<td>114,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.56mm M16A1 rifles</td>
<td>791,000</td>
<td>155,000</td>
<td>946,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other rifles</td>
<td>857,580</td>
<td>104,000</td>
<td>961,580</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62 M60 GMPG</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>15,320</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40mm M79 grenade launchers</td>
<td>47,000</td>
<td>18,500</td>
<td>65,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,800,580</strong></td>
<td><strong>301,820</strong></td>
<td><strong>2,102,400</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


By far the most severe problem in Asia is confined to the Indian subcontinent. South Asia may only be flooded with illegal weapons in some regions, but, nevertheless, the diffusion of light weapons is a major problem, which looks set to become much worse in the future.33

In South Asia, the proliferation of light weapons, especially AK47s, throughout the region has risen significantly over the past few years. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the CIA set up an arms pipeline through Pakistan to ensure the mujahideen acquired sufficient firepower to mount a defense against the Soviet armed forces. Throughout the 1980s, tens of thousands of tons of weaponry and ammunition flowed through the pipeline, which was controlled by

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the Pakistan Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) department. By prior arrangement, the CIA ensured the delivery of weapons and played no part in the process thereafter. In addition, for a number of reasons, the Saudis, the Chinese and the Israelis made contributions, but at least 50% of the weapons, though not of US origin, were paid for by the US government. All in all, some $8 billion worth of light weapons were pumped through the pipeline.

The pipeline ran from Karachi and Rawalpindi, depending upon whether the weapons arrived by sea or by air. It had many junctures because it involved several different forms of transportation - ship, train, truck and pack animal. Continuous loading and unloading of the weapons allowed the pipeline to leak prodigiously. This merely encouraged the US to step up the flow, rather than address the reasons for the leakages and, further, the possible impact upon the region. No action was taken, even when it became clear that control over the flow of Stinger surface-to-air missiles was in sharp decline. It has been estimated that only 30% of the weapons introduced into the pipeline reached their intended destination.

As the main actor in the process, the ISI acquired the bulk of the plunder - a former head of the ISI once admitted that his organization had 3 million Kalashnikovs packed and greased and hidden away in caches along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Some of the stocks are almost certainly being drip-fed onto the illegal market in Pakistan. Arms have also been used for political purposes, to fuel the growing anarchy in Karachi and to supply Sikh and Kashmiri militants across the border in India. Lately, the flow of weapons into the Punjab has dwindled to virtually nothing following the emasculation of the Kalistani militant movement, but the flow of weapons into Kashmir proceeds apace, accompanied increasingly by militants either directly from or trained in Afghanistan. It remains unclear as to whether any of the militant groups have access to surface-to-air missiles, including the Stinger.

Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan five years ago. Pakistan, especially the North West Frontier Province, is now awash with weapons, the bulk of which originated in the Afghan pipeline. In the virtually lawless North West Frontier Province, ownership of an AK47 is now de rigueur, where once the tribals sported Enfield .303s and more ancient models. Land disputes now involve the use of mortars and RPGs. Several hundred Stingers are in the system - these weapons are more than capable of bringing down a commercial aircraft. They can

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be purchased in Afghanistan and some parts of Pakistan and have certainly been acquired by the Iranians. At this juncture, nobody knows whether they are still in working order after so many years in the field but most, including commercial air lines, prefer not to take the risk. International flights leaving Islamabad initially fly south to avoid the Hindu Kush and, despite the tremendous cost and loss of profit, commercial flights from South East Asia avoid Afghanistan entirely by flying around the south west coast of the Indian subcontinent.

Virtually anyone, foreign or national, can acquire weapons in the North West Frontier Province, providing the vendors are convinced that neither the ISI or the CIA are involved. Illegal arms bazaars flourish openly around Peshawar and offer assault rifles, mortars, missiles and even anti-aircraft systems. Slowly, these weapons are turning up in other parts of Pakistan and beyond. In Karachi, much of the present chaos and violence is the responsibility of political gangs which openly sport, and use, illegal assault rifles. In late-May, Karachi witnessed one of its worst days over several months of violence. Within a day, 28 people were killed during a pitched battle between the MQM(A) and the Pakistan Rangers. The security forces have been threatened by rocket launchers, anti-tank rockets, light machine guns and assault rifles. These and the weapons used in the recent shooting of US citizens almost certainly originated in the Afghan pipeline.

Weapons are also finding their way into other parts of the India subcontinent. The underworld in Karachi is closely linked to the underworld in Bombay. Weapons are coming across the border and through the Rajasthan desert. Arms traffickers are finding a good market amongst Muslims who, in the wake of the communal violence sparked by the destruction of the Ayodhya mosque in December 1992, no longer feel that the Indian security forces are adequately concerned for the safety of Muslims, with some justification. So, they are turning to the black market for self-defense. There are a growing number of reports of arms seizures in urban centers with sizeable Muslim populations - Surat, Bombay, and Hyderabad, for example. Bihar, arguably the most violent state in India, is also similarly affected. Police intelligence sources estimate that there are 100,000 guns in the area, of which only 25,000 are licensed. Whilst most are crude, country-made weapons or dated rifles, acquisitions of more sophisticated weapons are on the increase. In the main, weapons are used for political coercion, but violent crime is on the increase - in early-1995 one criminal group resorted to the use of landmines.

Whilst the main movement of weapons is from northern Pakistan through into India via either Kashmir or Rajasthan, there are other conduits. Weapons from the Sri Lankan conflict are starting to reach India. Here there are two major routes, one from the Middle East through India to the coastline of Tamil Nadu,
and another from South East Asia (Hong Kong, Bangkok and Singapore) to the
northern shores of Sri Lanka. As in the case of the conflict in Afghanistan,
weapons will outlast the conflicts for which they were intended.
In addition, routes into South Asia from the east are especially porous. The
borders which separate India from Nepal, Bangladesh and Burma can be crossed
with relative ease - the India-Burma border is virtually open and a well-known
smuggling route for precious and semi-precious stones. Bangladesh is known to
have a growing gun control problem which is fuelled by high levels of political
violence centered upon university campuses. Significantly, however, ammunition
is extremely difficult to find in Bangladesh.

**Latin America**

The primary demand for light weapons in Latin American countries is
criminal, rather than political. In addition, Latin America never really developed
as a military Cold War theater in the same way as South Asia or Africa.
Consequently, there have been no consistent sources of supply or pipelines
because patterns of demand have invariably been subnational and the suppliers
commercial.

As might be expected, Bolivia and Colombia have experienced major
problems with firearms proliferation, especially in relation to narcotics
trafficking; the Medellin Cartel has a military wing. The types of weapons which
are in circulation in South America are eclectic, and there are no real patterns of
supply.

Of considerable interest to the US authorities is the growing problem of drug
traffickers accessing the illegal and legal market for US handguns via Panama.
This is also a growing problem in Mexico where rival narcotics factions have
been involved in violent confrontations using illegally procured and highly
advanced war weapons. The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms has
recently established a link between the easy availability of weapons within the
US, due to existing gun control laws, and regional security.

Many of the weapons abandoned by the United States during the withdrawal
from Vietnam in 1975 were acquired by the Cuban government in exchange for
foodstuffs, especially seafood. Thereafter, over the course of the 1980s, these
weapons found their way first to the Sandanistas in Nicaragua and then to the
FMLN in El Salvador. Other sources of light weapons were a number of H&K
and FMBP G3s discarded by the Portuguese when Mozambique and Angola were
granted independence. In addition, several other Latin American and Caribbean
countries received weapons originally discarded in Vietnam, including Chile, Colombia, Grenada, and Panama.35

Following the summit meeting in Guatemala of the five Central American Presidents in August 1987, the Esquipulas II Agreement was adopted as the framework for peace, national reconciliation and democratization throughout the region. This was followed by an expression of support from the UN Security Council (Resolution 637 (1989)) and, duly, a UN-sponsored peace process and the establishment of The United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA).36 In March 1990, the Security Council authorized an enlargement of ONUCA’s mandate and the addition of armed personnel in order for it to play a part in the voluntary demobilization of the Nicaraguan resistance. Of critical importance to the peace-keeping process which ensued, the weapons handed over by the Contras were destroyed in situ.37 By late-1990, over 18,000 weapons had been destroyed and more than 22,000 personnel demobilized.38

Obversely, the experience in El Salvador was somewhat different. By March 1995, the Secretary General reported that the ONUSAL mission was largely failing to ensure FMLN adherence to the disarmament agreements contained in the peace accord. The FMLN had, since the cessation of hostilities, kept large quantities of weapons in El Salvador and neighboring countries. Whilst ONUSAL military observers had located and destroyed a number of illegal weapons caches, progress was considered slow. Moreover, efforts by the Government were equally frustrating. Although approximately 2,000 weapons were seized during the first three months of 1995, the voluntary surrender program had proved unsuccessful which in turn prompted the Government to consider a buy-back program.39 There is very little evidence at the time of writing to suggest, either way, that ‘weapons of war’ have or have not proliferated beyond the reach of either the state or the peace keeping forces. However, a recent report states that more than 260,000

military small arms remain in private hands and demobilized soldiers and former rebels are being blamed for rising crime levels.40

Middle East and North Africa

The availability of light weapons in the Middle East is probably much less than might be expected, given the history of conflict throughout the region. In Lebanon, the civil war has benefited from the ongoing peace process between Israel, the PLO, Jordan and Syria. But a 'mini-war' still rumbles on involving the South Lebanon Army (SLA) on the one hand and Hizbollah on the other. As has been the case in other low-intensity conflicts (see above), this may be a means, albeit temporary, of controlling light weapons. Obversely, given the nature and history of the conflict in Lebanon, it is more likely that weapons are freely available and ownership widespread. Nor are the weapons of war controlled by Hizbollah especially limited - the standard counter-measure against Israeli or SLA action is to fire Katyusha rockets over the security zone and into northern Israel.41

In the inevitably slow passage towards peace in the region, the importance of controlling weapons, firearms and explosives cannot be underestimated. Since the signing of the Israel-PLO peace agreement in September 1993, over 120 Israelis have been killed by knife, gun or bomb.42 While it may be too late to prevent Hamas from acquiring the type of matériel it requires to conduct a campaign of terror, violence and bloodshed, the need to control the illegal proliferation of light weapons is considerable. A 'local' arms race resulting in the arming of militant vigilante Jewish settler groups could derail the peace process completely.

If light weapons in the Middle East threaten the peace process itself, there is a relatively small threat of illegal trafficking outside the region, although Israel is a significant producer of light weapons and illegal shipments for commercial gains have been documented.43 In North Africa, the situation is somewhat different. In Algeria, the military government has been virtually paralysed by the Front Islamique de Salut (FIS), which itself is threatened by the more radical Groupe Islamique Armée in the contest for the moral highground of Islamic

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41 "Israel's Forgotten War in South Lebanon", The Economist, 15th-21st July 1995, p.53.
fundamentalism. Weapons supplies for the FIS have largely been obtained from attacks on military and police facilities. However, it is entirely possible that the FIS or the GIA have decided to punish France for its support for Algeria's military government. Following the December 1994 Air France hijack by Islamic militants, speculation has risen that Islamic fundamentalists have commenced a program of terrorism in France, similar to IRA operations on the UK mainland in the 1980s. There is also strong evidence pointing towards the increase in the supply of weaponry into some of the main metropolitan suburbs. The FIS is alleged to receive most of its weapons from Sudan, which is said to operate as an arms warehouse, holding weapons from the Islamic world and distributing them to Muslims in Algeria, Uganda, Egypt, Zaire, Ethiopia, Eritrea and Somalia.

While the attentions of radical Islam within Algeria are focussed upon the former colonial power, the other major power in the Maghreb, Libya, is focussing more on the South. In recent years a large number of light weapons have been transferred by the Khaddafi regime to Chad in support of the Goukouni Weddeyye rebels. It is also strongly suspected that Libyan weapons have flowed south-west, to West African states.

Egypt is much more of an enigma. There have been persistent rumors that Egypt is a main supplier of arms to the SPLA in the Sudan, given that relations between Cairo and Khartoum are unequivocally cool. Moreover, there is also a growing suspicion that Egypt is a major supplier of ammunition throughout the African continent. The motive is unclear and will remain so until suppliers and patterns of trade are deciphered. However, these types of transfers, from countries such as Israel and Egypt, give a useful indication of regional ambitions, in the same way that the transfers of major weapons systems illuminated the foreign polices of the superpowers during the Cold War.

**Underdevelopment and Conflict: Africa in the 1990s**

The African sub-continent is undoubtedly one of the most conflict-ridden and underdeveloped regions of the world and exhibits many of the symptoms which exacerbate the proliferation and impact of light weapons. Indeed, some pundits argue that the sub-continent is beyond salvation. Without doubt, the

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44 IISS, *op. cit.*, p.140.
scale of recent economic decline throughout the entire sub-continent has been uneven but on the whole exceptionally debilitating.

Until recently, Africa was an active theater for superpower confrontation as both sides of the ideological divide struggled to attain influence as a result of the post-colonial upheavals. These upheavals left none of the subregions unaffected - from the Biafran civil war in Nigeria to the protracted and drawn out wars of national liberation in Angola and Mozambique. During the Cold War, most countries received military aid from either one of the superpowers, or France or Britain.

Although there were major exceptions in the cases of Nigeria and South Africa, the majority of African armed forces in West Africa could neither afford, acquire nor assimilate extremely advanced military technology, especially after the commercialization of the international arms market in the 1970s and devastating economic collapse in the 1980s. In addition, the characters of African wars, both civil and regional, have tended to emphasize the use of light weapons and artillery.

The 1980s was a devastating decade for Africa. Following years of poor government, high aid, poor growth rates and then, in the 1980s, falling output finally let loose the forces of economic retrogression. This was followed by a period of structural adjustment, which, to many observers, amounted to little more than structural maladjustment. The resultant cocktail of famine, conflict, alienation, crime and under-development has sent Africa further back, in development terms, than ever thought possible. Even World Bank officials admit that it could be forty years until the sub-continent returns to per capita income levels of the 1970s.

At present, and on balance, the sub-continent is failing to survive the political changes of the post-Cold War era. Recently, Africa's post-colonial cushions have collapsed. The patronage from Moscow and Washington has disappeared and aid donors now demand 'good governance' from corrupt or mismanaged regimes which were once, but are no longer, tolerated. The result has been the partial and sometimes complete collapse of the state and, along with it, civil society - Somalia, Rwanda and Zaire epitomize the failed states of the late-twentieth century, characterized by economic and technological decline, the collapse of education, politisation of the civil service and the erosion of the judiciary.47

Both a cause and an effect of this decline has been violent conflict. The African sub-continent typifies the way in which armed conflicts are being transformed into untidy and unstructured affairs where boundaries are blurred and the victims and costs widespread. In many parts of the sub-continent, the availability of light weapons has had a crucial impact upon conflicts and the humanitarian cost of conflict, as well as political outcomes.

**West Africa and the Horn**

Where the northern edge of the African subcontinent meets North Africa is one of the more prominent civilisational ‘fault lines' where racial, ethnic and religious differences have combined to propel countries such as Chad and the Sudan into debilitating, complex and seemingly unending civil wars.\(^48\) Many of these conflicts have been extended and defined by the transfer of light weapons from regional powers. Nor has the United States resisted the temptation to realize political gains through the supply of light weapons - witness the support extended to the government in Liberia and to rebel forces in the Sudan. The combined impact upon collapsed civil societies and failed states has been immense.

The availability of light weapons has defined the course of conflict in West Africa, especially Liberia. Soon after the outbreak of conflict, light weapons from an array of sources were transferred to the warring factions. Charles Taylor, for example, realized approximately $8 million a month from the exploitation of natural resources in the areas under his control prior to the outbreak of war, a significant proportion of which was used for the purchase of light weapons. The main suppliers to the Doe regime and rebel army led by Charles Taylor were the United States, Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, South Korea, Libya, Taiwan and Israel. Subsequently, Charles Taylor supplied the rebel forces in Sierra Leone.\(^49\)

Moreover, the peacekeeping forces in Liberia, the United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), have, so far, utterly failed to...
successfully disarm anything like the required or projected number of people.\textsuperscript{50} Few conflicts in Africa have been as violent or brutal as the Liberian civil war; 150,000 people have lost their lives, 2.5 million people are homeless, and the infrastructure has suffered enormously. Above all, however, there are 50,000 to 60,000 male and female soldiers, some 25\% of which are children, and bizarre killers are still roaming the towns and countryside.\textsuperscript{51} From the beginning of 1995 until early June, only 190 Liberian combatants had been disarmed.\textsuperscript{52}

The scale of light weapons proliferation in West Africa prompted the President of Mali to request the Secretary-General in October 1993 to undertake a fact-finding mission to put forward ideas to prevent Mali from being further affected by this trend. The mission to Mali took place in August 1994 and concluded that the problem had to be addressed not on a country-by-country basis, but on a regional level. This prompted a follow-on mission to neighboring West African states in February/March 1995.

The recommendations of the mission were interesting. While recognizing that Mali was not yet a state on the brink of failure, it saw that time was nevertheless running out. The proliferation of small arms could only be controlled if other countries in the region became involved, namely, Algeria, Burkina Faso, Chad, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal and Sierra Leone. Furthermore, the mission advised that further democratic structures could only be put in place once a secure security environment had been established.\textsuperscript{53}

In the Sudan, where an especially savage civil war has raged since 1983 and claimed some 1.3 million lives, fighting between government forces and the SPLA proceeds apace, fuelled by weapons imported from abroad. The government was until recently bankrolled by the government in Iran and by wealthy Saudis, on an individual basis. Weapons of highly limited sophistication have been received from China and used with extreme brutality against targets in the South.

\textsuperscript{50} J. Mackinlay and A. Alao, "Liberia ECOMOG and UNOMIL Response to a Complex Emergency", New York: United Nations University, 1995, 65p. provides an excellent overview, with a particular focus on disarmament.
The SPLA-Mainstream experienced serious problems acquiring weapons and ammunition through 1994. Towards the end of the year, however, stocks of ammunition and light weapons were obtained from either Egypt or Israel and, possibly, following a policy directive from Washington. Israel has also been involved in military training. Though Washington denies any set policy on arms transfers to the region - which would involve for the most part light weapons - Eritrea, Uganda and Kenya have all made requests to the US in recent months and supplies are likely the more the conflict in the Sudan spills across its borders.54

During the Somali civil war, most of the heavy weapons in the country were, according to the IISS, in a poor state of repair or inoperable.55 However, some 30,000 people were killed by light weapons between January 1991 and December 1992. Around the same period, some 300,000 people died of starvation.56 Although the heavy weapons in the possession of the Somali armed forces may have been inoperable, light weapons were not. Some 500,000 weapons abandoned by the Somali army as the civil war reached its peak in January 1992 quickly found their way into the struggle between forces loyal to General Mohamed Farah Aideed and Ali Mahdi.57 Weapons also flooded into Somalia after the collapse of the Mengistu regime in Ethiopia.58

Significantly, disarmament was not seen as a part of the mandate provided by Operation Restore Hope (ORH), and the failure by the US to prioritize disarmament became a major source of tension between the UN secretariat and the US-led multinational operation in Somalia. Washington was concerned that if the mission mandate included disarmament, the length of the US mission as well as the risk factor would be increased. This, it was believed, could have eroded the considerable political consensus for ORH within the US. Therefore, Washington was only prepared to include disarmament in the mandate if the process was limited, voluntary and conducted on an ad hoc basis. The UN Secretariat, by contrast, saw disarmament as a priority program which had to be

58 Ibid., p.65.
accomplished by UNITAF before a transition to UN command could be effected.59

Not only was the US responsible for discouraging the disarmament of the warring parties, but it actively contributed to an increase in the availability of firearms in the region. As a parting gesture, the US peacekeeping force donated 5,000 M-16 rifles and 5,000 handguns to the Somali police, which was seen at the time as a maladroit gesture in a country already flooded with weapons. Soon after, brand-new M-16s were sighted in the hands of criminals.60

Central Africa

Since the end of the civil war in Rwanda, there has been a great deal of interest in the supply of weapons to and the circulation of weapons in and around the Great Lakes area. Following the 1990 invasion of Rwanda by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) from its base in Uganda, arms began to flow to both sides. The Hutu government was too poorly armed to resist the invasion by the RPF, which was both equipped and more or less led by Ugandan military personnel. This link dates back to the early-1980s when Tutsi exiles, known as the Banyarwanda, fled to Uganda. Following persecution in Uganda, many joined a guerrilla movement led by Yoweri Museveni, which eventually took power in 1986.

Following the rapid transfer of weapons and troop support from France and military training and non-lethal supplies from Belgium, the Hutu government was able to counter the invasion. Thereafter both sides rushed to rearm, acquiring weapons from private sources and foreign governments. The Hutu government purchased AK47s from Russia, but the main bulk of equipment came from France, Egypt and South Africa.61 In 1993, an exercise in preventive diplomacy produced the Arusha Accords but these were never implemented. Meanwhile extremists began to take control of the government and waged savage attacks against the Tutsi minority, amounting to genocide in the eyes of many international observers. The counter-attack by the Tutsi RPF routed the Hutus.

