Meeting Summary

Examining the Roles, Responsibilities and Potential Contributions of Private Sector Industry Actors in Stemming the Flow of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Related Materials

Informal Private Sector Consultative Meeting
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Acronyms

B2B  business-to-business
CCW  Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects
COC  code of conduct
EUD  end-user documentation
IED  improvised explosive device
1. Background

In 2015, the United Nations General Assembly First Committee resolution 70/46 “Recognized that the wide spectrum of materials that can be used for the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, including those sourced from the military and civilian industry, contributes to their diverse nature and their deployment methods, which thus requires an appropriate approach to the formulation of measures to counter them”.¹ This acknowledgment was the product of several recent United Nations activities and has since provided a strong foundation for increased multilateral dialogue and action in efforts to address the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs).

In this same resolution, the General Assembly asked the Secretary-General of the United Nations to produce a report on IEDs and specifically to provide the “initial building blocks and recommendations for ways forward”.² The resultant report A/71/187, released in 2016,³ presented a large constellation of present and potential governmental and non-governmental efforts to address the increased proliferation of IEDs. Building on UNIDIR’s work in this domain,⁴ the report notes that an effective way forward in stemming the proliferation of IEDs is a “whole-of-government approach” coupled with a similarly inclusive and multifaceted approach at the international level.⁵

United Nations General Assembly resolution 71/72 on IEDs reiterates many key observations made in resolution 70/46, including the remark on the ‘wide spectrum of materials’ used to produce these weapons. Importantly, however, 71/72 drives dialogue forward and proposes multiple key activities; operative paragraph 2 is most relevant for this report. The General Assembly:

Recognizes that existing approaches in multilateral arms regulation, while valuable, do not fully address the issue of improvised explosive devices, and therefore strongly urges States to develop and implement, where appropriate, all national measures, including outreach and partnerships with relevant actors, including the private sector, necessary to promote awareness and vigilance among their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and firms incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the production, sale, supply, purchase, transfer and/or storage of precursor components and materials that could be used to make improvised explosive devices … .

¹ See General Assembly 70/46 on “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices”, adopted on 11 December 2015.
² See para. 16, General Assembly 70/46, “Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive Devices”, adopted on 11 December 2015.
Indeed, the role of private sector actors becomes highly relevant as IED components are often obtained from commercial sources. These materials can be, among others, explosive substances, detonators, and dual-use chemical precursors such as ammonium nitrate, nitric acid, or potassium chlorate. Through the observation made in resolution 71/72, the international community recognized the value of engaging relevant private sector stakeholders and exploring their roles and responsibilities in, and potential contributions to, curbing the proliferation of IEDs. Similarly, the first recommendation of the Secretary-General’s 2016 report calls for “Rigorous government scrutiny of commercial sectors from which IED components are sourced” and robust regulatory frameworks for commercial actors.6

As Governments around the world pursue solutions to this issue, idiosyncrasies vis-à-vis the IED threat reinforce a growing consensus that substantial engagement with relevant private sector actors is crucial if the international community is to pursue the inclusive and holistic approach urged by the General Assembly and the Secretary-General.

To this end, in 2016 UNIDIR began a project entitled “Examining the Roles, Responsibilities and Potential Contributions of Private Sector Industry Actors in Stemming the Flow of Improvised Explosive Devices and Related Materials”. This project sought to build on areas of common understanding and to clarify areas where there is a lack of consensus in order to identify challenges, opportunities, and ways forward for private sector engagement in stemming the proliferation of IEDs. From 6–7 March 2017, UNIDIR convened a small, closed-door group of industry representatives from a diverse set of industries and global regions. Present at this meeting were representatives from the following industries/sectors:

- chemical manufacturers;
- agrochemical/fertilizer manufacturers;
- national chemical business/manufacturer associations;
- international chemical business/manufacturer associations;
- semiconductor/microchip manufacturers;
- mining/resource extraction corporations;
- commercial explosive manufacturers;
- commercial explosive institutes;
- commercial explosive importers/distributors; and
- international organizations.

The following is a summary of this meeting’s proceedings and findings.

As a note, the terms industry and private sector are used interchangeably throughout this document.

2. Introduction

The threat posed by the proliferation of IEDs is a serious global problem which hinders the sustainable development of communities around the world, as well as the security, safety,
and stability of humanitarian and peace operations. IEDs themselves represent a wide set of harmful weapons which fall outside of traditional arms control mechanisms. They are neither systemically produced by a single manufacturer nor exported by a single country. Rather, they are diverse in their components, explosive charges, containers, means of detonation, and methods of delivery. Therefore, stemming their proliferation is a particularly challenging task for the international community.

The impacts of this vaguely defined set of weapons are severe. The Secretary-General’s 2016 report provides some sobering facts:

- Around the world, IED attacks “occur ... on a scale of hundreds per month”.7
- One review of international news reports from 2011–2015 documented “6,300 recorded IED explosions, resulting in over 105,000 casualties.”8
- The frequency of IED explosions is increasing around the world due, in part, to knowledge-sharing through information and communication technologies.9
- In 2015, “suicide attacks involving IEDs occurred in over 10 per cent of Member States, a greater proportion than ever before.”10
- In the same year, there were “38 direct attacks against United Nations personnel and peacekeepers [deployed around the world], resulting in fatalities, injuries and damage to property”.11
- In addition to the detrimental direct impacts of IED attacks, the indirect impacts are equally as important to highlight. The report noted that in situations of “recurrent IED attacks”, an “environment of sustained insecurity” is created “which saps the morale of security forces, hinders recruitment and impedes security sector reform.”12

The report is the result of years of multilateral work to draw attention to the IEDs issue. The report and resolution 71/72 reflect a growing understanding regarding the urgent need to address IEDs in a holistic and comprehensive manner. Moreover, both documents acknowledge that given the unique problem space of IEDs, particularly their non-traditional means of production, engaging non-governmental private sector stakeholders is essential to make meaningful progress.

Indeed, the IED threat is a multifaceted challenge in which States and the United Nations have a common interest in seeking effective, coordinated, and collaborative responses. A truly international response requires the attention and commitment of a variety of stakeholders, including Governments and militaries; humanitarian, operational, and other specialized agencies; industry and private sector actors; and research organizations and advocacy groups.

As mentioned, the role of the private sector is highly relevant as IED components and related materials are often obtained from commercial sources. The UNIDIR meeting of 6–7 March

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8 Ibid.
9 Ibid., p. 4.
10 Ibid., p. 3.
11 Ibid., p. 6.
12 Ibid., p. 5.
2017 sought to create a space for industry actors to openly exchange views and experiences with each other, and to explore options and avenues to address the threat posed by IEDs. The meeting was divided into five substantive areas for discussion:

1. examining the roles and responsibilities of industry actors;
2. regulatory frameworks in place;\(^{13}\)
3. physical security considerations;
4. information-sharing processes; and
5. awareness-raising and sensitization activities.

2.1. Introductory Comments by Participants

After a general introduction to the project by UNIDIR, participants provided some remarks before moving into the first substantive session. Private sector actors have found that while there are identifiable patterns in the diversion of commercial goods into IED supply chains, there are also regional and local specificities that should be considered when tackling the proliferation of these weapons. Many remarked that when it comes to the five components common to most modern IEDs (power source, switch, initiator, main charge, container), each follows a specific production and supply dynamic which varies from region-to-region. This raises regulatory challenges as some components are more easily and reasonably regulated than others. Similarly, participants noted that there are important differences between sectors affected by the diversion of commercial goods into IED supply chains. Within each industry sector there are different regulatory, trade, and business-related dynamics which means that efforts and the ability to tackle diversion at the sector level will vary. Moving forward, it would be valuable to consider these specificities when discussing and designing efforts to stem the diversion of commercial goods into IED supply chains.

3. Session: Roles and Responsibilities

In recent years, the international community has increasingly acknowledged that the private sector is a key stakeholder in efforts to limit the proliferation of IEDs, their precursors, and related materials. While there have been commendable efforts, particularly within the United Nations, to increase coordination, information-sharing, and overall engagement between the private sector and other stakeholders such as States and international organizations, there remains a lack of clarity regarding the appropriate roles and responsibilities of the private sector in these multilateral efforts. Therefore, as part of this meeting, UNIDIR devoted the first substantive session to exploring the roles and responsibilities of the private sector representatives in attendance. This session allowed for participants to expand on their work with States, international organizations, and other stakeholders, as well as share their perspectives on the matter.

Responsibility in a complex supply chain. Regardless of sector, a majority of participants agreed that the diversion of materials becomes more prevalent downstream in the supply chain at the distributor, wholesaler, and retailer levels. This is attributed to the fact that

\(^{13}\) This area covered law and non-law based regulatory frameworks, as well as regulation by a national authority and self-regulation within an industry or company.
responsibility for tracking or monitoring products sold by one company becomes challenging as the product changes hands, crosses borders, and moves through sectors down the supply chain. Many companies’ supply chains are pyramid-shaped, where the manufacturer of a specific item sells to a distributor, which then distributes to multiple sub-distributors, each of which distribute to multiple other actors, such as distributors, manufacturers or retailers (see figure 1). As distribution down the supply chain continues, the number of actors involved increases exponentially and the responsibilities of each involved actor becomes less clear.

**Figure 1.** Simplified Diagram of a Hypothetical Supply Chain with Three Business-to-Business Customers

As multiple sectors were present at this meeting, participants noted idiosyncrasies in their respective supply chains. For many companies in the commercial explosives industry, for example, their clients are other producers (their transactions are “business-to-business”, or B2B), meaning they do not engage with retailers, resellers, or distributors. Conversely, for the chemical industry, there often is a complex, pyramid-like supply chain which results in limited downstream visibility. To address this challenge, some chemical companies have sought to drill one step deeper into their supply chains, instigate good practices to limit diversion, and support compliance with relevant regulatory frameworks. However, such efforts appear to be initiatives from individual companies and not necessarily industry-wide practices. This suggests that perceived responsibility for preventing the diversion of products varies from company-to-company.

There is also variation in the ability to trace or monitor products once sold. For chemical and commercial explosives distributors, one of the main issues they face is that it is extremely challenging to control or monitor the use of their goods once sold to other companies down the supply chain. For example, it is difficult for a commercial explosives distributor to know whether their product, once sold, was used for authorized, legitimate and intended
purposes. Furthermore, it may not be feasible or appropriate for the distributor to have access to that information. This raises important questions on the limits of traceability and accountability when it came to many of the items used as IED precursors.

**Commendable efforts of industry.** In this context, industry-led initiatives represent activities proactively undertaken by private sector actors to prevent diversion and theft. Examining these activities helps to shed light on how various industries/companies view their respective roles and responsibilities in preventing the diversion of their products for unintended uses by unauthorized end-users. The following provides an indication of the participants’ (and their companies’) perceived roles in securing their products and, either directly or indirectly, in limiting the proliferation of IED precursors and related materials.

Some industries have independently developed codes of conduct (COCs) or good practices for the appropriate distribution and safe and secure handling of their products, participated in reporting activities for suspicious transactions and thefts, and/or employed a third party to verify the authenticity of potential customers and their requests.

Representatives of the chemical industry explained that the diversion of goods into IED supply chains had long been a topic for discussion within their industry. Many chemical industry representatives present had either participated in or provided forums for knowledge exchange, marketing, and awareness-raising relevant to chemical security. Representatives specifically mentioned providing training in chemical management inventory systems and focusing on audit control. Indeed, the participants from the chemical industry perceive that progress was being made in terms of awareness-raising. Notably, in recent years the International Council of Chemical Associations’ Responsible Care programme added security considerations in its assessment methodology. This was in part a reaction after the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States of America. The Council took the initiative to enhance chemical security against terrorism by creating a Responsible Care Security Code that is now recognized as a model security programme for chemical facilities around the world. There is also a European Responsible Care Security Code, the United Kingdom Chemical Business Association Security Code (mandatory for all Chemical Business Association members), and Fertilizers Europe’s Product Stewardship Program for Modern Fertilizer Production and Use.