59 Ibid., p.56.
61 The latter deals contravened UN Security Council Resolution 558, forbidding the import of arms from South Africa.
who fled across the border into Tanzania in one of the largest movements of refugees in history.62

While the international community largely ignored one of the most savage conflicts since the end of the Second World War, it was left to the French to intervene. Operation Turquoise managed to instil a degree of stability in the west of the country but not for long. Nor was there any attempt on the part of the French to disarm the warring parties, which was hardly unexpected given France's role as a major arms exporter to Rwanda. On the contrary, France took no steps to prevent the UN arms embargo from being broken.63

Since the end of the conflict, there have been persistent rumors that light weapons are still finding their way into the area. Of particular concern, the Chinese have set up a 7.62mm ammunition plant in Uganda, 7.62mm being the appropriate calibre for an AK47.64 Zimbabwe Defense Industries also has set up an ammunition plant with the assistance of the Chinese.

In June 1995 two of the world's foremost human rights groups, Human Rights Watch/Africa and Amnesty International, produced reports which offered persuasive evidence that France, China, South Africa, Zaire and the Seychelles were assisting in the rearmament of Rwanda's former Hutu army.65 In response the UN has set up a Commission to investigate the situation and is due to report in early-1996. Nevertheless, the UN has been in possession of evidence for some time before the publication of these reports.66

Also, fears of a similar conflict in Burundi linger on. This has also promoted the interest of arms exports, notably from China. In May 1995 a Chinese ship carrying 152 tons of arms destined for the Tutsi-dominated government in

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64 I am grateful to Robert Jarman, Defense Research and Analysis, London, for this information.
66 M. Huband, "UN Alert Urged as Arms Pour in for New Rwanda War", The Observer, 26th March 1995.
Burundi was prevented from unloading in Tanzania by the government.67 France has called unsuccessfully for an arms embargo.68

Southern Africa

Across the northern belt of the African sub-continent, light weapons are continuing to enter theaters of conflict, thereby adding to the existing stocks of weaponry in the continent as a whole. Further south, however, towards and including Southern Africa, flows of weapons have virtually ceased, with the exception of Angola. Despite the fact that the May 1991 Bicesse Accords prohibited both the government and UNITA from acquiring new weaponry, and despite the UN Security Council embargo on arms sales to UNITA in September 1993, weapons flowed into the region following the resumption of conflict. The return to conflict in late-1992 led to renewed procurement programs on both sides - facilitated financially on the government side by oil revenues, while UNITA exploited its access to Angola's diamond producing areas.69

On the government side, the majority of the procurement drive involved the acquisition of major weapons systems, such as T-55 and T-62 main battle tanks. However, one shipment destined for the government was known to have included four million rounds of 7.62 ammunition for AK47s; this shipment was well-documented following an incident when the cargo ship concerned, carrying weapons for Angola from the Czech Republic and the Russian Federation, was impounded in the British port of Plymouth.70 In addition to the Russian Federation and the Czech Republic, other suppliers of light weapons to the government included Brazil (X-40 and X-60 rockets), North Korea (SA-2 missiles), Israel or South Africa (Galil or R4/R5 rifles), Nigeria (G-3 rifles), the US (anti-tank weapons) and Zimbabwe (indigenously produced ammunition).71

On the UNITA side, the three main traditional sources of weaponry were South Africa and the United States, plus the steady supply of weapons captured

69 The ease by which both sides marshalled the financial resources to fund a renewed procurement drive is an excellent indication as to the country's economic and development potential.
71 Ibid., pp.35-47.
from the Angolan government. The US contribution of military aid was second only to what went through the Afghan pipeline to assist the Afghan mujahideen. However, in recent years, supplies from South Africa and the USA have declined substantially.  

Since the restart of the civil war, UNITA has been compelled to look for other, more covert supplies. Zaire has acted as both an outright supplier and a conduit, as has Namibia, to a much smaller degree. Russian and British arms dealers were thought to be involved, as were France, the Ukraine and Bulgaria. Many of the weapons were paid for using diamonds and necessitating the involvement of large mining companies, such as the De Beers diamond cartel.

Elsewhere, there are two major and inter-related reasons for the cessation of weapons flows. First, conflicts throughout the region have either slowed or ended. The termination of civil wars in Angola and Mozambique, coupled with political change in South Africa, has reduced the demand for light weapons, at least in the quantities required following mass troop mobilization. Second, existing stocks comfortably outweigh demand, in regional terms at least.

At the same time, the termination of conflicts in Angola and Mozambique and the subsequent peace processes have given rise to a new phenomenon. The peace processes throughout the region have not been accompanied by either comprehensive disarmament or the adequate control of weapons by the appropriate authorities. As a result, literally millions of weapons are now relatively free to change hands because they are no longer required or controlled by parties to the civil wars. Within the region, new arms flows have developed, primarily from within Mozambique and to a lesser extent from Angola. The main destination for light weapons is now South Africa, where demand from political and criminal groups is considerable.

IV. Peacekeeping and Arms Control in Southern Africa

Over the course of the 1990s, Southern Africa has witnessed profound political change. The Mozambique civil war has ended and a democratic process has started following national elections in October 1994, the first in the country's

72 The weapons which formed the basis for the recent Cameron Commission enquiry were surplus light weapons which were sold to a Middle East-based middle man because the supply of arms to UNITA had been all but stopped.

history. At the time of this writing, the peace process in Angola is just about holding and plans for UNAVEM III are well-advanced. Perhaps of greatest significance, the democratic process in South Africa proceeds apace.

From an international perspective, the prospect for political stability and economic growth in Southern Africa is considered to be excellent. To a great extent, the international community can, and indeed does, take some credit for these developments. Interest in the preservation of democracy is higher than anywhere else in the world, even including the trend elsewhere towards 'good governance' programs. It is undeniably clear that diplomatic and political efforts from the outside have assisted Southern Africa. Capital, both economic and political, is flowing into the country and there are no signs that members of the international community are tiring of the most important experiment in democracy since the end of the Second World War.

However, it is also the case that present and future efforts to achieve stability and security, both within the region and the individual countries concerned, have been seriously compromised by failures within the peacemaking processes to achieve the decommissioning of weapons.

Peacekeeping in Mozambique

The history of the conflict in Mozambique has been documented extensively in recent years. In the early-1960s Mozambique became engulfed in the tide of anti-colonialism which developed throughout Africa. A variety of independence movements were established over this period but the independence struggle only began to take shape in earnest when three independence groups combined in 1962 to form the Frente da Lebertacao de Mocambique (FRELIMO). In 1974, following the military coup in Portugal, the Portuguese government relinquished power in Mozambique and a FRELIMO-dominated national government took control.

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The new government's strong stand against minority rule in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa quickly attracted the hostility of both regimes and Southern Rhodesia began to supply armaments and training to anti-governments forces inside Mozambique. In 1977, after Mozambique declared itself to be a Marxist-Leninist state and signed aid agreements with the USSR and Cuba, Southern Rhodesia began to channel covert military aid directly to MNR/RENAMO (Mozambican National Resistance/Resistencia National Mocambicana).

Following Zimbabwe's attainment of independence, support to RENAMO ceased but the resulting shortfalls were quickly made up by South Africa and a number of Western countries. Thereafter, RENAMO grew in size through the 1980s, supported as well by commando and air force raids by the South African security force. By the late-1980s RENAMO controlled wide areas of the countryside and Mozambique plunged into a full civil war.76

The General Peace Agreement signed in Rome by RENAMO and FRELIMO in October 1992 marked the formal cessation of the conflict in Mozambique. The civil war had been exceptionally violent and debilitating, with over one million casualties, an even larger number of refugees, and an economy comprehensively devastated by strife, mismanagement and corruption.77

The involvement of the UN grew directly out of the peace process, insofar as both sides agreed in Rome that the transition to peace should be monitored by the UN and was to last for two years. ONUMOZ was officially launched in 1992 with a mandate to structure and implement the demobilization of an estimated 63,000 government and 20,000 RENAMO troops.78

The disarmament of the warring parties was implicit in the concept of demobilization, insofar as demobilization involved the transfer of former combatants either into the new army or back into civilian life.79 If combatants were to be reintegrated into the new national army, then personal weapons would be issued after reintegration. The need for disarmament prior to re-entry into civilian life is self-evident.

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78 Ibid., p.105.
ONUMOZ peacekeepers in the field had a clear understanding of the disarmament component within both the original peace agreement and the relevant UN Security Council Resolution which set up ONUMOZ.\textsuperscript{80} However, within the ONUMOZ mandate, guidelines as to what constituted disarmament, and how to achieve it, were absent. From the wording of the mandate, it would seem that the disarmament process was almost entirely subsumed under the definition of demobilization:

The term "demobilized soldier" means an individual who . . . subsequent to E-Day was demobilized at the decision of the relevant command, and handed over the weapons, ammunition, equipment, uniform and documentation in his possession . . . .\textsuperscript{81}

Nevertheless, to many ONUMOZ personnel working in the field, disarmament was a central feature of the agreement. It entailed the destruction of weapons and other appropriate forms of disposal. Disarmament was to cover only individual soldiers entering the assembly areas.\textsuperscript{82}

The limitations of the ONUMOZ mandate with regard to disarmament stemmed from the linkage to demobilization. ONUMOZ was denied permission, by the rules approved by the Cease-Fire Commission, to collect and disable weapons outside the assembly areas. In so far as hidden caches and weapons outside the assembly areas were implicitly excluded, it proved impossible to undertake anything approaching a comprehensive disarmament of the warring parties, let alone civilians in a polity which had become deeply militarized and well-armed over the course of the civil war.

Overall, the mandate was insufficiently clear when it came down to small print. Linkage between disarmament inside and outside the assembly areas was lacking. Top-down changes to the mandate after demobilization virtually eliminated the 'one soldier-one weapon' principle, which was particularly significant in the light of reports to the effect that RENAMO was stockpiling weapons. Although changes did occur, the UN did not offer full support for these

\textsuperscript{80} The following information is taken from United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), Practitioners' Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization During Peacekeeping Operations, ONUMOZ Operation, Geneva: UNIDIR, unpublished survey responses. The author is grateful to Mira Berglund for research assistance on this part of the paper.


\textsuperscript{82} UNIDIR, Practitioners' Questionnaire, ONUMOZ Operation.
changes: one area in which UN support was lacking, for instance, was the destruction of ammunition.\textsuperscript{83} Many of the UN’s best efforts were contradicted because both FRELIMO and RENAMO attempted to frustrate the process and maintain possession of as many weapons as possible.\textsuperscript{84}

In principle, both RENAMO and FRELIMO soldiers had to surrender their individual weapons. Representatives from both sides, as a part of the cease-fire agreement, were committed to supply the UN with complete inventories of troop strength, arms, ammunition, mines and other explosives. These inventories would be provided on E-Day, Eday+6, Eday+30, and every 15 days thereafter, but for the most part only from within the assembly areas.\textsuperscript{85} Overall, the weaponry which was surrendered proved to be of very mixed quality. ONUMOZ either destroyed weapons if the quality was extremely poor or, if the condition was reasonable or better, they were sent to the Mozambiquan Defense Force (FADM) for storage. Mines and ammunition were destroyed at the local level; both were assumed to be unstable.\textsuperscript{86}

By the end of the mission, the Secretary General reported on the disarming of the two sides:

ONUMOZ collected from the military and paramilitary forces, as well as from the general population, a total of 189,827 weapons, 43,491 of which belonged to the paramilitary forces. A limited amount of arms, ammunition and explosives was destroyed, while the remainder was transferred to the new Mozambican Defense Force (FADM).\textsuperscript{87}

At the same time, however, it was not possible for ONUMOZ to complete the verification and monitoring process to ensure that the mission had conducted a clean sweep. It was therefore impossible to do anything more than speculate as to how much of a success disarmament had really been. By the end of the

\textsuperscript{83} In addition, when UNOMOZ requested an additional £35 million (approximately $52.5 million) to ensure more comprehensive disarmament throughout Mozambique, the request was turned down in New York. I am grateful to Lt. Col. (Ret'd.) Clive Larkins for this information.

\textsuperscript{84} UNIDIR, \textit{Practitioners’ Questionnaire}, ONUMOZ Operation.


\textsuperscript{86} UNIDIR, \textit{Practitioners’ Questionnaire}, ONUMOZ Operation.

operation it was abundantly clear that anything but a comprehensive disarmament program had been achieved.

Throughout the mission, disarmament efforts encountered considerable obstacles. The circumspect nature of the ONUMOZ mandate largely prevented the peacekeeping forces from tackling arms caches outside the assembly areas, which represented a significant proportion of the weapons at large inside the country. Although ONUMOZ was permitted a verification role, personnel and equipment were insufficient. One exception was the decommissioning of munitions, but there were too few explosives teams to destroy mines and ammunition. In addition, it was difficult in some places to transport large stocks of arms and ammunition due to insufficient means of transportation. This was especially the case in RENAMO areas, which were often more remote and inaccessible.

These problems were accompanied by additional complications. The ONUMOZ mandate did allow for coercive disarmament but it frequently proved impossible or inadvisable to enforce the surrender of weapons, which on occasion compromised both disarmament and control over the movement of weapons. Finally, ONUMOZ was unclear as to what its goal should be on the disarmament front. Nobody knew how many weapons were in circulation, so no one could tell when disarmament had been accomplished. Nor was it totally clear as to which organizations, ranging from the NGOs to the Mozambique police, should be, or indeed were, involved in the disarmament process. When the UN left Mozambique in December 1994, some 40% of RENAMO's arms caches had not been verified by the UN Ceasefire Commission.

The extent of the ONUMOZ success, or failure, depends in a large part upon the proportion of weapons which the mission managed to secure on a permanent basis. Temporary collection and storage at assembly areas could only be a part of the process, given the UN's agreed-upon departure date soon after the election. But the proportion of weapons which were permanently secured is difficult to determine, since the total number of weapons in the country at the time remains in question. The Secretary-General's report claims that marginally less than 190,000 weapons were collected and that the majority were of Soviet origin. By contrast, INTERPOL reports that some 1.5 million AK47s were distributed to the

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88 UNIDIR, Practitioners' Questionnaire, ONUMOZ Operation. In the questionnaire returns, 7 respondents indicated that the police were involved in the collection of weapons, whereas eight returns stated that only UN observers were involved.

civilians population over the course of the civil war.\textsuperscript{90} More recently, a report has estimated that some 6 million AK47s are now available in Mozambique.\textsuperscript{91} This may be too high; current estimates - received wisdom - suggest that the Soviet Union shipped between 0.5 and 1 million AK47s. There is no documentation available, however, to confirm or deny either of these figures.

Weapons brought into the country through other sources are also difficult to quantify. Statistics on transfers by Rhodesia and later by South Africa have also proved impossible to acquire. According to a former member of the South African Special Forces, the South African government supplied very large amounts of weapons to RENAMO, most of which were of Chinese origin\textsuperscript{92} - probably in the form of stick hand grenades, mines, ammunition and Type 56 assault rifles.\textsuperscript{93} What of the support provided by independent right wing groups to RENAMO, or sales made by private contractors? Consequently, it is, and always has been, impossible to estimate how many light weapons were transferred into Mozambique.

Despite the claims made in the Secretary General's reports on ONUMOZ operations, the collection of weapons either possessed by or in the indirect control of the warring parties was unsuccessful. Moreover, the failures continued after the ONUMOZ operation had been concluded. When the UN forces left, a large number of weapons held in government armories or in the assembly areas were stolen and passed back into the civilian population. During the cantonment process, the weapons surrendered by troops were kept in special stores and keys were held by the camp commander and the ONUMOZ representative.\textsuperscript{94} When ONUMOZ left, the camp commander would have enjoyed full control over the weapons store. Following the departure of the UN, civil-military relations in Mozambique were far from good - there were several mutinies in early-1995 over pay.\textsuperscript{95} Many weapons stored in or close to the assembly areas, therefore, found their way into the hands of arms traffickers and criminals.

In summary, the failure of the ONUMOZ operation to undertake effective disarmament turns on several factors.

\textsuperscript{90} Third International Symposium on Firearms and Explosives, INTERPOL, Lyons, 7-9 September, 1994, p.8.
\textsuperscript{91} Africa Confidential, op. cit., p.7.
\textsuperscript{92} Confidential information made available to the author, Johannesburg, June 1995.
\textsuperscript{93} The Type 56 is a reverse-engineered AK47.
\textsuperscript{94} Coelho and Vines, op. cit., p.10.
\textsuperscript{95} Africa Confidential, op. cit., p.7.
First, while the disarmament component was a central feature of the peace accord, the resources made available to fulfil this mission were clearly inadequate.

Second, both RENAMO and FRELIMO failed on too many occasions to assist ONUMOZ, for both personal and broader political gain.

Third, ONUMOZ failed to acquire a clear interpretation of how to fulfil disarmament. Reports from those in the field are often contradictory and admit to a degree of confusion.96

Fourth, too few weapons were actually destroyed, despite the fact that the destruction of light weapons is neither difficult nor expensive - a hydraulic press mounted on the back of a four-wheel drive vehicle is perfectly adequate.97

Fifth, far too little effort was made to ensure the continuity of the disarmament process after the ONUMOZ mission had been concluded. This could have been greatly assisted through the destruction of all weapons handed over to ONUMOZ, for which the new government could have taken responsibility and which the UN could have verified.

Sixth, ONUMOZ had no mandate to act outside the assembly areas on disarmament; it could only decommission dangerous ordnance.

Finally, conceptual clarity over the difference and overlap between demobilization and disarmament was clearly lacking, which may be a reason why so many arms caches were left untouched.

The Peace Processes in Namibia, Angola and Rhodesia

In relation to the peace-keeping operation in Mozambique, other peace keeping operations have provided less of a negative regional impact. However, in the case of UNAVEM, a great deal depends upon to what extent the UN will be capable of learning the disarmament lessons of ONUMOZ to ensure that weapons are surrendered, controlled and secured.

The peace process in Angola was made possible by the end of the Cold War, especially following the withdrawal of Cuban troops. In late-December 1988 the UN established UNAVEM I through the endorsement of Resolution 626.

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96 UNIDIR, Practitioners’ Questionnaire, ONUMOZ Operation.
97 Hydraulic or manual presses are used by the South Africa Police logistical unit in Pretoria to destroy illegal weapons captured in either South Africa or further afield, after which they are shipped to a foundry as scrap.
UNAVEM I was successful insofar as it was set up to verify the withdrawal of Cuban troops, which duly occurred by the end of May 1991.

UNAVEM II entered Angola with a different mandate and against a changed international backdrop. The overall purpose of UNAVEM II was to verify the arrangements set out in the cease-fire agreements and monitor the neutrality of the Angolan peace force, as set out in the Protocol of Estoril. At the outset, UNAVEM II was given a mandate to observe the cantonment of armies in certain areas and to verify the surrender of weapons by both armies. They were not responsible for searching out hidden weapons caches or for penalizing parties for non-compliance.98

The importance of disarmament to the overall success of UNAVEM II was unequivocal. Peacekeepers on the ground believed the disarmament component was designed to achieve several outcomes. It authorized the full disarmament of MPLA and UNITA forces, along with their demobilization and integration into the new army of Angola (FAA), prior to holding free and fair elections. It mandated the collection, storage and custody of all the armaments in the hands of the population by the national police force (UNAVEM II was charged with verifying the neutrality of the Angolan police force as set out in the Protocol of Estoril). In addition, the disarmament component authorized the mission to: prevent the entry of new weapons and lethal materials into the country; retain arms under control in the cantonment areas; sort weapons for later use by the new Angolan Army and destroy unserviceable weapons; and run the disarmament process in tandem with demobilization, completing the process before elections started.99

It is widely accepted that disarmament did not take place prior to the elections due primarily to the lack of trust by UNITA and the MPLA. UNITA kept approximately 30,000 troops out of the disarmament process, and the MPLA approximately 10,000. Existing problems were compounded by time delays of up to two months before any weapons collection took place. Personnel on the ground felt that they had not been briefed adequately on the UNAVEM II mandate, and there was no adequate timetable set out for UNAVEM II to monitor progress.

Within the collection areas, UNAVEM II had a limited mandate over the collection and storage of weapons. The initial peace accords designed to bring the

civil war to an end were drawn up by UNITA and the MPLA. Funding for a major UN peace-keeping operation was impossible to secure. Consequently, when mistrust between the two sides surfaced, the disarmament process broke down. UNITA and the MPLA controlled weapons stocks in the assembly areas. In some cases, soldiers within the assembly areas retained their weapons. Ideally, UNAVEM II would have preferred to separate the weapons from the assembly points as originally envisaged in the peace agreement, but the warring parties were not prepared for this to happen. Even so, the financial resources would not have been available had this been a firm part of the UNAVEM II mandate. In sum, the UN role did not extend beyond the selection of arms to be destroyed or forwarded for the new armed forces, the verification of security during storage and transportation support.

The ramifications for UNAVEM II and for the Angolan state could not have been worse. Observers claim that preparations to restart the war began well before the elections. In Angola, the level of mutual mistrust was such that a successful election could not have been possible while both sides remained in control of their weapons.

In Rhodesia-Zimbabwe, the UN played no role in the termination of minority rule and the onset of democracy. Instead, the British government both brokered and oversaw the transition to peace and democracy. Of critical interest and importance, the British did not attempt to disarm the warring factions. It was recognized at an early stage that the nature of the country and the level of enmity which continued to exist between the several warring factions together made disarmament an impossible mission prior to the election.