Speaking from a chemical industry perspective, one representative saw the industry’s responsibilities as three-fold: prevention, detection, and response (non-law enforcement focused). However, this representative also echoed the general understanding that the risk of diversion for IED precursors is not likely to be at the manufacturing or consumer end, but rather in between at the distributor and retailer levels. There, the quantities and

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14 For more information, see [https://www.icca-chem.org/responsible-care/](https://www.icca-chem.org/responsible-care/).
15 For more information, see [https://responsiblecare.americanchemistry.com/ResponsibleCare/Responsible-Care-Program-Elements/Responsible-Care-Security-Code/](https://responsiblecare.americanchemistry.com/ResponsibleCare/Responsible-Care-Program-Elements/Responsible-Care-Security-Code/).
17 Not publicly available.
18 For more information, see [http://www.productstewardship.eu/](http://www.productstewardship.eu/).
concentration of precursors are ideal for diversion. The number of vulnerable points for diversion grows exponentially the farther one goes down the supply chain, specifically between distributors and retailers. To this representative, engaging distributors in efforts to prevent diversion is critical. It was evident that members of the chemical industry see distributors as a force multiplier in terms of detecting and preventing diversion.

Participants from the chemical industry further explained several good practices within their industry, such as pre-contract inspections, which include verifications about safety and respect for relevant regulations, and comprehensive product stewardship programmes. Some participants remarked that their product stewardship programmes included security components with audit looping which help to identify vulnerabilities in their supply chain. These security components are used as a tool for a company’s security risk assessments within a pragmatic, sustainable context. However, participants frankly acknowledged that there were limits to what these good practices could accomplish. Past the first point of sale in their supply chain, many agreed it was not feasible to offer guarantees that a given product would not be diverted. In other words, a chemical producer’s capacity to prevent diversion decreases exponentially, even with the implementation of good practices, as a precursor moves down the supply chain. Though these interventions came from the chemical industry, it held true for many other industry representatives present at the meeting.

To mitigate the increased risk of diversion as an item moves down the supply chain, participants affirmed the importance of awareness-raising. According to several representatives, awareness was needed both within the supply chain—even for those engaged exclusively in B2B transactions—and within the respective Governments and regulatory authorities. Many industries/companies felt as if they were deemed responsible by their Governments to ensure goods were not diverted while at the same time Governments were not divulging specific (or, at times, even general) information about possible threats or points of diversion. Moreover, industry participants reminded others that security was just one of the issues they must focus on; not only must private sector companies invest and profit in a competitive business environment, but many Governments have also placed a substantial security-related burden on these companies. Many felt that some Governments had implicitly assumed that securing a given supply chain should be financed by the relevant industry. A clearer and more equitable split in responsibilities among industry, Government, and other stakeholders would be desirable and likely more beneficial for all, according to participants.

Industry-related challenges. Participants from the commercial explosives industry felt that one of the main challenges is not the need for additional safety and security regulation, but rather that there should be more awareness of extant regulations, specifically among law enforcement. According to participants, there should also be increased awareness within the industry regarding the threat of diversion into the IED supply chain. This touched on the responsibility of States to inform specific actors and industries of current diversion risks, as well as local and regional specificities which have been identified.

There were also valuable contributions from representatives of the semiconductor industry. This industry faces a completely different set of challenges separate from the diversion discussion. Some radio-controlled IEDs function with semiconductor components. However,
field investigations in several IED-contaminated zones have found that many of the branded semiconductors used are counterfeit. Referring to the specific model of one semiconductor found in an IED during a recent field investigation, an industry representative explained that 30,000,000 legitimate models were produced on a daily basis. These were sold around the world, many via the Internet, to electronic manufacturers, distributors, and retailers. For this industry, determining its role and responsibility in stemming the proliferation of IEDs is a unique challenge. Monitoring their product throughout the entire supply chain would be very challenging given the large quantity of legitimate products produced. Yet the main area of concern for this industry is counterfeit products, not legitimate ones. This raises a challenging question: when a counterfeit product is used in an IED, what, if any, is the responsibility of the manufacturer of the legitimate product? This intervention from the semiconductor industry illustrates the industry-specific challenges which exist when attempting to holistically address the challenge of IEDs proliferation.

Despite the diversity and uniqueness of each industry’s—and in some cases each company’s—challenges when it came to preventing the diversion of materials into the IED supply chain, all companies constantly face the potential for reputational damage if their brand or products are, in some way, linked to an IED. This can result in unwelcome publicity, a loss of business and shareholder confidence, and negative media attention. There could also be legal repercussions, such as fines, prison sentences, travel restrictions, or business limitations. For some participants, a desire to protect the reputation of their company/industry incentivized activities which can be considered efforts to limit the proliferation of IEDs, their precursors, and related materials.

4. Session: Regulatory Frameworks

As a starting point, it is important to note that few States have IED-specific regulation. Moreover, as this meeting convened multiple sectors and industries, there were various relevant regulatory frameworks that were addressed, many of which only affect a specific sector. The following paragraphs provide a series of high-level observations under the broad discussion of regulatory frameworks which are relevant for the industries present and for tackling the IED threat. This discussion covered both law- and non-law-based regulatory frameworks, as well as regulation by a national authority and self-regulation within an industry or company. It is important to note that the challenges these representatives face do not diminish their respect and appreciation for regulation as a necessity; rather, these challenges point to areas which may require further dialogue in order to increase the regulations’ intended impact.

Many of the discussions from this session centred on the challenge of balancing sustainability, economic growth, and security. In many contexts, total bans on products vulnerable to diversion were a common regulatory response. However, in some cases, non-state actors determined to obtain these banned products have shown a troubling ability to adapt by using other available products. Therefore, for many participants, focusing regulatory approaches on one product was not as effective as a more holistic approach.

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19 Some semiconductor manufacturers do not sell their products directly online but rather to distributors and retailers, some of which sell products online.
Participants acknowledged that it may be virtually impossible to completely prevent the diversion of materials into the IED supply chain. Nevertheless, they suggested that it is important to improve overall security standards and to support reasonable measures which are shaped to local specificities and vulnerabilities.

**International regulation.** At the international level, the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW) is currently the only existing instrument of international humanitarian law which mentions IEDs.\(^{20}\) The CCW is legally binding and thus gives an important legal dimension to this regulatory discussion. However, membership is not universal. Furthermore, the CCW only applies to situations of armed conflict, while IEDs are not always used in contexts which neatly fall within the definition of armed conflict. Thus, for a discussion on preventing the proliferation of IEDs in diverse settings around the world, including those not afflicted by armed conflict as defined by international humanitarian law, the CCW provides only one piece to the puzzle, although a valuable one.