After Mugabe's election victory in March 1980, a British Military Assistance Team was requested to help with the training and integration of the new armed forces. This required the disarmament, demobilization and integration of 18,000 ZANLA, 6,000 ZIPRA and 16,000 RSF personnel. By the time the Commonwealth Monitoring Force had left, a degree of co-operation and stability had been achieved, so much so that the operation was widely regarded as a success. Paradoxically, stability had been achieved because, rather than despite the fact that, attempts to disarm the warring parties were deliberately not made. A further decline into violence and conflict was avoided because the warring parties were persuaded that their security was underwritten.100

The peacekeeping operation in Namibia was similarly successful. As in the case of ONUMOZ and UNAVEM, UNTAG’s mandate contained a clear reference to disarmament. Statements by the UN and reports from the field all suggest that the disarmament component was carried out effectively and successfully.\footnote{United Nations, *The Blue Helmets*, op. cit., pp. 341-388 and United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), *Practitioners’ Questionnaire on Weapons Control, Disarmament, and Demobilization During Peacekeeping Operations*, UNTAG Operation, Geneva: UNIDIR, unpublished survey responses.}

Peace-keeping operations in Southern Africa have returned some largely disappointing results regarding the commitment and ability to disarm the warring parties and thereby to offer continuity to peace-making processes. Success, as in the case of Namibia and Zimbabwe, may have contributed significantly to the relatively smooth transitions to democracy and the discernible diminution of violence. In the case of Angola, however, the failure to disarm the warring parties made the resurgence of civil war, and the massive humanitarian tragedy which followed, virtually inevitable. In Mozambique, the failure to disarm did not lead to a resurgence of war between RENAMO and FRELIMO. However, the growing availability of light weapons in the country and the region as a whole has been costly and debilitating because of its impact upon criminal and political violence.

The British succeeded in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe in part through luck and also because the CMT showed far fewer signs of bureaucratic inertia and rigidity than has been evident in UN operations. ONUMOZ and UNAVEM II, by comparison, failed for a number of common reasons. First, disarmament was half-heartedly attempted without laying the necessary foundations of confidence-building and transparency. Second, disarmament was always incomplete. This is especially true with regard to the failure to destroy the weapons which were captured or to store them safely, which made rearmament a formality. Nor did the overlooking of weapons caches make much sense to the overall process. Third, the interpretation of the mandates in each case appears to have been flexible and unduly influenced by political exigencies on the ground and financial constraints in New York.

Nevertheless, the difficulties facing peacekeepers should not be underestimated. Under any circumstances, achieving the disarmament of warring parties so soon after the termination of a conflict is complex at best. Nor would any responsible faction leader consider the complete surrender of weapons in an uncertain political environment. It seems, however, that ONUMOZ and
UNAVEM could have done much more with a clearer mandate, more financial muscle and, beyond political will, a clear vision of the cost of failure.

V. Regional Peacekeeping: Implications for South Africa

Firearms Trafficking and Weapons Proliferation

One of the most important aspects of the transition to democracy in South Africa has been the nature of the conflict which brought an end to apartheid rule. First, the relatively successful - or bloodless - integration of the armed forces has provided a platform for internal security which cannot be overvalued. This has happened largely because the Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK - the armed wing of the ANC) largely fought the South African Police, not the South African Defense Force. Second, the configuration of the conflict was somewhat unique in so far as the MK did not seek to acquire and control territory or key communication arteries. Instead, the intention was to raise the political and economic cost for the apartheid regime, both domestically and internationally. Of critical importance, this meant that few weapons were transferred into the country, although to some extent this changed with Operation Vula which involved arming the ANC in the townships.102

Consequently, when change came, South Africa had, in theory, an opportunity to ring-fence itself as a relatively gun-free society, despite the widespread possession of licensed firearms. This has not happened. Efforts to control the spread of legal and illegal firearms are failing with a rapidity that may yet have profound implications for the future stability of the republic. A major reason for this failure is the influx of weaponry from Mozambique and increasingly from Angola, to satisfy political and criminal demands. Weaponry is available at low prices and in abundant quantities, primarily because UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ failed so palpably to fulfil their mandates to disarm the warring parties over the course of the peacekeeping operations.

In Mozambique, the departure of ONUMOZ permitted weapons to leak out of the assembly areas and into arms trafficking networks. In addition, around the country there are an unknown but large number of arms caches, unguarded and open to retrieval and resale. Some of these caches are sizeable - one recent discovery uncovered a farmhouse stacked with mines, RPGs, ammunition and

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102 The author is grateful to Colonel Rocky Williams for these points.
AK47s. Former RENAMO and FRELIMO soldiers have knowledge of and access to these caches. There is a considerable amount of evidence that senior officers from both sides have become actively involved in arms trafficking. There also appears to be a good deal of ad hoc buying and selling. This may involve peasant farmers who uncover arms caches on their land or in the bush, or former soldiers who failed to surrender their personal weapons. Levels of poverty in Mozambique are driving many who own weapons, or can gain access to them, to sell them within the country for whatever price they can command.

There are several established conduits for weapons coming into South Africa from Mozambique. The most direct route, though Komartiport, along the route which links Maputo to Johannesburg, is less used now than in the past. Other routes have proved much safer for smugglers and closer to potential markets. At present, these are:

- from the former Transkei to Southern Kwazulu/Natal, the Kwazulu/Natal Midlands, and Northern Kwazulu/Natal;
- from the former Transkei to the former Ciskei in the Eastern Cape, and to Gauteng, Kwazulu/Natal, and the Western Cape;
- from Mozambique via Swaziland to Northern Kwazulu/Natal and the Kwazulu/Natal Midlands;
- from Mozambique to Northern Kwazulu/Natal, via two temporary border posts near Ndumo Game Reserve and Kosi Bay; and
- from Mozambique to Eastern Transvaal and Gauteng.

The methods adopted by arms traffickers are far from sophisticated, but they often work. Border security posts are underfunded and understaffed. The Mozambique-South African border is exceptionally porous - even the Kaftan Fence is breached frequently and no longer carries a lethal electric current. Elsewhere along the border, the fence is crossed regularly - at certain points there are stiles. This makes smuggling weapons on foot feasible enough. A bag of weapons, usually wrapped in a nylon rice bag, can be hidden across the fence and collected at a later stage. Weapons are also brought in and sometimes sold by illegal immigrants - there are some one million Mozambicans in South Africa.

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105 Information made available to the author, Pretoria, June 1995.
The most frequently uncovered methods of arms smuggling and transportation are the following:

- Two vehicles, one acting as a transporter for weapons, the other as a pilot. The first vehicle will reconnoitre the route and warn the vehicle following of additional vigilance and surveillance by the border security forces, such as road blocks.
- Transportation of illegal firearms in luggage on passenger trains.
- Concealment of firearms and ammunition amongst heavy vehicle payloads which are exceptionally difficult to uncover, given the amount of freight which moves across the border. One shipment of weapons was uncovered in a truck full of frozen fish.
- Firearms and ammunition are concealed in the panels, tires, fuel tanks and luggage compartments of vehicles. An average-sized fuel tank can conceal up to fifteen AK47s, complete with magazines and ammunition.
- False compartments in vehicles. 106

Swaziland has also become an important conduit for weapons from Mozambique. The borders between Mozambique and Swaziland are more porous than those between Mozambique and South Africa. The border post at Lomashasha is a major market center for light weapons, especially pistols (the Makarov, the Tokarev and the 9mm Browning) and AK 47s - one report put the Lomashasha market value of an AK47 in 1993 at $6.00.107 The Swazi security forces are less able to cope with arms trafficking than their South African counterparts, due primarily to inadequate budgets and poor staffing.108 By comparison, AK47s and small arms retail on the illegal market within South Africa for substantially larger sums of money. In most areas the current price for an AK47 can be as high as R.1,500, which represents a potential profit of close to $400 for each weapon.109 Therefore, a cache of fifteen weapons, an amount commonly recovered in the fuel tanks of vehicles used for smuggling, could return a profit of up to $6,000.

109 As of this writing, the exchange rate for the Rand equalled approximately 4 Rand for 1 U.S. dollar.
The South African security forces have been quick to address this growing problem, despite considerable institutional rancor between the police and the army. It is the South African Police Intelligence which is responsible for firearms trafficking control, and successful links have been made with the Mozambican police and the Swazi security forces - significantly, the Mozambican army is not included in arms trafficking operations. Following the establishment of a dedicated Firearms Investigation Unit in South Africa, active arrangements have been made with neighboring countries on two levels. First, there is a separate agreement with Mozambique, code-named 'Operation Rachel'. Joint operations have been underway now for over eighteen months, although a formal agreement between the two countries was not signed until March 1995, during President Chissano’s visit to South Africa. There also exists a trilateral agreement which brings in Swaziland. These agreements provide for access to detainees for interrogation in whichever country they are detained by any party to the agreement; regular exchange of information; and constant contact at the field level.

So far, joint operations have worked reasonably well, especially with regard to intelligence networks, which are seen by the South African Police as the most effective way of combating arms trafficking. Arms seizures have risen significantly in recent months. Between 1991 and 1994, seizures of AK47 and other rifles increased by around 50%, whereas seizures of pistols more than doubled. Seizures of 7.62 ammunition - the type required for an AK47 - increased in 1994 by two and a half times the amount in 1991 (see Table 2). A break down of the weapons seized within the countries which are co-operating in joint operations, as a result of intelligence and information-sharing, is also revealing (see Table 3).

Although seizures have increased, sources within South Africa are skeptical as to whether these represent an increase in the percentage of illegal weapons seized overall. It is impossible to say how much of the trade is intercepted, but police sources admit to believing that percentage seizure rates are extremely low. By comparison, the Indian police in the Punjab estimate having intercepted about 10% of the weapons transferred to Kalistani militants from Pakistan.

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110 Information made available to the author, Middleberg, 4 November 1994.
Table 2: Seizure of Firearms, Ammunition, and Explosives in RSA, 1991 - 1994\textsuperscript{112}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AK47s</td>
<td>1,090</td>
<td>891</td>
<td>1,386</td>
<td>1,589</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,773</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>1,792</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2,863</td>
<td>1,859</td>
<td>3,178</td>
<td>3,886</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>2,227</td>
<td>2,557</td>
<td>4,628</td>
<td>5,397</td>
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<tr>
<td>Revolvers</td>
<td>1,465</td>
<td>1,203</td>
<td>1,894</td>
<td>2,364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>42,965</td>
<td>36,712</td>
<td>119,610</td>
<td>103,424</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>17,953</td>
<td>33,080</td>
<td>1,178,425</td>
<td>203,367</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>60,918</td>
<td>69,792</td>
<td>1,298,035</td>
<td>306,791</td>
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<td>Explosives</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hand grenades</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>381</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>481</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>250</td>
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<tr>
<td>Limpet mines</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>PG 7s</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>37</td>
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<tr>
<td>Landmines</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>642</td>
<td>781</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Table 3: Seizure of Firearms and Ammunition by the South African Police in RSA, Transkei, Namibia and Mozambique, August 1993 - March 1995

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>RSA</th>
<th>Transkei</th>
<th>Namibia</th>
<th>Mozambique</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AK47s</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>433</td>
<td>726</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>31</td>
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<td>6</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>56</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMGs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machine guns</td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
<td>45</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>51</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolvers</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>Shotguns</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Handmade weapons</td>
<td>49</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>B10 Recoilless guns</td>
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<td>RPG 7s</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<td>5</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mortar pipes (60mm)</td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Projectiles</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While the news from the Mozambique-Swazi-South Africa borders is somewhat encouraging, joint operations have had a negative impact elsewhere in the region, especially in Namibia. Since joint operations have been able to infiltrate arms smuggling networks working out of Mozambique, several of these networks have transferred their operations to Namibia. In recent months, the Namibian police have reported a significant surge in arms smuggling. The source of the weapons is Angola, where impoverished soldiers, mainly from UNITA, are offering weapons for sale in Runda, a small town just inside Namibia. The prices of these weapons are competitive with those offered in Mozambique: an AK47
retails for R.50 on either side of the Angolan-Namibian border, but can be as high as R.250.

Weapons smuggling through Namibia tends to take a different form than the trafficking from Mozambique. In Mozambique, the actual traffickers tend to be men using small vehicles. In Namibia, the traffickers are largely Xhosa women. A group of women, usually between 10 and 15 in number, will pool money to purchase ornaments which will then be transported to various parts of South Africa, as far away as Cape Town or Durban. Here, the ornaments will be bartered for clothing in urban areas. The clothes are then transported to Rundu, via Windhoek. In Rundu, the group will gather around what becomes known as the 'Xhosa tree', from where they will sell the clothing to raise money to purchase weapons. Alternatively, clothing might be exchanged for weapons. Increasingly, the sale or barter of drugs is also being used as a means of acquiring weapons.

The weapons are then shipped into South Africa, concealed in suitcases or hold-alls, either via the same transportation method or by heavy truck. If the journey starts by minibus, the weapons are transported only as far as Windhoek or Grunau. From there, a truck driver is paid to transport a sealed container across the border into South Africa while the owner of the weapons travels by minibus. The truck and minibus then rendez-vous across the border, usually around Upington, where the firearms are transferred to the minibus. If the original minibus is unavailable at Rundu, the traffickers will hitch-hike until they find a truck driver willing to transport the weapons across the border in exchange for payment. There are five main border crossings used by the traffickers - Rietfontein, Noenieput, Nakop, Onseepkans and Vioolsdrift. Weapons move across the border from Angola with extreme ease, due to the nature of the terrain - the border can be crossed almost everywhere at most times of the year using a four-wheel drive vehicle.

Weapons from Angola are also reaching South Africa overland via Botswana. In addition, South African airports also report a rise in arms trafficking, from Mozambique, Angola and South Africa. Lanseria airport, close to Johannesburg, is a known conduit, as are Rand and Grand Central airports. Many aircraft which land in South Africa are never searched. This is especially true of small airfields, where customs desks are often unstaffed after office hours. Alternatively, pilots are known to have ways to avoid inspections of their aircraft.

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As in the case of policing the Mozambican border, the volume of trade and traffic renders the searching of the requisite percentage of vehicles impossible. Namibia has no access to sophisticated border security and detection technology. Dogs are used, but in the intense heat they can only be used for about twenty minutes before their effectiveness is reduced. Therefore, the police have come to rely increasingly upon the infiltration of arms trafficking networks by intelligence officers. This is dangerous and risk-laden work. It is also expensive.

A formal program of co-operation between Namibia and South Africa does not exist at present. There is an informal working group in place which is involved in joint operations and intelligence sharing. However, the size of Namibia and the extremely limited resources available to the Namibian police will continue to restrict success in preventing the increased flow of weapons from Angola to the south.

At present, the majority of weapons from Mozambique and Angola are smuggled into South Africa. However, since the decline of political demand for light weapons following the April 1994 elections, the authorities in Swaziland have noticed a sharp rise in the availability of relatively sophisticated light weapons in the country and a growing usage of these weapons in violent crimes. A similar trend is not yet discernible in Namibia, but a rise in violent crime may well be on the horizon. Neither country is equipped, either financially or institutionally, to cope with a marked rise in the proliferation of light weapons, which means the ability to curb violent crime will be limited.

In addition, there are other destinations for the weapons besides South Africa. Lozi militants in Zambia are in possession of some 30 rocket launchers from Angola.115 In Malawi, law and order is in swift decline, in part due to the overspill of more than 40,000 demobilized but still armed Mozambicans, mostly ex-RENAMO troops.116

### The Demand for Light Weapons in South Africa

There are two basic sources of demand for light weapons, including small arms, in South Africa. The first of these is political; the second is criminal. Increasingly, the division between the two is becoming blurred.
The unbanning of the ANC in February 1990 signalled the end of the apartheid system and a new era for South Africa. Contrary to expectations, the process of political transformation led to a marked increase in political violence: 1591 people died as a result of political violence in 1990, as opposed to 1403 the previous year during the height of the tension between the United Democratic Front (UDF) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).117 In addition, political groups began to stockpile weapons on the understanding that political violence would increase in the future.

The violence in South Africa between the unbanning of the ANC and the election in 1994 centered upon southern Natal, the Natal Midlands, and the PWV area (Pretoria, Witswatersrand and Vereeniging). The conflict was, and still is, rooted in the rivalry between the ANC and the IFP, but there is strong evidence that, at the very least, individuals within the state provided weapons to the IFP to encourage the conflict and to politically weaken the ANC.118 In July 1991 classified documents were exposed which revealed that the security police had paid R.250,000 to Inkatha to organize anti-ANC rallies. The most damaging allegations were those relating to the 'third force', which entailed a clandestine campaign to disrupt the negotiating process through acts of terror and the fuelling of sectarian township violence. Successive reports by the widely-respected Goldstone Commission criticized the South African state for encouraging political violence and in March 1994 implicated three SAP generals on charges of fomenting violence, including gun-running.

The process and direction of political change was also strongly resisted by the far right, especially the Afrikaaner Volksfront (AVF), which was responsible for some thirty bombings in the weeks leading up to the election.119 The AWB was also actively engaged in stockpiling weapons, many flown into Lancera from Angola.

Inevitably, the process designed to disrupt the path of peaceful political change involved the acquisition and distribution of firearms. Over this period there were three main sources of weapons. First, theft from the security forces

117 M. Donaldson, The Role of Firearms within the Changing Nature of South Africa’s Political Violence, Paper presented at the 2nd Annual International Seminar on Arms Control and Disarmament, Williamsburg, Pennsylvania, USA, 7th-18th September, 1994, p.12-13. The fatality figure in 1989 was a 22% increase over the 1988 figure (1,49) and a 112% increase over the 1987 figure (661), but only an 8% increase compared to the 1986 figure (1,298).
increased significantly. Raids on state arsenals netted supplies of explosives and firearms for right-wing organizations, including the Z88 pistol used in the assassination of ANC leader Chris Hani. The homeland police and defense forces were alleged to have supplied weapons from their arsenals to sympathetic sources, and the Kwazulu police were alleged by the Goldstone Commission to have supplied pistols and G3 rifles to IFP members. Second, homemade weapons, especially pipe-guns, are widely available in South Africa. These are crude shotguns which can be relatively easily produced from available materials, such as piping for plumbing. Finally, weapons - especially those of Soviet origin - are becoming widely available across the country through access to illegal markets. The majority of these weapons have come from either Mozambique or Angola.

It is extremely difficult to judge how much increased political violence before the 1994 election can be linked to weapons supplied from either Angola or Mozambique. The availability of weapons from existing domestic sources suggests that if individuals received weapons from external sources, the overall impact upon levels of violence would not have been great - these weapons would have added to rather than changed the nature of the conflict. However, the South African security forces have made the link:

The large amount of firearms confiscated in Natal can be attributed to the smuggling of armaments from Mozambique, Swaziland and Transkei into the RSA, as well as the ongoing power struggle between the ANC and the IFP.

The second source of demand for light weapons has been from criminals. Levels of crime, especially violent crime, have increased dramatically in recent years. In addition, it is becoming more difficult to establish where political violence ends and criminal violence begins. A far higher proportion of crime in South Africa now involves the threat or use of a fire-arm. Of the 18,312 murders committed in 1994, 5,872 were committed with small arms and light weapons. During the same year there were 68,320 armed robberies, 43,168 involving the

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use of fire-arms. In 1994, seizures of rifles increased by 22.28% and pistols by 16.62% (see Table 4).

Table 4: Comparative Statistics of Firearms Seized in RSA, 1993 - 1994

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>January-December 1993</th>
<th>January-December 1994</th>
<th>Increase/Decrease (in %)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AK47s</td>
<td>1,386</td>
<td>1,589</td>
<td>+14.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,792</td>
<td>2,297</td>
<td>+28.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3,178</td>
<td>3,886</td>
<td>+22.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistols</td>
<td>4,628</td>
<td>5,397</td>
<td>+16.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolvers</td>
<td>1,894</td>
<td>2,364</td>
<td>+24.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home-made</td>
<td>1,994</td>
<td>3,123</td>
<td>+56.62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ammunition</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.62</td>
<td>119,610</td>
<td>103,424</td>
<td>+13.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1,178,425</td>
<td>203,367</td>
<td>-82.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1,298,035</td>
<td>306,791</td>
<td>-76.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Handgrenades</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>481</td>
<td>+109.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mortars</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>-23.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limpet mines</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-12.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PG 7s</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>-52.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landmines</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Available statistics, even those compiled by the authorities, do not disaggregate sufficiently to establish the sources of these weapons. Anecdotal evidence points to a vast increase in the availability of Soviet weapons, especially AK47s, and it can be assumed that the majority of these weapons came out of Mozambique and to a lesser extent, but increasingly, Angola. In the space of one month, a single arms trafficker was alleged to have moved 1,212 AK47s, 108

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123 CAICA, Firearm Related Crime, p. 2.
Makarov pistols, 2 Draganov rifles and 12,500 rounds of ammunition from Mozambique into South Africa.\textsuperscript{124}

One of the most brutal recent developments in South Africa has been the rise of ‘taxi wars’. South Africa has one of the worst public transportation systems in the world - a direct legacy of the apartheid era. For the majority of blacks, the only available forms of transport are the minibuses whose routes criss-cross the country, earning large profits for the taxi owners and the controllers of routes. Across the country, existing monopolies and oligopolies are under threat from new operators and clashes though 1994 became frequent and violent in the extreme. The preferred weapons are the AK47 and the 9mm pistol, and the use of G3s has often been reported. Taxi owners have employed the services of hit men to target both passengers and the drivers of rival firms - the police in Gauteng claim that hitmen are paid R.1,000 for the death of a passenger, R.2,000 for a taxi driver and R.4,000 for a taxi owner. Passengers and bystanders have frequently been killed in the cross-fire.\textsuperscript{125} Taxi wars in the West Cape, Transkei and the East Rand have been linked directly to the demand for illegal weapons.\textsuperscript{126}

\textbf{Light Weapons Proliferation and Civil Society in South Africa and Swaziland}

Annual statistics on the seizure and use of fire-arms in South Africa show a steady increase. The impact upon civil society has been considerable.

First, South Africa is in the midst of an internal arms race which the security forces are almost powerless to prevent or stop; either legally or illegally, more South Africans are arme than ever before. Criminals now have access to an array of relatively sophisticated, and most certainly powerful, automatic firearms. South Africans citizens, especially whites, now fear that in the event of a criminal act against them, such as a mugging, burglary, rape, or car hi-jack, they will be confronted with this type of equipment. Consequently, they are acquiring gun licenses: 212,458 were issued in 1994 alone. (Every gun must have a license; an individual can hold up to thirteen licenses and licenses are issued for life.) At the

\textsuperscript{124} Fried, "The Gun Run", p.272.
\textsuperscript{125} A. Minaar and S. Pretorius, \textit{A Year of Living Dangerously: Hitmen, Corruption, Competition and Violence in the Taxi Industry During 1994}, Pretoria: Centre for Socio-Political Analysis and Human Sciences Research Council, unpublished manuscript, February 1995, p.2. This report is a comprehensive view of the taxi war phenomenon; a more detailed analysis of the same issue is forthcoming.
\textsuperscript{126} Information made available to the author, Windhoek, March 1995.
same time, criminals believe that if they are to commit a crime, they require sophisticated weapons because of the type of weapons now held by wealthy people. Both fears feed upon each other.

One clear result of this internal arms race is the way in which stabbings have decreased while shootings have increased; acts of violence are now defined more by the gun than the 'panga' (see Graph 1). The impact upon the health services is now considerable. The scale of trauma surgery now required in South Africa is so extensive that consultant trauma unit surgeons are considered the best in the world. Yet, the same consultants argue strongly that the increase in the requirements for trauma unit surgery and the necessary aftercare is a definite opportunity cost on health service resources.127

Graph 1

Changes in the relative occurrence of gunshot injuries and stab wounds in cases managed in the Natalspruit Spinal Rehabilitation Unit (left), compared to the cases seen in the Braamfontein medico-legal mortuary (right) during the period 1988 to 1993. Graphs are presented as percentages of the total number of cases seen in each year.


127 Interviews with consultants at Witswatersrand Medical School, February 1995.
In addition, the medical services have noted the cost of different types of gunshot wounds. One example offered compares a 9mm wound to that caused by an AK47, both to the abdomen. In the former case, after surgery to the upper bowel and stomach, the victim left the hospital after two weeks. The AK47 wound was far worse and required extensive surgery, two weeks in Intensive Care and a further twelve weeks of hospitalization. Moreover, once discharged from the hospital, the victim would have been incapable of functioning physically and psychologically as a normal person for the rest of his life.\footnote{128}

Wounds from high velocity rifles can be especially harmful. If the bullets are the 'tumbling' variety, they will enter the body and 'tumble' through the torso or limb, destroying internal organs and muscle tissue and shattering bone. A non-tumbling bullet fired from about 400m will have a similar effect if it hits bone, which prevents exit and redirects the bullet. Bullets can be adapted to tumble by removing the lead from the cartridge and replacing a small amount with mercury, to affect the equilibrium. Altering the shape of the bullet can create a similar effect. Alternatively, an ordinary bullet may tumble if it ricochets off a car or a branch, for example.\footnote{129} As a direct consequence of the increase in AK47 wounds, deaths from shootings show a sharp increase as well (see Table 5). Doctors based at the Baragwanath mortuary have noticed a significant increase in deaths caused by AK47s in recent months, but not as great as expected given the increased proliferation of these weapons in the area.\footnote{130} One possible reason is a shortage of ammunition.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shooting</strong></td>
<td>688</td>
<td>966</td>
<td>748</td>
<td>782</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Stabbing</strong></td>
<td>548</td>
<td>532</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Other</strong></td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>1927</td>
<td>1704</td>
<td>1730</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\footnote{128}{\footnotesize I am grateful to Mr Gareth Hine for this information. Witswatersrand Medical School, February 1995.}

\footnote{129}{\footnotesize I am grateful to Lt Col Jakkie Potgeiter for this information.}

\footnote{130}{\footnotesize Discussions held with the author at Baragwanath mortuary, February 1995.}

\footnote{131}{\footnotesize Data collected by the author, March 1995.}
Second, an increasing failure to control the flow of illegal weapons into South Africa may yet contain some significant implications for democracy and civil liberties. Attempts to persuade and cajole citizens to hand over illegal weapons have not been successful - only 1,111 weapons have been recovered in this way.132 As the situation grows less controllable, the government will be forced to consider alternative ways of dealing with the problem, as other governments have done before.

So far, national governments, security forces and international organizations have failed, understandably, to design strategies for recovering weapons once proliferation has occurred. There is a tendency to introduce draconian measures which dramatically raise the potential cost of arms trafficking. For example, after the end of the Nigerian civil war, light weapons became widely available throughout Nigeria. Armed robberies increased dramatically, which prompted the Federal Government to introduce the Armed Robbery and Firearms Decree. Under the decree, anybody found guilty of armed robbery was to be executed by a firing squad.

It is unclear as to what extent these laws reduced the level of arms trafficking. What did make a difference was economic development: when the Nigerian economy experienced an oil boom in the early 1970s, armed robberies decreased considerably. Relatedly, the proliferation of light weapons became an important issue once again from the mid-1980s on, after the country’s economy took a downward plunge. The government’s decision in July 1995 to execute 43 people convicted for armed robbery was widely applauded throughout the country. Other countries have established similar stiff penalties in attempts to address the weapons problem. In Jamaica, penalties for the possession of illegal weapons are especially harsh, in response to the failure to prevent the spread of illegal firearms. Closer to South Africa, the Swazi authorities have already acted decisively by making the possession of illegal weapons a non-bailable offense. Moreover, convictions for crimes involving the use of ‘weapons of war’ have increased significantly in recent months.133

In South Africa, a debate over stronger measures to stem the tide of illegal arms smuggling has already started. There is already a muted debate over whether to extend the electric fence and whether to return the voltage to a lethal level. Currently, the South African Firearms Act contains a legal presumption that

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133 Interview with Judge Richard Hull, former Chief Justice of Swaziland, Mbabane, November 1994.
anyone caught with an illegal weapon in any type of vehicle will be assumed to be guilty of arms trafficking unless he or she can prove otherwise. The rewriting of the South African constitution will ensure a change of presumption in the Firearms Act from guilty to innocent. Currently, there are enough voices within the establishment to probably ensure that this change will be far from automatic, if it is made at all.134

It takes a minimum of imagination to follow the logic of such moves through to their conclusion. It may well be the case that the new South Africa may have to forego or compromise certain civil liberties to ensure internal security in the long term at this level. However, assuming that the arrangement will be a temporary one, the implications for civil liberties - especially freedom of movement and police powers for the searching of individuals and their property - are considerable. Another component which might be added to these considerations is the fact that blacks from the townships still tend to opt for unlicensed weapons, whereas whites usually seek licenses.

Third, the growing availability of weapons is influencing the criminalisation of politics. In the wake of attacks upon ANC members by Inkatha and other vigilante groups, which began in 1990, the ANC has permitted the establishment of Self-Defense Units (SDUs) in the townships. These SDUs grew out of the township structures set up in the 1980s to promote, protect and institutionalize the United Democratic Front. The initial aims of the SDUs were to protect against attacks and harassment by the security forces and vigilante groups. From mid-1993, as violence in the East Rand townships increased between Inkatha-supporting hostel residents and township inhabitants, Inkatha called for the creation of Self-Protection Units to counter the SDUs.

Increasingly, both of these organizations are either being infiltrated by criminals or are experiencing the criminalization of their membership. It has become increasingly difficult for the ANC to control the SDUs and prevent a resort to crime and banditry.135 Some areas, such as Phola Park, have become "no-go areas" for the security forces, especially at night. Groups are known to commit armed robberies and to demand protection money. Car racketeering and arms smuggling are also common.136 A large number of convicted arms smugglers involved in arms trafficking from the Angolan-Namibian border are from Phola

There has also been a discernible blurring of the differences between organized crime and political activity in Natal.138

VI. Conclusions: Peacekeeping, Arms Trafficking and Stability in Southern Africa

The inability of the United Nations to effect meaningful disarmament over the course of the ONUMOZ operation has already had far-reaching consequences for the region, South Africa in particular. In most respects, ONUMOZ was an extremely successful peacekeeping operation, especially so early along the learning curve. However, the task of disarming and decommissioning the warring factions was at best extremely partial, and it amounts to the largest and most significant failure of the operation. Without doubt, more and worse is yet to come as weapons continue to remain in circulation and to proliferate through the region.

Yet, internationally, the ONUMOZ experience is widely recognized as a success, primarily because the UN oversaw the transition from civil war to democracy and peace. Critics in Southern Africa often remark that a similar 'success' by UNAVEM III in Angola will be exceptionally destabilising for the region. Recently, the UN has decided to request the Angolan police force to control the disarmament process, which makes the future begin to look very much like the past. The growing interest of arms traffickers in the weapons from Angola is a major warning sign for the region, South Africa in particular.

The mandates for the peacekeeping operations in Mozambique and Angola both reflect a fundamental failure to elaborate on the importance of achieving disarmament, what disarmament should entail, and the criteria for success. If UNAVEM III is to avoid repeating the failures of UNAVEM II and ONUMOZ, it is essential for the UN to summon the political and financial resources to ensure that weapons are collected and successfully decommissioned.

It is clear that there are major problems facing peacekeepers in the field of disarmament. Inevitably, comprehensive disarmament will add to the human and financial costs of any operation. As both costs rise, public support for peacekeeping will diminish, especially in the United States, which will remain an

important political actor into the future. Maintaining Congressional political support for peacekeeping operations in the future will be critical and much less likely if the loss of American lives rises.

Equally important, comprehensive disarmament will significantly increase political problems on the ground. Agreements to undergo demobilization are difficult to achieve - they depend upon trust. A salient precondition for building trust is the acknowledgement on the part of those undergoing demobilization that the process can be rapidly reversed if the peacekeeping efforts break down. This means that ex-combatants feel the need to remain close to their weapons, which should also remain in working order. Overcoming these problems is, arguably, one of the foremost tasks for those who negotiate peacekeeping mandates, and for those who control former combatants as well as the peacekeepers in the field. In order for these problems to be overcome, the disarmament process within peacekeeping must be better understood and more clearly defined and negotiated.

First, there should be a clear understanding of what disarmament means for a particular operation, as distinct from demobilization. The ONUMOZ mandate, for example, was unclear in this respect. Weapons collected within the assembly areas must be either destroyed at some point or removed to a place where leakage cannot occur, either during or after the peacekeeping operation. This may mean that the UN itself should keep tighter control, perhaps beyond the duration of the operation. It may also mean that weapons should be stored outside the country.

Second, there should be a clear and unequivocal position on the destruction of weapons. In the case of light weapons, this is not an expensive task. Weapons platforms can be immobilized pending destruction. Arms embargoes should be implemented and enforced. Development aid should be used as a quid pro quo for weapons destruction. The desirability of voluntary or enforced disarmament should be considered primarily on the basis of the future security of the region, not on the basis of its short-term effect upon the peace-keeping operation.

Third, peacekeeping operations thus far have not received the financial resources to cover the cost of effective disarmament. In the interests of medium- and long-term security, this situation must change. The building or strengthening of civil society, which must follow in the wake of conflict resolution if the concept of peace is to have any positive meaning, cannot occur, or will be made immensely more difficult, if weapons have been allowed to proliferate amongst sub-state actors. One possible source of additional funding could be from

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139 This is one possible answer to the current impasse affecting negotiations between the IRA/Sinn Fein and the British government.
Light Weapons and the International Arms Trade

concerned countries in the region which stand to lose if disarmament fails. Another source could and should be the original arms suppliers. Many external groups have transferred light weapons to combatants to further their own political and economic interests - arms pipelines are common enough features in any low-intensity conflict. When a conflict ends, however, arms suppliers take no responsibility for either the cost of disarmament or the impact upon civil societies when disarmament fails. This should change, but change can only happen in this quarter if the international community and international organizations enforce the 'polluter pays' principle in this field.

Fourth, the present linkage of disarmament to demobilization is clearly inadequate. Peacekeeping forces must address the existence of weapons caches; the 'one man-one weapon' principle which currently defines disarmament within peacekeeping must be broadened to include weapons at the disposal of the warring parties. The very nature of many of the conflicts in Southern Africa, most of which are low-intensity, called for the prepositioning of weapons. Over the course of a war, there must exist a considerable measure of control over weapons and matériel. One of the fundamental tasks of any quartermaster is to maintain information on where weapons are stored and in what quantities. Failure to maintain this information will jeopardize operations in the field. Once a conflict ends, the networks which hold information on the location of weapons can be disbanded or quickly incorporated into political processes and therefore distracted. At this juncture, weapons can cease to remain under control, which in turn provides opportunities for arms trafficking.

Evidence from Mozambique testifies to the unknown but certainly large number and volume of weapons caches which remain. Most are outside the control of the new government; recently the South African police decommissioned twenty-five such caches. Mozambique illustrates graphically and tragically the cost of failure and the importance of disarmament and weapons decommissioning. This could yet compromise the process of political and economic reconstruction in Mozambique and the building of democracy in South Africa. Similar failures in UNAVEM III will spell greater problems for South Africa and for Namibia as well. Arguably, the future of the region and, therefore, the future of the sub-continent as a whole, depends upon redressing the mistakes made by ONUMOZ and upon ensuring that fears over disarmament in Angola are not realized.
Chapter 2
Disarmament, Small Arms, and Intra-State Conflict: The Case of Southern Africa

Peter Batchelor

Introduction

Conflict in Southern Africa has been "widespread, intense and protracted" and has its origins in the conflicts over race, land, labor and political rights that occurred as a result of European conquest and colonial domination. However, in the last few years, the Southern African regional security environment has witnessed a remarkable transformation. Since 1989 the two main sources of conflict in Southern Africa, the Cold War and Apartheid, have disappeared. Thus the ideological, strategic and logistical imperatives that fueled and sustained many of the intra- and inter-state conflicts in the region have also disappeared. In this context, many of the region’s conflicts have been resolved, usually through the presence or intervention of a multilateral peace support operation. Despite these positive developments, many countries in the region are still experiencing various forms of intra-state conflict. This paper examines the relationship between disarmament during multilateral peace support operations, small arms, and intra-state conflict with reference to Southern Africa.

The deployment of multilateral peace support operations in countries such as Namibia, Angola and Mozambique was contingent upon the presence of a negotiated settlement agreement. The settlement agreement, which provided the terms of reference for the mandate of the multilateral peace support operation, usually contained a specific disarmament component. The disarmament component included some or all of the following measures: 1) control of

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2 For the purpose of this paper, "Southern Africa" includes the following countries: South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola, Malawi and Tanzania.
weapons, 2) disarmament, and 3) demobilization.\textsuperscript{3} Section I compares and contrasts the disarmament components of the settlement agreements and mandates of the various multilateral peace support operations that have been deployed in Southern Africa.\textsuperscript{4} While most of the settlement agreements contained a specific disarmament component, there were significant differences in terms of the mandate of each peace support operation and the way in which the disarmament component was to be implemented. Section II examines the implementation of the disarmament components of the settlement agreements during the various peace support operations.

The lack of effective disarmament during a multilateral peace support operation can have a number of consequences. Ineffective arms control measures and the failure to disarm combatants can contribute to the proliferation of arms, particularly small arms, within the country in the post-settlement period. Inadequate provisions for the demobilization and reintegration of combatants into civilian life during multilateral peace support operations can contribute to the emergence of armed banditry, particularly amongst unemployed and disaffected ex-combatants. Section III examines the relationship between ineffective arms control and disarmament and small arms proliferation, and analyzes how inadequate programs for the demobilization and reintegration of combatants can contribute to increased armed banditry.

The problems of small arms proliferation and armed banditry, which are linked, are inherently destabilizing and have helped to create and sustain new types of intra-state conflict in Southern Africa in the post-settlement period. Section IV examines the different types of intra-state conflict that are present in Southern Africa, and considers the relationship between small arms proliferation, armed banditry and the various types of intra-state conflicts.

The evidence from Southern Africa suggests that the lack of effective arms control, disarmament and demobilization measures during multilateral peace operations has not only prevented the successful resolution of many of the region's intra-state conflicts, but has the potential to undermine and ultimately frustrate the post-conflict reconciliation, reconstruction and peace-building processes which are so desperately needed in all the countries of Southern Africa. The international community, and particularly the United Nations, can play a role


\textsuperscript{4} This paper focuses on the following multilateral peace support operations: UNAVEM I and II in Angola, UNTAG in Namibia, and UNOMOZ in Mozambique.
in helping to ensure effective disarmament during peace operations. In this way, it can help to promote sustainable peace-building, reconstruction and development in the post-conflict period. Section V suggests a number of recommendations for improving the disarmament components of multilateral peace support operations in order to minimize the problems associated with ineffective disarmament and demobilization.

I. Multilateral Peace Support Missions in Southern Africa: The Disarmament Components of Settlement Agreements and Mandates

This section compares and contrasts the disarmament components of the settlement agreements and mandates of the various multilateral peace support missions that have been deployed in Southern Africa since 1989. The various missions were deployed into very different geo-political, institutional and operational environments, and this was reflected in their differing mandates, rules of engagement, operating procedures, structures, sizes and budgets.

All of these multilateral missions in Southern Africa were deployed under the auspices of the United Nations. They represented the "Second Generation" of United Nations peacekeeping, in that they pushed the bounds of "First Generation" peacekeeping both operationally and conceptually by having primarily non-military mandates. The UNTAG mission in Namibia in 1989-90 represented the start of "Second Generation" UN peacekeeping. It was the first UN mission, apart from UNTEA, to have a primarily non-military mandate, and its mandate included both peacekeeping and peacemaking elements.

The mandate of each mission, which was contained in a UN Security Council Resolution, was derived from a negotiated settlement agreement. The settlement agreement was usually agreed to by all the parties prior to the deployment of the multilateral mission.

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6 Ibid., p.118.

The bilateral agreement between Angola and Cuba, which provided the basis for UNAVEM I’s mandate (UN Security Council Resolution 626 of 1988), did not contain an explicit disarmament component. However, the Cuban forces were disarmed as they withdrew, at the discretion of their camp commanders and apparently in agreement with the Angolan authorities.\textsuperscript{7} The Cubans’ arms and military equipment were sent back in advance to Cuba on Soviet ships from Luanda and Lobito.

UNTAG (United Nations Transition Assistance Group): Namibia, 1989/90

The Namibian Settlement Plan, as contained in UN Security Council Resolution 435 of 1978, had an explicit disarmament component.\textsuperscript{8} UNTAG’s mandate, therefore, included a specific disarmament component that tasked UNTAG with responsibility for monitoring and supervising all of the disarmament provisions of the settlement plan.\textsuperscript{9} These included:

- the confinement of SWAPO and South African forces to base;
- the dismantling of the South African military presence in Namibia;
- the withdrawal of the South African Defense Force from Namibia;
- the disarmament and demobilization of SWAPO forces and the local forces established by South Africa; and
- the collection, storage and guarding of the arms and military equipment of demobilized personnel.

\textsuperscript{8} UN Security Council Resolution 632 of 1989 approved the deployment of UNTAG, which was charged with the implementation of Security Council Resolution 435 in its original and definitive form.
The Namibian Settlement Plan did not, however, make provision for the integration of armed forces prior to the election, the formation of a new Namibian Defense Force, or the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life.


The Bicesse Accords, which were signed in Portugal in May 1991 between the MPLA government and UNITA, provided the basis for UNAVEM II’s mandate, which was contained in UN Security Council Resolution 696 of 1991.10 The Bicesse Accords contained an explicit disarmament component which included the following measures:

- a cease-fire between both parties;
- the end of supplies of all lethal weapons by any government;11
- the separation, demobilization and disarmament of all forces;
- the disbanding of the MPLA and UNITA standing armies;
- the collection and disposal of weapons; and
- the formation of a new Angolan Armed Force (FAA) of 50,000 before elections.

However, UNAVEM II’s mandate did not have an explicit disarmament component, for it was charged with merely monitoring and verifying the implementation of the various provisions, including the disarmament measures, of the Bicesse Accords.