**National regulation.** At the national level, designing and implementing regulations which, even tangentially, attempt to address the IED challenge is a substantial task. As well, following and adhering to regulations can be burdensome. As many participants remarked, following the multiple control lists of relevant actors and Governments can be challenging for companies. Participants also underlined that regional and national differences in relevant regulations are a substantial consideration for companies conducting business internationally. In some cases, regulations exist on paper yet are obsolete in practice; in other cases, regulations do not exist. In addition to this, companies at times find it challenging to adjust to the cultural differences in approaches to regulation. For some participants, there were many ways to approach the relationship between the regulator and the regulated, with some regulators being more collaborative and constructive, and others being less so.

**End-user regulation.** Some national regulation requires the use of end-user documentation (EUD), while others make no specific mention of them. In some cases, exporting companies may request and obtain EUD from their customers abroad. However, as there is no harmonized EUD format in place around the world or within a given industry, it can be challenging for some actors to provide all that is required by the different EUDs in existence. Participants remarked that companies often become used to the markets they serve, and there is generally a good working relationship between suppliers and customers across borders. However, progress in this regard may be challenging as representatives did not seem to agree on the need for harmonization or some sort of standardization in this regard. Some thought it would help, while others thought it could create unintended complications.

Participants underlined the fact that the use and usefulness of EUD varies from sector to sector. For representatives of the commercial explosives industry, for example, the end user is almost implicit as sales are only made to companies which already have a licence to buy and use their products. Conversely, members of the chemical industry rarely sell to the

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actual end user of their product, but rather to another manufacturer, distributor, or retailer. In these latter cases, if there is EUD, it does not always designate the actual end-user.

Representatives from the chemical industry discussed the possibility of having EUD which documents a product’s path through the entire supply chain, from the seller to end user. However, some felt that transactions are already typically well documented from the manufacturer to the distributor or wholesaler, which is, in many ways, considered the end user. In practice, the transaction from the retailer to the final customer is less well documented.

**Public–private partnerships.** In terms of collaboration between public and private actors, industry representatives suggested that further trust and consistent engagement between the regulator and the regulated could be built. Industry representatives feel that they possess a substantial amount of expertise and knowledge about their respective sectors and how they function. They believe that this know-how could be used for or integrated into existing regulatory frameworks and governmental processes to produce more effective regulation. Many participants pointed to the successes of industry-led initiatives (see above, Roles and Responsibilities), such as COCs, guidance documents, and product stewardship programmes, as powerful examples of the contributions which industry could make to any regulatory discussion.

In addition to exploring the prospects for public–private partnerships, participants also discussed good practices for self-regulation. Some representatives from the chemical industry, for instance, ask their customers to complete in writing a checklist of regulatory and best practice compliance activities. They then ask the “ship-to destination” actor to validate the same compliance list. This represents one self-regulatory activity which intends to drill one step deeper into the supply chain. Moving forward, this practice could potentially be replicated elsewhere as appropriate.

**Balance between safety and security.** Representatives of the commercial explosives industry explained that their sector-specific regulation has traditionally focused on safety, and that only more recently has security been integrated. For many at the meeting, safety and security could not be separated. This was particularly relevant in one of the most vulnerable areas for the commercial explosive sector—transportation. Here, safety and security are tightly interlinked. However, this tight interlinkage is not necessarily a common understanding among all representatives. One valuable observation made by a participant from the chemical industry highlighted a tension between safety and security considerations when it comes to regulation. For example, if one were to think of regulations for a chemical storage depot from a safety perspective, the goal would be to provide as much information about the depot’s contents as possible including chemicals present, their quantities, toxicity levels, and so forth. However, if one were to approach the same regulatory example from a security perspective, disclosing this much information about the depot’s contents may increase the potential of theft. This contrasted heavily with other representatives’ perspective on the safety and security link, and certainly merits further discussion.

**Law-based regulation as part of the solution.** Throughout this session, participants discussed a broad range of activities which have sought to support or, at times, go beyond what law-based regulation seeks to accomplish. It became evident that a comprehensive approach to regulating and limiting the proliferation of IEDs would include several activities
that complement law-based regulation, such as COCs, codes of ethics signed with customers, and risk assessment procedures and practices. Participants explained that many voluntary, industry-led initiatives have been rapidly implemented and effective. In some cases, these initiatives were enacted before governmental or regional regulation addressed the issue. The key takeaway for participants here was that any regulation-oriented activity should be pragmatic, proportionate to the current threat level, and economically sustainable. One of the best ways to ensure that is to keep law-based regulation as part of a holistic strategy.

The limits of extant regulation. While participants acknowledged the value of regulation in addressing the IED threat, many noted that there are limits. Participants explained cases in which regulations are contradictory or have substantial gaps. For instance, in terms of reporting suspicious transactions, participants mentioned that competition law in some States hinders reporting activities. In these cases, competition law stipulates that competitors are not allowed to discuss sales records with those defined as business competitors. This may limit one’s ability to identify customers as “suspicious” since companies within a given industry are not allowed to pool or consolidate sales data.

Moreover, some participants feel that the focus of some extant regulation is not reflective of the problematic areas in the supply chain. Representatives of the chemical industry mentioned that most diversion happens between lower level distributors, retailers, and end-users. Therefore, should more stringent regulation be advisable, it may be most effective at that level.

Moving forward. Participants proposed several next steps for regulatory frameworks and processes to address the IED threat. Some participants believe that a body which oversees regulatory harmonization would be a welcome development. One participant stated that there should be a way for end users to demonstrate intended uses, and a national body which compiles, consolidates, and oversees this type of information. Some suggested that the United Nations could act as an overseeing regulatory body; however, participants insisted that any regulator should first look at how the industries themselves have tackled their respective vulnerabilities/issues and supported good practices down the supply chain. Specifically, representatives from the commercial explosives industry stated there is a need for a global, harmonized framework for the transport of commercial explosives, particularly in terms of labelling goods being transported. In this regard, participants believe that the current European Union traceability directive is a useful template for others to consider.21

However, for many participants, regulatory harmonization would in some cases not be useful. Due to the idiosyncrasies of each regulatory environment, in addition to varying IED

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21 The United Nations “Report of the Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods and on the Globally Harmonized System of Classification and Labelling of Chemicals on its eighth session” (9 December 2016) notes that, “In addition to the security provisions of these Regulations, competent authorities may implement further security provisions for reasons other than safety of dangerous goods during transport. In order to not impede international and multimodal transport by different explosives security markings, it is recommended that such markings be formatted consistent with an internationally harmonized standard (e.g. European Union Commission Directive 2008/43/EC).” For more information, see http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/trans/doc/2017/dgac10/ST-SG-AC10-44-Add1e.docx.
diversion threat levels, certain measures may only be applicable in certain contexts/cases. For some, harmonization could also dilute or confuse responsibilities among actors and make processes and procedures less effective. It was evident that further discussion is needed vis-à-vis regulatory harmonization.