The General Peace Agreement (GPA) that was signed by FRELIMO and RENAMO in Rome in October 1992 provided the basis for UNOMOZ’s

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10 UN Security Council Resolution 696 of 1991 effectively entrusted UNAVEM I with a new mandate which was initially for a period of 17 months. UNAVEM II’s mandate was extended and enlarged in the next few years as the country returned to civil war.

mandate, as contained in UN Security Council Resolution 797 of 1992. UNOMOZ’s mandate had a comprehensive disarmament component derived from the provisions of the GPA. The disarmament component made provision for UNOMOZ to supervise, monitor and verify the following measures:

- the cease-fire which came into effect on 15 October 1992;
- the complete withdrawal of foreign forces;
- the separation and containment of the forces to base;
- the demobilization and disarmament of combatants;
- the collection, storage and destruction of weapons; and
- the disbanding of private and irregular armed forces.

In terms of UN Security Council Resolution 850 of July 1993, UNOMOZ’s mandate was enlarged, and UNOMOZ was appointed chair of the Joint Commission for the Formation of the Mozambican Defense Force (CCFADM), which was charged with supervising the formation of the new Mozambican Defense Force (FADM).

**Comparison of Disarmament Components of Settlement Agreements and Mandates**

Several points can be made with respect to the disarmament components of the settlement agreements and mandates of the various multilateral peace support operations. The mandates of all the missions were derived from negotiated settlement agreements, which had been agreed to by all the parties prior to the deployment of the multilateral mission. In the case of Namibia, one of the parties, SWAPO, was not a party to the settlement agreement. In all the missions, the settlement agreements were mediated by external parties, either the former colonial powers (e.g., Portugal, South Africa), the Cold War superpowers (USA, USSR), and/or the United Nations.

Some of the missions were involved in assisting a decolonization process (e.g., UNTAG in Namibia), while others (e.g., UNOMOZ in Mozambique) were

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involved in helping to resolve conflicts ‘left over’ from the Cold War. All of the missions were tasked with monitoring and/or supervising the implementation of a negotiated settlement agreement. In some of the missions (e.g., Namibia) the settlement agreement provided the link between conflict resolution, elections and constitution-making. Some of the missions had multifaceted mandates which included military, police and civilian components (e.g., UNTAG, UNOMOZ).\textsuperscript{13}

In terms of levels of authority, some of the missions had a purely monitoring and verification function (e.g., UNAVEM I); others had a monitoring and supervisory function (e.g., UNOMOZ); and in some cases the mission also had a control function (e.g., UNTAG). In Angola, UNAVEM I and II played a rather passive role by merely monitoring and verifying the implementation of various settlement agreements. In Namibia and Mozambique, the multilateral missions played a more active role by supervising the implementation of the terms of the settlement agreement.

Most of the multilateral missions, except for UNAVEM I, had an explicit disarmament component in their mandate (United Nations Security Council Resolution). The disarmament component of the mandate usually included all or some of the following measures:

1) arms control (weapons exclusion zones, weapons storage, dual-key arrangements);
2) disarmament (weapons destruction, arms embargoes, weapons buy back programs, de-mining, and the disarming of combatants and irregular forces); and
3) demobilization (disarming of combat units, reintegration of combatants into civilian life, and the formation of a new national armed force).\textsuperscript{14}

The settlement agreements for Angola (UNAVEM II) and Mozambique (UNOMOZ) contained provisions relating to the demobilization and reintegration of combatants into civilian life, and the formation of new, integrated armed forces prior to the holding of elections. In Namibia, the settlement agreement did not

\textsuperscript{13} For details of the mandates of the various multilateral peace support missions, see Gamba, Potgieter, and Ukabiala; and Berman.

\textsuperscript{14} See UNIDIR, \textit{Practitioners Questionnaire}, pp.vii-viii.
make provision for the reintegration of combatants into civilian life or the formation of a new armed force.15

The disarmament component of each settlement agreement usually also included a timetable and a sequence for implementing the various disarmament measures. In all of the missions, the disarmament component of the settlement agreement was expected to be fully implemented before the political aspects of the settlement agreement (i.e., the holding of elections) could be carried out.

II. Multilateral Peace Support Operations in Southern Africa: Implementation of Disarmament Components of Settlement Agreements

This section examines the implementation of the disarmament components of the settlement agreements during the various multilateral peace support missions. All the missions, without exception, suffered delays and problems with the implementation of the disarmament components of their respective settlement agreements. In some cases (e.g., Mozambique), the timetable and sequence of implementing certain disarmament measures was revised or abandoned because of specific problems; in other cases (e.g., Angola), it was simply ignored.

Most of these delays and problems were mission-specific, but there were a number of common problems. There were delays in the deployment of all the UN missions, because of funding, logistical, and co-ordination problems within the UN organization. This caused delays in the implementation of many of the disarmament measures. All the missions suffered from a lack of adequate planning before deployment, and a lack of reliable and accurate information about the disarmament aspects of the mission - i.e., the quantity and quality of arms of each warring party. There was also often a lack of clarity, or even agreement, between the parties and the United Nations forces as to the specific modalities, schedule and procedures of the disarmament component of the mission.

15 Although the Namibian Settlement Plan did not make provision for the integration of armed forces prior to elections, after the elections UNTAG chaired a Tripartite Military Integration Committee which was established to develop a concept for an integrated Namibian Defense Force. The Kenyan battalion from the UNTAG force remained after the elections to help train the nucleus of the new Namibian Defense Force. The formation of a new Namibian Defense Force took place after independence, and was assisted by a British Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT). See United Nations, The Blue Helmets, pp.383-384.
Delays were also caused by the mistrust and suspicion between the parties, and their different interpretations of the disarmament component of the settlement agreement. Poor infrastructure (particularly lack of communication infrastructure), which caused logistical problems, also contributed to the delays in implementing the various disarmament measures. The poor security situation in the country, and in the assembly areas, and a lack of discipline on the part of the warring parties also caused problems and contributed to delays in implementing the disarmament measures. In many cases, specific training regarding disarmament operations was not undertaken prior to deployment, and in some cases training for disarmament only took place in the field. Poor co-ordination and planning between the various components of the UN mission also contributed to delays and problems with the implementation of the disarmament measures. In none of the missions did the parties enter into subsidiary disarmament agreements, which may have strengthened the disarmament component of the settlement agreement.

In assessing the implementation of specific disarmament measures, such as arms control, during the various missions, it is obvious that, with the exception of UNTAG, all the other multilateral missions were unable to implement effective disarmament before the holding of elections.

**Weapons Control**

The settlement agreements for Namibia, Angola and Mozambique all contained specific provisions relating to weapons control. These provisions normally included the following measures: dual key arrangements, weapons exclusion zones, and the collection and storage of weapons.

During all of the missions, regulations and operating procedures with respect to the collection and storage of weapons were agreed upon between the parties and the UN. In Mozambique the Cease-fire Commission, which was chaired by UNOMOZ, developed regulations and procedures to be followed with respect to the registration, classification, and storage of weapons; the transfer of weapons to the FADM; and the functioning of regional arms depots. In Angola, the parties themselves reached agreement on the regulations and procedures to be followed with respect to the collection and storage of weapons. The UN was not involved in these agreements, but merely made practical suggestions with respect to

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to the classification and storage of arms.\textsuperscript{17} The UNTAG forces negotiated a number of "field agreements" with the South African forces, which contained detailed schedules and procedures for the collection and storage of weapons during the disarmament process.

In all the missions the collection of weapons took place primarily in the assembly areas, although most of the multilateral forces made some limited attempts to search for, and collect weapons that were outside the assembly areas. In all the cases, the warring parties and the United Nations forces were involved in the collection of weapons.\textsuperscript{18}

The UNTAG mission was relatively successful with respect to the collection and storage of weapons. However, most of the weapons which were collected in the assembly areas in Namibia were of poor quality, thus suggesting that the better quality weapons remained outside the disarmament process. The UNTAG forces knew that there were hidden arms caches in many parts of the county, and during the mission were able to neutralize some of these caches.\textsuperscript{19} The presence of illicit weapons was not a problem for the UN forces in Namibia. However, UNTAG personnel were aware that the various parties continued to have access to weapons through external channels of supply, but were unable to effectively monitor or control these external channels of weapons supply during the mission.\textsuperscript{20} All the weapons that were collected as a result of the disarming of forces were stored in warehouses, which were guarded by UNTAG military personnel.\textsuperscript{21} The weapons which were collected and stored during the UNTAG mission were transferred to the new Namibian national forces (military and police) after independence.

The collection and storage of weapons in Angola was less effectively implemented than in Namibia. In Angola, UNAVEM II monitors merely monitored the Angolans, who were responsible for the collection and storage of weapons. In practice this meant that many weapons were not collected, and thus...
remained outside the disarmament process. UNAVEM II monitors, because of a lack of resources and their limited mandate, and because of the movement of combatants in and out of camps, were unable to effectively monitor the collection and storage of weapons in the assembly areas. According to UN sources, the collected weapons were poorly guarded and stored in unsecured locations in the camps. In some cases, combatants at the assembly points awaiting demobilization were given their guns back on the understanding they were used only to hunt for food, fearing that many combatants would turn to violent crime if provision were not made for them. Reports on the poor quality and limited quantity of the weapons stored at assembly points indicated that both UNITA and the MPLA forces were storing hidden weapons for potential future contingencies.

The UNAVEM monitors did not have the mandate or the resources to search for, and neutralize, arms caches. The parties' continued access to weapons through external supply channels, in contravention of the arms embargo, and UNAVEM's inability to monitor and control these external channels of supply undermined the collection and storage of arms. The existence of hidden arms caches, and large amounts of illicit arms outside the disarmament process, not only caused problems for the UN forces, but meant that both sides were able to rearm with relative ease when the civil war restarted after the elections.

In Mozambique, UNOMOZ military personnel were involved in monitoring and supervising the collection, registration and storage of weapons at assembly areas. However, contrary to the rules approved by the Cease-fire Commission, UNOMOZ was denied permission to collect and disable weapons at unassembled locations outside the assembly areas. This meant that UNOMOZ was unable to search for, and neutralize, the many arms caches which remained outside the disarmament process. UNOMOZ collected a total of 189,827 weapons, 43,491 of which belonged to paramilitary forces (out of a projected total of 49,806). This was significantly less than the amount of weapons which were known to be in Mozambique. Because of delays in the demobilization process, UNOMOZ was unable to complete the verification of weapons before the expiration of its mandate. Many of the weapons which were collected at the assembly areas were

25 See Ibid.
of poor quality, thus suggesting that the better quality weapons remained outside the disarmament process.27 UN forces were also given priorities as to the type of weapons which were to be collected: first, light weapons from regular forces; next, light weapons from irregular forces; and then heavy weapons.28 There was thus an acknowledgment that the presence of light weapons constituted the greatest risk in terms of the restarting of the conflict. The presence of hidden arms caches and illicit weapons was a problem during the UNOMOZ mission, and the UN forces were unable to control the external channels of weapons supply during the mission, especially in the absence of an arms embargo.29

Many of the problems surrounding the collection and storage of weapons in Angola and Mozambique were related to the suspicion and mistrust that existed between the various parties, a lack of commitment to effective disarmament on both sides, and the lack of agreement between the parties as to the procedures for collecting and storing arms. In particular, the CCPM in Angola was totally ineffective in ensuring the collection and storage of weapons. Furthermore, in both countries the UN force felt that it was unable to effectively monitor or control external supply channels, let alone search for and neutralize arms caches. In both Angola and Mozambique, the UN lacked the political will to actively confront the issue of weapons which remained outside the disarmament process, despite pressures from the international community.

The problems associated with the collection of weapons in Angola and Mozambique were related to the lack of reliable information on the quality and quantity of weapons held by each party prior to the deployment of the mission. A lack of personnel who were trained specifically for the collection of arms, and the lack of appropriate equipment for implementing the collection of weapons, also impeded the effective collection of arms during the various multilateral peace support operations. The lack of information given to the general public about the disarmament process, and particularly the collection of weapons, together with a lack of resources (intelligence, personnel, specialized equipment), meant that most of the multilateral forces could not implement effective arms control measures during their missions. However, in some cases (e.g., Mozambique), the local population was used to obtain information about the location of undeclared weapons caches.30

27 See UNIDIR, Practitioners' Questionnaire, No. M098.
29 See Ibid., p.23.
30 See UNIDIR, Practitioners' Questionnaire, No. M113.
The Bicesse Accords and the Rome General Peace Agreement made provision for the formation of new Armed Forces, and thus contained provisions relating to the transfer of arms, which had been collected from the assembly areas, to the new Armed Forces. However, there were problems with the collection and safe-keeping of weapons during the demobilization processes in Angola and Mozambique. This was partly related to problems linked to the UN's inability to monitor the collection and storage of weapons during the demobilization process, particularly in Angola. The inability of the multilateral forces to effectively monitor and control the collection and storage of weapons caused problems with the transfer of weapons to the new Armed Forces. In Mozambique, the new armed force was unable to effectively monitor and control the weapons which had been transferred from the assembly areas.\textsuperscript{31} Theft of weapons from the FADM storage facilities was a common problem, and partly explains the huge inflows of weapons into South Africa during the UNOMOZ mission. In Angola and Mozambique, few attempts were made to keep weapons, equipment and soldiers at different locations, and to keep weapons and equipment properly secured. This proved critical to the success of the mission.\textsuperscript{32}

In some of the missions, such as UNOMOZ and UNAVEM II, security zones were established to assist the implementation of weapons control and disarmament measures, and to enhance the security of the assembly areas. Security zones were not established during the UNTAG mission.

**Disarmament**

The settlement agreements for Namibia, Angola and Mozambique all contained provisions relating to disarmament. These provisions normally included the following measures: weapons destruction, arms embargoes, cash/land for weapons activities, the disarming of irregular units and/or individuals, the disarming of combatants, and de-mining.

**Weapons Destruction/Disposal**

Most of the settlement agreements made provision for the destruction and/or disposal of weapons and ammunition which were in bad condition or unserviceable. In all the cases the weapons that were collected during the disarmament process were stored and later transferred to the new armed forces.

In Angola, unserviceable weapons were destroyed, and the rest were stored for later use by the new Angolan armed forces. In Mozambique, UNOMOZ monitored and supervised the destruction of weapons, ammunition and explosives, particularly those that were in bad condition, dangerous, and/or inappropriate for the new armed forces. During the post-demobilization verification mission, which comprised the Mozambican government, RENAMO and UNOMOZ, substantial numbers of weapons were discovered at declared and undeclared locations.

Arms Embargoes

An important aspect of the disarmament components of most of the settlement agreements was the presence of an arms embargo on all parties during the multilateral mission. Namibia, as a "colony" of South Africa, had been subject to the 1977 mandatory United Nations arms embargo against South Africa. The arms embargo remained in place during UNTAG's mission and was only lifted after Namibia's independence.

In Angola, an arms embargo on both sides was one of the provisions of the Bicesse Accord, and some of the UNAVEM II forces were involved in monitoring the embargo at airports, border posts and ports. The supervising of the arms embargo was the responsibility of the Joint Political-Military Commission (CCPM), which was responsible for supervising the implementation of all aspects of the Bicesse Accords. However, there is evidence to suggest that the CCPM was unable to enforce the embargo, and that both parties continued to acquire arms during the UNAVEM II mission, in contravention of the embargo, by turning away from traditional suppliers (e.g., South Africa and the USSR) in favor of black market suppliers.
With the country returning to full-fledged civil war, the Angolan government announced in April 1993 that the Triple-Zero clause in the Bicesse Accords was obsolete, and that it would no longer abide by the arms embargo.\(^{38}\) In September 1993 the United Nations Security Council (Resolution 864) imposed an international arms embargo on UNITA. However, the implementation of the embargo has not stopped UNITA from acquiring weapons from a number of different sources.\(^{39}\)

In Mozambique no arms embargo was included in the settlement agreement. This constituted a serious problem because it meant that arms continued to enter Mozambique officially throughout the UNOMOZ mission, thereby undermining the disarmament component of the settlement agreement.

The presence or absence of an arms embargo on all parties during the deployment of a multilateral mission had a significant effect on the ability of the multilateral forces to implement effective disarmament, particularly with respect to controlling the external supply channels of weapons during peace support missions. The ongoing availability of arms, often from external black market sources, not only undermined the effective implementation of the disarmament measures, but compromised the security of the multilateral forces, particularly those that were unarmed (e.g., UNAVEM II).

**Weapons Buy Back Programs**

A number of ad hoc weapons buy back programs, where weapons were bought for cash, food and/or agricultural implements, were initiated during some of the peace support missions (e.g., Mozambique). However, these programs met with little success, in terms of the number of weapons handed in and the quality of weapons that were collected. In most cases the very old and poor quality weapons were handed in during buy back programs, suggesting that the better quality weapons were kept outside. While the effectiveness of weapons buy back programs is disputed, because they can stimulate new, and illegal markets in weapons, it is generally accepted that buy-back programs which provide food and/or agricultural implements are more appropriate than programs which offer cash for weapons.

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\(^{38}\) Later that year, all the members of the observing troika (the US, Russia, and Portugal) announced a lifting of their bans on arms sales to the Angolan Government. See *Ibid.*, p.36.

\(^{39}\) It has been reported that UNITA obtained weapons directly and indirectly from a number of different countries, such as Zaire, Congo, Russia, China and South Africa. See *Ibid.*, p.49.
Disarming of Private and Irregular Units

Most of the settlement agreements made provision for the disarming and disbanding of private and irregular units. In Namibia the issue of disarming private and irregular units did not constitute a major problem. In Angola, the warring parties supervised the disarming and disbanding of irregular units, with the UN merely acting as observers.40 In Mozambique the UNOMOZ forces, in conjunction with the local authorities, were involved in the disarming of irregular units and bandits. The weapons that were collected from these irregular forces were handed over to the UN forces for custody.41

Disarming of Combatants

All of the settlement agreements provided for the disarming of all combatants during the deployment of the peace support mission. Once combatants had been disarmed, they were either demobilized or recruited into the new armed force. In all of the multilateral missions, combatants were required to turn in a weapon either upon registration at the assembly areas, or upon their demobilization, in order to become eligible for various benefits. In all of the cases disarmament was voluntary, as opposed to coercive.42 In Namibia and Mozambique, however, the presence of armed military personnel meant that it was easier to encourage the disarming of soldiers and to enforce non-compliance. In Angola, it was impossible for the unarmed UNAVEM monitors to effectively monitor and verify the disarming of soldiers, because of substantial movement in and out of camps, and because of limited numbers of observers and a limited mandate. The inability of the UNAVEM II monitors to enforce the collection and storage of weapons meant that disarmament was reversible in Angola. Although disarmament was reversible in Namibia and Mozambique, given the presence of large amounts of arms outside the disarmament process, thus far both countries have not experienced a large scale rearming of individuals who are outside of the armed forces.

Psychologically, parties will only disarm if they are confident that the preceding stages of demobilization have been securely carried out and can be sustained. In Angola and Mozambique, both parties remained deeply suspicious

of each other (and the UN) throughout the UN mission, often accusing each other of not complying with the provisions of the disarmament component of the settlement agreement. The result was that neither of the warring parties was ever totally committed to fulfilling the provisions of the disarmament component. Being able to guarantee the security of disarmed combatants is an important factor in being able to effectively implement a disarmament process. In addition, the value of a weapon, and the willingness to part with it depends on two factors - its real (and perceived) economic value, and its security value. In Namibia and Mozambique the multilateral forces had sufficient resources and armed personnel to guarantee the security of disarmed forces. However, in Angola, the unarmed UNAVEM personnel were unable to guarantee the security of disarmed forces, particularly given the large amounts of soldiers and arms from both sides which remained outside the disarmament process. In both Angola and Mozambique the handing in of weapons not only meant a loss of security, but amounted to the loss of economic security and livelihood for many combatants. The presence of an adequately funded demobilization and reintegration program for combatants, to compensate for this loss of economic security, is a necessary requirement for successful disarmament.

The failure of the UNAVEM II mission, and its inability to ensure the effective implementation of the disarmament measures of the Peace Accords, was primarily a function of its limited mandate and the lack of commitment from both parties to ensuring effective disarmament. The passive mandate of UNAVEM II and its inability to enforce non-compliance meant that it was unable to ensure that all the disarmament measures of the settlement agreement were effectively implemented prior to the elections.

UNTAG and UNOMOZ, on the other hand, had more comprehensive and proactive mandates, and thus were able to play a much more interventionist role in ensuring the implementation of the disarmament components of their respective settlement agreements. In none of the missions was a system of rewards and penalties established to motivate compliance with the provisions of the settlement agreement.

De-mining

In both Angola and Mozambique, the presence of large amounts of landmines, particularly anti-personnel mines, constituted a severe threat to the security of UN personnel and to the disarmament process as a whole. In Angola, where there were an estimated 9 to 15 million landmines throughout the country, a de-mining sub-committee was established under the CCPM, and teams of
MPLA and UNITA troops cleared some 300,000 mines in the first month after the accords were signed. The de-mining program was aborted when the country returned to war.

In Mozambique, an ambitious de-mining program was initiated by the UN to deal with the problem of the estimated 2 million mines which were present throughout the country. The de-mining program, which was coordinated by UNOHAC in conjunction with the ICRC, WFP and the UNDP, was subject to many delays, but an accelerated program eventually got under way in mid-1994. Part of the program involved the establishment of a Mine Clearance Training Center, which was tasked with training local individuals as mine clearers. The de-mining program was not completed before the end of the UNOMOZ mission, but the United Nations has committed itself to continue funding and managing the de-mining program (through the UNDP).

Demobilization and Reintegration

Most of the settlement agreements contained provisions relating to the demobilization and reintegration of combatants. These provisions normally included the following measures: the cantonment and disbanding of regular combat units; the disbanding of irregular units; the reintegration of ex-combatants into civilian life; and the reintegration of regular and irregular forces from the different warring parties into new national forces (military and police). In most of the cases, the demobilization of combatants and the formation of a new national armed force was to be completed before elections could be held.

The rationale for implementing a demobilization and reintegration program for ex-combatants during a peace support operation is that such a program can defuse tensions between parties, thereby helping to achieve the effective disarming of warring parties and reducing the possibility of parties trying to use military means for political purposes. The demobilization and reintegration of combatants into civilian life during a peace support operation thus provides a

46 See United Nations, The UN and Mozambique, pp.52-53.
relatively stable environment for the holding of elections, thereby keeping the warring parties with the framework of the peace process and assisting with the implementation of the settlement agreement. It is also an important ingredient for post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction. Furthermore, the absence of such a program, and the release of large amounts of ex-combatants into civilian life without any prospects of employment, can provide the seeds for future forms of intra-state conflict.

In most of the missions there were a number of problems with the demobilization of combatants such as: 1) political problems - the deep suspicion and mistrust between the parties meant that soldiers were kept out of the demobilization process; 2) logistical problems - poor infrastructure, inadequate facilities, and lack of equipment delayed the establishment of assembly areas and the processing of combatants at assembly areas; 3) humanitarian problems - large numbers of displaced people, drought, and refugees; and 4) security problems - the criminality of society and the presence of weapons. As a result of these problems, there were delays in the demobilization process, with the result that the timetable for the implementation of the later stages of the disarmament component had to be constantly revised. In some cases, the various stages of the demobilization process took place concurrently, while in other cases various stages were aborted or not sufficiently completed before elections.

In Namibia, the demobilization of combatants from both sides was effectively carried out, despite some initial delays at the beginning of the UNTAG mission. These delays were related to SWAPO incursions at the time of the beginning of the cease-fire, and South Africa's reluctance to demobilize all its forces (e.g., Koevoet) and to dismantle its military command structures in Namibia. All the citizen forces and commandos (numbering 11,578) had been disarmed and demobilized by D-day. Some of these forces were reactivated as a result of the SWAPO incursions in early April, but by the end of May they had all been disarmed and demobilized. The SWATF forces (21,661) were completely demobilized by the end of June, 1989. However, the majority of demobilized SWATF personnel retained their uniforms and continued to receive their pay until after the elections. The South Africans also tried to avoid demobilization of their forces in Namibia by transferring members of the Koevoet counter-insurgency unit to the SWAPOL. Under pressure from the UN, South Africa finally agreed

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to demobilize 1,600 ex-Koevoet members before the elections. These demobilizations were supervised by UNTAG military monitors.

A program for the reintegration of ex-combatants and the formation of a new Armed Force was not part of the Namibian settlement agreement. However, UNTAG became involved in the initial attempts to establish a new armed force in Namibia. After the elections a Tripartite Military Integration Committee, with UNTAG as its chair, was established to develop a concept for the Namibian army. The Committee was charged with planning the integration of Namibian armed personnel and developing a military structure for the future Namibian army. A team from the Kenyan battalion of UNTAG remained after the elections to help train the integrated nucleus of the new Namibian army, which participated in the independence ceremonies. Shortly after independence, a British Army Military Advisory Training Team (BMATT) arrived in Namibia to help establish and train a new Namibian army. The formation of the Namibian Defense Force (NDF) occurred through the voluntary recruitment of former soldiers, rather than through a formal integration of existing armies, as almost all combatants were demobilized during the UNTAG mission.

In Namibia the total number of combatants before demobilization was approximately 52,000 (South African: 32,000 and SWAPO: 20,000). All combatants were demobilized before the elections. However, after demobilization had occurred, 57% of former SWAPO combatants remained unemployed, 36% were involved in subsistence agriculture, and 7% were in formal employment. Many of the former SWATF members and members of South African- sponsored forces departed from Namibia and returned to South Africa after demobilization. The formation of the new Namibian Defense Force (NDF), which took place after independence, was made up of SWATF and SWAPO ex-combatants. Approximately 7,000 ex-SWAPO combatants joined the NDF, which had an initial force level of 10,000.

The new Namibian government initially hoped that reintegration would occur "spontaneously" after combatants were demobilized, and so made no special plans to facilitate the reintegration of ex-combatants. However, 16 months

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49 See Ibid., p.376.
50 The number of SWAPO combatants may be an underestimate, as they were repatriated along with other Namibian returnees. 32,000 people showed up when the new Namibian government announced payments for veterans.
51 See L. Nathan, "Marching to a Different Drum: A Description and Assessment of the Formation and Assessment of the Namibian Police and Defense Force", Southern African Perspectives, No. 4, 1990, Center for Southern African Studies, University of the Western Cape, for a comprehensive discussion of the formation of the new armed forces in Namibia.
after independence, faced with high-level formal unemployment (over 80%) among ex-combatants, and a growing incidence of banditry, the government began a haphazard reintegration program, which included lump-sum cash payments to all those ex-combatants who were still unemployed, and the Development Brigades, a publicly financed on-the-job vocational training program.\textsuperscript{52} UN agencies, such as the UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNESCO, also assisted with the reintegration of ex-combatants in their respective areas of specialization. NGOs (e.g., Council of Churches in Namibia) were responsible for managing most of the reintegration programs in Namibia.\textsuperscript{53}

The demobilization of combatants in Angola was subject to many delays and problems, and was not effectively implemented before the elections were held in September 1992. It was initially intended that no combatants would be demobilized until the cantonment process was complete. The cantonment process was delayed, however, because of logistical problems (shortages of food and clothing), poor planning, security problems, discipline problems, and an uneven commitment to cantonment on the part of both sides. In many instances cantoned troops left the assembly areas before they could be demobilized.\textsuperscript{54} This in turn delayed the demobilization process, and eventually the cantonment and demobilization stages took place concurrently. In July 1992 the cantonment of forces to assembly areas was abandoned, after only 49% of troops had been assembled, in favor of a speedier process which involved troops being selected for demobilization or for integration into the new Angolan Armed Force without passing through Assembly areas. In September, just before the elections, only 41% of troops had been demobilized.\textsuperscript{55} Just before the elections, only 45% of government troops and 24% of UNITA troops had been demobilized.\textsuperscript{56}

The delays in the demobilization process meant that the disarming of combatants was not effectively implemented before the elections. In addition, both sides kept soldiers and arms out of the disarmament process in case of future contingencies. UNITA kept far more of its troops out of the demobilization process than the MPLA. It was estimated that UNITA kept a 10,000 to 20,000-strong army close to the Namibian border and at other locations, and 3,000 -

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52} See World Bank, p.54.
\item \textsuperscript{53} See \textit{Ibid.}, p.76 for details of the NGO-sponsored reintegration programs in Namibia.
\item \textsuperscript{56} \textit{Ibid.}
\end{itemize}
5,000 elite troops in Zaire. The MPLA reportedly shifted 10,000 to 20,000 troops into a paramilitary police force, thereby excluding them from the demobilization process. In addition, each side was granted, under the terms of the Peace Accords, personal security forces, which they also withheld from the demobilization process. The lack of real commitment to the demobilization process from both sides, and the large amounts of arms and soldiers which were kept outside the process, severely undermined the demobilization component of the Peace Accords, and facilitated the rearming of both sides and the ease with which both sides returned to war. The failure to implement effective demobilization merely exacerbated the problems with implementing the various arms control and disarmament measures.

In Angola, the settlement agreement provided for the formation of a new armed force, the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), with a troop strength of 50,000. Each party was to contribute an equal amount of troops to the new armed force, but recruitment was intended to be voluntary. The formation of the FAA was supervised by a joint commission for the formation of the Armed Forces, which fell under the authority of the CCPM. The Portuguese, French and British were responsible for the training of the new armed force. The formation of the FAA, which occurred simultaneously with the demobilization process, was to have been completed before elections. However, it also ran behind schedule, as a result of food shortages and logistical problems, and by early September 1992, just before the elections, only 8,800 soldiers (18%) had been integrated into the FAA. The fact that both parties were not only uncooperative in the demobilization process, but also kept large numbers of soldiers out of the demobilization process, in violation of the Bicesse Accords and as a hedge against future contingencies, meant that by the time of the elections, Angola had three standing armies on its soil. After the elections, with the return to civil war, most of the demobilized ex-combatants were remobilized, and those members of the new Angolan armed force returned to their former armies.

58 Fortna, p.400.
60 The government also openly created its new paramilitary police force, the Ninjas, in contravention of the Bicesse Accords during the demobilization period. See Human Rights Watch Arms Project, p.11.
The total number of combatants in Angola before demobilization was approximately 151,000 (MPLA: 113,700 and UNITA: 37,300). By the time of elections in September 1992, only 41% (61,994) had been demobilized (MPLA:54,737 and UNITA:7,270). The CCPM (with observers from USA, the USSR, and Portugal) was tasked with administering the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants. A number of NGO-sponsored programs for the reintegration of ex-combatants were prepared, but the implementation of most of these programs was postponed until after the elections. A large European Union-designed reintegration program was also prepared, but never implemented, because of the resumption of the civil war.

In Mozambique, demobilization was sufficiently completed before elections took place. However, there were also a number of problems and delays related to difficulties in reaching agreement on the final list of assembly areas, and by both sides's initial reluctance to allow their forces to be demobilized. Delays in the cantonment process, because of logistical problems, caused delays in the demobilization process, and large numbers of soldiers remained in the assembly areas for long periods without being demobilized, thus leading to riots and mutinies. Demobilization was "sufficiently completed" by 15 August, but both sides withheld troops and arms from the demobilization process - approximately 5,000 Government troops and 2,000 RENAMO troops - as a hedge against post-election crises. When the assembly areas were closed on 15 August, there were still a number of soldiers (3,734) in the assembly areas who had not been demobilized - they were quickly demobilized or recruited into the FADM.

The settlement agreement made provision for the formation of a new Mozambican armed force (FADM). It was intended that the FADM would have a strength of 30,000 troops, drawn in equal numbers from both parties, and that the formation of the FADM would be completed before elections. The formation of the FADM, which was intended to take place in conjunction with the demobilization process, also proceeded behind schedule, because of logistical problems (lack of training facilities) and a lack of volunteers. At the time of the elections less than 12,000 soldiers had joined, mostly from the government forces. This was significantly less than the 30,000 that had been agreed upon in terms of the settlement agreement. The figure of 30,000 was moderated downwards to 15,000 in August 1994, at the suggestion of the UN, when it became clear that the

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61 This number is based on a UNAVEM count as of June 1992.
62 See World Bank, p.77.
64 See United Nations, The UN and Mozambique, p.41.
integration of 30,000 combatants into the FADM would not be achievable before the elections. By mid-1995 it was estimated that the numbers in the FADM had decreased to below 10,000.\textsuperscript{65}

The total number of combatants in Mozambique before demobilization was estimated at 137,000 (Government: 116,000 and RENAMO: 21,000).\textsuperscript{66} By the end of the UNOMOZ mandate in December 1994, 82,000 troops had been registered at assembly areas, of which 12,000 had been recruited into the FADM (Government:8,500 and RENAMO:3,500). The remaining 70,000 were demobilized and reintegrated into civilian life.

The settlement agreement in Mozambique also provided for a program for the reintegration of combatants into civilian life. UNOMOZ, through the UNOHOC, chaired the Commission for Reintegration (CORE), which was tasked with planning, organizing and monitoring the reintegration of demobilized soldiers. Through CORE, demobilized soldiers received 6 months severance pay. A Reintegration Support Scheme, which was managed by UNDP, provided demobilized soldiers with subsidy payments representing a further 18 months' pay. In addition, the ILO initiated a vocational training program for demobilized soldiers, while the IOM established a job referral and counseling service. A Working Group of NGOs was convened in late 1994 to support the work of CORE.

### III. Disarmament, Small Arms Proliferation, and Armed Banditry

In comparing and contrasting the implementation of the disarmament components of settlement agreements during the respective multilateral peace support operations, it is evident that most of the multilateral forces were unable to implement effective disarmament measures before they departed.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[66] Some 13,000 government troops were demobilized before the signing of the GPA.
\end{footnotes}
The ineffective implementation of arms control and disarmament measures during multilateral peace support operations has had a significant impact on the availability of weapons, particularly small arms, in the countries of Southern Africa. In most cases, arms that remained ‘outside’ the disarmament process (i.e., were not collected, stored and/or destroyed by the multilateral forces) have either been used to restart intra-state conflicts, or have found their way into the illegal arms market in neighboring countries, thereby contributing to the problem of arms proliferation in these countries.67

The absence of a well-planned and well-funded demobilization and reintegration program for ex-combatants can result in renewed conflict or lead to increased banditry amongst unemployed and dissatisfied ex-combatants. The increase in armed banditry is inextricably linked to alternative employment opportunities (or the lack of employment opportunities) for ex-combatants, and to the availability of weapons, which in turn is a consequence of ineffective arms control and disarmament during multilateral peace support missions.

The countries of Southern Africa are currently "awash" with weapons, particularly small arms. This proliferation of weapons, which constitutes a major threat to the security of both states and citizens in the region, can be explained, in part, by the history of armed conflict in Southern Africa, in which Western countries, countries from the Warsaw Pact, Cuba, China and South Africa supplied large amounts of weapons to governments and "rebel movements" in the region.68 The presence of small arms production facilities in many countries in the region, "leaks" from state armories, and inadequate control over police and armed forces have also contributed to the problem of small arms proliferation in Southern Africa.69 However, the lack of effective arms control and disarmament during multilateral peace support operations is also regarded as one of the major reasons for the proliferation of small arms in Southern Africa.

In Namibia, the UN forces were able to implement relatively effective arms control and disarmament measures. UNTAG forces were able to neutralize many of the hidden arms caches in Namibia prior to the elections. They also monitored and verified the withdrawal of South African arms and equipment from Namibia.

69 The following countries in Southern Africa have domestic defense industries which produce small arms and ammunition: South Africa, Namibia, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania.
The presence of "field agreements" between the parties, which covered all aspects of the collection and storage of weapons, together with effective control of weapons which had been collected, also contributed to the success of the arms control component of the UNTAG mission. In terms of the disarming of combatants, all SWAPO forces were disarmed before they returned to Namibia, and the military and paramilitary forces which had been established by South Africa were demobilized and disarmed prior to the elections under the supervision of UNTAG. All weapons and equipment which belonged to the South African forces were confiscated and guarded by UNTAG, and handed over to the new Namibian armed forces after independence.

However, after independence it became clear that many weapons had remained outside the disarmament process. This was because combatants from both sides had been able to establish arms caches during the transition period. The availability of weapons outside the armed forces started to become a problem in the early 1990s, particularly in light of the rising crime rates. In order to address the problem of the proliferation of weapons, the Namibian government announced an amnesty period for the surrender of illegal and unlicensed weapons. Due to a poor response, the period was subsequently extended, but when the amnesty expired only a small fraction of the anticipated number of weapons had been turned in.

Many of the weapons which remained outside the disarmament process in Namibia have found their way into neighboring countries, thereby contributing to the proliferation of small arms in countries such as Botswana, Zambia and South Africa. The dramatic increase in armed criminal violence in countries such as Zambia and South Africa has been directly linked to the flow of illegal weapons from neighboring countries which have recently experienced a multilateral peace support operation.

In Angola, UNAVEM II did not have the resources (or the mandate) to try and implement effective arms control measures and thereby reduce the number of weapons prevalent in the country. According to UN sources, the weapons that were collected were poorly guarded and stored in unsecured locations in the

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71 See World Bank, p.30.
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camps. The weapons that were collected at the assembly points were of poor quality and limited quantity, thus suggesting that the MPLA and UNITA forces were storing weapons for future contingencies. In some cases, combatants at the assembly points were given back their weapons on the understanding that they were only used to hunt for food. The inability of the UN forces to implement effective arms control measures meant that vast quantities of arms remained outside the disarmament process. These arms provided the fuel for the resumption of the civil war, which occurred in late 1992 after UNITA rejected the results of the UN-supervised elections. Many of the arms which remained outside the disarmament process in Angola ended up flowing into other countries in the region, such as Namibia and South Africa. Anecdotal evidence suggests that large numbers of weapons from the Angolan conflict have ended up in neighboring countries.

In Mozambique, the UNOMOZ forces attempted to collect the large numbers of weapons which were estimated to be in the country at the time of the peace agreement. The weapons that were collected during the UNOMOZ operation were of poor quality, thus suggesting that many weapons were kept out of the process for future contingencies. Many of the weapons that were not collected found their way into neighboring countries. Those weapons that were collected during the disarmament process were often stored in the assembly areas and were not securely stored. Furthermore, the state armories were often not adequately guarded and there were many instances of "leakage" from state armories during the UNOMOZ mission. Thus, when the UN forces left towards the end of 1994, large numbers of weapons remained outside the process.

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75 See World Bank, p.31.
76 It was estimated that there were 2 million weapons in circulation in Angola when the civil war restarted in late 1992. See Ibid., p.7.
77 Ohlson, Stedman and Davies, p.195.
78 There have been reports of young Angolan woman exchanging AK-47s for second-hand clothes on the Namibian border with Angola (Angolan News Agency, 9 November 1993). There have also been reports of Angolans exchanging guns for food with people from Namibia and Zambia (The Sunday Mail, Zambia, 20 August 1995).
79 A South African Police source estimated that there were approximately 1.5 million AK-47s in Mozambique in 1993 left over from the war. See The Citizen, 16 July 1993.
80 During the UNOMOZ mission, the Malawian army uncovered a cache of AK-47s and RENAMO uniforms at the headquarters of the ruling Malawi Congress Party. See Africa Confidential, Vol. 34, 17 December 1993.
81 The UN Cease-fire Commission had not verified 40% of RENAMO’s arms caches when it left Mozambique in December 1994. This did not include either side’s secret supplies of weapons. See Africa Confidential, Vol. 36, No. 8, 14 April 1995.
The proliferation of weapons, particularly small arms, has become a significant problem in post-settlement Mozambique, and during 1995 large numbers of arms caches were discovered by the Zimbabwean mine-clearing teams.\textsuperscript{82} The proliferation of weapons in Mozambique is not only linked to ineffective arms control and disarmament during the UNOMOZ operation. Many members of the new armed forces have deserted the FADM since December 1994, taking their weapons with them. Some senior members of the armed forces have also been implicated in illegal arms deals involving weapons from state armories, because of low salaries in the new armed forces, inadequate discipline, low levels of morale, and a ready market for weapons in South Africa and other neighboring countries.\textsuperscript{83} These developments have certainly contributed to the proliferation of weapons in Mozambique and in neighboring countries like South Africa and Malawi. Mozambique constitutes the largest single source of supply of small arms for the South African domestic market.

The failure of UN forces to implement effective arms control and disarmament measures during their deployment in various Southern African countries can be explained by a number of factors: limited and/or inadequate mandates, insufficient resources, the absence (or violation) of an arms embargo, inadequate storage facilities, and/or a lack of co-operation and commitment on the part of the warring parties. Furthermore, the UN forces in these countries had insufficient information about the quality and quantity of weapons that were present in the country prior to their deployment, insufficient training to implement arms control measures, and inadequate personnel and equipment to undertake arms control operations.

In both Angola and Mozambique, the multilateral forces were unable to implement the effective disarmament of all combatants. This was related to a lack of co-operation and commitment on the part of the warring parties, and to a number of logistical problems on the part of the UN. A lack of resources for monitoring the implementation of the various disarmament measures, and the inability of the UN forces to guarantee the safety of disarmed soldiers, contributed to the lack of effective disarmament. The absence of a reward or incentive scheme for complying with disarmament and the lack of a system for enforcing non-compliance also contributed to the failure of the disarmament process. The passive nature of UNAVEM II’s mandate compromised the ability of UNAVEM forces to enforce disarmament. In Namibia, the disarming of combatants was more successful, given the political power of UNTAG and its ability to exert

\textsuperscript{82} “Arms for Africa”, \textit{Sunday Times} (Johannesburg), 27 August 1995.

\textsuperscript{83} See Williams, \textit{op. cit.}, p.5.
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control over all the parties. UNTAG’s large numbers of armed personnel also allowed it to effectively monitor the implementation of the various disarmament measures, such as weapons destruction and the disarming of combatants.

From the above it is evident that in all of the multilateral peace support operations, the arms control and disarmament measures of the settlement agreement were not effectively implemented. Even in Namibia, which is regarded as a relatively successful mission, large numbers of arms remained outside the disarmament process, and thus contributed to the arms proliferation problem in the post-election period. In Angola and Mozambique, large numbers of arms remained outside the disarmament process, thereby exacerbating the existing problem of arms proliferation in these countries. The arms which were not collected, stored and/or destroyed during the multilateral peace support operations not only ended up in circulation in the countries concerned, but also ended up contributing to the proliferation of weapons in neighboring countries, particularly in those countries such as South Africa where there is a large demand for small arms.