At the national level, some participants mentioned that in their respective States there are few, if any, governmental inspectors to monitor the sale and use of certain products useful to the production of IEDs. These participants suggested that a regulatory body could be created at the national level to license and track items once they are imported into the State and until they are used. Importantly, however, there was no consensus among participants regarding the establishment of any new regulatory or oversight body. Indeed, many participants see the most beneficial solutions coming from outside the law-based regulatory space.

5. Session: Physical Security Considerations

Physical security considerations relate to the security of items at any given stage in the supply chain, from production, storage, transport, to eventual use. This session was targeted at specific participants such as commercial explosive manufacturers and importers, chemical manufacturers and importers, agrochemical manufacturers and importers, and mining/resource extraction corporations. However, it became evident that physical security as a concept had lessons for all industries present. The following provides some of the key observations.

**Industry-specific realities.** As was the case in many of the sessions in this meeting, industry-specific realities were a central topic of discussion. For example, representatives of the chemical industry agreed that theft in their industry does not often happen because people typically fear for their own safety when handling raw chemicals. Moreover, for nefarious purposes it is generally easier to buy other goods and extract the chemicals necessary, as opposed to obtaining them in their pure form. When thefts do take place, however, it is difficult to conclusively determine that the stolen chemicals will be used to make IEDs.

For representatives of the agrochemical industry, there are unique packaging issues. In some cases, items packaged by the agrochemical producer are repackaged and redistributed at one point in the supply chain. For example, large containers of materials are put into smaller, unmarked (or differently marked) containers for further distribution. This conceivably makes it more difficult to physically secure goods after a certain point in the supply chain.

For some industries in some States, there are legislative compliance structures in place for the secure storage of products. Some participants’ companies have developed a checklist which is used before concluding a contract with customers (B2B or otherwise). This checklist is also used for post-contract follow-ups. Other companies physically meet with customers and verify their relevant compliance obligations which, they explained, is beneficial for all parties involved. For these actors, safety and security components are part and parcel of any contract and, along with feedback reviews, represent integral parts of their paperwork. These “know-your-customer” examples are useful and cooperative ways for assuring security in as much of the supply chain as possible.
Inventory and record-keeping management. Some participants see inventory and record-keeping management as an issue linked to physical security considerations, depending on the nature of the commodity. In terms of transport-related diversion, participants explained that truck transport presents the highest risk. As an example of a good practice, some companies request that buyers confirm in writing within 24 hours that they have received the complete shipment of goods. This requires customers to confirm they have received and weighed the goods. For many actors, this is a common delivery confirmation which is an industry standard for bulk shipments in many States and regions.

Good practices. As a good practice, some participants have third parties test the physical and cyber security of their premises in order to identify vulnerabilities. Chemical industry representatives mentioned mystery shopping activities in which a third party tests whether a controlled substance can be bought without the proper documentation or without the seller going through the required procedures. The results from these mystery shopping activities are then reported to the entities involved for improvements to be made. One representative from the commercial explosives industry explained that some companies participate in data shopping exercises in which a third party tries to mine for company and industry data, such as transport schedules. This participant explained that the results from these exercises provide valuable feedback—threat levels are adapted in response, and the results are anonymized and subsequently shared among members of industry associations. Though spanning multiple industries, these good practices are useful for participants to reflect on their own industry/company’s activities and brainstorm possible improvements.

6. Session: Information-Sharing Processes

It was widely recognized among participants that information-sharing is one of the most critical components of addressing the IED threat. To be effective in mitigating the diversion of goods into IED supply chains, one needs first to understand how these goods are being used to produce IEDs, how they are being diverted, and where diversion happens.

Information-sharing among States at multilateral forums. In terms of information-shared among Governments, the CCW has integrated mechanisms related to the fight against IED proliferation, such as systematic information exchange on the evolution of the threat, information on doctrines and counter-IED frameworks, and cooperation and assistance programmes. The information shared includes technical elements, types of devices, components, suffering caused, and impacts on communities. This enables the CCW to put out best practices on how to mitigate diversion, and set up risk education campaigns.

Prospects for information-sharing between industry and States. Participants largely agreed that effective public–private partnerships are a force multiplier in efforts to address the IED threat. Within this however there are several realities which participants highlighted. Many

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22 Some industry/business associations provide information on current threat levels to members. According to meeting participants, these threat levels are not specific to the IED threat but rather address a wide range of security-related issues.

23 See section 8 below for more information on good practices.

24 This section does not address law enforcement or military-related information-sharing between Governments or other actors.
noted that Governments tend to consult industry sporadically on specific cases and otherwise do not maintain regular contact. Moreover, much of the relationship between industry and States is complicated, according to some participants, by a lack of trust between the regulator and the regulated—even in cases where industry representatives are granted relevant security clearances.

Additionally, when industry actors report or provide information as requested by a given Government/regulatory body, they often do not hear back on how that information did or did not contribute to the investigation or activities. Using the reporting of suspicious transactions as an illustrative example, representatives explained that if a prospective buyer failed to answer several key questions regarding the proposed sale, the company would report the transaction to a relevant authority as suspicious. This authority may be a national focal point within an industry association, a law enforcement entity, or other competent authority, depending on the context. Participants explained that they are rarely informed if information reported is acted upon or found useful by the relevant national authorities. Participants appeared open to receiving feedback once a specific investigation or activity was concluded, which may assuage governmental confidentiality concerns. By and large, however, limited or non-existent feedback does not support the notion of a public–private partnership. For many, it represents more of a one-way information flow from industry to Government. Industry representatives suggested that, if provided with more information (without violating confidentiality requirements) related to what is being diverted, how, where, and for what purpose, they may be able to devote their own resources to monitoring the situation or supporting Government(s) in relevant efforts.

Participants also touched on the desired types and forums for future public–private partnerships. Some see the need for a more technical dialogue between the private sector and relevant government agencies. This, according to some, would allow for a better flow of information between subject matter experts. It would also help deepen partnerships between relevant actors which may enhance prospects for longer term engagement. Some see value in establishing information-sharing mechanisms in security-focused forums which would meet, at minimum, on an annual basis. Such forums would allow for consistent engagement between the regulator and the regulated. Moving forward, it would be highly useful to have a relationship that went beyond a law enforcement focus, which many participants see as the current dominant paradigm.