Armed banditry, coupled with rising levels of crime and violence, is becoming a common feature of many countries in Southern Africa. The issue of armed banditry is not only exacerbated by the availability of small arms, but is inextricably linked to the failure to implement well-planned and well-funded demobilization and reintegration programs for ex-combatants during multilateral peace support operations. During the various multilateral peace support operations in Southern Africa, programs for the demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants were implemented with varying degrees of success, and in some cases (e.g., Angola) they were aborted.

In Namibia, although demobilization was "effectively" completed before the UN forces left, the Namibian settlement agreement made no provision for a reintegration program for ex-combatants, for it was more concerned with demobilizing and disarming combatants and returning Namibians to their home territory than with a targeted reintegration program for ex-combatants. The new Namibian government initially hoped that reintegration would occur "spontaneously". However, a reintegration program was finally implemented by the government in late 1991 when it became apparent that large numbers of ex-

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84 See Ohlson, Stedman and Davies (1994) for a discussion of the incidence of armed banditry in Southern Africa.
combatants (nearly 80%) were still unemployed.\textsuperscript{85} The reintegration program, which was relatively haphazard and limited in scope, consisted of a lump-sum payment (US$476) and the establishment of the Development Brigades, a publicly-financed on-the-job vocational training program.\textsuperscript{86}

Most commentators have argued that the Namibian reintegration program has not been particularly successful, for the lump sum payments were not sufficient to contribute significantly to ex-combatants' long-term reintegration, and the Development Brigades program has suffered from inadequate funding. Furthermore, the absence of complementary programs, such as targeted training programs to improve the skills of ex-combatants, public work schemes, and psychological counseling to help combatants reintegrate more successfully also undermined the success of the reintegration program. The problem of armed banditry among ex-combatants which has emerged in northern Namibia in the last few years has been linked to the failure of the Namibian reintegration program.\textsuperscript{87}

In Angola, a detailed demobilization and reintegration program was prepared as part of the implementation strategy of the disarmament component of the settlement agreement. The reintegration program, which was to be implemented after the elections, had secured funding commitments from the European Community and some NGOs and was intended to be targeted towards the needs of ex-combatants, in addition to providing financial compensation such as pensions and severance pay.\textsuperscript{88} By the time the elections were held in September 1992, some demobilization had taken place, although it was severely behind schedule. Furthermore, both sides kept forces out of the demobilization process in order to prepare for future contingencies: the government reportedly shifted 10,000 to 20,000 of its best troops into a new paramilitary police force, while UNITA kept its heaviest weapons and 25,000 of its best fighters in the bush. By the time of the election, 40,000 troops had yet to be demobilized, the two armed forces were still intact, and the new integrated armed force had barely been formed. The program for the reintegration of ex-combatants, which had been

\textsuperscript{85} See World Bank, p.52.
\textsuperscript{88} In Angola, an ECC funded survey of FAPLA combatants was conducted in order to assist with the planning of the reintegration program. See World Bank, p.55.
prepared, was never implemented because of the resumption of the civil war in late 1992. The return to civil war in Angola was linked to the failure to implement an effective demobilization program during the deployment of UNAVEM II.

In Mozambique, a demobilization and reintegration program for ex-combatants was an integral part of the settlement agreement. Despite a number of problems and delays, most of the FRELIMO and RENAMO forces had been demobilized before the elections were held in late 1994. The reintegration program, which was relatively well-planned, started before the elections but was threatened by a lack of resources, and by December 1994 only 28% of the promised funding for the reintegration program had been received. Delays in payments, together with the absence of complementary reintegration programs for the communities which are absorbing ex-combatants, and the lack of employment opportunities, particularly in the rural areas, has led many ex-combatants to "return to the bush" or drift to the cities.

The failure to implement an effective and well-funded demobilization and reintegration policy, particularly in the light of Mozambique's high levels of poverty and underdevelopment, has led to rising levels of crime and violence, a growing lawlessness and an increase in armed banditry amongst ex-combatants. Examples of this banditry include the shooting of the new FADM commander in Maputo in February 1995, and the increase in armed robbery on the main north-south road from Beira to Maputo and in Sofala and Zambezia provinces. Groups of armed dissidents, known as Chimwenje (torch) have been carrying out operations in Manica Province, including attacks on a Mozambican government post in October and November 1995. In September 1995 it was reported that there were high levels of discontent amongst former RENAMO soldiers, and that as many as 400 armed RENAMO soldiers had taken over the town of Dombe. The discovery of a number of arms caches since the elections has also led to rising tensions, with clashes between civilians and police and mutual

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89 The United Nations estimated that both sides kept armed forces and weapons out of the demobilization process. This included less than 2,000 troops on RENAMO's side and 5,000 on the government's side. See Africa Confidential, 23 September 1994, Vol. 35, No. 19.
90 Stephen, p.65.
91 Most of the robbers admit to being former soldiers of either FRELIMO or RENAMO. See Africa Confidential, 14 April 1995, Vol. 36, No. 8.
92 It is alleged by some commentators that the Chimwenje dissidents have links with RENAMO, because they operate in the Dombe area, which is a RENAMO stronghold and the site of a former RENAMO encampment. RENAMO arms caches and radio equipment have also been discovered in the Dombe area. See Africa Confidential, 5 January 1996, Vol. 37, No. 1.
recriminations between RENAMO and FRELIMO as to who is responsible for the individual caches.\textsuperscript{94}

The formation of a new armed force during a peace support operation is often regarded as an integral part of the demobilization and reintegration process. It is also seen as an important mechanism for "mopping up" unemployed people, or for dealing with the large numbers of combatants who will be left without employment as a result of the end of the conflict. It is also used as a means of deflating conflict during peace support operations and contributing to post-conflict reconciliation and peace-building. The formation of new armed forces is complete in Namibia, partially complete in Mozambique and incomplete/arrested in Angola.\textsuperscript{95} The absence of white, settler armies in Mozambique and Angola should minimize the racial/ethnic problems that have afflicted the formation of new armed forces in Namibia.\textsuperscript{96} The formation of the new armed force in Mozambique has not been particularly successful, and by mid-1995 there were less than 10,000 members of the FADM, as large numbers of soldiers deserted as a result of poor salaries and working conditions.\textsuperscript{97}

**IV. Small Arms Proliferation, Armed Banditry and Intra-state Conflict in Southern Africa**

Despite the resolution of many of Southern Africa’s historical conflicts, including the ending of Apartheid in South Africa, many of the countries in the region are still experiencing some type of intra-state conflict. This intra-state conflict can take a number of different forms: \textsuperscript{98}

- conflict associated with war termination and reconciliation - this includes Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, and to a lesser extent, Namibia;

\textsuperscript{94} Stephen, p.65.

\textsuperscript{95} See Nathan (1990) and Preston (1993) for a discussion of the problems associated with the formation of the new armed forces in Namibia.

\textsuperscript{96} The armed forces in Namibia have had a number of problems with respect to the integration of former adversaries into the same armed force. There have also been a number of problems with the ethnic composition of the new Namibian Defense Force (NDF), in that 60% of Namibians are Ovambo, whereas 90% of command posts in the NDF are held by Northern Ovambo (Kwanyama). See *Africa Confidential*, 4 August 1995, Vol. 36, No. 16.

\textsuperscript{97} See *Africa Confidential*, 14 April 1995, Vol. 36, No. 8.

\textsuperscript{98} See Ohlson, Stedman and Davies, pp.221-223 for a discussion of the various types of intra-state conflict that are present in Southern Africa.
conflicts over the distribution of resources - this includes countries which are pursuing structural adjustment programs with distributional consequences that create conflict - e.g., Mozambique, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe; and conflicts over distribution that are tied to conflicts over reconciliation - e.g., Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa;

- conflicts over political participation - in which groups and individuals are demanding political rights, the institutionalization of multi-party democracy and an end to one-party states (e.g., Zimbabwe, Tanzania), military dictatorships (e.g., Lesotho) and anachronistic forms of government (e.g., Swaziland), and more accountability from leaders (this form of intra-state conflict is present in all countries in the region); and

- conflicts over political identity - in which conflicts over political identity clash with ethnic, tribal, religious, linguistic and other sub-national loyalties (in countries such as Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, various ethnic, racial and religious groups have mobilized to fight or demand political change).

In reality, these various forms of conflict are not distinct, but are interconnected. Thus conflicts over participation have implications for distribution, while conflicts over political identity are often linked to conflicts over participation and distribution. In most countries in Southern Africa, the state is often weak and lacks legitimacy, which in turn limits its capacity and ability to deal effectively with problems such as the proliferation of weapons and the rising tide of violent crime. The presence of severe economic problems (e.g., foreign debt burdens, declining terms of trade, little or no foreign investment, and declining foreign aid receipts) often exacerbates the potential for intra-state conflicts and undermines the ability of governments to resolve these conflicts.

The presence of IMF structural adjustment programs, which inevitably involve cuts in public spending and often lead to low levels of violence, also limits the ability of governments to resolve these intra-state conflicts. The departure of United Nations missions, often after an extended period, has had a destabilizing effect on some of the countries in Southern Africa (e.g., Mozambique). The political, institutional and economic void which often accompanies the departure of large numbers of UN personnel may also create the conditions for new forms of intra-state conflict.

The causes of these various forms of intra-state conflict are complex and in many cases interrelated. However, there are two specific factors which have helped to feed and sustain many of these various forms of intra-state conflict: the proliferation of small arms and the problem of armed banditry. The problem of
small arms proliferation in Southern Africa, as pointed out earlier, has a number of causes, such as the long history of protracted armed conflict in the region, the role of the superpowers in supplying their "proxy armies" with vast amounts of arms and military equipment, and the presence of inadequate police forces. However, much of the blame for the problem can also be attributed to inadequate arms control and disarmament measures during peacekeeping operations.

In all of the peace support operations which have been deployed in Southern Africa, an opportunity existed for the peacekeeping or monitoring force to implement effective arms control and disarmament measures. In all of the operations, that opportunity was wasted. In Mozambique and Angola, the United Nations allowed elections to take place when it knew that armed forces and weapons had been kept out of the process by both sides, and that there were still a large number of arms caches which had not been neutralized. Many of the weapons which remained outside of the disarmament process in Angola, Namibia and Mozambique found their way into neighboring countries, through smuggling and other parts of the black market, thereby contributing to the problem of arms proliferation, which is inherently destabilizing for these countries. The proliferation of small arms also tends to fuel the rising tide of criminal violence and armed banditry, which is becoming a severe problem in many of the countries in the region. The problem of weapons proliferation in Angola and Mozambique has certainly fueled the violence in Kwazulu-Natal in South Africa, as well as contributing to the rising crime rates in Zimbabwe, Zambia and other countries in the region.

The problem of armed banditry also has its origins in the execution of multilateral peace support operations, particularly the absence of adequately planned and funded demobilization and reintegration programs for ex-combatants. Thus, in many instances, disaffected ex-combatants, who have spent most of their life as soldiers, and who still have access to weapons which were not collected during the peace support operation, have been tempted to use these weapons in order to resolve their economic, social, and/or political conflicts. In many cases, criminal violence and armed banditry have become ‘politically’ and thus have taken on the dimensions of an intra-state conflict. In some cases the

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101 This is evidenced by the Chimwenje armed dissidents in Mozambique who are allegedly linked to RENAMO. See Africa Confidential, 5 January 1996, Vol. 37, No. 1.
problem of armed banditry, which is usually an internal matter, has ‘spilled over’ to neighboring countries and has the potential to create inter-state conflicts. For example, it is alleged that disaffected dissidents in Mozambique are supporting the activities of ex-Young Pioneers in post-Banda Malawi, and Zimbabwean opposition groups in Zimbabwe.\textsuperscript{102}

\textbf{V. Conclusion/Recommendations}

This paper has attempted to analyze the relationship between the disarmament components of multilateral peace support operations, small arms and intra-state conflict in Southern Africa, using the experiences of Namibia (UNTAG), Angola (UNAVEM I and II) and Mozambique (UNOMOZ).

Most of the settlement agreements which provided the mandates for the various multilateral peace support missions contained an explicit disarmament component with measures relating to arms control, disarmament and demobilization. The settlement agreements also usually contained a timetable and sequence for the implementation of these various disarmament measures. However, all of the multilateral peace support operations suffered delays and problems with the implementation of the disarmament components of their respective settlement agreements, and in some cases the timetable and sequencing of implementing certain disarmament measures had to be revised, abandoned, or even ignored. The problems with sequencing were particularly significant in that in certain cases (e.g., Angola, Mozambique) the various stages of the process, such as cantonment, disarmament, demobilization and the reintegration of combatants, often ended up taking place simultaneously. This situation placed huge strains on the UN operation’s human and logistical resources and provided numerous opportunities for problems to arise, such as combatants deserting the assembly areas. In some cases, it undermined the success of the peace support operation (e.g., Angola).

In all the cases, multi-party elections were supposed to be held after the disarmament component of the settlement agreement had been effectively completed. In most of the cases, with the exception of Namibia, elections were held before most of the disarmament measures had been completed. The failure to implement effective disarmament before the holding of elections and the

\textsuperscript{102} See \textit{Africa Confidential}, 5 January 1996, Vol. 37, No. 1.
departure of the multilateral forces has had a number of negative consequences for the countries concerned.

The inability to implement effective arms control and disarmament measures during peace support operations has certainly contributed to the problem of weapons proliferation, both within the countries concerned and in the region as a whole. The evidence from Southern Africa suggests that those weapons which remained outside the disarmament process have either been used to restart conflicts (e.g., Angola), or have found their way into neighboring countries. The problems of rising crime and violence in countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia and South Africa have been linked to the illegal flows of weapons from neighboring countries, particularly those countries which have experienced a peace support operation (e.g., Namibia, Angola and Mozambique).

The absence of well-planned and well-funded demobilization and reintegration programs during peace support operations has also had a number of detrimental consequences for the countries concerned. Countries such as Namibia and Mozambique have experienced rising levels of crime and violence, as well as increasing incidents of armed banditry, as a result of the failure to implement effective demobilization and reintegration programs. The presence of large numbers of demoralized, disaffected, unemployed ex-combatants, especially in the context of high levels of unemployment and poor economic conditions, has certainly contributed to the increasing incidence of armed banditry in many countries in Southern Africa.

In addition, the problems of small arms proliferation and armed banditry, which are common in countries such as Mozambique which have experienced multilateral peace support operations, can also provide the conditions for the resumption of different forms of intra-state conflict. These intra-state conflicts, it is argued, also have the potential to spill over to neighboring countries, and thereby contribute to the development of inter-state conflicts.

The problem of small arms proliferation, it has been suggested, requires a well-coordinated regional approach, which focuses on both the demand and supply sides of the market and utilizes bilateral and/or multilateral agreements. The tripartite agreement between South Africa, Swaziland and Mozambique, which was signed in June 1993 in an attempt to deal with the problem of illegal arms flows into South Africa, is an example of such a multilateral approach. A regional arms control mechanism, which tries to impose restraint and controls on suppliers and recipients, should therefore be established as part of a broader regional security arrangement which involves transparency, consultation, and cooperation with regard to defense and security matters. In addition, a regional arms register, along the lines of the UN register of conventional weapons but with
detailed information about production and stockpiles of weapons, could be established as a first step towards controlling the supply of weapons. The success of these regional initiatives would depend on the political will of the various governments, and whether they would be willing or able to adequately fund the initiatives.

The problem of armed banditry, which is essentially a domestic issue, can only be solved if it is linked to efforts to control the proliferation of small arms, to create a more secure environment for all citizens, and to improve the economic opportunities for ex-combatants. Thus, ex-combatants need to be convinced that their economic and physical security will not be compromised by handing in their weapon(s) and turning their backs on crime and banditry. Governments can play an important role in contributing to the creation of a more secure environment by increasing funding for the police and providing alternative job opportunities for ex-combatants. The international community, particularly the United Nations, can also play an important role by helping to fund targeted reintegration programs for ex-combatants and remaining engaged in countries during the post-settlement peacebuilding period.

The evidence from the various countries seems to suggest that a viable program for the demobilization and reintegration of combatants into civilian life during a peace support operation can play a critical role in ensuring the success of the peace support mission, and in contributing to the process of post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation. Furthermore, the presence of a program to assist the communities where the ex-combatants are going to settle - including the provision of seeds and agricultural implements, the establishment of training programs, and the rehabilitation of infrastructure - can also play a significant role in minimizing post-settlement intra-state conflict, particularly the incidence of armed banditry amongst disaffected ex-combatants.

While the formation of a new armed force during a multilateral peace support operation can be important as a confidence-building measure for former warring parties, it is too complex and demanding a process to be successfully implemented during a peace support operation. The lessons from Namibia suggest that the formation of a new, integrated armed force, with all its potential problems, should be delayed until after elections and the end of the peace support mission. The lessons from Mozambique suggest that the creation of a new armed force has to be adequately funded in order to prevent mutinies and/or corruption. The successful formation of new armed forces is also contingent upon the socio-economic and political context within which the new armed force is established. However, the international community, including the United Nations, can
certainly play an important role in assisting with the formation of a new, integrated armed force in the post-settlement period.

The failure to implement effective disarmament measures during multilateral peace support operations has thus not only contributed to the proliferation of small arms within and between the countries of Southern Africa, but has directly and indirectly helped to sustain the various forms of intra-state conflict which are present in the countries in Southern Africa. The high levels of crime and violence, which are fed by the presence of small arms, also have significant opportunity costs, in that governments have to spend increasing amounts of public resources on the police and defense (border patrols), thereby reducing the amount of resources available for other forms of government spending, such as education and health. The effective arms control, disarmament and demobilization of combatants during multilateral peacekeeping operations is therefore not just about controlling the proliferation of arms and minimizing the potential for intra-state conflict. It is also about reversing the process of militarization in Southern Africa, and thereby helping to guarantee long term peace, security and development for all the peoples of the region.
Chapter 3
Peacekeeping in Southern Africa:
A Regional Model

Jakkie Potgieter

"War and insecurity are the enemy of economic progress and social welfare. Good and strengthened political relations among the countries of the region, and peace and mutual security, are critical components of the total environment for regional cooperation and integration. The region needs therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity and provide for mutual peace and security . . . ".

Founding Statement of the Southern African Development Community

Introduction

In the past fifty years, the Southern African region has had its fair share of conflict and strife. The main causes of conflict revolved around issues of ethnic and religious identity, nationalism, scarcity of resources and internal wars. As each of these issues took a toll in the region at socio-economic and human levels, it also left a legacy of despair: an increased availability of light weapons throughout the region.

Since the early 1990's, with the resolution of some of its most pressing problems, Southern Africa has had the opportunity to take charge of its own future. Thus, when the conflict in Angola finally ends during 1996, for example, the region will be free from the inter-state and intra-state conflicts that prevented development and economic growth for so long. Now there is a chance to establish a secure enough environment for development to take root, and this, in turn, will benefit all the countries in the region. Nevertheless, the negative legacy of the conflicts will persist for many years to come. It will be up to the governments of the region to act and commit themselves to the speedy removal of this legacy.

One of the most preoccupying legacies is that of small arms proliferation. The region is awash with small arms and munitions, flowing freely across the borders of the countries to where and when they are in demand for political and criminal motives. Moreover, the long years of violent conflicts have developed
a culture of violence among recent generations, cultivating the *culture of the gun* as the only means for solving political disputes and gaining economic benefits. Thus, the temporary improvement of the general situation in Southern Africa, as seen in a number of resolved political conflicts and in the existence of United Nations missions for monitoring peaceful transitions to full democracy, is marred by a rise in crime and in weapons flows.

Each and every state in the region is now faced with a myriad of problems, including the increased availability of weapons in the region; the present fragility of states emerging from years of internal strife; the central governments’ inability to increase security internally and internationally; the increase in international criminal organizations trading drugs, weapons and counterfeit currencies in the region; and the spread of a culture of violence among the young and the economically challenged. No one state is strong enough to cope with these problems alone and thus a call for collaborative approaches for solving common problems has emerged. Southern Africa has understood that the only way to achieve lasting peace, stability and prosperity is through cooperation.

Cooperation mechanisms, therefore, are underway in every aspect of national life. Collaborative efforts have been established in the economic, development and cultural dimensions, and also at the security and military levels. The focus of this paper concerns this last aspect of regional cooperation possibilities. In it I will explore the prospects of regional peacekeeping efforts, undertaken by the militaries of the Southern African nations, to assist in the larger regional security objectives. The creation of such peacekeeping efforts will be fundamental for gaining confidence in regional interactions between neighboring states, which in turn can facilitate the national and regional objective of controlling weapons flows across borders, thus helping to reverse the culture of violence that has begun to permeate the region.

I. Regional Peace and Security: SADC and ASAS

The concept of the peaceful settlement of disputes, as set out in Chapter VI, Article 33 of the UN Charter, indicates that parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, should first of all seek solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, or judicial settlement, and "should" resort to regional agencies, arrangements, or other peaceful means of their choice. Only after
possible ways and means of resolving conflict or imminent conflict have been exhausted will the UN resort to chapter VII of the charter, where more forceful measures may be implemented by the UN to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.\footnote{Boutros Boutros-Ghali, \textit{An Agenda for Peace}, New York: United Nations, 1992.}

Against this background, on 30 June 1993, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) established a \textit{Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution}, which committed the OAU to cooperate closely with the United Nations with respect to peacemaking and peacekeeping\footnote{Organization of African Unity, \textit{Resolving Conflict in Africa}, Addis-Abeba: OAU Information Services Publication Series (II), 1993.}. The mechanism was created as a response to international preoccupations concerning the ability of Southern African nations to: a) comply with economic and political principles acceptable to the international community; b) ensure their preparedness to implement political and economic reconstruction; and c) promote co-operation. This OAU effort eventually led to the creation of the Southern African Development Community (SADC).

The declaration by the Heads of States, on 1 April 1980, gave rise to the establishment of a regional organization concerned with development and security. The Declaration and the Treaty were signed in Windhoek (Namibia) during 1992, finally creating the SADC. Commitment to the establishment of SADC was aimed at achieving specific ideals, serving as a vehicle for regional development and integration.

The adoption of the SADC Declaration and Treaty marked a major step forward for Southern Africa. Its birth represented the culmination of processes that had been under way in the region for some time. In its founding statement the SADC States indicated that:

\begin{quote}
War and insecurity are the enemy of economic progress and social welfare. Good and strengthened political relations among the countries of the region, and peace and mutual security, are critical components of the total environment for regional co-operation and integration. The region needs, therefore, to establish a framework and mechanisms to strengthen regional solidarity and provide for mutual peace and security....\footnote{J.K. Cilliers and Mark Shaw, \textit{South Africa and Peacekeeping in Africa}, Volume 1, Pretoria: Institute for Defence Policy, 1995.}
\end{quote}

Acting under these principles, the SADC adopted a framework of co-operation, trust and harmony that would provide for the following:
greater economic co-operation on the basis of balance, equity and mutual benefit, providing for cross-border investment and trade, and the freer movement of goods and services across national borders;

- common economic, political and social values and systems enhancing enterprise and competitiveness; democracy and good governance; respect for the rule of law; and the guarantee of human rights, popular participation and the alleviation of poverty; and

- strengthened regional solidarity, peace and security that will enable people in the region to live and work together in peace and harmony.

In pursuit of these objectives, member states of the SADC recommended the establishment of the Association of Southern Africa States (ASAS) -- as the political arm of the SADC -- to replace the now defunct Front-Line States' co-operative framework, becoming the primary mechanism for dealing with the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict in Southern Africa.

It must be noted that the Front-Line States (FLS) grouping had been born out of the need for common defense against activities aimed at destabilising the region. Since its inception in 1978, it co-ordinated strategies with and between the various national liberation movements. The FLS spearheaded international diplomacy and mobilised resources in support of these movements. The Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC), which was formed under the FLS, had an important role to play in this regard.

In the past, the views and efforts of the FLS found common ground in the task of liberation. However, with the end of regional conflict and the end of Apartheid in South Africa, the countries in the region have recognized the need for change. With the decision taken to replace the FLS with the ASAS grouping, the Southern African states have indicated that a new basis for common security must be found. This new base must necessarily reflect the shift from a strategy of confrontation to one of cooperation.

This cooperative strategy is clearly indicated in the new organization's proposed terms of reference. The proposed objectives of ASAS are:

- to protect the people of the region against instability arising from internal breakdown of law and order, interstate conflict, and conflict from external aggression;

- to co-operate fully in regional security and defense, through conflict prevention, management and resolution;

- to mediate intra-state and inter-state conflicts;
to promote and enhance the development of democratic institutions and practices within each member state, and to encourage them to observe universal human rights;

• to promote peace and stability; and

• to promote peacemaking and peacekeeping in order to achieve sustainable peace and security.

Although the promotion of peacemaking and peacekeeping is placed at the bottom of the tier in this short enumeration, its importance should not be underestimated.

In the Southern African context, the future development and prosperity of the entire region will depend on the rapid decrease of rising crime rates, the turning around of the culture of violence, and the stabilisation of inter-state conflicts. Assistance to other countries in the region in the maintenance of law and order is critical. If every member state concentrates on dealing with problems on its own soil, collaborating with its neighbours to address the problems on mutual borders, many of the negative legacies of the past can be overcome. One organized and controlled way of achieving this is to improve the regional capabilities for joint security and relief action through the creation of efficient peacekeeping forces.

For these reasons, peacekeeping and relief operations are one of the major issues at stake in Southern Africa. In recognition of this fact, and to manage military matters, the Inter-State Defence and Security Committee (ISDSC) of the FLS was expanded to form the Military Sub-Committee of ASAS. Its mandate is to focus on training and military co-operation rather than on building a regional military command and control system. Secondary objectives of the ISDSC are: to promote multilateral co-operation; to provide the intelligence support for preventative diplomacy initiatives in the case of pending or actual hostilities; and to plan combined operations, agreeing on standard staff procedures, drills, tactics and telecommunications.

In taking these steps, the ASAS is recognizing that regional co-operation is essential to ensure a favorable security environment. It also serves to diminish regional reliance on extra-regional assistance programs and facilitates the retention of regional finances.\(^4\) Above all, it generates the seeds of confidence and efficiency which are needed if the problem of light weapons

proliferation in the region is to be controlled, and if the culture of violence is to be reversed.

II. Implementation of Cooperative Security Arrangements

Notwithstanding the fact that there is light at the end of the tunnel concerning Southern Africa's role in peacekeeping, it is important to be aware of the problems posed by peacekeeping in the region and to explore ways of overcoming these obstacles. For this reason, I propose now to examine specific measures which might be explored by Southern African States to enhance their preparedness to keep the peace.

Southern Africa is not only a contributor to peacekeeping; it is also a region that is much in need of peacekeepers. In Southern Africa, as elsewhere on the continent, a number of practical difficulties, including insufficient material resources and slow deployment of troops and equipment, have impinged upon the implementation of peacekeeping missions as mandated in the past.

Independent of the institutional arrangements made between Southern African States, on this issue, the crux of the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations will, in each case, lie with the level of preparedness of troops. Therefore there is a pressing need to improve the readiness of countries to deploy appropriately-equipped forces rapidly and effectively. Improving preparedness for peacekeeping in the region should be viewed as a co-operative endeavour between the SADC, ASAS and the interested states. To ensure these, the cooperative mechanisms which are in place should pay particular attention to stand-by arrangements, equipment, confidence-building and training, and finance.

Stand-by Arrangements

One way to improve preparedness is to develop and encourage participation in regional stand-by arrangements. In these arrangements, governments indicate in advance to the regional body the types of personnel and equipment that they are willing, in principle, to make available for peacekeeping or assistance operations in the region. Such systems can be of great help when a crisis occurs or an operation is planned; they also enable participating governments to prepare and train their troops for specific task. As part of the stand-by arrangements, special attention could be given in the future
to the establishment of a capacity to respond rapidly to crises in the region. Such arrangements can significantly enhance the preparedness of member states for crisis management and peacekeeping in the region.

There are a number of advantages to a regional Stand-by Peacekeeping/Relief Aid Force. The most important of these is the ability to react swiftly. Troops remained stationed in their home countries, maintaining a high level of preparedness. Once the preventative diplomacy actions are under way, the peacekeeping force could be put on alert and deployed at very short notice. In the case of natural disasters, swift reaction is crucial in the fight to save and protect the lives of affected populations. In addition to rapid deployment, a second advantage of such a force is that it could help achieve a higher degree of commonality and standardisation regarding equipment, communications and training standards within the region.

The following weaknesses of international peacekeeping and relief aid structures would probably be accentuated on a regional level, and should be addressed from the outset of negotiations regarding standby arrangements:

- the limited capabilities available to international and regional organisations which result from the lack of a planning cell to identify, co-ordinate and direct the logistics flow in the early stages of an operation;
- the lack of tactical mobility for supporting operations within a given deployment area;
- an overall lack of air capabilities for intra-theatre logistics, airlifts, surveillance, reconnaissance, communications and search and rescue tasks; and
- the lack of financial support and budgetary allocation procedures for peacekeeping forces and relief aid activities.

These weaknesses of international peacekeeping and relief aid structures can be ameliorated with attention to the following elements, which should be pursued during the planning of such arrangements:

- the establishment of secure communications and the clarification of channels of command and reporting between Higher Headquarters and missions in the field;
- the establishment of an effective command and control system in the field, possessing the necessary arrangements of personnel, equipment and procedures to enable the force commander to plan, direct and control forces in support of the mission;
adequate training of units from countries which have no tradition of contributing troops and which lack specialised units and personnel in the areas of logistics, communication and engineering; and

- the provision to the Force Commanders of political and military intelligence which might have a bearing on their operations.

Intelligence is a sensitive issue in the UN context, but one which must be addressed on a regional level from the very start of co-operative peacekeeping. In the first place, a tactical intelligence capability is needed in order to avoid the kind of intelligence failures experienced in Somalia. Secondly, combined intelligence is a must if the OAU and the SADC are serious about developing a preventative and early warning capacity. Thirdly, such a capacity is needed simply as an independent source of information, especially in politically and ethnically complex areas of deployment.

**Equipment**

Established peacekeeping procedures require countries participating in operations to provide fully-equipped units. These units are expected to be self-sufficient for the first sixty days in a mission area. Although this expectation is a UN norm, it should also be applied within the SADC. This will not only ensure that SADC member states are ready to participate in UN operations in the region, but will also greatly enhance the speed and efficiency with which they can react within the region. Delays in deployment undermine the operational capability of peacekeeping and assistance operations. In crisis situations, like the one in Rwanda, such delays can have tragic consequences.

An effort should therefore be made by member states to provide their troops with the basic equipment needed, especially with regard to specialised and heavy equipment. One such effort could involve the forming of partnerships between member states, wherein one country would make troops available and the other would provide vehicles and heavy equipment. These partnerships, formed within the framework of SADC standby arrangements, could also provide for training in maintenance of equipment, air transport to the mission area, etc. To help overcome the delays encountered in the procurement and transport of equipment to mission areas, as well as to sustain troops once they are deployed, basic, non-lethal equipment such as tents and camping equipment, communication equipment, etc., could be pre-positioned at logistical centers in countries that are easily accessible. These arrangements
A Regional Model

Confidence-Building Measures and Training

Some training activities can be pursued to assist member states in preparing troops, military- and civil police units, and civilians to participate in peacekeeping or relief operations. Furthermore, the same activities can be utilised to build confidence between the different armed forces of the region, and to foster understanding and trust between old enemies and new friends. These activities could include, for instance, exchanges of students to attend all military courses throughout the region, joint planning and training exercises, development of a joint doctrine on peacekeeping for the region, and guidelines, handbooks and videos covering the general aspects of peacekeeping and relief operations in the region. In addition, to increase the general knowledge of peacekeeping and relief operations, established training teams from the UN, or even from the region, could assist in the training of national troops, at the request of governments. Countries from the region, such as South Africa and Zimbabwe, can assist other countries in the region to overcome training difficulties in a number of ways. Institutional collaboration between training centers can greatly enhance the ability to train all forces in joint and combined operations. A small staff exchange program can reinforce collaboration between States both at Headquarters and at the field level. Bilateral arrangements for the provision of equipment for training will also enhance the standard of training and ensure inter-operability in regional peacekeeping and relief operations.

Finance

Whether the efforts to improve peacekeeping or relief operations in the region are centered in the UN, the OAU or the SADC, or a combination of these bodies, a reliable financial basis is essential. The fact that the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has had to rely on voluntary contributions to meet the costs of its expanded activities in Liberia has undoubtedly been a major obstacle in the discharge of its duties and responsibilities. Obstacles such as this should be taken into account when considering the financial aspects of peacekeeping and relief activities in the region. Accordingly, member states must also consider their financial requirements. One method of providing the necessary resources, for example, could be the establishment of a voluntary fund dedicated to enhancing...
preparedness for peacekeeping and relief operations in the region. Such a fund could be opened to contributions from regional and other governments and interested business organizations. It could be used for the objectives described above, as well as to support the immediate deployment of missions when needed. Member states must be cognizant of the fact that this method of financing is dependent on the fund being replenished in a systematic and timely manner.

III. Factors to be Considered in Policy Formulation for Peacekeeping and Relief Operations in the Region

Steps such as standby arrangements, equipment, confidence building and training, and finance are important considerations if the regional organizations are to take up combined peacekeeping operations in all seriousness. Nevertheless, there are a number of factors over and above these four which need to be taken into account when deciding on procedures and policy formulations.

As explained above, the region already contains arrangements and plans which point in the direction of building peacekeeping forces to serve security and peace in Southern Africa. These arrangements must be considered with a critical eye to ensure that they are used to the best advantage and to suggest improvements conducive to effective deployment capabilities. For this reason, I will now concentrate on some of the most vital requirements for effective implementation of these plans.

Policy

Currently there is no regional policy on peacekeeping in Southern Africa. It is therefore imperative that the SADC, in conjunction with ASAS and ISDSC, develop a regional policy on peacekeeping and on the provision of aid in the region and in Africa at large.

Finance

A very clear policy regarding the funding of peacekeeping operations in the region has to be formulated. In addition, before operations are carried out, UN/OAU funding must be finalized.
A Peacekeeping Force

Because of financial and policy constraints, a standing peacekeeping force is not even an option for the Southern African region. The future role that the SADC will play in defense and security in the Southern African region requires a clear policy regarding force levels, equipment and logistical support within the region. For any of the region's military forces to operate successfully inside the region, a joint and combined training program must exist, and a peacekeeping doctrine and procedures for the region must be formulated in the short term. It is suggested that the task and mission of a future operation be the fundamental factors in determining the composition, equipment, training and preparation of the force. Current standing forces in the region should be earmarked for peacekeeping operations and the provision of assistance and humanitarian aid.

Operational Requirements

Before combined peacekeeping or humanitarian aid and assistance operations can be conducted in the Southern African region, the following operational aspects will require finalization:

Operations

If regional mechanisms for peacekeeping activities include the grouping of a peacekeeping force drawn from regional forces, the following aspects must be mutually agreed upon by the SADC and ASAS:

- standardization of equipment for combined operations;
- common doctrine, procedures, tactics and drills for peacekeeping operations;
- command and control structures for combined operations;
- combined training exercises - types, frequency and venue;
- contingency plans with provision for adequate reserves to meet all foreseen and major military activities;
- co-ordination of military and security policies and doctrines;
- agreements on assistance in national disasters (e.g., floods, earthquakes, etc.) and the distribution of relief aid during those crises;
- agreements on technical assistance and technology transfers regarding clearing of landmines, etc; and
policy-development and negotiations designed to address serious regional security issues like drug trafficking and the illegal trade in arms.

**Intelligence**

Inter-governmental agreement should be reached regarding the development of the following intelligence systems:

- a system for the exchange of information and intelligence regarding military and criminal issues outside the region that are of importance to the security of the region;
- a system for the exchange of information and relevant intelligence on the security of member states; and
- a system for providing early warning of pending conflict situations.

**Medical**

Proper medical research and information-gathering within the region must:

- evaluate all epidemic and endemic diseases in the region and the appropriate prophylactic measures to be taken against them; and
- assess the amounts of medical personnel, equipment and supplies required to support peacekeeping and humanitarian aid operations in the region.

**Confidence-Building Measures and Skills Development**

In order to further sound relations between the forces earmarked for participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations in the region, as well as to develop the necessary skills to execute the operations, the following issues require agreement between the states of the region:

- the formulation of common doctrine and procedures covering the envisaged combined activities of the forces involved;
- co-ordinated combined training (i.e., field exercises and training institutions such as Peacekeeping Centers, Police Academies, etc.);
- joint training manoeuvres with friendly forces;
- the exchange of information and sharing of experiences on measures to re-integrate ex-combatants and war veterans into civilian life in post conflict situations;
- co-operation in other fields, for example, facilitating sports and visits among member states;
- the creation of a Military Academy for Southern Africa for the training of professional officers; and
- the clearing of landmines in countries emerging from recent violent conflict, and other technical and professional assistance.

**Logistics**

The following logistic aspects require co-ordination:

- standardization of the equipment of national forces for peacekeeping roles;
- establishment of a procurement and maintenance policies and procedures for common equipment; and
- identification of sites and the formulation of a policy for pre-positioning stores and equipment near possible areas of conflict in the region, to facilitate the rapid deployment of forces.

**Finance**

Timely consideration should be given to the means of financing regional co-operation projects. Should conflict within a SADC member state escalate to such a level that a peacekeeping force must be deployed, the costs will be enormous, and provision should be made for such an eventuality. A SADC budget will have to be drawn up for multilateral military co-operation and should include provision for:

- the cost of Combined HQ's (if applicable);
- travel and accommodation expenses for representatives to attend meetings in member countries;
- conference expenses;
- peace force operation costs; and
- regional disaster and crisis relief fund expenses.
Considerations Before Deployment

Before any regional force becomes involved in peacekeeping operations, or in providing military aid to other states in Southern Africa, the following factors should be considered:

**UN Sanction.** A UN resolution must have been passed in the Security Council.

**The role of the OAU and SADC.** The UNSC Resolution must have the support of the OAU and must be in the interest of the region.

**Ethnicity.** The risks involved in participating in operations where conflicts are fueled by ethnic division must be carefully weighed. Far too often in the past, operations were jeopardized by claims of partiality, indirect involvement and even direct support for one of the belligerent parties because the ethnic composition of the force was not properly considered.

**Administration and Infrastructure.** Before a decision is made to provide military support for peace initiatives in the region, troop-contributing countries must consider the state of the infrastructure, local government, law and order agencies, and existing legal system of the area concerned, as well the accountability of the belligerent parties. Often in the past, peacekeeping missions altered the aims of parties to conflicts in ways which inflated the parties' ambitions and made their appetites more difficult to satisfy. Humanitarian aid landed on the black market to enrich the powerful, and people became dependent on the "false economy" created by the force deployed in the region.

**Areas of Influence and Interest.** The effect of the deployment of military forces and the operation on countries in the area of influence and in the area of interest must be considered and discussed with the countries involved. The legacy of the UN operations in Mozambique and Angola, in terms of disarmament and the proliferation of light weapons, will linger for a very long time in the region. If proper consulting and planning had been conducted with the countries in the region before the start of these operations, the proliferation problem could have been contained before it started.
**Internal Factors.** Before any regional military forces are committed to, or accepted for, participation in peace operations in the region, the following internal factors should be considered:

- Are the forces trained for the job at hand, and do they have the ability to meet the operational needs of the operation?
- Do liaison channels exist within the regional or international peacekeeping structure? Does the force have the ability to maintain them?
- Has a command and control system been established, and are the forces' systems compatible with it?
- Does the force have the ability to execute combined operations in terms of:
  - telecommunications;
  - languages; and
  - standardization of equipment, technical and logistical support?
- Is a disengagement plan in place?
- Can the force be logistically supported from own resources? If not, what alternative arrangements are possible?
- Are finance channels open so that contingencies within the force do not become the problem of the mission commander or the organization initiating the operation?

**IV. Conclusion**

Only in a cooperative spirit and in an organized manner will the present violence, political instability, and increased light weapons proliferation be controlled and eventually reduced. The region has clearly indicated that it is ready to take charge of its own future. Now, it is a question of adding a physical dimension to that political will. Part of the solution to these problems lies in the creation of an effective combined peacekeeping force within the region. It is therefore important that the following should be considered by the SADC in its pursuit of its founding statement:

a) The concept of stand-by arrangements for peacekeeping and relief operations should be fully realized.
b) Countries in the region which can afford to help their less-fortunate neighbours, like South Africa and Zimbabwe, should endeavour to train and help these countries to enable them to respond quickly and effectively to conflict, and should offer logistical support through bilateral means.

c) All efforts should be made to direct programs and projects in the region towards collaborative peace. Socio-economic development will only take root when security and peace are established in the region.

d) Those that have common borders with conflict areas should be motivated and actively helped in a collaborative regional manner to resist or prevent arms sales or shipments throughout their territories. The entire region will eventually pay for allowing this problem to get out of hand.

e) Regional peace seminars and workshops should be held frequently to discuss ways and means for addressing the security and crime problems of the region which threaten the fragile co-existence of member states.

f) Regional Armed Forces, Police Forces and Customs Officials should actively become involved in collaborative training and preparation programs, to ensure that they are ready to act cooperatively to address security crises as they arise.

Whatever the difficulties on the road ahead, the SADC remains the only mechanism of the region to finally create the secure environment needed in order for stability and development to take root. Peace and security are essential for regional economic and social development, and all possible steps must therefore be taken to support the SADC’s efforts to ensure peace and security in the region. The individual levels of preparedness of regional governments to contribute troops and equipment to peacekeeping and relief operations are crucial milestones on the road towards collaborative peace and security. What is required is the maximum collaboration of all SADC member states in contributing their quota of human and material resources. In the final analysis, the success of peacekeeping and relief operations, irrespective of the level of preparedness, depends on the political will of all Southern African Governments to ensure that when a crisis erupts, time is not wasted in taking steps that could have been taken in advance. Time that is wasted translates, at best, into despair, and, at worst, into loss of human lives. Southern Africa cannot afford to pay the price of lost time.