Several participants noted positive developments vis-à-vis public–private engagement and partnerships. Some have observed a growing trend among national authorities in search of advice to approach members of industry and request classified meetings. This is a welcome development according to meeting participants as it facilitates greater and more meaningful sharing of information.

7. Session: Awareness-Raising and Sensitization Activities

Similar to information-sharing, awareness-raising is an activity crucial to tackling the proliferation of IEDs, their precursors and related materials. Reiterating an important theme at this event, participants explained that they would find it very challenging to have
complete oversight over their full supply chain. For this reason, awareness-raising at every level in the supply chain is critical.

While awareness-raising is seen as a very important activity, there are practical challenges worthy of mention. Representatives of the chemical industry affirmed the importance of raising awareness down their supply chain. In their experience, wholesalers, formulators, and retailers are often unaware of how certain goods could be diverted. These participants emphasized the importance of engaging the lower levels of their complex supply chains; it is there that most diversion cases have been observed. While this is an important call from the chemical industry, actually reaching out to these lower levels is quite a challenge in practice as there are often few associations for retailers, wholesalers, and formulators engaged in IED-related discussions. This poses a challenge for chemical manufacturers and those distributors which are keen to raise awareness down the supply chain.

Moreover, many participants from this industry feel that there is a perception issue down the supply chain. Consider the following example: A certain chemical is deemed useful in the production of IEDs (chemical A). When chemical A is brought to a factory, it may be used or mixed with other materials to produce a new product, for example cosmetics, nail polish remover, or leather tanner. While the levels of chemical A remain high enough to be considered valuable to the production of IEDs, many actors no longer perceive this new product as one which merits security measures required of chemical A in its original form. Retailers of these items and others are often unaware of their potential value for the IED supply chain, or they believe the quantities of dangerous goods in which they deal are too small to be problematic. However, according to participants at this meeting, these are erroneous assumptions made by retailers and others lower in the supply chain.

This discussion touched on the complexity of the supply chains in which many of these industries operate, and the challenge of engaging all actors in regulatory (law-based or otherwise) processes. For example, in some regions the fertilizer industry reaches out to actors downstream in the supply chain and has developed guidance documents for the safe and secure handling of fertilizers, including awareness-raising on the risks of fertilizers being used for the production of homemade explosives. These guidelines also cover good practice advice for farmers. However, reaching out to farmers might be a substantial challenge, especially when one considers that in the certain areas there are many part-time farmers. This invariably complicates activities meant to raise awareness throughout the entire fertilizer supply chain, including the end users.

8. Good Practices Identified by Participants

The following are several good practices which participants are either currently undertaking or proposed during the meeting. It is important to note that not all of the practices listed below apply to every industry present at this meeting, nor was there a validation session for these practices (not all participants agreed on the utility of each practice below). The following represents a set of useful ideas which industry actors can consider tailoring to their specific context:
- Develop COCs. In line with the ethos of know-your-customer activities, some companies/industries have developed COCs which clients and business partners are required to sign. These COCs can range from ethical practices to due diligence and compliance activities.

- Focus on transport and distribution components of the supply chain. Some companies/industries have organized awareness-raising workshops targeted at the transportation and distribution components of their supply chain. Many workshops have covered both security and safety aspects of transport and distribution, and are often organized in partnership with regional chambers of commerce.

- Embed security components in professional trainings. Some companies/industries embed security and management components in their professional trainings and certifications (e.g. for professional chemists). Many participants feel that this practice could be replicated across sectors.

- Establish focal points. Participants discussed the possibility of establishing focal points along a given good’s supply chain which could be used to communicate and disseminate relevant information, as needed. Focal points could also be established with relevant Governments, as needed.

- Produce and distribute informative materials. Industry representatives see value in creating and distributing information leaflets to actors in their supply chain. These could be revised regularly or as needed. They could be made for a product’s real end users (e.g. for the fertilizer industry, these are farmers). The materials could provide information on flagging suspicious transactions, for example.

- Further integrate security elements into product stewardship training. When training new employees or updating product stewardship credentials, participants suggested including security elements into the curriculum.

- Update internal company procedures to reflect the challenges that the company/industry/region faces. This is particularly relevant for companies operating internationally. As well, some participants see value in updating internal procedures to include pre- and post-delivery verification.

- Develop vetting procedures for clients. Many participants see value in establishing formal vetting procedures for clients/customers.

- Create a security matrix for use in Responsible Care or other product stewardship programmes. Participants suggested that this matrix could be used for assessing specific situations and developing corrective measures and improvements. Some noted that a security matrix is not a mandatory part of their product stewardship programme and felt that there could be added value in making it mandatory.

- Seek third-party certification in product stewardship activities via audits. This could include an audit loop or cycle which would allow for continuous improvement. Many participants had experience with audit systems, some mandatory and some voluntary. In cases where an audit system was put in place for certification purposes, a relatively high result is required to proceed with business. This included independent checks on a regular basis. In other cases, where an audit system is
voluntary, there are options for obtaining certification. For example, if a company wants to be certified, then an audit is conducted. For many participants, these third-party certifications often increased the commitment of companies to corporate governance and responsible activities.

- **Join a relevant industry trade association.** Having frequent and consistent engagement with other actors in one’s respective industry can be a critical part of successful information-sharing, awareness-raising, and other relevant activities. A trade association can also be a positive forum for discussing new product stewardship initiatives.

### 9. Concluding Observations

The following is a series of observations that all stakeholders may wish to consider when designing and implementing future interventions and activities in IED threat mitigation.

1. **There is substantial variation in how a company and/or industry perceives its role(s) and responsibilities in global efforts to address the IED threat.** Further dialogue and research is needed—with attention paid to unique regional and national contexts—in order to gain increased clarity. This holds true both for actors across sectors, as well as down supply chains. Enhanced clarity in this respect among national authorities and private sector actors would be beneficial for understanding how each community can mutually support the other in achieving the common objective of preventing diversion and stemming the proliferation of IEDs.

2. **Across sectors, there are positive, promising signs of increasing awareness of the IED threat.** It may be valuable for stakeholders to work together to build on this current momentum and to raise awareness throughout industries and down supply chains, as appropriate. As well, this trend of increasing awareness of the IED threat and mitigation measures is not consistent across all sectors. This suggests that more awareness-raising activities are needed in order to fully integrate industry actors into efforts to stem the IED threat.

3. **Relevant industry-led initiatives should be seen as part of a comprehensive response to the IED threat.** Many private sector actors have established viable safety and security practices, for example through product stewardship programmes at the company-level and industry-wide initiatives such as voluntary COCs. These initiatives are particularly useful because they were developed for industry and by industry which increases their effectiveness and affords a sense of ownership and responsibility. Moving forward, these types of industry-led initiatives may enjoy wider participation if acknowledged as an integral part of the IED threat response.

4. **Public Government and/or international organization support for industry-led initiatives may help with their wider implementation across industries and companies.** Participants at this event asked for international organizations, specifically the United Nations, to publicly support successful models of industry-led initiatives.
which encourage the safe and secure handling and management of goods useful to the production of IEDs. For these participants, receiving United Nations support would be useful as they seek to raise awareness throughout their industries, companies and communities. Within the United Nations, support could come from various places including, but not limited to, General Assembly resolutions, Reports of the Secretary-General, and public declarations from high-ranking officials.

5. Robust, responsive, and effective regulatory frameworks will vary from good-to-good, sector-to-sector, Government-to-Government. Given the diverse nature of IEDs around the world, including the different components used to produce them, there will need to be tailored regulatory frameworks for each unique context. A “one-size-fits-all” solution to IED-relevant regulation is generally not seen as a useful regulatory intervention for addressing the IED threat.

6. When designing new regulatory frameworks or initiatives for addressing the IED threat, it would be valuable to consider a collaborative design process. Private sector actors, expert non-governmental organizations, international organizations, and other actors possess substantial expertise, and engaging them throughout the design process could ensure that regulatory frameworks achieve their expressed objectives and outcomes.

7. An innovative approach is needed to raise awareness on the IED threat down the supply chain. Supply chains for goods useful to the production of IEDs can be incredibly complex. This poses a challenge to wide-reaching awareness-raising efforts. Greater clarity regarding whose responsibility it is to raise awareness, and within which communities, may be beneficial moving forward. Utilizing industry associations, chambers of commerce, and other convening bodies may be one option for addressing this matter.

8. Physical security considerations, including record-keeping and traceability matters, are key challenges in the IED problem space. In an effort to secure materials throughout the supply chain, industry actors acknowledge the unique challenges posed by medium to small businesses in maintaining records and traceability of goods and materials. Moving forward, there may be added value in targeted engagement by States on this matter, or through industry-led initiatives to address these specific physical security-related matters.

9. Deepening and widening the relationship between the private sector and Governments would be highly valuable. As appropriate, an enhanced working relationship between these communities may be useful in coordinating and sharing information relevant to the IED threat. Naturally, this will vary from context-to-context; however, increased and continuous engagement can create a mutually beneficial working relationship which facilitates the achievement of common objectives, such as stemming the proliferation of IEDs. This may include sharing information on evolving or emerging threats (as appropriate), risk assessment methodologies, and suspicious behaviour.
10. **Feedback on the quality and utility of information shared between the private sector and Government is helpful for all parties in understanding their contribution to IED threat mitigation.** When requested, private sector actors are typically able to provide information which may be valuable to Governments and international organizations in their efforts to track IED threats and developments. Equally important is providing feedback on the utility of the information provided so that all actors can work to provide the most useful, actionable, and succinct information.

11. **Informal processes and forums for the private sector, such as this one convened by UNIDIR, to focus on the IED threat are highly useful for examining avenues for increased and more strategic engagement with other relevant stakeholders (companies, industries, Governments, international organizations, etc.).** Moving forward, this type of forum would be useful for brainstorming and developing solutions, and determining the feasibility of these solutions, for some of the challenges faced when addressing the IED threat.

12. **An expert-level dialogue focused on cooperation with relevant stakeholders in IED threat mitigation would be valuable.** To address the IED threat in a comprehensive manner, all stakeholders should continue to engage with one another, share information, and promote cooperation. UNIDIR envisions this dialogue through an expert-level meeting or meeting series which covers key process-related and/or thematic areas of concern. This would allow stakeholders to float ideas for future engagement, work through current challenges, and coordinate efforts.
The challenge of IEDs is not a new one, even though the scale of the threat is growing. The Secretary-General has repeatedly called for more international action on IEDs, and this is a subject of intense discussion between the Team and Member States. The Team has also engaged in detailed technical discussions with counter-IED specialists and those involved with private sector supply chains of components that may be used to construct IEDs.

The provision of arms to listed Al-Qaida affiliates or individuals is a breach of the arms embargo. The arms embargo includes “arms and related materiel of all types including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equipment, paramilitary equipment, and spare parts for all of these”. The term “related materiel” under the Al-Qaida arms embargo could include dual-use materials that could be used to make weapons, in particular components that could be used to manufacture improvised explosive devices. As Al-Qaida and its associates will use any available types of explosives to conduct attacks, the Team recommends that the Committee should encourage Member States to apply the term “arms and related materiel of all types” under the Al-Qaida arms embargo to all types of explosives, whether military, civilian or improvised explosives, but also to raw materials and components that can be used to manufacture IEDs or unconventional weapons, including but not limited to chemical components, detonating cord, fertilizers and poisons. The Committee has previously considered this issue, and the Team proposes to advance this initially through a revised explanation of terms paper currently under consideration by the Committee.

A comprehensive approach to limit IEDs should be a global approach, and one that reaches out directly to key partners in the private and public commercial sectors. Al-Qaida and its affiliates use both military components when they can secure them and civilian components to construct IEDs. Governments play the leading role in securing military stockpiles or preventing leakage from official procurement channels. The private and public commercial sectors, however, play a crucial role in manufacturing and influencing the availability, audit and signatures of commercial components. These include fertilizers such as ammonium nitrate and potassium chlorate, often used to make IEDs. Commercial detonating cord is also increasingly being used by terrorist manufacturers of IEDs,
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<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Resolution 2255 (2015) Adopted by the Security Council at its 7590th meeting, on 21 December 2015 [situation in Afghanistan]</td>
<td>S/RES/2255</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Preamble</td>
<td>Expressing concern at the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by the Taliban against civilians and the Afghanistan National Defence and Security Forces and noting the need to enhance coordination and information-sharing, both between Member States and with the private sector, to prevent the flow of IED components to the Taliban,</td>
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<td>17</td>
<td>Paragraph 49</td>
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<td>The Team believes that a sharper analytical focus on IED components used by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates, based on better information-sharing by affected States, could help in enforcing sanctions. Better identification of prevailing methods and choice of components could facilitate a coordinated approach to prevention. This relates in particular to large IEDs, which often use multiple detonators or detonating cord. Close cooperation with commercial manufacturers could help initiate measures to limit availability and improve forensic audit capabilities, particularly in cases of IED strikes where sophisticated forensic teams are not readily available.</td>
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<td>18</td>
<td>Paragraph 50</td>
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<td>The Team will continue to engage with relevant Member States and commercial producers and consumers, in particular those in the mining, chemical and construction sectors, to identify potential initiatives that could enhance the disruptive and preventative sanctions against Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. At present, three problems inhibit concerted action on this agenda. First, the awareness of how commercially produced materials are being used by Al-Qaeda and its affiliates often does not extend beyond the security communities of Governments. Second, national regulatory frameworks vary enormously on this. Third, a self-regulatory or standards-based approach to the problem has yet to be defined — and this is one particular area in which existing work on the problem of IEDs could be advanced. Each of these challenges can be overcome by systematic work through which affected States work collaboratively, the private and State-owned commercial sectors are engaged and strategic imagination is applied to the problem.</td>
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<td>databases, including but not limited to those with legal and/or beneficial ownership information, against the List;</td>
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<td>Operative paragraph 13 Decides that States, in order to prevent those associated with the Taliban and other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities from obtaining, handling, storing, using or seeking access to all types of explosives, whether military, civilian or improvised explosives, as well as to raw materials and components that can be used to manufacture improvised explosive devices or unconventional weapons, including (but not limited to) chemical components, detonators, or detonating cord, shall undertake appropriate measures to promote the exercise of enhanced vigilance by their nationals, persons subject to their jurisdiction and entities incorporated in their territory or subject to their jurisdiction that are involved in the production, sale, supply, purchase, transfer and storage of such materials, including through the issuance of good practices;</td>
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<td>2015</td>
<td>Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices, Report of the Secretary-General</td>
<td>70/46</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Preamble</td>
<td>In accordance with paragraph 51 of this resolution, the Monitoring Team shall operate under the direction of the Committee and shall have the following responsibilities: ... (v) To consult with the Government of Afghanistan, Member States, international and regional organizations and relevant representatives of the private sector on the threat posed by improvised explosive devices (IEDs) to peace, security and stability in Afghanistan, to raise awareness of the threat and to develop, in line with their responsibilities under annex (a), recommendations for appropriate measures, to counter this threat;</td>
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<td>2016</td>
<td>Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices</td>
<td>A/71/187</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Operative paragraph 13</td>
<td>Encourages States and relevant international and regional organizations to engage, as appropriate, business entities in discussions and initiatives on countering improvised explosive devices, including on issues such as accountability for dual use components, improving the regulation of explosive precursors, where possible and as appropriate, strengthening security for the transport of explosives and at explosive facilities, as well as enhancing the vetting procedures for personnel with access to explosives, while avoiding undue restrictions on the legitimate use of and access to such materials;</td>
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<td>2016</td>
<td>Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices</td>
<td>A/71/187</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Paragraph 31</td>
<td>Effectively addressing the sourcing of commercial components means ensuring that commercial explosives are regulated in conformity with international law, that businesses involved with commercial goods that can form components of IEDs are recurrently made aware of the risks of their trade and of effective measures to lower those risks, and that government and industry engage in international coordination and cooperation.</td>
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<td>2016</td>
<td>Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices</td>
<td>A/71/187</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Recommendation 1</td>
<td>Rigorous government scrutiny of commercial sectors from which IED components are sourced is essential, including at the local level. In particular, a regulatory framework over precursor materials, such as fertilizers and detonators for the mining and construction industry, should be in place. Purchase information on large or suspicious transactions of precursor materials should be recorded nationally, and shared internationally, where relevant. Industry and retail organizations and communications companies should be encouraged to develop national and international codes of conduct to assist such regulatory framework.</td>
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<td>2016</td>
<td>Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices</td>
<td>A/71/187</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Paragraph 77</td>
<td>Within the context of sanctions against Da’esh and Al-Qaida, the Security Council has noted the need to enhance coordination and information-sharing, both between Member States and between Governments and the private sector, so as to prevent the flow of IED components such as chemical components, detonators and detonating cords (Council resolution 2255 (2015)).</td>
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<td>2016</td>
<td>Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices</td>
<td>A/71/187</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Paragraph 82</td>
<td>As components of IEDs nearly always include commercial goods, awareness raising at the national level through contact with relevant industry sectors is of particular importance when addressing the issue of IEDs.</td>
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<td>2016</td>
<td>Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices</td>
<td>A/71/187</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>Paragraph 84</td>
<td>Programme Global Shield includes engagement with private industry to establish best-practice programmes on avoiding illicit diversion of precursor chemicals. For example, [World Customs Organization] has engaged in participation at the meetings of the International Fertilizer Industry Association (IFA).</td>
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<td>2016</td>
<td>Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices</td>
<td>71/72</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Preamble</td>
<td>Recognizing that the wide spectrum of materials that can be used for the manufacture of improvised explosive devices, including those sourced from the military and civilian industry, contributes to their diverse nature and their deployment methods, which thus requires an appropriate approach to the formulation of measures to counter them,</td>
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Meeting Summary

Examining the Roles, Responsibilities and Potential Contributions of Private Sector Industry Actors in Stemming the Flow of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Related Materials

Informal Private Sector Consultative Meeting
Geneva, Switzerland
6–7 March 2017

In 2016, UNIDIR began a project entitled, “Examining the Roles, Responsibilities and Potential Contributions of Private Sector Industry Actors in Stemming the Flow of Improvised Explosive Devices and Related Materials”. This project sought to build on areas of common understanding and clarify areas where there is a lack of consensus in order to identify challenges, opportunities and ways forward for private sector’s engagement in stemming the proliferation of IEDs. From 6 to 7 March 2017, UNIDIR convened a small, closed-door group of industry representatives from a diverse set of industries and global regions. This document is a summary of this meeting’s proceedings and findings.